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6th International Conference in Interpretive Policy Analysis 2011: Discursive Spaces.
Politics, practices and Power
Panel 21: Who is too big to fail? Exploring Discourses of Crisis ManagementChair: Bob Jessop, Lancaster University, r.jessop@lancaster.ac.uk
The ecopolitical theory of postmaterialism in times of financial crisis and recession
Lorraine MacIntosh and Cassandra StarPolitics & Public Policy, School of Social & Policy Studies, Flinders University
Corresponding author: maci0040@flinders.edu.au
Keywords: postmaterialism, global financial crisis, climate change, ecological crisis
Abstract
The global economy is currently experiencing the consequences of both financial crisis
and ecological crisis. In 2007 financial practices in the United States of America resulted
in a financial crisis that quickly spread throughout the rest of the world. The result was a
global recession from 2008 through 2009 unlike any seen since the Great Depression of
the thirties (Gamble 2009). At the time this recession occurred the world was struggling
to agree on timely action to deal with an ecological crisis. A crisis that had arisen as
evidence mounted that human activities were changing the planet’s climate: climate on
which life on earth is dependent.
The analysis of how environmental policy making has stood up to this severe financial
and recessionary pressure has begun (Christie 2008; Tuxworth 2008). This paper seeks to
add to this academic debate by examining the effect of the global financial crisis and
recession on environmental policy using the explanatory power of the postmaterialist
school of ecopolitical theory. Comparative analysis across three nations provides insight
into how national factors have interacted with decisions taken. This study incorporates
analysis of polls and surveys as well as national discourses specifically related to
environmental policy and meeting Kyoto Protocol obligations. The use of discourse
analysis is supported by the way in which the problem is ‘framed’ through sources such
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as political speech, media and other means of influencing the debate, also governs what
changes will be made (Hajer 1996, p.247).
The severity of this crisis provides the strongest test of economic condition since the
inception of the theory of postmaterialism. While postmaterialism is a contested theory, it
makes an important contribution to understanding values and their influence on the policy
process. Analysis centres on whether postmaterialist values are upheld or suppressed
during economic uncertainty. It is contended that dominant economic discourse sidelines
postmaterialist discourse without necessarily suppressing it. Political discourse in some
cases is found to reflect post materialist values in rhetoric while pursuing policies that
support economic growth at the expense of environmental protection. Factors influencing
the reduction of support for climate change action as a priority issue in polls are also
examined.
Introduction
Boom times in many developed countries had most people, including economists,
thinking problems of business cycles were over and the good times were not going to end
(Gamble 2009, p.1). At the same time global warming from anthropogenic gas emissions,
loss of biodiversity, ozone depletion, and acid rain built awareness that human activity
could adversely affect the planet (Weart 2010). Onto this scene came a crisis of the
international financial market so severe it resulted in a global recession that was the worst
since the 1930s depression (Wolf 2009). Many expected environmental concern to be
sidelined by actions to maintain economic stability (Robison 2009), while others saw
opportunity for a transition to environmentally sustainable societies (Gamble 2009, p.
167; Robins, Clover et al. 2009a). Crises are times when ideas that have become
established as the wisdom of the time are found to be fallible. The result is that all the
ideas, knowledge, theories, and information available have to be reassessed to make
decisions on how to resolve the crisis and proceed.
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This paper contributes to this assessment by examining the effect of the global financial
crisis on environmental policy. This is done through analysing how elites discursively
constructed issues around the crisis and climate change policy at the time. This is then
related to the ecopolitical theory of postmaterialism to examine the explanatory value of
this theory. As ecopolitical theory only developed as a cohesive school of thought in the
late 1960s, the severity of the crisis and provides an opportunity to further examine those
ecopolitical theories related to material circumstance.
Postmaterialism and the role of value change, especially related to economic condition
and political action is discussed. This is followed by analysis of the discourse in three
case countries to determine how issues around the crisis were constructed in different
settings and how this relates to outcomes in climate change policy. The analysis explores
the relationship between material circumstances and ecopolitical outcomes. Finally
conclusions are presented with particular reference to postmaterialism as a theory and its
relationship with outcomes in the case countries as well as comparison across the cases.
Postmaterialism and its relationship to political action during crisis
Dalton states “values identify what people feel are - or should be - the goals of society
and the political system” and attributes new patterns in political action and support to
changing political values (Dalton 2008, p. 79). Socioeconomic, post-war development in
industrialised societies has led to these changes which have, in part, been evidenced
through non-traditional forms of political activity, which include what have been called
the ‘new social movements’: feminism, anti-nuclear, peace, and environmentalism.
Ronald Inglehart advanced one of the most enduring theories for this value change which
he termed postmaterialism (Inglehart 1971).
Inglehart’s theory of intergenerational value change advances two hypotheses. One is
based on the premise that people will value what is scarce and take for granted those
things that are in abundant supply (the scarcity hypothesis). The second hypothesis
concerns the effect of economic security during young people’s politically formative
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years on value formation and that these values tend to persist during life (socialisation
hypothesis) (Inglehart and Abramson 1994). Inglehart’s index, a four or 12 point
preference ordering, has been used extensively for over thirty years in international value
surveys thereby providing a valuable source of empirical data for examining change over
time.
The lively debate about this theory of social and political change has attracted many
adherents (Abramson 1997; Dalton 2008; Díez Nicolás 2008b) and opponents (Clarke
and Dutt 1991; Duch and Taylor 1993; Trantor and Western 2003) whose work is
covered elsewhere in an extensive body of literature for example see (Inglehart 1971;
Marks 1997; Inglehart and Abramson 1999; Inglehart 2008). This paper concentrates on
the effects the adverse economic conditions have on postmaterialism and examines the
relationship of postmaterial values with the discourse and political actions during this
period. Inglehart more recently has identified “a broader cultural shift” in societies
associated with greater autonomy and self expression in all facets of modern lifestyles
(Inglehart 2008). Value change is important in the political process as it increases the
diversity of issues that are important to people, it affects the patterns of political
participation, and it shifts the issues of public debate (Dalton 2008, p.93-94).
This study analyses discourse using elite interviews in three case countries, media
discourse, climate change political actions and public opinion data. These methods are
appropriate given the contemporary nature of the issue. Elites are the people who
influenced or were involved in making decisions during this time. The media adopts
much of their discourse and introduce their interpretation of what the major players are
saying. By examining the policy actions it is possible to see if a gap exists between the
discourse and decisions taken. Surveys give a measure of what citizens felt about the
issue of climate change action during this time and measures of postmaterialism in each
country.
From 2000 a tapering off or decline in postmaterialism in some countries has been
observed (Inglehart 2008; Díez Nicolás 2008b) which to date only has tentative
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explanations. The financial crisis and economic problems of advanced industrial societies
provides an extreme period of financial uncertainty to further examine the postulations
behind this trend as well as the reaction of political actors. In this way the study extends
knowledge of postmaterialism and value change in the societies studied and the
relationship with environmental political action.
Background on Australia, New Zealand and Spain – economic, climate change
policy, postmaterialism and discourses
The three nations used to examine the relationship between the global recession,
postmaterialism, and policy discourses are: Spain, Australia and New Zealand. Each
country is discussed in terms of relevant background, climate change policy, discourse
used during the crisis period, postmaterialism and public opinion during this period.
Political environmental action focuses on climate change policy as the crisis coincided
with a time of increased international pressure for governments to introduce policy to
mitigate global warming. This study looks at how issues were discursively constructed
and how postmaterialist values within the citizenry related to the debate. In doing so this
study aims to reveal how this ecopolitical theory can explain what occurs during the
extreme economic conditions presented by the financial crisis and recession.
Australia
Political background and climate change policy. Environmental reform was a key issue
in the 2007 election (Rootes 2008) and one of the first acts of the new Australian Labor
Party, ALP, Government was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Australia is a country that is
already being affected by global warming (van Ommen and Morgan 2010) and the
increasing frequency and severity of extreme events is being attributed to climate change.
The Government began the process to introduce an emissions trading scheme (ETS) in
2008, but eventually postponed this plan in May 2010 (MacKay 2010). The process
towards legislation on emissions trading coincided with the greatest period of uncertainty
related to the GFC in Australia. The Rudd Labor Government introduced a Green Paper
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on the proposed Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) in June 2008 and a White
Paper with details of the emissions limits on 15 December 2008. A leadership change and
the call for early elections in 2010 were largely linked to actions related to the
Government’s failure to introduce the CPRS.
Economy . Australia’s highest export earnings in 2009 were from mining exports (39.3%)
followed by manufacturing exports (32.5%) (Australian Government 2009). Australia is
the largest exporter of coal in the world (Australian Coal Association 2010), derives 80%
of internal energy from burning coal and also has one of the highest per capita emissions
in the world. The value of the extractive industries to the Australian economy means that
this sector has considerable influence in political debates. Australia, like all OECD
countries, went through a period from October 2008 into the first months of 2009 where
the economy was characterized by disruption to the flow of finance, lack of credit for
businesses and high uncertainty on what was going to happen internationally.
Government reaction at this time, combined with key Asian trading partners only
suffering short v-shaped economic downturn, meant Australia only recorded one quarter
of negative growth and thereby avoided officially going into recession; the only OECD
country to do so.
Public opinion and postmaterialism. A majority of people support action on climate
change in Australia. Lowy Institute surveys show majority support for action on climate
remained high through to 2010 although a decrease in willingness to pay for it was
recorded (Hanson 2010, p.14-5). A vocal counter climate change movement is a feature
of the climate change debate in Australia. Postmaterialism in Australia, calculated from
various sources which included Inglehart’s 4-item measurement, shows Australia to have
had an increasing percentage of postmaterialists from 1988 through to 1996 with 18.5%
although a reduction is noted by 2001 (Trantor and Western 2003). The World Values
Survey (WVS) of 1995 and 2005 measured levels of 35.0% and 21.3% postmaterialists
respectively (World Values Survey 2005) although Trantor and Western suggest reasons
for the seemingly anomalous 1995 result (Trantor and Western 2003, p.243).
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Discourse and framing of issues during crisis.
Elite: According to Rudd his government inherited "a decade of denial and neglect" and
"climate change is the greatest moral, economic and social challenge of our time" (Manne
2008). His discourse going into Copenhagen included scathing attacks on all those he saw
trying to subvert the process of a new agreement including the opposition leader and
party (Morton and Flitton 2009). As the process for introducing the ETS got underway
the economically related discourse in Australia featured: not going ahead of the rest of
the world, going it alone, the rest of the world is doing nothing, and our emissions are
insignificant. More specifically related to the GFC were: industry needs to claw back
spending, every single dollar counted, trade-exposed industry need to stay competitive,
and that a conservative approach in policy at this time. On climate change action the
discourse included: an acknowledgement that a majority are concerned about climate
change action, people are ambivalent and just want the Government to do something, the
CPRS isn’t strong enough or is too strong. Once Copenhagen ‘fell over’ and Mr Abbott
became leader of the opposition, he effectively attacked the CPRS for being ‘a great big
tax on everything’. The widespread opinion of the elites interviewed was that the GFC
had little or only indirect influence on what happened with the CPRS policy process
during this time.
Media: “Some want us to conclude there was never any threat to the economy” and “the
talk-back jocks and a few right-wing types did their best to convince everyone it was
going to be the end of the Earth” (Interview, Participant [19]). The Murdoch media has
been accused of blatantly pursuing an opposing stance, and coordination use of internet
communication has been used to attack the science and scientists themselves through
cyber-bullying (Hamilton 2010). Opposition from extractive industry sector had been
well coordinated with intensive lobbying and use of the media to promote their interests
(Kevin 2009) The Australian Government cite the “deepening global recession” as the
reason for delaying the ETS until 2012 (Robins, Clover et al. 2010, p.14). In 2010
‘business and community want certainty’ emerged as some industry sectors did a seeming
about-face calling for a price on carbon (Coorey 2010). Garnaut introduced the term
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“diabolical challenge” into general discourse of climate change as a policy issue in his
review (Garnaut 2008).
New Zealand
Political background and climate change policy. New Zealand ratified the Kyoto
Protocol 6 months after the EU in 2002. Climate change predictions are for changed
rainfall patterns with more rain in much of the country and drought periods in some
eastern regions (MfE 2009). New Zealand has an unusual emissions profile with 70%
renewable energy production, mostly from hydro-power generation, and the high
proportion of emissions is from agricultural. In New Zealand an ETS was enacted under
the Labour Government in September 2008, two months before the 2008 elections. There
was consensus in the two main parties that New Zealand should have an ETS. Although
modified and delayed by the new National Party Government, the scheme came into law
on 1 July, 2010 for the stationary energy, industrial processes and liquid fossil fuels
sectors. Agriculture will not be included before 2015. As dairy products are the largest
agricultural export, the intensification of dairy farming comes under scrutiny from ETS
due to methane and nitrous oxide emissions, and there is strong sectoral opposition and
lobbying against the ETS. The National Government led an initiative at Copenhagen to
establish the Global Research Alliance to look for solutions for agricultural greenhouse
gases. Counter climate change discourse is evident as in Australia.
Economy . The principal source of export earnings is from the primary sector which is
mostly made up from agriculture, horticulture, forestry, mining and fishing (Statistics
New Zealand 2009). New Zealand is considered a trade-exposed economy due to its
geographical isolation and open economy with limited tariffs and trade protection
agreements. New Zealand began to be influenced by international financial problems as
early as 2007 with many smaller financial institutions failing (Braddock 2008). Recession
was officially announced after negative growth in the first two quarters of 2008 and was
recorded for 5 quarters.
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Public opinion and postmaterialism. In 2004/2005 New Zealand was included in the
WVS and the 4-item measurement used for the first time. The result for postmaterialists
was 17.9% and materialist 8.7% (World Values Survey 2005). Support for action on
climate change is high although New Zealanders were less willing-to-pay during 2009
and 2010 (Stuart 2010). On Inglehart’s cultural dimensions New Zealand is grouped with
the English speaking countries having a high level of self-expression and in the middle on
the traditional and secular-rational values scale. Only Canada, Switzerland and Sweden
rate higher than New Zealand on self-expression on the 2005-2007 cultural map
(Inglehart and Welzel 2010, p.554).
Discourse and framing of issues during crisis.
Elite: Discourse relating to discourse around the ETS debate included: rent seeking, self-
interest, complexity and abstractness of issue, price sensitivity, sense of identity – ‘our
clean green image’, protecting the environment, and ‘doing our fair share’. When
National delayed the scheme and set up a review committee: National ‘softened’ the
legislation, we won’t if they (rest of the world) don’t, why should we lead the world?,
we’re positioned as a fast follower (Interview, Participant [4]), the plumbing’s in place,
climate change is off the agenda, care with trade-exposed businesses, ‘greenies gave us
grief’, no one else has included all sectors and all greenhouse gases in their ETS. NZ was
already in recession when GFC started, and several interviewed said the GFC had no
effect on ETS policy process. Drought, rather than financial problems, was cited as the
cause of the recession (Interview, Participant [8]).
Media: Media reports in relation to the ETS focused on; increase energy prices, the
denialist point of view, why should NZ do anything when no one else is, we’re so small
what we do doesn’t matter, “we strut alone on an empty world stage” (George 2010),
‘softening of attitudes’ toward the issue of climate change, “prepare for pain in the
pocket”, creating jobs, and slow growth decade. Many prominent commentators support
action and the discourse also includes; ‘chilling warnings’, gap between rhetoric and
action, green foot-prints, forest-sinks, need to remember trading partners accept the
science, and doing our fair share. While economic discourse became more prominent, the
importance of being good moral international citizens is important for New Zealanders as
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demonstrated by the ban on nuclear powered or carrying ships still being “a sacrosanct
touchstone of New Zealand foreign policy” (Shepheard and McCracken 2009).
Spain
Political background and climate change policy. Spain had lagged on European Union (EU)
directed climate change policy implementation and only in recent years, before the financial
crisis, had begun to make serious attempts to address their environmental requirements as
part of the EU (Tábara 2007, p.162; Fernández, Font et al. 2010). Spain has difficulty
meeting its emission allocations, mainly due to its rapid industrialisation, and emissions
increased by 67.5% in the period from 1990 to 2007 (IEA 2009). Environmental policy is
dealt with within a new ministry which combined the previous ministries of agriculture,
fisheries, food and environment in 2008. Strong climate changes especially related to water
stress are predicted (Moyano, Paniagua et al. 2008). Citizens generally hold the
government of Spain and the EU responsible for mitigating climate change at a global level
(Moyano, Paniagua et al. 2008, p.68). That anthropogenic climate change is occurring is
widely accepted by the population and elites (Bowden 2010, p.2). The Kyoto Protocol was
ratified in 2002 as part of the EU and came into force in 2005 and as such Spain has been a
part of the EU ETS since 2005. Spain has been active in developing renewable energy with
feed-in tariffs. It is one of the biggest wind energy generators in the world and has already
met its EU 2020 target of 20% wind generated energy (EWEA 2011). In 2011 it’s leading
the world with solar thermal energy production. In November 2009 Spain hosted the last
preparatory session prior to the Copenhagen talks.
Economy . Spain joined the European Community in 1986 and the eurozone in 1999. Spain
is one of the European states most severely affected by the recession with official
unemployment over 20% in 2010 and a public deficit of 11.4% of GDP (Mallet 2010).
Spain, as in the United States of America and Ireland experienced unprecedented growth in
their property and construction sector and when this ‘bubble’ burst it exposed the weakness
of development in other sectors (Magone 2009). The depressed economic conditions show
little sign of improving and doubt persists that they will manage financially without
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international assistance (Münchau 2011). The principal source of Spain’s export earnings
are from manufacturing (Bank of Spain 2010).
Public opinion and postmaterialism. Spain has experienced various stages of economic
growth since the 1960s to become the advanced post industrialised state it is today. This has
made it an interesting case to examine the development of postmaterialist values. On
Inglehart and Welzel’s cultural map it is midway between traditional and secular values and
positive on self-expression values (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, p.354). In 2007 Spain
showed 11.5% postmaterialists and 34.8% materials using the 4-item measure (World
Values Survey 2005). Postmaterialist values had been steadily increasing up until 1999 but
showed a decrease since that year (Díez Nicolás 2008b, p.256).
Discourse and framing of issues during crisis.
Elite: Mr Zapatero didn’t talk crisis or recession until late 2009, and displayed what
Mallet (2010) referred to as some sort of optimism (Mallet, Barber et al. 2010). Delagdo
and Lopez Nieto point to the political debate became increasingly dominated by the
economy during 2008 (Delgado and Lopez Nieto 2009). In the Spanish presentation to
the Barcelona COP15 meeting in November 2009, Spain listed endless bureaucratic
committees and groups set up to deal with various aspects of policy but gave little
indication of specific actions and emission savings achieved (Government of Spain 2009.
This suggests a significant gap between the rhetoric and policy action.
Media: There is limited commentary on climate change policy unless a particular event
occurs for example when the Government announced cost cutting measures would
include guaranteed solar feed-in tariff reduction (Mallet 2010b). The lack of contested
debate on climate change seems to be reflected in limited discourse on the issue. The
media is mostly supportive of climate change science and NGOs are given coverage and
are mostly approved of by the people. For investors the most important economic
information comes from “the pronouncements of European politicians” (Mallet and Ford
2011). By late 2010 it was noted that the EU discourse had moved from the usual moral
responsibility and survival of humanity discourse, to one of energy efficiency and
improved innovation will save money. This narrative being considered more suited to “a
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public consumed with the economic crisis and that may be less concerned with rising seas
than job security” (Chaffin 2010). This is supported in EU documents with ‘smart
growth, green growth’ being the direction European economies need to take for recovery
(smart growth countries are China, South Korea) (Jaeger, Paroussos et al. 2011).
Discussion of postmaterialism, economic conditions and climate change actions in
each case
Influence of postmaterialism in relation to these advanced industrialised societies and
policy process.
Since Inglehart introduced his theory of generational value change in 1971 he has refined
the theory as debate on the theory developed and more empirical evidence became
available. Within the last ten years he points to postmaterialism being part of a broader
cultural change that is occurring in post-industrial states. A key link between broader
cultural change and postmaterialism is greater self-expression. This cultural change is
seen as a driver of greater democratisation of a society and persists despite globalisation
(Inglehart and Welzel 2010).
Inglehart (2008) identifies a polarisation between traditional and secular-rational values,
and also between survival and self-expression values (Inglehart 2008, p.139). Related to
this Inglehart and Welzel (2010) have developed a cultural map which includes the three
case countries according to their alignment on these two scales (Inglehart and Welzel
2010, p.554). According to Inglehart’s assessment traditional values “place strong
emphasis on religion, respect for authority, and have low levels of tolerance for abortion
and divorce and have relatively high level of national pride. Secular-rational values have
the opposite characteristics.” While self-expression values emphasise equality and
tolerance of out-groups such as gays and foreigners and people “give high priority to
environmental protection, tolerance of diversity and rising demand for participation in
decision making in economic and political life” (Inglehart 2008, p.139-140).
Postmaterialism relates strongly to the self-expression dimension.
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Inglehart stresses that values change, and subsequent cultural change, is a very slow
process and occurs principally from generational change. For example the socialisation
and scarcity hypotheses would suggest that the generation reacting adulthood during this
time of the current crisis would be more materialist. But there would be a time lag of 10
to 15 years until this generation has a political impact in the electorate, and another 10
years through entering positions of power and influence in society where their
postmaterial values influence what happens (Inglehart 2008, p.132). Inglehart has
demonstrated period effects related to recession where postmaterialist choose more
materialist answers but revert back to postmaterialist answers when the recession is over.
In this way postmaterialism endures in spite of recessions (Inglehart 1981).
The theory contends that economic growth and existential security since World War II
has resulted in cultural change that is driving change in politics and institutions. These
institutions need to be responsive to citizens who are more autonomous and self-
expressive. With the global financial crisis of 2008 this paper seeks to explore how policy
actions and the discourse in the three study countries are related to such values change.
Australia
When Kevin Rudd became Prime Minister of the Labor Government in 2007 he
repeatedly reiterated throughout 2008 that his government inherited "a decade of denial
and neglect" and that "climate change is the greatest moral, economic and social
challenge of our time” (Manne 2008, p.13). After ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, the new
Government began the policy process for introducing an ETS, the Carbon Pollution
Reduction Scheme (CPRS). While in opposition Labor commissioned a review of climate
change policy by the economist Ross Garnaut along similar lines to the 2006 Stern
Review in Great Britain. The Garnaut Climate Change Review was released during 2008
(Garnaut 2008), as were the Green and White papers on the CPRS.
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But for all the initial talk and action, by mid-2010 the CPRS had been postponed
indefinitely, Labor had had a leadership change and a new election in July saw Labor
forming a minority government with the slimmest margin. Discourse around the failure to
introduce the CPRS highlights failures within the Government itself; internal decision
making processes, Prime Minister Rudd’s style of leadership, and his rival’s political
ambitions (Taylor 2010). The Coalition changing from a position of support to opposing
the scheme, and the influence of industry and environmental lobby groups also played a
major part.
Australia has a large, highly organised lobbying industry made up of 150 groups,
spending over one billion Australian dollars a year (Source Watch). Once the White
Paper was released with specific figures for the CPRS, the lobby groups went into
‘overdrive’ (Interview, Participant [24]). Powerful private interests and the influence of
the ‘lobby machine’ are features of Australian politics and some elites interviewed felt
the GFC reinforced the influence of the industry lobby during this period. In particular
opposition from the extractive industry sector was well coordinated with intensive
lobbying (Kevin 2009, p.19). Discourse focused on business costs, ‘every single dollar
will hurt us’, the crisis and CPRS are a ‘double whammy’, ‘we can’t afford to go ahead
of the rest of the world’, and ‘we can’t afford to go it alone’, we need to protect
employment, we must protect trade-exposed business, we have to stay competitive, all
became catch cries. But even in the face of such an intensive campaign, a government
elected with a key issue of acting on climate change, had a clear mandate from the
citizens to do something. Their failure to do so and the intensity of lobbying during this
crucial period make it obvious to question their ability to act independently of vested
interests in Australia (Garnaut 2009, p.201).
Several elites interviewed compared the CPRS process to the introduction of the goods
and services tax under Howard in the late 90s. “Howard spent two and half years on that
and not much else. Introducing a complex economic reform in a contested political space
you need time for internal decision making and time to counteract scare campaigns”
(Interview, Participant [22]). Comments from some elites support the perception that the
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GFC distracted the Government from putting in the required effort to move the CPRS.
Issues relating to the content of the White Paper, restricted efforts from the Government
to react to attacks on the policy, and internal Government problems of making decisions
(Taylor 2010) would have led to problems with the introduction of the policy regardless
of the GFC.
There were still a significant number of elites interviewed that said the GFC didn’t affect
the legislative failure of the CPRS, and if there was any effect, it was only indirect at
most. The view that Australia had no recession and had escaped largely unscathed from
the GFC, was widespread by 2010. ‘Downturn’ became common currency for what
occurred to the economy in Australia and memory of the uncertainty and financial
problems seem to have evaporated. But it is clear from media reports, parliamentary
debates, and written accounts of the time that considerable financial stress and
uncertainty was widespread in Australia during the second half of 2008 and first half of
2009. “Some want us to conclude there was never any threat to the economy” was the
opinion of one commentator interviewed (Interview, Participant [19]).
Public opinion in Australia has been characterised by majority support for action on
climate change. By 2010 support for action was 72% but priority of the issue and
willingness to pay for it had dropped (Hanson 2010, p.1) In contrast to frequent polling of
opinion there has been limited study on value change or postmaterialism, although
Inglehart’s 4-item measure of postmaterialism has been used in various surveys and
forms since 1988 (Trantor and Western 2003, p.243). Australia has had a high standard of
living and material welfare for most of the second half of the twentieth and the level of
postmaterialism measured over time supports there being a value change in Australia
(Inglehart and Abramson 1999). An influential Green Party (Turnbull and Vromen 2006),
membership of environmental organisations, lobbying of politicians, use of the internet
and alternate forms of political action support Inglehart’s cultural assessment of Australia
as one of the group of English speaking countries measuring highly on self-expression
values. In fact only four countries measure higher on this measure on the 2005-7 cultural
map (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, p.554). These political features support Russell Dalton’s
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(2008) contention that modern developed states are developing a new style of citizen
politics and also that postmaterialists are more also likely to be politically active than
materialists as they show a greater interest in politics (Dalton 2008, p.92).
During the crisis, the CPRS has been constructed as a threat to economic stability and
growth (Coorey 2010). It has also been regarded as a threat to national security as
discourse around expected climate changes in Asia is linked with ‘climate refugees’ and
increasing numbers of ‘asylum seekers’, a very emotive political issue in Australia
(Chaturvedi and Doyle 2010). The Australian ‘lobby machine’ promoted opinions from
scientists that were contrary to the consensus view of climate scientists, conservative
newspapers, such as the Australian, attack climate change science and at times, the
scientists themselves (Hamilton 2010). Also criticising right-wing denialists, one
interviewee commented “the talk-back jocks and a few right-wing types did their best to
convince everyone it was going to be the end of the Earth” (Interview, Participant [19]).
It is probably notable that despite the discourse related to lobbying against the CPRS, the
reappearance of ‘latent’ denialists or ‘ascendant hardliners’ within the opposition
(Grattan 2009) and vocal denialists in the media, public opinion continues to show
majority support for action on climate change.
The Labor Party’s inability to deal with this issue effectively and Prime Minister Rudd’s
abandonment of the CPRS is related by almost all those interviewed to the public’s loss
of confidence in both Rudd and the ALP. The Labor leadership change and the
unprecedented, near second term defeat in the 2010 elections are both attributed to this
loss of confidence. This could be a case for showing how a government has failed to keep
relevant to changing values and their associated issues. As Dalton (2008) points out “the
issues of political debate are shifting” and “concerns about environmental protection,
individual freedom, social equality, participation, and the quality of life have been added
to the traditional political agenda of economic and security issues”(Dalton 2008, p.94).
Perhaps a key mistake of the Rudd, and later the Gillard led Governments have been to
underestimate the importance of new issues on the political agenda. Rudd won the
election with a discourse that included needing to take action on the greatest moral issue
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of our age but was able to put this aside with no apparent fight when other interests
seemed greater. His rhetoric did not match his actions.
New Zealand
New Zealand had a change of government in November 2008. The out-going Labour
Government had completed the policy process to legislate an ETS and did so weeks
before the 2008 election. The discourse under Labour had focused on New Zealand being
a leader in emissions reduction legislation and moral obligations as global citizens as had
occurred during the anti-nuclear debate of the 1980s (Buhrs and Christoff 2006). Under
the National Government and with the GFC at its worst, the discourse shifted to New
Zealand couldn’t afford to be a leader, it was too small to matter, the country shouldn’t be
going alone, no one else was doing anything and if they were, New Zealand was doing
much more than the anyone else. Going into the election the National Party had
campaigned to industry sectors and businesses that they would modify the ETS ‘to reduce
barriers to economic growth’ (Fleming 2008). This close relationship of the National
Party with these groups made it doubtful that the National Government would be able to
act independently of them.
Coming into power they immediately announced delays and established a review
committee in December 2008 (Fleming 2008). The scheme was eventually substantially
‘softened’ (Fallow 2011) and the government discourse became ‘doing our fair share’ and
‘New Zealand can not afford to be a leader and we are positioned to be a fast follower’
(Interview, Participant [4]). The changes made included delaying the date for the entry of
agriculture until 2015, delay the initial start for other sectors until July 2010 and
substantial relief for trade-exposed industries (Smith 2009). Because there was consensus
between the two main parties that an ETS was the desired instrument for controlling
greenhouse gas emissions, political action centred on trying to influence the design of the
scheme. The amended scheme met with approval from business groups but met with
continued, vigorous opposition from Federated Farmers (Fallow 2009). The softening of
the scheme and lowering of the issue as a priority send signals that climate change is not
17
a serious issue and can be dealt with later when economic conditions improve. For
example “Climate change public policy should … be moderate and measured until such
time as it is appropriate, and justified, to be otherwise” David Venables of Greenhouse
Policy Coalition, GPC (Walker 2010).
Industry lobby groups in New Zealand are well organised although many in such groups,
for example the GPC, accept that anthropogenic climate change is occurring. These
groups see their role as ensuring they protect the competitiveness of their industries and
that New Zealand New Zealand should not act until other key trading partners do
(Interview, Participant [5]). Federated Farmers is a notable exception to other business
sectors with their vigorous opposition to the inclusion of agriculture in the scheme and
that the ETS should be abandoned altogether. “Farmers don’t want a bar of it” (Fallow
2011). ‘Rent seeking’ by those included in the ETS was felt to be an important driver of
the modifications to the scheme by some groups (Interview, Participant [14]).
Public opinion surveys show ongoing, majority support for action on reducing carbon
emissions during the financial crisis (ShapeNZ 2007; ShapeNZ 2009a; Stuart 2010).
Although the survey by the GPC in 2010 found a “softening in attitudes towards the issue
of climate change” with less people inclined to think the issue is ‘pressing’ after it was
rated 10th in social and political issues (Stuart 2010). The New Zealand Government took
this survey to indicate they have the balance on the ETS right for the majority of New
Zealanders (Bowden 2010).
Postmaterialist values are manifest in the discourse which expounds the importance of
quality of life, the country’s ‘pure, clean, green image’, support for environmental
protection, New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance, support of unconventional political
activity – protest, direct contact with Members of Parliament, signing petitions, and
membership of environmental groups. The gap between citizens and politicians is
relatively small in New Zealand and it is not difficult for citizens to talk directly with
their Member of Parliament. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have shown, New Zealand
is the third highest country on the self-expression values on their cultural map (Inglehart
18
and Welzel 2005, p.63). Perhaps this small gap between citizens and politicians relative
to other countries accounts for the Government sensitivity to the mood of the people
(Laugesen 2010). During the GFC they have tried to balance citizen’s support for taking
action on climate change with protecting trade-exposed businesses influence due to the
uncertain financial conditions of the crisis. Like Australia, New Zealand has a vocal
denialist sector of the population although their influence appears less coordinated than in
Australia and the mainstream newspapers show less bias towards taking a particular
climate change stance. Overall New Zealanders place importance on ‘needing to do the
right thing’ but the GFC has made them more cautious about being a leader on climate
change especially when they perceive their allies Australia and the US are avoiding
introducing an ETS.
Spain
A distinctive feature of the political reaction and discourse related to the GFC in Spain
was the Zapatero led Government’s initial unwillingness to acknowledge the crisis
(Mallet, Barber et al. 2010). So while the citizens received news of the effects of the
crisis relating to other countries and experienced effects themselves, there was no
discourse of crisis coming from their government throughout 2009. Referred to by the
Financial Times (2010) as “the perennially optimistic José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero”
who wouldn’t use the ‘c’ word in the face of the rapidly deteriorating economy of the
country added to the country’s problems by alienating foreign investors (Mallet 2010a;
Mallet, Barber et al. 2010). A property bubble, fueled by cheap international finance,
imploded exposing the weakness of development in other sectors of the economy
(Magone 2009). As with the crash of the USA and Irish property booms, problems were
evident back in 2007 and failures of realtors, construction companies, increased during
2008 well ahead of the global crisis. Spain went from a surplus situation of 2.2% gross
domestic product, GDP, in 2007 to a deficit of 11.2% GDP by 2009. After 15 years of
growth the country went into recession in the third quarter of 2008 (BBC 2008).
Unemployment, although always higher than other European countries, reached 12.8%
by October 2008, 17.4% by April 2009 and 21% in April 2011. Such conditions had ‘ el
19
crisis’ foremost in the minds of the citizens and as a key issue in the media, even if
government discourse was lacking.
Environmental policy relating to climate change is mostly decided at the supranational
level through EU agreements and directives from the European Commission. Spain has
obligations to meet targets relating to emissions reduction, waste reduction, and
renewable energy production amongst others. Internally a pressing domestic issue is to
deal with water distribution: a problem with a long and highly contested history in Spain
(Saurí and del Moral 2001). The agriculture, fisheries, food and environment ministries
were amalgamated in 2008 (Altieri and Caprile 2009), a move that was seen by many as
showing the Government’s decreased focus on the environment as an issue.
An influences on public opinion and discourse on climate change issues is that policy
action is mostly dealt with at the autonomous region level (Tábara 2007). Although a
study of public opinion on climate change in Andalusia showed citizens were able to
differentiate which institutions were responsible for the scale of the problem and that they
generally hold the government of Spain and the European Union responsible for
mitigating global climate change (Moyano, Paniagua et al. 2008, p.68). That
anthropogenic climate change is occurring is widely accepted by the population and
elites. This is reflected in everyday activities such as the proportion of environmentally
related advertising in media, personal actions to reduce emissions, environmental actions
at community level by town-halls, and so forth. Even so there is a tendency to look at the
issue of climate change on a local level rather than globally (Moyano, Paniagua et al.
2008) and there is a feeling industry is responsible for most emissions and therefore
should be responsible for reductions. Most citizens would be ignorant of any detail of the
EU emissions trading scheme and how Spain is performing in regard to its obligations.
Díez-Nicolás (2008) through the Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y Políticos (ASEP)
has been able to evaluate value change in Spain using a database of more than 200
surveys which include Inglehart’s 12-item measurement from 1988 to present day (Díez
Nicolás 2008b). Spain, as a late but rapidly industrialising state, has been of special
20
interest in testing the postmaterialist thesis and has showed good support for the theory
until 2000. Díez-Nicolás points to terrorism, organised crime, corruption, high
unemployment, climate change, social and economic inequalities, delinquency, threats
associated with nuclear energy, globalisation of markets affecting personal security as
possibly influencing a return to materialist values in post-industrial societies (Díez
Nicolás 2008a, p.17). Researchers such as Díez-Nicolás, and Inglehart himself, are
expanding or adapting the theory to explain such observations (Inglehart 2008; Inglehart
and Welzel 2010). A ‘period effort’ on postmaterialist values during the 1992-4 period in
Spain probably related to high unemployment, corruption scandal in the government
circles and “great uncertainties about the future”(Díez Nicolás 2008b, p.256). A similar
or greater period effect would be expected during the current recession given its severity.
Spain, as it moved to becoming a post-industrial state, demonstrated a rise in the
expression of postmaterial values: increased self-expression, prioritising the environment
over economic growth, individualism, equality between men and women, preoccupation
with the aesthetic and quality of life, increase in the importance of relations and self
realisation at work and the political implication. NGOs are held in high esteem although
this doesn’t translate into membership, and social protest tends to be sporadic and
opportunistic which Magone (2009) associates with a shift to more self-expressive values
(Magone 2009, p.66-67). The internet and mobile phones are rapidly becoming a popular
forum for expressing opinions, networking and coordinating action. A high profile case in
2011 showed the potential for this type of action when several members of parliament
requested changing their vote on air travel privileges when fierce disapproval was
recorded on the internet (Editorial 2011). Later in May the youth protests during the local
body elections were organised through social networking sites (Mallet 2011).
But even with evidence of new political actions and postmaterialist values during the
crisis, discourse has focused on the economic, especially employment. With over one
fifth of the work force without work, and a disproportional number of young people
either without work or facing poor employment prospects as they enter the work force,
this issue becomes an overwhelming concern for most of the population. As one
21
commentator commented “when people don’t have jobs that’s all you can talk about”
(Interview, Participant [19]) although Spanish politicians appear slow to heed such
wisdom with issues like corruption scandals, and ETA terrorists regularly catching
headlines. Since the property market collapse there has been a focus on the issue of
political corruption, especially urban development irregularities at local government level
(Delgado and Lopez Nieto 2009). The issue of corruption coupled with a general loss in
confidence of President Zapatero, due to his seeming unwillingness to acknowledge the
seriousness of the crisis and take action for more than a year, exacerbated the gap
between citizens and politicians that already exists in Spain (Magone 2009, p.45). Since
mid 2010 the Zapatero Government has begun taking the economic measures required of
them to prevent a bail-out by the European Central Bank. Still, the recovery is expected
to be a protracted, difficult process with low economic growth for many years.
Discourse within the Spanish elite concentrates on neoliberal solutions and economic
growth as the imperative. ‘Smart growth’ and ‘green growth’ are used to describe where
economic opportunities lie and the desired direction of economic growth in Europe
(Jaeger, Paroussos et al. 2011) and in Spain there is discourse around the advantages new
green technologies can introduce into economies. Spain’s renewable energy industry is
frequently promoted in political speech and the media.
The media discourse in Spain, as in most European countries, is predominantly nationally
focused with little European Union information dealt with (Machill, Beiler et al. 2006).
This leads to limited information in the media on European climate change policy such as
the ETS. Increasing costs to citizens associated with meeting increasing emission
reduction levels is common in the discourse in both New Zealand and Australia but
doesn’t occur in Spain. Spain was one of the European countries that endorsed moving to
30% emission reduction on 1990 levels by 2020 (Roling 2011). Undoubtedly ‘el paro’ or
unemployment is an overwhelmingly important issue in Spain and although this does
remove climate change actions from discourse, citizens still expect this the Government
to deal with the issue.
22
The similarities and differences between the case countries
Both Australia and New Zealand had a majority of citizens wanting their governments to
take action on climate change and it was a key issue in their respective 2007 and 2008
elections. Majority support for action endured during the crisis although the priority of
the issue and willingness to pay for action declined. Whether this decline was due to
concern about material well-being or the scare campaigns, lobbying discourse and
denialist campaign run in each country is not clear. It is likely there is a combination of
the two, and the scare campaigners were able to use the fear of economic security caused
by the crisis to influence people. Discourse in both countries included: not going alone or
ahead of others, our emissions are so low they don’t matter, that it was going to make
businesses uncompetitive, and it was going to cost citizens a lot. The notable point is that
support for action stayed high, despite this discourse around material well-being.
New Zealand and Australia are advanced industrialised economies that have enjoyed
secure, prosperous conditions since World War II. Spain contrasts with this developing
much later and rapidly. Since the early 80s to this current recession they have
experienced the benefits of continuous growth apart from a period between 1992-4 when
there was high unemployment and concern about the success of democracy after high
level political scandals emerged (Díez Nicolás 2008b, p.256). On Inglehart and Welzel’s
(2010) cultural map, the three countries are very comparable on the traditional/secular
scale and all are positive on self expression value measurement, although New Zealand
and Australia rate much higher than Spain. Spain, as a relatively late industrial developer,
is showing the development of individualism and self-expression associated with
advanced industrialised states. The crisis period has provided a test these new values
against the moderation in political discourse that has been a characteristic of Spain since
the transition to democracy (Magone 2009, p.33). Magone contributes the Spanish social
protests that have become sporadic and opportunistic to the growth of individualism and
self-expressive values and the “decline and erosion of division” such as the Church and
political parties (Magone 2009, p.66).
23
That support for action on climate change stayed high in all three countries suggests
people did not revert to only worrying about their own well-being or more survivalist
values. New Zealanders and Australians were more exposed to debate on action that the
Spanish and one would expect the governments of those two countries to be more
sensitive to citizen concerns. That successive Australian governments, even though they
may have talked-the-talk of climate change action, have failed to take action leads one to
feel they are more interested in gamesmanship (Coorey 2010). Whatever the European
motivation for being a world leader on action it has drawn consensus from member states
and a general discourse around action, concern for the global situation and need for
action. How well Spain meets its obligations in a low growth economy is still to be seen.
Conclusions and further research
In the three countries, their focus on economic growth and complying with international
financial actions appears to have distracted them from respecting the support from their
citizens for climate change action. Especially Australia and Spain appear to have taken
citizen concerns for material well-being and for climate change action for granted, in
Australia to their own detriment. New Zealand, where elites are much closer and more
sensitive to the people, appears to have taken a more considered approach in their
discourse and action. A question associated that deserves more investigation is how
independently of vested interests are these three governments able to act? The Australian
case particularly points to this not being possible with the current main political parties.
In the three countries, with the development of postmaterialist and self expression values
and associated political actions, there is a sense that the governments in each case are not
keeping pace with the values changes that are occurring. Citizens in these three countries
are concerned enough about global climate change that they support their country taking
action. The governments say they agree, like Rudd’s ‘greatest moral challenge of our
age’, and have all committed to international agreements on the need to act. The problem
is that the discourse doesn’t match their actions and they continue with concessions to
24
industry, ‘softening’ of policy until others act, protecting competitiveness, and other
neoliberal economic excuses for lack of action that will prevent serious climate change.
Spain with its late, rapid industrialisation provides a good study for the progression of
postmaterial values and increasing self-expression values. With the country one of those
most affected by the GFC, they may be one that demonstrates the power of this value
change through new political actions. Those younger than 35 years have grown up
during the Spanish boom years, and it was this group who protested, demanding a change
in the political system in May this year. A protest coordinated through modern social
networking systems. Contrary to the idea that people are less interested in politics due to
falling voting turn outs, political parties would be advised to stay relevant to their
publics’ changing values priorities.
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