Transcript
Alexander the great imitator
Throughout the ancient sources on Alexander the Great
(Arrian, Plutarch, Diodorus, Curtius, Justin), the authors
struggle to understand Alexander’s choices during his campaigns
in Asia Minor and the rest of Persian territory. This is usually
characterized by Medizing, which from the time of Herodotus was
often applied to those who sympathized with either Persian policy
or culture. We can see the effects of Medizing in the Alexander
narratives in what W.W. Tarn called a “policy of fusion”:i
Alexander’s policies, military tactics, and alliances that have
been interpreted as effort towards cultural unity.ii Although the
Alexander sources seem conflicted with Alexander’s identification
with Persian tactics, they also reveal that Alexander borrows
many tactics from both his Macedonian predecessors, such as his
father Philip II and earlier kings, and local Persian customs,
either established by earlier kings like Cyrus the Great or
contemporary rulers. The question that arises is: were Alexander
the Great’s innovations truly innovative? Although this paper
could deal with the sources in particular, and their specific
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reasons for choosing and emphasizing events, issues of
historiography will be left aside in order to focus on the events
and decisions themselves. This paper will demonstrate that
Alexander’s Macedonian court policies appear to be similar to
previous policies in both Macedonia and Persia, through his
choices in diplomatic policies, clothing, and customary
practices.
Just as Alexander later would do, Philip’s power over his
troops came from the “breaking of personal ties between the
rulers/landlords…and their dependent population, and replacing
these bonds with attachments to himself.”iii Alexander exploited
the influence that Philip gained by claiming those bonds also
applied to his own rule of Macedon, and expanded new bonds to the
Persian rulers. Although our sources treat Philip’s bond-making
as Macedonian, the Persians had a similar system in which the
people were called bandaka, which “describes both subject and
loyal peoples who supplied aid against rebels.”iv The Achaemenid
rulers, just as Philip, sought to create personal relationships
between themselves and their subjects by weakening family
solidarity.v This is most evident in that fact that “the
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Macedonians were styled simply ‘those from Philip’ or ‘those from
Alexander,’” as the king was the main identity of the people.vi
Alexander treats high-ranking Persians and Macedonian Companions
as his own Kinsmen, as seen when Alexander allows Persians alone
to act as Kinsmen and give him the customary kiss, until the
repentance of the Macedonian troops at Opis.vii Proximity and
connectivity to the king was most easily represented by these
gifts of clothing and authority within the king’s ranks. As a
result that Llewellyn-Jones also points out, being “’Friend of
the king’ was clearly a closely guarded privilege and a source of
pride,” although notably for both the Persian and Macedonian
cultures.viii
Alexander also follows in Philip’s footsteps by his
ambitious campaigning into Asia Minor and Persia. As E.A.
Fredricksmeyer believes, the historical stereotype of Philip “as
prudent and cautious, and middle-aged, who pursued a purely
national Macedonian policy” is too calm, and does not take into
account the opportunity to take control of the heterogeneous
Persian Empire piece by piece, especially as expressed by
Isocrates.ix Philip even went to the Pythian oracle and asked for
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the gods’ approval in overthrowing the Persian king.x If
Fredricksmeyer is correct in viewing Philip as driven by an
expansionist foreign policy, then Alexander would have been
exposed to ideas of Persian conquest, desires for deification,
and absolute monarchy.xi
Even at the beginning of his Asiatic campaign, Alexander
used Persian tactics to allow conquered people to return to their
culturally normal style of rule. Persia allowed relative autonomy
to many conquered states, but failed to appease the Ionian Greeks
with enforced oligarchy. While freeing the Ionians and Aeolians
(Greeks living on the coast of Asia Minor), Arrian claims that
Alexander “drove on to destroy the oligarchies everywhere, and he
established democracies and restored its own laws to each and
every community, and he ceased the large tributes that they paid
to the barbarians.”xii But, establishment of democracy also would
benefit Alexander during his conquests, as the Ionian cities
would not easily revolt against their liberator. Although “what
the Macedonian government wished was only an external political
protectorate over the Greek states,” Alexander ironically
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accomplished this by overthrowing the Person political
protectorates already established in Ionia.xiii
The use of democracy to distract the Ionians kept
Alexander’s reputation positive with the ‘conquered/freed’
people, but also follows a divide and conquer tactic used in both
Macedonia and Persia (and later in Rome).xiv Alexander treats the
Ionians as Philip treated the mainland Greeks, as they both strip
“the Hellenic republics of their essential forces and of their
competence in foreign affairs, and this, not in order to hand
them over to an organ common to all the member states, but to a
third power outside the League.”xv Alexander allowed relative
autonomy and democracy for the Ionians, as long as his own
monarchical court could sit alongside of their Greek values.
Similarly, after Cyrus defeated the Lydians in 557 BCE and
offered terms to the Ionians, he also acted as a foreign
authority.xvi When Cyrus offered terms to the Ionians, “the
majority refused, but Miletus accepted, and the Persians had
learned their first lesson in handling the Greeks-divide and
conquer.”xvii One could see Cyrus’s and Alexander’s divide and
conquer stories as purely Roman bias imposed on previous events.
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However, the main source for Cyrus’s encounter is Herodotus, who
was “born a Persian subject...was still in contact with Persian
friends, [and] he employed Persian sources, written or
unwritten.”xviii This could not be simply a Roman invention for the
Ionian conquests, since Herodotus’s account of Cyrus predates the
rise and expansion of Rome or of Alexander. If anything,
Alexander might have gained inspiration for dealing with the
Ionians in a similar way by reading Herodotus and using this
Persian tactic, or through his own court system using divide and
rule tactics since they established Persian contact. Both Cyrus
and Alexander exploited the loose alliances of the Greek
poleisxix, recognizing that they were unable to unify as long as
they were individually accountable to a foreign power.
Alexander also has another divide and conquer example from
his own father, Philip II, and his treatment of Greece through
the League of Corinth. Justin and Plutarch both present the
Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE as “an end to the glorious
sovereignty and ancient liberty of all Greece,” since even the
Greeks’ unified efforts did not stop their defeat.xx The
conquering of Greece allowed Philip to sweep away their previous
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governments and create a common peace between himself and the
Greeks, so that Greece could neither rebel against Philip nor
allow other city-states to rebel without punishment.xxi Philip was
able to win over the Greeks through both military victory and his
“Philhellenic” nature, as he “spread the word that he desired to
make war against the Persians on behalf of the Greeks, and to
punish them on behalf of their profanation of the temples.”xxii
Even with the Greek states attempting to unify and defeat Philip,
they were still subjugated and divided by this peace treaty,
which was ironically “a variant [treaty] on a form invented by
Greeks and well known to them.”xxiii Each city-state was solely
accountable to Philip and his successors, not to other Greek
states. Therefore, the common peace formed by the League of
Corinth urged the Greek states to cautiously police each other
and themselves, and placed mental barriers between the city-
states. Philip appeared as the representative of Greece, acting
as an outside authority to whom the city-states were dependent.
After the death of Philip, city-states such as Thebes showed
signs of revolt, although the Greeks still lacked necessary
unification. With democracy subjugated under the peace treaty,
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Philip “had left them in turmoil and confusion, because he
created a situation which was completely unfamiliar to them.”xxiv
Alexander had an opportunity to reveal his pledged authority
during the revolt of Thebes. Since the Thebans were already
despised for assisting the Persians during the Persian Wars, they
became an easy target for Alexander to pinpoint and to unify the
Greeks under his cause. Diodorus tells us that “Greeks were
mercilessly slain by Greeks, and relatives butchered by their own
relatives, and not even a common dialect induced pity.”xxv Along
with this, Alexander calls “a meeting of the Greek
representatives to a common council, and puts before them how to
deal with the city of the Thebans.”xxvi Just as Philip gave the
Greeks the appearance of having some authority by policing each
other, Alexander allows the Greeks to also judge the punishment
for those who rebel. By giving certain Greeks this authority when
rebellion occurs, he could urge others to desire this judicial
authority over rebellion and punishment. If we trust Plutarch
that the “principal object in permitting the sack of Thebes was
to frighten the rest of the Greeks into submission by making a
terrible example,” then Alexander is reminding the Greeks of his
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place as head of the Greek states.xxvii So long as the Greek poleis
did not even consider fully unifying and revolting en masse,
Alexander would have no trouble with eliminating a few major
instigating cities as an example of his authority.
While seizing certain cities in Asia Minor, Alexander
controlled those new allies in a Persian manner by through his
choice of rulers. For example, while conquering Caria, Alexander
was met by Ada, a local woman of royal blood.xxviii During this
meeting, “he ordered for her to receive the rule of Caria. Thus
by his favors through his good service to this woman, he made the
Carians his own people.”xxix Alexander would have known that
Philip originally planned a marriage alliance with Pixodarus, by
his plans to marry his eldest son Arrhidaeus to Pixodarus’s
eldest daughter. Therefore, following his father’s uncompleted
political connection to a Persian satrap seems reasonable.
Alexander saw benefit in rising up the traditional power
structure of Caria, while also making himself her adopted son; a
family alliance even Philip was unable to do in his lifetime.xxx
This gave Ada power through Alexander, as she could claim him as
royal family and gain more authority to support her dynasty. On
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the other hand, Alexander could gain influence in matriarchal
Caria through his ruling ‘mother’ and could depend on her for
supplies and evidence for legitimacy as Persian royalty.
Alexander, as son of Ada, would be considered the legitimate heir
of Caria and therefore gained a stern footing for his role as a
Persian monarch.
After defeating Persian king Darius III at the Battle of
Issus in 333 BCE, Alexander captured Darius’s family that had
been left behind in the retreat, and “maintain[ed] to Sisyngambis
that she is his second mother.”xxxi Alexander claimed another
mother and related himself to the Achaemenid royal family, as “a
[Persian] king’s possession of the blood-royal was the very basis
of the monarchy,” and was necessary for his legitimacy as
ruler.xxxii This was a major political move, since “the king’s
mother held the highest place of authority among the court
ladies,” and was now solely in Alexander’s control.xxxiii He
returned all of her servants along with extra, promised a more
generous marriage for her daughters than Darius promised, and
desired to raise her son.xxxiv By doing this, Diodorus shows
Alexander claiming the role of a better father, putting himself
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over the weakening role of Darius. Alexander is able to build
credibility for Persian rule through both Ada and Sisyngambis,
using the women as a means to unify his territory.
These diplomatic connections are nothing new to Macedonian
royalty, as even Amyntas and Alexander I were both on good terms
with the Persians through royal women. We can see these
connections even with a Persian nobleman and son of Megabazus,
Bubares, who married the daughter of Amyntas. Justin tells us
that the “relationship with Bubares not only secured to
Alexander, his son and successor, peace in the reign of Darius,
but truly such favor with Xerxes, in order that, when that ruler
overcame Greece like a tempest, he conferred upon him the
sovereignty of all regions between the mountains of Olympus and
Haemus.”xxxv Just as Alexander I was able to expand in the Balkans
through Persian support, perhaps Alexander III could do the same,
so long as he gained Persian support and credibility.xxxvi
Similarly, Alexander acts just as Philip had, although Philip
used marriage rather than maternal status to unify surrounding
territories and prevail as the main authority of Balkan
countries. Because Philip bound Elimeia by means of Phila,
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Illyria by Audata, Thessaly by Nicesipolis and Philinna, Thrace
by Meda, Epirus by Olympia, and finally Macedonia by Cleopatra,
Alexander grew up with constant knowledge of the benefits of
diplomatic connections through women.
Alexander also exploited local legends to gain authority in
Persia, even if it was on a smaller scale. One such example is
his unraveling of the mythical Gordian Knot in Gordium, left
there by a Phrygian peasant made king, which some ancient sources
claim “that the one loosening the knot is destined by fate to
become king of the entire region.”xxxvii As Mark Munn argues, the
Greeks would have virtually no knowledge of the Gordian Knot or
King Midas, who stands at the center of the story.xxxviii Alexander
could manipulate any medium possible to gain credibility as a
Persian ruler, since the legend would play well with both
Macedonians and Phrygians in order to help secure Phrygia.
Alexander could manipulate any medium possible to gain
credibility as a Persian ruler, since the legend would play well
with local people (similarly to in Caria) and help secure
Phrygia. Ernest Fredricksmeyer claims that Alexander was “in
fact intimately acquainted with the Macedonian tradition about
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Midas son of Gordius.”xxxix Although Munn and Fredricksmeyer view
the Midas legend as migrating from Phrygia to Macedonia and
Macedonia to Phrygia, respectively, either direction of migration
does not include the Greeks. Our ancient sources find the need to
explain this legend to their Greco-Roman audience because of
their lack of cultural knowledge. Alexander’s Macedonian
background, which was culturally tied to Persian legends, allowed
him to exploit his heritage fully. By undoing the knot, Alexander
could allow his conquering of the myth to run rampant, as the
legend would add to his legitimacy as ruler in the area.
Once Darius was captured and killed by the Bactrian governor
Bessus, Alexander set out to seize the usurper, who was now
claiming kingship under the name of Artaxerxes V.xl As part of
his role as the new Achaemenid king, Alexander must protect arta
(truth) and wipe out drauga (lie). Since the “concept of drauga was
best represented by the chaos of rebellion and insurgence against
the throne,” it was necessary for Alexander to crush Bessus.xli
Curtius points out a change in Alexander’s attitude towards
others during the pursuit, noting, “Until now in the king’s soul
clung a slim remnant of his former manner…here having been
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liberated from the governorship of Media, he receives the brother
of Darius into his cohort of friends, having retained all honor
of his ancient and distinguished lineage.”xlii Curtius asserts
that Alexander once acted differently, and yet still was able to
treat a few conquered people with their previous cultural honor,
such as was done with Ada of Caria and others in Darius’s family.
Curtius recognizes that Alexander was not acting in a
predictable, Hellenocentric manner. This event reveals an
Alexander who connects himself to already established
governments, exploiting Persian policy and cultural ties in order
to gain authority.
After conquering Media, Ecbatana, and Hyrcania, all of our
ancient sources (besides Arrian) mention Alexander donning
Persian dress. N.G.L. Hammond notes, “as King of the Macedonians
and as King of Asia he had different roles to fill,” which the
ancient sources try to reconcile.xliii The Greco-Roman authors seem
confused by Alexander’s seemingly irregular actions, leading to
different explanations of Alexander’s purpose or changed
attitude. Diodorus shows Alexander putting on everything except
the trousers and shirt, and “brought around him concubines…[but
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he] used them sparingly…fearing any offence to the
Macedonians.”xliv Curtius describes Alexander whose “self-
restraint and moderation, supreme qualities at the height of good
fortune, turned into arrogance and dissipation,” now bringing in
concubines, wearing Persian dress, and also forcing the clothing
upon his friends and cavalry in a Persian attempt for loyalty.xlv
Justin comments as well on Alexander’s adoption of Persian garb,
forcing it upon friends, and the inclusion of concubines, also
stating the troops’ discontent at their king wearing the clothing
of the defeated.xlvi Plutarch tells us that Alexander had “either
a desire to adapt himself to neighboring customs, as dwelling
with the same race is a great step towards the reclaiming of men.
Alternatively, he was planning this as some trial of obeisance
for the Macedonians.”xlvii Each of these sources agree that
Alexander did begin to wear Persian clothing, while most agree
that he did not fully wear Persian garb for the sake of not
upsetting the Macedonian troops. The ancient sources do not know
what to make of this clothing change, only pointing out the
unsettled troops who are just as disconcerted as the authors.
Even without knowing Alexander’s exact intentions for wearing
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Persian clothing, the Alexander sources accept that this change
of culture occurred after the defeat of Darius and control of
Persia fell to Alexander.
Plutarch and Justin also point out Alexander’s allowance of
marriages.xlviii Justin writes that Alexander did not want to
appear alone in Medizing, and allowed his soldiers to marry
Persian women, “for he thought they would be less easer to return
home if they had in camp some semblance of a home and domestic
setting.”xlix Justin portrays this as Alexander’s reaction to his
troops’ resentment of Medizing, unlike Curtius and Diodorus who
show this through gift-giving. Alexander’s gift of marriage works
twofold; Alexander maintains influence over his troops through
his generosity, and to ally himself to the Persians. In both
Macedonian and Persian customs, gift-giving and marriages could
be used to “constrain the behavior of the aristocrats so that
they would act only in the king’s interests.”l Both Alexander and
Darius spread their wealth to nobles to retain loyalty and
authority, and were able to use women as a source of reliability
and connectivity to their closest associates.
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In each instance, from Alexander’s earlier dealings with the
Greek city-states to the eventual defeat of the Persian king
Darius III, Alexander did not create a new way to deal with
foreign policy or conquering. In dealing with his own military
and court leaders, Alexander followed Philip’s example (and
Achaemenid example) in creating strong personal connections to
the king, so that the king gained priority over familial or
national ties. When conquering the Greeks in Asia Minor,
Alexander restored democracy in an individualistic sense, so that
each city-state would owe Alexander directly for their
protection, and each polis would police each other for Alexander.
This strategy is not Alexander’s alone, but also used by Cyrus
against the Ionians and Philip against the mainland Greeks.
Alexander’s connections to Persian women for the sake of
authority seems no different than political marriages in the
Macedonian court, which works under a similar gift-giving system
of marriage.
Finally, Alexander’s donning of Persian outfits after
the death of Darius reveal his ability to borrow cultural objects
as a means of connecting with those around him. Although
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Alexander deals with situations which none of his Macedonian or
Persian predecessors had, he simply borrows policies or customs
that succeeded in previous kingships in order to ensure his own
success. Through this perspective, Alexander does not appear to
be as innovative in his policies, but instead takes the multiple
opportunities he can during the conquest to manipulate those
around him with his repertoire of royal tactics. While previous
rulers in both Persia and Macedonia set the foundation by means
of their policies, Alexander was able to exploit that previous
knowledge in new contexts by campaigning against the Persian
Empire.
Bibliography
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Tarn, W.W. Alexander the Great. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948 (2002).Vol. II, 399-449.
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i See W. W. Tarn, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” Proceedings of the British Academy, (1933), 123-166. W. W. Tarn initiates the modern discussion of Alexander’s intentions in challenging the apparently common belief that Zeno was the originator of a universalist ideal, ὁμόνοια, instead of Alexander the Great. Tarn’s linear progression fails to allow historical figures to make groundbreaking changes in history, since each is only allowed to make minor transitions in the footsteps of their predecessor. Ernst Badian (1958) replies to Tarn, revising points that he considered incorrect to a more realistic view of Alexander. The overall criticism of Tarn springs from Badian’s approach to Alexander, viewing him as more of a pragmatist instead of an idealist, a character Badian affectionately labels “Alexander the Dreamer” (428). Badian’s view of Alexander the pragmatist tackles the speech and banquet at Opis, seeing the event not as a desire for unity,but as reconciliation between Alexander and his troops, as well as the Macedonians and Persians. A.B. Bosworth (1980) picks up where Badian left off on Alexander’s integration of the Iranians as part of his policy of fusion. Bosworth grounds his position opposite of Tarn concerning Alexander, stating his belief that “the brotherhood of man as a vision of Alexander is dead” (1). Alexander finds an outletfor legitimacy through the acknowledgement of rule by Oxyathres, Darius’s brother, and his marriage to Oxyathres’s daughter, Roxane (6). Along with Roxane, Alexander also ended up marrying Barsine (Darius’s oldest daughter) and Parysatis (Ochus’s youngest daughter). Both of these marriages show Alexander connecting himself to Persian royals by family relations. Bosworth reveals an Alexander that chooses to marry for legitimacy, create separate Persian sections of his army, and change intoPersian dress, though just enough to conform to the “local mores” of the Persians (14). See Ernst,Badian, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 7, 4 (1958), 425-444; Ernst Badian, “Greeks and Macedonians,” In Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenic Times, Studies in the History of Art, Vol. 10 (Washington DC: National Gallery of Art, 1982): 33-51. A.B.Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 100, Centenary Issue (1980): 1-21. D. Brendan Nagle, “The Cultural Context of Alexander’s Speech at Opis,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 126 (1996): 151-172. Nagle mentions the issue of the authors’ differing reasons for the Macedonian troops’ discontent, although somehow centered on the Epigoni. Overall, Nagle gives an impression of an Alexander created by Arrian and Curtius who, at least at Opis, is willing to exploit his father’s deeds and pout at his troops until they beg for forgiveness. In this summarized progression of Alexander history (focused on the Opis event), we see a diminishing interest in Alexander’s ideals and a growing desire to view his actions, especially those relating to Persian nobles and customs.ii W. W. Tarn, “Brotherhood and Unity,” in Alexander the Great, Volume 2: Sources and Studies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 434.iii Edward M. Anson, “Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia,” In Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene Borza, edd. T. Howe and J. Reames (Claremont, CA: Regina, 2008 [2009]), 17.iv Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire. (Winona Lake, Indiana:Eisenbrauns 2002): 324-325. Jamzadeh also writes about bandaka, linguistically connected to banda “bond,” and how bandaka was probably translated into greek as δοῦλος (Alexander Hist. And Iranian Refl. 100). He notes how Curtius uses these words to
play on the idea of Alexander the slave-king. He is intstead losing his Greco-Macedonian honor as a leader of men, and becomes like “a satrap of Darius.” See Parivash Jamzadeh, Alexander Histories and Iranian Reflections: Remnants of Propaganda and Resistance, (Boston: Brill, 2012).; Quintus Curtius Rufus, History of Alexander the Great, 6.6.9.v Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 352.vi J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 21-24.vii Arrian, Anabasis, 7.11.1; A similar case can be seen in the Anabasis of Xenophon; Xenophon. Anabasis. 4.4.4. ὕπαρχος δ᾽ἦν αὐτῆς Τιρίβαζος, ὁ καὶ βασιλεῖ φίλος γενόμενος, καὶ ὁπότε παρείη, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος βασιλέα ἐπὶ τὸν ἵππον ἀνεβαλλεν. (The leiutenant was Tiribazus, who was a friend to the king, and whenever he was present, no other man placed the king upon his horse.) Also see Xenophon, Cyropaedia,8.2.8; Curt. 3.3.14-21; For information on the role of the Companions (ἑταῖροι) andthe other military ranks (footsoldier, shieldbearer, scout, helot), see Ellis, Philip II, 26-28.viii Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, King and Court in Ancient Persia 559 to 331 BCE, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013): 32.ix E.A. Fredericksmeyer, “On the Final Aims of Philip II,” in Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage. edd. W. Lindsay Adams and Eugene N. Borza, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1982): 86.x Diodorus Siculus, Library, 16.91.2-3.xi For more information on Philip’s Persian aims, see Fredericksmeyer, “On the Final Aims of Philip II,” 90-98.xii Arr. 1.18.2.xiii Hans Kelsen, “The Philosophy of Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy,” International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 48, 1 (1937), 52.xiv Alexander’s gift of democracy (under his authority) to the Ionians seems similar to Philip’s previous role as hegemon of the Corinthian League. See Tod GHI II, 192. This decree gave Ionians democracy, so long as they followed rules already established in the Common Peace by Philip, so that they do not turn againstAlexander as hegemon, but have to deal with the responsibility of new leadership and returning exiles. This is similar to The Common Peace, which states that “if anyone does anything that breaks the treaty, I will help those who are wronged as they request and I will make war against the transgressor of the common peace as isdecided by the common council.” See Tod vol II, no. 177. xv Kelsen, “The Philosophy of Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy,” 54.xvi Herodotus 1.141.1-4.xvii A.T. Olmstead, “Persia and the Greek Frontier Problem,” Classical Philology, Vol. 34, 4 (1939), 306.xviii Olmstead, “Persian and the Greek Frontier,” 306.xix Alexander seems to use Cyrus as a role model, mimicking many of his decisions and staying within the boundaries of his conquered land while in Persia. Our ancient sources (or Alexander’s own propaganda retained by the historiographers) reveals similarities in the boundaries of their rule and their overarching style ofconquest. See Howe and Muller, “Mission Accomplished: Alexander at the Hyphasis,” Ancient History Bulletin 26 (2012): 28-30.
xx Justin, Epitome, 9.3; Also see Plutarch, Alexander, 12.3xxi See IG II2 236, “Oath. I swear by Zeus, Gaia, Helios, Poseidon and all the gods and goddesses. I will abide by the common peace and I will neither break the agreement with Philip, nor take up arms on land or sea, harming any of those abiding by the oaths. Nor shall I take any city, or fortress, nor harbor by craft or contrivance, with intent of war against the participants of the war. Nor shall Idepose the kingship of Philip or his descendants, nor the constitutions existing ineach state, when they swore the oaths of the peace. Nor shall I do anything contrary to these agreements, nor shall I allow anyone else as far as possible. Butif anyone does commit any breach of the treaty, I shall go in support as called by those who need and I shall fight the transgressors of the common peace, as decided (by the council) and called on by the hegemon and I shall not abandon------- of Thessalians--Elimiotes--Samothracians and Thasians---Ambraciots---from Thrace and---Phocians, Locrians, Oitaeans and Malians and Ainianes --and Agraeans and Dolopes---Perrhaebi---Zacynthus and Cephalenia.” This decree gave Ionians democracy, so long as they followed rules already established in the Common Peace by Philip, so that they do not turn against Alexander as hegemon, but have to deal with the responsibility of new leadership and returning exiles. This is similar to The Common Peace, which states that “if anyone does anything that breaks the treaty, I will help those who are wronged as they request and I will make war against the transgressor of the common peace as is decided by the common council.” See Tod vol II, no. 177. xxii Diod. 16.89.2.xxiii Ellis, Philip II, 233. Although J.R. Ellis presents the common peace offered as Chaeronea as “a surprisingly mild settlement,” this action does not seem surprising. Philip often made peace with neighboring forces, such as Amphipolis andAthens (Ellis, 48-49; 100; 107-110), Thessalian League (61), Chalkidian League (66-67), Eubolos (100-101), Peace of Philcrates in 348 BCE (111-113), and the Amphiktyons (120-124).xxiv Plut. Alex. 11.1.xxv Diod. 17.13.6.xxvi Diod. 17.14.1.xxvii Plut. Alex. 11.5.xxviii Ada had already ruled Caria for four years, after her brother/husband Idreiusdied (Diod. 16.69.2). But Ada was overthrown by her brother Pixodarus for five years (Diod. 16.74.2; Arr. 1.23.7-8). Alexander was only restoring power to the woman who had already been the local leader, so that he did not truly interfere with the government already in place, but only returned it to the ‘rightful’ heir. For information on Ada’s background and the Hecaatomnid dynasty in which her familyruled Caria, see Stephen Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty: The Hecatomnids in the Fourth Century B.C. (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992).xxix Diod. 17.24.1-2; see also Arr. 1.23.8.xxx Plut. Alex. 10. It is worth noting that Pixodarus tried to give Ada as a marriagealliance to Philip after overthrowing her authority in Caria. This could be interpreted as an attempt to send away any threat to Pixodarus’s power, not allowing Ada to remain in her place of former rule, but delivering her to gain an alliance and authority.
xxxi Diod. 17.37.6. Parivash Jamzadeh questions our ancient sources’ understandings of royal women being brought into battle according to Persian custom (Diod. 17.37.3; Curt. 3.8.12). She instead views this word choice as a way to make Darius “so inept and dishonorable as to even take his most honorable female folks to combat” (13). See Jamzadeh, Alexander Histories and Iranian Reflections: Remnants of Propaganda andResistance, (Boston: Brill, 2012).xxxii Llewellyn-Jones, King and Court in Ancient Persia, 15.xxxiii Llewellyn-Jones, King and Court in Ancient Persia, 111.xxxiv Diod. 17.38.1. Later on in Alexander’s campaign, Plutarch and Curtius both mention the wife of Darius dying. Plutarch wrote that she died during childbirth, and Alexander “was distressed at having lost the chance to show his magnanimity, and he buried the woman with funeral rites, not being spared any expense” (Plut. Alex. 30.1). It is worth noticing that Plutarch mentions Darius’s wife as dying in childbirth, while other sources usually attribute to exhaustion. This doesn’t make sense, because Darius’s wife has been separated from Darius for longer than nine months. Even though “the wife of Darius was far the most comely of all royal women,” (Plut. Alex. 21.3) this might be seen as Plutarch attributing the death to childbirth in order to show Darius’s wife dying in the most honorable way. For Greeks, honorable death came to men through battle and to women through childbirth.Plutarch’s fabricated depiction of her style of death gives Alexander a positive appearance, allowing the royal woman to die in the most honorable way known to Greeks. On the other hand, Curtius wrote that Alexander mourned, “giving a heavy groan and tears, such as Darius might have shed…” which makes Alexander seem to grieve her death genuinely (Curt. 4.10.20). Through both portrayals of the royal wife’s death, Alexander receives the benefit of embodying a more ‘true’ Persian king.xxxv Just. 7.4.1; Also see Marek Olbrycht, “Macedonia and Persia,” In A Companion to Ancient Macedonia, Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington, edd. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell 2010), 343.xxxvi Just. 7.4.2. “But Alexander enlarged his dominions not less by his own valour than through the munificence of the Persians.”xxxvii Plut. Alex. 18.1. Plutarch reports that all barbarians believe this legend, while Arrian and Curtius only claim that it is a local belief. See Arr. 2.3.1; Curt. 3.1.14-18. The Phrygian peasant that arrived with the wagon containing the Gordian knot is debated by the ancient sources: Justin claimed the man was Gordius (Just. 11.7.12-14), while others agreed it was Midas who arrived (Arr. 2.3.2-8; Plut. Alex 18.1; Curt. 3.1.11). See E.A. Fredricksmeyer, “Alexander, Midas and the oracle at Gordium,” Classical Philology 56 (1961): 160-168.xxxviii M. Munn, “Alexander, the Gordion Knot, and the Kingship of Midas,” In Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza, T. Howe and J. Reames, edd. (Claremont, CA: Regina 2008 [2009]), 113.xxxix E.A. Fredricksmeyer, “Alexander, Midas and the oracle at Gordium,” Classical Philology 56 (1961): 164. See M. Munn, “Alexander, the Gordion Knot, and the Kingshipof Midas,” In Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza, edd. T. Howe and J. Reames (Claremont, CA: Regina 2008 [2009]), 107-144 for information on Greek and Macedonian knowledge of Midas and thelegend of the Gordian Knot. Munn concludes that “Midas was associated particulary
with wealth in silver and gold…and with the authority of kingship that claimed the right to such wealth through the support of the gods” (130). Munn’s explanation would play well to Alexander, if he and other Macedonians and Phrygians understood Midas in this way. Munn also claims that Alexander’s actions would foreclose “the possibility that anyone else might lay claim to this symbol of power” (131). Compare this to Alexander later marrying Barsine and Roxane, two of Darius’s relatives, and the implications both of these events have if Alexander was focused on closing possibilities of future rivals.xl Curt. 6.6.13. Curtius mentions Bessus now being called Artaxerxes V; Arr. 3.21.4.xli Llewellyn-Jones, King and Court in Ancient Persia, 27.xlii Curt 6.2.8-11. Curtius’s gradual transformation of Alexander wants to show him straying away from his previous image as a generous, respectful liberator. Curtius’s Alexander loses the trait of unification that he once had, as a result ofMedizing. Although this Medizing is mostly seen as a negative effect of conquering Persia in Curtius’s account, Alexander still seems to be making ties to the royal women, releasing 1,000 royal prisoners, and even gave the condemned Persian nobleman Oxydates satrapy over Media. There seems to be a lack of appreciation for the Macedonian troops and Greeks. Their homesickness, brought in around Alexander’sgenerosity to the Persians after Darius’s death, could also result from a lack of objectives and motivation, bringing into question Alexander’s purpose (if any) for going further east and conquering the rest of Persia. Also see Plut. Alex. 43; Diod. 17.77.5.xliii N.G.L. Hammond, The Genius of Alexander the Great (Chapel Hill: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), 200.xliv Diod. 77.6-78.1.xlv Curt. 6.6.1-11. Curtius views Alexander’s actions as a turning point, recognizing where Alexander’s former generosity failed to be retained by the view of the troops. Curtius and Justin both point out how the troops complained and gossiped over Alexander straying from the traditions of Philip, and that Alexander bribed them with gifts in order to calm them. Also see Plut. Alex. 45. For information on the royal robes given to Persian court members as a loyalty-gift, see Llewellyn-Jones, King and Court in Ancient Persia, 62-65; Curtius fails to realize that“the concubines of Persian kings should not be…confused with courtesans, prostitutes, or mistresses” as they could “gain high status and even become the mothers of kings” (118) Because of Curtius’s Greco-Roman influence, viewing all παλλακαῖ (concubines) as low-status prostitutes, he misunderstands and tries to Hellenize the Persian concubines.xlvi Just. 12.3.8-4.3.xlvii Plut. Alex. 45.1. Plutarch foreshadows proskynesis with his alternative explanationfor Alexander wearing Persian clothing. Although Plutarch views Alexander’s Medizing as part of his softening of men’s hearts, however vague that statement is,as its primary use. In either explanation, Plutarch hints at Alexander dealing withthe hard-heartedness of the troops and their denial of Persian customs.xlviii For information on polygamous marriage and succession within the Argead line,see William Greenwalt, “Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia,” Arethusa 22 (1989): 19-45.
xlix Just. 12.4.3. Justin also points out that the marriages would encourage more children during the campaign, who could be prepared “on the ramparts on which they had been born” for joining Alexander’s army (12.4.5.). These children would be supersoldiers, only knowing life in battle and the leadership of Alexander alone.l Briant, Pierre. From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire. (Winona Lake, Indiana:Eisenbrauns 2002), 324.
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