EUROPEAN CITIES/METROPOLIS Robustness, inequalities, · PDF file · 2014-01-28EUROPEAN CITIES/METROPOLIS Robustness, inequalities, governance Patrick Le Galès ... • Global...
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EUROPEAN CITIES/METROPOLIS
Robustness, inequalities,
governance
Patrick Le Galès
Professor of Sociology and Politics
Directeur de recherche CNRS at CEVIPOF
Sciences Po Paris
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• I) European cities obsolete or rising ?
• II) Inequalities , the case of upper middle
classes
• III) How to govern fragmented
cities/metropolis
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Good reasons not to be
interested in European cities
• Decades of « end of cities » views
• Everything is now urban ?
• Sprawls, fragmentation, chaos, Los Angeles
view of the world
• Mega/large/global/posmodern cities
• European cities are obsolete
• Mobility : Can we be anything anywhere ?
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Convergence towards megacities
• Megacities : size
• World cities : hierarchies, networks
• New Global cities : Sassen, advanced services and polarization
• New Megacities : Castells, nodes of networks
• Global city regions : innovation, social formations, political actors
• Post metropolis, post cities
• Liquid society view, nomades
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Future of European cities after 50
years of single market ?
• ‘Of cities like Amsterdam, Antwerp, Barcelona, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Lisbon, Liverpool, Lyons, Manchester, Marseilles, Munich, Naples, Newcastle, Nuremberg, Stockholm, Stuttgart, Turin and Vienna, half must either grow or decline: expanding to become one of the six or seven European urban giants, or declining into provincial insignificance … The carnage will likely be most pronounced among the mid-sized cities of Germany and the United Kingdom.’
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Political mechanisms of urban
decline : role of middle classes
• As Europe overall becomes less urban but its few
largest cities grow, the cultural divide between
city and suburb will likely grow, and
• political support for the needs of cities generally
may well decline – as has clearly occurred since
the 1960’s in the US’ (Rogowski 1998: 23).
• Less public investments and redistribution in cities
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Thinking beyond convergence :
European cities are part of
European societies
• Role of the state, welfare state
• Territorialisation
• Institutions
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Europeans are born to stay not
born to run
• Only 1,5 to 2% of Europeans move to another country, stable over time (3% at the global level, ILO)
• 7,2% change house (over 16% in the US), half of them stay in the same area
• Transnational movers, only 30% of skilled workers
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European cities
• The relative long-term stability of the European
urban system
• Its original structure—with a concentration of
medium-sized cities—and the remains of its
physical form.
• Cities as distinctive characteristics of European
societies
• Cities versus metropolitan regions : dynamics
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European cities
• A mix of public services and private firms,
including a robust body of middle class and
lower-middle class public-sector employees
and professionals, who constitute a firm
pillar of the social structure.
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• European cities, are still structured and
organized within European states: in
particular, welfare states. The state and
Europe, in part, protect the city including in
terms of resources.
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Public expenditure
• 1985 1990 1995 2000
• GERMANY 45,6 43,8 46,3 42,9
• FRANCE 51,9 49,5 53,5 51,4
• ITALY 49,8 52,4 51,1 44,4
• NETHERL 51,9 49,4 47,7 41,5
• SWEDEN 60,4 55,9 62,1 52,7
• UK 41,9 44,4 39,2
•
• UE 48,3 46,7 48,7 44,2
• USA 33,8 33,6 32,9 29,4
• Source : OECD Economic Outlooks, june 2001. P.278
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Political dimension
• The continuing representation of the city as
a whole and the increased legitimacy of
political elites in sustaining and re-inventing
this presentation.
• Political leaders, organised interests
• Planning, strategic project
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Robust European cities
• Accumulation of resources
• Despite increasing social tensions, inequalities,
even riots at times, European cites have resources,
identities, and political legitimacy, and it is not
appropriate to describe them as dual cities.
• 60 % of public investments (not in the UK) is
controlled by local or urban government in the EU
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European cities are becoming
more European
• The institutionalization of the EU is
creating rules, norms, procedures,
repertoires, and public policies that have an
impact on cities.
• The EU also is a powerful agent of
legitimization. By designing urban public
policies and agree ‘a Europe of cities’,
supporting transnational networks
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Two scenarios
• Rise of megacities in Europe and the carnage of
medium sized cities,
• Continuous growth of globalising medium sized
European cities
• Evidence sofar : in most countries, economic and
demographic development of cities/metropolitan
area/urban region (not in the UK)
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II Inequalities versus
integration/integration/cohesion
• No ideal view of European cities, no ideal coherence within an integrated urban society
• Competition
• Sprawls, environment issues
• Immigration
• Economic inequalities
• Social differentiation
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In What sort of European Urban
societies do we live in ?
• Denationalisation of societies
• Europeanisation ?
• Globalisation ? A liquid society ?
• Disembededness (Giddens)
• Fragmentation,
• Decline of national organisation, institutions, the state
• Take one issue here as a threat to the integration process within cities : the rich, upper middle classes
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Are the upper middle classes
exiting from national society and
the urban fabric ? Dual cities in
the making ?
• Gated communities
• Ghettoes of rich
• Secession
• Suburbanisation
• Potentially a major threat to cities, privatisation, individualisation, fears, end of public space
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Where do cadres supérieurs live
? (Préteceille ‘s study) : more in
Paris, more in suburbs • Category Cadres supérieurs and professions
intellectuelles :
180.000 in Paris in 1962, 400.000 now
• 66% of the category in Ile de France now
live in outside Paris, mainly in the western
suburbs of Paris, classic residential location
of the French bourgeoisie (52% in 1962)
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No radical gentrification or
suburbanisation
• No massive gentrification process : gradual
• No white flight : continuous embourgeoisement
• No dualisation of the global city
• Public sector/cultural cadres supérieurs more in
Paris, private sector managers in both spaces,
ingineers more in western suburb : new middle
class suburbs in the East
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Moyennisation of Paris/ile de
France space
• Because of decline of working class and more
middle class groups everywhere, more ethnic minorities also
• Two exceptions
- The making of ethnic/urban poor neighborhoods in Seine St Denis
- Slow but regular increase of social segregation of private managers and ingeers, firms executives from the private sectors in the most exclusive western suburbs (similar to the income argument)
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Income : top 10% increase their
share of national income in the
past 10 years • Piketty : long term stability of share of the highest
decile of wages in proportion of the overall wage
structure in France over the 20th century (between
25 and 28%) ie 2.5 the average wage
• Middle classes wages rose in parallel to average
wage in France over the century
• However, increase of that share over the past
decade : not as much as the UK but evolution
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French context : the differentiation
between les cadres and les cadres
supérieurs • Middle class public versus private sectors, the
particular category of « les cadres », rise in the 1960’s, consumption society
• After the 1980’s from 1,8 million in 1982 to 3,2 million in 2003 : massive growth and differentiation 13% of the French social structure
• More women but only a third of firms managers
• One third in the Paris region, over 55% for cadres supérieurs Paris as a social escalator region and a pump
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Social differentiation :
globalisation effect
• Differentiation and overlapping of various scales of interactions for individuals, beyond the national frontiers, open room of manoeuvres for individuals in terms of choice of residence, of social practices, of identity claiming, of invesment of different resources
• In principle, mobility and individualisation increase the dynamics of choice for invididuals and households....
• a major influence to blur national logics of stratification, disctinction, national income or prestige hierarchies.
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A European/transatlantic new
bourgeoisie in the making ?
• Economic processes are leading the globalisation dynamics (which is contradictory, not linear, conflicts)
• Groups which are related to these dynamics take advantage of the processes : status, prestige, income
• New resources (mobility) can be mobilised by groups in order to challenge existing hierarchies, to push for different modernisation projects, to articulate an interest of their own and to sustain their ambitions.
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UMC partial exit
• The rise of various types of mobility allows some individuals, particularly upper middle classes to partially exit from the national society to which they belong.
• They can choose to exit but that remains pretty rare. Mostly, they can choose to partially exit : their culture, consumption, friends, jobs, housing, children, financial investment, may be organised at the transnational level or in relation to this level. They have a different set of opportunities which allow them to play at different level : the transational scale, the national or the local/urban.
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UMC : locals and cosmpolitans
• most upper middle classes are mobile.At the same time, they live in local/urban area, hey send their children to schools, they use services, they are consumers.
• for upper middle classes groups, their status often results from both their occupation (may be narrowly defined by a type of employment or a professional community) and a residential choice, or trajectory, cities. (Savage)
They partly define who they are by the place –neighbourhood, city, urban region- they live in
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To renegociate their integration
• This opportunity for partial exit allows them to negociate their own position within the national social structure, for instance to actively campaign against high level of taxes, to escape taxation or to send their children to international schools and universities.
• They have some capacity to mobilise and invest resources at the national level but also at the international level, that gives them extra resources to put pressure on national structures and on cities
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Renegociating their integration
within the national societies
• Pressure on school, or against high level of taxes,
to escape taxation or to send their children to
international schools and universities, social
segregation
• Evidence : decrease of 15% of the income tax in
Europe over the last twenty years
• Capital is mobile, decrease of company taxes, high
income can partially avoid taxation
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EXIT : transnational and urban
dimension
Transnational
exit
Urban
exit/secession
+ -
+ Nomades Immobile
Retreat from the
city
- Mobile and locally
rooted
Immobile and
locally rooted
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Paris Case
• Pressure on schools
• Groups isolating themselves from the urban fabric
• Not the dominant process
• Similar results for London (Butler)
• No dual cities….sofar
• Ongoing research in Milan, Madrid, Lyon,
London, Paris , what about gated condominium in
Madrid ?
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III Urban Governance
• Government and governance of
metropolitan areas : how to govern
• The Democratic question
• State and UE : defining the parameters of
urban governance
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Agregation of groups, interests
Cities as political beasts
• Cities may be more or less structured in their economic and cultural exchanges and the different actors may be related to each other in the same local context with long-term strategies, investing their resources in a co-ordinated way and adding to the social capital riches.
• In this case the urban society appears as well structured and visible, and one can detect forms of (relative) integration.
• If not, the city reveals itself as less structured and as such no longer a significant subject for study:
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• This analysis suggests to look at the interplay and conflicts of social groups, interests, and institutions,
• which regulations have been put in place through conflicts and the logics of integration.
• Cities do not develop solely according to interactions and contingencies: groups, actors and organizations oppose one another, enter into conflict, co-ordinate, produce representations in order to institutionalize collective forms of action, implement policies, structure inequalities, and defend their interests.
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Government
• Rules, constitutions
• Organisations
• Processes : agregation of interests and
steering
• Outputs, public policies
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Gouvernance enchangée ou
gouvernance en chantier ?
• Good governance to solve problems beyond the failures of government : functionalist
• Governance : triumph of private interests in the growth coalitions
• The enchanted land of governance
• Modes of governance as the articulation of regulation
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Modes of governance in the
making
Coalition,
Institutions
political orientations and goals,
Outputs : resolution of conflicts, allocation of
resources
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Governance, Collective actor
• Common good
• Sense of unity
• innovation
• integration mechanisms
• representation
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back to the usual suspects
• European cities : urban governance, competition, flagship projects, construction, utility network, Agencies,
• Coordination : contracts, chartes, strategies, partnership
• Urban oligarchies ? Favourable context for corruption, urban growth coalitions/urban regime
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Restructured Metropolitan
governance
• Restructured goverments
• Services and policies
• Less clientelism and day to day management
• More strategic authorities
• More bureaucracy (flexible governance arrangement) versus more democracy
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New policy instruments
• Public policy instruments as :
“ a particular type of institution, a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics / society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation”
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Definition and typology of policy instruments (2)
Type of instrument
Type of political relations
Type of legitimacy Brief outline
Legislative and regulatory
Social guardian state Imposition of general interest by mandated
elected representatives
“Old” policy instruments as routinized legal forms constituting the archetype of state interventionism
Ex. : Norms, Taxes, Permits
Economic and fiscal Redistributive state Socio-economic efficiency
Agreement- and incentive-based
Mobilizing state Seek direct involvement
“New” policy instruments as less interventionist
forms of public regulation.
Ex.: Voluntary agreements, Codes of
conduct, Labels
Information- and communication-
based
Audience democracy
Explain decisions / accountability
De facto and de jure standards / Best practices
Competitive mechanisms
Mixed : scientific / technical and / or
pressure of market mechanisms
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New forms of state control
• Regulatory state
• Control and surveillance
• Competitive state
• Mobilising state
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EU : decline of territorial
cohesion priority
• ESDP : marginal
• Regional funds
• Urban programme
• EU competition dynamics versus territorial
cohesion
• Horizontal europeanisation : work in
progress
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Conclusion
• Metropolitan growth does not mean global cities or nothing
• Spread and growth of urban regions does not mean the end of cities
• Globalisation does not mean urban convergence
• Spatial segregation is also a question of middle classes
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• Individual choices of those groups are also influence by collective choices on public investment
• Political processes are central : how to govern cities which are more diverse, with more immigration and to keep some collective dynamism (fears, extreme right)
• EU : a bad cycle, what comes next ?
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