Government S-1740 INTERNATIONAL LAW Summer 2006 Individual Human Rights: The Problem of Enforcement.

Government S-1740INTERNATIONAL LAW

Summer 2006

Individual Human Rights:

The Problem of Enforcement

OUTLINEI. Sources of International Human Rights LawII. Multilateral “enforcement”

A. International human rights monitoring bodiesB. HR Committee: Individual complaints processC. HR Commission: 1503 proceduresD. UN General Assembly resolutions

III. Legal means of enforcementA. Domestic courtsB. Foreign courts

IV. Political mechanismsA. Hegemonic pressureB. Domestic political pressuresC. Transnational pressure: The role of NGOs

I. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

THE UNITED NATIONS

• The UN Charter (Article 55)• The Universal Declaration on Human Rights

– personal rights (Articles 2-6)– legal rights (Articles 8-12)– civil liberties (Articles 13, 18-20)– subsistence/economic rights (Articles 22-25)– social and cultural rights (Articles 26-27)– political rights (Article 21)

International Human Rights Instruments in Force

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Year

Num

ber

of in

stru

men

ts

Treaty Declaration Other

SIX “CORE” HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights• International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural

Rights• Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial

Discrimination• Convention against Torture• Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against

Women• Convention on the Rights of the Child

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL

AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR)

ICCPR OPTIONAL PROTOCOLS

• I: State parties agree to recognize the competence of the Human Rights Committee to monitor and review practices

• II: State parties agree not to use the death penalty

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

CONVENTION ON THE

ELIMINATION OF ALL

FORMS OF RACIAL

DISCRIMINA- TION(CERD) Steven Biko

CONVENTION AGAINST

CONVENTION ON THE

ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS

OF DISCRIMINATIO

N AGAINST WOMEN

CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD

(CRC)

0

200

400

600

800

1000To

tal R

atifi

catio

ns

year 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998

Year

Human Rights Treaty Ratifications

Civil&Political Economic&SocialRacial Discrimination WomenChildren Torture

II. MULTILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING

BODIES•Charter based bodies:

•Commission on Human Rights

•Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities

•Treaty-based bodies:

•Committee against Torture Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights•Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women•Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination•Committee on the Rights of the Child •Human Rights Committee*

DUTIES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMITTEE

• receives reports

• receives individuals complaints

• issues general comments

THE INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT PROCESS

• First Optional Protocol

• Patterns of individual complaints

• Findings

Jamaica

Finland

0

5

10

15

20

25

Leastdemocratic

moderatelydemocratic

mostdemocratic

degree of democracy

Average number of individual complaints to the UN Human Rights Committee

Closed cases Active cases

UN Human Rights Commission

The Torture ScaleType of activity:

Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5

Psychological mistreatment

Frequent, often

Used without reference to frequency

Sometimes, occasional

Isolated reports with disciplinary response

Rough handling, other abuse

Frequent, routine

Regular brutality, sever maltreatment of prisoners

Sometimes, occasional

Isolated reports with disciplinary response

Beatings Frequent, routine

Common (or not uncommon), numerous reports

Allegations or indications (any reported – regardless of redress)

Isolated reports with disciplinary response

torture Prevalent, widespread, repeated, methodical

Common, several reports, numerous allegations

Some, occasional (unless redressed)

Unsubstantiated; unlikely true; isolated, with redress

None

Abused to death

Common, frequent, many, widespread

Some, occasional incidents, several reports

Isolated reports

None None

Source: Oona Hathaway, 2002

Torture trends of the UNHR Commission

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

To

rtu

re s

cale

UNCHR members UNCHR nonmembers

The UNHR Commission and the Practice of Political Terror

0

1

2

3

4

5

Polit

ic T

erro

r Sca

e

UNCHR member UNCHR nonmember

1503 PROCEDURES

• ECOSOC Resolution 1503, (1970)

• Consistent pattern of gross violations

• Investigations can be initiated by the UN Human Rights Commission

1503 PROCEDURESStates Investigated Under the 1503 Procedure

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

19

67

19

70

19

73

19

76

19

79

19

82

19

85

19

88

19

91

19

94

19

97

20

00

Year

Nu

mb

er

of

Inv

es

tig

ati

on

s

Number of Countriesinvestigated

1503 Subjects: Practice of Political Terror

00.5

11.5

22.5

33.5

44.5

Po

litic

al T

erro

r S

cale

UNCHR member 1503 subjects

STATES EXAMINED UNDER THE 1503 PROCEDURE BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (THROUGH 2003)

• Afghanistan, 1981 - 1984

• Albania, 1984 – 1988, 1995

• Antigua & Barbuda, 1997

• Argentina, 1980-1984

• Armenia, 1994-1996

• Azerbaijan, 1994 - 1996

• Bahrain, 1991-1993

• Benin, 1984-1985, 1988

• Bolivia, 1977-1981

•Botswana, 1977•Brazil, 1974-1976•Brunei, 1988-1990•Burma, 1979-1980, 1990-1992•Burundi, 1974-1975•Central African Rep., 1980-81•Chad, 2002-2003•Chile, 1975-76, 1978-79, 1981,

2000

1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Czech Republic, 1997• Djibouti, 2003• El Salvador, 1981• Equatorial Guinea, 1976-79• Estonia, 1994, 1997• Ethiopia, 1978-1981• Gabon, 1986• Gambia, 1997-1999• German Dem. Rep., 1981-83• Germany, 1994• Grenada, 1988• Guatemala, 1981• Guyana, 1974-1975• Haiti, 1981-1987

•Honduras, 1988-1989•Indonesia (and East Timor),

1978-81, 1983-85•Iran, 1974-1975, 1983•Iraq, 1988, 1989•Israel, 1975-1977•Japan, 1981, 1998•Cambodia, 1979•Kenya, 1993, 2000•Korea, Rep. of, 1977-1982•Kuwait, 1994•Kyrgyzstan, 1997-1998•Laos, 1995

1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Latvia, 1995, 1997, 2000

• Lebanon, 1997

• Liberia, 2002-2003

• Lithuania, 1997

• Malawi, 1977-1980

• Malaysia, 1984

• Maldives, 2001

• Mali, 1996

• Moldova, 1995

• Mozambique, 1981

• Nepal, 1996, 1999

• Nigeria, 2002

• Pakistan, 1984, 1985, 1988

•Paraguay, 1978-90, 1998

•Peru, 1998

•Philippines, 1984-1986

•Portugal, 1974-1975

•Republic of the Congo, 2000, 2001

•Rwanda, 1993-1995

•Saudi Arabia, 1995-1999

•Sierra Leone , 1996-1999

•Slovenia, 1995, 1996

•Somalia, 1989-1994

•Sudan, 1991-1993

•Syria, 1989, 1992, 1997

1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Tanzania, 1974-1975, 1997

• Thailand, 1995, 1996

• Togo, 2001-2002

• Turkey, 1983-1986

• Uganda, 1975-81, 1995, 2000-01

• United Arab Emirates, 2000

• United Kingdom, 1974-1975

• United States of America, 1997

• Uruguay, 1978-1985

•Uzbekistan, 1996-97, 2003•Venezuela, 1982•Viet Nam, 1994, 2000•Yemen, 1998-1999, 2000•Zaire (Dem. Rep. of the Congo)

1985-89, 1991-93•Zimbabwe, 2000

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/stat1.htm

MULTILATERAL PRESSURE

• Efforts to manipulate multilateral aid

• United Nations multilateral pressure

UNGA State-Specific Human Rights Resolutions by Year

02468

1012141618

1946

1952

1958

1964

1970

1976

1982

1988

1994

2000

Year

Nub

er o

f Res

olut

ions

P

asse

d

Number of Resolutions

Political Terror Practices of UNGA Members and Their Resolution Targets

0

1

2

3

4

5

Po

litic

al T

erro

r S

cale

named in UNGA Resolution UNGA average

III. LEGAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

DOMESTIC COURTS

• Example: Israeli Supreme Court decision, 1999.

USE OF OTHER COUNTRIES’ LEGAL

SYSTEMS

The Alien Tort Statute:FILARTIGA V. PENA-

IRALA• Background: foreign nationals, incident of

torture on foreign soil

• Alien Tort Statute (ATS)

• Torture is a breach of customary international law, enforceable in US courts

THE CASE OF THE BURMA GAS PIPELINE

IV. POLITICAL MECHANISMS

•Hegemonic

•Domestic

•Transnational

HEGEMONIC PRESSURE

• Bilateral political pressure

• Multilateral pressure

What is the Likelihood of Rights Mobilization?

Stable autocracy

Stable democracy

Volatile/transitionalregimes

Likelihood of succeeding

Value ofsuccess

high

low

The Expected Value of Mobilization:

Expected Value of Mobilization=(value of succeeding) x (probability of success)

Stable autocracy

Volatile/transitionalregimes

Stable democracy

Expected Value of Mobilization

How can Treaties Influence Domestic Politics?

• Raise and focus domestic expectations

• Increase the political power of pro-rights groups

• Attract pro-compliance allies

Expectation

• Treaties should have their greatest positive impact in more fluid, transitional, only partially democratic regimes.

Freedom from Torture

The Effect of the CAT on Torture Practices

Model type:

Conditional effects:

Ordered probit, one-stage estimation:

Simultaneous estimation. I.V., probit:

CAT in stable democracies and stable autocracies

-.212* -.288***

Transitional countries w/o the CAT -.797** -.207**

Transitional countries with the CAT .044* .033*

Note: Compare lines 3 and 4

This analysis controls for:

• Regional torture practices

• Civil War• Interstate war• Log of GDP• Log of GDP/capita

• Free Press• National Truth

Commissions• Torture in previous period• Year (trend)

TRANSNATIONAL PRESSURES

• Norm emergence

• Norm cascade

• internalization

Number of States with Amnesty International Sections

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Year

Num

ber o

f Sta

tes

Sections

HUMAN RIGHTS NGO GROWTH

Human Rights Watch Sections and Offices

0

2

4

6

8

10

1219

78

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

Year

Numb

er of

Se

ction

s/Offic

es

Watch

Office

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Number of Internet Users (Millions)

US and Canada Western Europe Rest of the World

NGOs: BOOMERANG EFFECT

REPRESSIVE STATE

XXXXXXXXXXdomestic human rights demands

Coalition with transnational NGOs

Intergov.Organ.

Foreign gov’t

Multilateral or bilateral pressure

SUMMARY• The international human rights regime is characterized by weak

enforcement• Multilateral fora to hear individual complaints and render

recommendations exist, but often have no teeth.• Domestic enforcement is preferable in theory• The use of foreign courts is a theoretical possibility, but has been only

rarely used• Bilateral political pressure usually takes a back seat to foreign policy goals• Treaty commitments can change domestic politics and empower demands

of locals for rights realization.• NGOs are a crucial form of external vigilance; especially important in

extremely repressive political regimes.