Locke's Man Author(s): John W. Yolton Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 665-683 Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3654333 Accessed: 23/09/2009 15:01 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=upenn . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the History of Ideas. http://www.jstor.org
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Locke's ManAuthor(s): John W. YoltonSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 665-683Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3654333
Accessed: 23/09/2009 15:01
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sectionactuallyoffersathree-folddistribution: But t is theMindthatoperates,andexerts thesePowers [of choosing andthinking]; t is theMan thatdoes the
Action [of singinganddancing], t is theAgentthathaspower,or is able todo"(2.21.19).4"Operating," exerting," nd"doing"areall powerterms,designat-
ing activecontributions o theresult.Inotherwords,(1) thepowerof themind
formspreferences,makes achoice, (2) the mandancesandsingsbecause(3) the
manas agentpossesses thepowerof acting.Threedifferentpowers: hoseof the
mind,theman,andtheagent.Agency-powermaybethesameasman-power. f
we canthinkof aninactiveman,a manforthemomentnotdoing anything, uch
a manat thatmoment wouldnot be anagent;although, f he was forbearing o
do,I guesshewouldbeanagent.Locke'sexampleof a manasleepwhilecarried
intoanother oomwould be anexampleof a manwho,atthat ime,wouldnotbeanagent.Thechange na manfrompassiveto activemarksachangefrombeinga mantobeinganagent(andperhapsaperson).Agencydependsupontheman:
he is anagentbecause he is a man.
The headingsin the tableof contentsfor sections 14-21 read"Libertybe-
longs not to the Will....But to theAgentor Man."The "or" n this last phrase
maybe ambiguous,meaningtheagent s theman,orthatthetwo differ.Earlier
chaptersrefer to the free agent (1.3.14) and to sensible or voluntaryagents
power, hepowertoproducephysicalchanges nobjectsand n senseorgans, hepowerto move one's own limbs, to act in accordancewith one's preferences.The power or ability to act morally,to repaydebts, to tell the truth,to help
others, nvolves the mind as well as the body.Suchactionsinvolve intentions,
knowledge,a sense of responsibility, ndrespectfor others.Theknowledgerel-
evant to moralactions s theknowledgeof the laws of nature, hemoral aws on
whichsociety is foundedand which areto governouractions.
We can also say thatthesepassagesconfirm thatit is one "entity" hat has
the power,decides, andacts. Whetherwe speakof the man,the personor the
agent,thereference s the same. We cannotsay the referent s a substance,al-thoughperhapsthe physical body might count as a materialsubstance,even
thoughon Locke's account we have no knowledge of body as the traditional
substance.Certainly t is clear that"person"does not referto a substance,ma-
terialorimmaterial.E. J. Lowe hasrecently suggestedthatwe take thereferent
to be a psychological substance,meaning, I guess, thatwe are dealing with
propertiese.g.,rationality,ntention, onsciousness)whichbelongtosomething,to a consciousbeing.6But if thecore, as it were,of the man-person,of the unit
that is man,personandagent, is the humanbody with its biology andneuro-
physiology,thenmind andconsciousnessbecome propertiesof thatbody.Butthose propertiesdo not become physical (neural)properties.Man, a human,
startsout as anembryo,becomes an infant,an adultand anold man.Manalso
becomesaperson,whencertainconditionsaremet.
The term "person"requentlyhas a moral tone in Locke's accountof per-sonal identity,but it may be too strongto say thatis its only feature.It mighteven be possible to distinguish"self" from "person," he lattercarryingthe
moralconnotation, he formerreferring o self-identity.The agentof actionis
fencingor talkingareactionsof the agentas muchas aretruth-telling,helping
5Fora summary tatementof thepervasiveroleof powersin the physicalworld,see 3.2.2
and3.2.3. Locke talks there of "natural ubstances."The bulkof the long chapteron power is
devoted to thepowerswe have as agents.6 E. J. Lowe, Subjectsof Experience(New York,1996), 32-35. MarcParmentierhas sug-
gested that the conceptof personis a new categoryfor Locke.The traditionaldoctrineof sub-
stance identified two kinds, material and immaterial.But humans, individualmen embodyboth material and immaterialproperties,extension andthought,so they do not fit into either
one of the traditionalcategories.Parmentier efers to "unelocalisationconcomitantedes es-
prits et des corps."Following his remark,we might suggest thatextension and thoughtare
propertiesof theperson,theperson,we might say,playsthe roleof substance MarcParmentier,Introductiona I'Essai sur l'entendementhumainde Locke [Paris, 1999], 183, see also 271,
dent,buthardlyperson-confident.We can be self-ishbutnotperson-ish.To sayI amconcerned ormy personsoundsrather ormal.Itwouldbemorenatural o
be concerned ormy self, even formy body(my arms, egs, fingers).Wemightask "whowas thepersonat thedoor,"although t is more natural o simplyask
"whowas at thedoor?"We wouldnot ask "Whowas the self atthe door?"
Are theselinguisticconventionsreflected nLocke'suse of"self " and"per-son"?Of these two terms,"self" seems to be the morebasic. If we surveythe
sectionsin 2.27, we find (A) a numberof sectionswhere consciousnessdeter-
mines the self. (B) There arealso two sections thatmix self andpersonin the
discussion.(C)Thereare several sectionsthatapplyto the self thetalkof beingconcerned. tis tempting o suggestthat he(A) sectionspresentwhatwe mightcall the "secular elf,"in oppositionto personas the"moralself."
2.1. On Being Self to Self. The first section in which this curiousphrase
appears s in 2.27.9, thedefinitionof "person" s a "thinkingntelligentBeing,thathas reasonandreflection,and canconsider t self as it self."Consciousness
is the meansforsuchconsideration. pecifically, nsensingandperceiving,"ev-
eryone is tohimself,thatwhich he callsself."Theidentityof thepersonrestson
the samenessof self: "And as far as this consciousnesscan be extendedback-
wardsto any pastAction orThought,so far reachesthe identityof thatPerson;it is the sameself now as it was then;and'tis by thesameself withthis one that
now reflectson it, thatthatActionwasdone."Lockeemploystheterm"Being"
as a way to avoid "substance."He also uses the phrase"thinking hing"in a
similarway.Thatthinkingthingis, he seems to say,a self; over time, via con-
sciousness, it is "thesame to it self." When consciousness is interruptedby
Section 10endedwithhisremark hat hesameconsciousnessunites"those
distantActions intothe samePerson,whateverSubstancescontributedo their
Production." t is not same substance which accountsfor the person,but the
sameness of consciousness. Section 11 then offers evidence for thatremark.
"That his is so, we have some kindof Evidencein ourvery Bodies, all whoseParticles,whilst vitally united to this samethinkingconscious self, so that we
feel whenthey aretouch'dand areaffectedby,andconsciousof good or harm
thathappensto them, are a partof our selves: i.e. of our thinkingconscious
self" The referentof "this" n the first clause of this sentence is not entirelyclear.If thereference s to thefirst clause of the final sentenceof section 10,the
consciousness thatunites actions and constitutesthe personis said to depend
See also 2.21.50 (playingthe fool can "drawShame and Misery upon a Man's self');3.3.9 (we can consider "aMan'sself'); and4.11.2 (we can only be certainof the existence of
God and of "aMan'sself'); cf. Locke, Some ThoughtsconcerningEducation, ?175.
(for Lowe) is a psychological substanceor (for Parmentier)person is a newcategoryreplacing,as I wouldsay, the traditional ubstancedoctrine, henper-son may after all be more basic than self. The problemfor bothDescartesand
Locke was howtocharacterize he unionof mind andbodyin man.Suchaunion
fell outside the usualtwo-substancedoctrine.The notionof anincompletesub-
stancemayhavebeen Descartes'sattempt o finda differentcategoryfor man.
Similarly,butperhaps or differentreasons(ourlack of any knowledgeabout
substance),Locke may have employed the term"person"as a substitutecat-
egory.
It has been the term"person"which framedthe debatesaroundLocke'sdiscussionfromhisdaytothepresent. n thatway, "person"s themorefamiliar
term,not self. Thetwo termshavealmostequaloccurrences n 2.27. Itmaynot
be too important o decide which of those termsis more basic, especially if
Locke ascribesmostof the sameproperties r features o both.Thereare several
definitionswhichmayhelpus decidewhether here s a distinctionbetweenself
andperson.
8 Cf. Some Thoughts,?120: "Whenany new thing comes in theirway, Childrenusually
ask,the commonQuestionof a Stranger:What s it?Whereby heyordinarilymean
nothingbut
the Name; and thereforeto tell them how it is call'd, is usually the properAnswer to that
sider it self as it self, the same thinkingthing in differenttimes and
places;whichit does only by thatconsciousness,which is inseparablefromthinking,andas it seems to me essentialto it...."(2.27.9)
No moralovertoneshere, ustthespecificationof intelligence,reason,reflection
andtheconsideringof selfby self. The formation f, ortherealizationbythe self
of its self, is what aperson s on this definition.Theseconddefinitionof personis themore familiar.
Definition2: "Itis a ForensickTermappropriatingActions andtheir
Merit;and so belongs only to intelligent Agentscapableof a Law andHappinessandMisery.Thispersonalityextendsit self beyond presentExistenceto whatis past,only by consciousness,wherebyit becomes
concernedandaccountable,owns and mputes o itself pastActions...."
(2.27.26)
Thedifferencebetweenthesetwo definitionsmightbe characterized s the
differencebetween a cognitiveconsciousnessandanaffectiveoreven a moral
consciousness.9The intelligentbeing of definitionI considershimself to be a
self, not aperson. Consciousness constitutesa self, butin so doing, a personisalso formed.The seconddefinitionrefersto the ascription self-ascription?)of
responsibility orthe actions of thatself. So we cansaythat"person" ames the
self of both definitions. That name embracesboth a secularanda moral self.
The newcategorysuggestedby Parmentierhusplaysa substantiveor(better)a
Locke says that "Had I the same consciousness, that I saw the Ark and Noah's
Flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last Winter, or as that I write
now, I could no more doubt that I, that write this now, that saw the Thames
overflow'd last Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the general Deluge, was the
same self, place that self in what Substance you please, than that I that writethis am the same my self now whilst I write" (? 16). He goes on to stress the fact
that "as to this point of being the same self it matters not whether this present
self be made up of the same or other Substances, I being as much concern'd, and
asjustly accountable for any Action was done a thousand Years since, appropri-
ated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am that I did the last moment."
Section 17 is even more forthright in employing the affective language for the
self. It captures all of the properties that characterize the person: consciousness
"makes the same Person," thereby constituting what he calls the "inseparable
Self"; the person attributes its actions to "it Self, and owns all the Actions."Section 25 reiterates the concern for self: "This every intelligent Being, sensible
of Happiness or Misery, must grant that there is something that is himself, that
he is concerned for, and would have happy...." Section 26 picks up this associa-
tion of happiness and misery with the self and applies it to the person.
3. Physical Man, Rational Man, Moral Man
My suggested thesis that the term "self" designates a "secular self," as
opposed to or distinguished from "person" as a moral self, does not have anysystematic supportfrom Locke's usage in these passages, but the two definitions
of "person" do establish a dual function for consciousness: a cognitive and a
moral or affective constituting of self and person. The cognitive constituting is a
necessary condition for the moral or affective self or person. We may have a
choice between speaking of two aspects of self or treating these aspects as self
and person. In the first choice, personal identity spans both aspects, so we could
distinguish a secular from a moral self. In the alternative, the term "person"
identifies the moral, affective aspect. On this alternative we can cite two features
of the self that are different from person. (1) The self and the body, even body
parts, have a clear attachment." (2) The self also seems to be more basic than
person in a temporal sense: the person grows out of the self, the self can be called
a person (its name is "person") when certain conditions are met in character-
" Locke expresses this attachment n several ways. We saw above that in 2.27.11, he
also saw that in 2.27.25, he speaksof "any partof our Bodies vitally unitedto thatwhich is
consciousin us." Suchbody partsarethereby"apartof ourselves."In2.27.27, he tells us that
we areignorantof the "nature f thatthinkingthingin us"whichwe taketo be ourselves. He
goes on to say our lack of knowledge aboutthe self includes not knowing if it is "tied to asystem of animalspirits."So the self is the thinkingthing, the body and its partsareunitedto
the self, andthe self is tied to the physiology.The relation of "tiedto" is left unexplained.
any actionmyactionis the consciousnessI have of doing those things.In this
way,whether t be anactof singingordancing,of walkingby theThameswhen
it was frozen,of experimentingwith differenthandsin water,choppingan al-
mond,or whether t is actionssuchasrepayingadebt,honoringparents,helping
others,consciousness formsa self or a person.My attempt o saythefirstgroup
of actionsbelongs to the self while the second belongs to the persondoes notquitefit thetexts,although hereareonly a few passagesthatspeakof the self in
those forensictones usuallyreservedfor person.Keepingin mind the 3.11.16
passagejust cited, we may have some basis for speakingof a continuum rom
man n aphysicalsense,to manas rational perhaps heself ), to moralman(the
person).Each temalongthis linepossesses physicalpowers,powersof thinkingandacting,andmoralpowers.Themature ndividual, heunit of man, self, and
person, s the locusof all thesepowers. Agency is located nthisunit,the manas
agentof thoughtandaction is bothself andperson.
4. Definitionsof Man
Inlocatingthesourceof agencyin the unitof man, self, andperson,Locke
takesaccountof theroleof man(especiallyphysicalman)andperson n action.
Bodily motion andconscious intentionsare oint components n all humanac-
tion.His reference o theparticlesof matterandbody-partsbeingvitallyunited
with, even partsof, the conscious self is an emphaticrecognitionof the dual
involvementof bodyand mind in action.Locke does notgive us anydetailson
how thephysiology of thebody,the systemof animalspirits, s tiedto the self,but he makes use of the physiology in explainingsome sensoryexperiences.Mostoften,he confesses ignoranceof theway in whichsensation s causedby
the body is presumably of a different sort from the vital union of those particles
with the conscious self. "Union" and "partof " are left unanalyzed.
In the 2.27.8 passage Locke identifies the 2.27.6 remark as a definition,
adding that "the Idea in our Minds, of which the Sound Man in our Mouths is
the Sign, is nothing but of an Animal of such a certainForm [i.e., shape]"(2.27.8).When he says that "ingenuous observation puts it past doubt" that the word
"man" is a sign of animal with a specific shape, he seems to be reporting on
common usage among his contemporaries.'3Definition for Locke was not a mat-
ter of giving the genus and differentia. Rather,it is the enumeration of the simple
ideas comprising some complex idea (3.3.10). This is, he thought, the best way
to make "anotherunderstand by Words. what Idea the term defined stands for."
In the example from 2.27.8 the idea of man contains the ideas of animal and a
specific shape. He cites other definitions in 3.3.10, but there is no indication as
to whether he accepts either of them. Notice the way he starts the first definition:
Definition 1: "if it should be said, that Man was a solid extended Sub-
stance, having Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of
Reasoning," the meaning of that word would be understood.
Definition 2: Man is "a rational Animal; which by the several defini-
tions of Animal, Vivens, and Corpus, resolves it self into those enumer-
ated Ideas."
He repeats definition 1 in 3.6.3 with some variation: "Forthough, perhaps, vol-
untary Motion, with Sense and Reason, join'd to a Body of a certain shape, be
the complex Idea, to which I, and others, annex the name Man." The "perhaps"
leaves it open as to Locke's acceptance of this definition. In that passage, he is
concerned to deny that that definition would be, or would give us, the real es-
sence of man. It would only be the nominal essence.4 The same point about
essence is made in 3.11.16, where he cites anotherdefinition of man, one related
to morality: "when we say that Man is subject to Law: We mean nothing by
Man, but a corporeal rational Creature." With this definition in the context ofmoral discourse shape is irrelevant: "For were there a Monkey, or any other
Creature to be found, that had Reason, to such a degree, as to be able to under-
stand general Signs, and to deduce Consequences about general Ideas, he would
no doubt be subject to Law." Section 20 of this same chapter says that if shape
is taken as the mark for "Creatures of our kind," then the definition of man (of
the same man) as an idea "made up of Animalitn and Rationality, united in the
'3 In the seventeenthcentury"ingenuous"was often confused with "ingenious" Oxford
EnglishDictionary);Locke must mean the latter,hence "skillful"or "careful"observationof
whatfeaturesof man do flow from,arecausedby the realessence constitution.
Nevertheless,we canfill in somedetailsof a generalconceptof man,of a human
being.We knowfrom theearlybooks of theEssaythat hephysicalorganism, ven
pre-natally, xperiencessome sensationsof warmthandlight;after birthspe-cific ideas aregraduallyacquired.Thereare no nativeor innate ruthsbut,as we
just saw, thereis a practical nnateprincipleor tendencyto seek pleasureand
avoidpain.Wecanalso saythatdespiteLocke'suse of thewhitesheetorblank
tabletmetaphor, he organismhas a numberof faculties,at least the necessary
equipmentfor the functions of sensation, memory and reason. From Some
Thoughtswe learnthatthe child has, is bornwith, certaintraitswhich parentsand thetutormustacknowledgeand work within leadingthechild to becomea
rational,moralperson.Then from the brief passage in Essay 3.6.3, we know
thatLocke at least entertained he notionof an underlyingstructureprobablycorpuscular)whichcauses some of thesequalitiesor traitsof man.
5.2. RationalCreatures.Besides themanyvirtuescitedby Locke as impor-tantfor the child to acquire,rationality s perhapsof even greater mportance.After his detailedrecommendationson how to develop a strongand healthy
body, "Thenext and principleBusiness is, to set the Mind right, that on all
occasions it maybe disposedto consentto nothingbutwhatmaybe suitable o
theDignityandExcellencyof a rationalCreature."23ockeremarks,we all do
wantto be "thoughtRationalCreatures."24o we must treatchildrenas rational
creatures n order thatthey will come to see the value of rationality.' Lockeexplainsthattreatingchildren hatway involves makingthem"sensibleby the
Mildnessof yourCarriage, ndtheComposure ven inyourCorrection f them,
thatwhatyoudo is reasonablenyou,and usefulandnecessary orthem."26 he
faculty of reason,the operationof reasoning,andbeing rationalall appear n
Locke's definitionsof man andperson.Whetherwe believe physicalmanforLocke includesrationality thechild
has tobecomerational),or whetherwe thinkLockelimitedrationalityo the self
or person, what "flows from" the foundationof man, the innerconstitution,
includes thatproperty.Withthe distinctionhe suggestsin one passagebetweenphysical andmoralman,shape maybe thedefiningfeatureof theformer,ratio-
nality and otherpropertiescharacterize he latter.Whateverpropertiesare in-
cluded nthe definitionof manareonlythose we decideto includeor thatwe find
23Ibid., ?3124 Ibid., ?41. In the first edition of the Essay, Locke refersto "the Idea of ourselves,as
critiqueof RobertFilmer, n the first of Locke's Two Treatises e.g., ??16, 23,
39, 74, 92). Essay 2.12.5 explainsthe complex idea of theftas "theconcealed
changeof the possession of any thing,withoutthe consentof the Proprietor."Section 120 of the second of TwoTreatisesexplainsthatwhen a manincorpo-rateshimself "intoany Commonwealth,he, by his unitinghimself thereunto,
annexedalso, andsubmitsto theCommunity hosePossessions, whichhe has,orshallacquire."Man in thispassageis describedas theproprietor f his land,
his landandpossessions come underthejurisdictionof the governmentof the
of one's self is to havereasonas thecontrolof one'sdesiresandpassions: hat sin partwhat it is to be a rationalcreature.Toearntherightto own one's person,
Locke may be suggesting, I must become a rationalcreature.Perhapsbeingrational s beinga person.Locke'sSomeThoughts s amanual,a setof instruc-
tions forparentsandtutorto follow in moldingthechild into a rational,moral
person,wheremasteryof one's self is thegoal. Locke's Conductof the Under-
standingalso speaksof mastery,of theimportance f gettingmasteryoverone's
understanding ndof one's thoughts.29Whathe says in Some Thoughtsabout
the mind of the child thatis "in tune,and well-disposed" o learning, applies
equally to the child. The goal is "to teach the Mind to get the Masteryoveritself" (?75). Learning o gain"aMasteryoverhis [thechild's] inclinations"s