Commentary on Metaphysics by Aquinas - BOOK I, 17 Lessons
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COMMENTARY ON THE METAPHYSICS
By Thomas Aquinas
translated by John P. Rowan Chicago, 1961
1
METAPHYSICS
BOOK I
ARISTOTLES INTRODUCTION
HISTORY OF METAPHYSICAL INQUIRY
CONTENTS
LESSON 1: The Dignity and Object of This Science
LESSON 2: Wisdom Considers Universal First Causes and First Principles
LESSON 3: The Nature and Goal of Metaphysics
LESSON 4: Opinions about the Material Cause
LESSON 5: Opinions about the Efficient Cause
LESSON 6: Love and Hate as Efficient Causes of Good and Evil
LESSON 7: The Views of the Atomists and the Pythagoreans
LESSON 8: The Pythagorean Doctrine about Contraries
LESSON 9: The Opinions of the Eleatics and Pythagoreans about the Causes of
Things
LESSON 10: The Platonic Theory of Ideas
LESSON 11: A Summary of the Early Opinions about the Causes
LESSON 12: Criticism of the Views about the Number of Material Principles
LESSON 13: Criticism of the Pythagoreans' Opinions
LESSON 14: Arguments against the Platonic Ideas
LESSON 15: The Destruction of the Platonists' Arguments for Ideas
LESSON 16: Arguments against the View that Ideas Are Numbers
LESSON 17: Arguments against the View that the Ideas Are Principles of Being and
Knowledge
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LESSON 1
The Dignity and Object of This Science
ARISTOTLES TEXT Chapter 1: 980a 21-983a 3
[980] [21] . : , . [25] . .
1. All men naturally desire to know. Asign of this is the delight we take in
the senses; for apart from their
usefulness they are loved for
themselves, and most of all the sense
which operates through the eyes. For
not only that we may act, but even
when we intend to do nothing, we
prefer sight, as we may say, to all the
other senses. The reason is that of allthe senses this most enables us to
know and reveals many differences
between things.
,
2. Animals by nature, then, are born
with sensory power.
, .[980] [21] ,
3. Now in some animals memory
arises from the senses, but in others it
does not; and for this reason the
former are prudent and more capable
of being taught than those which are
unable to remember. Those which
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, : [10] , , , [] , .
Callias and Socrates and many other
individuals who suffer from this
disease, is a matter of experience; but
to judge that it has been beneficial to
all individuals f a particular kind, as
the phlegmatic, the bilious, or the
feverish, taken as a lass, who suffer
from this disease, is a matter of art.
, [15] ( ,
: , [20] : , , : ):
7. In practical matters, then,
experience seems to differ in no way
from art. But we see that men of
experience are more proficient than
those who have theory without
experience. The reason is that
experience is a knowledge of in
singulars, whereas art is a knowledge
of universals. But all actions and
processes of generation are
concerned with singulars. For the
physician heals man only incidentally,
but he heals Socrates or Callias, or
some individual that can be named, to
whom the nature man happens to
belong. Therefore, if anyone has thetheory without experience, and
knows the universal but not the
singulars contained in this, he will
very often make mistakes; for it is
rather the individual man who is able
to be cured.
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[25] , , :
8. Yet we think that scientific
knowledge and the ability to refute
objections belong to art rather than to
experience, and we are of the opinion
that those who are proficient in art
are wiser than men of experience,
implying that it is more according to
wisdom to know as one pursuing all
things.
. , : [30] .
, [981] [1] ( , , , : [5] ),
.
9. Now this is because the former
know the cause whereas the latter do
not. For those who have experience
know that something is so but do not
know why, whereas the others know
the why and the cause. For this
reason, too, we think that the master
planners in each art are to be held in
greater esteem, and that they know
more and are wiser than the manual
laborers, because they understand
the reasons for the things which are
done. Indeed, we think that the latter
resemble certain inanimate things,
which act but do not know what theydo, as fire burns. Therefore inanimate
things perform each of their actions
as a result of a certain natural
disposition, whereas manual laborers
perform theirs through habit,
implying that some men are wiser not
insofar as they are practical but
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insofar as they themselves have the
theories and know the causes.
, : , . [10]
10. In general a sign, of scientific
knowledge is the ability to teach, and
for this reason we think that art
rather than experience is science. For
those who have an art are able toteach, whereas the others are not.
: : , , .
11. Furthermore, we do not hold that
any one of the senses is wisdom, since
the cognition of singular things
belongs especially to the senses.
However, these do not tell us why athing is so; for example, they do not
tell us why fire is hot but only that it
is so.
[15] : , [20]
12 It is only fitting, then, that the one
who discovered any art whatsoever
that went beyond the commonperceptions of men should be
admired by men, not only because of
some usefulness of his discoveries,
but as one who is wise and as
distinguishing [a thing] from others.
And as more of the arts were
discovered, some to supply the
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. , : ,
[25] . :
necessities of life, and others to
introduce us [to the sciences], those
who discovered the former were
always considered to be wiser than
those who discovered the former,
because their sciences were not for
the sake of utility. Hence, after all
such arts had already been
developed, those sciences werediscovered which are pursued neither
for the sake of pleasure nor necessity.
This happened first in those places
where men had leisure. Hence the
mathematical arts originated in
Egypt, for there the priestly class was
permitted leisure. The difference
between art and science and similar
mental states has been stated in ourwork on morals.
, : ,
, [30] , , , .[982] [1] , .
13. Now the reason for undertaking
this investigation is that all men think
that the science which is called
wisdom deals with the primary
causes and principles of things.Hence, as we have said before (8, 9),
the man of experience is considered
to be wiser than one who has any of
the senses; the artist wiser than the
man of experience; the master
planner wiser than the manual
laborer and speculative knowledge
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wiser than practical knowledge. It is
quite evident then, that wisdom is a
science of certain causes and
principles.
COMMENTARY
Three reasons why people naturally
desire to know
Huic autem scientiae Aristoteles
prooemium praemittit, in quo duo tradit.
Primo quidem ostendit circa quid haecscientia versetur. Secundo qualis sit ista
scientia, ibi, quia vero non activa.
1. Aristotle first sets down an introduction
to this science, in which he treats of two
things. First (2), he points out with whatthis science is concerned. Second (53), he
explains what kind of science it is (That
this is not a practical science).
Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit,
quod huius scientiae, quae sapientia
dicitur, est considerare causas. Secundoquales vel quas causas considerat, ibi,
quoniam autem scientiam hanc.
In regard to the first he does two things.
First, he shows that the office of this
science, which is called wisdom, is toconsider the causes of things. Second (36),
he explains with what causes or kinds of
causes it is concerned (But since we are
in search).
Circa primum praemittit quaedam ex
quibus ad propositum arguit. Secundo ex
In regard to the first he prefaces certain
preliminary considerations form which he
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praedictis rationem sumit, ibi, cuius autem
gratia nunc.
argues in support of his thesis. Second
(35), he draws a conclusion from these
considerations (Now the reason for
undertaking).
Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit in
communi scientiae dignitatem. Secundo,
ostendit cognitionis ordinem, ibi, animalia
quidem igitur et cetera.
In regard to the first he does two things.
First, he makes clear the dignity of
scientific knowledge in general. Second
(9), he explains the hierarchy in knowing
(Animals by nature).
Scientiae autem dignitatem ostendit per
hoc quod naturaliter desideratur ab
omnibus tamquam finis. Unde circa hoc
duo facit. Primo proponit intentum.
Secundo probat, ibi, signum autem.
Now he establishes the dignity of
scientific knowledge from the fact that it
is naturally desired as an end by all men.
Hence, in regard to this he does two
things. First, he states what he intends [toprove]. Second (1), he proves it (A sign of
this).
Proponit igitur primo, quod omnibus
hominibus naturaliter desiderium inest ad
sciendum.
Accordingly, he says, first, that the desire
to know belongs by nature to all men.
Cuius ratio potest esse triplex: 2. Three reasons can be given for this:
primo quidem, quia unaquaeque res
naturaliter appetit perfectionem sui. Unde
et materia dicitur appetere formam, sicut
The first is that each thing naturally
desires its own perfection. Hence matter
is also said to desire form as any
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imperfectum appetit suam perfectionem.
Cum igitur intellectus, a quo homo est id
quod est, in se consideratus sit in potentia
omnia, nec in actum eorum reducatur nisi
per scientiam, quia nihil est eorum quae
sunt, ante intelligere, ut dicitur in tertio de
anima: sic naturaliter unusquisque
desiderat scientiam sicut materia formam.
imperfect thing desires its perfection.
Therefore, since the intellect, by which
man is what he is, considered in itself is all
things potentially, and becomes them
actually only through knowledge, because
the intellect is none of the things that exist
before it understands them, as is stated in
Book III of The Soul, so each man naturally
desires knowledge just as matter desires
form.
Secundo, quia quaelibet res naturalem
inclinationem habet ad suam propriam
operationem: sicut calidum ad
calefaciendum, et grave ut deorsum
moveatur. Propria autem operatio hominis
inquantum homo, est intelligere. Per hoc
enim ab omnibus aliis differt. Unde
naturaliter desiderium hominis inclinatur
ad intelligendum, et per consequens ad
sciendum.
3. The second reason is that each thing
has a natural inclination to perform its
proper operation, as something hot is
naturally inclined to heat, and something
heavy to be moved downwards. Now the
proper operation of man as man is to
understand, for by reason of this he
differs from all other things. Hence the
desire of man is naturally inclined to
understand, and therefore to possess
scientific knowledge.
Tertio, quia unicuique rei desiderabile est,
ut suo principio coniungatur; in hoc enim
uniuscuiusque perfectio consistit. Unde et
motus circularis est perfectissimus, ut
probatur octavo physicorum, quia finem
coniungit principio. Substantiis autem
separatis, quae sunt principia intellectus
humani, et ad quae intellectus humanus se
habet ut imperfectum ad perfectum, non
coniungitur homo nisi per intellectum:
4. The third reason is that it is desirable
for each thing to be united to its source,
since it is in this that the perfection of
each thing consists. This is also the reason
why circular motion is the most perfect
motion, as is proved in Book VIII of
the Physics, because its terminus is united
to its starting-point. Now it is only by
means of his intellect that man is united to
the separate substances, which are the
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unde et in hoc ultima hominis felicitas
consistit. Et ideo naturaliter homo
desiderat scientiam. Nec obstat si aliqui
homines scientiae huic studium non
impendant; cum frequenter qui finem
aliquem desiderant, a prosecutione finis ex
aliqua causa retrahantur, vel propter
difficultatem perveniendi, vel propter alias
occupationes. Sic etiam licet omnes
homines scientiam desiderent, non tamenomnes scientiae studium impendunt, quia
ab aliis detinentur, vel a voluptatibus, vel a
necessitatibus vitae praesentis, vel etiam
propter pigritiam vitant laborem
addiscendi. Hoc autem proponit Aristoteles
ut ostendat, quod quaerere scientiam non
propter aliud utilem, qualis est haec
scientia, non est vanum, cum naturale
desiderium vanum esse non possit.
source of the human intellect and that to
which the human intellect is related as
something imperfect to something
perfect. It is for this reason, too, that the
ultimate happiness of man consists in this
union. Therefore man naturally desires to
know. The fact that some men do not
devote any study to this science does not
disprove this thesis; for those who desire
some end are often prevented frompursuing it for some reason or other,
either because of the difficulty of attaining
it, or because of other occupations. And in
this way, too, even though all men desire
knowledge, still not all devote themselves
to the pursuit of it because they are held
back by other things, either by pleasures
or the needs of the present life; or they
may even avoid the effort that learning
demands because they are lazy. Now
Aristotle makes this statement in order to
show that it is not pointless to search for a
science that is not useful for anything else,
as happens in the case of this science,
since a natural desire cannot exist in vain.
Deinde ostendit quod proposuerat, per
signum: quia cum sensus ad duo nobis
deserviant; scilicet ad cognitionem rerum,
et ad utilitatem vitae; diliguntur a nobis
propter seipsos, inquantum cognoscitivi
sunt, et etiam propter hoc, quod utilitatem
ad vitam conferunt. Et hoc patet ex hoc,
quod ille sensus maxime ab omnibus
5. Then he establishes his thesis by means
of an example. Since our senses serve us
in two respects: in knowing things and in
meeting the needs of life, we love them for
themselves inasmuch as they enable us to
know and also assist us to live. This is
evident from the fact that all men take the
greatest delight in that sense which. is
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diligitur, qui magis cognoscitivus est, qui
est visus, quem diligimus non solum ad
agendum aliquid, sed etiam si nihil agere
deberemus. Cuius causa est, quia iste
sensus, scilicet visus, inter omnes magis
facit nos cognoscere, et plures differentias
rerum nobis demonstrat.
most knowing, i.e., the sense of sight,
which we value not merely in order to do
something, but even when we are not
required to act at all. The reason is that
this sensethat of sightis the most
knowing of all our senses and makes us
aware of many differences between
things.
In quo manifestum est quod duas
praeeminentias visus in cognoscendo ad
alios sensus ponit. Unam quidem quia
perfectius cognoscit. Quod quidem visui
accidit, eo quod spiritualior est inter
omnes sensus. Quanto enim aliqua vis
cognoscitiva est immaterialior, tanto est
perfectior in cognoscendo. Quod autem
visus sit immaterialior, patet si
consideretur eius immutatio, qua ab
obiecto immutatur. Nam, cum omnia alia
sensibilia immutent organum et medium
sensus secundum aliquam materialem
immutationem, sicut tactus obiectum
calefaciendo et infrigidando, obiectum vero
gustus, afficiendo sapore aliquo organum
gustus mediante saliva, obiectum autemauditus per motum corporalem, obiectum
autem odoratus per fumalem
evaporationem, solum obiectum visus non
immutat nec organum nec medium nisi
spirituali immutatione. Non enim pupilla
nec aer coloratur, sed solum speciem
coloris recipiunt secundum esse spirituale.
Quia igitur sensus in actu consistit in
6. In this part it is clear that he gives two
reasons why sight is superior to the other
senses in knowing. The first is that it
knows in a more perfect way; and this
belongs to it because it is the most
spiritual of all the senses. For the more
immaterial a power is, the more perfectly
it knows. And evidently sight is a more
immaterial sense, if we consider the
modification produced in it by its object.
For all other sensible objects change both
the organ and medium of a sense by a
material modification, for example, the
object of touch by heating and cooling, the
object of taste by affecting the organ of
taste with some flavor through the
medium of saliva, the object of hearing bymeans of motion in the body, and the
object of smell by means of the
evaporation of volatile elements. But the
object of sight changes the organ and
medium of sight only by a spiritual
modification; because neither the pupil of
the eye nor the air becomes colored, but
these only receive the form of color in a
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actuali immutatione sensus ab obiecto,
manifestum est illum sensum
spiritualiorem esse in sua operatione, qui
immaterialius et spiritualius immutatur. Et
ideo visus certius et perfectius iudicat de
sensibilibus inter alios sensus.
spiritual mode of being. Therefore,
because actual sensation consists in the
actual modification of a sense by its
object, it is evident that that sense which
is changed in a more immaterial and
spiritual way is more spiritual in its
operation. Hence sight judges about
sensible objects in a more certain and
perfect way than the other senses do.
Aliam autem praeeminentiam ponit, quia
nobis plura demonstrat. Quod quidem
accidit ex ratione sui obiecti. Tactus enim
et gustus, et similiter odoratus et auditus
sunt cognoscitivi illorum accidentium, in
quibus distinguuntur inferiora corpora a
superioribus. Visus autem est
cognoscitivus illorum accidentium, in
quibus communicant inferiora corpora
cum superioribus. Nam visibile actu est
aliquid per lucem, in qua communicant
inferiora corpora cum superioribus, ut
dicitur secundo de anima; et ideo corpora
caelestia solo visu sunt sensibilia.
7. The other reason which he gives for the
superiority of sight is that it gives us more
information about things. This is
attributable to the nature of its object, for
touch and taste, and likewise smell and
hearing, perceive those accidents by
which lower bodies are distinguished
from higher ones. But sight perceives
those accidents which lower bodies have
in common with higher ones. For a thing
is actually visible by means of light, which
is common both to lower and higher
bodies, as is said in Book II of The Soul.
Hence the celestial bodies are perceptible
only by means of sight.
Est autem alia ratio, quia visus plures
differentias rerum demonstrat; quia
sensibilia corpora praecipue per visum et
tactum cognoscere videmur, et adhuc
magis per visum. Cuius ratio ex hoc sumi
potest: quod alii tres sensus sunt
cognoscitivi eorum quae a corpore
8. There is also another reason. Sight
informs us of many differences between
things, for we seem to know sensible
things best by means of sight and touch,
but especially by means of sight. The
reason for this can be drawn from the fact
that the other three senses perceive those
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sensibili quodammodo effluunt, et non in
ipso consistunt: sicut sonus est a corpore
sensibili, ut ab eo fluens et non in eo
manens: et similiter fumalis evaporatio
cum qua et ex qua odor diffunditur. Visus
autem et tactus percipiunt illa accidentia
quae rebus ipsis immanent, sicut color et
calidum et frigidum. Unde iudicium tactus
et visus extenditur ad res ipsas, iudicium
autem auditus et odoratus ad ea quae arebus ipsis procedunt, non ad res ipsas. Et
inde est quod figura et magnitudo et
huiusmodi, quibus ipsa res sensibilis
disponitur, magis percipitur visu et tactu,
quam aliis sensibus. Et adhuc amplius
magis visu quam tactu, tum propter hoc
quod visus habet maiorem efficaciam ad
cognoscendum, ut dictum est, tum propter
hoc, quod quantitas et ea quae ad ipsam
sequuntur, quae videntur esse sensibilia
communia, proximius se habent ad
obiectum visus quam ad obiectum tactus.
Quod ex hoc patet, quod obiectum visus
omne corpus habens aliquam quantitatem
aliquo modo consequitur, non autem
obiectum tactus.
accidents which in a way flow from a
sensible body and do not remain in it.
Thus sound comes from a sensible body
inasmuch as it flows away from it and
does not remain in it. The same thing is
true of the evaporation of volatile
elements, with which and by which odor
is diffused. But sight and touch perceive
those accidents which remain in sensible
bodies, such as color, warmth andcoldness. Hence the judgment of sight and
touch is extended to things themselves,
whereas the judgment of hearing and
smell is extended to those accidents which
flow from things and not to things
themselves. It is for this reason that figure
and size and the like, by which a sensible
being itself is disposed, are perceived
more by sight and touch than by the other
senses. And they are perceived more by
sight than by touch, both because sight
knows more efficaciously, as has been
pointed out (C 6), and also because
quantity and those [accidents] which
naturally follow from it, which are seen to
be the common sensibles, are more
closely related to the object of sight than
to that of touch. This is clear from the fact
that the object of sight belongs in some
degree to every body having some
quantity, whereas the object of touch does
not.
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9. Animals by nature, then (2).
Deinde cum dicit animalia quidem
prosequitur de ordine cognitionis. Et
primo quantum ad bruta animalia. Secundo
quantum ad homines, ibi, alia quidem
igitur et cetera.
Here he considers the hierarchy in
knowledge. He does this, first (9), with
respect to brute animals; and, then (14),
with respect to men (Thus other
animals).
Circa vero bruta animalia tangit primo
quidem id in quo omnia animalia
communicant. Secundo id in quo animalia
differunt, et seinvicem excedunt, ibi, ex
sensibus.
With respect to brute animals he
mentions first what all animals have in
common; and second (10), that by which
they differ and surpass one another
(Now in some animals).
Communicant autem omnia animalia in
hoc quod naturaliter sensus habent. Nam
ex hoc animal est animal, quod habet
animam sensitivam, quae natura est
animalis, sicut forma unicuique propria est
natura eius. Quamvis autem omnia
animalia sensum habeant naturaliter, non
tamen omnia habent omnes sensus, sed
solum perfecta. Omnia vero habent sensumtactus. Ipse enim est quodammodo
fundamentum omnium aliorum sensuum.
Non autem habent omnia sensum visus,
quia sensus visus est omnibus aliis
perfectior in cognoscendo, sed tactus
magis necessarius. Est enim cognoscitivus
eorum, ex quibus animal constat, scilicet
calidi, frigidi, humidi et sicci. Unde sicut
Now all animals are alike in the respect
that they possess by nature the power of
sensation. For an animal is an animal by
reason of the fact that it has a sentient
soul, which is the nature of an animal in
the sense in which the distinctive form of
each thing is its nature. But even though
all animals are naturally endowed with
sensory power, not all animals have all thesenses, but only perfect animals. All have
the sense of touch, for this sense in a way
is the basis of all the other senses.
However, not all have the sense of sight,
because this sense knows in a more
perfect way than all the other senses. But
touch is more necessary; for it perceives
the elements of which an animal is
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visus inter omnes est perfectior in
cognoscendo, ita tactus est magis
necessarius, utpote primus existens in via
generationis. Ea enim quae sunt
perfectiora, secundum hanc viam, sunt
posteriora respectu illius individui, quod
de imperfecto ad perfectionem movetur.
composed, namely, the hot, cold, moist
and dry. Hence, just as sight knows in a
more perfect way than the other senses, in
a similar way touch is more necessary
inasmuch as it is the first to exist in the
process of generation. For those things
which are more perfect according to this
process come later in the development of
the individual which is moved from a state
of imperfection to one of perfection.
10. Now in some animals (3).
Deinde cum dicit ex sensibus ponit
diversitatem cognitionis, quae est in brutis:
et tangit etiam tres gradus cognitionis inhuiusmodi animalibus. Quaedam enim
sunt, quae licet sensum habeant, non
tamen habent memoriam, quae ex sensu
fit. Memoria enim sequitur phantasiam,
quae est motus factus a sensu secundum
actum, ut habetur in secundo de anima. In
quibusdam vero animalibus ex sensu non
fit phantasia, et sic in eis non potest esse
memoria: et huiusmodi sunt animalia
imperfecta, quae sunt immobilia secundum
locum, ut conchilia. Cum enim animalibus
cognitio sensitiva sit provisiva ad vitae
necessitatem et ad propriam operationem,
animalia illa memoriam habere debent,
quae moventur ad distans motu
progressivo: nisi enim apud ea remaneret
per memoriam intentio praeconcepta, ex
Here he indicates the different kinds and
three levels of knowing found among
brute animals. For there are certainanimals which have sensation, although
they do not have memory which comes
from sensation. For memory accompanies
imagination, which is a movement caused
by the senses in their act of sensing, as we
find in Book II of The Soul. But in some
animals imagination does not accompany
sensation, and therefore memory cannot
exist in them. This is found verified in
imperfect animals which are incapable of
local motion, such as shellfish. For since
sensory cognition enables animals to
make provision for the necessities of life
and to perform their characteristic
operations, then those animals which
move towards something at a distance by
means of local motion must have memory.
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qua ad motum inducuntur, motum
continuare non possent quousque finem
intentum consequerentur. Animalibus vero
immobilibus sufficit ad proprias
operationes, praesentis sensibilis acceptio,
cum ad distans non moveantur; et ideo
sola imaginatione confusa habent aliquem
motum indeterminatum, ut dicitur tertio
de anima.
For if the anticipated goal by which they
are induced to move did not remain in
them through memory, they could not
continue to move toward the intended
goal which they pursue. But in the case of
immobile animals the reception of a
present sensible quality is sufficient for
them to perform their characteristic
operations, since they do not move
toward anything at a distance. Hencethese animals have an indefinite
movement as a result of confused [or
indeterminate] imagination alone, as he
points out in Book III of The Soul.
Ex hoc autem, quod quaedam animalia
memoriam habent, et quaedam non
habent, sequitur quod quaedam sunt
prudentia et quaedam non. Cum enim
prudentia ex praeteritorum memoria de
futuris provideat (unde secundum Tullium
in secundo rhetoricae, partes eius
ponuntur memoria, intelligentia, et
providentia), in illis animalibus prudentia
esse non potest, qui memoria carent. Illa
vero animalia, quae memoriam habent,aliquid prudentiae habere possunt. Dicitur
autem prudentia aliter in brutis
animalibus, et aliter hominibus inesse. In
hominibus quidem est prudentia
secundum quod ex ratione deliberant quid
eos oporteat agere; unde dicitur sexto
Ethicorum, quod prudentia est recta ratio
agibilium. Iudicium autem de rebus
11. Again, from the fact that some animals
have memory and some do not, it follows
that some are prudent and some not. For,
since prudence makes provision for the
future from memory of the past (and this
is the reason why Tully in his Rhetoric,
Book II, makes memory, understanding
and foresight parts of prudence),
prudence cannot be had by those animals
which lack memory. Now those animals
which have memory can have someprudence, although prudence has one
meaning in the case of brute animals and
another in the case of man. Men are
prudent inasmuch as they deliberate
rationally about what they ought to do.
Hence it is said in Book VI of the Ethics,
that prudence is a rationally regulated
plan of things to be done. But the
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agendis non ex rationis deliberatione, sed
ex quodam naturae instinctu, prudentia in
aliis animalibus dicitur. Unde prudentia in
aliis animalibus est naturalis aestimatio de
convenientibus prosequendis, et fugiendis
nocivis, sicut agnus sequitur matrem et
fugit lupum.
judgment about things to be done which is
not a result of any rational deliberation
but of some natural instinct is called
prudence in other animals. Hence in other
animals prudence is a natural estimate
about the pursuit of what is fitting and the
avoidance of what is harmful, as a lamb
follows its mother and runs away from a
wolf .
Inter ea vero, quae memoriam habent,
quaedam habent auditum et quaedam non.
Quaecumque autem auditum non habent,
ut apes, vel si quod aliud huiusmodi animal
est, licet prudentiam habere possint, non
tamen sunt disciplinabilia, ut scilicet per
alterius instructionem possint assuescere
ad aliquid faciendum vel vitandum:
huiusmodi enim instructio praecipue
recipitur per auditum: unde dicitur in libro
de sensu et sensato, quod auditus est
sensus disciplinae. Quod autem dicitur
apes auditum non habere, non repugnat ei,
quod videntur ex quibusdam sonis
exterreri. Nam sicut sonus vehemens
occidit animal, et scindit lignum, ut intonitruo patet, non propter sonum, sed
propter commotionem aeris vehementem
in quo est sonus: ita animalia, quae auditu
carent, iudicium de sonis non habendo
possunt per sonos aereos exterreri. Illa
vero animalia, quae memoriam et auditum
habent, et disciplinabilia et prudentia esse
12. But among those animals which have
memory some have hearing and some do
not. And all those which cannot hear (as
the bee or any other similar type of animal
that may exist), even though they have
prudence, are still incapable of being
taught, i.e., in the sense that they can be
habituated to the doing or avoiding of
something through someone elses
instruction, because such instruction is
received chiefly by means of hearing.
Hence inThe Senses and Their Objectsit is
stated that hearing is the sense by which
we receive instruction. Furthermore, the
statement that bees do not have hearing is
not opposed in any way to theobservation that they are frightened by
certain sounds. For just as a very loud
sound kills an animal and splits wood, as
is evident in the case of thunder, not
because of the sound but because of the
violent motion of the air in which the
sound is present, in a similar fashion
those animals which lack hearing can be
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possunt. frightened by the sounding air even
though they have no perception of sound.
However, those animals which have both
memory and hearing can be both prudent
and teachable.
Patet igitur tres esse gradus cognitionis in
animalibus. Primus est eorum, quae nec
auditum nec memoriam habent: unde nec
disciplinabilia sunt, nec prudentia.
Secundus est eorum quae habent
memoriam, sed non auditum; unde sunt
prudentia, et non disciplinabilia. Tertius
est eorum, quae utrumque habent, et sunt
prudentia et disciplinabilia. Quartus autem
modus esse non potest, ut scilicet sit
aliquod animal, quod habeat auditum, et
non habeat memoriam. Sensus enim, qui
per exterius medium suum sensibile
apprehendunt, inter quos est auditus, non
sunt nisi in animalibus quae moventur
motu progressivo, quibus memoria deesse
non potest, ut dictum est.
13. It is evident, then, that there are three
levels of knowing in animals. The first
level is that had by animals which have
neither hearing nor memory, and which
are therefore neither capable of being
taught nor of being prudent. The second
level is that of animals which have
memory but are unable to hear, and which
are therefore prudent but incapable of
being taught. The third level is that of
animals which have both of these
faculties, and which are therefore prudent
and capable of being taught. Moreover,
there cannot be a fourth level, so that
there would be an animal which had
hearing but lacked memory. For those
senses which perceive their sensible
objects by means of an external
mediumand hearing is one of these
are found only in animals which havelocomotion and which cannot do without
memory, as has been pointed out (10).
14. Thus other animals (4).
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Deinde cum dicit alia quidem ostendit
gradus cognitionis humanae. Et circa hoc
duo facit. Primo namque ostendit in quo
cognitio humana excedit praedictorum
cognitionem. Secundo ostendit quomodo
humana cognitio per diversos gradus
distribuatur, ibi, fit autem ex memoria.
Here he explains the levels of human
knowing; and in regard to this he does
two things. First (14), he explains how
human knowing surpasses the knowing of
the abovementioned animals. Second
(17), he shows how human knowing is
divided into different levels (Now in
men).
Dicit ergo in prima parte, quod vita
animalium regitur imaginatione et
memoria: imaginatione quidem, quantum
ad animalia imperfecta; memoria vero
quantum ad animalia perfecta. Licet enim
et haec imaginationem habeant, tamen
unumquodque regi dicitur ab eo quod est
principalius in ipso. Vivere autem hic non
accipitur secundum quod est esse viventis,
sicut accipitur in secundo de anima: cum
dicitur, vivere viventibus est esse. Nam
huiusmodi vivere animalis non est ex
memoria et imaginatione, sed praecedit
utrumque. Accipitur autem vivere pro
actione vitae, sicut et conversationem
hominum vitam dicere solemus. In hoc
vero, quod cognitionem animaliumdeterminat per comparationem ad regimen
vitae, datur intelligi quod cognitio inest
ipsis animalibus non propter ipsum
cognoscere, sed propter necessitatem
actionis.
Accordingly, in the first part (4) he says
that the life of animals is ruled by
imagination and memory: by imagination
in the case of imperfect animals, and by
memory in the case of perfect animals. For
even though the latter also have
imagination, still each thing is said to be
ruled by that [power] which holds the
highest place within it. Now in this
discussion life does not mean the being of
a living thing, as it is understood in Book
II of The Soul, when he says that for living
things to live is to be; for the life of an
animal in this sense is not a result of
memory or imagination but is prior to
both of these. But life is taken to mean
vital activity, just as we are alsoaccustomed to speak of association as the
life of men. But by the fact that he
establishes the truth about the cognition
of animals with reference to the
management of life, we are given to
understand that knowing belongs to these
animals, not for the sake of knowing, but
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because of the need for action.
Supra memoriam autem in hominibus, ut
infra dicetur, proximum est experimentum,
quod quaedam animalia non participant
nisi parum. Experimentum enim est ex
collatione plurium singularium in memoria
receptorum. Huiusmodi autem collatio est
homini propria, et pertinet ad vim
cogitativam, quae ratio particularis dicitur:
quae est collativa intentionum
individualium, sicut ratio universalis
intentionum universalium. Et, quia ex
multis sensibus et memoria animalia ad
aliquid consuescunt prosequendum vel
vitandum, inde est quod aliquid
experimenti, licet parum, participare
videntur. Homines autem supra
experimentum, quod pertinet ad rationem
particularem, habent rationem
universalem, per quam vivunt, sicut per id
quod est principale in eis.
15. Now, as is stated below (18), in men
the next thing above memory is
experience, which some animals have only
to a small degree. For an experience arises
from the association of many singular
[intentions] received in memory. And this
kind of association is proper to man, and
pertains to the cogitative power (also
called particular reason), which associates
particular intentions just as universal
reason associates universal ones. Now
since animals are accustomed to pursue
or avoid certain things as a result of many
sensations and memory, for this reason
they seem to share something of
experience, even though it be slight. But
above experience, which belongs to
particular reason, men have as their chief
power a universal reason by means of
which they live.
Sicut autem se habet experimentum ad
rationem particularem, et consuetudo ad
memoriam in animalibus, ita se habet ars
ad rationem universalem. Ideo sicut
perfectum vitae regimen est animalibus
per memoriam adiuncta assuefactione ex
disciplina, vel quomodolibet aliter, ita
perfectum hominis regimen est per
rationem arte perfectam. Quidam tamen
ratione sine arte reguntur; sed hoc est
16. And just as experience is related to
particular reason [in men], and customary
activity to memory in animals, in a similar
way art is related to universal reason.
Therefore, just as the life of animals is
ruled in a perfect way by memory
together with activity that has become
habitual through training, or in any other
way whatsoever, in a similar way man is
ruled perfectly by reason perfected by art.
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regimen imperfectum. Some men, however, are ruled by reason
without art; but this rule is imperfect.
17. Now in men (5).
Deinde cum dicit fit autem ostendit
diversos gradus humanae cognitionis. Etcirca hoc duo facit. Primo comparat
experimentum ad artem quidem. Secundo
comparat artem speculativam ad activam,
ibi, primum igitur conveniens et cetera.
Here he explains the different levels of
human knowing; and in regard to this hedoes two things. First (17), he compares
art with experience; and, second (31), he
compares speculative art with practical
art (It is only fitting).
Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit
generationem artis et experimenti.
Secundo praeeminentiam unius ad
alterum, ibi, ad agere quidem igitur et
cetera.
He treats the first point in two ways. First,
he explains how art and experience
originate. Second (20), he explains how
one is superior to the other (In practical
matters).
Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit
utriusque praedictorum generationem.
Secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi,
acceptionem quidem enim et cetera.
In regard to the first he does two things.
First, he explains how each of the above
originates. Second (18), he makes this
clear by means of an example (For to
judge).
Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit
generationem experimenti. Secundo artis
generationem ibi, hominibus autem et
In regard to the first he does two things.
First, he describes how experience
originates, and second (18), how art
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cetera. originates (But in men, science).
Dicit ergo primo, quod ex memoria in
hominibus experimentum causatur. Modus
autem causandi est iste; quia ex multis
memoriis unius rei accipit homo
experimentum de aliquo, quo experimento
potens est ad facile et recte operandum. Et
ideo quia potentiam recte et faciliter
operandi praebet experimentum, videtur
fere esse simile arti et scientiae. Est enim
similitudo eo quod utrobique ex multis una
acceptio alicuius rei sumitur. Dissimilitudo
autem, quia per artem accipiuntur
universalia, per experimentum singularia,
ut postea dicetur.
He says first (5), then, that in men
experience is caused by memory. The way
in which it is caused is this: from several
memories of a single thing a man acquires
experience about some matter, and by
means of this experience he is able to act
easily and correctly. Therefore, because
experience provides us with the ability to
act easily and correctly, it seems to be
almost the same as science and art. For
they are alike inasmuch as in either case
from many instances a single view of a
thing is obtained. But they differ inasmuch
as universals are grasped by art and
singular things by experience, as is stated
later (18).
Deinde cum dicit hominibus autem ponit
generationem artis: et dicit, quod ex
experientia in hominibus fit scientia et ars:
et probat per auctoritatem Poli, qui dicit,
quod experientia facit artem, sed
inexperientia casum. Quando enim aliquis
inexpertus recte operatur, a casu est.
Modus autem, quo ars fit ex experimento,
est idem cum modo praedicto, quo
experimentum fit ex memoria. Nam sicut
ex multis memoriis fit una experimentalis
scientia, ita ex multis experimentis
apprehensis fit universalis acceptio de
omnibus similibus. Unde plus habet hoc ars
18. But in men science and art(6). Here
he describes the way in which art arises.
He says that in men science and art come
from experience, and he proves this on
the authority of Polus, who says that
Experience causes art and inexperience
luck. For when an inexperienced person
acts correctly, this happens by chance.
Furthermore, the way in which art arises
from experience is the same as the way
spoken of above in which experience
arises from memory. For just as one
experiential cognition comes from many
memories of a thing, so does one universal
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quam experimentum: quia experimentum
tantum circa singularia versatur, ars autem
circa universalia.
judgment about all similar things come
from the apprehension of many
experiences. Hence art has this [unified
view] more than experience, because
experience is concerned only with
singulars, whereas art has to do with
universals.
Quod consequenter per exempla exponit,
cum dicit, acceptionem quidem etc.: quia
cum homo accepit in sua cognitione quod
haec medicina contulit Socrati et Platoni
tali infirmitate laborantibus, et multis aliis
singularibus, quidquid sit illud, hoc ad
experientiam pertinet: sed, cum aliquis
accipit, quod hoc omnibus conferat in tali
specie aegritudinis determinata, et
secundum talem complexionem, sicut quod
contulit febricitantibus et phlegmaticis et
cholericis, id iam ad artem pertinet.
19. Thereupon he makes this clear by
means of examples (But in men). For
when a man has learned that this
medicine has been beneficial to Socrates
and Plato, and to many other individuals
who were suffering from some particular
disease, whatever it may be, this is a
matter of experience; but when a man
learns that this particular treatment is
beneficial to A men who have some
particular kind of disease and some
particular kind of physical constitution, as
it has benefited the feverish, both the
phlegmatic and the bilious, this is now a
matter of art.
20. In practical matters (7).
Deinde cum dicit ad agere comparat artem
ad experimentum per modum
praeeminentiae. Et secundum hoc duo
facit. Primo comparat quantum ad
actionem. Secundo quantum ad
He compares art to experience from the
viewpoint of pre-eminence; and in regard
to this he does two things. First (20), he
compares them from the viewpoint of
action; and, second (23), from the
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cognitionem, ibi, sed tamen scire et cetera. viewpoint of knowledge (Yet we think).
Dicit ergo, quod quantum ad actum
pertinet, experientia nihil videtur differre
ab arte. Cum enim ad actionem venitur,
tollitur differentia, quae inter
experimentum et artem erat per universale
et singulare: quia sicut experimentum circa
singularia operatur, ita et ars; unde
praedicta differentia erat in cognoscendo
tantum. Sed quamvis in modo operandi ars
et experimentum non differant, quia
utraque circa singularia operatur, differunt
tamen in efficacia operandi. Nam experti
magis proficiunt in operando illis qui
habent rationem universalem artis sine
experimento.
He says then that in practical matters
experience seems to differ in no way from
art; for when it comes to acting, the
difference between experience and art,
which is a difference between the
universal and the singular, disappears,
because art operates with reference to
singulars just as experience does.
Therefore the aforesaid difference
pertains only to the way in which they
come to know. But even though art and
experience do not differ in the way in
which they act, because both act on
singular things, nevertheless they differ in
the effectiveness of their action. For men
of experience act more effectively than
those who have the universal knowledge
of an art but lack experience.
Cujus causa est, quia actiones sunt circa
singularia, et singularium sunt omnes
generationes. Universalia enim non
generantur nec moventur nisi per accidens,
inquantum hoc singularibus competit.
Homo enim generatur hoc homine
generato. Unde medicus non sanat
hominem nisi per accidens; sed per se
sanat Platonem aut Socratem, aut aliquem
hominem singulariter dictum, cui convenit
esse hominem, vel accidit inquantum est
curatus. Quamvis enim esse hominem per
21. The reason is that actions have to do
with singular things, and all processes of
generation belong to singular things. For
universals are generated or moved only
by reason of something else, inasmuch as
this belongs to singular things. For man is
generated when this man is generated.
Hence a physician heals man only
incidentally, but properly he heals Plato
or Socrates, or some man that can be
individually named, to whom the nature
man belongs, or rather to whom it is
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se conveniat Socrati, tamen curato et
medicato per accidens convenit: haec est
enim per se, Socrates est homo: quia si
Socrates definiretur, poneretur homo in
eius definitione, ut in quarto dicetur. Sed
haec est per accidens, curatus vel sanatus
est homo.
accidental inasmuch as he is the one
healed. For even though the nature man
belongs essentially to Socrates, still it
belongs only accidentally to the one
healed or cured; for the proposition
Socrates is a man is an essential one,
because, if Socrates were defined, man
would be given in his definition, as will be
said below in Book IV. But the
proposition What is healed or cured isman is an accidental one.
Unde cum ars sit universalium, experientia
singularium, si aliquis habet rationem artis
sine experientia, erit quidem perfectus in
hoc quod universale cognoscat; sed quia
ignorat singulare cum experimento careat,
multotiens in curando peccabit: quia
curatio magis pertinet ad singulare quam
ad universale, cum ad hoc pertineat per se,
ad illud per accidens.
22. Hence, since art has to do with
universals and experience with singulars,
if anyone has the theoretical knowledge of
an art but lacks experience, he will be
perfect insofar as he knows the universal;
but since he does not know the singular,
because he lacks experience, he will very
often make mistakes in healing. For
healing belongs to the realm of the
singular rather than to that of the
universal, because it belongs to the former
essentially and to the latter accidentally.
23. Yet we think (8).
Deinde cum dicit sed tamen comparat
experimentum ad artem quantum ad
cognitionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo
ponit praeeminentiam artis ad
Here he compares art with experience
from the viewpoint of knowing; and in
regard to this he does two things. First
(23), he states how art is superior to
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experimentum. Secundo probat, ibi, hoc
autem est quia hi quidem et cetera.
experience; and second (24), he proves
this (Now this is because).
Proponit autem praeeminentiam artis et
scientiae quantum ad tria. Scilicet quantum
ad scire, quod quidem magis arbitramur
esse per artem quam per experimentum.
Item quantum ad obviare, quod in
disputationibus accidit. Nam habens artem
potest disputando obviare his quae contra
artem dicuntur, non autem habens
experimentum. Item quantum ad hoc quod
artifices plus accedunt ad finem sapientiae,
quam experti, tamquam magis sit, idest
contingat, scire sapientiam sequentem
omnia, idest dum sequitur universalia. Ex
hoc enim artifex sapientior iudicatur, quam
expertus quia universalia considerat. Vel
aliter. Tamquam magis sit scire secundum
sapientiam omnia sequentem, idest
universalia. Alia litera, tamquam magis
secundum scire sapientia omnia sequente:
quasi dicat: tamquam sapientia sequente
omnia idest consequente ad
unumquodque, magis sit secundum scire,
quam secundum operari: ut scilicetdicantur sapientes magis qui magis sciunt,
non qui magis sunt operativi. Unde alia
litera hunc sensum habet planiorem, qui
sic dicit: tamquam secundum illud quod est
scire magis, omnes sequuntur sapientiam.
He claims that art and science are
superior to experience in three respects.
First, they are superior from the
viewpoint of scientific knowledge, which
we think is attained by art rather than by
experience. Second, they are superior
from the viewpoint of meeting objections,
which occurs in disputes. For in a dispute
the one who has an art is able to meet the
objections raised against that art, but one
who has experience [alone] cannot do
this. Third, they are superior from this
point of view, that those who have an art
come nearer to the goal of wisdom than
men of experience, Implying that it is,
i.e., happens to be, more truly to know if
wisdom pursues all things, i.e., insofar as
it pursues universals. For one who has an
art is judged wiser than one who has
experience, by reason of the fact that he
considers universals. Or in another
version: Implying that it is more
according to wisdom to know as onepursuing all things, i.e., universals.
Another reading has: As more
conformable to knowing, since wisdom
pursues all things, as if to say: As more
dependent upon knowing than upon
doing, since wisdom pursues all things,
i.e., it seeks to reach each single thing; so
that those are rather called wise who are
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more knowing, not those who are more
men of action. Hence another reading
expresses this meaning more clearly,
saying: Implying that all pursue wisdom
more with respect to knowing.
24. Now this is (9).
Consequenter cum dicit hoc autem probat
praedictam praeeminentiam tripliciter.
Prima probatio talis est. Illi, qui sciunt
causam et propter quid, scientiores sunt et
sapientiores illis qui ignorant causam, sed
solum sciunt quia. Experti autem sciunt
quia, sed nesciunt propter quid. Artifices
vero sciunt causam, et propter quid, et nonsolum quia: ergo sapientiores et
scientiores sunt artifices expertis.
Then he proves the superiority of art and
science mentioned above, and he does this
by means of three arguments. The first
runs thus: those who know the cause and
reason why a thing is so are more
knowing and wiser than those who
merely know that it is so but do not know
why. Now men of experience know thatsomething is so but do not know the
reason, whereas men who have an art
know not merely that something is so but
also know its cause and reason. Hence
those who have an art are wiser and more
knowing than those who have experience.
25. For this reason too (9).
Primo primam probat cum dicit, unde et
architectores et cetera. Probatio talis est.
Illi qui sciunt causam et propter quid
comparantur ad scientes tantum quia, sicut
architectonicae artes ad artes artificum
Here he proves the first aspect of
superiority, and this runs as follows.
Those who know the cause and reason
why a thing is so are compared to those
who merely know that it is so as the
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manu operantium. Sed architectonicae
artes sunt nobiliores: ergo et illi qui sciunt
causas et propter quid, sunt scientiores et
sapientiores scientibus tantum quia.
architectonic arts are to the arts of
manual laborers. But the architectonic
arts are nobler. In a similar way, then,
those who know the causes and reasons of
things are more knowing than those who
merely know that things are so.
Huius probationis prima ex hoc apparet,
quia architectores sciunt causas factorum.
Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est, quod
architector dicitur quasi principalis artifex:
ab archos quod est princeps, et techne
quod est ars. Dicitur autem ars principalior
illa, quae principaliorem operationem
habet. Operationes autem artificum hoc
modo distinguuntur: quia quaedam sunt ad
disponendum materiam artificii, sicut
carpentarii secando ligna et complanando
disponunt materiam ad formam navis. Alia
est operatio ad inductionem formae; sicut
cum aliquis ex lignis dispositis et
praeparatis navem compaginat. Alia est
operatio in usum rei iam constitutae; et
ista est principalissima. Prima autem est
infima, quia prima ordinatur ad secundam,
et secunda ad tertiam. Unde navisfactor estarchitector respectu eius qui praeparat
ligna. Gubernator autem, qui utitur navi
iam facta, est architector respectu navis
factoris.
26. The first part of this proof becomes
clear from the fact that architects, or
master artists, know the causes of the
things that are done. In order to
understand this we must note that
architect means chief artist, from meaning chief, and meaning art.
Now that art is said to be a chief art which
performs a more important operation.
Indeed, the operations of artists aredistinguished in this way; for some
operations are directed to disposing the
material of the artifact. Carpenters, for
example, by cutting and planing the wood,
dispose matter for the form of a ship.
Another operation is directed to
introducing this form into the matter, for
example, when someone builds a ship out
of wood which has been disposed andprepared. A third operation is directed to
the use of the finished product, and this is
the highest operation. But the first
operation is the lowest because it is
directed to the second and the second to
the third. Hence the shipbuilder is a
superior artist compared with the one
who prepares the wood; and the
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navigator, who uses the completed ship, is
a superior artist compared with the
shipbuilder.
Et, quia materia est propter formam, et
talis debet esse materia quae formae
competat, ideo navisfactor scit causam,
quare ligna debeant esse sic disposita;
quod nesciunt illi qui praeparant ligna.
Similiter, cum tota navis sit propter usum
ipsius, ille qui navi utitur, scit quare talis
forma debeat esse; ad hoc enim debet talis
esse, ut tali usui conveniens sit. Et sic patet,
quod ex forma artificii sumitur causa
operationum, quae sunt circa
dispositionem materiae. Et ex usu sumitur
causa operationum, quae sunt circa
formam artificiati.
27. Further, since matter exists for the
sake of form, and ought to be such as to
befit the form, the shipbuilder knows the
reason why the wood should be shaped in
some particular way; but those who
prepare the wood do not know this. And
in a similar way, since the completed ship
exists in order to be used, the one who
uses the ship knows why it should have
some particular form; for the form should
be one that befits its use. Thus it is evident
that the reason for the operations which
dispose the matter is taken from the
design of the product in the artists mind,
and the reason for the operations which
produce the form of the artifact is taken
from the use [to which the artifact is put].
Et sic manifestum est, quod architectores
factorum causas sciunt. Illos vero, scilicet
manu artifices, iudicamus vel
denominamus, sicut quaedam
inanimatorum. Et hoc non ideo quia faciunt
operationes artificiales, sed quia quae
faciunt, incognita faciunt. Sciunt enim quia,
sed causas non cognoscunt; sicut etiam
ignis exurit absque aliqua cognitione. Est
igitur quantum ad hoc similitudo inter
inanimata et manu artifices, quod sicut
28. It is evident, then, that the master
artists know the causes of the things
which are done. In fact we judge and
speak about the others, i.e., the manual
laborers, as we do about certain
inanimate things. This is not because they
do not perform artful operations, but
because the things which they do they do
without knowing the cause; for they know
that something is to be done but not why
it is, just as fire burns without knowing
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absque causae cognitione inanimata
operantur ut ordinata ab aliquo superiori
intellectu in proprium finem, ita et manu
artifices. Sed in hoc est differentia: quia
inanimata faciunt unumquodque suorum
operum per naturam, sed manu artifices
per consuetudinem: quae licet vim naturae
habeat inquantum ad unum inclinat
determinate, tamen a natura differt in hoc,
quod est circa ea quae sunt ad utrumlibetsecundum humanam cognitionem.
Naturalia enim non consuescimus, sicut
dicitur in secundo Ethicorum. Nec etiam
cognitione carentium est consuescere.
Haec autem quae dicta sunt, sic sunt
consideranda tamquam ex eis appareat,
quod aliqui non sunt sapientiores
secundum quod est practicos, id est
operatores esse, quod convenit expertis;
sed secundum quod aliqui habent rationem
de agendis, et cognoscunt causas
agendorum, ex quibus rationes sumuntur:
quod convenit architectoribus.
why. Hence there is a likeness between
inanimate things and manual laborers
from this point of view, that, just as
inanimate things act without knowing the
causes, inasmuch as they are directed to
their proper end by a superior intellect, so
also do manual laborers. But they differ in
this respect, that inanimate things
perform each of their operations as a
result of their nature, whereas manuallaborers perform theirs through habit.
And while habit is practically the same as
nature inasmuch as it is inclined to one
definite effect, still habit differs from
nature inasmuch as it is open to opposites
by reason of human knowledge. For we do
not habituate natural bodies, as is stated
in Book II of the Ethics; nor, indeed, is it
possible to cause habits in things that lack
knowledge. Now the statements that have
been made, as is evident from the
statements themselves, must be
interpreted as meaning that some men
are wiser, not insofar as they are
practical, i.e., men of action, as befits
men of experience, but insofar as they
have a plan for things to be done and
know their causes, which are the basis of
such a plan; and this befits master artists.
29. In general a sign of scientific
knowledge (10).
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Deinde cum dicit et omnino ponit
secundam rationem: quae talis est. Signum
scientis est posse docere: quod ideo est,
quia unumquodque tunc est perfectum in
actu suo, quando potest facere alterum sibi
simile, ut dicitur quarto Meteororum. Sicut
igitur signum caliditatis est quod possit
aliquid calefacere, ita signum scientis est,
quod possit docere, quod est scientiam in
alio causare. Artifices autem docerepossunt, quia cum causas cognoscant, ex
eis possunt demonstrare: demonstratio
autem est syllogismus faciens scire, ut
dicitur primo posteriorum. Experti autem
non possunt docere, quia non possunt ad
scientiam perducere cum causam ignorent.
Et si ea quae experimento cognoscunt aliis
tradant, non recipientur per modum
scientiae, sed per modum opinionis vel
credulitatis. Unde patet quod artifices sunt
magis sapientes et scientes expertis.
Here he gives the second argument, which
is as follows: a sign of knowledge is the
ability to teach, and this is so because
each thing is perfect in its activity when it
can produce another thing similar to itself,
as is said in Book IV of Meteors. Therefore,
just as the possession of heat is indicated
by the fact that a thing can heat something
else, in a similar way the possession of
knowledge is indicated by the fact thatone can teach, that is, cause knowledge in
another. But men who have an art can
teach, for since they know causes they can
demonstrate from these; and
demonstration is a syllogism which
produces knowledge, as is said in Book I
of the Posterior Analytics. But men who
have experience [only] cannot teach; for
since they do not know the causes, they
cannot cause knowledge in someone else.
And if they do teach others the things
which they know by experience, these
things are not learned after the manner of
scientific knowledge but after that of
opinion or belief. Hence, it is clear that
men who have an art are wiser and more
knowing than those who have experience.
30. Furthermore, we do not hold (11).
Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit
tertiam rationem; quae talis est.
Cognitiones singularium magis sunt
Here he gives the third argument, which is
as follows: knowing singular things is
proper to the senses rather than to any
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propriae sensibus quam alicui alteri
cognitioni, cum omnis cognitio singularium
a sensu oriatur. Sed tamen, nec unum, idest
nullum sensum dicimus sapientiam, scilicet
propter hoc quod licet aliquis sensus
cognoscat quia, tamen, non propter quid
cognoscit. Tactus enim iudicat quod ignis
calidus est, non tamen apprehendit
propter quid: ergo experti qui habent
singularium cognitionem causamignorantes, sapientes dici non possunt.
other type of knowing [power], since our
entire knowledge of singular things
originates with the senses. Yet we do not
hold that any one of these, i.e., any one
of the senses, is wisdom, because even
though each sense knows that a thing is
so, it does not know why it is so; for touch
judges that fire is hot but does not know
why it is hot. Therefore men of
experience, who have a knowledge ofsingular things but do not know their
causes, cannot be called wise men.
31. It is only fitting (12).
Deinde cum dicit primum quidemcomparat artem activam speculativae. Et
circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod
ars speculativa magis est sapientia quam
activa. Secundo respondet cuidam
obiectioni, ibi, in moralibus.
Here he compares practical art withspeculative art; and in regard to this he
does three things. First (20), he shows
that a speculative art is wisdom to a
greater degree than a practical art. Second
(ibid.), he answers an objection (The
difference).
Ostendit autem quod primo dictum est, tali
ratione. In quibuscumque scientiis vel
artibus invenitur id propter quod homines
scientes prae aliis hominibus in
admiratione vel honore habentur, illae
scientiae sunt magis honorabiles, et magis
dignae nomine sapientiae. Quilibet autem
inventor artis habetur in admiratione,
He proves his first statement by this
argument: in any of the sciences or arts
we find that men with scientific
knowledge are more admired and are
held in higher esteem than all other men,
because their knowledge is held to be
nobler and more worthy of the name of
wisdom. Now the discoverer of any art at
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propter hoc quod habet sensum et
iudicium et discretionem causae ultra
aliorum hominum sensum, et non propter
utilitatem illorum quae invenit: sed magis
admiramur, sicut sapientem et ab aliis
distinguentem. Sapientem quidem,
quantum ad subtilem inquisitionem
causarum rei inventae: distinguentem
vero, quantum ad investigationem
differentiarum unius rei ad aliam. Velaliter, ab aliis distinguentem, ut passive
legatur, quasi in hoc ab aliis distinguatur.
Unde alia litera habet, differentem. Ergo
scientiae aliquae sunt magis admirabiles et
magis dignae nomine sapientiae propter
eminentiorem sensum, et non propter
utilitatem.
all is admired because he perceives,
judges and discerns a cause beyond the
perceptions of other men, and not because
of the usefulness of his discoveries. We
admire him rather as being wise, and as
distinguishing [a thing] from others. As
being wise, indeed, in the subtle way in
which he investigates the causes of his
discoveries, and as distinguishing [a
thing] from others insofar as heinvestigates the ways in which one thing
differs from another. Or, according to
another interpretation, as being distinct
from the others is to be read passively, as
being distinguished in this respect from
others. Hence another text has one who
is different. Some sciences, then, are
more admirable and worthy of the name
of wisdom because their observations are
more outstanding, not because they are
useful.
Cum igitur plures artes sint repertae
quantum ad utilitatem, quarum quaedam
sunt ad vitae necessitatem, sicut
mechanicae; quaedam vero adintroductionem in aliis scientiis, sicut
scientiae logicales: illi artifices dicendi sunt
sapientiores, quorum scientiae non sunt ad
utilitatem inventae, sed propter ipsum
scire, cuiusmodi sunt scientiae
speculativae.
32. Therefore, since many useful arts have
been discovered (some to provide the
necessities of life, as the mechanical arts,
and others to introduce us to the sciences,as the logical disciplines), those artists
must be said to be wiser whose sciences
were discovered not for the sake of utility
but merely for the sake of knowing, that is
to say, the speculative sciences.
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Et quod speculativae scientiae non sint
inventae ad utilitatem, patet per hoc
signum: quia, iam partis, id est acquisitis
vel repertis omnibus huiusmodi, quae
possunt esse ad introductionem in
scientiis, vel ad necessitatem vitae, vel ad
voluptatem, sicut artes quae sunt ordinatae
ad hominum delectationem: speculativae
non sunt propter huiusmodi repertae, sed
propter seipsas. Et quod non sint adutilitatem inventae, patet ex loco quo
inventae sunt. In locis enim illis primo
repertae sunt, ubi primo homines
studuerunt circa talia. Alia litera habet, et
primum his locis ubi vacabant, id est ab
aliis occupationibus quiescentes studio
vacabant quasi necessariis abundantes.
Unde et circa Aegyptum primo inventae
sunt artes mathematicae, quae sunt
maxime speculativae, a sacerdotibus, qui
sunt concessi studio vacare, et de publico
expensas habebant, sicut etiam legitur in
Genesi.
33. That the speculative sciences were not
discovered for the sake of utility is made
clear by this fact, that after all sciences of
this kind had already been developed,
i.e., acquired or discovered, which can
serve as introductions to the other
sciences, or provide the necessities of life,
or give pleasure (as those arts whose
object is to delight man), the speculative
sciences were discovered, not for thiskind of end, but for their own sake. The
fact that they were not discovered for the
sake of utility becomes evident from the
place in which they were discovered. For
they originated in those places where men
first applied themselves to such things.
Another version reads, And first in those
places where men had leisure, i.e., they
had time for study because they were
released from other occupations as a
result of the abundance of things
necessary [for life]. Hence the
mathematical arts, which are speculative
in the highest degree, were first
discovered in Egypt by the priests, who
were given time for study, and whose
expenses were defrayed by the
community, as we also read in Genesis
(47:22)
Sed quia usus nomine artis fuerat et
sapientiae et scientiae quasi indifferenter,
ne aliquis putet haec omnia esse nomina
synonyma idem penitus significantia hanc
34. But because the names wisdom,
science and art have been used
indifferently, lest someone should think
that these terms are synonymous, he
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opinionem removet, et remittit ad librum
Moralium, idest ad sextum Ethicorum, ubi
dictum est, in quo differant scientia et ars
et sapientia et prudentia et intellectus. Et
ut breviter dicatur, sapientia et scientia et
intellectus sunt circa partem animae
speculativam, quam ibi scientificum
animae appellat. Differunt autem, quia
intellectus est habitus principiorum
primorum demonstrationis. Scientia veroest conclusionis ex causis inferioribus.
Sapientia vero considerat causas primas.
Unde ibidem dicitur caput scientiarum.
Prudentia vero et ars est circa animae
partem practicam, quae est ratiocinativa
de contingentibus operabilibus a nobis. Et
differunt: nam prudentia dirigit in
actionibus quae non transeunt ad
exteriorem materiam, sed sunt
perfectiones agentis: unde dicitur ibi quod
prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Ars
vero dirigit in factionibus, quae in
materiam exteriorem transeunt, sicut
aedificare et secare: unde dicitur quod ars
est recta ratio factibilium.
excludes this opinion and refers to his
work on morals, i.e., to Book VI of
the Ethics, where he has explained the
difference between art, wisdom, science,
prudence, and understanding. And to give
the distinction brieflywisdom, science
and understanding pertain to the
speculative part of the soul, which he
speaks of in that work as the scientific
part of the soul. But they differ in thatunderstanding is the habit of the first
principles of demonstration, whereas
science has to do with conclusions drawn
from subordinate causes, and wisdom
with first causes. This is the reason it is
spoken of there as the chief science. But
prudence and art belong to the practical
part of the soul, which reasons about our
contingent courses of action. And these
also differ; for prudence directs us in
actions which do not pass over into some
external matter but are perfections of the
one acting (which is the reason why
prudence is defined in that work as the
reasoned plan of things to be done), but
art directs us in those productive actions,
such as building and cutting, which pass
over into external matter (which is the
reason why art is defined as the reasoned
plan of things to be made).
Wisdom deals with causes.
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Deinde cum dicit cuius autem ostendit ex
praehabitis principale propositum; quod
scilicet sapientia sit circa causas. Unde dicit
quod hoc est cuius gratia nunc sermonem
facimus, idest ratiocinationem praedictam:
quia scientia illa quae denominatur
sapientia, videtur esse circa primas causas,
et circa prima principia. Quod quidem
patet ex praehabitis. Unusquisque enim
tanto sapientior est, quanto magis acceditad causae cognitionem: quod ex
praehabitis patet; quia expertus est
sapientior eo qui solum habet sensum sine
experimento. Et artifex est sapientior
experto quocumque. Et inter artifices
architector est sapientior manu artifice. Et
inter artes etiam et scientias, speculativae
sunt magis scientiae quam activae. Et haec
omnia ex praedictis patent. Unde
relinquitur quod illa scientia, quae
simpliciter est sapientia, est circa causas.
Et est similis modus arguendi, sicut si
diceremus: illud quod est magis calidum,
est magis igneum: unde quod simpliciter
est ignis, est calidum simpliciter.
35. From what has been said he proves his
major thesis, that is to say, that wisdom
deals with the causes of things. He says
that the reason for undertaking this
investigation, i.e., the above piece of
reasoning, is that the science which is
called wisdom seems to be about first
causes and principles. This is evident from
the foregoing; for the more a man attains
to a knowledge of the cause, the wiser heis. This is also evident from the foregoing;
because the man of experience is wiser
than one who has sensation alone without
experience; and the artist is wiser than
any man of experience; and among artists
the architect is wiser than the manual
laborer. And similarly among the arts and
sciences the speculative are more
scientific than the practical. All these
things are dear from the foregoing
remarks. It follows, then, that that science
which is wisdom in an absolute sense is
concerned with the causes of things. The
method of arguing would be similar if we
were to say that that which is hotter is
more afire, and therefore that that which
is afire in an absolute sense is hot in an
absolute sense.
LESSON 2
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Wisdom Considers Universal First Causes and First Principles
ARISTOTLES TEXT Chapter 2: 982a 4-982b 11
, [5] ,
. , . , [10] :
14. But since we are in search of this
science, it will therefore be necessary
to consider with what kind of causes
and principles wisdom or sciencedeals. This will perhaps become
evident if we take the opinions which
we have about the wise man. First of
all, then, we think that the wise man is
one who knows all things in the
highest degree, as becomes him,
without having a knowledge of them
individually.
, ( , ):
15. Next, we say that that man is wise
who is capable of knowing things that
are difficult and not easy for man to
understand. For sensory perception is
common to all, and is therefore easy
and not a matter of wisdom.
16. Again, [we consider him wise whois] more certain.
17. And in every branch of science we
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: say that he is wiser who is morecapable of teaching us about the causes
of things.
[15]
,
18. Again, among the sciences we think
that that science which exists for itself
and is desirable for the sake of
knowledge is wisdom to a greaterdegree than one which is desirable for
the sake of contingent effects.
:
, , .
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