Y UGOSLAVIA II: E UROPEAN S ECURITY IN F OCUS PI5501 European Security after 1945.

YUGOSLAVIA II: EUROPEAN SECURITY IN FOCUSPI5501 European Security after 1945

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

European Security after the Cold War Questions of Intervention Questions of US withdrawal Dilemmas of intervention Dayton peace accords (1995) Peace-keeping and peace-building Europe, US, and Russia Kosovo and NATO’s first out of area

operations (1999) Where are we now? The Kosovo effect

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Return to Mearsheimer’s argument: 1945-1990 was an essentially peaceful time for

Europe. The end of the Cold War means a transition from

a bipolar system to a multipolar system. The distribution and character of military power

are the root causes of war and peace

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Mearsheimer argues that peace in Europe is the result of three factors:

1. The bipolar distribution of military power across the continent.

2. The rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe (the importance of parity).

3. That each superpower was equipped with nuclear weapons.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Domestic Factors: Important in generating conflict, such as the two world wars (and the dissolution of two federal states). Fall of hyper-nationalism in the Cold War

International Factors: However, military power continues to remain an important factor in the peace and stability of Europe.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR

European Security and institutions What to do with NATO? From CSCE to the OSCE From CFSP to ESDP What role for the UN after the Cold War?

Busy in other areas: examples, El Salvador, Ecuador, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique

Delegating peacekeeping to regional organizations (Charter function)

Shy away from humanitarian intervention

THE STATE OF INTERVENTION

The principle of state sovereignty Forms of Collective Security

Pure – Maximum sovereignty Procedural – Power and Rule based Hegemonic – Power and no rules

DILEMMAS OF INTERVENTION

Peacekeeping SC generally agrees to peacekeeping only when

both parties have accepted third party mediation What happens when a party reneges on their

commitment? Ex. Former Yugoslavia

THE CONFLICT CONTINUES

Bosnia (in 1990) Demographics

Bosniaks 44 % Serbs 31 % Croats 17 %

Independence April 1992 (after

Croatia)

COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION UN Security Council

SCR 713 Arms Embargo Effect on the Bosniaks Yugoslav arms and Serbs Yugoslavia initially called for the embargo

SCR 743 Peacekeeping and Aid Mission Established UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) UN military escorts of humanitarian aid began in

August 1992 SCR 757 Enforcement Measures

Reaction to reports of concentration camps, ethnic cleansing, and the use of rape as a war tactic

Banned air travel, financial transactions, sports and cultural exchanges, and scientific and technical cooperation with Yugoslavia

COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION

UN and NATO SCR 787 Authorized NATO to enforce SCR 757

Also authorised NATO to begin maritime inspections in the Adriatic

First time NATO was ever used as a collective security entity

Splits in the Security Council Bosnian Serbs threatened to kidnap UNPROFOR troops if

not neutral Thus, the UK and France were reluctant to see the UN

step up collective security Russia and China refused to allow for the use of force or

to provide humanitarian aid The US required a strong mandate for the use of force if

it were to send troops

COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION

Alternatives to the use of force SCR 764

Established the precedent of charging individuals for war crimes

SCR 771 Stated that blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid

was a violation of international law SCR770 and SCR 776

Increased the mandate for protecting aid convoys Tied to original rules of engagement and existing troop

levels

COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION

SCR 781 Banned all flights, but not enforced (Russia vetoed) Iraq no-fly-zone not authorised but enforced, Bosnia

no-fly—zone authorised but not enforced. SCR 808 (Revolutionised International Law)

Created an ad-hoc court to try individuals of guilty genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes

OTHER DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

The Vance-Owen Plan (January 1993) Confederation of 10 provinces split along ethnic

lines Russia, France and UK favoured the plan, China

did not have an opinion US (now Clinton) opposed it, calling it

appeasement for Serb aggression Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan because they

already controlled 70% of Bosnia

FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE

May 1993 Clinton Administration began to advocate lifting

the arms embargo and conducting limited air strikes against Serb targets

UK and France feared a backlash against UNPROFOR

Russia vetoed, China did not have to Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan by

referendum in May

FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE

What did it take? Throughout 1993, Serbs violated the no-fly-zone

and began bombing Bosniak villages. SCR 816

Allowed NATO to enforce the no-fly-zone First authorization of the use of force in the

former Yugoslavia Problem: each engagement had to be authorised

by the Secretary General and the commander of UNPROFOR Engagement requests were denied throughout 1993 to

prevent retaliation against UN troops on the ground

FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE

SCR 819 Made Srebrenica a ‘safe area’

SCR 824 Further expanded ‘safe areas’

SCR 836 In June 1993, NATO was authorised to use air

strikes against Serb forces surrounding the ‘safe areas’.

Russia and China abstained from all of these resolutions

FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE

July 1993 Serbs were about to take Sarajevo US prepared for air strikes against Serb positions

on the hills surrounding the city HOWEVER, the UNPROFOR commander

negotiated an arrangement that would place French peacekeepers on the front line between the Serbs and the city

So close that they prevented any air strikes The US began to openly criticise UK and France US pointed to SCR 770 as authority to use force

(enforced delivery of humanitarian aid delivery)

FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE

Getting past the impasse UK and France reluctant to use force US reluctant to go without allies

NATO threatened on 9 August 1993 to undertake strategic air strikes unless the Serbs stopped their offensive Sarajevo Airstrikes would also have to be authorised by

UNPROFOR command, all 16 NATO ambassadors and the UN SG.

Serbs made token efforts to withdraw No airstrikes were carried out

FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE

The Owen-Stoltenberg plan Divide Bosnia into three ministries

Serbs would receive 52.5% Croats would receive 17.5% Bosniaks would receive 30%

UK, France and Russia supported it US did not because it rewarded a ‘Greater

Serbia’ to the Serbs Serbs and Croats agreed, Bosnians did not

FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE

Serbs were close to capturing three safe havens in Dec 1993.

Serbs killed 69 at a market in Sarajevo in Feb 1994

NATO responded that it would use airstrikes within 20 kilometres around the city (Not UN approved)

Feb 2004: NATO shot down four Serb warplanes violating the no-fly-zone

This was the first use of force in the Bosnian war to enforce UNSC resolutions

FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE

Russian position was adamant against NATO strikes Yeltsin moved Russian ‘peacekeepers’ into place

near Serb positions to deter NATO strikes April 1994, NATO struck Serb tanks and an

armoured personnel carrier near Gorazde This was the first ground strike in the conflict

Yeltsin demanded to be included in any future military decisions Contact Group was formed in April 1994 to bring

together the positions of US, Russia, UK, France, and Germany

NATO AND THE USE OF FORCE In August, Milosevic ordered a withdrawal of

the JNA from Bosnia in order to reduce the sanctions against the remaining part of Yugoslavia

SCR 943 eased the sanctions on Yugoslavia Contact Group constructed a new plan to split

the country, but the Bosnian Serbs rejected it US wanted to raise the weapons ban and begin to

enforce weapons exclusion zones UK, France and Russia did not want to raise the risk

to UN troops In September, the US unilaterally breached

NATO policy by delivering weapons to the Bosniaks and enforcing weapons exclusion zones.

NATO AND THE USE OF FORCE

By 1995, the Bosnian Serbs accepted that the split among the UN SC powers would prevent significant intervention by the international Community

In August, the UN SC was drawing up withdrawal plans (SCR 998)

However, once withdrawn, the UN was able to strike without harm to UN peacekeepers NATO began a sustained bombing campaign

against Serb positions and facilities in Bosnia on 10 Sep 1995

FROM FORCE TO DIPLOMACY

After two weeks of bombings, several things changed: The Croat/Bosniak forces took control of the

nearly half of Bosnia (up from 28%) Bosnian Serb leadership and Milosevic combined

into a joint negotiating committee to communicated with the Contact Group

While the Serbs were willing to settle, the Croats and Bosniaks had to be pushed to accept any deal.

The Dayton Peace Accords, based on the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, was signed on 5 October 1995.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL FIRSTS

The war led to The first council resolution mentioning individual

responsibility for war crimes The first time NATO acted as a United Nations

authorised collective security entity The first time the council established an ad hoc

tribunal The first time NATO used force in Europe The first time American and Russian troops

worked together on the same mission The first preventative peacekeeping force (FYR

Macedonia)

KOSOVO

Context Kosovo declared

independence in October 1991

Evidence of massive human rights violations

Usual council split NATO was willing to

use force without council authorisation

NATO IN KOSOVO

Air strikes on Yugoslav forces

38 004 sorties flown820 aircraft from 14 states

Peace-keeping

RUSSIA’S RESPONSE Kosovo ended the dream of a European

security system without the United States NATO was invoking rules of empire rather

than of collective security Signed a joint-defence initiative with Belarus Expelled NATO representatives Withdrew from the PfP programme Withdrew mission to Brussels Withdrew communication with NATO forces in

Kosovo Postponed a vote on START II Began talks with India and China on alliance

FROM AUTONOMY TO INDEPENDENCE

Autonomy Rambouillet talks

Independence 17 Feb 2008

Kosovo effects Force without UN

support Future secession:

Cyprus, Georgia, Azerbaijan