Commentary on Metaphysics by Aquinas - BOOK I, 17 Lessons

8/14/2019 Commentary on Metaphysics by Aquinas - BOOK I, 17 Lessons

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COMMENTARY ON THE METAPHYSICS

By Thomas Aquinas

translated by John P. Rowan Chicago, 1961

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METAPHYSICS

BOOK I

ARISTOTLES INTRODUCTION

HISTORY OF METAPHYSICAL INQUIRY

CONTENTS

LESSON 1: The Dignity and Object of This Science

LESSON 2: Wisdom Considers Universal First Causes and First Principles

LESSON 3: The Nature and Goal of Metaphysics

LESSON 4: Opinions about the Material Cause

LESSON 5: Opinions about the Efficient Cause

LESSON 6: Love and Hate as Efficient Causes of Good and Evil

LESSON 7: The Views of the Atomists and the Pythagoreans

LESSON 8: The Pythagorean Doctrine about Contraries

LESSON 9: The Opinions of the Eleatics and Pythagoreans about the Causes of

Things

LESSON 10: The Platonic Theory of Ideas

LESSON 11: A Summary of the Early Opinions about the Causes

LESSON 12: Criticism of the Views about the Number of Material Principles

LESSON 13: Criticism of the Pythagoreans' Opinions

LESSON 14: Arguments against the Platonic Ideas

LESSON 15: The Destruction of the Platonists' Arguments for Ideas

LESSON 16: Arguments against the View that Ideas Are Numbers

LESSON 17: Arguments against the View that the Ideas Are Principles of Being and

Knowledge


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LESSON 1

The Dignity and Object of This Science

ARISTOTLES TEXT Chapter 1: 980a 21-983a 3

[980] [21] . : , . [25] . .

1. All men naturally desire to know. Asign of this is the delight we take in

the senses; for apart from their

usefulness they are loved for

themselves, and most of all the sense

which operates through the eyes. For

not only that we may act, but even

when we intend to do nothing, we

prefer sight, as we may say, to all the

other senses. The reason is that of allthe senses this most enables us to

know and reveals many differences

between things.

,

2. Animals by nature, then, are born

with sensory power.

, .[980] [21] ,

3. Now in some animals memory

arises from the senses, but in others it

does not; and for this reason the

former are prudent and more capable

of being taught than those which are

unable to remember. Those which


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, : [10] , , , [] , .

Callias and Socrates and many other

individuals who suffer from this

disease, is a matter of experience; but

to judge that it has been beneficial to

all individuals f a particular kind, as

the phlegmatic, the bilious, or the

feverish, taken as a lass, who suffer

from this disease, is a matter of art.

, [15] ( ,

: , [20] : , , : ):

7. In practical matters, then,

experience seems to differ in no way

from art. But we see that men of

experience are more proficient than

those who have theory without

experience. The reason is that

experience is a knowledge of in

singulars, whereas art is a knowledge

of universals. But all actions and

processes of generation are

concerned with singulars. For the

physician heals man only incidentally,

but he heals Socrates or Callias, or

some individual that can be named, to

whom the nature man happens to

belong. Therefore, if anyone has thetheory without experience, and

knows the universal but not the

singulars contained in this, he will

very often make mistakes; for it is

rather the individual man who is able

to be cured.


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[25] , , :

8. Yet we think that scientific

knowledge and the ability to refute

objections belong to art rather than to

experience, and we are of the opinion

that those who are proficient in art

are wiser than men of experience,

implying that it is more according to

wisdom to know as one pursuing all

things.

. , : [30] .

, [981] [1] ( , , , : [5] ),

.

9. Now this is because the former

know the cause whereas the latter do

not. For those who have experience

know that something is so but do not

know why, whereas the others know

the why and the cause. For this

reason, too, we think that the master

planners in each art are to be held in

greater esteem, and that they know

more and are wiser than the manual

laborers, because they understand

the reasons for the things which are

done. Indeed, we think that the latter

resemble certain inanimate things,

which act but do not know what theydo, as fire burns. Therefore inanimate

things perform each of their actions

as a result of a certain natural

disposition, whereas manual laborers

perform theirs through habit,

implying that some men are wiser not

insofar as they are practical but


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insofar as they themselves have the

theories and know the causes.

, : , . [10]

10. In general a sign, of scientific

knowledge is the ability to teach, and

for this reason we think that art

rather than experience is science. For

those who have an art are able toteach, whereas the others are not.

: : , , .

11. Furthermore, we do not hold that

any one of the senses is wisdom, since

the cognition of singular things

belongs especially to the senses.

However, these do not tell us why athing is so; for example, they do not

tell us why fire is hot but only that it

is so.

[15] : , [20]

12 It is only fitting, then, that the one

who discovered any art whatsoever

that went beyond the commonperceptions of men should be

admired by men, not only because of

some usefulness of his discoveries,

but as one who is wise and as

distinguishing [a thing] from others.

And as more of the arts were

discovered, some to supply the


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. , : ,

[25] . :

necessities of life, and others to

introduce us [to the sciences], those

who discovered the former were

always considered to be wiser than

those who discovered the former,

because their sciences were not for

the sake of utility. Hence, after all

such arts had already been

developed, those sciences werediscovered which are pursued neither

for the sake of pleasure nor necessity.

This happened first in those places

where men had leisure. Hence the

mathematical arts originated in

Egypt, for there the priestly class was

permitted leisure. The difference

between art and science and similar

mental states has been stated in ourwork on morals.

, : ,

, [30] , , , .[982] [1] , .

13. Now the reason for undertaking

this investigation is that all men think

that the science which is called

wisdom deals with the primary

causes and principles of things.Hence, as we have said before (8, 9),

the man of experience is considered

to be wiser than one who has any of

the senses; the artist wiser than the

man of experience; the master

planner wiser than the manual

laborer and speculative knowledge


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wiser than practical knowledge. It is

quite evident then, that wisdom is a

science of certain causes and

principles.

COMMENTARY

Three reasons why people naturally

desire to know

Huic autem scientiae Aristoteles

prooemium praemittit, in quo duo tradit.

Primo quidem ostendit circa quid haecscientia versetur. Secundo qualis sit ista

scientia, ibi, quia vero non activa.

1. Aristotle first sets down an introduction

to this science, in which he treats of two

things. First (2), he points out with whatthis science is concerned. Second (53), he

explains what kind of science it is (That

this is not a practical science).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit,

quod huius scientiae, quae sapientia

dicitur, est considerare causas. Secundoquales vel quas causas considerat, ibi,

quoniam autem scientiam hanc.

In regard to the first he does two things.

First, he shows that the office of this

science, which is called wisdom, is toconsider the causes of things. Second (36),

he explains with what causes or kinds of

causes it is concerned (But since we are

in search).

Circa primum praemittit quaedam ex

quibus ad propositum arguit. Secundo ex

In regard to the first he prefaces certain

preliminary considerations form which he


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praedictis rationem sumit, ibi, cuius autem

gratia nunc.

argues in support of his thesis. Second

(35), he draws a conclusion from these

considerations (Now the reason for

undertaking).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit in

communi scientiae dignitatem. Secundo,

ostendit cognitionis ordinem, ibi, animalia

quidem igitur et cetera.


First, he makes clear the dignity of

scientific knowledge in general. Second

(9), he explains the hierarchy in knowing

(Animals by nature).

Scientiae autem dignitatem ostendit per

hoc quod naturaliter desideratur ab

omnibus tamquam finis. Unde circa hoc

duo facit. Primo proponit intentum.

Secundo probat, ibi, signum autem.

Now he establishes the dignity of

scientific knowledge from the fact that it

is naturally desired as an end by all men.

Hence, in regard to this he does two

things. First, he states what he intends [toprove]. Second (1), he proves it (A sign of

this).

Proponit igitur primo, quod omnibus

hominibus naturaliter desiderium inest ad

sciendum.

Accordingly, he says, first, that the desire

to know belongs by nature to all men.

Cuius ratio potest esse triplex: 2. Three reasons can be given for this:

primo quidem, quia unaquaeque res

naturaliter appetit perfectionem sui. Unde

et materia dicitur appetere formam, sicut

The first is that each thing naturally

desires its own perfection. Hence matter

is also said to desire form as any


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imperfectum appetit suam perfectionem.

Cum igitur intellectus, a quo homo est id

quod est, in se consideratus sit in potentia

omnia, nec in actum eorum reducatur nisi

per scientiam, quia nihil est eorum quae

sunt, ante intelligere, ut dicitur in tertio de

anima: sic naturaliter unusquisque

desiderat scientiam sicut materia formam.

imperfect thing desires its perfection.

Therefore, since the intellect, by which

man is what he is, considered in itself is all

things potentially, and becomes them

actually only through knowledge, because

the intellect is none of the things that exist

before it understands them, as is stated in

Book III of The Soul, so each man naturally

desires knowledge just as matter desires

form.

Secundo, quia quaelibet res naturalem

inclinationem habet ad suam propriam

operationem: sicut calidum ad

calefaciendum, et grave ut deorsum

moveatur. Propria autem operatio hominis

inquantum homo, est intelligere. Per hoc

enim ab omnibus aliis differt. Unde

naturaliter desiderium hominis inclinatur

ad intelligendum, et per consequens ad

sciendum.

3. The second reason is that each thing

has a natural inclination to perform its

proper operation, as something hot is

naturally inclined to heat, and something

heavy to be moved downwards. Now the

proper operation of man as man is to

understand, for by reason of this he

differs from all other things. Hence the

desire of man is naturally inclined to

understand, and therefore to possess

scientific knowledge.

Tertio, quia unicuique rei desiderabile est,

ut suo principio coniungatur; in hoc enim

uniuscuiusque perfectio consistit. Unde et

motus circularis est perfectissimus, ut

probatur octavo physicorum, quia finem

coniungit principio. Substantiis autem

separatis, quae sunt principia intellectus

humani, et ad quae intellectus humanus se

habet ut imperfectum ad perfectum, non

coniungitur homo nisi per intellectum:

4. The third reason is that it is desirable

for each thing to be united to its source,

since it is in this that the perfection of

each thing consists. This is also the reason

why circular motion is the most perfect

motion, as is proved in Book VIII of

the Physics, because its terminus is united

to its starting-point. Now it is only by

means of his intellect that man is united to

the separate substances, which are the


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unde et in hoc ultima hominis felicitas

consistit. Et ideo naturaliter homo

desiderat scientiam. Nec obstat si aliqui

homines scientiae huic studium non

impendant; cum frequenter qui finem

aliquem desiderant, a prosecutione finis ex

aliqua causa retrahantur, vel propter

difficultatem perveniendi, vel propter alias

occupationes. Sic etiam licet omnes

homines scientiam desiderent, non tamenomnes scientiae studium impendunt, quia

ab aliis detinentur, vel a voluptatibus, vel a

necessitatibus vitae praesentis, vel etiam

propter pigritiam vitant laborem

addiscendi. Hoc autem proponit Aristoteles

ut ostendat, quod quaerere scientiam non

propter aliud utilem, qualis est haec

scientia, non est vanum, cum naturale

desiderium vanum esse non possit.

source of the human intellect and that to

which the human intellect is related as

something imperfect to something

perfect. It is for this reason, too, that the

ultimate happiness of man consists in this

union. Therefore man naturally desires to

know. The fact that some men do not

devote any study to this science does not

disprove this thesis; for those who desire

some end are often prevented frompursuing it for some reason or other,

either because of the difficulty of attaining

it, or because of other occupations. And in

this way, too, even though all men desire

knowledge, still not all devote themselves

to the pursuit of it because they are held

back by other things, either by pleasures

or the needs of the present life; or they

may even avoid the effort that learning

demands because they are lazy. Now

Aristotle makes this statement in order to

show that it is not pointless to search for a

science that is not useful for anything else,

as happens in the case of this science,

since a natural desire cannot exist in vain.

Deinde ostendit quod proposuerat, per

signum: quia cum sensus ad duo nobis

deserviant; scilicet ad cognitionem rerum,

et ad utilitatem vitae; diliguntur a nobis

propter seipsos, inquantum cognoscitivi

sunt, et etiam propter hoc, quod utilitatem

ad vitam conferunt. Et hoc patet ex hoc,

quod ille sensus maxime ab omnibus

5. Then he establishes his thesis by means

of an example. Since our senses serve us

in two respects: in knowing things and in

meeting the needs of life, we love them for

themselves inasmuch as they enable us to

know and also assist us to live. This is

evident from the fact that all men take the

greatest delight in that sense which. is


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diligitur, qui magis cognoscitivus est, qui

est visus, quem diligimus non solum ad

agendum aliquid, sed etiam si nihil agere

deberemus. Cuius causa est, quia iste

sensus, scilicet visus, inter omnes magis

facit nos cognoscere, et plures differentias

rerum nobis demonstrat.

most knowing, i.e., the sense of sight,

which we value not merely in order to do

something, but even when we are not

required to act at all. The reason is that

this sensethat of sightis the most

knowing of all our senses and makes us

aware of many differences between

things.

In quo manifestum est quod duas

praeeminentias visus in cognoscendo ad

alios sensus ponit. Unam quidem quia

perfectius cognoscit. Quod quidem visui

accidit, eo quod spiritualior est inter

omnes sensus. Quanto enim aliqua vis

cognoscitiva est immaterialior, tanto est

perfectior in cognoscendo. Quod autem

visus sit immaterialior, patet si

consideretur eius immutatio, qua ab

obiecto immutatur. Nam, cum omnia alia

sensibilia immutent organum et medium

sensus secundum aliquam materialem

immutationem, sicut tactus obiectum

calefaciendo et infrigidando, obiectum vero

gustus, afficiendo sapore aliquo organum

gustus mediante saliva, obiectum autemauditus per motum corporalem, obiectum

autem odoratus per fumalem

evaporationem, solum obiectum visus non

immutat nec organum nec medium nisi

spirituali immutatione. Non enim pupilla

nec aer coloratur, sed solum speciem

coloris recipiunt secundum esse spirituale.

Quia igitur sensus in actu consistit in

6. In this part it is clear that he gives two

reasons why sight is superior to the other

senses in knowing. The first is that it

knows in a more perfect way; and this

belongs to it because it is the most

spiritual of all the senses. For the more

immaterial a power is, the more perfectly

it knows. And evidently sight is a more

immaterial sense, if we consider the

modification produced in it by its object.

For all other sensible objects change both

the organ and medium of a sense by a

material modification, for example, the

object of touch by heating and cooling, the

object of taste by affecting the organ of

taste with some flavor through the

medium of saliva, the object of hearing bymeans of motion in the body, and the

object of smell by means of the

evaporation of volatile elements. But the

object of sight changes the organ and

medium of sight only by a spiritual

modification; because neither the pupil of

the eye nor the air becomes colored, but

these only receive the form of color in a


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actuali immutatione sensus ab obiecto,

manifestum est illum sensum

spiritualiorem esse in sua operatione, qui

immaterialius et spiritualius immutatur. Et

ideo visus certius et perfectius iudicat de

sensibilibus inter alios sensus.

spiritual mode of being. Therefore,

because actual sensation consists in the

actual modification of a sense by its

object, it is evident that that sense which

is changed in a more immaterial and

spiritual way is more spiritual in its

operation. Hence sight judges about

sensible objects in a more certain and

perfect way than the other senses do.

Aliam autem praeeminentiam ponit, quia

nobis plura demonstrat. Quod quidem

accidit ex ratione sui obiecti. Tactus enim

et gustus, et similiter odoratus et auditus

sunt cognoscitivi illorum accidentium, in

quibus distinguuntur inferiora corpora a

superioribus. Visus autem est

cognoscitivus illorum accidentium, in

quibus communicant inferiora corpora

cum superioribus. Nam visibile actu est

aliquid per lucem, in qua communicant

inferiora corpora cum superioribus, ut

dicitur secundo de anima; et ideo corpora

caelestia solo visu sunt sensibilia.

7. The other reason which he gives for the

superiority of sight is that it gives us more

information about things. This is

attributable to the nature of its object, for

touch and taste, and likewise smell and

hearing, perceive those accidents by

which lower bodies are distinguished

from higher ones. But sight perceives

those accidents which lower bodies have

in common with higher ones. For a thing

is actually visible by means of light, which

is common both to lower and higher

bodies, as is said in Book II of The Soul.

Hence the celestial bodies are perceptible

only by means of sight.

Est autem alia ratio, quia visus plures

differentias rerum demonstrat; quia

sensibilia corpora praecipue per visum et

tactum cognoscere videmur, et adhuc

magis per visum. Cuius ratio ex hoc sumi

potest: quod alii tres sensus sunt

cognoscitivi eorum quae a corpore

8. There is also another reason. Sight

informs us of many differences between

things, for we seem to know sensible

things best by means of sight and touch,

but especially by means of sight. The

reason for this can be drawn from the fact

that the other three senses perceive those


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sensibili quodammodo effluunt, et non in

ipso consistunt: sicut sonus est a corpore

sensibili, ut ab eo fluens et non in eo

manens: et similiter fumalis evaporatio

cum qua et ex qua odor diffunditur. Visus

autem et tactus percipiunt illa accidentia

quae rebus ipsis immanent, sicut color et

calidum et frigidum. Unde iudicium tactus

et visus extenditur ad res ipsas, iudicium

autem auditus et odoratus ad ea quae arebus ipsis procedunt, non ad res ipsas. Et

inde est quod figura et magnitudo et

huiusmodi, quibus ipsa res sensibilis

disponitur, magis percipitur visu et tactu,

quam aliis sensibus. Et adhuc amplius

magis visu quam tactu, tum propter hoc

quod visus habet maiorem efficaciam ad

cognoscendum, ut dictum est, tum propter

hoc, quod quantitas et ea quae ad ipsam

sequuntur, quae videntur esse sensibilia

communia, proximius se habent ad

obiectum visus quam ad obiectum tactus.

Quod ex hoc patet, quod obiectum visus

omne corpus habens aliquam quantitatem

aliquo modo consequitur, non autem

obiectum tactus.

accidents which in a way flow from a

sensible body and do not remain in it.

Thus sound comes from a sensible body

inasmuch as it flows away from it and

does not remain in it. The same thing is

true of the evaporation of volatile

elements, with which and by which odor

is diffused. But sight and touch perceive

those accidents which remain in sensible

bodies, such as color, warmth andcoldness. Hence the judgment of sight and

touch is extended to things themselves,

whereas the judgment of hearing and

smell is extended to those accidents which

flow from things and not to things

themselves. It is for this reason that figure

and size and the like, by which a sensible

being itself is disposed, are perceived

more by sight and touch than by the other

senses. And they are perceived more by

sight than by touch, both because sight

knows more efficaciously, as has been

pointed out (C 6), and also because

quantity and those [accidents] which

naturally follow from it, which are seen to

be the common sensibles, are more

closely related to the object of sight than

to that of touch. This is clear from the fact

that the object of sight belongs in some

degree to every body having some

quantity, whereas the object of touch does

not.


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9. Animals by nature, then (2).

Deinde cum dicit animalia quidem

prosequitur de ordine cognitionis. Et

primo quantum ad bruta animalia. Secundo

quantum ad homines, ibi, alia quidem

igitur et cetera.

Here he considers the hierarchy in

knowledge. He does this, first (9), with

respect to brute animals; and, then (14),

with respect to men (Thus other

animals).

Circa vero bruta animalia tangit primo

quidem id in quo omnia animalia

communicant. Secundo id in quo animalia

differunt, et seinvicem excedunt, ibi, ex

sensibus.

With respect to brute animals he

mentions first what all animals have in

common; and second (10), that by which

they differ and surpass one another

(Now in some animals).

Communicant autem omnia animalia in

hoc quod naturaliter sensus habent. Nam

ex hoc animal est animal, quod habet

animam sensitivam, quae natura est

animalis, sicut forma unicuique propria est

natura eius. Quamvis autem omnia

animalia sensum habeant naturaliter, non

tamen omnia habent omnes sensus, sed

solum perfecta. Omnia vero habent sensumtactus. Ipse enim est quodammodo

fundamentum omnium aliorum sensuum.

Non autem habent omnia sensum visus,

quia sensus visus est omnibus aliis

perfectior in cognoscendo, sed tactus

magis necessarius. Est enim cognoscitivus

eorum, ex quibus animal constat, scilicet

calidi, frigidi, humidi et sicci. Unde sicut

Now all animals are alike in the respect

that they possess by nature the power of

sensation. For an animal is an animal by

reason of the fact that it has a sentient

soul, which is the nature of an animal in

the sense in which the distinctive form of

each thing is its nature. But even though

all animals are naturally endowed with

sensory power, not all animals have all thesenses, but only perfect animals. All have

the sense of touch, for this sense in a way

is the basis of all the other senses.

However, not all have the sense of sight,

because this sense knows in a more

perfect way than all the other senses. But

touch is more necessary; for it perceives

the elements of which an animal is


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visus inter omnes est perfectior in

cognoscendo, ita tactus est magis

necessarius, utpote primus existens in via

generationis. Ea enim quae sunt

perfectiora, secundum hanc viam, sunt

posteriora respectu illius individui, quod

de imperfecto ad perfectionem movetur.

composed, namely, the hot, cold, moist

and dry. Hence, just as sight knows in a

more perfect way than the other senses, in

a similar way touch is more necessary

inasmuch as it is the first to exist in the

process of generation. For those things

which are more perfect according to this

process come later in the development of

the individual which is moved from a state

of imperfection to one of perfection.

10. Now in some animals (3).

Deinde cum dicit ex sensibus ponit

diversitatem cognitionis, quae est in brutis:

et tangit etiam tres gradus cognitionis inhuiusmodi animalibus. Quaedam enim

sunt, quae licet sensum habeant, non

tamen habent memoriam, quae ex sensu

fit. Memoria enim sequitur phantasiam,

quae est motus factus a sensu secundum

actum, ut habetur in secundo de anima. In

quibusdam vero animalibus ex sensu non

fit phantasia, et sic in eis non potest esse

memoria: et huiusmodi sunt animalia

imperfecta, quae sunt immobilia secundum

locum, ut conchilia. Cum enim animalibus

cognitio sensitiva sit provisiva ad vitae

necessitatem et ad propriam operationem,

animalia illa memoriam habere debent,

quae moventur ad distans motu

progressivo: nisi enim apud ea remaneret

per memoriam intentio praeconcepta, ex

Here he indicates the different kinds and

three levels of knowing found among

brute animals. For there are certainanimals which have sensation, although

they do not have memory which comes

from sensation. For memory accompanies

imagination, which is a movement caused

by the senses in their act of sensing, as we

find in Book II of The Soul. But in some

animals imagination does not accompany

sensation, and therefore memory cannot

exist in them. This is found verified in

imperfect animals which are incapable of

local motion, such as shellfish. For since

sensory cognition enables animals to

make provision for the necessities of life

and to perform their characteristic

operations, then those animals which

move towards something at a distance by

means of local motion must have memory.


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qua ad motum inducuntur, motum

continuare non possent quousque finem

intentum consequerentur. Animalibus vero

immobilibus sufficit ad proprias

operationes, praesentis sensibilis acceptio,

cum ad distans non moveantur; et ideo

sola imaginatione confusa habent aliquem

motum indeterminatum, ut dicitur tertio

de anima.

For if the anticipated goal by which they

are induced to move did not remain in

them through memory, they could not

continue to move toward the intended

goal which they pursue. But in the case of

immobile animals the reception of a

present sensible quality is sufficient for

them to perform their characteristic

operations, since they do not move

toward anything at a distance. Hencethese animals have an indefinite

movement as a result of confused [or

indeterminate] imagination alone, as he

points out in Book III of The Soul.

Ex hoc autem, quod quaedam animalia

memoriam habent, et quaedam non

habent, sequitur quod quaedam sunt

prudentia et quaedam non. Cum enim

prudentia ex praeteritorum memoria de

futuris provideat (unde secundum Tullium

in secundo rhetoricae, partes eius

ponuntur memoria, intelligentia, et

providentia), in illis animalibus prudentia

esse non potest, qui memoria carent. Illa

vero animalia, quae memoriam habent,aliquid prudentiae habere possunt. Dicitur

autem prudentia aliter in brutis

animalibus, et aliter hominibus inesse. In

hominibus quidem est prudentia

secundum quod ex ratione deliberant quid

eos oporteat agere; unde dicitur sexto

Ethicorum, quod prudentia est recta ratio

agibilium. Iudicium autem de rebus

11. Again, from the fact that some animals

have memory and some do not, it follows

that some are prudent and some not. For,

since prudence makes provision for the

future from memory of the past (and this

is the reason why Tully in his Rhetoric,

Book II, makes memory, understanding

and foresight parts of prudence),

prudence cannot be had by those animals

which lack memory. Now those animals

which have memory can have someprudence, although prudence has one

meaning in the case of brute animals and

another in the case of man. Men are

prudent inasmuch as they deliberate

rationally about what they ought to do.

Hence it is said in Book VI of the Ethics,

that prudence is a rationally regulated

plan of things to be done. But the


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agendis non ex rationis deliberatione, sed

ex quodam naturae instinctu, prudentia in

aliis animalibus dicitur. Unde prudentia in

aliis animalibus est naturalis aestimatio de

convenientibus prosequendis, et fugiendis

nocivis, sicut agnus sequitur matrem et

fugit lupum.

judgment about things to be done which is

not a result of any rational deliberation

but of some natural instinct is called

prudence in other animals. Hence in other

animals prudence is a natural estimate

about the pursuit of what is fitting and the

avoidance of what is harmful, as a lamb

follows its mother and runs away from a

wolf .

Inter ea vero, quae memoriam habent,

quaedam habent auditum et quaedam non.

Quaecumque autem auditum non habent,

ut apes, vel si quod aliud huiusmodi animal

est, licet prudentiam habere possint, non

tamen sunt disciplinabilia, ut scilicet per

alterius instructionem possint assuescere

ad aliquid faciendum vel vitandum:

huiusmodi enim instructio praecipue

recipitur per auditum: unde dicitur in libro

de sensu et sensato, quod auditus est

sensus disciplinae. Quod autem dicitur

apes auditum non habere, non repugnat ei,

quod videntur ex quibusdam sonis

exterreri. Nam sicut sonus vehemens

occidit animal, et scindit lignum, ut intonitruo patet, non propter sonum, sed

propter commotionem aeris vehementem

in quo est sonus: ita animalia, quae auditu

carent, iudicium de sonis non habendo

possunt per sonos aereos exterreri. Illa

vero animalia, quae memoriam et auditum

habent, et disciplinabilia et prudentia esse

12. But among those animals which have

memory some have hearing and some do

not. And all those which cannot hear (as

the bee or any other similar type of animal

that may exist), even though they have

prudence, are still incapable of being

taught, i.e., in the sense that they can be

habituated to the doing or avoiding of

something through someone elses

instruction, because such instruction is

received chiefly by means of hearing.

Hence inThe Senses and Their Objectsit is

stated that hearing is the sense by which

we receive instruction. Furthermore, the

statement that bees do not have hearing is

not opposed in any way to theobservation that they are frightened by

certain sounds. For just as a very loud

sound kills an animal and splits wood, as

is evident in the case of thunder, not

because of the sound but because of the

violent motion of the air in which the

sound is present, in a similar fashion

those animals which lack hearing can be


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possunt. frightened by the sounding air even

though they have no perception of sound.

However, those animals which have both

memory and hearing can be both prudent

and teachable.

Patet igitur tres esse gradus cognitionis in

animalibus. Primus est eorum, quae nec

auditum nec memoriam habent: unde nec

disciplinabilia sunt, nec prudentia.

Secundus est eorum quae habent

memoriam, sed non auditum; unde sunt

prudentia, et non disciplinabilia. Tertius

est eorum, quae utrumque habent, et sunt

prudentia et disciplinabilia. Quartus autem

modus esse non potest, ut scilicet sit

aliquod animal, quod habeat auditum, et

non habeat memoriam. Sensus enim, qui

per exterius medium suum sensibile

apprehendunt, inter quos est auditus, non

sunt nisi in animalibus quae moventur

motu progressivo, quibus memoria deesse

non potest, ut dictum est.

13. It is evident, then, that there are three

levels of knowing in animals. The first

level is that had by animals which have

neither hearing nor memory, and which

are therefore neither capable of being

taught nor of being prudent. The second

level is that of animals which have

memory but are unable to hear, and which

are therefore prudent but incapable of

being taught. The third level is that of

animals which have both of these

faculties, and which are therefore prudent

and capable of being taught. Moreover,

there cannot be a fourth level, so that

there would be an animal which had

hearing but lacked memory. For those

senses which perceive their sensible

objects by means of an external

mediumand hearing is one of these

are found only in animals which havelocomotion and which cannot do without

memory, as has been pointed out (10).

14. Thus other animals (4).


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Deinde cum dicit alia quidem ostendit

gradus cognitionis humanae. Et circa hoc

duo facit. Primo namque ostendit in quo

cognitio humana excedit praedictorum

cognitionem. Secundo ostendit quomodo

humana cognitio per diversos gradus

distribuatur, ibi, fit autem ex memoria.

Here he explains the levels of human

knowing; and in regard to this he does

two things. First (14), he explains how

human knowing surpasses the knowing of

the abovementioned animals. Second

(17), he shows how human knowing is

divided into different levels (Now in

men).

Dicit ergo in prima parte, quod vita

animalium regitur imaginatione et

memoria: imaginatione quidem, quantum

ad animalia imperfecta; memoria vero

quantum ad animalia perfecta. Licet enim

et haec imaginationem habeant, tamen

unumquodque regi dicitur ab eo quod est

principalius in ipso. Vivere autem hic non

accipitur secundum quod est esse viventis,

sicut accipitur in secundo de anima: cum

dicitur, vivere viventibus est esse. Nam

huiusmodi vivere animalis non est ex

memoria et imaginatione, sed praecedit

utrumque. Accipitur autem vivere pro

actione vitae, sicut et conversationem

hominum vitam dicere solemus. In hoc

vero, quod cognitionem animaliumdeterminat per comparationem ad regimen

vitae, datur intelligi quod cognitio inest

ipsis animalibus non propter ipsum

cognoscere, sed propter necessitatem

actionis.

Accordingly, in the first part (4) he says

that the life of animals is ruled by

imagination and memory: by imagination

in the case of imperfect animals, and by

memory in the case of perfect animals. For

even though the latter also have

imagination, still each thing is said to be

ruled by that [power] which holds the

highest place within it. Now in this

discussion life does not mean the being of

a living thing, as it is understood in Book

II of The Soul, when he says that for living

things to live is to be; for the life of an

animal in this sense is not a result of

memory or imagination but is prior to

both of these. But life is taken to mean

vital activity, just as we are alsoaccustomed to speak of association as the

life of men. But by the fact that he

establishes the truth about the cognition

of animals with reference to the

management of life, we are given to

understand that knowing belongs to these

animals, not for the sake of knowing, but


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because of the need for action.

Supra memoriam autem in hominibus, ut

infra dicetur, proximum est experimentum,

quod quaedam animalia non participant

nisi parum. Experimentum enim est ex

collatione plurium singularium in memoria

receptorum. Huiusmodi autem collatio est

homini propria, et pertinet ad vim

cogitativam, quae ratio particularis dicitur:

quae est collativa intentionum

individualium, sicut ratio universalis

intentionum universalium. Et, quia ex

multis sensibus et memoria animalia ad

aliquid consuescunt prosequendum vel

vitandum, inde est quod aliquid

experimenti, licet parum, participare

videntur. Homines autem supra

experimentum, quod pertinet ad rationem

particularem, habent rationem

universalem, per quam vivunt, sicut per id

quod est principale in eis.

15. Now, as is stated below (18), in men

the next thing above memory is

experience, which some animals have only

to a small degree. For an experience arises

from the association of many singular

[intentions] received in memory. And this

kind of association is proper to man, and

pertains to the cogitative power (also

called particular reason), which associates

particular intentions just as universal

reason associates universal ones. Now

since animals are accustomed to pursue

or avoid certain things as a result of many

sensations and memory, for this reason

they seem to share something of

experience, even though it be slight. But

above experience, which belongs to

particular reason, men have as their chief

power a universal reason by means of

which they live.

Sicut autem se habet experimentum ad

rationem particularem, et consuetudo ad

memoriam in animalibus, ita se habet ars

ad rationem universalem. Ideo sicut

perfectum vitae regimen est animalibus

per memoriam adiuncta assuefactione ex

disciplina, vel quomodolibet aliter, ita

perfectum hominis regimen est per

rationem arte perfectam. Quidam tamen

ratione sine arte reguntur; sed hoc est

16. And just as experience is related to

particular reason [in men], and customary

activity to memory in animals, in a similar

way art is related to universal reason.

Therefore, just as the life of animals is

ruled in a perfect way by memory

together with activity that has become

habitual through training, or in any other

way whatsoever, in a similar way man is

ruled perfectly by reason perfected by art.


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regimen imperfectum. Some men, however, are ruled by reason

without art; but this rule is imperfect.

17. Now in men (5).

Deinde cum dicit fit autem ostendit

diversos gradus humanae cognitionis. Etcirca hoc duo facit. Primo comparat

experimentum ad artem quidem. Secundo

comparat artem speculativam ad activam,

ibi, primum igitur conveniens et cetera.

Here he explains the different levels of

human knowing; and in regard to this hedoes two things. First (17), he compares

art with experience; and, second (31), he

compares speculative art with practical

art (It is only fitting).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit

generationem artis et experimenti.

Secundo praeeminentiam unius ad

alterum, ibi, ad agere quidem igitur et

cetera.

He treats the first point in two ways. First,

he explains how art and experience

originate. Second (20), he explains how

one is superior to the other (In practical

matters).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit

utriusque praedictorum generationem.

Secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi,

acceptionem quidem enim et cetera.


First, he explains how each of the above

originates. Second (18), he makes this

clear by means of an example (For to

judge).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit

generationem experimenti. Secundo artis

generationem ibi, hominibus autem et


First, he describes how experience

originates, and second (18), how art


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cetera. originates (But in men, science).

Dicit ergo primo, quod ex memoria in

hominibus experimentum causatur. Modus

autem causandi est iste; quia ex multis

memoriis unius rei accipit homo

experimentum de aliquo, quo experimento

potens est ad facile et recte operandum. Et

ideo quia potentiam recte et faciliter

operandi praebet experimentum, videtur

fere esse simile arti et scientiae. Est enim

similitudo eo quod utrobique ex multis una

acceptio alicuius rei sumitur. Dissimilitudo

autem, quia per artem accipiuntur

universalia, per experimentum singularia,

ut postea dicetur.

He says first (5), then, that in men

experience is caused by memory. The way

in which it is caused is this: from several

memories of a single thing a man acquires

experience about some matter, and by

means of this experience he is able to act

easily and correctly. Therefore, because

experience provides us with the ability to

act easily and correctly, it seems to be

almost the same as science and art. For

they are alike inasmuch as in either case

from many instances a single view of a

thing is obtained. But they differ inasmuch

as universals are grasped by art and

singular things by experience, as is stated

later (18).

Deinde cum dicit hominibus autem ponit

generationem artis: et dicit, quod ex

experientia in hominibus fit scientia et ars:

et probat per auctoritatem Poli, qui dicit,

quod experientia facit artem, sed

inexperientia casum. Quando enim aliquis

inexpertus recte operatur, a casu est.

Modus autem, quo ars fit ex experimento,

est idem cum modo praedicto, quo

experimentum fit ex memoria. Nam sicut

ex multis memoriis fit una experimentalis

scientia, ita ex multis experimentis

apprehensis fit universalis acceptio de

omnibus similibus. Unde plus habet hoc ars

18. But in men science and art(6). Here

he describes the way in which art arises.

He says that in men science and art come

from experience, and he proves this on

the authority of Polus, who says that

Experience causes art and inexperience

luck. For when an inexperienced person

acts correctly, this happens by chance.

Furthermore, the way in which art arises

from experience is the same as the way

spoken of above in which experience

arises from memory. For just as one

experiential cognition comes from many

memories of a thing, so does one universal


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quam experimentum: quia experimentum

tantum circa singularia versatur, ars autem

circa universalia.

judgment about all similar things come

from the apprehension of many

experiences. Hence art has this [unified

view] more than experience, because

experience is concerned only with

singulars, whereas art has to do with

universals.

Quod consequenter per exempla exponit,

cum dicit, acceptionem quidem etc.: quia

cum homo accepit in sua cognitione quod

haec medicina contulit Socrati et Platoni

tali infirmitate laborantibus, et multis aliis

singularibus, quidquid sit illud, hoc ad

experientiam pertinet: sed, cum aliquis

accipit, quod hoc omnibus conferat in tali

specie aegritudinis determinata, et

secundum talem complexionem, sicut quod

contulit febricitantibus et phlegmaticis et

cholericis, id iam ad artem pertinet.

19. Thereupon he makes this clear by

means of examples (But in men). For

when a man has learned that this

medicine has been beneficial to Socrates

and Plato, and to many other individuals

who were suffering from some particular

disease, whatever it may be, this is a

matter of experience; but when a man

learns that this particular treatment is

beneficial to A men who have some

particular kind of disease and some

particular kind of physical constitution, as

it has benefited the feverish, both the

phlegmatic and the bilious, this is now a

matter of art.

20. In practical matters (7).

Deinde cum dicit ad agere comparat artem

ad experimentum per modum

praeeminentiae. Et secundum hoc duo

facit. Primo comparat quantum ad

actionem. Secundo quantum ad

He compares art to experience from the

viewpoint of pre-eminence; and in regard

to this he does two things. First (20), he

compares them from the viewpoint of

action; and, second (23), from the


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cognitionem, ibi, sed tamen scire et cetera. viewpoint of knowledge (Yet we think).

Dicit ergo, quod quantum ad actum

pertinet, experientia nihil videtur differre

ab arte. Cum enim ad actionem venitur,

tollitur differentia, quae inter

experimentum et artem erat per universale

et singulare: quia sicut experimentum circa

singularia operatur, ita et ars; unde

praedicta differentia erat in cognoscendo

tantum. Sed quamvis in modo operandi ars

et experimentum non differant, quia

utraque circa singularia operatur, differunt

tamen in efficacia operandi. Nam experti

magis proficiunt in operando illis qui

habent rationem universalem artis sine

experimento.

He says then that in practical matters

experience seems to differ in no way from

art; for when it comes to acting, the

difference between experience and art,

which is a difference between the

universal and the singular, disappears,

because art operates with reference to

singulars just as experience does.

Therefore the aforesaid difference

pertains only to the way in which they

come to know. But even though art and

experience do not differ in the way in

which they act, because both act on

singular things, nevertheless they differ in

the effectiveness of their action. For men

of experience act more effectively than

those who have the universal knowledge

of an art but lack experience.

Cujus causa est, quia actiones sunt circa

singularia, et singularium sunt omnes

generationes. Universalia enim non

generantur nec moventur nisi per accidens,

inquantum hoc singularibus competit.

Homo enim generatur hoc homine

generato. Unde medicus non sanat

hominem nisi per accidens; sed per se

sanat Platonem aut Socratem, aut aliquem

hominem singulariter dictum, cui convenit

esse hominem, vel accidit inquantum est

curatus. Quamvis enim esse hominem per

21. The reason is that actions have to do

with singular things, and all processes of

generation belong to singular things. For

universals are generated or moved only

by reason of something else, inasmuch as

this belongs to singular things. For man is

generated when this man is generated.

Hence a physician heals man only

incidentally, but properly he heals Plato

or Socrates, or some man that can be

individually named, to whom the nature

man belongs, or rather to whom it is


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se conveniat Socrati, tamen curato et

medicato per accidens convenit: haec est

enim per se, Socrates est homo: quia si

Socrates definiretur, poneretur homo in

eius definitione, ut in quarto dicetur. Sed

haec est per accidens, curatus vel sanatus

est homo.

accidental inasmuch as he is the one

healed. For even though the nature man

belongs essentially to Socrates, still it

belongs only accidentally to the one

healed or cured; for the proposition

Socrates is a man is an essential one,

because, if Socrates were defined, man

would be given in his definition, as will be

said below in Book IV. But the

proposition What is healed or cured isman is an accidental one.

Unde cum ars sit universalium, experientia

singularium, si aliquis habet rationem artis

sine experientia, erit quidem perfectus in

hoc quod universale cognoscat; sed quia

ignorat singulare cum experimento careat,

multotiens in curando peccabit: quia

curatio magis pertinet ad singulare quam

ad universale, cum ad hoc pertineat per se,

ad illud per accidens.

22. Hence, since art has to do with

universals and experience with singulars,

if anyone has the theoretical knowledge of

an art but lacks experience, he will be

perfect insofar as he knows the universal;

but since he does not know the singular,

because he lacks experience, he will very

often make mistakes in healing. For

healing belongs to the realm of the

singular rather than to that of the

universal, because it belongs to the former

essentially and to the latter accidentally.

23. Yet we think (8).

Deinde cum dicit sed tamen comparat

experimentum ad artem quantum ad

cognitionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo

ponit praeeminentiam artis ad

Here he compares art with experience

from the viewpoint of knowing; and in

regard to this he does two things. First

(23), he states how art is superior to


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experimentum. Secundo probat, ibi, hoc

autem est quia hi quidem et cetera.

experience; and second (24), he proves

this (Now this is because).

Proponit autem praeeminentiam artis et

scientiae quantum ad tria. Scilicet quantum

ad scire, quod quidem magis arbitramur

esse per artem quam per experimentum.

Item quantum ad obviare, quod in

disputationibus accidit. Nam habens artem

potest disputando obviare his quae contra

artem dicuntur, non autem habens

experimentum. Item quantum ad hoc quod

artifices plus accedunt ad finem sapientiae,

quam experti, tamquam magis sit, idest

contingat, scire sapientiam sequentem

omnia, idest dum sequitur universalia. Ex

hoc enim artifex sapientior iudicatur, quam

expertus quia universalia considerat. Vel

aliter. Tamquam magis sit scire secundum

sapientiam omnia sequentem, idest

universalia. Alia litera, tamquam magis

secundum scire sapientia omnia sequente:

quasi dicat: tamquam sapientia sequente

omnia idest consequente ad

unumquodque, magis sit secundum scire,

quam secundum operari: ut scilicetdicantur sapientes magis qui magis sciunt,

non qui magis sunt operativi. Unde alia

litera hunc sensum habet planiorem, qui

sic dicit: tamquam secundum illud quod est

scire magis, omnes sequuntur sapientiam.

He claims that art and science are

superior to experience in three respects.

First, they are superior from the

viewpoint of scientific knowledge, which

we think is attained by art rather than by

experience. Second, they are superior

from the viewpoint of meeting objections,

which occurs in disputes. For in a dispute

the one who has an art is able to meet the

objections raised against that art, but one

who has experience [alone] cannot do

this. Third, they are superior from this

point of view, that those who have an art

come nearer to the goal of wisdom than

men of experience, Implying that it is,

i.e., happens to be, more truly to know if

wisdom pursues all things, i.e., insofar as

it pursues universals. For one who has an

art is judged wiser than one who has

experience, by reason of the fact that he

considers universals. Or in another

version: Implying that it is more

according to wisdom to know as onepursuing all things, i.e., universals.

Another reading has: As more

conformable to knowing, since wisdom

pursues all things, as if to say: As more

dependent upon knowing than upon

doing, since wisdom pursues all things,

i.e., it seeks to reach each single thing; so

that those are rather called wise who are


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more knowing, not those who are more

men of action. Hence another reading

expresses this meaning more clearly,

saying: Implying that all pursue wisdom

more with respect to knowing.

24. Now this is (9).

Consequenter cum dicit hoc autem probat

praedictam praeeminentiam tripliciter.

Prima probatio talis est. Illi, qui sciunt

causam et propter quid, scientiores sunt et

sapientiores illis qui ignorant causam, sed

solum sciunt quia. Experti autem sciunt

quia, sed nesciunt propter quid. Artifices

vero sciunt causam, et propter quid, et nonsolum quia: ergo sapientiores et

scientiores sunt artifices expertis.

Then he proves the superiority of art and

science mentioned above, and he does this

by means of three arguments. The first

runs thus: those who know the cause and

reason why a thing is so are more

knowing and wiser than those who

merely know that it is so but do not know

why. Now men of experience know thatsomething is so but do not know the

reason, whereas men who have an art

know not merely that something is so but

also know its cause and reason. Hence

those who have an art are wiser and more

knowing than those who have experience.

25. For this reason too (9).

Primo primam probat cum dicit, unde et

architectores et cetera. Probatio talis est.

Illi qui sciunt causam et propter quid

comparantur ad scientes tantum quia, sicut

architectonicae artes ad artes artificum

Here he proves the first aspect of

superiority, and this runs as follows.

Those who know the cause and reason

why a thing is so are compared to those

who merely know that it is so as the


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manu operantium. Sed architectonicae

artes sunt nobiliores: ergo et illi qui sciunt

causas et propter quid, sunt scientiores et

sapientiores scientibus tantum quia.

architectonic arts are to the arts of

manual laborers. But the architectonic

arts are nobler. In a similar way, then,

those who know the causes and reasons of

things are more knowing than those who

merely know that things are so.

Huius probationis prima ex hoc apparet,

quia architectores sciunt causas factorum.

Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est, quod

architector dicitur quasi principalis artifex:

ab archos quod est princeps, et techne

quod est ars. Dicitur autem ars principalior

illa, quae principaliorem operationem

habet. Operationes autem artificum hoc

modo distinguuntur: quia quaedam sunt ad

disponendum materiam artificii, sicut

carpentarii secando ligna et complanando

disponunt materiam ad formam navis. Alia

est operatio ad inductionem formae; sicut

cum aliquis ex lignis dispositis et

praeparatis navem compaginat. Alia est

operatio in usum rei iam constitutae; et

ista est principalissima. Prima autem est

infima, quia prima ordinatur ad secundam,

et secunda ad tertiam. Unde navisfactor estarchitector respectu eius qui praeparat

ligna. Gubernator autem, qui utitur navi

iam facta, est architector respectu navis

factoris.

26. The first part of this proof becomes

clear from the fact that architects, or

master artists, know the causes of the

things that are done. In order to

understand this we must note that

architect means chief artist, from meaning chief, and meaning art.

Now that art is said to be a chief art which

performs a more important operation.

Indeed, the operations of artists aredistinguished in this way; for some

operations are directed to disposing the

material of the artifact. Carpenters, for

example, by cutting and planing the wood,

dispose matter for the form of a ship.

Another operation is directed to

introducing this form into the matter, for

example, when someone builds a ship out

of wood which has been disposed andprepared. A third operation is directed to

the use of the finished product, and this is

the highest operation. But the first

operation is the lowest because it is

directed to the second and the second to

the third. Hence the shipbuilder is a

superior artist compared with the one

who prepares the wood; and the


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navigator, who uses the completed ship, is

a superior artist compared with the

shipbuilder.

Et, quia materia est propter formam, et

talis debet esse materia quae formae

competat, ideo navisfactor scit causam,

quare ligna debeant esse sic disposita;

quod nesciunt illi qui praeparant ligna.

Similiter, cum tota navis sit propter usum

ipsius, ille qui navi utitur, scit quare talis

forma debeat esse; ad hoc enim debet talis

esse, ut tali usui conveniens sit. Et sic patet,

quod ex forma artificii sumitur causa

operationum, quae sunt circa

dispositionem materiae. Et ex usu sumitur

causa operationum, quae sunt circa

formam artificiati.

27. Further, since matter exists for the

sake of form, and ought to be such as to

befit the form, the shipbuilder knows the

reason why the wood should be shaped in

some particular way; but those who

prepare the wood do not know this. And

in a similar way, since the completed ship

exists in order to be used, the one who

uses the ship knows why it should have

some particular form; for the form should

be one that befits its use. Thus it is evident

that the reason for the operations which

dispose the matter is taken from the

design of the product in the artists mind,

and the reason for the operations which

produce the form of the artifact is taken

from the use [to which the artifact is put].

Et sic manifestum est, quod architectores

factorum causas sciunt. Illos vero, scilicet

manu artifices, iudicamus vel

denominamus, sicut quaedam

inanimatorum. Et hoc non ideo quia faciunt

operationes artificiales, sed quia quae

faciunt, incognita faciunt. Sciunt enim quia,

sed causas non cognoscunt; sicut etiam

ignis exurit absque aliqua cognitione. Est

igitur quantum ad hoc similitudo inter

inanimata et manu artifices, quod sicut

28. It is evident, then, that the master

artists know the causes of the things

which are done. In fact we judge and

speak about the others, i.e., the manual

laborers, as we do about certain

inanimate things. This is not because they

do not perform artful operations, but

because the things which they do they do

without knowing the cause; for they know

that something is to be done but not why

it is, just as fire burns without knowing


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absque causae cognitione inanimata

operantur ut ordinata ab aliquo superiori

intellectu in proprium finem, ita et manu

artifices. Sed in hoc est differentia: quia

inanimata faciunt unumquodque suorum

operum per naturam, sed manu artifices

per consuetudinem: quae licet vim naturae

habeat inquantum ad unum inclinat

determinate, tamen a natura differt in hoc,

quod est circa ea quae sunt ad utrumlibetsecundum humanam cognitionem.

Naturalia enim non consuescimus, sicut

dicitur in secundo Ethicorum. Nec etiam

cognitione carentium est consuescere.

Haec autem quae dicta sunt, sic sunt

consideranda tamquam ex eis appareat,

quod aliqui non sunt sapientiores

secundum quod est practicos, id est

operatores esse, quod convenit expertis;

sed secundum quod aliqui habent rationem

de agendis, et cognoscunt causas

agendorum, ex quibus rationes sumuntur:

quod convenit architectoribus.

why. Hence there is a likeness between

inanimate things and manual laborers

from this point of view, that, just as

inanimate things act without knowing the

causes, inasmuch as they are directed to

their proper end by a superior intellect, so

also do manual laborers. But they differ in

this respect, that inanimate things

perform each of their operations as a

result of their nature, whereas manuallaborers perform theirs through habit.

And while habit is practically the same as

nature inasmuch as it is inclined to one

definite effect, still habit differs from

nature inasmuch as it is open to opposites

by reason of human knowledge. For we do

not habituate natural bodies, as is stated

in Book II of the Ethics; nor, indeed, is it

possible to cause habits in things that lack

knowledge. Now the statements that have

been made, as is evident from the

statements themselves, must be

interpreted as meaning that some men

are wiser, not insofar as they are

practical, i.e., men of action, as befits

men of experience, but insofar as they

have a plan for things to be done and

know their causes, which are the basis of

such a plan; and this befits master artists.

29. In general a sign of scientific

knowledge (10).


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Deinde cum dicit et omnino ponit

secundam rationem: quae talis est. Signum

scientis est posse docere: quod ideo est,

quia unumquodque tunc est perfectum in

actu suo, quando potest facere alterum sibi

simile, ut dicitur quarto Meteororum. Sicut

igitur signum caliditatis est quod possit

aliquid calefacere, ita signum scientis est,

quod possit docere, quod est scientiam in

alio causare. Artifices autem docerepossunt, quia cum causas cognoscant, ex

eis possunt demonstrare: demonstratio

autem est syllogismus faciens scire, ut

dicitur primo posteriorum. Experti autem

non possunt docere, quia non possunt ad

scientiam perducere cum causam ignorent.

Et si ea quae experimento cognoscunt aliis

tradant, non recipientur per modum

scientiae, sed per modum opinionis vel

credulitatis. Unde patet quod artifices sunt

magis sapientes et scientes expertis.

Here he gives the second argument, which

is as follows: a sign of knowledge is the

ability to teach, and this is so because

each thing is perfect in its activity when it

can produce another thing similar to itself,

as is said in Book IV of Meteors. Therefore,

just as the possession of heat is indicated

by the fact that a thing can heat something

else, in a similar way the possession of

knowledge is indicated by the fact thatone can teach, that is, cause knowledge in

another. But men who have an art can

teach, for since they know causes they can

demonstrate from these; and

demonstration is a syllogism which

produces knowledge, as is said in Book I

of the Posterior Analytics. But men who

have experience [only] cannot teach; for

since they do not know the causes, they

cannot cause knowledge in someone else.

And if they do teach others the things

which they know by experience, these

things are not learned after the manner of

scientific knowledge but after that of

opinion or belief. Hence, it is clear that

men who have an art are wiser and more

knowing than those who have experience.

30. Furthermore, we do not hold (11).

Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit

tertiam rationem; quae talis est.

Cognitiones singularium magis sunt

Here he gives the third argument, which is

as follows: knowing singular things is

proper to the senses rather than to any


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propriae sensibus quam alicui alteri

cognitioni, cum omnis cognitio singularium

a sensu oriatur. Sed tamen, nec unum, idest

nullum sensum dicimus sapientiam, scilicet

propter hoc quod licet aliquis sensus

cognoscat quia, tamen, non propter quid

cognoscit. Tactus enim iudicat quod ignis

calidus est, non tamen apprehendit

propter quid: ergo experti qui habent

singularium cognitionem causamignorantes, sapientes dici non possunt.

other type of knowing [power], since our

entire knowledge of singular things

originates with the senses. Yet we do not

hold that any one of these, i.e., any one

of the senses, is wisdom, because even

though each sense knows that a thing is

so, it does not know why it is so; for touch

judges that fire is hot but does not know

why it is hot. Therefore men of

experience, who have a knowledge ofsingular things but do not know their

causes, cannot be called wise men.

31. It is only fitting (12).

Deinde cum dicit primum quidemcomparat artem activam speculativae. Et

circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod

ars speculativa magis est sapientia quam

activa. Secundo respondet cuidam

obiectioni, ibi, in moralibus.

Here he compares practical art withspeculative art; and in regard to this he

does three things. First (20), he shows

that a speculative art is wisdom to a

greater degree than a practical art. Second

(ibid.), he answers an objection (The

difference).

Ostendit autem quod primo dictum est, tali

ratione. In quibuscumque scientiis vel

artibus invenitur id propter quod homines

scientes prae aliis hominibus in

admiratione vel honore habentur, illae

scientiae sunt magis honorabiles, et magis

dignae nomine sapientiae. Quilibet autem

inventor artis habetur in admiratione,

He proves his first statement by this

argument: in any of the sciences or arts

we find that men with scientific

knowledge are more admired and are

held in higher esteem than all other men,

because their knowledge is held to be

nobler and more worthy of the name of

wisdom. Now the discoverer of any art at


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propter hoc quod habet sensum et

iudicium et discretionem causae ultra

aliorum hominum sensum, et non propter

utilitatem illorum quae invenit: sed magis

admiramur, sicut sapientem et ab aliis

distinguentem. Sapientem quidem,

quantum ad subtilem inquisitionem

causarum rei inventae: distinguentem

vero, quantum ad investigationem

differentiarum unius rei ad aliam. Velaliter, ab aliis distinguentem, ut passive

legatur, quasi in hoc ab aliis distinguatur.

Unde alia litera habet, differentem. Ergo

scientiae aliquae sunt magis admirabiles et

magis dignae nomine sapientiae propter

eminentiorem sensum, et non propter

utilitatem.

all is admired because he perceives,

judges and discerns a cause beyond the

perceptions of other men, and not because

of the usefulness of his discoveries. We

admire him rather as being wise, and as

distinguishing [a thing] from others. As

being wise, indeed, in the subtle way in

which he investigates the causes of his

discoveries, and as distinguishing [a

thing] from others insofar as heinvestigates the ways in which one thing

differs from another. Or, according to

another interpretation, as being distinct

from the others is to be read passively, as

being distinguished in this respect from

others. Hence another text has one who

is different. Some sciences, then, are

more admirable and worthy of the name

of wisdom because their observations are

more outstanding, not because they are

useful.

Cum igitur plures artes sint repertae

quantum ad utilitatem, quarum quaedam

sunt ad vitae necessitatem, sicut

mechanicae; quaedam vero adintroductionem in aliis scientiis, sicut

scientiae logicales: illi artifices dicendi sunt

sapientiores, quorum scientiae non sunt ad

utilitatem inventae, sed propter ipsum

scire, cuiusmodi sunt scientiae

speculativae.

32. Therefore, since many useful arts have

been discovered (some to provide the

necessities of life, as the mechanical arts,

and others to introduce us to the sciences,as the logical disciplines), those artists

must be said to be wiser whose sciences

were discovered not for the sake of utility

but merely for the sake of knowing, that is

to say, the speculative sciences.


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Et quod speculativae scientiae non sint

inventae ad utilitatem, patet per hoc

signum: quia, iam partis, id est acquisitis

vel repertis omnibus huiusmodi, quae

possunt esse ad introductionem in

scientiis, vel ad necessitatem vitae, vel ad

voluptatem, sicut artes quae sunt ordinatae

ad hominum delectationem: speculativae

non sunt propter huiusmodi repertae, sed

propter seipsas. Et quod non sint adutilitatem inventae, patet ex loco quo

inventae sunt. In locis enim illis primo

repertae sunt, ubi primo homines

studuerunt circa talia. Alia litera habet, et

primum his locis ubi vacabant, id est ab

aliis occupationibus quiescentes studio

vacabant quasi necessariis abundantes.

Unde et circa Aegyptum primo inventae

sunt artes mathematicae, quae sunt

maxime speculativae, a sacerdotibus, qui

sunt concessi studio vacare, et de publico

expensas habebant, sicut etiam legitur in

Genesi.

33. That the speculative sciences were not

discovered for the sake of utility is made

clear by this fact, that after all sciences of

this kind had already been developed,

i.e., acquired or discovered, which can

serve as introductions to the other

sciences, or provide the necessities of life,

or give pleasure (as those arts whose

object is to delight man), the speculative

sciences were discovered, not for thiskind of end, but for their own sake. The

fact that they were not discovered for the

sake of utility becomes evident from the

place in which they were discovered. For

they originated in those places where men

first applied themselves to such things.

Another version reads, And first in those

places where men had leisure, i.e., they

had time for study because they were

released from other occupations as a

result of the abundance of things

necessary [for life]. Hence the

mathematical arts, which are speculative

in the highest degree, were first

discovered in Egypt by the priests, who

were given time for study, and whose

expenses were defrayed by the

community, as we also read in Genesis

(47:22)

Sed quia usus nomine artis fuerat et

sapientiae et scientiae quasi indifferenter,

ne aliquis putet haec omnia esse nomina

synonyma idem penitus significantia hanc

34. But because the names wisdom,

science and art have been used

indifferently, lest someone should think

that these terms are synonymous, he


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opinionem removet, et remittit ad librum

Moralium, idest ad sextum Ethicorum, ubi

dictum est, in quo differant scientia et ars

et sapientia et prudentia et intellectus. Et

ut breviter dicatur, sapientia et scientia et

intellectus sunt circa partem animae

speculativam, quam ibi scientificum

animae appellat. Differunt autem, quia

intellectus est habitus principiorum

primorum demonstrationis. Scientia veroest conclusionis ex causis inferioribus.

Sapientia vero considerat causas primas.

Unde ibidem dicitur caput scientiarum.

Prudentia vero et ars est circa animae

partem practicam, quae est ratiocinativa

de contingentibus operabilibus a nobis. Et

differunt: nam prudentia dirigit in

actionibus quae non transeunt ad

exteriorem materiam, sed sunt

perfectiones agentis: unde dicitur ibi quod

prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Ars

vero dirigit in factionibus, quae in

materiam exteriorem transeunt, sicut

aedificare et secare: unde dicitur quod ars

est recta ratio factibilium.

excludes this opinion and refers to his

work on morals, i.e., to Book VI of

the Ethics, where he has explained the

difference between art, wisdom, science,

prudence, and understanding. And to give

the distinction brieflywisdom, science

and understanding pertain to the

speculative part of the soul, which he

speaks of in that work as the scientific

part of the soul. But they differ in thatunderstanding is the habit of the first

principles of demonstration, whereas

science has to do with conclusions drawn

from subordinate causes, and wisdom

with first causes. This is the reason it is

spoken of there as the chief science. But

prudence and art belong to the practical

part of the soul, which reasons about our

contingent courses of action. And these

also differ; for prudence directs us in

actions which do not pass over into some

external matter but are perfections of the

one acting (which is the reason why

prudence is defined in that work as the

reasoned plan of things to be done), but

art directs us in those productive actions,

such as building and cutting, which pass

over into external matter (which is the

reason why art is defined as the reasoned

plan of things to be made).

Wisdom deals with causes.


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Deinde cum dicit cuius autem ostendit ex

praehabitis principale propositum; quod

scilicet sapientia sit circa causas. Unde dicit

quod hoc est cuius gratia nunc sermonem

facimus, idest ratiocinationem praedictam:

quia scientia illa quae denominatur

sapientia, videtur esse circa primas causas,

et circa prima principia. Quod quidem

patet ex praehabitis. Unusquisque enim

tanto sapientior est, quanto magis acceditad causae cognitionem: quod ex

praehabitis patet; quia expertus est

sapientior eo qui solum habet sensum sine

experimento. Et artifex est sapientior

experto quocumque. Et inter artifices

architector est sapientior manu artifice. Et

inter artes etiam et scientias, speculativae

sunt magis scientiae quam activae. Et haec

omnia ex praedictis patent. Unde

relinquitur quod illa scientia, quae

simpliciter est sapientia, est circa causas.

Et est similis modus arguendi, sicut si

diceremus: illud quod est magis calidum,

est magis igneum: unde quod simpliciter

est ignis, est calidum simpliciter.

35. From what has been said he proves his

major thesis, that is to say, that wisdom

deals with the causes of things. He says

that the reason for undertaking this

investigation, i.e., the above piece of

reasoning, is that the science which is

called wisdom seems to be about first

causes and principles. This is evident from

the foregoing; for the more a man attains

to a knowledge of the cause, the wiser heis. This is also evident from the foregoing;

because the man of experience is wiser

than one who has sensation alone without

experience; and the artist is wiser than

any man of experience; and among artists

the architect is wiser than the manual

laborer. And similarly among the arts and

sciences the speculative are more

scientific than the practical. All these

things are dear from the foregoing

remarks. It follows, then, that that science

which is wisdom in an absolute sense is

concerned with the causes of things. The

method of arguing would be similar if we

were to say that that which is hotter is

more afire, and therefore that that which

is afire in an absolute sense is hot in an

absolute sense.

LESSON 2


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Wisdom Considers Universal First Causes and First Principles

ARISTOTLES TEXT Chapter 2: 982a 4-982b 11

, [5] ,

. , . , [10] :

14. But since we are in search of this

science, it will therefore be necessary

to consider with what kind of causes

and principles wisdom or sciencedeals. This will perhaps become

evident if we take the opinions which

we have about the wise man. First of

all, then, we think that the wise man is

one who knows all things in the

highest degree, as becomes him,

without having a knowledge of them

individually.

, ( , ):

15. Next, we say that that man is wise

who is capable of knowing things that

are difficult and not easy for man to

understand. For sensory perception is

common to all, and is therefore easy

and not a matter of wisdom.

16. Again, [we consider him wise whois] more certain.

17. And in every branch of science we


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: say that he is wiser who is morecapable of teaching us about the causes

of things.

[15]

,

18. Again, among the sciences we think

that that science which exists for itself

and is desirable for the sake of

knowledge is wisdom to a greaterdegree than one which is desirable for

the sake of contingent effects.

:

, , .

Commentary on Metaphysics by Aquinas - BOOK I, 17 Lessons

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