Alexander the great imitator

Alexander the great imitator

Throughout the ancient sources on Alexander the Great

(Arrian, Plutarch, Diodorus, Curtius, Justin), the authors

struggle to understand Alexander’s choices during his campaigns

in Asia Minor and the rest of Persian territory. This is usually

characterized by Medizing, which from the time of Herodotus was

often applied to those who sympathized with either Persian policy

or culture. We can see the effects of Medizing in the Alexander

narratives in what W.W. Tarn called a “policy of fusion”:i

Alexander’s policies, military tactics, and alliances that have

been interpreted as effort towards cultural unity.ii Although the

Alexander sources seem conflicted with Alexander’s identification

with Persian tactics, they also reveal that Alexander borrows

many tactics from both his Macedonian predecessors, such as his

father Philip II and earlier kings, and local Persian customs,

either established by earlier kings like Cyrus the Great or

contemporary rulers. The question that arises is: were Alexander

the Great’s innovations truly innovative? Although this paper

could deal with the sources in particular, and their specific

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reasons for choosing and emphasizing events, issues of

historiography will be left aside in order to focus on the events

and decisions themselves. This paper will demonstrate that

Alexander’s Macedonian court policies appear to be similar to

previous policies in both Macedonia and Persia, through his

choices in diplomatic policies, clothing, and customary

practices.

Just as Alexander later would do, Philip’s power over his

troops came from the “breaking of personal ties between the

rulers/landlords…and their dependent population, and replacing

these bonds with attachments to himself.”iii Alexander exploited

the influence that Philip gained by claiming those bonds also

applied to his own rule of Macedon, and expanded new bonds to the

Persian rulers. Although our sources treat Philip’s bond-making

as Macedonian, the Persians had a similar system in which the

people were called bandaka, which “describes both subject and

loyal peoples who supplied aid against rebels.”iv The Achaemenid

rulers, just as Philip, sought to create personal relationships

between themselves and their subjects by weakening family

solidarity.v This is most evident in that fact that “the

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Macedonians were styled simply ‘those from Philip’ or ‘those from

Alexander,’” as the king was the main identity of the people.vi

Alexander treats high-ranking Persians and Macedonian Companions

as his own Kinsmen, as seen when Alexander allows Persians alone

to act as Kinsmen and give him the customary kiss, until the

repentance of the Macedonian troops at Opis.vii Proximity and

connectivity to the king was most easily represented by these

gifts of clothing and authority within the king’s ranks. As a

result that Llewellyn-Jones also points out, being “’Friend of

the king’ was clearly a closely guarded privilege and a source of

pride,” although notably for both the Persian and Macedonian

cultures.viii

Alexander also follows in Philip’s footsteps by his

ambitious campaigning into Asia Minor and Persia. As E.A.

Fredricksmeyer believes, the historical stereotype of Philip “as

prudent and cautious, and middle-aged, who pursued a purely

national Macedonian policy” is too calm, and does not take into

account the opportunity to take control of the heterogeneous

Persian Empire piece by piece, especially as expressed by

Isocrates.ix Philip even went to the Pythian oracle and asked for

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the gods’ approval in overthrowing the Persian king.x If

Fredricksmeyer is correct in viewing Philip as driven by an

expansionist foreign policy, then Alexander would have been

exposed to ideas of Persian conquest, desires for deification,

and absolute monarchy.xi

Even at the beginning of his Asiatic campaign, Alexander

used Persian tactics to allow conquered people to return to their

culturally normal style of rule. Persia allowed relative autonomy

to many conquered states, but failed to appease the Ionian Greeks

with enforced oligarchy. While freeing the Ionians and Aeolians

(Greeks living on the coast of Asia Minor), Arrian claims that

Alexander “drove on to destroy the oligarchies everywhere, and he

established democracies and restored its own laws to each and

every community, and he ceased the large tributes that they paid

to the barbarians.”xii But, establishment of democracy also would

benefit Alexander during his conquests, as the Ionian cities

would not easily revolt against their liberator. Although “what

the Macedonian government wished was only an external political

protectorate over the Greek states,” Alexander ironically

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accomplished this by overthrowing the Person political

protectorates already established in Ionia.xiii

The use of democracy to distract the Ionians kept

Alexander’s reputation positive with the ‘conquered/freed’

people, but also follows a divide and conquer tactic used in both

Macedonia and Persia (and later in Rome).xiv Alexander treats the

Ionians as Philip treated the mainland Greeks, as they both strip

“the Hellenic republics of their essential forces and of their

competence in foreign affairs, and this, not in order to hand

them over to an organ common to all the member states, but to a

third power outside the League.”xv Alexander allowed relative

autonomy and democracy for the Ionians, as long as his own

monarchical court could sit alongside of their Greek values.

Similarly, after Cyrus defeated the Lydians in 557 BCE and

offered terms to the Ionians, he also acted as a foreign

authority.xvi When Cyrus offered terms to the Ionians, “the

majority refused, but Miletus accepted, and the Persians had

learned their first lesson in handling the Greeks-divide and

conquer.”xvii One could see Cyrus’s and Alexander’s divide and

conquer stories as purely Roman bias imposed on previous events.

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However, the main source for Cyrus’s encounter is Herodotus, who

was “born a Persian subject...was still in contact with Persian

friends, [and] he employed Persian sources, written or

unwritten.”xviii This could not be simply a Roman invention for the

Ionian conquests, since Herodotus’s account of Cyrus predates the

rise and expansion of Rome or of Alexander. If anything,

Alexander might have gained inspiration for dealing with the

Ionians in a similar way by reading Herodotus and using this

Persian tactic, or through his own court system using divide and

rule tactics since they established Persian contact. Both Cyrus

and Alexander exploited the loose alliances of the Greek

poleisxix, recognizing that they were unable to unify as long as

they were individually accountable to a foreign power.

Alexander also has another divide and conquer example from

his own father, Philip II, and his treatment of Greece through

the League of Corinth. Justin and Plutarch both present the

Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE as “an end to the glorious

sovereignty and ancient liberty of all Greece,” since even the

Greeks’ unified efforts did not stop their defeat.xx The

conquering of Greece allowed Philip to sweep away their previous

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governments and create a common peace between himself and the

Greeks, so that Greece could neither rebel against Philip nor

allow other city-states to rebel without punishment.xxi Philip was

able to win over the Greeks through both military victory and his

“Philhellenic” nature, as he “spread the word that he desired to

make war against the Persians on behalf of the Greeks, and to

punish them on behalf of their profanation of the temples.”xxii

Even with the Greek states attempting to unify and defeat Philip,

they were still subjugated and divided by this peace treaty,

which was ironically “a variant [treaty] on a form invented by

Greeks and well known to them.”xxiii Each city-state was solely

accountable to Philip and his successors, not to other Greek

states. Therefore, the common peace formed by the League of

Corinth urged the Greek states to cautiously police each other

and themselves, and placed mental barriers between the city-

states. Philip appeared as the representative of Greece, acting

as an outside authority to whom the city-states were dependent.

After the death of Philip, city-states such as Thebes showed

signs of revolt, although the Greeks still lacked necessary

unification. With democracy subjugated under the peace treaty,

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Philip “had left them in turmoil and confusion, because he

created a situation which was completely unfamiliar to them.”xxiv

Alexander had an opportunity to reveal his pledged authority

during the revolt of Thebes. Since the Thebans were already

despised for assisting the Persians during the Persian Wars, they

became an easy target for Alexander to pinpoint and to unify the

Greeks under his cause. Diodorus tells us that “Greeks were

mercilessly slain by Greeks, and relatives butchered by their own

relatives, and not even a common dialect induced pity.”xxv Along

with this, Alexander calls “a meeting of the Greek

representatives to a common council, and puts before them how to

deal with the city of the Thebans.”xxvi Just as Philip gave the

Greeks the appearance of having some authority by policing each

other, Alexander allows the Greeks to also judge the punishment

for those who rebel. By giving certain Greeks this authority when

rebellion occurs, he could urge others to desire this judicial

authority over rebellion and punishment. If we trust Plutarch

that the “principal object in permitting the sack of Thebes was

to frighten the rest of the Greeks into submission by making a

terrible example,” then Alexander is reminding the Greeks of his

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place as head of the Greek states.xxvii So long as the Greek poleis

did not even consider fully unifying and revolting en masse,

Alexander would have no trouble with eliminating a few major

instigating cities as an example of his authority.

While seizing certain cities in Asia Minor, Alexander

controlled those new allies in a Persian manner by through his

choice of rulers. For example, while conquering Caria, Alexander

was met by Ada, a local woman of royal blood.xxviii During this

meeting, “he ordered for her to receive the rule of Caria. Thus

by his favors through his good service to this woman, he made the

Carians his own people.”xxix Alexander would have known that

Philip originally planned a marriage alliance with Pixodarus, by

his plans to marry his eldest son Arrhidaeus to Pixodarus’s

eldest daughter. Therefore, following his father’s uncompleted

political connection to a Persian satrap seems reasonable.

Alexander saw benefit in rising up the traditional power

structure of Caria, while also making himself her adopted son; a

family alliance even Philip was unable to do in his lifetime.xxx

This gave Ada power through Alexander, as she could claim him as

royal family and gain more authority to support her dynasty. On

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the other hand, Alexander could gain influence in matriarchal

Caria through his ruling ‘mother’ and could depend on her for

supplies and evidence for legitimacy as Persian royalty.

Alexander, as son of Ada, would be considered the legitimate heir

of Caria and therefore gained a stern footing for his role as a

Persian monarch.

After defeating Persian king Darius III at the Battle of

Issus in 333 BCE, Alexander captured Darius’s family that had

been left behind in the retreat, and “maintain[ed] to Sisyngambis

that she is his second mother.”xxxi Alexander claimed another

mother and related himself to the Achaemenid royal family, as “a

[Persian] king’s possession of the blood-royal was the very basis

of the monarchy,” and was necessary for his legitimacy as

ruler.xxxii This was a major political move, since “the king’s

mother held the highest place of authority among the court

ladies,” and was now solely in Alexander’s control.xxxiii He

returned all of her servants along with extra, promised a more

generous marriage for her daughters than Darius promised, and

desired to raise her son.xxxiv By doing this, Diodorus shows

Alexander claiming the role of a better father, putting himself

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over the weakening role of Darius. Alexander is able to build

credibility for Persian rule through both Ada and Sisyngambis,

using the women as a means to unify his territory.

These diplomatic connections are nothing new to Macedonian

royalty, as even Amyntas and Alexander I were both on good terms

with the Persians through royal women. We can see these

connections even with a Persian nobleman and son of Megabazus,

Bubares, who married the daughter of Amyntas. Justin tells us

that the “relationship with Bubares not only secured to

Alexander, his son and successor, peace in the reign of Darius,

but truly such favor with Xerxes, in order that, when that ruler

overcame Greece like a tempest, he conferred upon him the

sovereignty of all regions between the mountains of Olympus and

Haemus.”xxxv Just as Alexander I was able to expand in the Balkans

through Persian support, perhaps Alexander III could do the same,

so long as he gained Persian support and credibility.xxxvi

Similarly, Alexander acts just as Philip had, although Philip

used marriage rather than maternal status to unify surrounding

territories and prevail as the main authority of Balkan

countries. Because Philip bound Elimeia by means of Phila,

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Illyria by Audata, Thessaly by Nicesipolis and Philinna, Thrace

by Meda, Epirus by Olympia, and finally Macedonia by Cleopatra,

Alexander grew up with constant knowledge of the benefits of

diplomatic connections through women.

Alexander also exploited local legends to gain authority in

Persia, even if it was on a smaller scale. One such example is

his unraveling of the mythical Gordian Knot in Gordium, left

there by a Phrygian peasant made king, which some ancient sources

claim “that the one loosening the knot is destined by fate to

become king of the entire region.”xxxvii As Mark Munn argues, the

Greeks would have virtually no knowledge of the Gordian Knot or

King Midas, who stands at the center of the story.xxxviii Alexander

could manipulate any medium possible to gain credibility as a

Persian ruler, since the legend would play well with both

Macedonians and Phrygians in order to help secure Phrygia.

Alexander could manipulate any medium possible to gain

credibility as a Persian ruler, since the legend would play well

with local people (similarly to in Caria) and help secure

Phrygia. Ernest Fredricksmeyer claims that Alexander was “in

fact intimately acquainted with the Macedonian tradition about

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Midas son of Gordius.”xxxix Although Munn and Fredricksmeyer view

the Midas legend as migrating from Phrygia to Macedonia and

Macedonia to Phrygia, respectively, either direction of migration

does not include the Greeks. Our ancient sources find the need to

explain this legend to their Greco-Roman audience because of

their lack of cultural knowledge. Alexander’s Macedonian

background, which was culturally tied to Persian legends, allowed

him to exploit his heritage fully. By undoing the knot, Alexander

could allow his conquering of the myth to run rampant, as the

legend would add to his legitimacy as ruler in the area.

Once Darius was captured and killed by the Bactrian governor

Bessus, Alexander set out to seize the usurper, who was now

claiming kingship under the name of Artaxerxes V.xl As part of

his role as the new Achaemenid king, Alexander must protect arta

(truth) and wipe out drauga (lie). Since the “concept of drauga was

best represented by the chaos of rebellion and insurgence against

the throne,” it was necessary for Alexander to crush Bessus.xli

Curtius points out a change in Alexander’s attitude towards

others during the pursuit, noting, “Until now in the king’s soul

clung a slim remnant of his former manner…here having been

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liberated from the governorship of Media, he receives the brother

of Darius into his cohort of friends, having retained all honor

of his ancient and distinguished lineage.”xlii Curtius asserts

that Alexander once acted differently, and yet still was able to

treat a few conquered people with their previous cultural honor,

such as was done with Ada of Caria and others in Darius’s family.

Curtius recognizes that Alexander was not acting in a

predictable, Hellenocentric manner. This event reveals an

Alexander who connects himself to already established

governments, exploiting Persian policy and cultural ties in order

to gain authority.

After conquering Media, Ecbatana, and Hyrcania, all of our

ancient sources (besides Arrian) mention Alexander donning

Persian dress. N.G.L. Hammond notes, “as King of the Macedonians

and as King of Asia he had different roles to fill,” which the

ancient sources try to reconcile.xliii The Greco-Roman authors seem

confused by Alexander’s seemingly irregular actions, leading to

different explanations of Alexander’s purpose or changed

attitude. Diodorus shows Alexander putting on everything except

the trousers and shirt, and “brought around him concubines…[but

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he] used them sparingly…fearing any offence to the

Macedonians.”xliv Curtius describes Alexander whose “self-

restraint and moderation, supreme qualities at the height of good

fortune, turned into arrogance and dissipation,” now bringing in

concubines, wearing Persian dress, and also forcing the clothing

upon his friends and cavalry in a Persian attempt for loyalty.xlv

Justin comments as well on Alexander’s adoption of Persian garb,

forcing it upon friends, and the inclusion of concubines, also

stating the troops’ discontent at their king wearing the clothing

of the defeated.xlvi Plutarch tells us that Alexander had “either

a desire to adapt himself to neighboring customs, as dwelling

with the same race is a great step towards the reclaiming of men.

Alternatively, he was planning this as some trial of obeisance

for the Macedonians.”xlvii Each of these sources agree that

Alexander did begin to wear Persian clothing, while most agree

that he did not fully wear Persian garb for the sake of not

upsetting the Macedonian troops. The ancient sources do not know

what to make of this clothing change, only pointing out the

unsettled troops who are just as disconcerted as the authors.

Even without knowing Alexander’s exact intentions for wearing

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Persian clothing, the Alexander sources accept that this change

of culture occurred after the defeat of Darius and control of

Persia fell to Alexander.

Plutarch and Justin also point out Alexander’s allowance of

marriages.xlviii Justin writes that Alexander did not want to

appear alone in Medizing, and allowed his soldiers to marry

Persian women, “for he thought they would be less easer to return

home if they had in camp some semblance of a home and domestic

setting.”xlix Justin portrays this as Alexander’s reaction to his

troops’ resentment of Medizing, unlike Curtius and Diodorus who

show this through gift-giving. Alexander’s gift of marriage works

twofold; Alexander maintains influence over his troops through

his generosity, and to ally himself to the Persians. In both

Macedonian and Persian customs, gift-giving and marriages could

be used to “constrain the behavior of the aristocrats so that

they would act only in the king’s interests.”l Both Alexander and

Darius spread their wealth to nobles to retain loyalty and

authority, and were able to use women as a source of reliability

and connectivity to their closest associates.

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In each instance, from Alexander’s earlier dealings with the

Greek city-states to the eventual defeat of the Persian king

Darius III, Alexander did not create a new way to deal with

foreign policy or conquering. In dealing with his own military

and court leaders, Alexander followed Philip’s example (and

Achaemenid example) in creating strong personal connections to

the king, so that the king gained priority over familial or

national ties. When conquering the Greeks in Asia Minor,

Alexander restored democracy in an individualistic sense, so that

each city-state would owe Alexander directly for their

protection, and each polis would police each other for Alexander.

This strategy is not Alexander’s alone, but also used by Cyrus

against the Ionians and Philip against the mainland Greeks.

Alexander’s connections to Persian women for the sake of

authority seems no different than political marriages in the

Macedonian court, which works under a similar gift-giving system

of marriage.

Finally, Alexander’s donning of Persian outfits after

the death of Darius reveal his ability to borrow cultural objects

as a means of connecting with those around him. Although

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Alexander deals with situations which none of his Macedonian or

Persian predecessors had, he simply borrows policies or customs

that succeeded in previous kingships in order to ensure his own

success. Through this perspective, Alexander does not appear to

be as innovative in his policies, but instead takes the multiple

opportunities he can during the conquest to manipulate those

around him with his repertoire of royal tactics. While previous

rulers in both Persia and Macedonia set the foundation by means

of their policies, Alexander was able to exploit that previous

knowledge in new contexts by campaigning against the Persian

Empire.

Bibliography

Anson, Edward M. “Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia.” In Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene Borza, T. Howe and J. Reames, edd. Claremont, CA: Regina, 2008 [2009]. 17-30.

Badian, E. “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind.” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 7, 4 (1958): 425-444.

Badian, E. “Greeks and Macedonians.” In Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early

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Hellenic Times, Studies in the History of Art, Vol. 10, 33-51. Washington DC: National Gallery of Art, 1982.

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Bosworth, A.B. From Arrian to Alexander. Studies in Historical Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 101- 113.

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Nagle, D. Brendan. “The Cultural Context of Alexander’s Speech at Opis.” Transactions of the American Philological Association 126 (1996): 151-172.

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Olmstead, A.T. “Persia and the Greek Frontier Problem.” Classical Philology, Vol. 34, 4 (1939): 305-322.

Ruzicka, Stephen. Politics of a Persian Dynasty: The Hecatomnids in the Fourth Century B.C. London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992.

Tarn, W.W. Alexander the Great. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948 (2002).Vol. II, 399-449.

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i See W. W. Tarn, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” Proceedings of the British Academy, (1933), 123-166. W. W. Tarn initiates the modern discussion of Alexander’s intentions in challenging the apparently common belief that Zeno was the originator of a universalist ideal, ὁμόνοια, instead of Alexander the Great. Tarn’s linear progression fails to allow historical figures to make groundbreaking changes in history, since each is only allowed to make minor transitions in the footsteps of their predecessor. Ernst Badian (1958) replies to Tarn, revising points that he considered incorrect to a more realistic view of Alexander. The overall criticism of Tarn springs from Badian’s approach to Alexander, viewing him as more of a pragmatist instead of an idealist, a character Badian affectionately labels “Alexander the Dreamer” (428). Badian’s view of Alexander the pragmatist tackles the speech and banquet at Opis, seeing the event not as a desire for unity,but as reconciliation between Alexander and his troops, as well as the Macedonians and Persians. A.B. Bosworth (1980) picks up where Badian left off on Alexander’s integration of the Iranians as part of his policy of fusion. Bosworth grounds his position opposite of Tarn concerning Alexander, stating his belief that “the brotherhood of man as a vision of Alexander is dead” (1). Alexander finds an outletfor legitimacy through the acknowledgement of rule by Oxyathres, Darius’s brother, and his marriage to Oxyathres’s daughter, Roxane (6). Along with Roxane, Alexander also ended up marrying Barsine (Darius’s oldest daughter) and Parysatis (Ochus’s youngest daughter). Both of these marriages show Alexander connecting himself to Persian royals by family relations. Bosworth reveals an Alexander that chooses to marry for legitimacy, create separate Persian sections of his army, and change intoPersian dress, though just enough to conform to the “local mores” of the Persians (14). See Ernst,Badian, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 7, 4 (1958), 425-444; Ernst Badian, “Greeks and Macedonians,” In Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenic Times, Studies in the History of Art, Vol. 10 (Washington DC: National Gallery of Art, 1982): 33-51. A.B.Bosworth, “Alexander and the Iranians,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 100, Centenary Issue (1980): 1-21. D. Brendan Nagle, “The Cultural Context of Alexander’s Speech at Opis,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 126 (1996): 151-172. Nagle mentions the issue of the authors’ differing reasons for the Macedonian troops’ discontent, although somehow centered on the Epigoni. Overall, Nagle gives an impression of an Alexander created by Arrian and Curtius who, at least at Opis, is willing to exploit his father’s deeds and pout at his troops until they beg for forgiveness. In this summarized progression of Alexander history (focused on the Opis event), we see a diminishing interest in Alexander’s ideals and a growing desire to view his actions, especially those relating to Persian nobles and customs.ii W. W. Tarn, “Brotherhood and Unity,” in Alexander the Great, Volume 2: Sources and Studies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 434.iii Edward M. Anson, “Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia,” In Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene Borza, edd. T. Howe and J. Reames (Claremont, CA: Regina, 2008 [2009]), 17.iv Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire. (Winona Lake, Indiana:Eisenbrauns 2002): 324-325. Jamzadeh also writes about bandaka, linguistically connected to banda “bond,” and how bandaka was probably translated into greek as δοῦλος (Alexander Hist. And Iranian Refl. 100). He notes how Curtius uses these words to

play on the idea of Alexander the slave-king. He is intstead losing his Greco-Macedonian honor as a leader of men, and becomes like “a satrap of Darius.” See Parivash Jamzadeh, Alexander Histories and Iranian Reflections: Remnants of Propaganda and Resistance, (Boston: Brill, 2012).; Quintus Curtius Rufus, History of Alexander the Great, 6.6.9.v Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 352.vi J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 21-24.vii Arrian, Anabasis, 7.11.1; A similar case can be seen in the Anabasis of Xenophon; Xenophon. Anabasis. 4.4.4. ὕπαρχος δ᾽ἦν αὐτῆς Τιρίβαζος, ὁ καὶ βασιλεῖ φίλος γενόμενος, καὶ ὁπότε παρείη, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος βασιλέα ἐπὶ τὸν ἵππον ἀνεβαλλεν. (The leiutenant was Tiribazus, who was a friend to the king, and whenever he was present, no other man placed the king upon his horse.) Also see Xenophon, Cyropaedia,8.2.8; Curt. 3.3.14-21; For information on the role of the Companions (ἑταῖροι) andthe other military ranks (footsoldier, shieldbearer, scout, helot), see Ellis, Philip II, 26-28.viii Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, King and Court in Ancient Persia 559 to 331 BCE, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013): 32.ix E.A. Fredericksmeyer, “On the Final Aims of Philip II,” in Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage. edd. W. Lindsay Adams and Eugene N. Borza, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1982): 86.x Diodorus Siculus, Library, 16.91.2-3.xi For more information on Philip’s Persian aims, see Fredericksmeyer, “On the Final Aims of Philip II,” 90-98.xii Arr. 1.18.2.xiii Hans Kelsen, “The Philosophy of Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy,” International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 48, 1 (1937), 52.xiv Alexander’s gift of democracy (under his authority) to the Ionians seems similar to Philip’s previous role as hegemon of the Corinthian League. See Tod GHI II, 192. This decree gave Ionians democracy, so long as they followed rules already established in the Common Peace by Philip, so that they do not turn againstAlexander as hegemon, but have to deal with the responsibility of new leadership and returning exiles. This is similar to The Common Peace, which states that “if anyone does anything that breaks the treaty, I will help those who are wronged as they request and I will make war against the transgressor of the common peace as isdecided by the common council.” See Tod vol II, no. 177. xv Kelsen, “The Philosophy of Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy,” 54.xvi Herodotus 1.141.1-4.xvii A.T. Olmstead, “Persia and the Greek Frontier Problem,” Classical Philology, Vol. 34, 4 (1939), 306.xviii Olmstead, “Persian and the Greek Frontier,” 306.xix Alexander seems to use Cyrus as a role model, mimicking many of his decisions and staying within the boundaries of his conquered land while in Persia. Our ancient sources (or Alexander’s own propaganda retained by the historiographers) reveals similarities in the boundaries of their rule and their overarching style ofconquest. See Howe and Muller, “Mission Accomplished: Alexander at the Hyphasis,” Ancient History Bulletin 26 (2012): 28-30.

xx Justin, Epitome, 9.3; Also see Plutarch, Alexander, 12.3xxi See IG II2 236, “Oath. I swear by Zeus, Gaia, Helios, Poseidon and all the gods and goddesses. I will abide by the common peace and I will neither break the agreement with Philip, nor take up arms on land or sea, harming any of those abiding by the oaths. Nor shall I take any city, or fortress, nor harbor by craft or contrivance, with intent of war against the participants of the war. Nor shall Idepose the kingship of Philip or his descendants, nor the constitutions existing ineach state, when they swore the oaths of the peace. Nor shall I do anything contrary to these agreements, nor shall I allow anyone else as far as possible. Butif anyone does commit any breach of the treaty, I shall go in support as called by those who need and I shall fight the transgressors of the common peace, as decided (by the council) and called on by the hegemon and I shall not abandon------- of Thessalians--Elimiotes--Samothracians and Thasians---Ambraciots---from Thrace and---Phocians, Locrians, Oitaeans and Malians and Ainianes --and Agraeans and Dolopes---Perrhaebi---Zacynthus and Cephalenia.” This decree gave Ionians democracy, so long as they followed rules already established in the Common Peace by Philip, so that they do not turn against Alexander as hegemon, but have to deal with the responsibility of new leadership and returning exiles. This is similar to The Common Peace, which states that “if anyone does anything that breaks the treaty, I will help those who are wronged as they request and I will make war against the transgressor of the common peace as is decided by the common council.” See Tod vol II, no. 177. xxii Diod. 16.89.2.xxiii Ellis, Philip II, 233. Although J.R. Ellis presents the common peace offered as Chaeronea as “a surprisingly mild settlement,” this action does not seem surprising. Philip often made peace with neighboring forces, such as Amphipolis andAthens (Ellis, 48-49; 100; 107-110), Thessalian League (61), Chalkidian League (66-67), Eubolos (100-101), Peace of Philcrates in 348 BCE (111-113), and the Amphiktyons (120-124).xxiv Plut. Alex. 11.1.xxv Diod. 17.13.6.xxvi Diod. 17.14.1.xxvii Plut. Alex. 11.5.xxviii Ada had already ruled Caria for four years, after her brother/husband Idreiusdied (Diod. 16.69.2). But Ada was overthrown by her brother Pixodarus for five years (Diod. 16.74.2; Arr. 1.23.7-8). Alexander was only restoring power to the woman who had already been the local leader, so that he did not truly interfere with the government already in place, but only returned it to the ‘rightful’ heir. For information on Ada’s background and the Hecaatomnid dynasty in which her familyruled Caria, see Stephen Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty: The Hecatomnids in the Fourth Century B.C. (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992).xxix Diod. 17.24.1-2; see also Arr. 1.23.8.xxx Plut. Alex. 10. It is worth noting that Pixodarus tried to give Ada as a marriagealliance to Philip after overthrowing her authority in Caria. This could be interpreted as an attempt to send away any threat to Pixodarus’s power, not allowing Ada to remain in her place of former rule, but delivering her to gain an alliance and authority.

xxxi Diod. 17.37.6. Parivash Jamzadeh questions our ancient sources’ understandings of royal women being brought into battle according to Persian custom (Diod. 17.37.3; Curt. 3.8.12). She instead views this word choice as a way to make Darius “so inept and dishonorable as to even take his most honorable female folks to combat” (13). See Jamzadeh, Alexander Histories and Iranian Reflections: Remnants of Propaganda andResistance, (Boston: Brill, 2012).xxxii Llewellyn-Jones, King and Court in Ancient Persia, 15.xxxiii Llewellyn-Jones, King and Court in Ancient Persia, 111.xxxiv Diod. 17.38.1. Later on in Alexander’s campaign, Plutarch and Curtius both mention the wife of Darius dying. Plutarch wrote that she died during childbirth, and Alexander “was distressed at having lost the chance to show his magnanimity, and he buried the woman with funeral rites, not being spared any expense” (Plut. Alex. 30.1). It is worth noticing that Plutarch mentions Darius’s wife as dying in childbirth, while other sources usually attribute to exhaustion. This doesn’t make sense, because Darius’s wife has been separated from Darius for longer than nine months. Even though “the wife of Darius was far the most comely of all royal women,” (Plut. Alex. 21.3) this might be seen as Plutarch attributing the death to childbirth in order to show Darius’s wife dying in the most honorable way. For Greeks, honorable death came to men through battle and to women through childbirth.Plutarch’s fabricated depiction of her style of death gives Alexander a positive appearance, allowing the royal woman to die in the most honorable way known to Greeks. On the other hand, Curtius wrote that Alexander mourned, “giving a heavy groan and tears, such as Darius might have shed…” which makes Alexander seem to grieve her death genuinely (Curt. 4.10.20). Through both portrayals of the royal wife’s death, Alexander receives the benefit of embodying a more ‘true’ Persian king.xxxv Just. 7.4.1; Also see Marek Olbrycht, “Macedonia and Persia,” In A Companion to Ancient Macedonia, Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington, edd. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell 2010), 343.xxxvi Just. 7.4.2. “But Alexander enlarged his dominions not less by his own valour than through the munificence of the Persians.”xxxvii Plut. Alex. 18.1. Plutarch reports that all barbarians believe this legend, while Arrian and Curtius only claim that it is a local belief. See Arr. 2.3.1; Curt. 3.1.14-18. The Phrygian peasant that arrived with the wagon containing the Gordian knot is debated by the ancient sources: Justin claimed the man was Gordius (Just. 11.7.12-14), while others agreed it was Midas who arrived (Arr. 2.3.2-8; Plut. Alex 18.1; Curt. 3.1.11). See E.A. Fredricksmeyer, “Alexander, Midas and the oracle at Gordium,” Classical Philology 56 (1961): 160-168.xxxviii M. Munn, “Alexander, the Gordion Knot, and the Kingship of Midas,” In Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza, T. Howe and J. Reames, edd. (Claremont, CA: Regina 2008 [2009]), 113.xxxix E.A. Fredricksmeyer, “Alexander, Midas and the oracle at Gordium,” Classical Philology 56 (1961): 164. See M. Munn, “Alexander, the Gordion Knot, and the Kingshipof Midas,” In Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza, edd. T. Howe and J. Reames (Claremont, CA: Regina 2008 [2009]), 107-144 for information on Greek and Macedonian knowledge of Midas and thelegend of the Gordian Knot. Munn concludes that “Midas was associated particulary

with wealth in silver and gold…and with the authority of kingship that claimed the right to such wealth through the support of the gods” (130). Munn’s explanation would play well to Alexander, if he and other Macedonians and Phrygians understood Midas in this way. Munn also claims that Alexander’s actions would foreclose “the possibility that anyone else might lay claim to this symbol of power” (131). Compare this to Alexander later marrying Barsine and Roxane, two of Darius’s relatives, and the implications both of these events have if Alexander was focused on closing possibilities of future rivals.xl Curt. 6.6.13. Curtius mentions Bessus now being called Artaxerxes V; Arr. 3.21.4.xli Llewellyn-Jones, King and Court in Ancient Persia, 27.xlii Curt 6.2.8-11. Curtius’s gradual transformation of Alexander wants to show him straying away from his previous image as a generous, respectful liberator. Curtius’s Alexander loses the trait of unification that he once had, as a result ofMedizing. Although this Medizing is mostly seen as a negative effect of conquering Persia in Curtius’s account, Alexander still seems to be making ties to the royal women, releasing 1,000 royal prisoners, and even gave the condemned Persian nobleman Oxydates satrapy over Media. There seems to be a lack of appreciation for the Macedonian troops and Greeks. Their homesickness, brought in around Alexander’sgenerosity to the Persians after Darius’s death, could also result from a lack of objectives and motivation, bringing into question Alexander’s purpose (if any) for going further east and conquering the rest of Persia. Also see Plut. Alex. 43; Diod. 17.77.5.xliii N.G.L. Hammond, The Genius of Alexander the Great (Chapel Hill: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), 200.xliv Diod. 77.6-78.1.xlv Curt. 6.6.1-11. Curtius views Alexander’s actions as a turning point, recognizing where Alexander’s former generosity failed to be retained by the view of the troops. Curtius and Justin both point out how the troops complained and gossiped over Alexander straying from the traditions of Philip, and that Alexander bribed them with gifts in order to calm them. Also see Plut. Alex. 45. For information on the royal robes given to Persian court members as a loyalty-gift, see Llewellyn-Jones, King and Court in Ancient Persia, 62-65; Curtius fails to realize that“the concubines of Persian kings should not be…confused with courtesans, prostitutes, or mistresses” as they could “gain high status and even become the mothers of kings” (118) Because of Curtius’s Greco-Roman influence, viewing all παλλακαῖ (concubines) as low-status prostitutes, he misunderstands and tries to Hellenize the Persian concubines.xlvi Just. 12.3.8-4.3.xlvii Plut. Alex. 45.1. Plutarch foreshadows proskynesis with his alternative explanationfor Alexander wearing Persian clothing. Although Plutarch views Alexander’s Medizing as part of his softening of men’s hearts, however vague that statement is,as its primary use. In either explanation, Plutarch hints at Alexander dealing withthe hard-heartedness of the troops and their denial of Persian customs.xlviii For information on polygamous marriage and succession within the Argead line,see William Greenwalt, “Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia,” Arethusa 22 (1989): 19-45.

xlix Just. 12.4.3. Justin also points out that the marriages would encourage more children during the campaign, who could be prepared “on the ramparts on which they had been born” for joining Alexander’s army (12.4.5.). These children would be supersoldiers, only knowing life in battle and the leadership of Alexander alone.l Briant, Pierre. From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire. (Winona Lake, Indiana:Eisenbrauns 2002), 324.