Xrootd proxies Andrew Hanushevsky

xrootd Proxies

Andrew Hanushevsky (SLAC)

Middleware Security Group Meeting 5-6 June 2006

http://xrootd.slac.stanford.eduxrootd is largely funded by the US Department of Energy

Contract DE-AC02-76SF00515 with Stanford University

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 2: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Outline

xrootd Architecture OverviewTerms and ConceptsClustering

ProxiesSingle and double firewallsProxy clusters for scalability

Security transformations Conclusions & Acknowledgements

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 3: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

authentication(gsi, krb5, etc)

Clustering(olbd)

lfn2pfnprefix encoding

Storage System(oss, drm/srm, etc)

authorization(name based)

File System(ofs, sfs, alice, etc)

Protocol (1 of n)(xrootd)

xrootd Plugin Architecture

Protocol Driver(XRD)

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 4: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Acronyms, Entities & Relationships

datadataxrootd

olbdxrootd

olbd

Data Clients

Redirectors

Data Servers

MM

SS

ctlctl

olbdolbdControl Network

Managers, Supervisors & Servers(resource info, file location)

xrootdxrootdData Network

(redirectors steer clients to dataData servers provide data)

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 5: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Cluster Architecture

Server

A cell is 1-to-64 entities (servers or cells)clustered around a cell manager

called a supervisor

A manager is an optionallyreplicated xrootd/olbd pairfunctioning as a root node

A server is an xrootd/olbdpair leaf node that

delivers data

Up to 64 servers or cells can connect

to a manager

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 6: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Single Level Switch

ClientClient RedirectorRedirector(Head Node)

Data ServersData Servers

open file XAA

BB

CC

go to C

open file X

Who has file X?

I have

ClusterClient sees all servers as Client sees all servers as xrootdxrootd data serversdata servers

2nd open X

go to C

RedirectorsRedirectorsCache fileCache filelocationlocation

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 7: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Two Level Switch

ClientClient

RedirectorRedirector(Head Node)

Data ServersData Serversopen file XAA

BB

CC

go to Copen file X

Who has file X?

I have

Cluster

Client sees all servers as Client sees all servers as xrootdxrootd data serversdata servers

SupervisorSupervisor(sub(sub--redirector)redirector)

Who has file X? DD

EE

FF

I havego to F

open file X

I have

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 8: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

SLAC Configuration

client machinesclient machines

kan01 kan02 kan03 kan04 kanxx

bbr-olb03 bbr-olb04 kanolb-a

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 9: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Extending Access

Easy clustered local accessEveryone sees everyoneSimple configurationLow human overhead to maintain

Remote accessDifficult because of connection constraintsWant to make it humanly administrable

Critical to minimize cross-domain knowledge

Utilize the peer-to-peer nature of xrootd

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 10: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Proxies I (single firewall)

client machinesclient machines

data01 data02 data03 data04

proxy xrootd

IN2P3

INDRA11

3322

FirewallFirewall

olbd

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 11: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Scaling Proxies

Need to provide more than one proxySelection criteria for proxies?

Utilize natural rooted clusteringCreate proxy clustersAutomatically load balanceNo practical limit on number

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 12: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Proxy Clusters (single firewall)

client machinesclient machines

data01 data02 data03 data04

proxy managerxrootd

33

4455

FirewallFirewall

olbdolbd

proxy serverxrootd

11

22

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 13: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Dealing With Lockdowns

Double FirewallsReality sets in.

Incoming and outgoing traffic limited

Utilize peer-to-peer nature of rootedMaintains practical simplicity

Alternative not particularly appealingApplication controlled firewall

LBL and ANL models for gridFTP.Could use xrootd’s for this as well, though.

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 14: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Proxies II (double firewall, simplified)

client machinesclient machines

data01 data02 data03 data04

remote proxy xrootd

11

4433

FirewallsFirewalls

olbd

local proxy xrootd

22

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 15: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

N-to-M Authentication issues

Clusters of proxies on each sideRandom server-server connectionsAuthentication key management issues

Complex because of size and interactionsWould like to simplify key distribution

Use a security transformationGSI to global session key

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 16: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Scalable Proxy Security

SLAC PROXY RAL PROXY

3

2 2

1

11 Authenticate & develop session key22 Distribute session key to authenticated subscribers33 Servers can log into each other using session key

Data ServersData Servers

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 17: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Extending Security Transforms

xrootd protocol allows security transformsRedirect can pass along a CGI string

Anyone can redirect!No practical redirect limit.

Allows security framework substitutionsMinimizes GSI intra-cluster overhead

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 18: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Security Transforms

client machinesclient machines

data01 data02 data03 data04

x-authxrootd

11

4433

olbd

GSI “proxy”xrootd

22

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 19: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Conclusion

xrootd has a security enabling architecture Protocol was designed with security in mindAccommodates security transforms

Server-to-serverClient-server

Very easy to administerCritical for maintaining security

MWSG 5-6 June 2006 20: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

Acknowledgements

Software collaboratorsINFN/Padova: Fabrizio Furano, Alvise DorigaoRoot: Fons Rademakers, Gerri GanisAlice: Derek Feichtinger, Guenter Kickinger, Andreas PetersCornell: Gregory SharpSLAC: Jacek Becla, Tofigh Azemoon, Wilko Kroeger, Bill WeeksPrinceton: Pete Elmer

Operational collaboratorsBNL, CNAF, FZK, INFN, IN2P3, RAL, SLAC