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North American Philosophical Publications
Confucius' Relational Self and Aristotle's Political
AnimalAuthor(s): Jiyuan YuSource: History of Philosophy Quarterly,
Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 281-300Published by: University of
Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical
PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27745033
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History of Philosophy Quarterly Volume 22, Number 4, October
2005
CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF AND ARISTOTLE'S POLITICAL ANIMAL
Jiyuan Yu
Confucius,
according to commentators, holds a conception of the rela tional
self which is in sharp contrast to the modern Western liberal
conception of the self, and which makes his ethics an
alternative model to rights-centered modern ethics. There is not
much consensus, however, about what precisely "relational self"
means. Numerous different ac counts have been proposed.1 There has
also been a major debate about the connection between the
relational self and individuality. Some be lieve that relationships
exhaust the content of a Confucian self,2 whereas others insist
that there remains an individuality that goes beyond the sum of
one's relationships. Of those who hold the latter position, there
are also different views about what kind of individuality it
is.3
Confucius' conception of relational self is usually discussed
through a comparison with the dominant liberal conception of self
that is char acterized by individual choice and freedom. Little
attention has been
paid to Aristotle's thesis that a man is by nature a political
animal
(politikon z?on).4 Yet this thesis indicates that a human being
es
sentially involves interpersonal relationships, and it appears
to be a
counterpart to Confucius' relational understanding of the self.
Social nature and interrelationships of individuals constitute an
integral part of Aristotle's ethics.
It is a common phenomenon, then, for both Eastern Confucius and
Western Aristotle to value human relatedness, and this motivates us
to bring them together in this comparative study. Interpretation
of
Aristotle's "political animal" thesis has been a subject of
controversy. Yet in contrast to Confucius who himself does not
articulate the concept of relational self, Aristotle's general
approach is relatively clear. We can use it as a mirror to better
understand what Confucius' relational self
might mean. In the meantime, we can also ask Aristotle similar
ques
281
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282 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
tions that have been asked in the discussion of Confucius'
relational self, and thereby lead to a fresh look at the "political
animal" thesis.
I. Political Animal, Relational Self, and Human Nature
1.1. Political Animal and Human Nature
It is easy to conceive of a Confucian relational self as one
that occupies this or that social role and lives within a network
of relationships. Ar istotle has a similar idea in mind when
explaining what the political animal is: "One cannot live a
solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general
for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is sociable by
nature."5 A person lives within a network of relationships, but it
would be philosophically meager if the relational self or political
animal were to mean merely this.
Aristotle, of course, goes much further. In Politics 1.2, he
explicates his "political animal" thesis in association with the
thesis that "the state is a creation of nature" (1253a3-4). He
justifies both theses on the grounds of a naturalistic and genetic
account of the state. Human
community starts with the family, develops through the village,
and
eventually leads to the form of the state:
When several villages are united in a single complete community,
large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes
into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and
continuing in ex istence for the sake of a good life. And
therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the
state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its
end. For what each thing is when fully devel
oped, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a
horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause or the end of a thing
is best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. Hence it
is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is
by nature apolitical animal. (1252b28-1253a4, emphasis mine)
To understand Aristotle's "political animal" thesis, this
passage is es sential. Yet how to understand this condensed text
has been a topic of
dispute.6 The key is the concept of nature. The canonical
definition of nature (phusis) is "a principle of motion and of
stationariness" that each
thing has within itself.7 In this sense, "two sorts ofthing are
called na
ture, the form and the matter."8 Form and matter are the
constituents of a thing, each of them being an inner principle of
motion and also a cause (formal cause or material cause, Physics
192b21-23). Form is more a nature than is matter. The other major
sense of nature is the end toward which a thing develops. These two
senses are not separate, for the end is the final actualization of
the form that exists potentially at the beginning (193b3-12). It is
the formal cause that internally directs
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CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF 283
and promotes a thing toward its actualization. The formal cause
is also the final cause (192bl3-15).
Nature as the inner principle of motion and nature as end are
both
employed in the "political animal" thesis. When Aristotle claims
that "A social instinct [horm?, or impulse] is implanted in all men
by nature"
(Politics 1253a30), he is using the first sense of nature. Horm?
(impulse) is the natural tendency of a thing to attain a specific
condition (Physics, 192bl3-23). In Politics 1.2, it is precisely
these impulses that serve as the driving force for human beings to
form various communities. They propel human beings to join with
others in order to be fulfilled or per fected, thus initiating an
inevitable process of the creation of a state.
It is Aristotle's belief in Politics 1.2 that human beings have
a number of social elements in our innate natural impulses. The
first is the desire to have sufficient necessities of life. Family
is originally formed for the sake of producing offspring, but it is
also for the sake of acquiring the necessities of life. The
different functions of male and female comple ment each other and
make what belongs to each available to both in common. Furthermore,
some neighboring families are motivated to group themselves
together to form a village because it is clear that larger and
more complex communities make it easier to survive. It is for
the same motivation that the state is formed. The state is the most
self-sufficient
community and makes it possible for its members to lead richer
lives than are available in the household and village alone.
The second innate element is our gift of speech (logos, Pol.
1253a9-10). Other animals have voices with which to express emotion
and give signal, yet it is only human beings who are able to use
words and sentences. This gift of speech is not merely a matter of
linguistic ability. Aristotle
specifies: "The power of speech is intended to set forth the
expedient and
inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust"
(1253al5 16). Accordingly, the gift of speech amounts to the
ability that enables human beings to discriminate moral as well as
amoral things, and to elucidate the intelligible content of what we
refer to. Indeed, in Greek, logos is "speech" or "language," but is
also "reason."
The third innate element is our natural moral sense. "It is a
charac teristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and
evil, of just and
unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who
have this sense makes a family and a state" (1253al7-19).9
All these social elements in our natural impulses are driven to
their actualization. In Politics 1.2, Aristotle contends that they
can only be actualized in a state. When Aristotle claims that the
state is the final
stage or the proper end toward which these impulses move and in
which
they seek actualization, he is using the second sense of nature.
"For what
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284 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature"
(1252b3-34). It is easy to understand why the desire for the
necessities of life can be
fully actualized in the state. It is less clear, and also less
discussed, why practical rationality and natural moral senses can
only be developed in the state. Why is a state the final stage of
the actualization of these social impulses?
Actualization means reaching a state of self-sufficiency. A
state comes into being because the state is necessary for a
person's life to be self sufficient. This does not only mean that
the state provides sufficient life necessities. In the passage
under discussion (1252b28-1253a4), Aristotle
says that "the state comes into existence, originating in the
bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of
living well." "Living well" {eu z?n) is synonymous with eudaimonia
(happiness). This remark shows that the existence of the state is
necessary for one to achieve eudaimonia. Self-sufficiency is a
criterion for happiness in NE, i.7 and it means that "which when
isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing" (1097bl5-16).
What can the state offer to make one's life self-sufficient in this
sense?
Since "political" (politikon) is etymologically related to
polis, the Greek city-state, it is easy to think that "political
animal" means that human beings are by nature adapted to live in a
Greek polis. There is
not, however, such a straightforward relation. Man is not the
only spe cies that is called a "political animal." Aristotle also
uses the same title to refer to bees, wasps, ants, cranes, and
other gregarious animals.10 He defines "political animal" as "such
as have some one common object in view" (History of Animals,
488a8). Animals are "political" as long as
they are involved in cooperative activities that lead to a
common end. In this sense, "political" means nothing more than
"communal" or "social."
Aristotle also says: "Man is "more of a political animal than
bees or any other gregarious animals" (Politics. 1253a8). What
makes man "more of a political animal" than other communal
animals?
When Aristotle claims that human beings are more political than
other gregarious animals, the direct reason he gives for this claim
is that "man is the only animal who has the gift of speech [logos]"
(1253a9-10). He also claims that "it is a characteristic of man"
that he alone has natural moral sense (1253al7-19). Both animals
and human beings need life necessities. Hence, if man is more of a
political animal than
animals, it must be because of these two kinds of social
impulses and their actualization.
Our practical rationality and natural virtue need to be refined
and
perfected. For Aristotle, "For man, when perfected, is the best
of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the
worst of all; since
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CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF 285
armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at
birth with
arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which he
may use for the worse ends" (1253a30-36). Intelligence and natural
virtue must be perfected by law and justice. Otherwise, a man would
lose his
humanity and become "the most unholy and the most savage of
animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony" (1253a36-37).
Where do we find law and justice, then? The answer is in the
state.
Justice and virtue are precisely the things that bind a
political society together (Politics 1252b37-40). To perfect one's
implanted social nature, one must be a member of a political
community. In NE, v.l, he claims that justice in its broad sense
(which is the complete virtue in relation to others) means "what is
lawful" (nomimon). Aristotle admits that there can be and have been
defective and unjust laws (cf. NE, 1129b25; Politics
1282a41-bl3). Nevertheless, he believes that "Evidently all
lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts laid down by the
legislative art are
lawful, and each of these, we say, is just" (NE, 1129bl3-14).
All legal systems are "in a sense" (p?s) just because a community
regulated by laws is better off than a lawless state, although a
society must have a
system of laws based on a proper understanding of human
well-being in order to promote the happiness of its citizens.
The state is a natural creation because it is grounded in human
social
nature, and is the actualization of it. Correspondingly, man is
by nature a political animal, not only because he has natural
social desires, but also because a political community is
indispensable for the fulfillment of these desires. Aristotle
associates the "political animal" thesis with the "state as a
natural creature" thesis, because they are established on the same
grounds. "Political animal" is, therefore, meant in two senses. In
a low sense, a person must live with others in order to secure the
necessities of life. This sense is shared with other gregarious
animals. In a high sense, one has a social nature that can only be
fulfilled in a
community that has law and justice.
1.2. Relationship and Human Nature in Confucius
The familiar textbook view is that Confucius himself does not
really have a theory of human nature and that it is Mencius who
lays down the psychological foundation for orthodox Confucianism.
Yet, Mencius himself suggests that his theory of human nature has
been implied in Confucius' thinking. In Mencius's view, there are
four inborn roots or
beginnings (duan) to moral behaviors in everyone's natural
endowment:
compassion, shame and disgust, compliance and respect, and right
and
wrong. When these roots grow and become mature, they turn into
the four main Confucian virtues: benevolence (ren), appropriateness
(yi),
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286 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
propriety (li), and wisdom (zhi) (Mencius, 6a/6). Right after
his exposi tion of the theory, Mencius states:
The Book of Odes says, heaven produces the teeming masses, and
where there is a thing there is a norm. If the people held on to
their constant nature, they would be drawn to superior virtue.
Confucius commented, "The author of this poem must have had
knowledge of the way [dao]. Thus where there is a thing there is a
norm, and because the people hold onto their constant nature they
are drawn to superior virtue."11
On the strength of this passage, in Confucius' understanding,
human
beings possess a constant nature that leads toward virtue.
Mencius also quotes another saying: "Confucius said, 'Hold on to it
and it will
remain; let go of it and it will disappear. One never knows the
time it comes and goes, neither does one know the direction.' It is
perhaps to the heart/mind this refers" (Mencius, 6a/8). If
Mencius's quotations and comments are credible, Confucius holds the
idea that there is an original constant nature for people to
preserve and develop. Mencius's theory, as he himself acknowledges,
is the legitimate extension or elaboration of this idea.
Confucius' ethics presupposes the assumption that there is a
natu ral basis in human beings for them to become good. Confucius
sets the
conceptual framework of dao~de at the core of his thinking. In
the an cient Chinese belief system, each thing is thought to have a
de (virtue, in Chinese it is etymologically related to de, "to
get") that is derived from Heaven's dao, and if the thing fully
develops its de, it embodies in itself Heaven's dao and reaches its
perfect state. Human de is the
manifestation of Heaven's dao in human life. Such a conceptual
scheme
implies that we must have the root of de in our original nature
which is from Heaven. Confucius himself claims that it is his
divine mission to restore the dao of Heaven in the human world
(Analects 3:24). He names human de "ren" (humanness), and his whole
ethics is about how to cultivate "ren." The saying in the Analects
that is most directly about human nature is that "men are close to
one another by xing ["nature" or "human nature"]. They diverge as a
result of repeated practice" (17:2).12 According to the prevailing
reading, this remark shows that human nature is neutral and waits
to be shaped by practice. However, to borrow a point from
Aristotle, practice can make a difference only if a thing has a
natural basis to receive it (NE, 1103a20-24). Read in this
way, Confucius can also be taken to imply that, in the common
nature that human beings have, there is a part that is the natural
basis for us to be virtuous through practice. He says: "Is ren
really far away? No sooner do I desire it than it is here" (7:30).
This seems to be a positive affirmation that ren has a natural
ground in us.
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CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF 287
Confucius' teaching unambiguously relates human relationships
to
what a human being should be. In the Analects, the achievement
of ren
is said to be a process of shiuji (the cultivation of the self).
An excellent or virtuous person (junzi) is he who "cultivates
himself and thereby achieves reverence" (14:42). To cultivate is to
"cultivate virtues" (7:3).13 The roots of a person's virtuous
character are said to be filial love and fraternal respect.14 Self-
cultivation is a process of expanding these roots to larger
communities. "Once the roots are established, the Way will
grow therefrom" (1:2). Family relationships are the source and
grounds for the cultivation of the self.
Confucius' key concept ren also points to the significance of
relation
ships in a person's becoming good. On the one hand, ren is the
quality that makes a man a man (uRen zhe ren ye," literally "to be
ren is to be a man.");
15 on the other hand, this term consists of two components in
Chinese: "human" and "two," symbolizing the most basic mode of hu
man relatedness. It indicates that relationships must be
indispensable in achieving humanity. Confucius never believes that
one who lives in isolation or seclusion can attain virtues and dao.
"I have heard such a claim," Confucius says, "but I have yet to
meet such a man" (16:11). He repeatedly claims that cultivation is
a process of examining your self inwardly (nei shin).16 Yet this
does not mean that cultivation can be independent of human social
relationships. The remark of Zheng Zi in Analects 1.3 shows the
relation between examining oneself and human relationships: "Every
day I examine myself on three counts. In what I have undertaken on
another's behalf, have I failed to do my best? In my dealings with
my friend have I failed to be trustworthy in what I say? Have I
passed on to others anything that I have not tried out myself?" The
content of self-examination is loyalty to others, faithfulness to
friends, and commitment to learning. All these involve
human-relatedness.
With Mencius's theory of human nature, the connection between
the relational self and human nature becomes more explicit. The
four inborn
roots, which set a human being apart from an animal and define
what a human being really is,17 involve interpersonal relationships
and presup pose a community. These seeds must grow in order for one
to become a good human being. Yet, they can only grow or gain full
expression in a society that has norms which regulate human
relationships. For Confucius and Mencius, it is the rites or
rituals (li)? that is, the entire
body of socially acknowledged behavior patterns, customs,
institutions, and life-styles, as best presented in the early Zhou
Dynasty.
Hence, Confucius and Mencius pursue a line of thinking similar
to that of Aristotle. Being a relational self, just like being a
political animal,
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288 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
means that a person is by nature relational. A community in
which hu man relationships are regulated is indispensable for the
actualization of the relational nature.
1.3: Human Social Nature and Ethics
Aristotle and Confucius, then, commonly emphasize human social
or relational nature. This common emphasis leads to at least three
common features in their respective ethics, and these features
distinguish both of them from the dominant principle-based modern
Western ethics. A detailed discussion of each will take us too far
afield, but let me briefly mention them to indicate the
implications of the "political animal" thesis and of the
"relational self" conception.
First, both respect the fact that each person grows in and is
shaped by a social web. Hence both connect ethics with the
internalization of social values. For Aristotle, virtues of
character or ethical virtues (?thek? arete) are formed out o? ethos
(habit or social custom, NE, 1103al7-19). To learn to be virtuous
involves a process of habituation (ethismos). For
Confucius, ren is to conform to social rites. Being a good
person involves a process of ritualization. Both habituation and
ritualization mean the inculcation or internalization of social
values as the source of virtue.
Second, given the significance of the politically organized
community in the fulfillment of what is human, both Aristotle and
Confucius hold that ethics and politics are inseparable. Aristotle
claims that the project in the NE regarding happiness and virtue is
only part of the "philosophy of human affairs," and it must be
completed by the study of legislation and political institutions
(1181bll-15), that is, the topic of his Politics. For Confucius, to
be a person of ren is to conform to social rites (12.1) and the
best politics is the implementation of social rites (12:11). The
Chinese term 'politics' is etymologically related to zheng (the
correction of one's behavior). Using this relation, Confucius
claims: "To govern [zheng] means to rectify [zheng]." Rectification
of his personal character is essential for a ruler's
leadership.
Third, both Aristotle and Confucius pay much attention to the
role of family since family is the basic unit of social
relationship. Confu cius' position is well known. The core of
social rites lies in two types of
relationships: one is the father-son relationship in the family
and the other is the ruler-subject relationship in politics
(Analects, 12:11). Filial love and brotherly respect are the roots
of ren and dao (Analects 1:2).
Aristotle's interest in family is mentioned less in the
secondary litera ture. Yet following the "political animal" thesis,
Aristotle believes that
family is indispensable for human beings to actualize their
humanity. Moral education, according to Aristotle, comes at two
levels: the state
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CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF 289
and the family. "For as in cities laws and character have force,
so in households do the injunctions and the habits of the father"
(1180b4-5). "Perhaps one's own good cannot exist without household
management, nor without a form of government" (NE, 1142a9-ll).
II. Self and Individuality
Now let us turn to the issue of whether the Confucian relational
self is submerged into human relationships, or it still has
individuality that cannot be reduced to human relationships. In a
sense, the concept "relational self" invites this debate. For on
the one hand, relationships and individuation are thought to form a
contrast;18 on the other, the notion of self leads to the
traditional question of self-identity. In Aris totelian
scholarship, there is no corresponding debate about whether a
political animal is individual. Yet since political animal is
analogous to relational self, we are led to ask the question
whether a political ani mal has individuality and if it has, what
kind of individuality it is. By "individual," I follow the normal
practice and identify it with "single," "uninstantiable," or
"particular."19
"Political animal" figures into Aristotle's notion of self when
Aristo tle distinguishes two kinds of self-love. One gratifies the
non-rational
part of the soul by pursuing things such as money, honors, or
bodily pleasures. This is the bad form of self-love.20 The other
kind seeks to
gratify the rational part of the soul and is the noble form of
self-love.21 Each type of self-love involves a notion of "self."
The self of the base self lover is defined by the appetitive part
of the soul, whereas the self of the noble self-lover is identified
by his reason.22 Aristotle further claims that a noble self-lover
is one who develops a virtuous character. The noble self-lover
develops practical wisdom, and practical wisdom is an
indispensable aspect of a developed virtuous character. At
1168b25-6, such a self-lover is one who is always eager to act
temperately, justly or in accordance with other moral virtues.
Rational actions are said to be noble actions (1169a8-9). The self
of the noble self-lover turns out to be his virtuous character.
In his theory of friendship, Aristotle has a well-known thesis
that a friend is another self (NE, 1166a32) or a second self (Magna
Moralia, 1213a20-26). This is, of course, limited to virtue-based
friendship.23 A friend is my second self because we are both
virtuous and we are fun
damentally the same in character. For this reason, I can know
myself better by looking at my friends. Clearly, in this "second
self" theory, the self is also identified with one's virtuous
character.
Some commentators question whether Aristotle should have
identified self with character.24 This may be due to our usual way
of
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290 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
identifying "self" with "person," and taking Aristotle to be
dealing with the metaphysical issue of personal identity. In that
case, it is true that one remains the same person even if his
character changes, and that a person cannot be reduced to abstract
attributes. However, Aristotle
distinguishes between person and self, and his concern is the
formation of a moral self which he defines in terms of moral
character. We may feel strange about his use of "self," but should
follow him in order to understand his point.25
Confucius also appears to have distinguished between person and
self. In his view, to achieve ren or virtue, one first of all has
aji (self) to overcome (keji, Analects 12:1). One needs to moderate
appetitive desires.
Moreover, there is a ji (self) to be cultivated, that is, an
original good nature to be developed into a virtuous character. A
noble person is he who "cultivates himself and thereby achieves
reverence" (14:42). Keji ("to overcome oneself) and shiu ji ("to
cultivate oneself") are not two
separate processes, given that the process of forming virtue is
also the
process that moderates desires.26 Confucius' usage of ji (self)
suggests that he does not identify ji (self) with person. For a
person includes both the good nature and the appetitive desires. A
virtuous agent must overcome the latter but develop the former.
Like Aristotle, Confucius is concerned with moral rather than
metaphysical identity of the self.
He is interested in the development of an ethical character
rather than what it is that remains the same person over time.
Given this, in asking whether the Confucian relational self or
the Aristotelian character-self (or political animal) is an
individual, what is at issue should be the moral self. Moreover, we
must distinguish between the following two questions. First, is the
moral self, constituted by the virtuous character, an individual?
Second, is the person or the agent who is characterized by the
moral self an individual? Both Confucius and Aristotle answer "no"
to the first question, but "yes" to the second
question.
Neither Confucius nor Aristotle thinks that the self is
submerged in social relationships. Aristotle's ethics is concerned
with one's own eudaimonia. The development of one's nature into
being a political ani mal is a significant part of one's
eudaimonia. The actualization of one's social nature is not to let
go of one's own self. Rather, it is essential for the formation of
the self. Similarly, Confucius insists that while human
relationships are indispensable, the self is not just a sum of
relation
ships. The goal of self-cultivation is learning to be a virtuous
person by acquiring ren. Ren is the character that defines an agent
as being virtuous. To become virtuous, one is not merely getting
into a network of relationships (indeed, one must have already been
thrown into such
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CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF 291
a network), but is developing a disposition to treat others in
community appropriately. This disposition, although it is developed
in practicing ritualized relationships, is itself not relational.
Confucius emphasizes a distinction between the self (ji) and others
in the cultivation of ren. "The practice of benevolence depends on
oneself alone, and not on others"
(Analects 12:1). "Men of antiquity studied to improve
themselves; men
today study to impress others" (14:24). A person of ren "helps
others to take their stand in so far as he himself wishes to take
his stand, and
gets others there in so far as he himself wishes to get there"
(6:30).27
Indeed, for Confucius, it is not the case that when these
relations
change, character changes. Once a character is formed, it is not
only distinct, but it also confers on the agent a strong
personality and in
tegrity. "The Master said: The three armies can be deprived of
their
commanding officer, but even a common man cannot be deprived of
his zhi ["will" or "resolve"]"' (Analects 9:26). It also gives the
agent a high degree of moral independence, so that he can live in a
different society but still exercise his virtue to influence the
new environment.28
What becomes a problem for both Confucius and Aristotle is how a
virtuous character can be individual in the sense of being single
or
particular. A character is not private or particular, but
contains general, predictable, and repeatable values. It can be
instantiated many times and identify a certain social group
(namely, virtuous people). Both Ar istotle and Confucius are
ethical objectivists. They believe that there is an objective good
that each human being should achieve, and the content that makes a
person a virtuous agent is shared and common. For both,
self-actualization is to become a person of a certain type or an
ideal human being, rather than becoming a particular individual
that is distinct from other human beings.
In Aristotle's ethics, a moral character is developed and
perfected through social habituation and is informed by social
ethos and laws. The content of a virtue is the same for all
virtuous agents; indeed, when Aristotle defines virtue as a mean
disposition, he specifies that it be "in the way in which the man
of practical wisdom would determine it"
(NE 1107al-2). Each virtuous agent is a noble self-lover. The
self she
loves, however, is her virtuous character, which is more or less
com
monly shared by other virtuous agents. Furthermore, the paradigm
friendship is character-based friendship, in which the virtuous
agent's genuine concern for his friends is justified on the ground
that the friend is another self. This is not because his friend is
a particular individual, but because his friend has the traits of
character that the virtuous agent possesses and values, the
fundamentally same character that defines the virtuous agent as
such.29
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292 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
In Confucius' ethics, the virtuous character (ren) is a quality
that is shared by all virtuous agents. There is a human dao that is
the em bodiment of the dao of Heaven. The goal of self-cultivation
(shiu ji) is to lead one's life in accordance with the dao of
Heaven. Ren, the quality that makes a person a person, is not meant
to make a person a unique individual, but an ideal person.30
While it is certainly right that a virtuous character is shared
and
instantiable, it does not entail that the virtuous agent, the
subject of
virtue, is simply a physically discernible neutral medium to
embody or instantiate the common virtuous character. The self or
the virtuous character is not, as it were, "a ghost in a machine."
There are at least the following reasons for granting particularity
to a virtuous agent. These reasons are held by both Confucius and
Aristotle.
(1) Although the content of virtue is objective, its achievement
in volves conscious personal effort. For Confucius, the root of
cultivation is filial love, not filial love in general, but the
love that one has for one's own
parents. Furthermore, it is precisely because cultivation needs
personal effort that only a few can actualize the originally equal
potentiality to become a sage. The Analects is full of sayings that
exhort us to show our
personal determination and commitment in the pursuit of ren.
Confucius also attends to the need of each student as an individual
in his teach
ing. On Aristotle's side, although moral virtues are generated
in and by social habituation, habituation is not a passive and
mechanical process of following norms. It involves one's active
engagement, and one is at least partly responsible for one's
character (1114b2-3).
(2) The possession of virtue involves personal understanding.
Aristotle stresses that to be a virtuous agent, in addition to
having a fixed disposi tion, one must have knowledge, must "choose
the acts and choose them for their own sakes" (1105a31-32), and
take pleasure in it.31 For Confucius, knowing is a necessary
quality o? ren, as one who does not possess know
ing cannot be ren (5:18). A man of ren must have his own
understanding about what to do. "The gentleman agrees with others
without being an echo. The small man echoes without being in
agreement."
(3) The possession of virtue must involve personal feeling. For
Aris
totle, an agent with this quality is "a true lover of what is
noble" (NE, 1179b9). This kind of enjoyment constitutes one's
ethical taste. It is a sign of virtue: "The man who does not
rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call
a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who
did not enjoy liberal actions; and simi
larly in all other cases" (1099al6-20).32 A person who engages
in just acts is not necessarily just. It is in light of whether one
likes or enjoys doing something, rather than merely what one does,
that we determine
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CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF 293
whether one truly has a good character. Correspondingly, for
Confucius, ren must involve love or benevolence (uren is to love
your fellow men,"
Analects, 12:22), and one's actions must be carried out with
ease and
enjoyment. A man of ren is one who "finds ren attractive" (4:6)
and "is fond of what is appropriate" (12:20). "The man of ren is
attracted to ren
because he feels at home with it" (4:2).
(4) The exercise of virtue requires individual discretion. Both
Con fucius and Aristotle are moral particularists and hold that a
virtuous
agent must bring the general requirements of virtue to bear
appropri ately in particular situations. A virtuous agent must
critically assess the salient features of the circumstances and
determine what is called for. For Aristotle, practical wisdom is
concerned with actions we can do
by means of our own agency. While it requires knowledge of the
uni versal about what should be done, it focuses on the salient
features of
particular situations and circumstances in which each action is
taken.33 It is likened to perception, that is, the individual
practical sensitivity, a
seeing, of how to act (NE, 1142a23-30). For Confucius, the
regulations of social rites are of a general nature. The
intellectual aspect of virtue, yi ("appropriateness"), requires
adjusting the generality of the social rites and bringing them to
bear in particular circumstances. Indeed, "In his
dealing with the world the gentleman is not invariably for and
against anything. He is on the side of what is appropriate"
(Analects, 4:10).
III. Self and Contemplation
The comparison of Aristotle's political animal with the
Confucian re lational self cannot be concluded without introducing
Aristotle's other notion of self, the theoretical self. For
Aristotle, being a political animal is only one aspect of human
nature, and the acquisition of a virtuous character is only a
partial actualization of human function. In addition, there is a
theoretical self and its actualization. For Confucius, the re
lational self is the only self that should be fulfilled. It is
worthwhile to
point out this contrast, albeit briefly, so that our comparison
of political animal with relational self becomes complete.
For Aristotle, what distinguishes a human being from animals is
that he is a rational animal rather than that he is a political
animal.
However, being a political animal has a low sense and the high
sense. While the high sense (distinguished by the human power of
language and moral sense) is peculiar to human beings, the low
sense is shared
by the gregarious animals. Being a political animal in the high
sense is
certainly part of being a rational animal; yet it is not the
whole content of being a rational animal.
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294 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
Aristotle subdivides the part of the soul that has reason in
two: theo retical and practical. The virtue of practical reason is
practical wisdom, while the virtue of theoretical reason is
theoretical wisdom and its ex ercise is contemplation. If we put
the political animal into this picture, it is clearly related only
to practical rationality and practical virtue.
Being a political animal, therefore, is only one part of human
function, and its actualization is only a partial
actualization.
We mentioned earlier that Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of
self
love, each involving a distinct notion of "self," identified
respectively with the appetitive part and with reason. Given that
there are two kinds of
rationality, the rational self has two parts: a theoretical
rational self and the practical rational self. The love of either
kind of rationality should be noble self-love. Indeed, it has been
demonstrated that Aristotle iden tifies the self with one's
character and practical reason. Now, he also identifies the self
with theoretical intellect (nous). He says at NE, x.7, 1178a 1-8:
"This [nous] would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is
the authoritative and the better part of him. It would be strange,
then, if he were to choose not the life of himself but that of
something else. . . . Since nous more than anything else is man."
The self is a person's theoretical intellect.
Aristotle's identification of the self with nous, like his
identification of the self with practical rationality and
character, gives rise to contro
versy.34 Furthermore, these two identifications lead many
commentators to accuse him of creating a contradiction.35 Some
commentators seek to find a way out for Aristotle by giving
different interpretations of nous,36 but others think that the
tension is simply not solvable.37
Yet, Aristotle is consistent and intelligible as well if we bear
in mind that Aristotle distinguishes between the person and the
self and that his concern is not with metaphysical identity. A
person, whether he is
contemplative or not, has both rational and irrational parts of
the soul, and must also have both parts of the rational. Aristotle
describes these
parts independently and applies the concept "self" to each of
them. He defines one rational self in terms of practical reason,
and the other in terms of nous.
Putting Confucius' relational self together with Aristotle's
theory, one cannot escape the observation that for Confucius, there
is no distinction between a practical self and a theoretical
self.
This difference can be traced to their different views of what
is characteristic of a human. For Aristotle, human function
contains both
practical reason and theoretical reason, and these two parts
turn out to have distinct natures. Hence, to some extent,
Aristotle's notion of human function itself implies a tension. In
contrast, the intellectual aspect of
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CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF 295
virtue in Confucius, yi (appropriateness), is not divided into
the practical and the theoretical. Yi is about what is appropriate
for one to do and to live. It corresponds mainly to Aristotle's
practical wisdom. What is
lacking in Confucian ethics is Aristotle's nous, which is
distinct from
practical rationality and independent from affection, and is
concerned with universal and necessary knowledge. Confucius does
not emphasize the theoretical aspect of human intelligence. As a
result, while Confu cius' relational self corresponds to
Aristotle's political animal, there is no room in Confucian ethics
for Aristotle's theoretical self.
This difference leads them to different pictures of
self-actualization.
Aristotle, out of two distinct concepts of self, offers two
different models of self-actualization. Self-development is not a
unified process. Rather, different parts of human function lead to
different processes of growth. There is one process for the
realization of the practical self, and another for the realization
of the theoretical self. Aristotle even concludes the main project
of the NE with a hierarchy or ranking of eudaimonia cor
responding to these two models of self-actualization: "This [the
life of
nous] is therefore also the happiest. But in a secondary degree
the life in accordance with the other kind of excellence [i.e.,
practical wisdom and moral virtue] is happy" (1178a8-10). This
passage has been a source of
continuing debate. Reading it in the context of our current
discussion, Aristotle is talking about a ranking of the two models
of self-realization. The primary happiness is the actualization of
the theoretical self, and the secondary happiness is the
actualization of the practical self.
Aristotle maintains that so far as contemplative activity itself
is concerned, moral deeds are not only not required, but they are
"even hindrances (empodia), at all events to his contemplation"
(1178b4-5). This point is further reinforced when Aristotle claims
that God, whose life is nothing but contemplative activity, does
not possess any moral virtue or vice (1178bl6-7). When they do not
conflict, practical wisdom can provide the conditions for
theoretical wisdom (1145a8-9); but when
they are in conflict, "We must not follow those who advise us,
being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal
things, but must, as far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and
strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us"
(117b32-35).
In contrast, because his concept of self is unified, Confucius
presents one single process of the development of self. The
cultivation of self is a continuous course in which one's virtuous
character keeps deepening and perfecting. For Confucius, however, a
process of self-cultivation is one in which one's self grows and
deepens. His autobiographic passage shows this clearly:
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296 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
The Master said, "At fifteen I set my heart on learning; at
thirty I took
my stand; at forty I came to be free from doubts; at fifty I
understood the Decree of Heaven; at sixty my ear was attuned; at
seventy I fol lowed my heart's desire without overstepping the
line." (2:4)
What we are presented with here is an agent who realizes that
his in ner state or character becomes increasingly polished and
profound. The cultivation is endless, as long as one lives. The
process itself is unified, and does not involve two different
actualized selves. It is the deepening of one's virtuous character
only, and does not lead to a fulfilled theoretical self. For the
actualization is the unfolding of our original good human
nature, and nous was not there in the first place.
The result is that while Aristotle's ethics contains a theory of
con
templation that incorporates practical virtue, Confucius does
not have a corresponding dichotomy. In other words, what Aristotle
regards as
primary happiness is missing in Confucius. The actualization of
the relational self corresponds largely to Aristotle's secondary
happiness, that is, the actualization of our nature of being a
political animal or our practical self. When Confucius mentions
that at the age of fifty he knows "the Decree of Heaven," he shows
that his ethics has a transcen dental dimension. We start with
Heaven-endowed de (virtue), and our
destiny to fulfill it. This transcendental dimension is fully
developed in the Mencius and the Doctrine of the Mean as the
Confucian theory of "the unity between man and Heaven." This is the
level at which the relational self is fully actualized, and ren is
fully possessed. It is not Aristotle's contemplation of eternal
truth, and there is also no tension involved between the
cultivation of ren and the man/Heaven unity.
The rationale behind Aristotle's hierarchy of happiness is
deep-seated enthusiasm for the pursuit of knowledge of things
necessary and un
changing. For Aristotle, contemplative activity is best on the
grounds that "since not only is intellect the best thing in us, but
also the objects of intellect are the best of knowable objects"
(1177a21-22). Theoretical
rationality is concerned with "the kind of things whose
principles cannot be otherwise" (1139a7), and unchangeable
principles are "the highest objects in nature" (t?n timi?tat?n;
1141a20, b4). In contrast, practical rationality is about human
affairs, things that admit of variation, but "man is not the best
thing in the world" (1141a21). For him, unchang ing things such as
the constituent parts of the universe have a far more divine nature
(polu theiotera t?nphusin) than human affairs (1141bl-2).
Theoretical wisdom is said to be the most precise mode of knowledge
(? akiribetat?; 1141al7), whereas practical wisdom is said to be
"inferior to wisdom" (1143b33). Aristotle's rank of happiness
indicates the superior ity of unchanging objects over changing
things, and the superiority of eternal knowledge over contingent
truth. Contemplation of eternal truth,
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CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF 297
despite its potential tension with practical wisdom and social
morality, is the highest and most valuable human activity, and the
life character ized by this activity is the best. It is in the
pursuit of contemplation that
we find the real manifestation of our rational essence.
In contrast, Confucius puts weight on the harmony among
human
beings and the harmony between human beings and the world.
Even
though his ideal is the embodiment of Heaven's Dao in a person's
life, he is not interested in conducting a theoretical
investigation about Heaven, for the sake of knowing Heaven per se.
Indeed, he dismisses speculation about non-practical issues as idle
curiosity.38 Hence, whereas Aristotle holds not only that a person
is a "political animal" by nature, but that a person should pursue
eternal and necessary knowledge about the
universe, Confucius focuses on a person as being a "relational
self" and
appears to ignore the theoretical nature of being a
person.39
State University of New York at Buffalo
NOTES
1. For Tu Wei-Ming, it means the self "was never conceived of as
an isolated or isolable entity" (Confucian Thought [Albany: State
University of New York
Press], p. 53). For Henry Rosemont, it suggests "the altogether
social nature of human life, for the qualities of persons, the
kinds of person they are, and the knowledge and attitudes they have
are not exhibited in actions, but only in interactions, human
interactions" (Rosemont, "Rights-Bearing Individuals and
Role-Bearing Persons," in Rules, Rituals, and Responsibilities:
Essays Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette, ed. Mary I. Bockover [La
Salle, 111.: Open Court, 1991], p. 89; emphasis in the original).
Roger T. Ames takes it as the "focus field" model of self ("The
Focus-Field Self in Classical Confucianism, in Self as Person in
Asian Theory and Practice, ed. R. T. Ames with W. Dissanayake and
T. P. Kasulis [Albany: SUNY Press, 1994], p. 173). David Wong lays
out two
possibilities. One means that "we begin life embodied as
biological organisms and become persons by entering into
relationship with others of our kind"; and the other means that
"persons need the help of others to develop as agents."
Wong calls the former "the social conception of the person" and
the latter "the
developmental sense of relationality." ("Relational and
Autonomous Selves," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 31, no. 4
[2004], pp. 420-421).
2. One view holds that, for Confucius, one's relationships,
taken collectively, are all that a self is, and one's identity as a
person is constituted of nothing more
than the sum of the roles he assumes in various relationships.
See, Rosemont,
"Rights-Bearing Individuals," p. 90.
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298 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
3. Donald Munro relates the Confucian view of individualism to
the value of uniqueness and innerlichheit of the German Romantics
(Individualism and Holism, ed. D. Munro [Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1985], p. 3). Roger T. Ames
proposes to distinguish between two senses of "individual": one
means one of a kind: "a single, separate, and indivisible
thing that, by virtue of some essential property or properties,
qualifies as a member of a class," and the other means uniqueness:
"the character of a single and unsubstitutable particular" (Ames,
"The Focus-Field Self in Classical Confucianism," p. 194). He
concludes that "Confucius has a notion of unique individuality
rather than autonomous individuality" (Ames, "The Focus-Field Self
in Classical Confucianism," p. 197). David Wong, in order to dispel
the view that the self is nothing more than the sum of one's
relationships, pointedly argues that there is a plausible sense of
individual autonomy that is operative in Confucianism. That sense,
differing from the libertarian conception of free agency, means
that the virtuous agent possesses a global character or context
invariant character so that he "resides in one's ethical
excellence through hard and easy circumstances" ("Relational and
Autonomous Selves," p. 426).
4. HA, 488a7-10; NE, 1097b8-ll, 1162al7-19, 1169bl6-20; Pol.
1253a4, 1278b20; EE, 1242a22-27.
5. NE, 1097b9-ll; also, 1169M7-19. The translations of Aristotle
are based on the revised Oxford translation of The Complete Works
of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1984).
6. For helpful discussions, see David Keyt, "Three Basic
Theorems in Aristotle's Politics," in A Companion to Aristotle's
Politics, ed. David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1991), pp. 118-141; Fred D. Miller Jr., Nature, Justice,
and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995),
pp. 27-45; Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford:
Oxford
University Press, 2002), pp. 240-253; C. D. C. Reeve, Aristotle:
Politics (India napolis: Hackett), Introduction, sec. 7.
7. Physics, ii.l, 192bl4. Cf. also 192a22-23.
8. Physics, ii.2, 194all.
9. David Keyt thinks that Aristotle is wrong here on the ground
that a moral sense cannot be inborn, but can only be possessed by a
fully virtuous agent (Keyt, "Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle's
Politics," p. 134). This criticism cannot hold if Aristotle means
natural virtue. In NE, 1144b7-10, Aristotle believes that human
beings possess natural dispositions.
10. Pol. 1253a7-9; HA, 487b33-488al0.
11. Unless otherwise indicated, the translation of the Book of
Mencius is based on D. C. Lau, Mencius (Hong Kong: Chinese
University Press, 1984).
12. Unless otherwise indicated, the translation of the Analects
is based on D. C. Lau, Confucius: The Analects (Hong Kong: Chinese
University Press, 1983).
13. Shiuji is also called shiu sheng (to cultivate personal
life). Indeed, self cultivation is the project of Confucianism:
"From the Son of Heaven down to
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CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF 299
the common people, all must regard cultivation of personal life
as the root or foundation" (The Great Learning, in W-T. Chan, The
Source Book in Chinese Philosophy [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1963], p. 87). The object of shiuji or shiu sheng
is to nurture virtues. Doctrine of the Mean (chap. 20) quotes
Confucius as saying that "He who knows wisdom, ren, and courage
knows how to shiu sheng."
14. The most important contents of the Mencian four roots are
also filial love and fraternal respect (Mencius, 4a/27).
15. The Doctrine of the Mean, p. 20, and Mencius 7a/16.
16. Analects,4:l7; 5:27; 12:4.
17. Mencius, 2a/6, 4b/19, 6a/8.
18. For instance, Carol Gilligan writes: "The males tend to have
difficulty with relationships, while females tend to have problems
with individuation." Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 8.
19. This normal use, however, is un-Aristotelian. Aristotle
distinguishes between individual and particular. The word
"individual" is from the Latin Individuum, which is a literal
translation of the Greek term atomon (literally, indivisible). When
Aristotle employs atomon, it refers not only to things such as
"Socrates" or "this horse," but also to infima species (e.g.,
vii.8, 1034a5-8).
?nfima species is universal in the sense of being predicated of
many subjects, but is also individual in the sense of being
indivisible into further kinds of the same nature. Hence, in
Aristotle, all particulars are individuals (indivisibles), but not
vice versa. What is opposed to the universal (katholou) is
particular (kath hekaston), and they are distinguished on the
ground of predictability (DI. 7, 17a39-40). A particular is not
predicable of anything further, and is not repeatable.
20. "It is just, therefore, that men who are lovers of self in
this way are
reproached for being so" (1168b22-23). 21. NE, 1168b32-33;
1166al7-18.
22. Aristotle repeatedly claims that reason is the man himself
(NE, 1168b35, 1169al-2).
23. "The friendship of people who are good and alike in virtue"
(NE, 1156b6, 1164al2, 1165b8-9, EE, 1241al0, 1242b36).
24. Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 498, n. 33. Julia Annas, The
Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.
250.
25. Joel Kupperman does believe that character approximates the
nature of self. See his Character (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991), p. 44.
26. Aristotle distinguishes two types of self-love. Confucius
has the cor
responding idea that "The gentleman understands what is moral.
The small man understands what is profitable" (4:16).
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300 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
27. See also Analects, 1:8, 9:25, 15:21, 15:23.
28. Analects, 9:14; cf. 4:1, 4:2.
29. This issue has been raised by Jennifer Whiting, who claims
that, ac
cording to Aristotle's "other self" doctrine, friends are
impersonal: "Since she [the virtuous agent] values that sort of
character in itself, she will value that character not only in
herself but also in others." J. E. Whiting, "Impersonal Friends,"
The Monist, vol. 74 (1991), p. 11.
30. In Confucian scholarship, Herbert Fingarette remarks: "Since
the chun tzu" \junzi, the noble person]'s will is thus ideally the
medium by which, and through which, the tao is allowed and enabled
to work and to be actualized, the
T of the chun tzu, as purely personal, has become, as it were,
transparent. It is
a generative space-time locus of will without personal content."
H. Fingarette, "The Problem of the Self in the Analects,"
Philosophy East and West, vol. 29, no. 2 (April 1979), p. 136. From
here, Fingarette leads to the conclusion that Confucius holds a
selfless theory. That, I think, goes too far.
31. NE, 1099al6-2; 1104b3-13; 11109bl-5; 1113a31-33; 1120a26-27;
1172a20-23.
32. AT?,1104b3-13; 1109bl-5; 1113a31-33; 1120a26-27;
1172a20-23.
33. NE, 1141bl4-15, 1142al4, 1142a21.
34. Urmson, Aristotle's Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988),
p. 125. Bos tock, Aristotle's Ethics, p. 196.
35. Maclntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985, 2nd
edition), p. 158.
36. Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991), pp. 436-437, n. 56; Reeve, Practices of Reason
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 133-137.
37. Bostock, Aristotle's Ethics, p. 197.
38. Analects, 7:21; 11:12; 6:22; 3:12.
39. I wish to thank David Wong and Robin Wang for their helpful
comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Article Contentsp. 281p. 282p. 283p. 284p. 285p. 286p. 287p.
288p. 289p. 290p. 291p. 292p. 293p. 294p. 295p. 296p. 297p. 298p.
299p. 300
Issue Table of ContentsHistory of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 22,
No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 281-373Volume InformationFront
MatterConfucius' Relational Self and Aristotle's Political Animal
[pp. 281-300]Free Will and Free Action in Anselm of Canterbury [pp.
301-318]Two Theories of Retributive Punishment: Immanuel Kant and
Thomas Aquinas [pp. 319-338]Berkeley's Corpuscular Philosophy of
Time [pp. 339-356]Cultivating Habits of Reason: Peirce and the
Logica Utens versus Logica Docens Distinction [pp. 357-372]Back
Matter