Page 1
Youth Voice Journal
Hard copies of Youth Voice Journal are available to purchase at http://iars.org.uk/content/youthvoicejournal
Each year, IARS members will receive a collection of articles and book reviews from the Youth Voice
Journal in a glossy printed format for free as part of their membership. Join us today as an IARS member. Full membership package and details at www.iars.org.uk
© 2014 INDEPENDENT ACADEMIC RESEARCH STUDIES
Page 2
Published in YVJ, May 2014 http://youthvoicejournal.com/
© IARS 2014 -ISBN (online): 978-0-85865-267-1
Patrick English
Young People and Europe: Quantitatively researching Euroscepticism in Europe’s
youth.
Biography
I am a current Masters level student at the University of Sheffield, studying for an MA in
Politics with Research Methods. I am specialising in political participation, migration
politics, and quantitative methods. I hold a BA honours degree in Politics and Philosophy
from the same institution. I have previously published work on media engagement strategy.
Abstract
The next round of European elections are due to take place in May 2014, against the
backdrop of support for the European Union (EU) at its lowest ever point according to
Eurobarometer data. Eurosceptic discourse is dominant in much of the media across Europe,
and prominent Eurosceptics claim that Euroscepticism is now the prevailing attitude towards
Europe among the populations of EU member states. This study focuses on Euroscepticism
and young people in Europe. Using quantitative methods, this paper finds that Euroscepticism
is not at all prominent in young people, and also that young people are the least Eurosceptic
Page 3
of all age groups, consistently disagreeing with key Eurosceptic positions and attitudes.
Despite the sustained Eurosceptic discourse and rhetoric which dominates much political
discussion in Europe, Euroscepticism is not a popular belief held by, or representative of the
views and attitudes, of Europe’s young.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to GESIS for providing access to Eurobarometer data, without which this study
would not be possible. I am also thankful to Professor Graham Harrison for his feedback and
recommendations on the final draft of this paper, and to Dr. Maria Grasso for her feedback
and continued support and guidance in my learning and practicing of quantitative methods.
Research Outline
The next round of European elections are due to take place in May 2014, against the
backdrop of the most recent Eurobarometer data showing that support for the European
Union (EU) among citizens Europe is at its lowest ever point (see Standard Eurobarometer
2012). European election time serves as a perfect opportunity for Eurosceptics parties and
politicians to take centre stage in the political agenda, to ascertain votes, and the realisation of
their political agendas (Sitter 2002). Eurosceptic rhetoric is dominant in media sources across
Europe, particularly those traditionally of a right wing or centre-right back ground (De
Vreese 2007, Schuck and De Vreese 2006, Statham & Koopmans 2009), typifying a large
increase in discursive Euroscepticism in the public domain in recent years. Taggart and
Szczerbiak (2002) concluded that support for Eurosceptic parties is now entrenched and
engrained into European politics. To define Euroscepticism is not entirely easy as it is broad
in both nature and origins, but perhaps a simple definition of it is “outright opposition to the
EU” (Taggart 2003: p363). This can be directed at the institution itself, or frequently at the
Union’s central policy of greater integration between its member-states. Weβels (2007: p300-
Page 4
4) argues that there are three kinds of Euroscepticism, but that the dominant group are those
who oppose European integration and other key EU principles, and who wish to see a
reduction in or complete elimination of the institution that is the EU. When I refer to
‘Eurosceptics’ or ‘Euroscepticism’ from herein, I am referring to this ‘strong’ position – as
opposed to those who might describe themselves as ‘Eurosceptic reformists’. Today, the
dominant Eurosceptic discourse in the media claims that Euroscepticism is now the most
prominent attitude towards the EU across all of Europe – including in its young persons (see
De Vreese 2007). This research will aim to address whether Euroscepticism really is the most
prominent position on the EU among Europe’s young people.
This research will study the young people of Europe’s opinions on the EU as a unique aspect
of public opinion. Public opinion is important to study when analysing any political claims,
and Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, and De Vreese (2000: p242) wrote that “Public opinion
towards the European Union (EU) is at the heart of political, popular and academic debates
regarding the present state and future of European integration”. Academics have long studied
Euroscepticism among populations, and arrived at varying conclusions as to its origins,
causes, and proponents. Taggart (2003) focuses on “new populist parties” which are directing
and sustaining Eurosceptic discourse, while De Vreese (2007) states that in particular the
media have their part to play in ‘fuelling’ cynicism and scepticism towards the EU. McLaren
(2002) argues that in general people are ‘hostile’ towards the EU in large part because of their
‘perceptions of threats posed by other cultures’, and Weβels (2007) finds similarly that most
Eurosceptics oppose European integration – a key EU policy. Whilst there may be academic
disagreement about the finer details, it is clear from the literature that Euroscepticism is an
important and growing issue in European political discourse. Indeed, Sitter (2002: p5) writes
that “Euroscepticism has come to play a remarkable role in European party politics”. This
Page 5
research paper will use quantitative analysis on a large, cross-national dataset to measure
levels of Euroscepticism in young people in order to determine if Euroscepticism is 1) the
most prominent attitudes toward the EU among Europe’s young people, and 2) if thus the
Eurosceptic discourse is representative of the majority of young people in Europe.
According to Boomgaarden et al. (2011: p243) there have been problems in academic
research into Euroscepticism to date, specifically regarding the “conceptual and empirical
clarification” of ‘EU support’ and ‘Euroscepticism’. Their claim is that conceptually the
terms are often too narrowly measured and too broadly used: “Euroscepticism – narrowly
defined as opposition towards a specific policy or integration effort – may be just one facet of
public opinion towards the EU” (Boomgaarden et al. 2011: p242). Thus, rather than focusing
on one specific aspect of attitudes towards the EU, this research will study three attitudes, or
opinions, towards the EU so as to build a broad picture of how the people of Europe view the
EU. There are three different attitudes towards the EU in general which were measured
recorded in the Eurobarometer 78, the seventy-eighth edition of the Europe wide social and
political attitudes survey which shall be used as the data-set for this inquiry: 1) perceived
‘image’ of the EU, 2) general ‘trust’ in the EU, and 3) views on the future of the EU and the
respondents' respective states within it.
Measuring these three different attitudes towards the EU among young people as recorded in
a European wide survey will give us a good understanding of precisely how Eurosceptic
young people are – indeed if at all. However, this is not a measure or study of pro-European
attitudes or discourses. Boomgaarden et al. (2011: p258) argue that it is an error to
understand support of, or for, the EU as simply the reverse of Euroscepticism - that it is very
Page 6
possible for a person to be sceptical of certain EU policies or goals, but not define themselves
as sceptical towards the Union itself and in fact support it, and indeed vice-versa. Therefore I
am careful to argue that a three-fold understanding of attitudes and opinions towards the EU
will be a large enough measure of Euroscepticism, but not that the reverse of this will equate
to a measure of EU support. Thus I argue that if a person indicates that they have a negative
image of the EU, do not trust the EU, and are pessimistic about its future, then we have good
grounds to label them as a Eurosceptic. If a person holds the exact opposite – a positive
image of the EU, trust in the EU, and optimism about its future – I argue that there is a strong
case to label them as not Eurosceptic, but perhaps not as supporters of the EU. For example:
if it is shown that young people across Europe in general have a more positive image of the
EU than other age groups, are more likely to trust the EU, have more positive views on the
future of the EU, and approve highly (or at least highest) of their country’s relationship with
the EU, then this will suggest that they cannot be said to be, in general, a Eurosceptic age
group.
While much work has been done investigating Euroscepticism, and the growth of, in the
general population, there is little work specifically on young people (hereafter defined as
those aged 15-24) and their attitudes towards the European Union. Studies have shown that
young people are the least likely age group to turn out to a European election (Schmitt and
Mannheimer 2006), but low electoral turnout among young people is not specific to European
elections – it is indicative of an overall trend of low turnout among young people in all
elections across Europe (Matilla 2003: p451, also see generally Fieldhouse, Tranmer, and
Russell 2007). Young people’s low turnout rate to European elections does not indicate any
particular graft between young people and the EU that is different towards the usually noted
distance between younger generations and political general in general. Lastly, reasons for a
Page 7
voter not turning out in any given election are not necessarily to do with scepticism or
negative attitudes towards the institutions and or processes which that election concerns (see
Schmitt and Mannheimer 2006). Thus, we cannot infer attitudes towards the EU from
observations of low voter turnout.
Some studies do offer some potential insight into young people and their attitudes towards the
EU. Henn and Foard (2012) argued that despite their low propensity to vote, and generally
negative attitudes towards politicians, young people are generally positive about politics in a
more general sense – giving the example of 'the democratic process’. Most interestingly, Fox
(2013: p1) argues that “The British Election Survey for 2010” shows “only 22% of 18-24
year olds could be called Eurosceptics”. Further, Fox (2013: p2) found that “young people
have become less likely than their elders to be Eurosceptics since 1980”.
Hypotheses and Methodology
Following the arguments made from Fox (2013) and Henn and Foard (2005), two hypotheses
were drawn to be investigated from the data:
a) Euroscepticism will not be the prominent view on Europe among young people in
Europe, and
b) Young people will prove to be the least Eurosceptic age group in Europe.
To test the hypotheses, the research quantitatively investigated three public attitudes towards
the EU as recorded in the Eurobarometer 78 study and coded in a data-set available online
from the GESIS Eurobarometer data service. The Eurobarometer 78 was dedicated to
studying public opinion in Europe on a wide range of issues, including the EU itself. Young
people are those aged 15-24, and all other age groups which appear in this study are defined
Page 8
according to the 6-split-up age variable in the Eurobarometer 78. As outlined above, three
different attitudes towards the EU have been investigated: 1) perceived 'image' of the EU , 2)
general 'trust' in the EU, and 3) perceptions of the future of the EU and the future of the
respondents' respective states within it. The Eurobarometer 78 is a cross-national survey
commissioned and produced by the EU in November 2012. The study surveyed nearly 33,000
people from across the 27 member states of the EU and a number of other geographically
European countries and territories. The responses from each individual in the study have been
coded in the form of a statistical dataset, which was accessed and downloaded through
GESIS online resources.
The following questions have been selected and recoded from the Eurobarometer responses
dataset for this research. Question A12 of the Eurobarometer 78 asked respondents “In
general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly
negative, or very negative image?” Answering options offered to respondents of this question
were: ‘Very positive’, ‘positive’, 'neutral', ‘negative’, and ‘Very negative’. There was also an
‘I don’t know’ option. In the dataset of results, each response to the question has been coded
from 1 to 6, from 1 being ‘Very positive’ to 5 being ‘Very negative’, with 3 representing
‘neutral’ and 6 as ‘I don’t know’. A new dummy variable for use in the later regression
analyses (dummy variables recode all responses into either 0 or 1) was created, which
recoded the responses into ‘Negative’ and ‘Not negative’ images of the EU. Responses 4 and
5 were coded into 1 for ‘Negative response’, while options 1, 2, 3, and 6 were coded to 0
representing ‘Not negative’.
Public trust in an institution is a vital part of general public attitudes towards said institution
(Rudolph and Evans 2005: p60, also see Hay 2007 ch.1). Question A11 part 8 was as follows:
‘Tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust the EU’. Questions A11 parts 5, 6, and 7
Page 9
asked the same of political parties, national government, and national parliaments
respectively. Possible responses were 1 ‘Tend to trust’, 2 ‘Tend not to trust’, or 3 ‘I don’t
know’. A new dummy variable was created to recode 1 as respondents who selected answer 1
to the original question, and thus indicated ‘Trust’, while responses 2 and 3 were recoded into
0, labelled ‘Did not indicate trust’. Figure C displays the percentage of young people who
responded that they tended to trust each of the four types of political institution.
Respondents from the Eurobarometer 78 study were asked in question QA23 “Would you say
that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very pessimistic about the
future of the EU?” Possible responses ranged from ‘Very positive’, coded as 1 in the data set,
to ‘Very negative’, coded as 4. Once again, ‘I don’t know’ responses were recorded as a 5. A
new dummy variable was created from these responses, which records 1 as a ‘Positive’
response to question QA23, and 3 through to 5 as a ‘Not positive’ response. This question
was not asked of respondents from countries not in the EU or not a candidate state, and thus
the number of observations for this variable drops to just over 26,500 individuals.
Question QA20a part 11 asked respondents to what extent they agreed with the following
statement: “(Our Country) could face a better future outside the EU”. Again, for obvious
reasons this question was only asked in countries which are currently members of the EU,
and so the total number of observations in the data is once again 26.662. Possible responses
ranged from ‘Agree strongly, coded as 1 in the data set, to ‘Disagree strongly’, coded as 4.
Once again, ‘I don’t know’ responses were recorded as a 5. A new dummy variable was
created from these responses, which recoded 3 and 4 as into 1 for ‘Disagreed’, and 1 through
to 3 into 0 a ‘Did not disagree’ response.
Page 10
This research paper will make use of logistic regressions; a Logistic regression shows the
likelihood, in the form of an odds ratio, that a young person will have a negative image of the
EU, relative to all other age groups. An odds ratio is the log of the odds within a variable that
any given individual case from a particular type will display a certain characteristic, relative
to all other cases not of that individual’s type. In this regression, the given individual cases
are young people, the characteristic is a negative image of the EU, and the odds ratio is
relative to people of all other ages. Some figures displaying regressions are split into two
regression models – A and B – which represent the regression ran without added variables
which should be controlled for (A), and then with the addition of such variables (B).
Variables must be added to regression analyses to check for potential prior antecedent factors,
and only prior antecedent factors, which might explain or reduce the significance of the
effects observed in initial regressions (Miller and Shanks 1996). Prior antecedent variables
are those which could take effect on the characteristic that one is observing, before the
variable used in the original regression; for example, if investigating propensity to vote
among union members, it would be necessary to control for age, sex, and other factors such
as political interest, which would come into effect on one’s propensity to vote before being a
union member would. In this case, the effect of age is being investigated against another
characteristic, and the only variables in a cross-national dataset which would be considered
prior antecedent variables would be sex and country of respondent. Controlling for these
variables after the initial regression investigating the effect of just age on likelihood to have a
negative image of the EU allows us to investigate how much of the effect we are observing is
potentially explained by a respondent’s sex, and what country they occupy (for instance it
might be that women in this dataset were more negative about the EU than men, or that a
particular country was highly sceptical of the EU and is thus affecting the results).
Page 11
Results
The Standard Eurobarometer 78 studied approximately 1,000 people from 34 countries and
territories in geographical Europe, asking questions on a broad range of topics affecting
Europeans. Each of their responses to the questions chosen above forms the data which has
been analysed in this research.
Figure A – Bar Graph displaying percentage of each age group responding that they had a
negative image of the EU.
Age group
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
% o
f a
ge
gro
up
ind
ica
ting
ne
ga
tive
im
ag
e
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Page 12
Figure A shows the percentage of each age group who indicated that they had a negative
image of the EU. It shows that young people have the lowest such percentage of respondents
– indeed the percentage of young people who indicated that they had a negative image of the
EU was just under 20%, some way off the highest recorded percentage of negative responses,
which was 32% of 55-64 year olds.
Figure B – Odds ratios of a young person having a negative image of the EU, relative to all
other age groups
Variables
A
Negative Image of EU
B
Negative Image of EU
Young People 0.61*** 0.62***
Sex 0.95*
Country 0.98***
Constant 0.40*** 0.59***
Pseudo R2
0.4% 1%
Source: Eurobarometer 78. 32,731 total observations.
Reference Category: Individuals of all other ages (25+)
P values: <0.001 = *** (highly significant), 0.001 = **, <0.005 = *, zero stars = >0.005 (not significant)
Figure B shows a regression analysis ran on the data, which tells us statistically precisely how
much lower a young person is likely to be to have a negative image of the EU compared to
someone of any other age, according to the data. Figure B suggests that a young person is less
likely to have a negative image of the EU than people of all other ages. Underneath the table
are the Pseudo R2
scores for each model. The Pseudo R2
test, like the Chi2 test, is ran
simultaneously with the regression analysis, and informs us as to the percentage of the
Page 13
variance in the results which can be explained simply by the factors (variables) which we are
using in the model. The scores are low, but this is to be expected of models using just one and
three variables respectively on a dataset of tens of thousands.
Figure C – Bar Graph displaying percentage of young people indicating trust in various
institutions.
Eur
opea
n Union
Nat
iona
l Gov
ernm
ent
Nat
iona
l Par
liam
ent
Nat
iona
l Par
ties
% o
f yo
ung
pe
op
le ind
ica
ting
tru
st in
institu
tio
ns
0
10
20
30
40
50
Page 14
% of age group indicating trust in their national parliament
0 10 20 30 40 50
Ag
e g
roup
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
% of age group indicating trust in their national political parties
0 10 20 30 40 50
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Figure C shows the graphical representation of trust in the EU by age group. According to the
responses, the EU is by far the most trusted of the four political institutions among young
people with over 10 percentiles between it and the next most trusted institution – national
parliaments. Nearly half of all young people asked in the study responded that they ‘tend to
trust’ the EU.
Figure D – Percentages of each age group that indicated trust in various institutions
% of age group indicating trust in their national governments
0 10 20 30 40 50
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
% of age group indicating trust in the EU
0 10 20 30 40 50
Ag
e g
roup
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Source: Eurobarometer 78. 32,731 total observations
Page 15
Figure D shows the percentage of each age group who indicated that they ‘tend to trust’ the
EU, their national governments and parliaments, and their national political parties. Here we
can clearly see that as well as trusting the EU highest of all four institutions, a significantly
higher percentage of young people trust the EU than any other age group. Crucially, this is
not true of any of the other three political institutions listed, so it is not the case that young
people are simply more trusting in general of political institutions – there is specific and
significantly higher levels of trust in the EU among young people.
Figure E – Odds ratios of young people trusting the EU relative to all other age groups
Variables
A
Trust in EU
B
Trust in EU
Young People 1.47*** 1.43***
Sex 0.86***
Country 1.01***
Constant 0.56*** 0.58***
Pseudo R2
0.3% 0.7%
Source: Eurobarometer 78.1. 32,731 total observations.
Reference Category: Individuals of all other ages (25+)
P values: <0.001 = *** (highly significant), 0.001 = **, <0.005 = *, zero stars = >0.005 (not significant)
Figure E displays Logistic regression results using the data on trust. Using the age group
dummy variable for young people, the odds ratios displayed are those of a young person to
indicate that they tend to trust the EU, relative to respondents of all other ages. The results
indicate that young people are around 1.5 times more likely to indicate they trust the EU than
people of all other ages.
Page 16
Figure F shows the percentages of each age group who expressed positive attitudes towards
the general future prospects of the EU. We can see from Figure F that the percentage of
young people indicating that they were optimistic about the future of the EU is significantly
Age Groups
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
% W
ho indic
ate
d t
hey w
ere
optim
istic a
bout
the E
U's
futu
re
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Figure F – Bar Graph displaying percentage age groups indicating they were optimistic about
the future of the EU.
Source: Eurobarometer 78. 26,662 total observations
Page 17
higher than that of all other age groups; over 60% of young people asked in the study
responded that they saw a positive future for the EU.
Figure G – Logistic Regression displaying likelihood of young people to be optimistic about
the future of the EU, relative to all other age groups.
Variables
A
Optimistic Future EU
B
Optimistic Future EU
Young People 1.55*** 1.54***
Sex 0.93*
Country 1.01***
Constant 1.00*** 0.98
Pseudo R2
0.3% 0.5%
Source: Eurobarometer 78. 26,662 total observations.
Reference Category: Individuals of all other ages (25+)
P values: <0.001 = *** (highly significant), 0.001 = **, <0.005 = *, zero stars = >0.005 (not significant)
Figure G displays Logistic regression results using the data on the future of the EU. Using the
age group dummy variable for young people, the odds ratios displayed are those of a young
person to indicate that they were optimistic about the future of the EU, relative to respondents
of all other ages. The results indicate that young people are over 1.5 times more likely to be
optimistic about the future of the EU than people of all other ages.
Figure H represents that proportion of each age group who disagreed with the statement
“(Our Country) could face a better future outside the EU”. It shows that while young people
Page 18
recording the highest percentage of respondents who disagreed with the assertion that their
country would have a better future outside of the EU, the differences between the age groups
were not statistically significant. Whilst this means we cannot suggest that young people are
significantly more likely to disagree with their country leaving the EU than other age groups,
we can it is still the case that over 60% of the respondents believed their country would not
be better off outside the EU. Seeing as the results were not statistically significant between
each age group, a regression analyses on the responses from this question has not been ran.
Figure H – Bar graph displaying the percentages of each age group who disagreed with the
suggestion that their state would have a better future outside the EU.
Age Groups
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
% W
ho d
isagre
ed t
hat
their s
tate
would
have
abett
er
futu
re o
uts
ide t
he E
U
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Source: Eurobarometer 78. Chi2 Pr = <0.001 (highly statistically significant differences) 26,662 total observations
Page 19
-
Discussion
Less than 20% of young people studied indicated that they had a negative image of the EU,
and a young person in the study is just over half as likely to have such an image of the EU
than a person of any other age. This suggests that both the majority of young people in
Europe do not have a negative image of the EU, and are much less likely than any other
generation to hold one. Typically, Euroscepitcs will have a negative image of the EU, and
thus these findings suggest that in this sense young people in Europe are not even remotely
prominently Eurosceptic.
Nearly 50% of young people in the study indicated that they ‘tend to trust’ the EU, and on
average nearly twice as many young people indicated that they trusted the EU than their
national governments, parliament, and political parties. Also, a young person from the study
was nearly twice as likely to ‘tend to trust’ the EU than a person of any other age. This
suggests that far from being Eurosceptic and mistrusting the EU, it is mostly the case that
young people in Europe tend to trust the EU. Indeed, this finding is consistent with
arguments in the literature that surpra-national bodies tend to be more trusted than national
governments (see Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). Lastly, over 60% of young people studied in the
survey suggested that they were optimistic about the future of the EU, and were over 1.5
times more likely to hold such a belief than a person of any other age group in the study.
Page 20
Further, over 60% of young people asked disagreed that their respective state would face a
better future outside the EU than within it. These findings suggest once more that the
majority of young people are not Eurosceptic.
In each case studied, young people consistently failed to indicate high levels of Eurosceptic
attitudes in their responses, and Eurosceptic attitudes were far from the majority in any case.
This has been demonstrated in both graphical and regression form in the results. Each of the
Model B analyses in the regression, where controlling variables were added, did not display
significantly altered odds ratios – in other words the addition of the controlling variables did
not make a significant change to the results observed in any case where a regression analysis
was used. This means that the effect of being a young person on having attitudes towards the
EU that we observe in the Model A of each part is a real effect.
However, there are limitations to the data and the results. Questions regarding the future of
the EU were not asked of respondents from countries not in the EU or not a candidate state,
and thus the number of observations for these variables drops to just over 26,500 individuals.
This means that while the sample size is still more than apt, we can only generalise these
particular findings to young people from states within the EU, and not Europe wide. Future
studies could look to include more areas where Eurosepticism which I was not able to for a
lack of time. Lastly, some readers may take issue with my coding of ‘I don’t know’ responses
as ‘Not negative’, but I stress that my understanding of ‘Not negative’ is not equitable to
‘Positive’, but quite simply as a response that was not an expression of a negative attitude. ‘I
don’t know’ is neither a positive or negative response, so to class it as ‘Not negative’ is
wholly appropriate. The same reasoning applies for my coding of ‘Neutral’ responses as ‘Not
negative’, and will be used in all other questions in the study which offer ‘I don’t know’ as a
Page 21
possible response. It must be stressed that this coding method must be kept in mind when
reading the following figures and results, as for example if a figure displayed that 45% of an
age group’s respondents held a certain opinion, it would not be correct to assume that the
remaining 55% held the reverse of that opinion, as potential ‘I don’t know’ or ‘neutral’
responses would make up a portion of that remaining percentage, depending on the question.
It would only be correct to state that the remaining 55% did not hold that particular opinion.
Whilst the above is a perfectly viable manoeuvre, it is indeed the case that rather than
analysing actual reported Euroscepticism, a number of inferences and assumptions are being
made to define Euroscepticism on the part of this research.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the results of this study suggest that both hypothesis a)
Euroscepticism will not be prominent among young people in Europe, and b) young people
will prove to be the least Eurosceptic age group in Europe, are correct. The findings in this
paper suggest that Euroscepticism is not at all prominent in young people, and also that
young people are the least Eurosceptic age group, consistently showing to disagree with key
Eurosceptic positions and attitudes. Thus, I argue that despite the sustained Eurosceptic
discourse which dominates European media and political discussions, Euroscepticism is not
at all prominent among the young people of Europe and thus Eurosceptic who claim that
Euroscepticism is rife among the population of Europe are not speaking the truth in terms of
Europe’s young people. Euroscepticism is not prominent and not popular belief among
European young persons, and thus suggests the Eurosceptic discourse among both
Eurosceptic parties and vast swaths of mainstream media in Europe is not reflective of the
views of the majority Europe’s young.
Thee findings of this paper should be an important note for academics, researchers, and
writers concerned with or studying the subject of Euroscepticism. Future research in this field
Page 22
should look to investigate why it might be that young people are comparatively much less
Eurosceptic than their elders; perhaps there are cultural and social attitudes which may
underpin young people’s likelihood to be less Eurosceptic. Young people’s comparatively
greater positivity, and lesser scepticism, for the EU cannot possibly be linked with a
propensity to vote, as it has been shown on numerous occasions that young people are less
likely to vote than any other age group (Schmitt and Mannheimer 1991). Further, other
studies have suggested that young people are less politically interested than their elders
(Fieldhouse et al 2007), suggesting that a negative correlation between political interest and
Euroscepticism would not be a plausible assertion. Studies following could focus on the kinds
of social and political attitudes which are typical of those more likely to be comfortable with
‘other cultures’, to which McLaren (2002) suggests hostility towards is intrinsically linked
with Euroscepticism. Those looking to develop knowledge on the relationship between
Europe’s young people and the EU should look to test here for potential explanation.
Bibliography
Page 23
Boomgaarden, H. G., Schuck, A. R., Elenbaas, M., & de Vreese, C. H. (2011). ‘Mapping
EU attitudes: Conceptual and empirical dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU support’
in European Union Politics, 12(2), p241-266.
De Vreese, C. H. (2007). ‘A spiral of Euroscepticism: The media's fault?’ in Acta
Politica, 42(2), p.271-286.
Fieldhouse, E., Tranmer, M., & Russell, A. (2007). ‘Something about young people or
something about elections? Electoral participation of young people in Europe: Evidence
from a multilevel analysis of the European Social Survey’ in European Journal of
Political Research 46(6), p797-822.
Fox, S. (2013). Not everyone in the UK is anti-EU: young people and the Eurosceptic
vote. European Politics and Policy at LSE.
Hay, C. (2007) Why We Hate Politics. (Basingstoke: Polity Press)
Henn, M., & Foard, N. (2012). ‘Young people, political participation and trust in Britain’
in Parliamentary affairs, 65(1), p47-67.
Inglehart, R. (2003). ‘How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy—And How Can We
Measure It?’ in Political Science and Politics 36(1) p51-57
McLaren, M. (2002). ‘Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or
Perceived Cultural Threat?’ in The Journal of Politics, 64, p551-566.
Leconte, C. (2010). Understanding Euroscepticism. (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
Marks G and Hooghe L (2003) National identity and support for European integration.
Working paper, Wissenschaftszentrum fu¨r Sozialforschung Berlin.
Page 24
Mattila, M. (2003). ‘Why bother? Determinants of turnout in the European elections’
in Electoral studies, 22(3), p449-468.
Rudolph, T. J., & Evans, J. (2005). ‘Political trust, ideology, and public support for
government spending’ in American Journal of Political Science, 49(3), p660-671.
Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2000). ‘The political basis of support for European integration’
in European Union Politics, 1(2), p147-171.
Schmitt, H. and Mannheimer, R. (1991). ‘About voting and non-voting in the European
elections of June 1989’ in European Journal of Political Research 19 p31–54
Schuck, A. R., & De Vreese, C. H. (2006). ‘Between Risk and Opportunity: News
Framing and its Effects on Public Support for EU Enlargement’ in European Journal of
Communication, 21(1), p5-32.
Sitter, N. (2002). Opposing Europe: Euro-scepticism, opposition and party competition.
(Sussex European Institute).
Standard Eurobarometer 2007:
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb71_std_part1.pdf Standard
Eurobarometer 2007
Statham, P., & Koopmans, R. (2009). ‘Political party contestation over Europe in the
mass media: who criticizes Europe, how, and why? in European Political Science
Review, 1(3), p.435-463.
Taggart, P. (1998). ‘A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western
European party systems’ in European Journal of Political Research,33(3), p363-388.
Page 25
Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2002). The party politics of Euroscepticism in EU member
and candidate states (Sussex European Institute). p1-41
Weßels, B. (2007). ‘Discontent and European identity: Three types of Euroscepticism’
in Acta Politica, 42(2), p287-306.