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Blazing Pelts and Burning Passions: Nationalism,Cultural
Politics, and Spectacular Decommodificationin Tibet
EMILY T. YEH
A few months after the fourteenth Dalai Lama stated at the
Kalachakra InitiationCeremony in India in January 2006 that
Tibetans should cease wearing clothing linedwith endangered animal
skins, Tibetans across the Tibetan Plateau destroyed millionsof
yuan worth of otter, leopard, tiger, and other pelts. Outsiders
interpretations ofthese events have flattened out the complexity of
participants motivations, whichincluded not only religious and
national loyalty, but also concerns about inequalitywrought by
capitalist development, framed through a lens of modern Chinese
history.This paper traces heated debates among Tibetans about the
burnings, including theirimplications for Tibetans global
reputation, the survival of Tibetan culture, and the possi-bility
of a moral economy in an era of deepening commodification. It also
explores theembodied, visual, and performative elements of the
burnings through participantsvideos. The role of local filmmaking
efforts in spreading the burnings makes the accom-panying videos
especially relevant.
ON FEBRUARY 13, 2006, the herders of Tangkor (Wylie: Thang skor)
Township inSichuan Provinces Dzg (Mdzod dge, Ch: Ruoergai) County
gathered togetherto publicly burn what they estimated to be one
million U.S. dollars worth of pelts ofendangered animals, including
tiger, leopard, and otter.1 In an area where average percapita
annual income is officially estimated at roughly 400 U.S. dollars,
these pelts,which were used to decorate Tibetan robes, were in some
cases investments madewith a familys life savings (see figure 1;
see also video 1).2 This was only one of manysuch bonfires across
culturally Tibetan areas of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)in
the spring of 2006.
The burnings were a response to the fourteenth Dalai Lamas
request at the thirtiethKalachakra Initiation Ceremony, held in
Amaravati, India, in January 2006, that Tibetanscease wearing such
pelts. Roughly eight thousand Tibetans from the PRC managed
toattend despite restrictions on cross-border movement, and through
them the news
Emily T. Yeh ([email protected]) is an Associate Professor
of Geography at the University ofColorado-Boulder.1I have spelled
place names with the Tibetan and Himalayan Library simplified Wylie
system,giving the Wylie transcription in parentheses, as well as
Chinese pinyin for prefecture-level unitsand counties for which the
Chinese and Tibetan are dramatically different.2References to
videos refer to online video content (see
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0021911812002227). The unattributed
photo and videos in this article were donated anonymously.
The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 72, No. 2 (May) 2013: 319344.
The Association for Asian Studies, Inc., 2013
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spread and the burnings ensued. Enraged by this evidence of
loyalty to the Dalai Lama,officials arrested organizers of the
burnings and began to force Tibetan governmentemployees to
participate in summer festivals and appear on television
broadcastswearing pelts of animals whose sale in China is illegal.
Chinas accession to the Conven-tion on International Trade in
Endangered Species in 1981 and its 1993 national environ-mental law
banning all domestic trade in tiger parts were enacted in part to
bolster itssovereignty by increasing its international standing
through environmental stewardship.However, when the Dalai Lamas
environmentalist message converged with Chinasown laws, the state
was caught in the contradictions of entanglements of sovereigntyand
environmental stewardship.
Figure 1. Participants in Tangkor lined up with their pelts
beforeburning them.
Video 1. Burning in Tangkor, as participants shout Tashi
Delek!
320 Emily T. Yeh
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Two years after the burnings, in the lead-up to the Beijing
Olympics, the TibetanPlateau witnessed an unprecedented wave of
more than 100 protests. In hindsight, thepelt burnings have been
interpreted as little more than a warm-up for, or harbinger of,the
main nationalist events to come. However, this obscures more than
it reveals; it flattensout the complexity of
participantsmotivations, erases the role of environmental activism
aswell as capitalist development, and is complicit with the states
discursive practices in itsreduction of the fullness of Tibetan
subjectivity to a binary stance on the status of thenation. While I
will explore the important role that loyalty to the Dalai Lama and
nation-alism played in the burnings, I seek to avoid what Michel
Foucault calledde-eventalization, the ascription of a unitary,
inevitable, and self-evident character towhat are in fact
contingent processes. He advocated instead eventalization, a
procedureof analyzing an event according to the multiple processes
which constitute it and requir-ing a rediscovery of the
connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces,
strat-egies and so on that establish what later appears
self-evident (Foucault 1996, 27778).
Based on Tibetan- and Chinese-language interviews conducted
during two monthsof fieldwork across the Amdo and Kham Tibetan
cultural regions as well as the TibetAutonomous Region (TAR) during
the summer of 2006, interviews conducted in Dhar-amsala, India, in
2007, and readings of secondary reports, radio broadcasts, and
Chineseand Tibetan-language blogs, I seek to eventalize the
burnings through a discussion ofthe many debates that took place
among Tibetans, showing that neither the burningsnor how they were
subsequently deployed were self-evident or inevitable. Elsewhere
Ihave argued that transnational environmental advocacy around
saving the wild tigerwas a major impetus for the Dalai Lamas
Kalachakra speech, though one that wasobscured to most Tibetans
(Yeh 2012). Here I focus on the question of why Tibetansburned
their pelts. I examine how the burnings began and spread after the
DalaiLamas speech, and how they were subsequently signified,
contested, and debatedthrough a variety of competing interpretive
frameworks. Rather than conclude that theburnings were definitively
about one issue rather than another, I view them as conjunc-tural,
a contingent coming together of multiple processes, movements,
memories, andforces. These included not just environmentalism and
nationalism, but also contestedregimes of value and commodification
that have intensified in Tibetan areas with theOpen up the West
campaign. I also explore the embodied, emotional, and visual
dimen-sions of the events, suggesting that the performativity of
the burnings contributes to anunderstanding of the burnings as a
struggle over value in the context of state developmentefforts.
Their spectacular nature, combined with the importance of the
circulation oflocal film-making efforts in spreading the burnings
and in capturing how the organizersand participants wished to
represent themselves, make videos an especially relevantcomplement
to the ethnographic material presented through text.
THE KALACHAKRA SPEECH
The fourteenth Dalai Lamas statement about pelt-wearing at the
2006 Kalachakraempowerment ceremony was not the first time he or
other Tibetan Buddhist leadershad taken up this issue. The Dalai
Lama first began to speak and write publicly anddirectly about
environmental protection in the mid-1980s, through linkages
made
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between the Tibetan Government in Exile and transnational
environmental institutions,at a time of the rise of global
discourses of indigeneity, traditional ecological knowledge,and the
relationship between religion and environment (Huber 1997, 2001).
However,pelts did not become a major concern until the early 2000s,
when transnational conserva-tion organizations identified Tibetan
consumption of pelts as the major new obstacle tothe survival of
the wild tiger. In particular, the new emphasis on tourism and the
commo-dification of Tibetan culture as a strategy for development
that accompanied ChinasOpen up the West campaign had significant
implications for tigers, and the otters andleopards whose pelts
generally accompanied those of tigers in illicit trade routes(Cooke
2003; Kols 2007; Oakes 2007). The Open up the West campaign
coincidedwith new representations of Tibetans within China as
simple and spiritual, and ofTibetan areas as being romantic
utopias, paradises where Han Chinese tourists couldseek natural
beauty and exotic culture.
County and prefectural governments in Tibetan areas began to
organize horse-racingfestivals at which participants were asked to
come decked out in specific quantities ofcoral necklaces and
pelt-lined chubas (phyu pa; Tibetan robes), which became part ofthe
exotic image sold to tourists. Borrowing was necessary, as no
single family ownedas much as was typically worn on such occasions.
This became standard at events suchas the Khampa Arts festival, the
first of which was held in Zhongdian (Rgyal thang, sub-sequently
renamed Shangri-la) in 1997, and at which counties in the Tibetan
culturalregion of Kham, spread across four provinces, competed to
show off their wealth anddevelopment status through the hyperbolic
display of jewelry and pelts on the bodiesof their Tibetan
participants, often so much that participants had trouble
walkingunder their weight (Kols 2007, 95; see video 2). The late
1990s also saw an explosion
Video 2. Participants of the fourth Khampa Arts festival, Kardz
Pre-fecture, in 2004, heavily adorned with jewelry and pelts. Clip
fromMeili Ganzi (Enchanting Ganzi), Sichuan Publishing Group.
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of Tibetan music DVDs in which popular Tibetan singers began to
don outfits with ever-wider pelt trims. These new fashions,
together with the deepening of market reforms andthe rising
availability of cash, particularly from sales of caterpillar
fungus, fueled competi-tive pressures to purchase ever more and
larger pelts. They became requisite features ofweddings, summer
festivals, and the New Year.
Transnational conservation groups on both sides of the Himalayas
noticed this surgein poached tigers and leopards displayed upon
Tibetan bodies (Yeh 2012). Undercoverinvestigations in Tibet
produced material for news conferences and media coverage inIndia,
leading Indian politician and environmentalist Maneka Gandhi to
call for throwingall Tibetans out of India. This generated
considerable concern among Tibetan exiles,dependent as refugees and
noncitizens upon the goodwill of the Indian governmentand its
citizens. In October 2005, the Dalai Lama gave a speech at the
Tibetan ChildrensVillage stating that he had seen photos of such
pelts being worn in Tibet: To be honest, Iam embarrassed! Real
ornaments should be the knowledge and wisdom one possessesinside,
not what one wears.
The Dalai Lamas speech at the Kalachakra several months later
was very similar toseveral previous ones, with two exceptions.
First, many of his remarks were directedspecifically at the
Tibetans from the PRC, mostly Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan,
whomanaged to attend despite restrictions on passports. Second, the
message was deliveredwith unprecedented strength:
As I get older, if Tibetans behavior continues to worsen, then I
sometimes feelthat it makes no difference if I continue to stay any
longer. If the personality,behavior and reputation of Tibetans
continue to worsen, then I have no confi-dence in my rebirth and
whether it will be of any use. I am not being boastful;this is what
I truly feel sometimes.
Tibetans in the audience wept as they heard this, as did those
who watched videos of thespeech later. Their emotional outpouring
was a reaction to his calling into question notonly how much longer
he would remain alive, but also the very possibility of future
rein-carnations of the Dalai Lamamanifestation of Avalokitesvara,
bodhisattva of com-passion, patron and protector of the land of
Tibetand thus their connection to thehistorical past and to a
symbol of the Tibetan nation itself. The disgrace of wearingpelts,
he suggested, jeopardized all of these.
The Dalai Lama also made more lighthearted but still pointed
references to nationalidentity:
[In addition to wearing pelts] there are some who show off their
wealth bywearing two or three large gold rings on their fingers.
Its to the point wherethey cannot even bend their fingers to knead
their own tsampa.
Tsampa, roasted barley flour typically mixed with yak butter and
tea and kneaded intoballs of dough, is the Tibetan staple, and a
potent marker of Tibetan-ness, sharedacross regions of the Tibetan
Plateau with vastly different dialects, livelihoods, dress,
reli-gious schools, calendars, and histories of political rule.
Indeed, tsampa-eaters is asynonym for Tibetans and the phrase
calling all tsampa-eaters has been used to
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mobilize Tibetans in protest against Chinese rule from 1959
through the demonstrationsof 2008 (Barnett 1994; Shakya 1993). In
not so many words, then, the Dalai Lama calledthe wearing of pelts
and large rings un-Tibetan, acts that reject rather than reinforce
aTibetan national identity.
Intertwined with this message about Tibetans potential
forfeiting of their nationalidentities was a strong focus on the
reputation of Tibetans. Labeling their jewelry and pelt-wearing a
disgrace, the Dalai Lama stated, You should tell them in Tibet that
because offoolish activities such as the craving for ostentatious
jewelry and the making of garmentsout of carnivore pelts, the
collective Tibetan reputation is being ruined, and the DalaiLama is
ashamed. This concern about Tibetans collective reputation is acute
for exilesgiven their precarious positions as noncitizens of India.
The global reputation of Tibetanswith regard to environmental
protection has also been a key component of the struggleover the
legitimacy of Chinese rule in Tibet. At the same time, the
reputation of Tibetansis also very relevant to Tibetans inside
Tibet, struggling with their constant positioning atthe bottom of
the ethnic hierarchy in the family of nationalities (minzu).
BACK ACROSS THE HIMALAYAS
The Dalai Lamas message spread very quickly, as Kalachakra
participants called andreturned home, bringing with them DVDs and
audio tapes of the event, as well asenvironmental flyers and
posters that were passed out by conservation NGOs there. Tibe-tans
also heard the news through Voice of America and Radio Free Asia.
The firstreported burnings took place on January 31, in Kardz (Dkar
mdzes) and Tawu (Rtau)Counties in Kardz (Dkar mdzes; Ch: Ganzi)
Prefecture.
A week later, another burning took place in the Amdo county of
Repkong (Reb kong),Qinghai, begun by a prominent local businessman
who had attended the Kalachakra. Thesame day as the Dalai Lamas
speech, he arrived at a tent where a Tibetan
environmentalorganization had been passing out posters and
encouraging participants to take oaths tostop wearing pelts. Along
with about 3,000 others, he took the oath. He also stated inpublic,
I have 40,000-some renminbi worth of otter pelts, and I swear that
I will burnthem as soon as I get home. Arriving back in Repkong on
February 6, he discussedhis plans with his family late into the
night. The following morning, he brought 48,000renminbi worth of
his familys otter pelts, most of which he had purchased just
theyear before, to the courtyard of Rongwu Monastery. After
speaking briefly about hisreasons to the crowd that had gathered,
he burned his pelts. Three families joined in,and the spectators
donated 7,000 renminbi in support, which they used to
purchasebutter lamps to light around the monastery for the lives of
the animals that had beenkilled for their pelts. A much larger
burning was planned for six days later, but thelocal government
banned the event; some families subsequently burned their pelts,but
in private.
News about the Repkong burning spread quickly by word of mouth
as well asthrough a number of Internet sites, including Tibetan
writer Woesers blog,3 where an
3Woeser is a high-profile Tibetan poet who writes in Chinese,
and whose book, Notes on Tibet, wasbanned because it praises the
Dalai Lama as a religious leader. Fired from her government job
as
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active discussion about this and other burning incidents ensued.
Among those who heardabout the Repkong burnings were eight young
Tibetan men in Ngawa (Rnga ba; Ch: Aba)County, Sichuan, all local
intellectuals, including a doctor, a teacher, and two
herders.Deciding that they too should do something, they debated
amongst themselveswhether to simply burn their own pelts in private
or to make an impression in public.Settling on the latter, they
chose the most heavily attended day of the MonlamChenmo festival at
Kirti Monastery, so that their actions would have a larger impacton
those who might witness them. To prepare, they downloaded relevant
Chineseenvironmental protection laws and wildlife photographs from
the Internet. On theflyers announcing the burnings, they wrote,
Protection of the environment and wildlifeis the responsibility of
all in the Peoples Republic of China. The imbalance of the
eco-system brings about a sense of fear and insecurity to mankind
(Tibet Info Net 2006a).
The film that a ninth man produced about the Ngawa burnings (see
video 3) beginswith shots of the posters made by the eight, such as
a photo of a forlorn tiger cub crying,Mother! Mother! Whose body is
your skin ornamenting? These images of anthropo-morphized, tragic
megafauna, not unfamiliar from globally circulating idioms of
environ-mental protection, are followed by shots of the framed PRC
wildlife protection law, theannouncement in Tibetan about the need
for environmental protection and the plans forthe bonfire, and then
pelts hung from a rope strung along the side of Kirti Monastery,
on
Video 3. Beginning of the 18-minute video produced by organizers
inNgawa.
editor of the official journal of the Literature Association of
the TAR, she now lives in Beijing.Woeser continued to write in a
dissident voice on multiple blogs, which were shut down in
succes-sion. She now writes on a blog hosted outside China. She is
frequently under house arrest alongwith her husband, Wang Lixiong,
and her blog serves as a prominent source of information forwhat is
happening inside Tibet.
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display before burning. The rest of the video, which was widely
distributed, features thecrowd looking on and cheering as a pyre is
built, the fire lit, and leopard, otter, and otherpelts offered and
burned (see video 4). Afterward, the organizers were arrested
anddetained for fifteen days.
A number of herders from nearby Tangkor Township attended the
Monlam festivalin Ngawa. The organizers there, who learned about
the Dalai Lamas speech and theRepkong burning from the Internet and
phone calls, initially faced some skepticismfrom other villagers
about whether these were just rumors. Villagers witnessing of
andparticipation in the Ngawa event overcame their doubts and
encouraged many ofthem to burn their pelts in Tangkor two days
later. A few days prior to the date theychose, the organizers had
also begun to wear leopard skin trims, draped around theirbacks,
around the township as a way to publicize their plan. They received
permissionfrom the local monastery to hold the event just outside
its courtyard, where manypeople would be gathered for the Monlam
festival. The magnitude of the burning farexceeded the expectations
of the organizers, who had earlier considered burning theirown
pelts in private because they feared others would not
participate.
Several monks from Tangkor who were studying at Ts (Gtsos, Ch:
Hezuo) Monas-tery in Gansu had come home for the Monlam festival.
They brought images back to Ts,which was subsequently the site of
one of the biggest burning events on the Plateau,lasting four to
seven days according to different accounts (see videos 5 and 6).
Again,the photographs and videos from Tangkor helped convince many
to participate.Among the organizers and key participants in Ts were
monks, including monasticleaders, and local government cadres.
Participants estimated the market value of peltsburned within the
first two days at over two million U.S. dollars (Tibet Info Net
2006b).
Video 4. The crowd watching and participating in burning in
Ngawa.
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Burnings were not confined to Amdo. Several events were reported
in Lhasa, andmany in Kham, including parts of Nakchu (Nag chu; Ch:
Naqu), TAR, and Kardz Pre-fecture in Sichuan. One of the larger
burnings in Kardz took place in Litang (Li thang)County, where the
annual horse-racing festivals had previously been occasions of some
ofthe most extravagant pelt displays on the Tibetan Plateau. It was
also the site of a 2005
Video 5. Piling on pelts about to be burned in Ts.
Video 6. Men lining up to burn leopard pelts in Ts.
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undercover investigation by the London-based Environmental
Investigation Agency,photos and videos from which were subsequently
used in publicity campaigns andshown to the Dalai Lama prior to the
Kalachakra. One image displayed a young manwearing an almost
complete tiger pelt that his father, a wealthy caterpillar fungus
busi-nessman, had purchased for about 10,000 U.S. dollars. When, at
the Kalachakra, hisfather saw the photograph of his son featured on
a poster connecting the pelts to thedemise of the tiger, he felt
deeply embarrassed and called home saying, That peltmust be burnt!
Their family was the first to burn in their village, where
residentsburned ivory and coral jewelry alongside pelts. As with
Ngawa, the organizers focusedon the bonfire as an act of
environmental protection, in accordance with PRC laws.
PERFORMING SPECTACULAR SPACES OF SURPLUS
The burnings were spectacles. As I discuss below, their
spectacularity was crucial toparticipants efforts to destroy the
commodity-nature of the pelts. The visual character ofthese events
was reinforced by their widespread capture in still photographs and
digitalvideo, generally by the participants themselves. Their films
were part of a broader trendsince the late 1990s of Tibetans
producing home and civic videos both for their own con-sumption and
to circulate for a wider global audience (Barnett 2010). Though
many ofthese efforts produced only raw footage, often of poor
quality (see video 5), otherswere set to music and edited to
present a clear message (see, e.g., video 3). Some whofilmed
described their desire to show the world through their videos that
Tibetanswere no longer so backwards in their environmental
consciousness compared to otherethnic groups, and to serve as an
inspiration for other Tibetans. Others sought to gettheir videos
delivered to the Dalai Lama, to present evidence that Tibetans
stillheeded his teachings.
In addition to being dramatic, visual events, the burnings were
also bodily perform-ances. Given an understanding of space not
simply as a container in which social actionunfolds but rather as
produced through specific performances, what kinds of uniquespaces
did the burnings bring into being (cf. Gregson and Rose 2000, 441)?
First, thespaces were characterized by the privileging of the
(male) embodiment of pelts.Women, for the most part, watched and
tore small trims off of their chubas, but didnot make a dramatic
show of the burnings (see video 7). Men, on the other hand,
spec-tacularly exhibited the pelts upon their bodies before
sacrificing them.4 In Ts, rows ofmen stood in the public square,
wearing their fox hats, with otter and wide leopardpelts draped
upon and encircling their bodies; some were adorned with pelts
literallyfrom head to toe (see video 8). They stood for significant
periods of time, the centerof attention as they modeled the
soon-to-be-burned pelts, before swaggering forwardslowly to the
flames. In Litang, men lined up to approach the bonfire (see video
9). At
4An analysis of the noticeably gendered aspects of the burnings
is beyond the scope of this paper.Not only was the wearing of pelts
gendered (otter pelts were worn by both men and women, buttiger and
leopard pelts generally only by men), but so too were the spaces
performatively producedin the process of burning, as women sat
demurely on the sidelines while men strutted and displayedthe
pelts.
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each mans turn, he carefully unfolded and threw his pelts into
the flames, sometimes in along, graceful arc that seemed to suspend
the skins momentarily in mid-air, so that allgathered could witness
his sacrificial moment. Cheers and claps followed each turn,and
afterwards, monks on the other side of the pyre presented each man
with a ceremo-nial scarf.
Furthermore, these were emotionally charged spaces, made so in
part through spec-tacle and the multiple layers of meaning read
into the events. As Tolia-Kelly (2006, 215)remarks, collectivities
of affect are engendered, shaped and empowered through visualand
social registers. In Tangkor, a cacophony of whoops and cheers
preceded the
Video 7. Women in Tangkor tearing off pelt trims.
Video 8. Men displaying pelts on their bodies before
burning.
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burning, as participants sat and stood in rows displaying their
pelts and chubas, andcalling out Chod! or Offering! (see video 10).
After the fire had been going for awhile, several monks led the
crowd in pumping their fists in the air, shouting againand again
Tashi Delek!a phrase connoting auspiciousness and joy (see video
1). InTs (see videos 5 and 6), a gargantuan pile of pelts formed as
participants threw their
Video 9. Men burning pelts and receiving scarves in Litang.
Video 10. Participants in Tangkor shouting Offering!
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contributions onto the pyre as they yelled and whooped, while
firecrackers were set offand lungta (confetti-like pieces of
colored paper inscribed with prayers) rained down,creating spaces
suffused with emotion, not as the property or possession of single
individ-uals, but rather as a relational force, the fulfillment of
each participants capacity to bothaffect and be affected (Deleuze
1988; Pile 2010; Tolia-Kelly 2006). Participants laterdescribed the
events with phrases such as the happiest day of my life, as they
recalledthe surfeit of feeling that their embodied performances
brought into being. As one put it,I was so happyI felt the power of
Tibet. Everyone was united. Far from disembo-died, transparent
space, as public spaces are often conceptualized (Longhurst
2000,455), these were embodied and suffused with a conviction for
their participant-producers, however fleeting, of Tibetan community
and unity.
ALTERNATIVE FRAMINGS AND ORIENTATIONS
The euphoric spaces and embodied emotions produced in the events
did not, however,indicate agreement on the essence of the act of
burning. The herders, farmers, business-men, students, monks, and
intellectuals who participated inscribed a diverse set of mean-ings
and motivations to the bonfires. The rationales they offered and
the debates thatensued show that, even as the burnings would not
have happened without the DalaiLamas speech, neither would they
have happened in the absence of a convergence ofother processes,
conditions, and pressures. Furthermore, though the rejection of
peltsoccurred expansively across cultural Tibet, it was not
universal. Both the presence orabsence of burnings and the fierce
debates about them in their aftermath reveal schismswithin Tibetan
society and the complex cultural politics of contemporary
Tibetan-ness.
Religious and National Loyalty
Loyalty to the fourteenth Dalai Lama first and foremost as a
religious leader but alsoas a form of national loyalty was a key
motivation for most if not all Tibetans who chose toburn their
pelts. His questioning of his continuation on this earth in both
this and futurelifetimes had a potent impact. As a participant from
Repkong put it, We [Tibetans] aresaying, even though we cannot see
you [the Dalai Lama], we are waiting for yourcommand. A monk from
Tangkor who helped organize the burnings there describedhis
reaction, in Tibetan, after watching a video of the Kalachakra
speech:
It made a big impression on our feelings, because if the worlds
sun [i.e., theDalai Lama] disappears, then everything will be
plunged into darkness. If Bod-hisattva is not here, the world would
experience a huge loss. I thought,whether or not I am capable, I
need to do something.
Another lay participant stated, also in Tibetan:
I was so excited, I couldnt control myself. I shouted, May He
live 10,000years! I had to shout this a few times before people
started to chant withme. Of course, I didnt actually mention his
name, but everyone knew who Imeant. I just couldnt control myself
[despite the danger].
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That religious loyalty to the fourteenth Dalai Lama was a key
motivation for theburnings is also evident given the places where
Tibetans did not burn, and where ordinaryvillagers (not just
cadres) continued to wear pelts several years after the events
despitethe widespread taboos that had developed around them. No
Bnpo villages inNakchu, in the northern TAR, burned their pelts
though Buddhist villages did.Indeed, one young Bnpo man in Nyenrong
(Gnyan rong) County who reportedbuying new leopard skins in 2008
after their prices had dropped drastically because ofthe burnings
stated, The Buddhists burned their pelts and now their fortune is
gone;now it is the Bnpos turn to build up their wealth, which we
can do because we havethe best caterpillar fungus-harvesting areas
[which provides substantial income].5
Another exception that confirms the importance of religious
loyalty is Drit (Bristod), a remote and very sparsely populated
pastoral county on the upper reaches ofthe Yangtze River in
Qinghai. Gongsar Monastery, the only monastery throughout theentire
county of more than 80,000 square kilometers, is a center for the
worship ofDorje Shukden, the Geluk protector deity that has been at
the center of an intense con-troversy since the 1990s, when the
Dalai Lama spoke out forcefully against its worship(see Dreyfus
1999; Lopez 1998). In the diaspora, those who continue this
practicehave been ostracized and labeled a cult; they in turn have
accused the Dalai Lama of vio-lating human rights and religious
freedom. Within China, Shukden worshippers arelooked upon askance
by most Tibetans, but have been supported by the Chinese
govern-ment (Hillman 2005). This creates quandaries for its
worshippers. In 2011, I was told by ayoung driver in Drit who
propitiated Shukden that I could offer no proof that the DalaiLama
had ever said not to wear pelts. He told me, All Tibetans like the
Dalai Lama. TheDalai Lama is a king, so of course he would never
say such a thing. Those who say so arelying.His odd stance
attempted to uphold a kind of national identity of Tibetans
throughthe Dalai Lama, while rejecting his religious teachings by
denying their existence.
Equality
Even among those who burned their pelts, a wide variety of
motivations and mean-ings far exceeded both the original message in
the Dalai Lamas speech and the interpret-ations ascribed by
observers. Among the most important of these was the argument
thatdestroying the pelts was necessary for creating greater social
harmony and reducingvisible signs of jealousy due to wealth
differentiation that had been growing with the dee-pening of
economic reforms. The Repkong businessman who played the pivotal
rolethere emphasized that his primary motivation was to eliminate
the social difficultiesengendered by the wearing of pelts. He
argued that social pressure to display ever-largerpelts on chubas
during festival occasions was causing tremendous rivalry among
andwithin families, and that the annual Lrol festival had become a
scene of constant evalu-ation: who was wearing what, and who had
borrowed what from whom? These competi-tive pressures were leading,
he argued, not only to jealousy within families but also
toprocesses of indebtedness, as poorer families began to perform
extra labor for wealthierones so that they could borrow a pelt or
jewelry to wear. Villagers were increasingly
5Thanks to Yonten Nyima for this interview quote.
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making decisions to spend meager incomes on pelts rather than
agricultural inputs inorder to avoid the embarrassment of pelt-free
outfits at festival time.
Many attendees of summer horse-racing festivals in 2006 told me
that it was moreenjoyable than in the past because now everybody is
wearing the same kind of outfit.Now there is no difference between
rich and poor people. Everyone is equal now.Numerous participants
framed the pelt burnings as an action that helped close the
gapbetween rich and poor, and contributed to poverty alleviation by
relieving social pressureupon poorer families. When I asked about
the benefits of the burnings, one herderreplied, First, the animals
that are in danger of going extinct can now recover.Second,
Tibetans have very little money, but spend all of it borrowing
money to buypelts for weddings and so forth. Even poor families had
to do this. Its good that wedont have to do this anymore.
In other words, for many participants, the burnings encapsulated
a critique of dee-pening inequality from a perspective congruent
with socialist ideologies of egalitarianism.Starting in 2005,
Chinese leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao began to break from
thegrowth at all costsmodel of economic development, calling
instead for the constructionof a harmonious society and a new
socialist countryside to address growing inequal-ities and rural
welfare. The aims of many of the pelt-burning participants
werewell-aligned with these goals. Indeed, one monk-organizer
sought to convince othersto participate in the burnings by saying
to them:
Many Tibetans do not eat well. Our arms and legs hurt; our backs
are bent-over. But instead of using our money to address this
[through medical treat-ment] we use it on pelts. What do you think,
is this good or bad? If we giveup wearing these, we could use the
money to send our children to school, orto go to the hospital when
we need to.6
Despite the convergence of Tibetan desires with the stated aims
of Hu Jintaos scientificdevelopment, however, Tibetans
understandings of their own actions as motivated by adesire for
greater social harmony and equality in the context of deepening
capitalistrelations were roundly ignored or rejected by state
officials because of the associationof the burnings with the Dalai
Lama.
National-Historical Orientation
Like Chinese officials, Tibetan exiles and observers read the
burnings as definitiveproof of Tibetans orientation toward the
diaspora. However, some Tibetans in thePRC interpreted and framed
their own actions through references to Chinese, ratherthan Tibetan
or Indian, history and culture, revealing the complexities of
Tibetan subjec-tivity in the PRC.7 Responding to critics who
suggested that the pelts should have beenplaced in a museum rather
than burned, Pema, an intellectual and one of the eight
6This argument is in line with teachings by Tsultrim Lodr. As I
discuss in Yeh (2012), the DalaiLamas teaching was similar to those
of some Tibetan Buddhist leaders, especially from theLarung
Buddhist Academy in Sertar (Gser thar), before 2006.7For example, I
never came across any references, either in interviews or blog
posts, to Gandhisbonfire of foreign cloth as an inspiration or
comparison.
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organizers arrested in Ngawa, argued to me, in a conversation
that mixed Tibetan andChinese:8
I say no. Human memory is a museum. Some things which are put in
a build-ing are forgotten. Some things that are not memorialized in
this way will never-theless always be remembered. For example, Lu
Xun. The Lu Xun Museum isnot important, not one bit. The reason he
lives on in the hearts of the Hanpeopleindeed, the reason he lives
on in my heart, is because of humanmemory.
Pemas references to Lu Xun, the most influential writer of
Chinas May Fourth move-ment, are integral to his interpretation of
the pelt-burning movement in terms ofmodern Chinese history. He
argued that calling it the incident of pelt-burning was amistake,
obscuring the true meaning of the event. Pelts themselves were not
important,he said. Rather, it was a cultural movement. It is just
like the Han minzus May Fourthmovement.9 It is a cultural movement
of Tibetans in contemporary times. In associatingthe burnings with
the famous 1919 Chinese movement, Pema implied that they were nota
blind following of a traditional religious leader, but rather a
nationalist and anti-imperialist Tibetan awakening to science,
democracy, and modernity.
Pema also unapologetically aligned his views with those of
Zhokdung (Zhogs dung),the widely known, radical modernist Amdo
intellectual who was very controversial at thetime for arguing that
Tibetans needed to modernize and abandon many elements of
tra-ditional culture, customs, and values in order to overcome
their dejected state. Zhokdunghad also written about environmental
protection prior to the Dalai Lamas speech, andPema credited his
own knowledge and original inspiration to protect the environmenta
key element of the public presentation of the burnings in Ngawa
(see video 3)to Zhok-dungs works. Zhokdung was highly unpopular
with bothmonks and lay Tibetans, who ofteninterpreted his writings
as calling for a complete eradication of Tibetan language
andculture (Hartley 2002). For example, in his controversial
article Blood-letting That WillOvercome the Tumor of Ignorance:
Against the Old Decaying Propensities, publishedin an official 1999
volume commemorating the centenary of Lu Xuns death,
Zhokdungargued:
We have no choice but to stubbornly destroy and discard our old
propensities.The ancient religion of worldly deities the [Buddhist]
teachings of no-self andkarmasuch views are the old propensities
about which we are talking.(Hartley 2002, 19)
Indeed, many saw him, at least until his arrest in 2010, as
following official Chinese Com-munist Party (CCP) lines.10
Residents of Ngawa were similarly wary of Pemas views.Calling them
Zhokdungwa (followers of Zhokdung), they argued that Pema and
his
8All interviewees names are pseudonyms.9The Chinese term minzu
(Tibetan: mi rigs) translates very loosely as nationality or ethnic
group;Pema used the term in both languages.10On his arrest see Kyi
(2010).
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co-organizer friends knew little about Buddhism. Yet they were
the ones who successfullyorganized a very large burning at Kirti
Monastery, showing how very different subject-positions came
together contingently and collaboratively.
Despite its apparent opposition to traditional culture, Pemas
stance was clearly res-onant with that of the fourteenth Dalai
Lamas Kalachakra speech in its strong concernfor Tibetans global
reputation. Noting that Tibetan areas were now the worldsprimary
sites of tiger, leopard, and otter consumption, Pema stated:
If we say something that doesnt sound good about Tibetansand I
say this as aTibetanthen [if we compare the earth to a body]
Tibetans are just like blood-sucking parasites on a person. They
suck away that thing which has the mostvalue, the most
nutrition.
Like the Dalai Lama, he was sharply critical of Tibetans.
However, his critique wasframed in terms and analogies most
familiar within a Chinese social context:
On this, Tibetans are profoundly ugly. This is my own analysis
of my ownminzu, like a doctor putting a patient on an operating
table. Its difficult forme to bear, but one must accept the
reality. The only hope is to let thewhole world see that the minzu
that sits on the roof of the world is one that isgoing upward, one
that once criticized will reform itself.
Pemas remarks about the ugly Tibetan echo Taiwan-based
intellectual Bo Yangs([1985] 1992) well-known polemic on Chinese
national character, as the uglyChinese, which was published in the
PRC in 1986. Pema critiques Tibetans as aminzu, a classificatory
category that makes sense only within the context of the PRC.He
poses his criticisms from a stance of standing apart from Tibetans
as a group, dissect-ing their faults as an impartial scientific
observer, a surgeon. The vision is a radical mod-ernist one, not
unlike Zhokdungs. His reading of the pelt burnings as a new May
Fourthmovement also suggests a great sense of hope that a new
Tibetan political consciousnesscan develop. Thus, he presents a
narrative of the burnings that is nationalist, in the senseof a
deep pride in Tibetan national identity, but not religious, and not
of unquestioningloyalty derived from tradition. This narrative is
informed by and steeped in references toa specifically Chinese
cultural history, rather than being oriented toward India or
thedominant narratives and ideologies of Tibetans in exile.
WHY BURN? THE DEBATE OVER CULTURE
Tibetans who burned their pelts in 2006 thus brought with them
variegated under-standings of why it was important, or necessary,
to destroy that for which they had (inmany cases, recently) paid so
dearly. Exigencies of environmentalism, national identity,religious
loyalty, and social inequality came together contingently in the
event of theburnings, and just as quickly, broke apart. Even as
burnings were ongoing, newdebates emerged about what they meant,
and whether or not they should have happened.One of the most
prominent was an argument about whether Tibetans were
destroying
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their own culture, and the related question of whether the pelts
should have beenburned, or instead put in a museum or simply not
worn.
The extent to which the wearing of tiger, leopard, and other
pelts was an importantmarker of Tibetan culture was a major
flashpoint for this dispute among Tibetans (aswell as between
participants and state authorities). The outlines of the broad
historyare generally accepted. During the Tibetan Imperial period
of the 600s700s CE,tiger pelts were presented to war heroes after
victories in major battles. Leopard pelts,not as prestigious, were
a secondary award (Dawa 2004). However, these traditionswere
limited to parts of Kham, and ordinary people who could not afford
such luxuriesdid not wear tiger, leopard, and otter (though fox
hats were more common). As aresult, many Tibetans, particularly in
Amdo where such pelts were not traditional,expressed outrage after
2006 when the government began to insist that television
broad-casters and ordinary citizens wear pelts in order to preserve
traditional Tibetan culture.
At the same time, though, some Tibetans insisted that the
burning of pelts was devastat-ing to Tibetan culture. For them the
pelts are Tibetan culture, and thus by burning
them,Tibetansweredestroying their ownheritage.As discussed
above,manyparticipants expressedrelief and satisfaction at the
elimination of the compulsion to wear pelt-lined outfits
athorse-racing festivals and thus of competitive pressure and
jealousy. However, althoughmany festival-goers replaced their
pelt-lined chubas with beautiful brocades, many others,particularly
men, came to the festivals wearing jeans and button-down shirts.
Thus someargued that the burning of pelts accelerated the demise of
Tibetan cultural identity.
One cadre in Jyekundo, Yulshul (Ch: Yushu) Prefecture, Qinghai,
articulated thisposition very strongly to me at the horse-racing
festival there in 2006. Unlike Amdoand parts of Central Tibet, this
Kham area had a strong historical tradition of wearingpelts. It is
also one of the few major places of Shukden worship, and has a
long-standingreputation of leaning more favorably toward China and
the CCP than areas such as Lhasaor Kardz. The cadre defended the
wearing of pelts by asking rhetorically, in Chinese,Who doesnt like
their own minzus traditions and costumes? In a mirror image ofPema
from Ngawa, this cadre combined a spirited defense of Tibetan
tradition with anincisive critique of contemporary Tibetans: in a
few years time, Tibetans would assuredlybe spending yet more
hard-earned money to buy and wear pelts because, as they say,
weTibetans have no brains. Thus, he said, Tibetans could not hold
firm in their resolveagainst the irresistible pull of the beauty of
traditional outfits for long. Parroting officialdiscourse, he also
praised the CCP, arguing that its benevolence is what had allowed
somany Tibetans to be able to afford to wear peltsunlike in the
past when only elites andwar heroes could do so. In other words, it
is thanks to the CCP that Tibetans can fullyexpress and participate
in their own culture. Yet even as he seemed to simply mimethe
official narrative, he also departed from the most important issue
in state andparty discourse by refusing to criticize the fourteenth
Dalai Lama. Instead, like thosein Drit, he claimed not only that
the Dalai Lama had not asked Tibetans to burntheir pelts, but also
that the Dalai Lama said that Tibetans are crazy for burning
theirpelts and destroying things of value. That is, he attempted to
stake out a position inwhich loyalty to the Dalai Lama was
perfectly congruent with the ideology of the CCPand with the
defense of Tibetan cultural traditionrejecting in his own creative
waythe demands of both the Chinese party-state (to disavow the
Dalai Lama) and the Tibe-tans who burned their pelts (to renounce
what he viewed as Tibetan culture).
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The debate about Tibetan culture raged online as well, where the
act of burning wasoften associated with the Cultural Revolution.
The following entries are taken fromdifferent contributors to
Woesers Chinese-language blog in February and March2006, where many
observed (correctly) that the Dalai Lama had never mentionedburning
the pelts, and suggested that while the pelts should not be worn,
neithershould they be violently destroyed:11
Since some people agree with such extreme actions [as burning]
and others evencrush their agate jewelry, let me bring up another
suggestion: Lets erase ourown history. Lets bring out all people
who have participated in the killing ofendangered animals and put
big hats on them, parade them in public.Doesnt it sound cool? There
are thousands of years of history of Tibetanswearing pelts. This is
our minzu culture, so why are we denying it all, changingit into a
sin? Is it necessary to burn, destroy, and deny all that
history?
Such savage actions as burninghow is that different from burning
culturalrelics to destroy the Four Olds during the Cultural
Revolution?
Im an ordinary Tibetan. I agree that Tibetans should not wear
these pelts but Idont agree with burning. During [Tibetan emperor]
Songtsen Gampos time,Tibetans had magnificent architectural
technology, but everything was burnedduring the Cultural Revolution
and cannot be recovered. Its the same now.[We should] put them in
museums.
For these contributors, the spectacular destruction of the pelts
by fire amounted to asecond Cultural Revolution, a furious wave of
destruction that Tibetans were unleashingupon themselves. Like
those who burned their pelts, those who objected saw their
pos-ition as one that promoted Tibetan cultural and national
identity, but for them, havingclothing that distinguished them from
the Han was of paramount importance. Their fre-quent appeals to the
Cultural Revolution index not only the importance of modernChinese
history as an interpretive anchor for contemporary Tibetan
intellectuals, butalso how fraught the terrain of culture has
become. Some contributors also suggestedthat the violence of
burning would run against the global reputation of Tibetans as
beingof a peaceful and intelligent nature and further that the act
of burning did not matchthe Dalai Lamas orientation toward
nonviolence. In this view, burning was aligned notwith the Dalai
Lama, but with the Cultural Revolution as the apotheosis of a
long-standing process of the destruction of Tibetan culture.
Echoing concerns about the reputation and shame of Tibetans as a
people, a numberof commentators suggested that the pelts should
have been put in museums, as a lessonfor future generations and
others around the world, a reminder that Tibetans had onceworn
these pelts to show off their wealth, and more importantly, that
they had now cometo see the error of their ways. Other critics
suggested that the pelts should be donated to
11Though both forums for Tibetan debate, Chinese-language blogs
such as Woesers tended toattract comments that were more critical
of the burnings than Tibetan-language blogs.
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monasteries, in the manner that guns and knives have
traditionally been offered as a sym-bolic gesture of regret and an
oath for the donor to never use such implements again.
Defenders of the burnings, however, argued that it would be too
dangerous becauseTibetans short memory would soon lead to their
wearing of pelts again, defying thefourteenth Dalai Lama and
resulting in the extinction of wild animals. Like the cadrein
Yulshul who cynically predicted that Tibetans would start buying
and wearing peltsagain in a few short years, their position was
anchored in a strong, modernist self-critiqueof Tibetans. However,
the solution for them was to destroy the pelts so that the
tempta-tion would be removed for good. A similar debate played out
over the wearing of syn-thetic pelts. Some felt this was a perfect
solution, obviating the further killing of wildanimals while
allowing Tibetans to perform their unique cultural identity
throughbodily adornment, while others feared that this would be a
slippery slope back towardthe consumption of real pelts.
SPECTACULAR DECOMMODIFICATION AND REGIMES OF VALUE
Aside from culture, the other major point of contention was over
whether burninghad been a terrible waste of money and valuable
resources. As one online commentatoron Woesers blog put it, They
didnt steal, they didnt rob. They earned the pelts throughtheir
hard work, through a lifetime of labor. Why burn? They could just
not wearthem. Another argued, I think its really too much of a
waste to burn them. Whycant we exchange them for money? We can
donate that money to temples or keep itfor our families. We have
already spent money on the pelts, why do we want to endup with
nothing? A third asked, If we really need to sacrifice personal
benefit for theenvironment, then why cant we donate our pelts to
bring warmth to poor people?
Those in favor of the burnings invoked several rationales to
rebut these critiques.First, they argued that the spectacle of the
burnings was necessary to motivate otherTibetans. Only witnessing
something so visually dramatic could affect and move manyTibetans.
Indeed, those who initiated burnings invoked this logic of the
spectacle. Theintellectuals in Ngawa decided to make a statement in
public to make an impressionand offer a lesson to observers. The
Repkong businessman stated that withoutburning in public, all there
would be was talk, talk, talk. His purpose was to letpeople watch
in order to mobilize them: If I burn my pelts in front of you and
youare still wearing them, then naturally you will become
embarrassed and think aboutwhy you are still wearing pelts.
To this, he added, by burning them, I reduce them to zero.
Burning was a perfor-mative declaration that this is trash, this is
worthless; it has no value whatsoever. Inarguing for the need to
visually demonstrate the reduction of the value of the pelts
tozero, he invoked a logic of decommodification that was
significant among the competingmotivations and interpretations. The
burnings were a deliberate act of decommodifica-tion in the sense
that they destroyed the exchange value of the pelts, along with
their sym-bolic and use values. Tibetans confronted with critiques
about burning as a shamefulwaste rejected this argument by in
effect rejecting the very possibility that they shouldhave had
value in the first place. Only by destroying exchange value, they
suggested,could the possibility of the future circulation of value
through the pelts be eliminated.
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The need to nullify exchange value also explained why they
argued against putting thepelts in museums. Indeed within a few
days of the first burnings, pelt prices werereported to have
dropped by a factor of ten.12
Returning to the visual images of the embodied events, we can
see the burnings asspaces both of destructionof exchange valueand
productionof moral worth and ofa surplus of feeling. Those who
looked on at the burnings bore witness to the destructionof
monetary exchange value but, in doing so, facilitated its
conversion into the value of acollective recognition of those who
participated as pious bearers of righteousness andmoral worth.
Burning effectively converted exchange to moral value, trading
oneregime of value for another.
In addition to the value of the pelts themselves, the burnings
were also an act ofdecommodification in a broader sense of a
political, social or cultural process thatreduces the scope and
influence of the market in everyday life (Fridell 2007; Vail2010,
313; Wallerstein 2002). Like other forms of decommodification, the
act ofburning was a search for and an attempt to promote a more
egalitarian agenda and toilluminate the true costs of consumption
desires, in this case, their social costs ofstrife, jealousy, and
impoverishment, and the costs to the lives of endangered animals.It
also sought to effect an ethical and emotional transformation to
realign preferenceswith a new collective ethos (Vail 2010).
Thus, in response to critiques by both Tibetans and local
Chinese officials that theburnings were a shame because they were
such a waste of money, one Tibetan participantstated, They say why
cant you all think clearly? But they are the ones who cannot
thinkclearly. All they think about is money. Or, as one organizer
in Ngawa put it:
Those who arrested us said, What a shame to burn all these
pelts! Why not sellthem? Their psyches have only one thing in it,
and that is money, nothing else.If you should be able to see 10
kilometers away but have nothing but money inthe world of your
mind, your vision will be reduced to one kilometer. You willonly
lead yourminzu in the wrong direction. Being too focused on money
cloudsones vision, making one unable to think about what is good
for ones people.
From this perspective, the deliberate and spectacular
decommodification of thepelts can be understood as an attempt to
articulate a vision of a moral economya setof moral sentiments and
norms that should influence, rather than be overridden by,
econ-omic forces (Sayer 2003, 2007). This moral economy is
articulated specifically in responseto the entrenchment of a
capitalist regime of value in post-reform China. Since the
1980s,and particularly since the Open up the West campaign and the
deepening of neoliberalreforms in the 2000s, state legitimacy in
Tibet has been increasingly linked to the pro-vision of commodities
and the satisfaction of consumer desires. Statist
developmentefforts across China have prioritized the increased
circulation of commodities and thecultivation of a commodity
consciousness or vision of commodity production
12Though those who burned desired to reduce the exchange value
of the pelts to zero, they did notsucceed. In areas where burnings
did not take place, some Tibetans sought to take advantage of
thelower price to buy more pelts. The illicit trade in pelts from
India also did not disappear. The dropin demand was quickly
compensated by an increase in consumption in the Chinese
market.
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(shangpin yishi, shangpin shengchan yanguang) as a necessary
prerequisite for becomingmodern Chinese citizens suitable for
Chinas growing global power (Makley 2007, 48; Yan2008, 120). The
horse-racing festivals at and through which the wearing of
endangeredanimal pelts had been encouraged were but one of many
venues in which Tibetanculture has been increasingly commodified,
even while Tibetans themselves have beenurged to learn to turn
themselves into commodities to generate income fromtourism (Hayes
2008; Kols 2007).
Some Tibetans commented directly about the commodification of
culture as a per-formance for tourism dollars, stating that
horse-racing festivals give a huge falseimpression of Tibetan
economic development and improvement of peoples living stan-dard.
Tibet is still poor! But the deeper rejection was not of a false
representation ofliving standards, but of the very terms on which
the project of development has beenofferedone in which Tibetans
must be forever grateful and compelled to performtheir loyalty by
cultivating themselves as subjects with the proper commodity
conscious-ness. In deliberately seeking to obliterate the
commodity-nature of the pelts, Tibetanswere in effect refusing what
anthropologist Charlene Makley has called their politicsof
conversion to both loyal Chinese citizen and the ascendant model of
homo econom-icus, who is now supposed to represent Chinas path to
its historical destiny as a worldpower (Anagnost 1997; Makley 2006;
Won 2005).
CONCLUSION
Burnings of a very different kind swept across the Tibetan
Plateau in 201112: a hor-rifying series of self-immolations by
Tibetans, both lay and monastic, many young. Anextreme tendency
among state authorities to react to all Tibetan agency as a direct
chal-lenge to state sovereignty fueled a greatly intensified
militarization, particularly inNgawa, provokingTibetans to take
their own lives in a fiery reclamation of their sovereigntyover
their own bodies.13 But protest against the Chinese state was not
the singular hiddenintention of those who burned their pelts in
2006. Those who participated generally saw nocontradiction between
their acts and their Chinese citizenship insofar as their actions
werein accordance with Chinese national environmental law. Indeed,
there was no contradic-tion until one was created by state
officials after the burnings. The reading of the pelt burn-ings
through a whole set of assumptions about Tibetans and their
motivations ischaracteristic of the narrowing of space for Tibetan
identity within the PRC that hasfueled further protests. In
approaching the pelt burnings as an event, a product of
contin-gent, multiple, and sometimes contradictory processes,
connections, and meanings, thispaper has beenwritten against the
tendency toward the simplification of Tibetan subjectiv-ities,
aspirations, and desires that characterize opposing positions on
the Tibet Question.
Why, then, did Tibetans burn their pelts? I have argued that
there was a complexcultural politics to the burning, a set of
interpretations, debates, and motivations that
13Ngawa, an epicenter of self-immolations, has been the site of
greatly intensified security spendingsince 2006 (Human Rights Watch
2011). As of January 2013, there have been ninety-nine
self-immolations in Tibet since 2009, ninety-eight since 2011. Of
these, thirty-five have taken placein Ngawa Prefecture. See
Sangster (2012) for an analysis of circulating videos and
photographsof the self-immolations.
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far surpassed the imaginations of both the Chinese state and the
transnational Tibetmovement. Religious loyalty to the Dalai Lama
was clearly central to the events. Thechoice not only not to burn,
but also to continue wearing pelts in Drit and parts ofNakchu
reveals religious fault lines within Tibetan society. Religious
loyalty was closelyintertwined with, but not the same as, burning
as an assertion of Tibetan national identity.On the one hand, some
were greatly inspired by and supported the burnings as a show
ofTibetan national unity; on the other, those who opposed the
burnings pointed out that theDalai Lama had, after all, never told
anyone to burn their pelts. Some even argued thatthe Dalai Lama had
never told Tibetans to cease wearing pelts, and that Tibetans
shouldwear them to maintain their distinction from the Han.
Even those who supported the burnings brought a wide range of
motivations to theevents. Some found inspiration in lessons from
modern Chinese history and its intellec-tuals, particularly those
of the early twentieth-century May Fourth movement. For
many,burning was a deeply modernist, reflexive act of self-critique
as well as self-salvation, anindictment of Tibetans moral standing
among the ethnic groups of the world and a pathtoward the
restoration of Tibetans fallen reputation. This focus on reputation
echoed theKalachakra speech, but also both mimics and seeks to
subvert the Chinese states officialpositioning of Tibetans as an
always backward, underdevelopedminzu in need of the ben-evolent
state and the older brother Han to help them catch up. Some even
surmisedthat state officials had encouraged Tibetans to wear pelts
precisely to ruin their reputationand make them look bad in the
eyes of the world.
Others, however, framed their participation in and support for
the burnings in termsof religious rationales, the need to protect
innocent wild animals, and, more commonly,the desire to address the
social strife that was increasing with wealth disparities in
thecontext of Chinas neoliberalizing political economy. For them,
the display of wealththrough pelts was both a false semblance of
development and a cause of new conflicts.Destroying the pelts was
thus beneficial to the cause of social harmonya clearlystated goal
of the central government since 2006. This logic also dictated that
the peltscould only be destroyed, not donated to museums, as only
this could destroy theircommodity-nature, breaking the possibility
of the circulation of exchange value. Unlikethe original bonfire of
the vanities, the spectacle of fire here did not destroy
objectsthat might be occasions of sin, but rather was a deliberate
attempt to halt the future cir-culation of exchange value through
these objects. The embodied performances of theburnings created
spaces in which the acts of pious sacrifice were witnessed and
convertedinto a moral value sanctioned by those present, striving
toward an alternative regime ofvalue than that ruled by homo
economicus.
Still others argued that the pelts should not have been
destroyed because doing sowas ultimately a violation of Tibetan
culture and tradition. State officials adopted this pos-ition after
the burnings as they required some Tibetans to wear pelts at
festivals and ontelevision in the name of Tibetan culture,
highlighting the way in which culture is a malle-able and unstable
surface upon which politics is practiced and fought. In a sense,
thosewho burned their pelts adopted a more flexible view of culture
as something that canchange to fit evolving circumstances. In this
view, which also characterized the DalaiLamas speech, Tibetans
should pick and choose from among their traditions, definingnew
forms of cultural identity in the face of new circumstances and
knowledge. Thosewho opposed the burnings took a more conservative
position, one that also defended
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cultural identity, but in a way that privileged concerns about
Sinification and the CulturalRevolution-like destruction of Tibetan
culture by Tibetans themselves. Ultimately, thosewho participated
in and debated the burnings asked: is there a right way to be
Tibetan inthe contemporary world, and if so, what is it?
Acknowledgments
This piece could not have been written without the assistance of
numerous Tibetansin Tibet who unfortunately cannot be named. I am
also grateful to Hu Zhiying for assist-ance during the research
process and to Kunga Lama for video editing. The paper wasimproved
significantly by comments from audiences where I presented earlier
versionsof this paper, at AAG, University of British Columbia,
Simon Fraser University, Univer-sity of Toronto, CU Boulder, Duke,
University of Wisconsin, and UC Santa Cruz. Thankstoo to Holly
Gayley, Nicole Willock, Jeff Wasserstrom, and the anonymous
reviewers forcomments on earlier drafts of the paper. The video
component of this publication wasmade possible by funding from the
Shelly & Donald Rubin Foundation.
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Blazing Pelts and Burning Passions: Nationalism, Cultural
Politics, and Spectacular Decommodification in TibetThe Kalachakra
SpeechBack Across the HimalayasPerforming Spectacular Spaces of
SurplusAlternative Framings and OrientationsReligious and National
LoyaltyEqualityNational-Historical Orientation
Why Burn? The Debate Over CultureSpectacular Decommodification
and Regimes of ValueConclusionAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsList of
References