Youth Gangs in Central America — Report from WOLA

8/14/2019 Youth Gangs in Central America Report from WOLA

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AWOLA Special Report

No v e mb e r 2 0 0 6

Youth Gangs in Central AmericaIssues in Human Rights, EffectivePolicing, and Prevention

Differing Perspectives on Gangs

A sk someone to describe a gang member and the response will be almostimmediate. Most people, whether they have ever encountered an actual gangmember or not, will describe a gun-toting, tattooed criminal. Ask someone toexplain what a Central American youth gang is and the respondent is likely to paintan image of a dangerous network of criminal gangs, based in Central America andpreading their tentacles from there into the United States and other countries. Fueled

by sometimes one-sided media coverage, these terms carry with them a strong set of prejudices and assumptions.

he reality is far more complex. Gangs and gang members are very serious threats topublic security in some communities both in Central America and in the United States.But the character and the origins of Central American youth gangs, and the problem of outh gang violence, are not simple to understand or address. They have both local andransnational aspects and are a social as well as a law enforcement issue.

In Central America, youth gangs have existed since at least the 1960s, although theirharacter changed signicantly in the 1990s.

o understand youth gangs in Central American immigrant communities in the UnitedStates, one must recognize that youth gangs in the U.S. can be traced back as far as the

780s. Gangs based in particular ethnic groups (Irish, Italian, Jewish, Slavic, etc.) emerged

IN THIS ISSUE

Differing Perspectiveson Gangs ...........................................1

Police Reform and the Rule of Law in Central America ................8

Social Cleansing and ExtraJudicial Execution: A HumanRights Challenge .......................... 15

Preventing Youth Violence ....... 20


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2 Youth Gangs in Central America: Issues in Human Rights, Effective Policing, and Prevention

with successive waves of immigration tothe United States. And since World WarII, youth gangs like the Blackstone Rangers,the Vice Lords, Skinheads, the Bloodsand the Crips, and the Latin Kings havebeen present in most major cities. In theCentral American immigrant community

in the U.S, youth gangs emerged in LosAngeles in the 1980s. The two dominantyouth gangs in this community became theMara Salvatrucha or MS-13, and the arrioDieciocho, or the 18 t Street gang.

As Central American youth who hademigrated to the U.S. in the 1980s beganto return to their countries of origin in the1990s (often involuntarily because of U.S.deportation policies), and as U.S. culturalinuences spread more widely in Central

America, youth gangs in the region beganto adopt the style, and the names of the LosAngeles gangs. While connections betweengangs in the two regions developed, thetwo phenomenagrowing ethnic youthgangs in Central American immigrantcommunities in the U.S, and the youthgangs in Central America that were re-inventing themselveswere distinct.

Today, migration ows between the U.S.and Central America are strong, andthe links between the gangs in variouscountries have been reinforced. However,there is little evidence that those linkshave, as yet, taken on a structured,institutional character, and the level of transnational communication does notappear to be highly organized or consistent.

In the past few years, as youth gangsin Central America have grown andbecome more violent, as youth gangactivity in Central American immigrantcommunities in the United States hasbecome more visible, and as cross-bordercontact between gangs has raised concernsamong national security specialists,these gangs (in particular MS-13 and18t Street) have been the focus of muchattention in Central America and theUnited States. Governments, homelandsecurity agencies, police, social serviceproviders, youth advocacy groups, and the

media have all attempted to address theissue from a number of angles and using a

ariety of methods.

Each of these actors plays an importantrole in addressing the issue of youthangs and youth gang violence. Yet, each

actor approaches the problem from aifferent point of view, and often withifferent assumptions about the origins

and nature of Central American youthangs. Different denitions of who is aang member, and what it means to be aang member determine how one countshe number of gangs and gang members;his in turn inuences assessments of how

much of a threat to public security gangsare considered to be. Different analyses

f why gangs form and why young people

join gangs shape how one decides the besttrategies to combat them.

Research Efforts andGovernment Responses

here are several efforts underwayhat seek to analyze comprehensivelyhe phenomenon of youth gangs inentral America and the related, butistinct, phenomenon of U.S. youthangs which started in the Centralmerican immigrant communities of Losngeles and have spread in the United

States. Since the mid-1990s, a networkf Jesuit-related research centers inentral America has produced important

information and statistics on the gangphenomenon in Central America.

entered at the University of Centralmericas Institute for the Study of

Public Opinion (IUDOP) in El Salvador,he research teams have published fourolumes entitled, Maras y Pandillas enentroamrica, which report on survey

research among gang members, analyzehe factors that lead young people to joinangs, and discuss related issues such asocial capital, rehabilitation, and civilociety responses.1

nother important research effort is the Network on Transnational Youth Gangs

Today, migration ows

between the U.S. and

Central America are

strong, and the links

between the gangs in

various countries havebeen reinforced.


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Washington Ofce on Latin America November 2006 3

(Red Transnacional de Anlisis sobre Maras)f the Center for Inter-American Studies

and Programs at the nstituto Tecnolgico Autnomo de Mexico. They are conductinga comparative analysis of youth gangs in

entral America and youth gangs made upf Central American immigrants or their

hildren in Mexico and the United States.heir ndings on the nature of youth gangsand transnational aspects of the youthang problem (including a section by the

ashington Ofce on Latin AmericaWOLA) on Central American immigrantouth gangs in the Washington D.C. metro

area) will be released in early 2007.

In addition, the U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID)published a comprehensive report in April of

2006 which examines the factors contributingo gang membership from the U.S. to

Mexico and Central America and makesrecommendations for the U.S. government. 2

hese efforts to understand the complexityf the phenomenon of youth gang violenceill contribute, over time, to sensible

policy responses to the problem.

hile research goes forward, governmentshave begun to take action. Starting in2003, Central American governmentsbegan to respond to youth gang

iolence with what politicians called aano dura (iron st), highly repressive

policing strategies that included massiveetentions of young people for the crimef gang membership, relaxed evidentiarytandards, and harsh prison sentences.hese government strategies were driven

by a mix of factors. Growing levels of iolence in El Salvador, Guatemala, and

Honduras, and sometimes sensationalisticmedia coverage of that violence,intensied the sense of insecurity thatmany citizens expected their governmentsand politicians to address. Simplisticunderstanding of the nature of youthangs and a tendency to attribute to gangs

often without evidence the blame formost of the crime and violence in theregion, also increased pressure for hardline policies.

Today, governments in El Salvador,Guatemala, and Honduras continue tofocus on repressive policing as the principleresponse to youth gang violence.

Central American Gangs

and the Impact of U.S.Deportation PolicesEstimates of the number of gangs and gangmembers that exist in Central Americavary enormously. Low-end estimatesuggest there are 70,000 100,000 gang

members in the Central American regionand high end estimates sometimes triplehat number. 3

Estimates of the numbers of Central

American immigrant gangs and gangmembers in the U.S. are somewhat moreprecise, although certainly not exact. TheU.S. Department of Justice, looking atyouth gangs overall, questioned a sample

f police forces across the country in 2004.Based on this survey, they estimated thathere were 760,000 gang members in 2004,

including members of predominantlyAfrican-American gangs, members of mostly white gangs, and of predominantlyAsian gangs, and gangs reecting differentethnic groups within the U.S. Latinoommunity (predominantly Mexican-

American gangs, Puerto Rican gangs,Central American immigrant gangs,etc.) 4 This report did not provide a moredetailed breakdown. Separately, theFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)and the U.S. National Drug IntelligenceCenter estimate that there are some38,000 members of MS-13 or the 18thStreet gang in the United States, thewo predominant gangs in the Central

American immigrant community. 5

MS-13 is one of the most well known youthgang connected to the Central Americanommunity. By most accounts, MS-13 was

initially formed in Los Angeles during the980s by Central American immigrants,

many of whom lived in poor neighborhoodsalready rife with racial and ethnic gangs.Refugees or the children of refugees

MS-13 is one of the

most well known youth

gang connected to

the Central American

community. By most

accounts, MS-13 wasinitially formed in

Los Angeles during

the 1980s by Central

American immigrants,

many of whom lived in

poor neighborhoods

already rife with racial

and ethnic gangs.


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from the civil war in El Salvador in the

1980s created MS-13 as a way to protectthemselves from local gangs (principallyMexican-American gangs) in their newL.A. neighborhoods.6

In the1990s, U.S. deportation policy(the Illegal Immigration Reform andImmigrant Responsibility Act, IIRIRA, of 1995) began to more aggressively targetindividuals with criminal records fordeportation. Any non-citizen, includinglegal permanent residents of the UnitedStates, who was convicted of a crimewhose sentence might last longer than ayear was subject to removal from the U.S.after they had served a full jail sentence.7 In a three year period (1994-1997), thisdeportation strategy caused the forcedmigration of more than 150,000 backto their home country, bereft of socialnetworks and sometimes without Spanishlanguage skills.8 Similar tactics have beenstepped up in the past year with 2,179 riminal aliens deported in May 2006alone as a result of Operation Returnto Sender. Approximately 370 of thesedeportees were thought to be members of MS-13.9 There is no hard data availableabout the total number of gang-involveddeportees since 1994, but most analystsbelieve that many of the younger peopleconvicted of criminal activity anddeported had become gang-involved whilein the United States. Returned to Central

merica involuntarily, they were leftith few options and often join existing

local gangs in Central America, bringingith them the gang culture that hadeveloped in Central American immigrantommunities in 1980s Los Angeles.

Deportation policies played an importantrole in the evolution of gangs in theentral American region and a key role in

he transnationalization of the problem.s migration between the U.S. and the

region continues to surge, the connectionsand inuences between the gangs in eachountry have only become stronger.

Some in the United States have proposeda still stronger emphasis on deportation,as a way to get criminals out of the United

States. There are legislative proposals,uch as the Alien Gang Removal Act.here are policing practices, such as

Operation Community Shield, in whichederal authorities seek to identify, arrest

and deport suspected gang members basedn immigration violations. Increasingly

aggressive deportation policies are likely tourther strengthen the transnational links

between gangs in Central America andin the United States and to worsen theproblems in the region. At the same time,hey are likely to have little impact on levelsf youth gang violence in Central Americanommunities in the United States. 10

Addressing the Problem inCentral America: Obstaclesand the Need for Alterna-tive Approaches

angs in the Central American countriesf Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador

have been transformed by their contact with.S. based gang culture and style and they

have become serious public security threatsin many communities in Central America.Partly in response to indiscriminate andrepressive tactics used by the police, theseangs are becoming more organized and

more violent, and are turning towardnew forms of criminal conduct. While

Deportation policies

played an important

role in the evolution

of gangs in the Central

American region

and a key role in the

transnationalization

of the problem. Asmigration between

the U.S. and the region

continues to surge,

the connections and

inuences between

the gangs in each

country have only

become stronger.


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ensationalized reporting and politicalposturing contributes to citizens fear of angs, that fear remains high based on real

experiences. Once primarily neighborhoodbased groups that fought over turf withrival gangs, some gangs have become moreiolent and are often involved in extortion

f neighborhood residents, businesses, andpublic transportation operators, as well as inneighborhood drug dealing.

entral American societies face structuralproblems in dealing with gang violence andits causes. Governments are still in the earlytages of democratization and stabilization.

Levels of poverty and unemployment arehigh, police and other institutions remain

eak, youth are marginalized, and thereare very few resources to address many of

he root problems which lead youth to joinangs in the rst place.

ang violence is only one of many seriousecurity issues in the region. Organizedrime, narco-trafcking, common crime,

and family violence are widespread andhreaten citizen security everywhere in the

region. Gangs are often used as scapegoatsor various other security problems andriminal activity for which they are

not responsible. The majority of youtheemed to be gang members still belongo smaller, neighborhood gangs and are

not involved in serious criminal activity.nfortunately, the fear in communitiesith a gang presence is sometimes inated

by inammatory media reports.

overnments have been quick to pandero these fears by implementing short term

repressive measures that appear to offerimmediate results. Additionally, theyhave seized these provocative reports asan opportunity to blame nearly all crimeand violence on gangs. Most Central

merican government policies havereated gangs as enemy combatants to

be eliminated rather than as the productf various societal problems that needo be addressed through comprehensivetrategies that include smart law

enforcement, combined with preventionand rehabilitation programs.

Specically, the governments of Honduras and El Salvador haveresponded to youth gangs with repressivemano dura strategies in an attempt toontrol gangs and appease constituents.

These laws make membership in a gangillegal. Thousands of youth, guilty of

nothing more than having a tattoor wearing baggy pants, have beenindiscriminately arrested. Massive arrestshave violated the rights of thousands of Salvadoran and Honduran youth andplaced considerable pressure on thealready overcrowded prison system. WhileGuatemala has not passed such legislation,police have implemented many of theame repressive policing strategies.

Much as the U.S. deportation strategy

ince the mid-90s unexpectedlyontributed to the growth of gangs, these

mano dura policies have pushed thegangs underground and, as a result, theyhave become more organized.11 Manygang members have lowered their publicprole. They are no longer tattooinghemselves or wearing identiablelothing nor are they congregating

publicly; but they are continuing tomeet, and to carry out gang activities.Meanwhile, the prisons have providedan ideal location for the gangs tobecome more cohesive. In addition toontributing to the mutation of gangs,

repressive policies have done nothingo alleviate the rising level of violence

and number of homicides in Guatemala,Honduras, and El Salvador.

In our view, these mano dura responseso youth gang violence have been

ineffective in controlling the problemwhile posing serious threats to humanrights and democratic governance in theregion. This publication examines thesehreats (repressive government policies,

ineffective policing, and social cleansing)while exploring what is known aboutalternative approaches and highlightingbest practices in curbing gang violence andmembership (community policing thatrespects human rights and comprehensiveprevention-oriented programs). The U.S.

Most Central American

government policies

have treated gangs as

enemy combatants to

be eliminated rather

than as the product

of various societal

problems that need to

be addressed through

comprehensive

strategies that

include smart law

enforcement, combined

with prevention and

rehabilitation programs.


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experience with the evolution of gangs anddeveloping effective responses can providea useful framework for Central Americancountries to begin deciphering the issuewithin their own cultural and historicalcontexts. Additionally, the policies andreactions of one region in dealing with

Central American youth gangs have clearimplications for the other. Transnationalcooperation and a nuanced understandingof the realities of each country are essentialto effectively addressing the CentralAmerican youth gang phenomenon.

WOLAs Interestin the IssuesThe Washington Ofce on Latin America

(WOLA) has long followed issues of human rights and public security in CentralAmerica. We saw police reform as a centralelement of the peace processes in theregion and believed that citizen securitycould be guaranteed by modern, effectivepolice forces that respected human rightsand due process. WOLA has worked witha number of civil society organizationsin Central America on citizen securityand police reform issues over the years.As youth gang violence has emerged as amajor problem in Central America (and asan issue in Central American immigrantcommunities in the United States), WOLAhas begun to focus on the need for aneffective response to gang violence thatrespects human rights and involves civilsociety and community groups.

We began to monitor the problem of gangviolence in Central America and theresponses of governments, civil society,and donors in early 2004. We gatheredinformation about the problem of youthgang violence in Central Americaand consulted with colleagues in theregion, including human rights activists,government ofcials, church groups, youthworkers, and others. We participatedin several events sponsored by U.S.government agencies and talked with a

numerous U.S. government ofcials aboutheir perspectives on the problem. Finally,e met with colleagues in the NGOommunity and with U.S. experts on youthang violence.

In February of 2005, WOLA, in conjunction

ith the Due Process of Law Foundation,he Pan-American Health OrganizationPAHO), and the Inter-Americanoalition for the Prevention of Violence (a

oalition that includes the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank (IDB), the World Bank,

SAID, the Centers for Disease Control,and others), organized an event entitledVoices from the Field: Local Initiatives and

New Research on Youth Gang Violencein Central America. 12 The day-longonference was held in Washington, DC.

ith nancial support from PAHO andhe World Bank, we brought researchers

and NGO speakers from Central America,a prominent U.S. academic, police fromnorthern Virginia and Central America, andthers to speak on the issue.

hat conference underscored a centralmessage in our work: while youth gang

iolence is a difcult problem, withoutmagic solutions, progress can be madeif governments adopt comprehensivetrategies that recognize the problem as onehat requires prevention and rehabilitation

programs, as well as effective, rights-respecting law enforcement.

Since that conference, we have worked,ith the support of the Ford Foundation and

he W.K. Kellogg Foundation, to conveyhat message as widely as possible, especially

by working with Central Americanolleagues who formed the Centralmerican Coalition for the Prevention of outh Violence. During this period, we have

examined issues of human rights, policepractices, and youth violence preventionin Central America, and touched on somef the issues in the development of youthangs in Central American immigrantommunities in the United States. This

report reects our views.

As youth gang violence

has emerged as a major

problem in Central

America (and as an issue

in Central American

immigrant communities

in the United States),WOLA has begun to

focus on the need for

an effective response

to gang violence that

respects human rights

and involves civil society

and community groups.


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Endnotes See http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/principal.htm See pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG834.pdf

3 Ribando, Clare. angs in Central America. Washington,DC: Congressional Research Service, January 2006.

Ofce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.2004 National Youth Gang Survey. Washington, DC:Department of Justice, April 2006.5 United States Agency for International Development.

entral America and Mexico Gangs Assessment.ashington, DC: April 2006.

6 Loga n, Sam. Deportation Feeds a Cycle of Violence n Central America. Washington, DC: InternationalRelations Center, March 2006.

Morawetz, Nancy. Understanding the Impact of the1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of ProposedReforms. Boston: Harvard Law Review, 2000. Vol. 113.

Taylor, Margaret and Alexander Aleinikoff. Deportation f Criminal Aliens: A Geopolitical Perspective. Washington,DC: Inter-American Dialogue, June 1998.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. ICE pprehends more than 2,100 criminal aliens, gang members,ugitives and other immigration violators in nationwide interiornforcement operation. Washington, DC: Department of

Homeland Security, June 2006.

0 This report makes a number of policyrecommendations. Most are contained in the sectionson social cleansing and human rights, effective lawenforcement, and prevention programs. The issue of U.S. deportation policy is a complex and politicallycharged topic which is not addressed in this report. Herewe note though that if high levels of deportation areto continue, the U.S. needs to work more closely withCentral American governments to keep them informedbout deportees, and to help governments develop

effective programs to receive deportees, enabling themto re-integrate into Central American societies. Beyondthat, the policy of aggressive deportation needs to bere-evaluated. Its impact on Central American societiesneeds to be rigorously analyzed, as does its effectivenessin reducing youth violence in the United States.

1 Cruz, Jose Miguel and Marlon Carranza. Pandillas yPoliticas Pblicas: El Caso de El Salvador, Juventudes,Violencia y Exclusin: Desaos para las Politicas Publicas.San Salvador, El Salvador: INDES, January 2006.

2 Washington Ofce on Latin America. Voices from theField: Local Initiatives and New Research on Youth Gang

Violence in Central America. Washington, DC: WOLA,August 2005.


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The application of mano durapractices in response to youth gang

iolence has had a negative impacton the consolidation of the police forcesof El Salvador, Guatemala, and Hondurasas professional forces that respect humanrights and due process, and has weakenedrespect for the rule of law. This is anespecially serious problem, from the pointof view of human rights and democracy.

El Salvador, Guatemala, and Hondurasall began processes of demilitarizationand democratization in the 1990s. It

is common today to describe CentralAmerica as a region in which a transitionto democracy has taken place, althoughit is more accurate to say that a fragileand uneven transition is still underway.The reform and professionalizationof police was a central element of thetransition to a more democratic state.Reform of the police and security forceswas written into the 1992 Peace Accordsin El Salvador, and the 1995 peaceagreements in Guatemala. With theend of the contra war in Nicaragua,and the peace agreement in El Salvador,the space for reform began to emergein Honduras, as well, and a slow reformprocess began there in the early 1990s,in which police and security forces wereseparated, and a process of police reformand professionalization began.1

The police reform processes in CentralAmerica were generally intended to:

separate police and security forces, anddelineate clearly the mandates andappropriate roles and spheres of each ina democratic society;

subject police practice to a system of internal controls and rules, preventingarbitrary detentions, the abuse of detainees or suspects, the excessive useof force, and extra-judicial actions bythe police;

strengthen the investigative capacityof the police, particularly of detective

units, thus reducing the likelihoodthat police would resort to coercivepractices or forced confession in orderto solve crimes;

reduce and control police corruption.

hese reforms were seen as vital tohe consolidation of peace and theemocratization of the region. They were

intended rst and foremost to re-assureormer rebels and the political opposition

hat the police would not be employedas instruments of political repression.

reating apolitical, professional, andivilian police leadership was centralo this. They were also intended to endhe human rights abuses practiced with

impunity by both police and securityorces during the 1980s. And they were

intended as part of the larger projectf creating modern states in Centralmerica, in which citizens, businesses,

political groups, and others have a levelf condence in the police in controllingrime and providing citizen security,ithout favor or advantage to any

individual or group.

he police reform process in Centralmerica has been difcult. The results to

ate are uneven, and the process is by nomeans complete.

El Salvador has made the most progressf the three countries. The war-time

police forces were dissolved and theirmembers forbidden from joining the neworce. Recruits for the new force which

eventually reached nearly 20,000 members were primarily civilians, although apercentage of former guerrillas and formeroldiers were admitted. Though imperfectly

implemented, this design substantiallyreduced the inuence of the old securityervices. This was perhaps the most

Police Reform and the Ruleof Law in Central America

The application of mano dura practices

in response to youth

gang violence has had

a negative impact on

the consolidation of

the police forces of El

Salvador, Guatemala,and Honduras as

professional forces that

respect human rights

and due process, and

has weakened respect

for the rule of law.


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to undermine the modest progress thathas been made to date on police reformin the region. There are at least threeareas in which mano dura strategies haveundermined police reform: in blurring theline between the police and the military;in giving arbitrary authority to police to

carry out raids and detentions of suspectedgang members; and in creating a climatein which police abuse and extra-judicialaction by police is tolerated.

Blurring the lines betweenthe police and the militaryMano dura approaches, by involving themilitary in joint patrols with the police,have involved the military in internalsecurity matters, and eroded the linebetween the police and the armed forces. Inall three countries in the region, presidentshave ordered military troops to accompanyspecial police patrols carrying out anti-gangactivities, arguing that police forces arenot large enough, or well-armed enoughto combat violent gangs. In principle, thepolice are supposed to take the lead inmaking arrests, with troops providing back-up and additional re power, if needed.

Putting aside the question of whether a

massive deployment of police power isan effective strategy for responding togangs, ordering the military to join inpolice patrols raises serious concerns. Jointpatrols between police and military blurthe lines between the structures and rolesof the two institutions, undermining theseparation of powers, which was a signicantaccomplishment of the peace processes inthe region. In addition, to the extent thatit is true that the police are too small ortoo poorly armed to combat violent gangs,

the appropriate response is to build up thecapacity of the police, not to re-engagethe military. History suggests that whilegovernments often justify the deployment of military forces in joint patrols as a short-termmeasure to respond to a crisis, they rarelyorder the troops back to the barracks. (Jointpatrols in rural areas of El Salvador wereordered as emergency measures in 1996, andare still underway today, for example.)

ncreasing the arbitraryuthority of the policehe laws in El Salvador and Honduras,

and police practice in Guatemala, hasallowed for the detention of suspectedang members based on the crime of illicit

association or gang membership. Thereare two signicant problems with thisapproach. First, it substantially weakenshe presumption of innocence, since it

makes gang membership a crime, withoutrequiring proof of criminal activity.Second, it substantially loosens evidentiarytandards, permitting police to arrestuspects for the crime of gang membershipn very thin evidence. For example, therst Ley anti-mara in El Salvador, approved

in 2003, allowed the police to introduce, asevidence of gang membership, the presence

f tattoos or other aspects of appearanceincluding dress), or the fact that suspects

had been detained while gathering inpublic places in groups of three or more.5

aken together, these changes substantiallyincrease the authority of the police to carry

ut arrests based on arbitrary decisions police ofcers individual judgmentsabout particular young people, based onheir appearance or presence in groups,

and heavily inuenced by ofcers ownpinions, biases, etc. Even in the mostroubled police forces in Central America,

most police ofcers are trustworthy,edicated and honest individuals doingifcult work. But given the power andhe potential for abuse of that powerhat is inherent in police work, civilian

police forces generally seek to constrainhe discretion of police ofcers, and limitheir arbitrary authority. The police

reforms of the 1990s in Central America

ere intended to reduce arbitrary policeauthority and to require police to act basedn clear criteria and evidentiary standards.

In the year after the rst mano dura lawas enacted in El Salvador (from July

23, 2003 to August 30, 2004), 19,275people were detained by the police on theharge of belonging to a gang. In a striking

illustration of what happens when police

Joint patrols between

police and military

blur the lines between

the structures and roles

of the two institutions,undermining the

separation of powers,

which was a signicant

accomplishment of

the peace processes

in the region.


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are allowed to carry out detentions basedn such arbitrary criteria, 91% of thoseetained were released without charge dueo lack of evidence.

verall, ano dura approaches allow, andften encourage, police to carry out arrests

based on vague and arbitrary criteria, ando act against suspected criminals basedn their own opinions, judgments, and

prejudices, rather than on clear evidentiarytandards. This is clearly a step backwards

in the reform and professionalization of thepolice in Central America.

xtra-Judicial Actionhe emphasis in ano dura policing isn tough action by the police to detainuspected gang members, and deter gang

activity in high-crime neighborhoods. Asnoted above, police are given new powerso arrest suspected gang members, andhe arbitrary authority of the police is

increased. One consequence of this maybe to create a climate in which extra-judicial action by members of the policeorce against suspected gang members isolerated. This is discussed at greater length

in the section of this publication on extra-judicial executions.

Recommendationshe search for alternative policing methods

is motivated in part by the recognition thatano dura approaches undermine the rulef law and set back police reform processes

in Central America.

It is worth noting as well that mano duraapproaches have proven to be ineffectivein controlling youth gang violence, andhat from a pragmatic law enforcement

point of view, alternatives are needed. Thepractice of massive detention of suspectedang members has not reduced gang-

related crime, and shows of police force, orf police-military force, while sometimesriving gang activity underground,

have not broken up gangs or reducedrime levels. While crime statistics are

notoriously unreliable in Central America,

and while most crime cannot be attributedo gang members, overall crime trends in

Central America are a rough indicator of levels of gang violence. When compared to2003, the year that mano dura approacheswere rst systematically implemented inEl Salvador and Honduras, overall crime

levels have increased. And based oninterviews with both active and imprisonedgang members, researchers argue that youthgangs in Central America have not beenweakened by mano dura policing. Instead,hey have become more clandestine and

more organized. Thus, there is a need foralternative approaches. 7

There is some consensus about elementsf policing that are important. In

general, support for police reform requires

trengthening police command and controlystems, and improving the effectivenessf disciplinary systems and oversight

mechanisms. In relation to gang violencein particular, there are law enforcementmeasures that can be taken. These include:

Intelligence gathering. In areas wheregangs are present police should have ananti-gang unit, which collects informationabout gang members, gang structures,etc. That unit needs specialized trainingin understanding gangs, informationollection and analysis, etc.

Gang intelligence gathering, like allpolice intelligence gathering, has thepotential for very serious abuse. Humanrights concerns must be addressed in theintelligence gathering process. Intelligenceunits in public security forces in CentralAmerica have a bad history from the

980s, when intelligence information wasused to extrajudicially detain, torture, andexecute suspects. Oversight mechanismso prevent abuses, and respond to citizenomplaints are crucial; training in anti-

gang law enforcement should insist on theestablishment, and effective functioning of hese mechanisms, as a fundamental aspectf the process.

The quality of anti-gang intelligenceneeds to be carefully evaluated, as well.

The practice of massive

detention of suspected

gang members has

not reduced gang-

related crime, andshows of police force,

or of police-military

force, while sometimes

driving gang activity

underground, have not

broken up gangs or

reduced crime levels.


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Informants and detainees do not alwaysprovide complete or truthful information,and anti-gang intelligence units needto carefully assess the informationthey receive, rather than making snapjudgments, based on limited or biasedinformation, about who are gang members

or gang leaders. (In the United States,community activists often complainthat young people get put on policeintelligence lists as suspected gangmembers, and are never removed fromthem, no matter how law-abiding theirconduct. Thus, they remain subject tohigher levels of police scrutiny, long aftersuch scrutiny is appropriate.)

In addition, intelligence gathering itself can be problematic. For example, in both

El Salvador and Guatemala, police haveengaged in sweeps that pick up hundreds of young men in high crime neighborhoods.Law enforcement authorities have told theauthor that police sometimes conduct thesesweeps, knowing that most of those arrestedwill be released without charge, because thearrests allow them to gather informationfrom each arrestee. This is troubling from acivil liberties perspective. It is troubling toobecause some part of the abuse committedby police and security forces in the 1980swas based in the ability of the police toarbitrarily detain people, based on suspicion,and without solid evidence. Police reformand professionalization in the1990s soughtto reduce the power of the police to arrestarbitrarily and on suspicion. The practice of arresting young people without evidence of a crime in order to gather gang intelligenceundermines this progress.

Training and assistance focused on gangintelligence units ought to include sectionson institutional controls and oversight,and human rights issues, as well as on thetechnical aspects of intelligence collectionand analysis.

In addition to training for specialized units,governments and international donorsought to offer training to patrol ofcers,who also need to be trained in informationgathering and awareness about gangs, and

need to pass that information along to anti-ang units. Again, training in respect for

privacy, civil liberties, and human rights,needs to be built into this training process.

iven the dangers for abuse, donors shouldbe careful to monitor police practices, and

be prepared to respond strongly if there isevidence that police trained or assisted byonors are engaged in abusive practices orhe misuse of intelligence.

Differentiating among gang members,and targeting gang leaders. Mano duraapproaches in Central America, and theirounterpart in zero tolerance approaches

in the U.S., tend to treat all youngpeople, or all young people who t someriteria, as gang members or potential

ang members. Another approach, oneemployed in the Operation Ceasere (theBoston Youth Violence Initiative), andused by the Northern Virginia Anti-Gang

ask Force, and the Washington, D.C.ang Intervention Partnership, focuses

n identifying serious criminals withinouth gangs, and tries to treat otherang members in a way that does notonsolidate their involvement in criminal

activity, but reduces it.

In this approach, teams that include policeand other community gures (schoolfcials, community social service agencytaff, etc.) work to identify the relativelymall number of youth most likely, basedn their history and their leadership roles,o engage in violent behavior. Ratherhan trying to nd a reason to arresthese individuals, the teams seek to deterhose specic individuals from carryingut violent acts. This approach is basedn the notion that traditional deterrenceoesnt work because violence-prone youtho not believe that they will personally

experience any consequences if theyengage in violent criminal behavior. Thisapproach targets these young people, andhas police, probation ofcials, judges,chool ofcials, and others all sit downogether with targeted gang-involved youtho communicate clearly that they will belosely monitored by law enforcement

Training and assistance

focused on gang

intelligence units ought

to include sections on

institutional controls

and oversight and

human rights issues.


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fcials and community leaders, and thathere will be a swift legal response toiolent criminal behavior. At the sameime, community, school, and socialervice groups offer programs and positive

alternatives to these youth. 8 While thisapproach requires coordination of resources,

and intensive work by the police and othersin the community, the evidence is that itan contribute to signicant reductions iniolent crime. While there are issues about

how it is applied in the Central Americanontext, where resource constraints areifferent, the principle that police andommunity leaders together should target

potentially violent gang leaders withintensive deterrent efforts, rather than goafter all gang members is a sound one.

Distinguishing youth gangs from organizedcrime. Theres a tendency in much of theiscussion about youth gangs to conateouth gangs with organized crime. Whileouth gangs can turn into organized crimeroups and some have, sometimes as a

reaction to the mano dura strategies thewo are separate, and need to be treatedeparately by police. Training ought to

help police ofcers and anti-gang specialistsunderstand the distinction, and employ it inheir dealings with young people.

Understanding the social origins of gangs.Police both at the level of patrol ofcers,and in anti-gang detective units needome training that helps them better

understand that young people have manyreasons for joining gangs, and that not allare hardened criminals who need to beaken off the streets. While police should

not be expected to become sociologists,r social workers, they do need enough

understanding to help them approach theirork in a sophisticated way.

Community Oriented Policing. Local police patrol ofcers and their superiors, as wellas detectives and specialized units oughto receive some basic training in communityriented policing. This approach, in

which police ofcers seek to know and torespond to particular communities and their

oncerns, and in which police ofcers helpidentify and resolve community problems,ts well with the need to understand andaddress the problem of youth gangs inparticular communities.

Training in respect for the presumptionof innocence and due process. Increasedawareness of the presumption of innocence,and respect for due process concerns,are among the most important advancesin police and judicial reform in Central

America in the last decade. In combatingyouth gang violence, police are under agreat deal of pressure to achieve results,

ften measured by the number of arrestshey make, and the number of gang

members taken off the streets. Mano duraapproaches tend to increase this pressurefurther. In this context, regular trainingfor ofcers on respect for the presumption

f innocence and for due process, and theinstitutionalization of procedures based onhose norms, are extremely important.

Combined with a serious commitment toinvestment in prevention, intervention,and rehabilitation, these kinds of policingtrategies could have a signicant long-term

impact in controlling youth gang violence,in ways that support police reform,professionalization, and the consolidation

f democracy. Central American policeforces ought to pursue these approaches andhe U.S. and other international donorsught to offer them technical assistance

and training.

In combating youth

gang violence, police

are under a great deal

of pressure to achieve

results, often measured

by the number of

arrests they make,and the number

of gang members

taken off the streets.Mano dura approaches

tend to increase this

pressure further.


14/32


Endnotes WOLA has published a number of briefs on police

reform processes in Central America. An earlyoverview is Demilitarizing Public Order, The InternationalCommunity, Police Reform, and Human Rights in Central

America and Haiti. Washington, DC: WOLA, November,1995. Another regional overview is ustaining Reform:Democratic Policing in Central America. Citizen SecurityMonitor, Volume 1, Number 1. Washington, DC:WOLA, October 2002.2 Neild, Rachel. Sustaining Reform: Democratic Policing inCentral America. Citizen Security Monitor, Volume 1,

Number 1. Washington, DC: WOLA, October 2002.3 Ribando, Clare. Gangs in Central America,Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,anuary 2006, p.4

Neild, Rachel. Sustaining Reform: Democratic Policing inentral America Citizen Security Monitor. Volume 1,

Number 1. Washington, DC: WOLA, October 2002.5 Lakshmanan, Indira A.R. Gangs Roil Central America:Troubles Linked to U.S. Deportee. The Boston Globe,

pril 17, 2006. Martinez Ventura, Jaime. Limites Democrticos al Poder

Penal, Reformas de la Seguridad Publica y la Justicia Penal.San Salvador: FESPAD 2005, p.401. Cruz, Jose Miguel and Marlon Carranza. Pandillas y

Politicas Pblicas: El Caso de El Salvador, Juventudes,iolencia y Exclusin: Desaos para las Politicas Publicas.uatemala: INDES, January 2006. p.134.

Duane, Daniel. Straight Outta Boston, Mother JonesMagazine, January-February, 2006.


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Crime and violence have growndramatically in Central America

in recent years, and citizens sensef insecurity has increased. In the rstuarter of 2006, for example, 710 murdersere reported in Honduras, 100 more

han in the same time period in 2005. 1Homicide rates have gone up in Honduras,El Salvador, and Guatemala, as have rates

f robbery and assault. Youth gangs are notholly responsible for the increase (in El

Salvador, police have variably attributedbetween 20% and 60% of killings to gang-related violence), but they are responsible

or a signicant part of it. And they are ahighly visible symbol of the growing sensef insecurity that many people in Centralmerica feel.

s noted in the introduction to this report,outh gangs have become an increasingly

present and violent phenomenon in Centralmerica over the last decade. As gangs

have become more present in the daily livesf many Central Americans, their presence

has contributed to the growing sense of insecurity. To date, governments haveresponded to this insecurity principally byimplementing repressive mano dura lawenforcement policies.

he inability of Central Americanovernments to rein in gang violence, as well

as the other sources of insecurity, creates alimate in which many in Central Americanociety have to protect themselves. Therowing numbers of gated middle classommunities and the dramatic rise in privateecurity forces provide clear examples of his trend. According to published statistics,here are some 10,000 national police in

Honduras and an estimated 30,000 privateecurity guards.2 The ratio is similar in bothuatemala and El Salvador. 3 It is in this

ontext that some individuals and groupshave apparently turned to the extrajudicialkillings of gang members as a solution to theproblem of insecurity.

Background onExtrajudicial MurdersSocial cleansing is the name given tohe chilling process in which individualsr groups, acting without legal authority,

decide to rid a community of thosehey have identied as criminals orroublemakers. They take justice intoheir own hands, and capture and executeheir victims. In the last few years, there

have been disturbing indications that suchocial cleansing is taking place in Central

America, as unknown individuals or groups

appear to be detaining and killing suspectedgang members.

Social cleansing has a sad history inCentral America. In the 1970s and 1980s,hese kinds of killings were widespread

and politically motivated. Groups of heavily armed men in civilian dress, to

use the term often cited in descriptionsf these cases, captured and disappearedtroublemakers: opposition politicians,ommunity activists, and organizers. As

peace agreements brought the wars of theera to an end, these killings declined. Butacts of social cleansing did not disappearompletely. They changed in character,

and often targeted suspected criminals.In a well-known case in El Salvador inhe mid-1990s, a shadowy group calledhe Sombra Negra took credit for killingeventeen alleged gang members in eastern

El Salvador. Although sixteen people,including four police ofcials were arrestedin connection with the case, no one wasever convicted for these killings.

When this type of killing takes placewith the cooperation or tolerance of stateactors or agents, it is called extrajudicialexecution. Whether state actors areinvolved or not, these kinds of killings in which an individual or group, withoutany legal process or authority, takes itupon themselves to judge and execute

Social Cleansing and Extra Judicial Execution:Human Rights Challenge

Social cleansing is the

name given to the

chilling process in

which individuals or

groups, acting without

legal authority, decide

to rid a community

of those they have

identied as criminals or

troublemakers. They take

justice into their own

hands, and capture and

execute their victims.


16/32


someone frequently take place becausethe police and judicial system are perceivedas weak and ineffective in providing justiceand citizen security. In these situations,community members or local leaders, andsometimes local authorities, may decide totake matters into their own hands to rid

their community of troublemakers. Localbusinesses or property owners may decidethat they are no longer willing to tolerateextortion by gang members. Rather thancalling the police, who they believe to beslow and ineffective, they may contractsecurity guards or others to solve theirproblem through extrajudicial executions.In other cases, police ofcers themselvesmay decide that the judicial system istoo slow, and the constraints of the rulesof evidence are too burdensome, and so

they take it upon themselves to removecriminals from the community.

Most often, these murders are carried outby small groups acting on their own. Inthe worst cases, extrajudicial executionsoccur with the knowledge, the complicity,or sometimes even the approval of localauthorities, police ofcers, or nationalgovernment ofcials. Those captured aredenied due process, and the right to afair trial, or to defend themselves. Thoseinvolved in the killings assume the roleof judge, jury, and executioner withoutany legal right to do so. Beyond theseobvious and basic problems, extrajudicialkillings undermine the authority of thestate by usurping legal and judicial powerthat ought to be the exclusive preserve of the state. States that seek to protect theirpower and defend the rule of law cannottolerate extrajudicial killings. These killingsare always wrong; when governments areinvolved in these gross violations of humanrights, the situation is exacerbated.

What are the signs of social cleansingmurders? Sometimes, the killers leavemessages, such as signs or notes left withthe bodies, or statements sent to the press,declaring that the victims were killedbecause of alleged criminal activity, orthat they were killed by a group that hasannounced itself as carrying out social

leansing. More often, there are onlybodies, left in public places, killed for noapparent reason, sometimes showing signs

f torture, and often murdered execution-tyle (hands tied behind the back, shots tohe back of the head, etc.).

uatemala, El Salvador, and Hondurashave all seen increases in the number of hese kinds of unexplained murders in the

last few years. Not all these deaths canbe attributed to acts of social cleansing;riminal rivals may have carried out

execution-style killings in some of theases, and other motives may be found.hat being said, many analysts believe that

a part of the explanation for the increasesin murders committed by unknown personsor unknown motives is that there are

rowing numbers of extrajudicial killings of ang members.

Social Cleansing and YouthGangs in Central America

rime statistics are notoriously difculto collect and compare everywhere. Inentral America, police record-keeping isften poor, and police data often differ fromhe data kept by coroners ofces and by

public prosecutors. And all of these differrom the information gathered by reviewing

newspaper or other media accounts thatreport violent crimes.

Nonetheless, a review of available datauggests some broad trends. Homicide

rates in Guatemala, El Salvador, andHonduras have long been high by worldtandards. Wartime rates were extremely

high, and did not drop substantially in theimmediate post-war period. Some sourcesput El Salvadors intentional homicide rateat an astonishing 139 deaths per hundredhousand persons in 1995, for example.5ates declined somewhat in the late 90s

and the rst years of the new century,but started to rise again in 2003. Theyhave risen steadily in El Salvador and

uatemala; in Honduras, they rose in 2003,ipped in 2004, rose again in 2005, and

have risen again in the rst half of 2006.

Whether state actors are

involved or not, these

kinds of killings in

which an individual or

group, without any legal

process or authority,

takes it upon themselvesto judge and execute

someone frequently

take place because

the police and judicial

system are perceived

as weak and ineffective

in providing justice and

citizen security.


17/32


In particular, homicides rates amonghildren and youth have risen. For

example, the childrens rights group Casalianza gathers and reports statistics on

homicides of young people in Honduras,abulating all media reports of killings of

people 23 or under, and reporting them on

a regular basis. According to their gures,here were 1,976 reported violent deathsand/or executions of children and youthin the period of 2002 -2006. This is a 90%increase in comparison to the number of

eaths recorded from 1998-2002, in which,019 youth murders were registered.6

Similar increases in youth homicides can bebserved in Guatemala and El Salvador.

Many of these homicides are the result of omestic disputes, or crimes of passion, or

are killings that take place in the coursef arguments or disputes among friendsr acquaintances. Some are related torugs, and many are the result of disputes

among gang members or between rivalangs. Law enforcement authorities have

a duty to investigate these crimes, to carryut criminal prosecutions, and to see thathose judged responsible are punished.

Disturbingly, though, there are signicantnumbers of these killings that have noapparent explanation. These are killings

here there is no obvious motive. Oftenhe body is found in a public place. Noang violence was reported by neighborsr witnesses, there is no evidence of otherriminal activity, and there are no signshat the death resulted from a crime of

passion or a domestic dispute that spilledinto a public space. Because most Central

merican police forces have limitedinvestigative capacity, it may be that some

f these murders with no apparent motiveould be explained with better police work.

Still, the trend is clear: larger numbers of unexplained murders, many with the markshat suggest social cleansing.

In an analysis of murders of children andouth without apparent explanation in

2005 in Honduras, Casa Alianza foundhat many of these murders show the sameharacteristics and the modus operandi of

arbitrary [extrajudicial] executions that hadpresented themselves in previous years:he bodies of children and youth found

in open elds, in rivers, or on desertedroads, bodies burned or showing signs of orture, having the hands or feet tied, and

with shots to the head, and/or other vital

rgans. Of the total of children and youthfound murdered, 42% presented one ormore characteristics similar to patterns of arbitrary executions. 7

Given this analysis, Casa Alianza argueshat it is undeniable that in Honduras

boys, girls, and young adults faceassassination and systematic execution. 8

This is not a new allegation in Honduras.Casa Alianza began gathering data on the

murders of children and youth in 1998.The Honduran governments NationalCommissioner for the Protection of Human Rights investigated allegations

f extrajudicial executions in 2001, andpublished a report in January of 2002.In 2001, the UN Special Rapporteur onExtrajudicial, Arbitrary, and SummaryExecutions visited Honduras. She issueda 2002 report that said not only thatextrajudicial killings were taking place,but that government security forces wereinvolved in covering up their involvementin some of the summary killings of youthand children, and that some of the killingsinvolved police. 9

In response to these criticisms, theHonduran government set up a specialUnit for the Investigation of the Murders

f Minors. The Unit has investigated,between June of 2003 and November of 2005, 980 cases of murder of minors, orabout a third of the 2,995 cases that CasaAlianza has documented since 1998. Of the980 cases, 166 cases have been forwardedo the Attorney Generals ofce for possible

prosecution. Forty-eight cases have gone torial and as of November 2005, only eightases have ended with convictions and theentencing of those found guilty. 10

Similar patterns of apparent extrajudicialkillings are visible in Guatemala and in

Because most Central

American police

forces have limited

investigative capacity,

it may be that some

of these murders with

no apparent motivecould be explained with

better police work. Still,

the trend is clear: larger

numbers of unexplained

murders, many with

the marks that suggest

social cleansing.


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El Salvador. In Guatemala, the Group forMutual Support (GAM), a human rightsorganization, recently issued a reportexamining violent deaths in Guatemala. Of the 1,590 violent deaths that occurred inGuatemala in the rst six months of 2005,GAM noted that 1,294 of them had some

evidence suggesting that they might beacts of social cleansing.11 The evidenceincluded signs of torture, the tiro de gracia(a shot to the back of the head), and theuse of high caliber weapons often associatedwith the police. Similarly, on June 15,2006, lawyers from the Archbishops LegalAid Ofce in San Salvador attributedmany of El Salvadors homicides to socialcleansing groups. They reported that, Thesystematic nature of the cases leads one tobelieve that they have been committed to

carry out social cleansing.12

A particularly sensitive issue is theallegation that police ofcers have beeninvolved in some of the extrajudicialexecutions that have taken place. Highhomicide rates increase public pressureon government ofcials and on policethemselves. Under these circumstances,and given the weak rule of law that stillpersists in Central America, as well asthe relative lack of oversight on policeofcers, police are sometimes prone to actharshly with little fear of legal restraintor punishment. As gangs continue tobe perceived as an increasing threat tonational security, some police ofcials mayfeel at greater liberty to execute youth gangmembers without due process of law.

In Honduras, Casa Alianza producesmonthly reports on extrajudicialexecutions. Just to take one example, inMay of 2006, Casa Alianza reported thatuniformed police were responsible for twoof twenty-six killings.13 In Guatemala,according to press reports, the policeinternal affairs department investigated24 reports of police involvement inextrajudicial executions in 2005. 14 In June of 2006, in a case in El Salvador, theOfce of the Human Rights Ombudsmancharged that police ofcers in the

epartment of Sonsonate were responsibleor the extrajudicial killing of three

alleged gang members.15

hese are particularly troublingallegations. It is central to the rule of lawhat the public have condence that the

police themselves respect the law and donot circumvent it. Any allegation thatpolice have been involved in extrajudicialkillings of any kind must be taken seriouslyand fully investigated. This requiresassuring that internal affairs ofces andinspector generals ofces in Central

merican police forces are functioningell, politically independent, and

adequately staffed, and that prosecutorsfces are prepared to fully and impartially

investigate these allegations.

Recommendationshough precise information is scarce, and

he number of cases is not clear, thereare strong indications that in all threeountries where gang violence is a serious

problem, extrajudicial executions andocial cleansing are part of the response.he U.S. State Departments 2005 Humanights reports for Guatemala, El Salvador,

and Honduras all note the allegations of extrajudicial executions.

It is imperative for police and governmentagencies to improve the techniques used forata collection and the method for recordinghis information in a clear and systematicashion; Without this information, it isifcult to determine the true causes of iolence and, therefore, impossible to

address the problem at its root.

Beyond that, governments in the regionhould acknowledge the strong evidencehat social cleansing and extrajudicial

executions are taking place, and shouldrespond to this serious human rightsproblem. Governments need to stronglyand publicly condemn extrajudicialkillings, and to make clear that they willnot tolerate people taking the law intoheir own hands.

As gangs continue to

be perceived as an

increasing threat to

national security, some

police offi cials may

feel at greater liberty

to execute youth gang

members without due

process of law.


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Endnotes Andino, Leonarda. Presentan en la Ciudad Universitaria:

bservatorio de la Violencia. Honduras: Universidad Nacional Autnoma de Honduras, August 2006.

Rosenzweig, Howard. opan Update Honduras Thiseek Online. September 18, 2006. http://www.marrder.om/htw/travel.html

3 http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1006/p06s01-woam.htmlDouglas Payne. ElSalvador: Re-emergence of Socialleansing Death Squads.Washington, DC: INS Resource

Information Center, March 1999.5 Spence, Jack; Mike Lanchin; and Geoff Thale. FromElections to Earthquakes: Reform and Participation in Post-

ar El Salvador Hemisphere Initiatives. Cambridge,MA: WOLA, April 2001. Casa Alianza, Honduras. nforme de Ejecuciones y

Muertes Violentos de Nios, Nias, y Jvenes Durante la Administracin del Presidente Ricardo Maduro, Enero 2002 Enero 2006 . Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Casa Alianza,

anuary 2006.

Ibid.8 Ibid9 Human Rights Watch. Principal Concerns of HumanRights Watch for the 58th Session of the UN Human RightsCommission. http://www.hrw.org/un/unchr58.htm#_

Toc5365319770 Op Cit. Casa Alianza.1 ABC13.com. Crueles crmenes se atribuyen a limpieza

social en Guatemala. 2005, http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=latin-america&id=3535946.

2 Reuters. El Salvador death squads targeting criminals:Church. San Salvador, El Salvador: Reuters, June 15,

006.3 Casa Alianza. Analisis Mensual Sobre Problematicas de la

Ninez Hondurena .Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Casa Alianza,une 2006.4 Lakshmanan, Indira A.R. Death Squads Said to Target

Youths. Boston: Boston Globe, April 19, 2006.4 Leonel Herrera. PDDH insiste en investigar a grupos de

exterminio. San Salvador: Diario CoLatino, August 30,

006.

o make their public declarationsmeaningful, governments need to seriouslyinvestigate the widespread allegations

f extrajudicial killings. Honduras needso strengthen the technical capacity

and political resources of the specialinvestigative unit. Other countries need to

ask detectives, whether in a special unitr not, to investigate crimes that showigns of social cleansing. Investigations and

prosecutions need to happen.

he United States and others in theinternational community need to continueo monitor allegations of extrajudicial

executions, report on them, and stronglyencourage the governments of Central

merica to condemn any extrajudicialaction and to promptly and thoroughly

investigate cases.

Extrajudicial executions cannot and shouldnot be tolerated by any state. Especially

in those cases where there are credibleallegations that police ofcers may beinvolved in extrajudicial executions,governments, including police internalaffairs units and attorney generals ofces,have a special responsibility to carry outhorough investigations that demonstrate

heir commitment to the rule of law.

It is clear that attempting to eliminategangs and their criminal behavior throughextrajudicial action is wrong on moral aswell as legal grounds. It is also likely tobe ineffective in reducing crime and gangviolence. Tolerance for, or indifference to,extrajudicial executions undermines therule of law and the authority of the state.Governments and civil society must opposeit, and instead support effective and rights-

respecting law enforcement strategies,while seeking to address the roots of theproblem through programs that focus onprevention and rehabilitation.

It is clear that attempting

to eliminate gangs and

their criminal behavior

through extrajudicial

action is wrong on moral

as well as legal grounds.

It is also likely to be

ineffective in reducing

crime and gang violence.


20/32


21/32


22/32


commitment many young people feel totheir communities, as the communities areunable to offer the economic incentivesand rewards that build loyalty andcommunity solidarity. 6

Domestic/social violence, economic

instability, and weak communityinstitutions are three broad andsignicant risk factors contributing to thegrowth of gangs throughout the CentralAmerican region. Other factors, such ashigh school drop out rates, easy accessto guns, and the availability of drugs,are contributing factors as well. Thesemajor underlying factors must be takeninto account when developing youthviolence prevention programs. Noneof these are issues that can be easily or

quickly addressed, and it is necessary torecognize the challenges presented byresource-strapped governments, weakcommunity groups and non-governmentalorganizations, schools, and religiousorganizations, all functioning in a post-war period of relative instability.

Resolving the problem of youth violencerequires recognizing and addressing thesebroad social factors. At the same time,specic and targeted violence preventionprograms have been shown to make asignicant difference, and governmentsand civil society groups should pursuethese programs.

Benets of PreventionThe costs of crime and violence are high.There are economic losses, and pain,suffering, and emotional trauma for thevictim. There are social costs, including thecosts to the legal, penitentiary, and healthsectors for both the perpetrator and victim.A 1999 cost assessment of violence in LatinAmerica found that the total direct andindirect cost of violence to El Salvador was24.9% of the nations GDP. 7 In the UnitedStates, violence costs nearly $500 billiondollars a year in direct and indirect costs. 8

Given these costs, effective violenceprevention programs could save enormous

amounts of money and prevent sufferingand keep youth from delinquency. Aninvestigation by the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank found that for every

ollar invested in a prevention programin the U.S., between six and seven dollars

ould be saved on control programs-n investigation, prosecution and

incarceration after the violence occurs. 9

t a hearing in October, 2005, in frontf the Crime Subcommittee of the

Judiciary Committee in the U.S. House of epresentatives, a researcher on violence

and crime in the United States testiedabout the benets of prevention programsin addressing youth gang violence.

Prevention is more effective and less costlythan punishment and incarceration. Thehandful of scientic comparisons conductedshows that violence prevention reduces

future crime more, costs less to deliver, provides greater cost savings over time and produces a broader set of health and socialbenets than treatment or punishment.10

nother study of the impact of preventionprograms compared the costs and benetsf several prevention programs with thosef a tough law enforcement approach.he 1995 comparative research project

by Greenwood & Associates comparedalifornias three strikes law (mandatory

life sentence for repeat offenders) with otherrime prevention strategies. The researchound that the three strikes law could

reduce serious crime by 21%, by keepinghose likely to commit crimes in prisonor the rest of their lives. In comparison,

oung women at a center or at ris yout in on uras.Domestic/social

violence, economic

instability, and weak

community institutions

are three broad and

signicant risk factors

contributing to thegrowth of gangs

throughout the Central

American region. Other

factors, such as high

school drop out rates,

easy access to guns,

and the availability of

drugs, are contributing

factors as well.


23/32


a combination of four prevention andintervention techniques would have reducedrime by nearly 80% while costing 90% lesso implement than incarceration.

t the same time, not all preventionprograms are equal. In particular, the

reenwood researchers found thatprograms oriented toward youth facingubstantial risk factors are both more cost-

effective and more successful than programshat do education and outreach to theeneral youth population. 11

Primary, Secondary, andTertiary Programs

hat follows is a brief overview of the

pecic categories of prevention programsprimary, secondary, and tertiary), a summary

f whats known to date, based on researchabout effective ways to design preventionprograms, and a few examples of programshat have had some impact in the U.S.

Violence preventions specialists generallyharacterize programs as primary,

econdary, or tertiary, depending onwhether they focus on broad outreach,argeted outreach to at-risk youth, or work

with already gang-involved youth. Manyf these best practices could be of great

use to those addressing the gang issue inCentral America, despite the signicantituational differences.

Primary prevention includes school andommunity based activities that reach outo a broad population. They range from

he general educational campaigns toencourage young people to stay in school,

CASASTART (Striving Together to Achieve Rewarding Tomorrows) is an example of a successful community-based program that brought togethersocial services, law enforcement, and juvenile justice agencies. It was designed bythe National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia Universityto keep youth between the ages of 8-13 away from delinquency and drugsin Austin, Bridgeport, Memphis, Newark, and Savannah. 16 After a grant from

the Ford Foundation to replicate the model in ve new sites, the program wasffectively implemented in 23 urban and rural communities in 11 states and

the District of Columbia. The Urban Institute conducted a full evaluation of theimpact of the program entitled, CASASTART: A Proven Youth DevelopmentStrategy that Prevents Substance Abuse and Builds Communities.

ASASTART is a prime example of a program which can be coordinated onnational level, laying out a basic model with key characteristics, but can be

implemented locally in order to incorporate neighborhood-specic attributes. InPhase 1, specialists and community organizers work with local groups to carry out

full community assessment, identify potential leaders and partners, and establishspecic goals. In Phase 2, partnerships are developed between community

rganizations, local government agencies, police, etc. and then a clear work planis developed. Specialists and organizers offer training and technical assistance forthe service providers who work directly with young people.

verall, the program had a signicant impact on preventing youth from using orselling drugs (20% and 60% less likely respectively), and committing crimes (20%less likely). It has also increased the likelihood that youth would stay in schoolnd be promoted to the next grade. These positive effects directly address threef the foremost risk factors which lead youth to joining gangs. 17


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or stay away from drugs, for example - tomore specic programs that train youngpeople how to make good decisions,or that offer anti-gang training in theschools. Their major goal is to decreaserisk factors and increase protection factors.Often times, programs that reach out tothe general youth population seem toobroad to have a direct effect on gangprevention, but preventing drug use andother acts of delinquency can signicantlyreduce the possibility that youth willeventually join gangs. 12

The most effective primary programsare skills oriented At the core, theseprograms aim to give youth the trainingthey need to make the right decisionsthrough adolescence and into adulthood.The Life Skills Training program is oneexample of a primary prevention modelwhich is aimed at preventing drug use. Byteaching social skills, personal managementskills, and street-smart skills, teachersreduced the possibility that youth willbegin regular drug use.13 If this can beprevented from the outset, youth areless likely to move from street drug useonto other varied and more serious drugsand are, therefore, less likely to becomeinvolved in violent and criminal behavior.

Because the impact of these programs isbroad and long term, it can be difcult forovernments to justify the funding needed toarry them out. Nevertheless, governmentshould make a concerted effort to provideunding for this work just as they do forther ongoing social services.14

Secondary prevention targets individualsho are considered high risk. Youthho display the greatest risk of joiningangs should be presented with practical

and attractive alternatives, offeredeffective support systems, and be heldaccountable for their actions. 15 As notedabove, these programs are those thatappear to be most cost-effective and havehe most impact on preventing youthrom joining gangs.

Some of the most successful secondaryprevention programs, and most feasible

hen working with limited resources,are community based approaches. Inhese approaches, experts on violence

prevention, usually provided by thenational government, work withommunity and church groups, localovernments, police, and others toonduct an assessment of the particularommunity. The assessment tries to

identifying the various risk factors in thepecic community that might lead young

people to join gangs. The assessment alsoeeks to identify myths or misconceptions

in the community (due to race, clothingtyle, or speech) that make it harder toeal realistically with at-risk youth. Oncehe assessment is done, and potentialolutions identied, partnerships areormed among the various members of theommunity. In order to make the mostut of minimal resources, new programsr organizations seeking to address theangs issue are built upon establishedervice agencies and other institutionschurch, school etc) in order to increaseeasibility and nancial sustainability.

s noted earlier, conditions in Centralmerica are different than they are

in the United States, and U.S. basedprograms cannot simply be replicated. But

Conditions in Central

America are different

than they are in the

United States, and U.S.

based programs cannot

simply be replicated.

But while there arenowhere near as many

social service providers

and while many

existing institutions

are far less stable, the

basic principle and

value of community

collaboration still holds.

A sign advertising tattoo removal fo members looking for a clean start.former gang


25/32


hile there are nowhere near as manyocial service providers and while many

existing institutions are far less stable, thebasic principle and value of communityollaboration still holds. Local service

providers, churches, community groups,and non-governmental organizations, needo be brought together as partners, and new

initiatives should be built on their existingork. Municipalities are also an ideal

etting for coordinating mutlti-sectoralresponses to gangs as they encompass a

eeper understanding of the history andneeds of a community which would likelybe absent from a national strategy. 18

ertiary programs are informally referredo as rehabilitation and are directed towardouth who are already involved in violence

and delinquency. Tertiary programs arehe costliest, but, as Operation Cease Firehows, and as many programs in Latin

America demonstrate as well, these can beproductive. These programs work to reduceviolence by gang members. They provideounseling and support, and sometimesffer housing alternatives, social services,

educational programs, and job training toyouth who want to leave gangs.

A major issue for many tertiary rehabilitationprograms is economic re-insertion. Whilerehabilitation programs allow youth toreadjust to society they do not always providea mechanism to ensure that the youth willbecome part of the labor force or otherwisebecome productive members of society.Without this, many youth remain vulnerableo the lure of the gang.

Another problematic element of manyertiary programs was rst identied inhe Chicago Area Project (CAP). In the

CAP program, social workers worked with

Operation Cease Fire is an example of prevention through law enforcementtactics. It focused on gun violence control when it was created in 1996, a period

hen homicides in the United States were at an all time high and gangs wereproliferating in African-American and Latino communities. In response to a

ave of violence, the Boston Police Department formed an Anti Gang ViolenceUnit which used non-traditional strategies to combat violence. It combined

very intensive focus on the relatively small number of individuals who werelikely to commit crimes with guns, with a community policing approach (donein partnership with community members, service providers, schools etc.),problem solving, and prevention programs. It included a community-widessessment in which all sectors were involved, and a number of myths aroundangs and gang members were addressed. The primary focus of this programas enforcement (as described in the section on police reform, pg. 8) but theverall program was comprehensive.

The results of Operation Ceasere were striking, and are a clear indication of the importance of community-wide involvement in addressing gangs. Afterthe second full year of operation, through May 31, 1998, there was a 71%

ecrease in homicides by youth ages 24 and under and a 70% reduction inun assaults for all ages. 19

ver time, funding for this program was reduced, and its impact decreased.But its initial success, and the fact that it has been replicated in a number of

ther communities, shows that by sending a strong message that violence willnot be tolerated in conjunction with services and support, gang violence canbe reduced.

While rehabilitation

programs allow youth

to readjust to society

they do not always

provide a mechanism to

ensure that the youth

will become part of thelabor force or otherwise

become productive

members of society.

Without this, many

youth remain vulnerable

to the lure of the gang.


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specic neighborhood youth gangs, seekingto transform the gang from an anti-socialyouth group to a pro-social group. 20 Theevaluation showed that attempting totransform an anti-social and violent group

into a productive one might actually leadto further cohesiveness among the gangmembers and increase gang crime. Thus,work with gang members in their groupsneeds to be carefully structured to ensurethat it is productive.

Effective Responses to Youth Gang ViolenceResearch-based knowledge about the

effectiveness of specic violence preventionprograms is limited. While there have beenfew large scale evaluations of preventionprograms, there is useful information fromthe studies that exist. A review of successfulprograms indicates some common elementsin how these programs are designed,implemented, and reviewed. Mostsuccessful programs are developed using thefollowing methodology:21

Clearly dening the problem andgathering accurate information onyouth and the community at largewith particular attention placed onidentifying key risk factors facing youth;

Creating programs to specicallytarget these risk factors and identifyingexisting and potential resources(institutions, services, funds, etc.);

Implementing the program with care toensure proper management; and

Monitoring the program and analyzingthe results.

Many communities and organizations

ee the need to work with youth in ordero keep them away from gangs. Theystematic approach outlined above, when

implemented by governments, communities,and police in a coordinated manner, ismostly likely to produce long-term results.

he information gathering stage shouldinclude developing a clear understanding of he youth in the community as individuals,

Homeboy Industries in Los Angeles is a good example of a program whichspecically targets gangs and involves coordination between the federal andlocal levels of government.This program is supported by the OJJDP GangReduction Program 24 and is one of four model sites located in the United States.Homeboy Industries focuses on reaching out to at-risk or already gang involvedyouth with job opportunities, skills training, and counseling. The combination of intervention, rehabilitation, and reinsertion has proven to be quite successful.

The employment referral center and economic development program, foundedin 1988 by Father Gregory Boyle, is known as Jobs for a Future. The center helpsover 1,000 people a month nd jobs. In 1992, Homeboy Industries was formallycreated, out of which were formed Homeboy Bakery, Homeboy Silkscreen,Homeboy / Homegirl Merchandise, Homeboy Graffi ti Removal, HomeboyMaintenance, and Homeboy Landscaping. Father Boyles model provides acutting edge framework for how the business community can play a critical andintegrated role in addressing the root causes of youth gangs.

Farther Boyle, founder and executive director of Homeboy Industries. In a 2004interview with National Public Radio Father Boyle stated, Youth who join gangsare looking for a personal connection and sense of belonging. Community is thefullest, truest antidote to gangs.


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he gangs as social groups and theirtructure, and the community context inhich these individuals and gangs exist.

In assessing risk factors for young people,uccessful programs look at a range of

issues, from broad social problems to

pecic individuals concerns. These riskactors are typically categorized into 5ifferent groups:

broad community factors (poverty, drugs,guns, lack of social opportunities);

family factors (broken homes, domesticviolence, lack of role models);

school factors (academic failure,negative or untrained teachers);

peer group factors (delinquent peers,drugs, peer pressure); and,

individual factors (prior delinquency,victimization, aggression, hopelessness).22

nce the assessment is complete, programsan be designed to address particular riskactors or combinations thereof. Once

implemented, these programs should beracked and assessed. This analysis should

be used not only to determine best practicesbut to ensure that the program adapts

Youth Gangs in Central America — Report from WOLA

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