XO and Consult Congress CPs - Michigan7 2013 BFJR

8/13/2019 XO and Consult Congress CPs - Michigan7 2013 BFJR

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XO & Consult Congress CPs – BFJR 7wk





Executive Order CP



1NC

Text: The president of the United States should

The CP solves

Hsu 12 (David T. Hsu - Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Browne Center for International Politics, “Executive Discretion,

Domestic Constraints, and Patterns of Post-9/11 U.S. Foreign Economic Policy”, September 2012, Pg 6,

http://davidthsu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/hsu-patterns-of-post911-us-foreign-economic-policy-september-2012.pdf) MaxL

The specific empirical puzzle, how to explain the pattern of U.S. foreign economic engagement in the context of post-

9/11 security pressures, relates to the broader theoretical debate about the politics of foreign economic policy

(Krasner 1978; Ikenberry, et al. 1988). Much of the previous research maintains that the president has strategic advantages in

controlling foreign policy. Informational advantages enable the president to mobilize pressure in favor

of a preferred policy agenda with greater knowledge of strategic imperatives and alternative relative to

legislators. 11 In tandem with the ability to exercise unilateral powers (via executive order, memorandum, and other

directives), presidents are in a “unique position to lead” at “the front-end of the policy-making process.”12

This reasoning justifies an analytical focus on the president’s strategic motivations for manipulating foreign economic policies.

<Insert prez powers net benefit and/or run politics and insert doesn’t link to politics card>

http://davidthsu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/hsu-patterns-of-post911-us-foreign-economic-policy-september-2012.pdf

http://davidthsu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/hsu-patterns-of-post911-us-foreign-economic-policy-september-2012.pdf



XO Solvency



Generic

XO solves best- 5 reasons

Pauly and Lansford 3 (Robert and Tom, professor of history and political Science at Norwich University and assistant professor of

political science, University of Southern Mississippi, American Diplomacy, “National Security Policy and the Strong Executive: The French and

American Presidents and the War on Terror”, June, 2003 http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04-

06/lansfordpauly_exec/lansfordpauly_exec.html) SC France and the United States have presidential systems which give their nations’ highest elected official

wide powers to conduct foreign and security policy. To different degrees, the division of responsibilities

for both nations’ highest office reflects Wildavsky’s concept of “two-presidencies” in which one facet

represents domestic policy and one represents foreign policy.1 In writing about the U.S. chief executive,

Wildavsky summarized contemporary scholarship on the foreign policy powers of the presidency and

identified five main reasons for the concentration of power: 1) since foreign policy and security issues

often need “fast action”, the executive rather than the legislative branch of government is the more

appropriate decision-making structure; 2) the Constitution grants the president broad formal powers; 3)

because of the complexities involved voters tend to delegate to the president their “trust and

confidence” to act; 4) the “interest group structure is weak, unstable and thin”; and 5) the legislature

follows a “self -denying ordinance” since tradition and practicality reinforce the power of the chief

executive.2 Wildavsky’s work is echoed by many scholars, including Logan, who contends that in

Western democracies, “the mass public consciously or unconsciously cedes influence” to politicians and

policy elites.3



Cuba

Executive orders should be first steps to lifting restrictions against Cuba

Richardson 10 (Bill Richardson – Governor and former UN ambassador, The Washington Post, “Time for Western Hemisphere countries to

collaborate”, 8-14-10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/13/AR2010081304982.html) MaxL -- Second, as a first step to changing our policy toward Cuba, the president should issue an executive

order to lift as much of the travel ban as possible. The travel ban penalizes U.S. businesses, lowers our

credibility in Latin America and fuels anti-U.S. propaganda. Lifting the ban would also be a reciprocal gesture for Cuba's

recent agreement, negotiated among the Catholic Church, the Spanish government and President Ra?l Castro, to release political dissidents.

Obama has taken significant steps to loosen restrictions on family travel, remove limits for remittance

and expand cooperation in other areas such as expanding the export of humanitarian goods from the United

States into Cuba. Loosening travel restrictions is in U.S. interests and would be a bold move toward normalization

of relations with Cuba.

An executive order can remove embargo provisions – it won’t be rolled back

ASCE 09 (Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, “Lifting the Cuban Embargo: The New Labors ofHercules?”, Cuba in Transition, 2009, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume19/pdfs/traviesodiaz.pdf) MaxL

The actions taken by the United States in the past to remove trade embargoes against foreign countries appear to

show that, unless such lifting is specifically limited by the legislation, Presidential decisions and determinations are sufficient

authority to lift trade embargoes. On that basis, removing the TWEA as a source of the Cuban trade

embargo would be straightforward. The simplest procedure would be for the President to abstain from issuing the required

annual Determination that exercise of the TWEA authority with respect to Cuba is in the national interest of the United States. An

alternative, but perhaps more controversial, course of action would be for the President to issue an executive

order expressly ending the state of emergency with regard to Cuba. The same document could repeal other

elements of the embargo, such as some of the CACR issued after March 1996. Alternatively, the Treasury Department could take

administrative action to rescind the post-1996 CACR.64 In the case of the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 620(a)(1) of the FAA, 22 U.S.C. §

2370(a)(1), authorizes the President to “establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba.” This

section is clearly permissive and leaves the President free to determine whether to “maintain” the embargo,and consequently whether to lift it. The President could remove the embargo, to the extent it is imposed under

this provision, by an executive order that rescinds President Kennedy’s Proclamation and revokes all subsequent

executive orders and regulations thereunder implementing aspects of the embargo. The President

could also take this action unilaterally, without reference to any external events.

The CP solves for Cuba and avoids the link to politics

Progreso 10 (Progreso Weekly, Why President Obama should Issue and Executive Order on Travel to

Cuba, 11/24/10, http://progreso-weekly.com/ini/index.php/cuba/144-angelicas-eyes-on-washington-

blogs/angelicas-eyes-on-washington/495-why-president-obama-should-issue-an-executive-order-on-

travel-to-cuba)//LA

The administration is considering an Executive Order to be issued by the President that wouldbroaden the scope of what’s generally called “people to people” non-tourist travel to Cuba. This is the same authority

President Obama used in April 2009 to restore the unrestricted rights of Cuban Americans to visit their

families on the island. Issuing the executive order is in the economic interest, the foreign policy interest,

and the national security interest of the U.S. It fulfills the President’s commitment to seek new

openings with Cuba, and encourages and responds to the processes of change going on in Cuba itself.

There is broad support for these changes among U.S. organizations and constituencies. Announcing

an executive order to permit more travel to Cuba and more engagement would not harm the

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/13/AR2010081304982.html

http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume19/pdfs/traviesodiaz.pdf



http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/13/AR2010081304982.html





government," said José Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at Human Rights Watch. "Only by working with its allies in Latin American and

Europe will the US be able to chip away at Castro's repressive machinery."

Presidential action solves Cuba Huddleston and Pascual 9 (Vicki and Carlos, Miami Herald Op Ed, Presidential Authority to Lift Most of

Embargo, 2/24/9, http://uscubanormalization.blogspot.com/2012/11/presidential-authority-to-lift-

most-of.html)//LAContrary to popular myth and public misunderstanding, if President Barack Obama wishes to change the U.S. policy toward

Cuba, he has ample authority to do so. If he takes charge of Cuba policy, he can turn the embargo into

an effective instrument of ''smart power'' to achieve the United States' policy objectives in Cuba.

Obama's leadership is needed to change the dynamic between the United States and Cuba. The status

quo is no longer an option. Not only has it failed to achieve its goals; it has tarnished our image in the

hemisphere and throughout the world. Waiting for Congress to act will only further delay change.

Fortunately, even in the case of Cuba, Congress has not materially impaired this country's venerable

constitutional arrangement under which the president has the ultimate authority to conduct our

foreign affairs. Executive authority Again and again we hear that the embargo can't be changed because the

Helms-Burton law codified it. Nothing could be further from the truth. Whether you agree or disagree with the

current commercial embargo, the president can effectively dismantle it by using his executive authority. Helms-

Burton codified the embargo regulation, but those regulations provide that ``all transactions are prohibited except as specifically authorized by

the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, and licenses.'' This means that the president's power

remains unfettered. He can instruct the secretary to extend, revise or modify embargo regulations. The

proof of this statement is that President Bill Clinton issued new regulations for expanded travel and remittances in order to help individuals and

grow civil society.



Removal of Sanctions

Presidential waver authority solves

Haass 98 (Richard N., Brookings Institute, Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing, Brookings

policy brief series #33, 6/98, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/1998/06/sanctions-haass)//LAAll sanctions embedded in legislation should provide for presidential discretion in the form of a

waiver authority. Discretion would allow the President to suspend or terminate a sanction if he judged

it was in the interests of national security to do so. Such latitude is needed if relationships are not to

become hostage to one interest and if the executive is to have the flexibility needed to explore

whether the introduction of limited incentives can bring about a desired policy end. Waivers (exercised in

May 1998) in laws calling for secondary sanctions against non-American firms doing business with Iran, Libya, and Cuba had a salutary effect on

U.S. foreign policy, although they did nothing for U.S. firms still precluded from operating in these countries by the primary sanctions. The

absence of waivers is likely to haunt U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan. Sanctions will make it more difficult to influence

future Indian and Pakistani decisions involving the deployment or even use of nuclear weapons—and could contribute to instability inside

Pakistan, thereby eroding control over these weapons.



Trafficking

Executive orders solve human trafficking – full implementation is key

ACLU 12 (Devon Chaffee, American Civil Liberties Union, “President Issues Executive Order to Stop Human Trafficking in Government

Contracts”, 9-25-12, http://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights/president-issues-executive-order-stop-human-trafficking-government-

contracts) MaxL

Today, President Barack Obama signed an executive order that will give better protections to vulnerable

workers employed by government contractors. The order, announced on the 150th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation, lays out

new requirements for U.S. government contractors and their subcontractors operating overseas to prevent human trafficking and

forced labor. In a powerful speech this morning announcing the order, President Obama recognized that U.S. tax payer

dollars should never be used to support human trafficking, a form of modern day slavery. For many years,

U.S. government contractors providing services to the military and U.S. diplomatic missions overseas have engaged in the trafficking and forced

labor of reportedly thousands of men and women from low-wage countries such as Nepal, India and the Philippines. In June, the ACLU released

a joint report with Yale Law School, Victims of Complacency, which documents this ongoing problem. Recruited from impoverished villages

overseas, these workers (known as Third Country Nationals or TCNs) are charged exorbitant recruitment fees, often lied to about what country

they will be taken to and how much they will be paid. Many are left with no choice but to live and work in unacceptable and unsafe conditions

serving as security personnel, cooks, janitors, cleaners and construction workers on U.S. military bases and embassies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Media reports, government audits, and other official government documents obtained by the ACLU through a Freedom of Information Act

request reveal that trafficking and forced labor of TCNs by government contractors is a pervasive and ongoing problem. Today’sexecutive order will help ensure that workers who provide valuable services to our troops and embassies are

not trafficked or forced into indentured servitude on the taxpayer’s dime. It prohibits contractors and subcontractors

from charging recruitment fees and requires prime contractors to take responsibility for ensuring that their

subcontractors are not engaging in trafficking or forced labor. It also mandates the creation of new

guidance and training for contract officers responsible for enforcing the new anti-trafficking provisions. Of course,

there is still work to be done. Today’s order needs to be fully implemented, which will be challenging given the

burdens already on the contracting officers tasked with ensuring that contractors comply with U.S. regulations. It also remains to be

seen whether the administration will be more willing than it has been in the past to pursue criminal

prosecutions and administrative penalties against those contractors who are found to have engaged in human

trafficking and forced labor. This is why the ACLU will continue to urge Congress to adopt critical pending legislation, the End Trafficking in

Government Contracting Act, that would create new criminal penalties for contractors who employ fraudulent recruitment tactics. Adoption of

this statute will also make it harder for a future administration to reverse the executive order’s requirements. Click here to tell your Senator tosupport this important piece of legislation today.

http://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights/president-issues-executive-order-stop-human-trafficking-government-contracts












Generic

Normal means includes Congress – they have oversight on key Latin American policies

Sullivan 13 (Mark P. Sullivan – Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service, “Latin America and the Caribbean: Key

Issues for the 113th Congress”, 2-8-13, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42956.pdf ) MaxL

Congress plays an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. In the 112th C ongress, legislative and

oversight attention focused on the continued increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico and assistance

under the Mérida Initiative; efforts to help Central Amer ican and Caribbean countries contend with drug trafficking and violent crime; as well

as continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia. The 2010 earthquake that devastated Haiti focused attention on

the enormous task of disaster recovery and reconstruction. As in past years, U.S. sanctions on Cuba, particularly restrictions on travel and remittances, remained a

contentious issue in the debate over how to support change in one of the world’s last remaining communist nations. Another area of

congressional oversight was the deterioration of democracy in several Latin American countries, especially

Nicaragua and Venezuela. Congressional concern also increased over Iran’s growing relations in the region, especially with Venezuela, and about the

activities of Hezbollah. In the 113th Congress, these issues are likely to continue to be the focus of congressional attention. Congress may also complete action on

FY2013 appropriations for foreign assistance, and soon will begin consideration of the Administration’s FY2014 foreign aid budget request, allowing for examination

of ongoing and proposed foreign assistance and counternarcotics programs for the region. Other issues that could receive congressional attention include relations

with Mexico under the new administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto and consideration of a trans-boundary energy agreement; the health status of

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and implications for the United States; prospects of Colombia’s peace negotiations with the FARC and implications for U.S.

policy; whether and how to strengthen relations with Brazil; progress on negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that includes three Latin American

countries (Chile, Mexico, and Peru); whether to extend trade preferences for Ecuador; and review of the operation and activities of the Organization of American

States. Potential U.S. legislative action on comprehensive immigration reform and gun control efforts would likely be wellreceived in the region, especially in

neighboring Mexico.

Congress has oversight over Latin American policy



Congress plays an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Legislative and oversight

attention to the region during the 112th Congress focused on the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico

and U.S. assistance to Mexico under the Mérida Initiative; efforts to help Central American and Caribbean countries contend

with drug trafficking and violent crime; as well as continued counternarcotics and security support to

Colombia. The 2010 earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince, Haiti, continued to focus congressional attention on the enormous task of

disaster recovery and reconstruction. As in past years, U.S. sanctions on Cuba, particularly restrictions on travel and

remittances, remained a contentious issue in the debate over how to support change in one of the world’s last

remaining communist nations. Another area of congressional oversight was the deterioration of

democracy in several Latin American countries, especially Nicaragua and Venezuela. Congressional concern

also increased about Iran’s growing relations in the region, especially with Venezuela, and about the activities of

Hezbollah. Many of these same issues are likely to continue to be the focus of congressional oversight and

potential legislative action in the 113th Congress. At the beginning of a new Congress and President Obama’s second term, the

relevant congressional committees may examine the current status of U.S. relations and policy toward

Latin America and the Caribbean. Early in the first session, Congress will face action on FY2013 appropriations for foreign

assistance, and soon will begin consideration of the Administration’s FY2014 foreign aid budget request. Congressional hearings on the

President’s budget request, and subsequent consideration of appropriations legislation, can be an important means for Congress to examine

ongoing and proposed foreign assistance programs for the region. Potential U.S. legislative action on comprehensive

immigration reform would likely be well received in Latin America and the Caribbean, but especially in

neighboring Mexico. U.S. gun control efforts would also likely be welcomed by Mexico, along with Caribbean and Central American countries

concerned about the illicit flow of arms from the United States Other issues that could be the subject of oversight in the

new Congress, and are addressed in the sections below, include relations with Mexico, and the status of reforms, under the

new administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto; potential consideration of a trans-boundary energy agreement with

Mexico; the health status of President Hugo Chávez and the potential effect of a government change on U.S. relations;

prospects of Colombia’s peace negotiations with the FARC and the potential ramifications for U.S. policy and foreign aid; whether and how to

strengthen relations with Brazil, including boosting U.S. exports; progress on negotiations for the Trans-Pacific

Partnership (TPP) that includes three Latin American countries (Chile, Mexico, and Peru); whether to extend Andean Trade Preference Act

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42956.pdf










(ATPA) benefits for Ecuador; the scope and direction of the region’s counternarcotics relationship with the United States; and the

operation and activities of the Organization of American States.



Trade

Congress has oversight over commerce

Hornbeck and Irace 13 (J. F. Hornbeck – Coordinator Specialist in International Trade and Finance, Mary A. Irace – Coordinator Section

Research Manager, Congressional Review Service, “International Trade and Finance: Key Policy Issues for the 113th Congress”, 4-15-13,

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41553.pdf) MaxL

The U.S. Constitution grants authority over the regulation of foreign commerce to Congress, which it exercises

in a variety of ways. These include the oversight of trade policy generally, and more particularly, the consideration of

legislation to approve trade agreements and authorize trade programs. Policy issues cover such areas as: U.S. trade

negotiations; tariffs; nontariff barriers; worker dislocation from trade liberalization, trade remedy laws; import and

export policies; international investment, economic sanctions; and the trade policy functions of the

federal government. Congress also has an important role in international finance. It has the authority over U.S. financial

commitments to international financial institutions and oversight responsibilities for trade- and

finance-related agencies of the U.S. Government.

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41553.pdf

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41553.pdf





Mexico

Congress has oversight over Mexico policy



Key Policy Issues: This year, Congress is likely to closely follow the policies implemented by the Peña Nieto government, particularly in the

security realm. The 113th Congress is likely to continue funding and overseeing the Mérida Initiative and

related domestic initiatives, but may also consider supporting new programs. Congressional action may soon be

required in order for the U.S.-Mexico Trans-boundary Hydrocarbons Agreement to take effect . Migration

and border security cooperation could also be substantially overhauled should Congress consider comprehensive immigration reform. Mexico’s

role in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and what that agreement might mean for the North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA) is also likely to generate congressional interest. Potential oversight questions that Congress might

consider include How effectively is the Peña Nieto government implementing its reformist agenda? Will the

government be able to reduce violence in Mexico while still combating organized crime? How might this

government support efforts to enact comprehensive immigration reform in the United States? Will the Mexican

economy perform better under this PRI government than under the PAN?







Venezuela

Congress has oversight over Venezuelan policies



The 113th Congress may continue strong congressional oversight on the status of human rights and democracyin Venezuela as well as drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the extent of Venezuela’s relations

with Iran. Of particular interest will be the ramifications of President Chávez’s health status on Venezuela’s political

future and on U.S.- Venezuelan relations. Early in the first session, Congress will face action on State Department, Foreign

Operations, and Related Programs appropriations for the second half of FY2013, which includes funding for Venezuela democracy projects,

while Congress will also soon be considering the Administration’s FY2014 foreign aid funding for such assistance.









1NC

TEXT: The President of the United States should issue an executive order instructing the administrator

of the United States Environmental Protection Agency to create regulations pursuant to the Clean Air

Act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources.

That’s the key step to resolving global warming – all political barriers have been resolved

Westmoreland 10 (Joshua K. Westmoreland, Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs

Law Review, 1/1/2010, “Global Warming and Originalism: The Role of the EPA in the Obama

Administration”http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&co ntext=ealr&sei-

redir=1#search=%22presidential%20power%20global%20warming%20obama%22 | JJ)

Global warming is becoming an emergency that warrants immediate action by the United States.275 President Obama has an

obligation to lead the United States’ response to the climate crisis because there is currently no viable

GHG reduction policy—especially one targeting mobile sources—under the existing federal environmental law

regime.276 President Obama can and should issue an executive order instructing EPA Administrator Jackson

to create regulations pursuant to the CAA to drastically reduce GHG emissions from mobile sources.277

Constitutionally, Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework justifies an executive order initiating EPA action; consequently, the Court

would afford Obama’s order the highest degree of judicial deference .278 There is authority for such an

executive order. 279 The Vesting Clause of Article II of the Constitution specifically grants executive power to the President.280

Agencies and their Administrators—including the EPA and Administrator Jackson—take their direction from

the President as subordinate members of the executive branch.281 Therefore, statutory grants of authority to the

Administrator can be interpreted as grants of authority to the chief executive to use the specified agency to implement the policy goals set

forth by Congress in the statute.282 In the proposed action, the CAA authorizes the EPA Administrator to create

regulations to curb air pollution from mobile sources when it states that regulations “shall” be

prescribed to “any” air pollutant that “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or

welfare.”283 However, the CAA does not state precisely what the regulations should entail.284 The CAA delegates this responsibly to the

EPA Administrator, provided that the rulemaking process is followed and that certain standards—including the requirement that only pollutants

“reasonably . . . anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” can be targeted—regarding the content of the regulations are met.285 Therelationship between the President and the EPA Administrator and the CAA’s grant of broad authority to the Administrator supports the

conclusion that Congress’s grant of power to the Administrator to design and implement pollution regulations is an implied grant of authority

to the executive branch to use the EPA as a vehicle for creating an air pollution control scheme.286 Therefore, under Justice Jackson’s

Youngstown framework, an executive order from President Obama instructing the EPA to begin curbing

mobile sources of GHGs per the CAA properly fits within the first category of presidential action

because authorization is “implied” from Congress’s grant of authority to an executive officer who has

cabinet-level status.287 Moreover, an executive order would not violate any constitutionally protected rights, including rights upheld

by separation of powers principles.288 The APA protects both substantive and procedural due process rights.289 In particular, an order

instructing the Administrator to act pursuant to the CAA is by definition an order to abide by the APA.290 The CAA delegates authority to the

Executive Branch via the instruction that the “Administrator shall” regulate air pollution.291 Agencies must abide by the rulemaking process

specified in the APA.292 The administrative requirements, including notice of proposed rulemaking, opportunities for comment, and the EPA’s

written response to comments, secure the public’s substantive and procedural due process rights.293 Additionally, such an order

would not jeopardize separation of powers principles because Congress delegated legislative duties

to the executive in the CAA. 294 Examples of executive orders that President Obama may issue could

direct the EPA Administrator to (1) set strict emission standards for future automobiles that will

compel technological innovations; (2) propose regulations that compel or encourage states to set strict

emissions targets; or (3) establish an innovative permit scheme designed to both limit the use of

mobile sources in the short-term and to fund research and development of new energy sources over

the medium to long-terms.295 Regardless of the avenue he pursues, President Obama has wide constitutional



latitude to prescribe regulatory standards under the CAA to reduce GHGs from mobile sources.

Conclusion Mapping the national and international response to global warming poses a major challenge to President Obama. Given the climate

crisis, President Obama should not wait for Congress to take action . He should initiate the United States’ c limate policy

through existing tools, particularly the CAA. While the CAA may not be an ideal vehicle for launching a national campaign to reduce GHG

emissions, it is a vehicle that already exists and has congressional approval.296 Conservatives opposed to a

progressive climate policy will challenge the President’s agenda in the courts, where conservative judges who rely on originalist readings of the

Constitution predominate. Therefore, the Obama Administration needs to justify its regulatory proposals in light of the judiciary’s conservative

jurisprudence. Based on a unitary executive theory, President Obama has the constitutional authority to issue an

executive order instructing the EPA Administrator to issue GHG-emission-limiting regulations

pursuant to the CAA.



2NC – Solvency/Doesn’t Link to Politics

The counterplan is key to solve and it doesn’t link to politics


Law Review, 1/1/2010, “Global Warming and Originalism: The Role of the EPA in the ObamaAdministration”http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=ealr&sei -

redir=1#search=%22presidential%20power%20global%20warming%20obama%22 | JJ)Human-induced-global warming is mostly attributable to the utilization of combustion-powered machines.31 One way to categorize

combustion- powered machines is by distinguishing whether the machine is stationary or mobile.32 Stationary sources of GHGs include

factories, power plants, and refineries.33 Mobile sources, which are generally found in the transportation sector, include “passenger cars and

light trucks, heavy duty trucks and off-road vehicles, and rail, marine, and air transport.”34 The latest research indicates that mobile sources

account for at least one third of the total GHG emissions in the United States.35 Conservative projections indicate that global

warming is happening rapidly and is irreparably changing the earth’s ecosystems.36 Many species will become

extinct or will be pushed to the brink of extinction as a result of human-induced climate change.37 James E. Hansen, Director of NASA’s

Goddard Institute for Space Studies, noted that the global climate system is approaching various tipping points.38 If

human emission rates continue at their current pace , the results could be very grim: sea levels will rise due to

melting ice caps and hundreds of millions of people will be displaced from their homelands.39 Mass

extinctions will be as likely as they were during the previous warming periods in the earth’s history.40Even assuming a gradual phase-out of all GHG emissions by the year 2300, scientific models predict dire consequences unless immediate action

is taken.41 Reports show that some effects of global warming are already irreversible.42 The effects of global warming also have the potential

to spill over into the realm of national security and politics.43 Global warming may deplete precious resources; result in infrastructure-

destroying weather that will wreak economic havoc; create large numbers of refugees and migrants; and make weak governments susceptible

to extremist takeovers. 44 Consequently, civil, regional, and international war may become more common.45 Presently, the American public is

divided on the importance of global warming,46 and the government’s position on international climate agreements has hurt the United States’

credibility abroad.47 Domestically, the lack of a concerted effort to change Americans’ consumption patterns has eviscerated the possibility of

climate consciousness for most of the population.48 A new Pew Center survey of twenty national priorities for 2009 indicates that global

warming ranks lowest.49 Furthermore, since global warming is a worldwide problem, international

cooperation will be imperative in order to achieve any meaningful reduction in GHG emissions.50 The

United States’ refusal to commit to any binding international climate treaties or agreements

compromises its credibility and interferes with global efforts to combat global warming.51 Other major GHG-emitting

countries simply will not take action without such commitments from the United States .52 Current

proposals to address global warming fail to take immediate action to curb U.S. emissions from mobile sources.53 A recent

congressional proposal dealing with climate change was the Boxer- Lieberman-Warner Resolution.54

Two problems were immediately evident with this proposal. First, the proposed action would have been gradual,

unfolding over the course of years, and GHG emissions would not have immediately been impacted.55

Second, the proposal completely ignored mobile sources of GHGs, focusing exclusively on implementing a cap-and-

trade program for stationary sources.56 The severity of global warming demands that the government act quickly,

and mobile sources are prime targets for emission reductions given their substantial contributions to warming.57 Furthermore, the

American public’s ambivalence toward global warming58 and its opponents’ successful f ilibuster of

the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner proposal, suggests that any proposal will face a tough battle in

Congress.59



2NC - Congress Fails

The AFF will fail – falls victim to cost overruns and legislative dilutions


Law Review, 1/1/2010, “Global Warming and Originalism: The Role of the EPA in the ObamaAdministration”http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=ealr&sei -

redir=1#search=%22presidential%20power%20global%20warming%20obama%22 | JJ)

Barack Obama has assumed the presidency at a time when the consequences of global warming

demand immediate action.1 Unfortunately, immediate action is not likely to come in the form of

legislation,2 as any congressional climate change proposal will likely be thwarted because it is too

costly to society, or it will be so diluted by legislative compromise that it will be ineffective. 3 A recent

Gallup Poll highlighted that there is a growing number of Americans who are skep-tical of the science

underlying global warming.4 Such polling is spurring some members of Congress to oppose climate

legislation.5 However, the Obama Administration is aware of the threats posed by global warming.6 The Administration is

poised to act following on endangerment finding from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) declaring

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from mobile sources to be a type of pollutant that is dangerous to publichealth and welfare.7 In the wake of the endangerment finding, President Obama will most likely build on the Supreme

Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA8 by initiating the regulatory process to control GHG emissions in the

United States under the authority of the Clean Air Act (CAA).9



Prez Power Good



XOs = Prez Powers

Unilateral executive policies let the president take credibility from Congress

Howell and Pevehouse 7 (William G. Howell - Sydney Stein Professor in American Politics in the Harris School And Jon C. Pevehouse -

associate professor at the University of Chicago's Irving B. Harris School of Public Policy, Princeton University Press, “While Dangers Gather:

Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers”, 2007, Pg. 7) MaxL There is, at present, a burgeoning body of work within American politics that documents the strategic advantages presidents

enjoy when they exercise their unilateral powers, or what elsewhere we have called "power without persuasion,“ which

very much embodies the deployment of troops abroad,“ Two features of this unilateral politics literature are worth noting. The first concerns

sequence. When presidents act unilaterally, they stand at the front end of the policy-making process and

thereby place on Congress and the courts the burden of revising a new political landscape. lf adjoining branches of

government choose not to retaliate, either by passing a law or ruling against the president, then the presidents order stands. Only by

taking (or credibly threatening to take) positive action can either adjoining institution limit the

presidents unilateral powers.



Prez Power Good – Conflict

A strong presidency solves a laundry list of wars and outweighs your turns

South China Morning Post 2K (South China Morning Post, 12/11/2000, ProQuest | JJ) <MODIFIED FOR

GENDERED LANGUAGE>A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world. For better or worse, the person

who rules the United States influences events far beyond the shores of his [or her] own country. Both

the global economy and international politics will feel the effect of political instability in the US. The

first impact will be on American financial markets, which will have a ripple effect on markets and

growth across the world. A weakened US presidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world.

The Middle East, the conflict between India and Pakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way

relations between China and Taiwan play out, will be influenced by the authority the next US president

brings to his [or her] job. There are those who would welcome a weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for

example, feel they would benefit from a less interventionist American policy in the Middle East. Even within the Western alliance, there are

those who would probably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for example, might feel

that a less assertive US might force the European Union to be more outward looking. But the dangers

of having a weak , insecure US presidency outweigh any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and

military power cannot be wished away. A president with a shaky mandate will still command great power and

influence, only he [or she] will be constrained by his domestic weakness and less certain about how to use his

authority. This brings with it the risks of miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that

heightens conflict . There are very few conflicts in the world today which can be solved without US

influence. The rest of the world needs the United States to use its power deftly and decisively. Unfortunately, as the election saga

continues, it seems increasingly unlikely that the next US president will be in a position to do so.



Prez Power Good – Hegemony

Weak presidents are comparatively worse – they cause incoherent foreign policy and spark conflicts

Koh 95 (Harold Hongju, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Director,

Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School, 1995, “ War andResponsibility in the Dole-Gingrich Congress”, 50 U. Miami L. Review 1, Hein Online | JJ) Both precedents have obvious parallels today, not to mention a third possibility: that temptation might draw the executive branch into a

"splendid little war" - like Grenada or Panama - with an eye toward a possible presidential bounce in the polls. That possibility raises Maxim

Two: that weak presidents are more dangerous than strong ones . Jimmy Carter, for example, in the last two years of

his presidency, engaged in perhaps the most dramatic nonwartime exercise of emergency foreign power ever seen,

not because he was strong but because he was so politically weak . 43 In foreign policy, weak presidents all too

often have something to prove. 44 In a gridlock situation, the president's difficulty exhibiting strength in

domestic affairs - where Congress exercises greater oversight and must initiate funding proposals - makes it far easier for him

to show leadership in foreign affairs. At the same time, weak presidents may underreact to looming crises

that demand strong action , for fear that they cannot muster the legislative support necessary to generate the appropriate response.

But when these weak presidents do finally respond, they tend to overreact : either to compensate fortheir earlier underreaction, or because by that time, the untended problem has escalated into a full-

blown crisis, Bosnia and Haiti being the two prime Clinton Administration examples. 45 When private parties bring suits to challenge these

presidential policies, courts tend to defer to weak presidents, because they view them not as willful, so much as stuck in a jam, [*12] lacking

other political options. Finally, weak presidents are more prone to give away the store, namely, to undercut their own

foreign policy program in order to preserve their domestic agenda. This raises the question of whether this

Democratic president may be forced to sign restrictive congressional legislation - or whether Congress might pass such legislation over

presidential veto, as Congress did with the War Powers Resolution in 1974 - which may later come back to haunt future presidents. Nor, in this

media age, is any president's strength truly secure. These days every president, whatever his current popularity rating, is potentially

weak. We sometimes forget that just after the Gulf War, George Bush's popularity rating stood at 91%, only ten months before he lost

reelection, and five years before he recanted about his actions during the war itself.

A strong executive is vital to a successful American foreign policyMallaby 2K (Sebastian Mallaby, member of The Washington Post's Editorial Board, “The Bullied Pulpit: A

Weak Chief Executive Makes Worse Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb 2000 Edition, JSTOR | JJ)

Finally, some will object that the weakness of the presidency as an institution is not the main explanation for

the inadequacies of American diplomacy, even if it is a secondary one. The ad hominem school of thought argues instead that

Bill Clinton and his advisers have simply been incompetent. Others make various sociological claims that isolationism or

multiculturalism lies at the root of America's diplomatic troubles. All of these arguments may have merit. But the

evidence cited by both camps can be better explained by the structural weakness of the presidency.

Take, for example, one celebrated error: President Clinton's declaration at the start of the Kosovo war that the Serbs need not fear NATO

ground troops. This announcement almost certainly cost lives by encouraging the Serbs to believe that America was not serious about stopping

ethnic cleansing. The ad hominem school sees in this example proof of Clinton's incompetence; the sociological school sees in it proof of

isolationist pressure, which made the option of ground troops untenable. But a third explanation, offered privately by a top architect of the

Kosovo policy, is more plausible. According to this official, the president knew that pundits and Congress would criticize whichever policy he

chose. Clinton therefore preemptively took ground troops off the table, aware that his critics would then urge him on to a ground war -- andalso aware that these urgings would convince Belgrade that Washington's resolve would stiffen with time, rather than weaken. The president's

stand against ground troops was therefore the logical, tactical move of a leader feeling vulnerable to his critics. Other failings of

American diplomacy can likewise be accounted for by the advent of the nonexecutive presidency.

Several commentators, notably Samuel Huntington and Garry Wills in these pages, have attacked the arrogance of America's presumption to

offer moral leadership to the world. But American leaders resort to moral rhetoric largely out of weakness. They fear that their policy will be

blocked unless they generate moral momentum powerful enough to overcome domestic opponents. Likewise, critics point to the hypocrisy of

the United States on the world stage. America seeks U.N. endorsement when convenient but is slow to pay its U.N. dues; America practices

legal abortion at home but denies funds to organizations that do the same abroad. Again, this hypocrisy has everything to do with the weak



executive. The president has a favored policy but is powerless to make Congress follow it. Still other critics

decry American diplomacy as a rag-bag of narrow agendas: Boeing lobbies for China trade while Cuban-Americans demand sanctions on Cuba.

Here, too, presidential power is the issue. A strong presidency might see to it that America pursues its

broader national interest, but a weak one cannot. This is why Clinton signed the Helms-Burton sanctions on Cuba even

though he knew that these would do disproportionate harm to U.S. relations with Canada and Europe. What if America's

nonexecutive presidency is indeed at the root of its diplomatic inadequacy ? First, it follows that it is toooptimistic to blame America's foreign policy drift on the weak character of the current president. The institution of the presidency itself is weak,

and we would be unwise to assume that a President Gore or Bradley or Bush will perform much better. But it also follows that it is too

pessimistic to blame America's foreign policy drift on cultural forces that nobody can change, such as

isolationism or multiculturalism.

Presidential power is key to hegemony

Deans 2K (Bob Deans, Associate Director of Communications, Washington DC, 1/23/2000, “THE

AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: White House power growing”, The Atlanta Journal the Atlanta Constitution,

ProQuest | JJ)

Yet the U.S. presidency, long regarded as the most powerful institution in the world, arguably has

assumed more authority and reach than at any time in its history. While no one can doubt the growing impact of theInternet, Silicon Valley and Wall Street on the daily lives of all Americans, only the president can rally truly global resources

around American ideals to further the quest for equality and to combat the timeless ills of poverty

and war. It is that unique ability to build and harness a worldwide consensus that is widening the

circle of presidential power. "The presidency will remain as important as it is or will become more important," predicted presidential

scholar Michael Nelson, professor of political science at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tenn. The voice of all Americans The taproot of

presidential power is the Constitution, which designates the chief executive, the only official elected

in a national vote, as the sole representative of all the American people. That conferred authority reflects the

state of the nation, and it would be hard to argue that any country in history has possessed the military,

economic and political pre-eminence that this country now holds. And yet, the nation's greatest strength

as a global power lies in its ability to build an international consensus around values and interests

important to most Americans. On Clinton's watch, that ability has been almost constantly on display as he has patched together

multinational responses to war in the Balkans, despotism in Haiti, economic crises in Mexico, Russia, Indonesia and South Korea, and natural

disasters in Turkey and Venezuela. The institutions for putting together coalition-type action --- the United Nations, the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization among them --- are

hardly tools of American policy. But the United States commands a dominant, in some cases decisive,

position in each of those institutions. And it is the president , far more than Congress, who determines how

the United States wants those institutions to be structured and to perform . "Congress is a clunky institution of

535 people that can't negotiate as a unit with global corporations or entities," said Alan Ehrenhalt, editor of Governing magazine. "It's the

president who is capable of making deals with global institutions." It is the president, indeed, who

appoints envoys to those institutions, negotiates the treaties that bind them and delivers the public

and private counsel that helps guide them, leaving the indelible imprint of American priorities on

every major initiative they undertake. "That means, for example, that we can advance our interests in resolving ethnic conflicts,

in helping address the problems of AIDS in Africa, of contributing to the world's economic development, of promoting human rights," saidEmory University's Robert Pastor, editor of a new book, "A Century's Journey," that elaborates on the theme.

Strong president key to preserve heg

Deans 2k (Bob “The American Presidency: White House Power Growing”, The Atlanta Journal Constitution,

http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/247246574 1/23/00) SC

Yet the U.S. presidency, long regarded as the most powerful institution in the world, arguably has

assumed more authority and reach than at any time in its history .¶ While no one can doubt the growing impact of the





Prez Power Good – Nuke Terror

Strong executive authority is key to solve nuclear terrorism

Taylor 9 (Stuart Taylor Jr., staff writer for Newsweek magazine, 1/9/2009, “Obama’s Cheney Dilemma”,

http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/01/09/obama-s-cheney-dilemma.html | JJ)In times of war and crisis, as presidents such as Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt discovered, the nation needs a strong

chief executive. The flaw of the Bush-Cheney administration may have been less in what it did than in the way it did it—flaunting

executive power, ignoring Congress, showing scorn for anyone who waved the banner of civil liberties. Arguably, there has been an

overreaction to the alleged arrogance and heedlessness of Bush and Cheney—especially Cheney, who almost seemed to take a grim satisfaction

in his Darth Vader-esque image. The courts, at first slow to respond to arrogations of executive power after

September 11, have pushed back. Many federal officials have grown risk-averse, fearing that they will

be prosecuted or dragged before a congressional committee for fighting too hard against terrorism. (A

growing number of CIA officials buy insurance policies to cover legal fees.) Obama, who has been receiving intelligence briefings for weeks,

already knows what a scary world it is out there. It is unlikely he will wildly overcorrect for the Bush administration's abuses. A very senior

incoming official, who refused to be quoted discussing internal policy debates, indicated that the new administration will try to find a middle

road that will protect civil liberties without leaving the nation defenseless. But Obama's team has some strong critics of the

old order, including his choice for director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, who has spoken out strongly against coercive interrogation methods.

In Obama's spirit of nonpartisanship, the new crowd would do well to listen to Jack Goldsmith, formerly a

Bush Justice Department official, now a Harvard Law School professor. At Justice, Goldsmith was the head of an obscure but

critically important unit called the Office of Legal Counsel. OLC acts as a kind of lawyer for the

executive branch, offering opinions—close to binding—on what the executive branch can and cannot do. It

was an OLC lawyer, John Yoo, who in 2001 and 2002 drafted many of the memos that first gave the Cheneyites permission to do pretty much

whatever they wanted in the way of interrogating and detaining suspected terrorists (and eavesdropping on Americans to catch terrorists).

Goldsmith, who became head of OLC in 2003, quietly began to revoke some of these permissions as illegal or unconstitutional. The revolt of

Goldsmith and some other principled Justice lawyers was a heroic story, kept secret at the time. Now Goldsmith worries about the pendulum

swinging too far, as it often does in American democracy. "The presidency has already been diminished in ways that

would be hard to reverse" and may be losing its capability to fight terrorism, he says. He argues that

Americans should now be "less worried about an out-of-control presidency than an enfeebled one."

A strong executive is key to resolve terrorismSulmasy 9 (Glenn Sulmasy, law faculty of the United States Coast Guard Academy, 2009, “Executive Power: The Last Thirty Years”,

University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 30 Issue 4, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1944-sulmasyexecutive-power|

JJ)

Since the attacks of 9/11, the original concerns noted by Hamilton, Jay, and Madison have been

heightened. Never before in the young history of the United States has the need for an energetic

executive been more vital to its national security . The need for quick action in this arena requires an

executive response -particularly when fighting a shadowy enemy like al Qaeda-not the deliberative bodies opining on

what and how to conduct warfare or determining how and when to respond. The threats from non-state actors, such as al Qaeda,

make the need for dispatch and rapid response even greater. Jefferson's concerns about the slow and deliberative

institution of Congress being prone to informational leaks are even more relevant in the twenty first century. The advent of the

twenty-four hour media only leads to an increased need for retaining enhanced levels of executivecontrol of foreign policy. This is particularly true in modern warfare. In the war on international terror, intelligence

is vital to ongoing operations and successful prevention of attacks . Al Qaeda now has both the will and the ability to

strike with the equivalent force and might of a nation's armed forces. The need to identify these individuals before they

can operationalize an attack is vital. Often international terror cells consist of only a small number of

individuals - making intelligence that much more difficult to obtain and even more vital than in

previous conflicts. The normal movements of tanks, ships, and aircrafts that, in traditional armed conflict are indicia of a pending attack

http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/01/09/obama-s-cheney-dilemma.html

https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1944-sulmasyexecutive-power

https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1944-sulmasyexecutive-power

http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/01/09/obama-s-cheney-dilemma.html



are not the case in the current "fourth generation" war. Thus, the need for intelligence becomes an even greater

concern for the commanders in the field as well as the Commander-in-Chief.



Prez Power Good – Prolif

Pres power K2 prevent proliferation - empirics prove

Thompson 94 (Kenneth is an author of many US policy books. “PRESIDENTS AND ARMS CONTROL” 1994, p. 63-64.

http://mirlyn.lib.umich.edu/Record/002901933 ) SC Kissinger believed that the role of the NSC staff was to develop a set of options for the President. Kissinger restructured the staff, creating

interdepartmental groups to study problem areas and formulate policy choices; the groups would develop and assess alternatives. he [or

she]created a verification panel and a senior review group at the undersecretary level-which he [or she]chaired-to deal with

recommendations coming up the ladder from the interdepartmental groups, various departments, and various government agencies. In

this manner the control of national security decision making was centered in the White House, which

dearly the President wanted, as well as Kissinger, because President Nixon, like President Kennedy, without question gave top

priority to foreign affairs. Kissinger also created various special groups that were subordinate to the NSC-such as the Vietnam Special

Studies Group-which strengthened the NSC and helped the NSC staff attempt to dominate the Department of State. Kissinger's success in

this regard can be seen in a statement made at that time by President Nixon to the effect that, "Kissinger covers not only foreign policy, but

national security policy-the coordination of those policies." Of course, Kissinger remained a key player in the Ford administration. During

both administrations, while Kissinger's personal influence was virtually unassailable, the NSC staff had markedly less power during the Ford

administration, with no direct access to the president. Arms control during this period, while conducted by ACDA negotiators, was not

removed from the intervention of the powerful Henry Kissinger. Although career diplomats might have felt neglected during the Kissinger

era, or indeed stung by it, it can be argued that the positive outcome of that period was an extraordinary set

of arms control agreements based on the premise that arms control really worked . Only a strongpresident could have brought such an ambitious arms control agenda through congressional

ratification. During the height of the Nixon years, the agreements reflected the power of the

President, his [or her] international interests, and the power of Henry Kissinger. Presidents Ford and

Carter, who for very different reasons had single-term presidencies, were unable to achieve the depth and the span of

the Nixon arms control initiatives. As an example, the SALT I agreements represented the first U.S.-Soviet agreements to place

limits and restraints on some of those countries' central and most important strategic offensive and defensive weapons. The agreements

were a diplomatic achievement because there were large asymmetries in the Soviet and American weapon systems, and material

differences in the two countries'defense needs and defense commitments.



Prez Power Good - War on Terror

Pres powers k2 war on terror

Pauly and Lansford 3 (Robert and Tom, professor of history and political Science at Norwich University and assistant professor of

political science, University of Southern Mississippi, American Diplomacy, “National Security Policy and the Strong Executive: The French and

American Presidents and the War on Terror”, June, 2003 http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04-

06/lansfordpauly_exec/lansfordpauly_exec.html) SC The result of this concentration of power has been the repeated presidential use of the U.S. military

throughout the nation’s history without a formal congressional declaration of war and an increased

preference by both the executive and the legislature for such actions.17 One feature of this trend was

consistency in U.S. foreign policy, especially during the Cold War era. Even during periods when the

United States experienced divided government, with the White House controlled by one political party

and all or half of the Congress controlled by the party in opposition, the executive was able to develop

and implement foreign and security policy with only limited constraints.18 Given the nature of the

terrorist groups that attacked the United States on 11 September 2001, such policy habits proved useful

since a formal declaration of war was seen as problematic in terms of the specific identification of the

foe and the ability of the Bush administration to expand combat operations beyond Afghanistan to

countries such as Iraq.



Prez Power Good – Trade Wars

Prez powers is key to resolve trade wars

Mead 2K (Walter Russell Mead, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard

College, 11/12/2000, “American Influence Abroad May Shrink”http://articles.latimes.com/2000/nov/12/opinion/op-50619 | JJ)

A serious crisis could flare up in this region at a moment's notice, and those who remember the

controversies over Central American policy in the 1980s--and the continuing bitter battles over Cuba today--know how hard it

can be for the United States to develop a political consensus concerning neighborhood policy. Expanding

NAFTA or pushing harder to establish a free trade area of the Americas are proposals most of the Washington establishment think have the

best chances for stabilizing the region but, again, it is hard to see a politically enfeebled president and a divided

Congress mustering the determination to move far down either road. Trade gridlock could have

repercussions beyond the Western Hemisphere . It will be harder for a weak president to make the

kinds of creative concessions and compromises necessary to resolve trade disputes at the World

Trade Organization , thereby increasing the risk of trade wars with partners like the European Union. Fast-track

authority for new trade rounds will be difficult, if not impossible to get.

http://articles.latimes.com/2000/nov/12/opinion/op-50619

http://articles.latimes.com/2000/nov/12/opinion/op-50619





AT PP Bad – Constitution

The aff’s retreat toward the Constitution only creates a more volatile government and halts the

transformation into a modern society

Skowronek 11 (Stephen Skowronek, Pelatiah Perit Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale University, 2011, “Shall We Cast Our Lotwith the Constitution?”, from “Presidency in the Twenty-first Century” by Charles W. Dunn, University Press of Kentucky | JJ)

But there is no mistaking the cutting edge of their new formulation. The arguments of the unitarians do not just scoop up

the progressives’ legacy of national and executive power; they also marginalize and stigmatize the

extraconstitutional mechanisms on which the progressives had relied to surround and regulate their

presidency-centered system. Public opinion, publicity, pluralism, empiricism, science, openness,

technical expertise, professional judgment, administrative independence, freedom of information—

all the operating norms on which the progressives pegged their faith in building the “modern”

presidency— are sidelined by this appeal back to the Constitution . When Theodore Roosevelt addressed the

question of how to limit his heady notion of a presidential “stewardship,” he endorsed the idea of a popular recall of presidents who had lost

the confidence of the public. 48 When an interviewer pressed Vice President Cheney on the decisive turn of public opinion aga inst Bush-

administration war policies, the quick retort— “So?”—offered a pointed lesson on the distance that has been traveled between these two

constructions. 49 Democracy’s claims on presidential power now end with the administration of the oathof office. Had the ambitions of the conservative insurgency not met such stubborn resistance for so long, it might be harder to credit its

heavy investment in the exclusivity of presidential control. As it stands, the unitary theory is a high-stakes gamble that leaves movement

priorities no more secure than the next election cycle. More striking still is the theory’s pretension to upholding

constitutional intent, for a more personalized and internalized form of modern executive power

threatens to render the whole of modern American government more volatile . 50 When the notion of a

presidential stewardship is stripped of progressive provisions for collective oversight by the nation’s “prudentes”; when the notion of a

politicized bureaucracy is stripped of Jacksonian provisions for collective oversight by the party; when the notion of a concert of power is

stripped of Jeffersonian provisions for collective oversight by the Congress— when the extraconstitutional ballast for

presidential government is all stripped away and the idea is formalized as fundamental law, the

original value of stability in government is all but lost from view.



AT PP Bad – Separation of Powers

TURN – an expansive executive is necessary to preserve separation of powers

Mansfield 89 (Harvey Mansfield, William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Government at Harvard University,

1989, “Taming the Prince”, http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/pcg/files/taming_the_prince.pdf | JJ)Leaving aside consideration of the American presidency for a moment, we find two notable works by M. J. C. Vile and W. B. Gwyn on the history

of the doctrine of the separation of powers. Here again we encounter the ambivalence of executive power. Both authors insist that the

doctrine of separation of powers must be understood as connected with-or, as they say, confused with-the

notion of the mixed or balanced constitution. 35 The cause of this confusion, it would seem, is the problem of executive

power. Because the separation of powers, according to them, is based on an analysis of functions, and

because the executive function is considered subordinate to the legislative, the result is a weak

executive. Yet the powers do not remain separate operationally unless they are strong enough to

defend themselves against each other, and thus are independent. In such circumstances a strong

executive is required. Obviously because no formal dictionary or functional definition of ''executive''

power can produce equality with legislative power, a supplementary and informal reality must be

found and justified by the doctrine of the mixed or balanced constitution. This in itself requires only an informalmix or balance of functions and not a formal demarcation of them. To secure an actual separation of powers, therefore,

the doctrine of separation of powers must reach outside its formal justification for that separation

and necessarily grasp some notion of expansive, informal, executive power. A recognition, more or less

understood, of this necessity has produced the supposed confusion of the separation of powers and the mixed constitution. Accordingly, the

history of the doctrine of separation of powers needs to be considered with special emphasis on executive power.

http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/pcg/files/taming_the_prince.pdf





AT AFF Args



AT Links to Politics

CP shields congress

Milner and Tingley 11 (Helen V. and Dustin H., Profs @ Princeton U, Who Supports Global Economic

Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy , InternationalOrganization 65, Winter 2011, p. 37-68,

http://www.princeton.edu/~hmilner/forthcoming%20papers/MilnerTingley%20(2011)%20Who%20Sup

ports%20Global%20Economic%20Engagement.pdf, p. 37-8)//LA

Governments pursue their international goals through the setting of foreign policy+ Chief executives

endeavor to choose foreign policies that respond to the exi- gencies of the international system; they seek to respond optimally

to external circumstances and to the policies chosen by other countries to advance their goals+ But the tools of foreign policy

have domestic consequences+ Military interventions, trade policy, foreign aid, economic sanctions, and alliance

commitments, for instance, all exact costs from and provide benefits to different sectors of the domestic

polity+ To use these tools to advance a country’s international goals means that some domestic

groups benefit and others are harmed: “For any choice of foreign policy, there will be winners and losers at the

domestic level; what one player values, another may discount”1 Foreign policy tools thus have a domestic political

component+ In democracies, governments have to build domestic support for the use of foreign policy tools+ In the United States,

which we focus on in this article, presidents must build legislative coalitions because of the separation of

powers system+ Presidents are not free to simply design the optimal policy for foreign engagement;

instead they must obtain domestic approval+ Legislators may have their own preferences about

foreign policy, given the impact policy has on their local constituencies and therefore their re-election prospects+ Legislators may

find it politically costly to yield to the president’s foreign policy concerns+ Foreign policy, then, results from some

combination of these domestic and international pressures.

Executive orders are protected from encroachment and avoid the link to politics

Howell and Pevehouse 7 (William G. Howell - Sydney Stein Professor in American Politics in the Harris School And Jon C. Pevehouse -

associate professor at the University of Chicago's Irving B. Harris School of Public Policy, Princeton University Press, “While Dangers Gather:

Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers”, 2007, Pg. 8) MaxL

The second feature of unilateral powers that deserves attention is that when the president acts, he acts alone. Of course, he

relies on numerous advisors to formulate the policy, to devise ways of protecting it against congressional or

judicial encroachment, and to oversee its implantation. But to issue the actual policy, as either an

executive order or memorandum or any other kind of directive, the president need not rally majorities, compromise

with adversaries or wait for some interest group to bring a case to court. The president, instead, can

strike out on his own, placing on others the onus of coordinating an effective response. Doing so, the modern president is in a

unique position to lead, break through the stasis that pervades the federal government, and impose his

will in more and more areas of governance.

Obama can pass policies to bypass partisan congress

NYT 12 (Charlie Savage, New York Times Politics, “Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals”, 4-22-12,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-obama-bypass-congress.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) MaxL

WASHINGTON — One Saturday last fall, President Obama interrupted a White House strategy meeting to raise an issue not on the agenda. He declared,

aides recalled, that the administration needed to more aggressively use executive power to govern in the face of

Congressional obstructionism. “We had been attempting to highlight the inability of Congress to do anything,” recalled William M. Daley, who

was the White House chief of staff at the time. “The president expressed frustration, saying we have got to scour everything and push the envelope in find ing things

we can do on our own.” For Mr. Obama, that meeting was a turning point. As a senator and presidential candidate, he had criticized George W. Bush for flouting the

role of Congress. And during his first two years in the White House, when Democrats controlled Congress, Mr. Obama largely worked through the legislative process

to achieve his domestic policy goals. But increasingly in recent months, the administration has been seeking ways to act without

Congress. Branding its unilateral efforts “We Can’t Wait,” a slogan that aides said Mr. Obama coined at that strategy meeting, the Whit e House has rolled out

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-obama-bypass-congress.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-obama-bypass-congress.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0



dozens of new policies — on creating jobs for veterans, preventing drug shortages, raising fuel economy standards, curbing domestic violence and more. Each time,

Mr. Obama has emphasized the fact that he is bypassing lawmakers. When he announced a cut in refinancing fees for federally insured

mortgages last month, for example, he said: “If Congress refuses to act, I’ve said that I’ll continue to do everything in my power to

act without them.” Aides say many more such moves are coming. Not just a short-term shift in governing s tyle and a re-election strategy, Mr. Obama’s

increasingly assertive use of executive action could foreshadow pitched battles over the separation of powers in his second term, should he win and Republicans

consolidate their power in Congress. Many conservatives have denounced Mr. Obama’s new approach. But William G. Howell, a University of Chicago political

science professor and author of “Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action,” said Mr. Obama’s use of executive power

to advance domestic policies that could not pass Congress was not new historically. Still, he said, because of Mr.

Obama’s past as a critic of executive unilateralism, his transformation is remarkable. “What is surprising is that he is coming around to responding to the incentives

that are built into the institution of the presidency,” Mr. Howell said. “Even someone who has studied the Constitution and holds it in high regard — he, too, is going

to exercise these unilateral powers because his long-term legacy and his standing in the polls crucially depend upon action.” Mr. Obama has issued signing

statements claiming a right to bypass a handful of constraints — rejecting as unconstitutional Congress’s attempt to prevent him from having White House “czars”

on certain issues, for example. But for the most part, Mr. Obama’s increased unilateralism in domestic policy has relied on a diff erent form of executive power than

the sort that had led to heated debates during his predecessor’s administration: Mr. Bush’s frequent assertion of a right to override statutes on matters like

surveillance and torture. “Obama’s not saying he has the right to defy a Congressional statute,” said Richard H. Pildes, a New York University law professor. “But if

the legislative path is blocked and he otherwise has the legal authority to issue a n executive order on an issue, they are clearly much more willing to do that now

than two years ago.” The Obama administration started down this path soon after Republicans took over the House of Representatives last year. In February 2011,

Mr. Obama directed the Justice Department to stop defending the Defense of Marriage Act, which bars federal recognition of sa me-sex marriages, against

constitutional challenges. Previously, the administration had urged lawmakers to repeal it, but had defended their right to enact it. In the following months, the

administration increased efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions through environmental regulations, gave states waivers from federal mandates if they agreed to

education overhauls, and refocused deportation policy in a way that in effect granted relief to some illegal immigrants brought to the country as children. Each step

substituted for a faltered legislative proposal. But those moves were isolated and cut against the administration’s broader political messaging strategy at the time:

that Mr. Obama was trying to reach across the aisle to get things done. It was only after the summer, when negotiations over a deficit reduction deal broke down

and House Republicans nearly failed to raise the nation’s borrowing limit, that Mr. Obama fully shifted course. First, he proposed a jobs package and gave speeches

urging lawmakers to “pass this bill” — knowing they would not. A few weeks later, at the policy and campaign strategy meeting in the White House’s RooseveltRoom, the president told aides that highlighting Congressional gridlock was not enough. “He wanted to continue down the path of being bold with Congress and

flexing our muscle a little bit, and showing a contrast to the American people of a Congress that was completely stuck,” said Nancy-Ann DeParle, a deputy chief of

staff assigned to lead the effort to come up with ideas. Ms. DeParle met twice a week with members of the domestic policy council to brainstorm. She met with

cabinet secretaries in the fall, and again in February with their chiefs of staff. No one opposed doing more; the challenge was coming up with workable ideas, aides

said. The focus, said Dan Pfeiffer, the White House communications director, was “what we could do on our own to help the economy in areas Congress was failing

to act,” so the list was not necessarily the highest priority actions, but instead steps that did not require legislation. Re publican lawmakers watched warily. One of

Mr. Obama’s first “We Can’t Wait” announcements was the moving up of plans to ease terms on student loans. After Republican complaints that the executive

branch had no authority to change the timing, it appeared to back off. The sharpest legal criticism, however, came in January after Mr. Obama bypassed the Senate

confirmation process to install four officials using his recess appointment powers, even though House Republicans had been fo rcing the Senate to hold “pro forma”

sessions through its winter break to block such appointments. Mr. Obama declared the sessions a sham, saying the Senate was really in the midst of a lengthy

recess. His appointments are facing a legal challenge, and some liberals and many conservatives have warned that he set a dangerous precedent. Senator Harry Reid

of Nevada, the Senate Democratic leader, who essentially invented the pro forma session tactic late in Mr. Bush’s presidency, has not objected, however. Senate

aides said Mr. Reid had told the White House that he would not oppose such appointments based on a memorandum from his counsel, Serena Hoy. She concluded

that the longer the tactic went unchallenged, the harder it would be for any president to make recess appointments — a significant shift in the historic balance of

power between the branches. The White House counsel, Kathryn Ruemmler, said the Obama administration’s legal team had begun examining the issue in early

2011 — including an internal Bush administration memo criticizing the notion that such sessions could block a pr esident’s recess powers — and “seriously

considered” making some appointments during Congress’s August break. But Mr. Obama decided to move ahead in January 2012, inc luding installing Richard

Cordray to head the new consumer financial protection bureau, after Senate Republicans blocked a confirmation vote. “I refuse to take ‘no’ for an

answer,” Mr. Obama declared, beneath a “We Can’t Wait” banner. “When Congress refuses to act and — as a result — hurts our economy

and puts people at risk, I have an obligation as president to do what I can without them.” The unilateralist

strategy carries political risks. Mr. Obama cannot blame the Republicans when he adopts policies that liberals oppose, like when he overruled the Environmental

Protection Agency’s proposal to strengthen antismog rules or decided not to sign an order banning discrimination by federal contractors based on sexual

orientation. The approach also exposes Mr. Obama to accusations that he is concentrating too much power in the White House. Earlier this year, Senator Charles E.

Grassley, Republican of Iowa, delivered a series of floor speeches accusing Mr. Obama of acting “more and more like a king that the Constitution was designed to

replace” and imploring colleagues of both parties to push back against his “power grabs.” But Democratic lawmakers have been largely quiet; many of them accuse

Republicans of engaging in an unprecedented level of obstructionism and say that Mr. Obama has to do what he can to make the government work. The pattern

adds to a bipartisan history in which lawmakers from presidents’ own parties have tended not to object to invocations of executive power. For their part,

Republicans appear to have largely acquiesced. Mr. Grassley said in an interview that his colleagues were reluctant to block even more bills and nominations in

response to Mr. Obama’s “chutzpah,” lest they play into his effort to portray them as making Congress dysfunctional. “Some of the most conservative people in our

caucus would adamantly disagree with what Obama did on recess appointments, but they said it’s not a winner for us ,” he said. Mr. Obama’s new approach puts

him in the company of his recent predecessors. Mr. Bush, for example, failed to persuade Congress to pass a bill allowing rel igiously affiliated groups to receive

taxpayer grants — and then issued an executive order making the change. President Bill Clinton increased White House involvement in

agency rule making, using regulations and executive orders to show that he was getting things done despite oppositionfrom a Republican Congress on matters like land conservation, gun control, tobacco advertising and treaties. (He was assisted by a

White House lawyer, Elena Kagan, who later won tenure at Harvard based on scholarship analyzing such efforts and who is now on the Supreme Court.) And both

the Reagan and George Bush administrations increased their control over executive agencies to advance a

deregulatory agenda, despite opposition from Democratic lawmakers , while also developing legal theories and tactics to increase

executive power, like issuing signing statements more frequently.

Executive orders get past congressional gridlock avoiding the link to politics

Koenig 12 (Brian Koenig, Yahoo News, “Obama Uses Executive Orders to Bypass Congress



Obama Uses Executive Orders to Bypass Congress”, 4-23-12, http://news.yahoo.com/obama-uses-executive-orders-bypass-congress-

192700126.html) MaxL

President Barack Obama's agenda, particularly involving legislative proposals like his ambitious "Buffett Rule" tax plan, has been

stunted by a polarized Congress now toiling in gridlock. Consequently, the White House is resorting to its

purported "executive authority" -- specifically, by issuing a flurry of new executive orders. To put it lightly, the president's view of

Congress has been unpalatable, at least, since the Republicans captured the House of Representatives in the 2010 election. And Obama's

solution? Bypass Congress altogether. "We had been attempting to highlight the inability of Congress to do anything," assertedformer White House chief of staff William M. Daley, referring to a strategy meeting carried out last fall. "The president expressed frustration,

saying we have got to scour everything and push the envelope in finding things we can do on our own." Indeed,

the Obama administration is now launching its "We Can't Wait" campaign, a seemingly despotic ploy to work

around Obama's congressional foes and enact a catalog of new executive-ordained policies. On Monday,

for example, Obama issued an executive order that would grant U.S. officials the authority to decree sanctions on foreign nationals who have

used internet tracking and cellphone monitoring -- among other technologies -- to perform human-rights abuses. Furthermore, the White

House released another executive order earlier this month that would establish an oversight group consisting of 12 federal agencies charged

with supporting "safe and responsible unconventional domestic natural gas development." One more executive order -- entitled, "National

Defense Resources Preparedness" -- quietly issued on March 16, granted unprecedented power to the president to control "critical resource

and production sources," including energy production. In effect, this insatiable product of Obama's "We Can't Wait" campaign granted the

president unbounded authority to seize control of all U.S. resources as long as his intention is "to promote the national defense" -- an obscure

maxim that bolsters countless meanings. All in all, the White House's agenda is clear. "I refuse to take 'no' for an

answer," Obama professed in a speech carried out earlier this year. "When Congress refuses to act and -- as a result -- hurts our

economy and puts people at risk, I have an obligation as president to do what I can without them."

Administration efforts solve Latin American policy – bypasses Congress

Hallow 13 (Ralph Z. Hallow, The Washington Times, “A Top 10 list for the new Congress:

Issues, trends to watch on Capitol Hill in 2013, beyond”, 1-7-13, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/7/top-10-list-for-the-new-

congress/) MaxL

4) Benghazi and the world: Despite the administration’s best efforts, the problems in security and foreign policy exposed by

the deadly attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, will get a fresh airing in the new Congress. Other overseas events

likely to be felt strongly at home include the potential shifts in Latin America with the passing from the

scene of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez, who is battling cancer, and the European Union’s never-ending efforts to get its arms

around the euro crisis. “The ability of Europe’s elite to find political Band-Aids to cover over ever-expanding economic wounds is truly impressive, but not without

bounds,” said Heritage Foundation fellow J.D. Foster. 5) Alien nation: Watch for Republicans, stung by huge losses among Hisp anic voters Nov. 6, to tear themselves

apart in a struggle to reach a bipartisan immigration deal. Mr. Obama has vowed to get more involved in drafting legislation to ove rhaul the nation’s immigration

policies, but any final compromise could wind up alienating the ideological wings of both parties. O ne element both sides likely will agree on is a move to reverse

the “brain drain” of talented immigrants, said Brookings Institution’s Governance Studies Fellow John Hudak, easing rules for visa-bearing foreign graduates of U.S.

universities who have high-tech savvy to stay and work in the country. Many GOP leaders say they recognize the need to refine the party’s message on imm igration,

but Sen. Marco Rubio’s efforts to draft a Republican version of the Dream Act could prove problematic with the party base if the freshman Floridian makes a 2016

presidential run. 6) Economic blame game: As in Mr. Obama’s first term, a potential economic slowdown this year would leave the two parties fighting over who

bears the blame for the failure of the economy to recover fully. Mr. Obama was able to blame predecessor George W. Bush for much of his first term’s woes, but

that argument is unlikely to fly in the next four years. 7) Waging war on wages: Whatever the pace of economic growth in the next four years, an equally important

political debate is shaping up over pocketbooks and paychecks. After years of unimpressive wage growth, labor unions will pre ssure Mr. Obama to do something to

boost paychecks, extending the fight already begun over higher taxes for the rich passed in the “fiscal cliff” compromise. In his first term, Mr. Obama condemned

wage stagnation but offered no concrete solutions. If he does so in 2013, Republicans face a question of how to position their opposition. 8) Governors on the

ballot: Two very different Republicans will be carrying the banner in the only two states holding gubernatorial contests this year. In Virginia, state Attorney General

Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II, a favorite of movement conservatives, will test his appeal as the GOP nominee in an i ncreasingly purple state that voted once again for Mr.

Obama in November. In New Jersey, Gov. Chris Christie seeks a second term while facing anger from some on the right over his performance in the Superstorm

Sandy aftermath and seeking to enhance his national profile ahead of a possible 2016 presidential bid. 9) Congressional bypass operation: With divided

government and partisan gridlock returning to Capitol Hill in 2013, conservatives will be on the watch for efforts by the

administration to bypass Congress to implement Mr. Obama’s liberal agenda. The expectation on both sides is for agency action and

executive orders that bypass Congress, moves that can’t be blocked legislatively but pile moreregulations on the private sector.

http://news.yahoo.com/obama-uses-executive-orders-bypass-congress-192700126.html


http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/7/top-10-list-for-the-new-congress/








AT XO Gets Rolled Back

Executive orders rarely get rolled back – in fact, they force Congressional action

Fine and Warber 12 (JEFFREY A. FINE and ADAM L. WARBER, Associate Professor of Political Science at

Clemson College of Business and Behavioral Science, 4/13/12, “Circumvent ing Adversity: ExecutiveOrders and Divided Government”, Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 42, Issue 2, 256-274, Wiley Online

| JJ)We also should expect presidents to prioritize and be strategic in the types of executive orders that they create to maneuver around a hostile

Congress. There are a variety of reasons that can drive a president's decision. For example, presidents can use an executive

order to move the status quo of a policy issue to a position that is closer to their ideal point . By doing so,

presidents are able to pressure Congress to respond , perhaps by passing a new law that represents a

compromise between the preferences of the president and Congress. Forcing Congress's hand to

enact legislation might be a preferred option for the president, if he perceives Congress to be unable

or unwilling to pass meaningful legislation in the first place. While it is possible that such unilateral

actions might spur Congress to pass a law to modify or reverse a president's order, such responses by

Congress are rare (Howell 2003, 113-117; Warber 2006, 119). Enacting a major policy executive order allows the president to move theequilibrium toward his preferred outcome without having to spend time lining up votes or forming coalitions with legislators. As a result, and

since reversal from Congress is unlikely , presidents have a greater incentive to issue major policy

orders to overcome legislative hurdles.

Executive orders are fast and fear little checks from the other branches

Fisher 7 (Louis Fisher, Scholar in Residence at the Constitution Project, 2007, A review of “Executive

Orders and the Modern Presidency: Legislating from the Oval Office” by Adam Warber, Political Science

Quarterly Vol. 121 Issue 4, 712-713, ProQuest | JJ)A reader may draw the erroneous conclusion that the significance of executive orders is not growing. Looking at total numbers, there has been

no significant increase, but executive orders are being used more frequently for policy purposes. From the

administration of Franklin Roosevelt to that of John Kennedy, the percentage of policy executive orders ranged from

22.2 percent to 38.8 percent, or an average of 25.7 percent. That percentage increased to 42.8 percent from the administration of Lyndon

Johnson to that of Gerald Ford, and climbed still further, to 65.6 percent from the administration of Jimmy Carter to that of Bill Clinton (p.

39). Also, Warber makes clear that presidents are at liberty to issue executive orders with little fear of

legislative or judicial checks . Without pushback from other branches, executive orders remain a

potent weapon.



AT SOP Disad

The prez has got the power—comparative evidence

Propst 11 (Stephen F., The Brookings Institution, Presidential Authority To Modify Economic Sanctions

Against Cuba, 2/15/11, http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/57d34e80-51b8-4ee0-ae64-750f65ee7642/Preview/PublicationAttachment/55896b90-840a-42bf-8744-

752a7a206333/Cuba%20Aritcle%20FINAL.pdf)//LA

Through a complex series of federal statutes, Congress has codified the comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions

against Cuba and restricted the President’s authority to suspend or terminate those sanctions until a “transition

government” is in power in Cuba. Notwithstanding these statutory requirements , the President maintains

broad authority and discretion to significantly ease specific provisions of the Cuba sanctions regime in

support of particular U.S. foreign policy objectives recognized by Congress, including the provision of

humanitarian support for the Cuban people and the promotion of democratic reforms. In fact, since Congress codified of the

Cuba sanctions in 1996, Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama have each exercised this authority to ease

the scope of restrictions applicable to Cuba, without action or approval by Congress. This executive authority to modify the Cuba

sanctions is grounded in Constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions that empower the Presidentand the responsible executive branch agencies to grant exceptions to the sanctions through executive

actions, regulations and licenses. The authority is particularly broad in certain areas, such as

telecommunications-related transactions and humanitarian donations, where Congress has explicitly granted discretion to

the President under existing statutes. Consistent with the relevant statutory authorities and restrictions, as well as statutory

statements of U.S. policy objectives, the President arguably has sufficient legal authority to make the following

types of additional changes to the current U.S. sanctions against Cuba: • Establishing “general licenses” for existing

categories of travel to Cuba that are currently authorized only by specific licenses; • Expanding existing categories of authorized travel to

include new travel provisions (along the same lines as the new authorization announced on January 14, 2011 for travel related to non-academic

clinics and workshops in Cuba); • Revising existing general and specific license provisions to ease or eliminate current limitations and conditions

applicable to travel and remittances to Cuba; • Establishing a new general license for the provision of services to Cuba (along the same

lines as the March 2010 revision that authorized services to facilitate Internet communications); • Establishing a general license for entry

into U.S. ports of vessels engaged in trade with Cuba; • Permitting payment for authorized transactionswith Cuba (except sales of agricultural commodities or products) to be financed through letters of credit or other financing

arrangements issued, confirmed or advised by U.S. financial institutions (but subject to statutory restrictions on the extension of credit for

transactions involving “confiscated property”); • Authorizing imports of certain goods and services from Cuba;

Modifying current export control regulations to establish more favorable licensing policies for additional categories of items

that may be exported under specific licenses; • Establishing additional license exceptions for exports of U.S.-origin

goods to Cuba; and • Expanding the availability of existing license exceptions to cover additional categories of exports and

easing conditions and limitations on the use of those exceptions.

Only the CP is constitutional Powell 99 (H. Jefferson, Prof @ Duke Law School, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An

Executive Branch Perspective, The George Washington Law Review March 99 Vol. 67 No. 3, p. 527,

http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1391&context=faculty_scholarship&sei-

redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%2522exec

utive%2522%2520%2522responsibility%2522%2520%2522foreign%2520policy%2522%2520%2522congr

ess%2522%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D5%26ved%3D0CEgQFjAE%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fsch

olarship.law.duke.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1391%2526context%253Dfacu

lty_scholarship%26ei%3D3kfcUcLeCeT98AH04IH4Bw%26usg%3DAFQjCNHoPUm0q3wf09AANmj7ZMAN

xtDmLw#search=%22executive%20responsibility%20foreign%20policy%20congress%22)//LA



As the preceding discussion of conditional spending indicates, the executive branch perspective involves challenging

questions of how to reconcile the existence of the President'-s broad authority as constitutional

representative of the United States in foreign affairs with Congress's far-reaching powers. It is as

unacceptable to allow Congress to seize control of the executive's responsibilities for foreign policy and

national security as it is to give crabbed readings to the authority of the national legislature to provide for the common defense and

general welfare. Responsible constitutional reasoning from the executive branch perspective seeks to

serve both of these goals: "we fully acknowledge the broad sweep of Congress's powers while

insisting, as we must, that those powers cannot be legitimately employed so as to undermine the

constitutional authority of the executive branch."127 Understood from the executive branch perspective, in other words,

executive primacy in foreign affairs and national security is a faithful exposition not only of judicial

precedent and historical practice, but also of the fundamental notion that the Constitution is meant to

provide checks on the tendency of power, including executive power, to become arbitrary. As I noted in the

Introduction, executive primacy is a persuasive interpretation of the Constitution only if it can generate a set of doctrines concerning power

over foreign affairs and national security that makes sense in light of the whole of constitutional law. The next Part of this Essay provides a

schematic outline of those doctrines, a descrip- tion of the executive primacy position rather than a direct defense of its supe- riority over

competing views of the Constitution.





22 U.S.C. § 7028 acknowledges that Congress did not attempt to alter any prohibitions on the

importation of goods from Cuba under 31 C.F.R. § 515.204. However, Congress did not codify or

otherwise mandate the enforcement of this regulation.

Presidential Authority

Although, multiple Congressional statutes have re-stated the regulatory prohibition on the importation

of Cuban goods, no legislation appears to codify the restriction. Thus, the President may modify 31

C.F.R. § 204’s complete prohibition on the importation of Cuban goods to permit some exceptions.

2. Allow for the export and sale of goods and services to businesses, agricultural cooperatives and

individuals engaged in certifiably (i.e., non-state) economic activity.

Regulatory Prohibition(s)

15 C.F.R. § 746.2 prohibits a variety of exports of U.S. goods to Cuba. This regulatory provision sets forth

various licensing exceptions and special licenses that permit the exportation of certain goods to Cuba,

however, none apply to the goods described by the recommendation.

31 C.F.R. § 515.559 prohibits the exportation of goods to Cuba which require special licenses pursuant to

15 C.F.R. § 746.2 unless the good meets a series of requirements listed within 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(a)-(b).

Importantly, a special license will only be authorized for goods relating to (1) contracts that were

entered into prior to October 23, 1992; (2) medicine or medical devices (subject to additional

restrictions); or (3) telecommunications equipment.Statutory Prohibition(s)

22 U.S.C. § 6005(a)(1) codifies the restrictions for issuing special licenses for exports to Cuba found

within 31 C.F.R. § 515.559.


The President will have the authority to amend 15 C.F.R. § 746.2 to permit additional licensing

exceptions for the exportation of goods discussed in the recommendation. However, the President’s

ability to create additional special licenses is restricted by the limitations imposed by 31 C.F.R. § 515.559

and 22 U.S.C. 6005(a)(1).

3. Allow licensed U.S. travelers to Cuba to have access to U.S.-issued pre-paid cards and other financial

services—including travelers’ insurance.

Regulatory Prohibition(s)31 C.F.R. § 515.201(a)(1) prohibits all transfers of credit by or through any banking institution or person

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

31 C.F.R. § 515.560(e) prohibits the use of credit cards, debit cards, or other instruments for travel

expenditures within Cuba.

31 C.F.R. § 515.560(c)(5) only permits transactions incident to travel in Cuba to be conducted using

“currency, which is defined as money, cash, drafts, notes, travelers’ checks, negotiable instruments, or

scrip having a specific and readily determinable face value or worth, but which does not include gold or

other precious metals in any form.”

Statutory Prohibition(s)

22 U.S.C. § 6033(a) prohibits the financing of any transactions involving confiscated property claimed by

a U.S. national.

22 U.S.C. § 7207(b) prohibits the financing of agricultural sales in terms other than in cash.


The President may modify the current regulations to permit the use of credit cards and other financial

services in Cuba subject only to the minor limitations imposed by 22 U.S.C. § 6033(a) and 22 U.S.C. §

7207(b).

4. Expand general licensed travel to include U.S. executives and their duly appointed agents to Cuba in

financial services, travel and hospitality-related industries, such as banking, insurance, credit cards, and

consumer products related to travel.




31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a) prohibits all travel to, from, or within Cuba except travel incident to activities

which fall into one of twelve different licensing categories.

31 C.F.R. § 515.564(a)(2)-(3) limits travel for “professional meetings” to those organized by international

professional organizations or for commercial telecommunications transactions.

31 C.F.R. § 515.574 limits travel to provide “support for the Cuban people” to include a non -exhaustive

list of activities such as: activities for recognized human rights organizations; activities for independent

organizations supporting democracy in Cuba; and activities by non-governmental organizations to

promote independent activity within Cuban civil society.


22 U.S.C. § 7209(b) prohibits all travel to, from, or within Cuba that does not fall into a category set forth

in 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(c). The President may not add any additional travel category to 31 C.F.R. §

515.560(c).


The President may permit additional general licensed travel only to the extent the President is able to

broaden the scope of one of the current twelve travel categories.[8] Presently, none of the twelve

categories directly incorporate the activities detailed in the recommendation; however, no legislation

prohibits the President from altering the meaning of each category. The most applicable travelcategories are 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(4)—“Professional research and professional meetings”—or 31

C.F.R. § 515.560(8)—“Support for the Cuban people.” The President may amend the provisions that

define these travel categories—31 C.F.R. § 515.564(a)(2)-(3) and 31 C.F.R. § 515.574—in order to permit

the desired activity.

5. Expand general licensed travel to include: law, real estate and land titling, financial services and

credit, and any area defined as supporting independent economic activity.

The President does not have the authority to add more categories of licensed travel as explained in

Question (2). However, The President will have authority to amend or redefine the existing travel

categories—most specifically the categories focused on travel in support of the Cuban people or for

professional meetings.

6. Allow for the sale of telecommunications hardware—including cell towers, satellite dishes, andhandsets—in Cuba.


None

31 C.F.R. § 515.542 currently permits all transactions of common carriers incident to the use of cables,

satellite channels, radio signals, or other means of telecommunications for the provision of services

between Cuba and the U.S.


22 USC § 6004(e)(5) declines to authorize any U.S. person from investing in the domestic

telecommunications network within Cuba. Thus, U.S. individuals may not invest funds to physically link

telecommunications devices with the Cuban domestic network.


The President has the authority to amend the current regulations in order to further enhance

telecommunications connections between the U.S. and Cuba. Importantly, 22 U.S.C. § 6004(e)(5) does

not prohibit investment in the Cuban telecommunications network. Instead, the statute only states that

it does not authorize such activity. Notably, much of what this recommendation seeks to accomplish

has already been enacted by the President under 31 C.F.R. § 515.542.[9] The only additional

amendments that may be necessary are those that will clarify the ability of telecommunications

providers to invest or link with the Cuban domestic network.



7. Promote Cuba’s engagement with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to create opportunities for

gradual process of confidence building through technical and development assistance


None


22 U.S.C. § 6034(a) requires the U.S. representative of any international financial institution to oppose

by voice or vote the admission of Cuba as a member of such institution unless the President determines

that a democratically elected government has come to power in Cuba.


The President has no authority to permit Cuba to become a member of any international financial

institution (“IFI”), limiting the ability of the U.S. to promote Cuba’s engagement with IFIs. However, 22

U.S.C. § 6034(a) only applies to issues of Cuba’s admission as a member of an IFI. To the extent the

President wishes to otherwise engage in a policy to increase Cuba’s engagement with IFIs without

seeking Cuba’s admission as a member, the President may do so.



AT Perm

Perm links to the net benefit – it hurts prez powers

Suto 13 (Ryan J. Suto, Policymic, “What is an Executive Order And is It Constitutional?”, February 2013,

http://www.policymic.com/articles/27100/what-is-an-executive-order-and-is-it-constitutional) MaxL

The National Archives describes executive orders as “official documents, numbered consecutively, through which the President of the

United States manages the operations of the Federal Government.” These documents are largely constitutional and

uncontroversial. Despite President Obama’s relatively infrequent use of executive orders, they have become

a salient topic lately, and thus warrant more explanation. There are two relevant clauses in the U.S. Constitution regarding executive

orders: Art. I Sec. 1 and Art. II Sec. 3. The first states, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,

which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” The second clause states that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be

faithfully executed.” Or, put more simply, Congress makes the laws and the president enforces the laws. Thus, the deeply-rooted American

concept of "separation of powers" is what drives the controversy of executive orders. While the president cannot "legislate," he/she must be

able to control his/her branch of the government: if Congress micromanaged the executive branch, that would

encroach on presidential power, and thus violate the separation of powers as much as presidential

legislation would. This is the constitutional tightrope that executive orders must walk: they cannot constitute "legislation," but must

allow the president to effectively run the executive branch of the government so that he/she can ensure the laws are faithfully executed.

The perm fails – Congress will veto unpopular executive orders if included

Abourezk 77 (James Abourezk – Former US senator, Maurer School of Law: Indiana University, Indiana Law Journal, “The Congressional

Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives”, 1-1-1977,

http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3235&context=ilj) MaxL

As a means of controlling and limiting the exercise of legislative-like power by executive or administrative agencies,

Congress has adopted the congressional veto procedure.4 This procedure enables Congress, by action

short of enactment of new legislation, to preclude implementation of proposed executive or administrative

actions which have been advanced pursuant to statutory authority. The congressional veto takes three forms: (1) action by one

or more designated committees of Congress (committee veto); (2) a simple resolution passed by either House of Congress (oneHouse veto); or

(3) a concurrent resolution (concurrent veto). The congressional veto customarily takes effect in the following manner. Congress

enacts a statute, either signed by the President or passed over his veto, requiring implementation by the executive or an administrative agency.

Pursuant to a delegation of authority in the enabling statute, an affected agency must submit to Congress whatever

executive orders, rules, regulations or directives it proposes to implement the stated congressional policy. If at the expiration

of a specified time period, usually thirty to sixty days, no disapproval action is taken by the Congress, the proposed action

becomes effective.

http://www.policymic.com/articles/27100/what-is-an-executive-order-and-is-it-constitutional

http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3235&context=ilj

http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3235&context=ilj

http://www.policymic.com/articles/27100/what-is-an-executive-order-and-is-it-constitutional



AT Perm Do the CP

The perm is severance

‘The’ means all parts Merriam-Websters 8 Online Collegiate Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group

as a whole <the elite>

“USFG” is all three branches

US Legal, No Date (US Legal Definitions, “United States Federal Government Law & Legal Definition”,

http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/) MaxL

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares

sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i)

the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii)

Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the

three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; allpowers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

Severance is illegitimate

A. Kills neg ground – allows them to spike out of links killing fairness and in depth education

B. Makes them a moving target – severing parts of the 1AC make it impossible to have coherent

debates and education

http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/

http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/







Perm

Perm—do both—Congress can enact legislation granting Obama the power to do the plan

Gosar 13 (Rep. Paul R-AZ, Breitbart.com, PRESIDENTIAL GUN BAN: EXECUTIVE POWER OR

UNCONSTITUTIONAL POWER GRAB? , 1/10/13, http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/01/10/presidential-gun-ban-executive-unconstitutional)//LA

Let's focus on the supposed authority of the President to simply enact laws by the stroke of his pen.

Article I Section I of the Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress. All. None are given to the

President or the Courts. All government acts need to be evaluated on whether they are consistent

with our Constitution. The executive branch has the Constitutional responsibility to execute the laws

passed by Congress. It is well accepted that an executive order is not legislation nor can it be. An executive

order is a directive that implements laws passed by Congress. The Constitution provides that the president "take care

that the laws be faithfully executed." Article II, Section 3, Clause 5. Thus, executive orders can only be used to carry out the

will of Congress. If we in Congress have not established the policy or authorization by law, the

President can't do it unilaterally. In order for the President to enact a gun ban by executive order, he

would have to have such power given to him by Congress (we already established that the Constitution does not give

him that power). Any unilateral action by the President must rely on either a constitutional authority or a

statutory power from Congress. What laws exist for the President to enact gun bans by executive order? The Attorney General is

authorized under the Gun Control Act (GCA) to regulate the import of firearms if it is “generally suitable" for or readily adaptable to sporting

purpose. Thus, the Attorney General could use a “sporting purposes test” by which he can determine the types of firearms that can be

imported into the United States. But this law does not authorize a gun ban or affect domestic manufacture and sales. So it provides no

Congressional basis for Mr. Biden or the President to create a gun ban. President Obama may point out that President Clinton

issued an executive order (No. 12938) in 1994 where some Chinese firearms and ammunition were restricted from import. If

that occurred, it would have been a serious overreach of the application of the authority set forth in

that Executive Order, which President Clinton said at the time was being implemented under the International Economic Powers Act,

the National Emergencies Act, and the Arms Export Control Act. As stated in the Order itself, "the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and

chemical weapons (‘‘weapons of mass destruction’’) and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary

threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that

threat." President Clinton Executive Order 12938 (1994). How that justification, based on large scale weapons of mass destruction, could be

interpreted to include Chinese hand guns is unclear and problematic. Indeed, any fair reading of those laws would conclude they could notsupport a domestic gun ban. The bottom line is that there is no Congressional authority enacted that would

allow the President to take unilateral action to make it unlawful for individuals to transfer or possess a rifle, handgun or other

gun or a large capacity ammunition feeding device. Nor is there any Constitutional power under Article II (the power of being the “Commander

in Chief”) that allows this. If the President wants a gun ban or ammunition ban he has to first revise the Second Amendment, which is not easy,

but possible. I would, of course, oppose that, as would most Americans. But that is at least a lawful and Constitutional means to achieve this.

Executive-legislative COOPERATION solves best

Eizenstat 98 (Stuart E., JD Harvard Law School, Jimmy Carter’s Chief Domestic Policy Advisor, Bill

Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business, and

Agricultural Affairs, and Undersecretary of Commerce, also was United States Ambassador to the EU

from 1993-6, Very qualified individual, Sanctions By Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for

Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, 9/8/98, http://wpobw-

res8.wpafb.af.mil/Pubs/Indexes/Vol%2021_2/Eizenstat.pdf)//LAMost importantly. Mr. Chairman. our foreign policy is most effective when it reflects cooperation and

consultation between the Administration and the Congress. The decision to apply economic sanctions-

-or to lift or waive potential measures or those already in place--should reflect a relationship of

comity between the Executive and Legislative branches. We must respect the particular role that each

branch plays in making foreign policy. The Congress shares with the Executive Branch the

responsibility for helping shape our foreign policy. In the realm of economic measures. Congress has a

clear role which we respect. At the same time. the President is responsible for conducting the nation's



foreign policy and for dealing with foreign governments. Thus. sanctions legislation needs to take into

account these respective responsibilities. Sanctions legislation should set forth broad objectives but

should allow the flexibility to respond to a constantly changing and evolving situation and give the

President the necessary authority to tailor specific U.S. actions to meet our foreign policy objectives. As

Secretary Albright has said, there can be no "cookie-cutter," no "one size fits all "approach to sanctions policy.

Comity between branches of government is expressed in sanctions legislation through the inclusion of

appropriate Presidential flexibility. including broad waiver authority. Congress speaks. but ultimately

only the President can weigh all the foreign policy issues at stake at any given moment and tailor our

response to a specific situation. Congress's power of the purse and of oversight are more-than-

adequate tools with which to shape our foreign policy: but those powers should not be used to hobble

the President's authority to act with discretion and alacrity. As a matter of general principle.

legislation that empowers the President to impose economic sanctions should also empower him not

to act and to waive or suspend measures already in place if it is in the national interest. If our policies

are to be effective. we must work together to see that our use of sanctions is appropriate. coherent.

and designed to gain international support. There must be more structured. systematic discussions

between the Executive Branch and Congress when sanctions are an option. The efforts of this Task Force and this

hearing itself are. Mr. Chairman. a good example of the way our two branches of government should work together to design an effective and

principled sanctions policy that can be truly effective in advancing our broad national interests.



Perm Avoids Politics

Congress would be totally down with the perm

Weiner 1/14 (Sarah, Very good former debater, works @ Center for Strategic and International Studies,

Fast Tracking Nuclear Treaties, 1/14/13, http://csis.org/blog/fast-tracking-nuclear-treaties)//LAIt would appear as if nuclear agreements are stuck between a rock and a hard place. President Obama could act independently,

provoking congressional backlash and raising Constitutional objections, or he could submit

agreements to the Senate for their advice and consent, likely to receive much of the former but too little of the latter.

Fortunately, there is a third way forward, a half-step between independent executive action and

cumbersome treaty ratification in the Senate. The Administration should consider submitting future

international nuclear pacts to Congress in the form of congressional-executive agreements. This alternative

ratification process, frequently used for trade and financial treaties, lowers the bar for Congressional consent

without excluding the legislative branch from the treaty process.





CP Links to Politics

On a scale of one to ten, how much does this CP link to politics? OVER NINE THOUSAND!!!

Weisman 9 (Jonathan, WSJ, Obama’s Fiat Angers Lawmakers, *I’m dead serious. The article is ACTUALLY

called Obama’s Fiat Angers Lawmakers…like holy crap right? Ermagerdermagerd+, 7/15/9,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124761651200542351.html)//LA

WASHINGTON -- With $108 billion in International Monetary Fund loan guarantees in jeopardy last month, White House economic

officials begged, cajoled and cut deals with Democrats to secure passage of legislation boosting the fund's power. Days later,

President Barack Obama announced he wasn't bound by any of the agreements. The ensuing flap over the

president's June 24 signing statement is the latest in a series of clashes between the White House and

Congress over an issue Mr. Obama once fought against himself: presidential fiat . As a candidate, Mr. Obama

pledged that he wouldn't abuse the presidential signing statement, a declaration issued by the president when he

signs a bill to give his interpretation of that law. President George W. Bush used so many signing statements -- more than 750 -- that

the American Bar Association criticized it as an abuse of power. After Mr. Obama's issuance of his second signing

statement last month, even some Democrats say he isn't keeping his word on reining in unilateral

presidential actions. "Of course there's a broader issue here," said House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank (D., Mass.),

referring to the brewing battles with Mr. Obama over presidential prerogative. "It's outrageous. It's exactly what the Bush people did." A

White House official said the signing statement was issued "out of an abundance of caution" to

preserve "core presidential prerogatives" in the area of foreign policy. "The administration negotiated in good faith

on this bill and has every intention of living up to our commitments undertaken in the legislation," said White House deputy press secretary Jen

Psaki. The House last week reinstated the restrictions on the IMF that were undone by the president's June signing statement, by a vote of 429-

2, in a foreign-operations appropriations bill. In a letter slated for delivery on Wednesday, Mr. Frank, House Appropriations

Committee Chairman David Obey (D., Wis.), and New York Democratic Reps. Nita Lowey and Gregory Meeks will inform

the president that if he issues another signing statement on IMF and World Bank funding, Congress will cut off

the funds he wants. Mr. Obama needs good relations with congressional Democrats to help pass his

agenda on health care, energy and financial-markets regulation. At the London summit of the Group of 20 largest

economic powers in April, Mr. Obama had promised to secure large increases in loan guarantees for the IMF. With the Group of Eightsummit kicking off soon, failure to make good on that promise would have been an embarrassment. Many

Republicans opposed the IMF loan-guarantee language, which had been inserted in a war-spending bill making its way through Congress last

month, calling it a bailout for international bankers. The White House needed to win over balking Democrats. Rep. Brad

Sherman (D., Calif.), negotiating for some Jewish lawmakers, said he told White House National Economic Council Director Lawrence Summers

they needed stronger guarantees that IMF loans wouldn't go to Iran.

Executive power is partisan—it CAN be blocked by Congress and causes backlash

Daly et al 2/8 (Matthew, Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Mary Clare Jalonick, and Sam Hananel, Associated

Press, How Obama is wielding executive power in 2nd term, http://washingtonexaminer.com/how-

obama-is-wielding-executive-power-in-2nd-term/article/2520953) LA [Card from last year]

WASHINGTON (AP) -- This is what "Forward" looks like. Fast forward, even. President Barack Obama's campaign slogan is springing to

life in a surge of executive directives and agency rule-making that touch many of the affairs of

government. They are shaping the cost and quality of health plans, the contents of the school cafeteria, the front lines of future combat,

the price of coal. They are the leading edge of Obama's ambition to take on climate change in ways that may be unachievable in legislation.

Altogether, it's a kinetic switch from what could have been the watchword of the Obama administration in the closing, politically hypersensitive

months of his first term: pause. Whatever the merits of any particular commandment from the president or his agencies, the perception of a

government expanding its reach and hitting business with job-killing mandates was sure to set off fireworks before November. Since Obama's

re-election, regulations giving force and detail to his health care law have gushed out by the hundreds of pages. To some extent this was

inevitable: The law is far-reaching and its most consequential deadlines are fast approaching. The rules are much more than fine print,

however, and they would have thickened the storm over the health care overhaul if placed on the radar in last year's presidential campaign.

That, after all, was the season when some Republicans put the over-the-top label "death panel" on a board that could force cuts to service

providers if Medicare spending ballooned. The new health law rules provide leeway for insurers to charge smokers thousands of dollars more



for coverage. They impose a $63 per-head fee on insurance plans -- a charge that probably will be passed on to policyholders -- to cushion the

cost of covering people with medical problems. There's a new fee for insurance companies for participating in markets that start signing

customers in the fall. In short, sticker shock. It's clear from the varied inventory of previously bottled-up directives that Obama cares about

more than "Obamacare." "I'm hearing we're going to see a lot of things moving now," Hilda Solis told employees in her last

day as labor secretary. At the Labor Department, this could include regulations requiring that the nation's 1.8 million in-home care workers

receive minimum-wage and overtime pay. Tougher limits on soot from smokestacks, diesel trucks and other sources were announced just over

a month after the November election. These were foreseen: The administration had tried to stall until the campaign ended but released the

proposed rules in June when a judge ordered more haste. Regulations give teeth and specificity to laws are essential to their functioning evenas they create bureaucratic bloat. Congress-skirting executive orders and similar presidential directives are less

numerous and generally have less reach than laws. But every president uses them and often tests how

far they can go, especially in times of war and other crises. President Harry Truman signed an executive order in 1952

directing the Commerce Department to take over the steel industry to ensure U.S. troops fighting in Korea were kept supplied with weapons

and ammunition. The Supreme Court struck it down. Other significant actions have stood. President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an order in

February 1942 to relocate more than 110,000 Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast to internment camps after Japan's attack on the

Pearl Harbor naval base. Decades later, Congress passed legislation apologizing and providing $20,000 to each person who was interned. After

the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, President George W. Bush approved a series of executive orders that created an office of homeland

security, froze the assets in U.S. banks linked to al-Qaida and other terrorist groups, and authorized the military services to call reserve forces to

active duty for as long as two years. Bush's most contentious move came in the form of a military order approving the use of the military

tribunals to put accused terrorists on trial faster and in greater secrecy than a regular criminal court. Obama also has wielded considerable

power in secret, upsetting the more liberal wing of his own party. He has carried forward Bush's key anti-terrorism policies and expanded the

use of unmanned drone strikes against terrorist targets in Pakistan and Yemen. When a promised immigration overhaul failed in legislation,

Obama went part way there simply by ordering that immigrants brought illegally to the United States as children be exempted from

deportation and granted work permits if they apply. So, too, the ban on gays serving openly in the military was repealed before the election,

followed now by the order lifting the ban on women serving in combat. Those measures did not prove especially

contentious. Indeed, the step on immigration is thought to have helped Obama in the election. It may be a different story as

the administration moves more forcefully across a range of policy fronts that sat quiet in much of his first term.

William Howell, a political science professor at the University of Chicago and the author of "Power Without Persuasion: The P olitics of Direct

Presidential Action," isn't surprised to see commandments coming at a rapid clip. "In an era of polarized parties and a fragmented Congress, the

opportunities to legislate are few and far between," Howell said. "So presidents have powerful

incentive to go it alone. And they do." And the political opposition howls. Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., a possible

contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 2016, said that on the gun-control front in particular, Obama is "abusing his

power by imposing his policies via executive fiat instead of allowing them to be debated in Congress."

The Republican reaction is to be expected, said John Woolley, co-director of the American Presidency Project at the University

of California in Santa Barbara. "For years there has been a growing concern about unchecked executive

power ," Woolley said. "It tends to have a partisan content , with contemporary complaints coming from the

incumbent president's opponents." The power isn't limitless, as was demonstrated when Obama issued one of

his first executive orders, calling for closing the military prison at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba

and trying suspected terrorists housed there in federal courts instead of by special military tribunals. Congress stepped in to prohibit

moving any Guantanamo prisoners to the U.S., effectively blocking Obama's plan to shutter the jail. Among recent actions: --Obama issued

presidential memoranda on guns in tandem with his legislative effort to expand background checks and ban assault-type weapons and large

capacity magazines. The steps include renewing federal gun research despite a law that has been interpreted as barring such research since

1996. Gun control was off the table in the campaign, as it had been for a decade, but the shooting at a Connecticut elementary school in

December changed that overnight. --The government proposed fat, calorie, sugar and sodium limits in almost all food sold in schools, extending

federal nutritional controls beyond subsidized lunches to include food sold in school vending machines and a la carte cafeteria lines. The new

proposals flow from a 2010 law and are among several sidelined during the campaign. The law provoked an outcry from conservatives who said

the government was empowering itself to squash school bake sales and should not be telling kids what to eat. Updated regulations last year on

subsidized school lunches produced a backlash, too, altogether making the government shy of further food regulation until the election passed.The new rules leave school fundraisers clear of federal regulation, alleviating fears of cupcake-crushing edicts at bake sales and the like. --The

Justice Department released an opinion that people with food allergies can be considered to have the rights of disabled people. The finding

exposes schools, restaurants and other food-service places to more legal risk if they don't accommodate patrons with food allergies. --The

White House said Obama intends to move forward on rules controlling carbon emissions from power plants as a central part of the effort to

restrain climate change, which the president rarely talked about after global-warming legislation failed in his first term. With a major

climate bill unlikely to get though a divided Congress, Obama is expected to rely on his executive

authority to achieve whatever progress he makes on climate change. The Environmental Protection Agency is expected to complete the

first-ever limits on carbon pollution from new coal-fired power plants. The agency also probably will press ahead on rules for existing power

plants, despite protests from industry and Republicans that such rules would raise electricity prices and kill off coal, the dominant U.S. energy



source. Older coal-fired power plants have been shutting across the country because of low natural gas prices and weaker demand for

electricity. --In December, the government proposed long-delayed rules requiring automakers to install event data recorders, or "black boxes,"

in all new cars and light trucks beginning Sept. 1, 2014. Most new cars are already getting them. --The EPA proposed rules to update water

quality guidelines for beaches and control runoff from logging roads. As well, a new ozone rule probably will be completed this year, which

would mean finally moving forward on a smog-control standard sidelined in 2011. A regulation directing federal contractors to hire more

disabled workers is somewhere in the offing at the Labor Department, as are ones to protect workers from lung-damaging silica and reduce the

risk of deadly factory explosions from dust produced in the making of chemicals, plastics and metals. Rules also are overdue on genetically

modified salmon, catfish inspection, the definition of gluten-free in labeling and food import inspection. In one of the most closely watched

cases, Obama could decide early this year whether to approve the Keystone XL oil pipeline from Canada to

Texas.

Congress will have the final say over executive orders – dooms solvency and links to politics

Jones 13 (Sarah Jones, Politicus USA, “Obama Can’t Fix Congress’ Monsanto Giveaway with an Executive Order”, 3-27-13,

http://www.politicususa.com/2013/03/27/congress-sequester-crisis-slip-corporate-give-monstanto.html) MaxL Food activists are now calling for the President to issue a signing statement and/or executive order to label our

food, “Today we’re calling on President Obama to issue an executive order to call for the mandatory labeling of genetically engineered

foods.” A signing statement would have been issued while signing the legislation, and would have claimed that part of the law was

unconstitutional. However, it wouldn’t have changed how the law was implemented. An executive order

cannot make new law; only Congress can do that. An executive order tells a President’s administration how he

wants a law implemented; it gives direction to officers and agencies of the executive branch. But here’s the real kicker:

Even if President Obama were to sign an executive order to label our food (we have no indication as to whether he would beinclined to do so), Congress could deny funding its execution, just as they have with his order to close

Gitmo. When it comes to laws, it always comes back to Congress. Our food safety has been severely compromised by

corporate lobbyists’ ever-tightening control over our representatives. If people really want things to change, they need to be able to identify

the individuals behind these cowardly acts. Here’s a hint: Republican Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO) takes the most money from pro-GMO PACs in

the Senate Appropriations Committee, where this dastardly rider was secretly attached (this time, that is. We have a certain House Republican

who tries to attach a similar amendment to almost every bill that touches his greedy fingers). Democratic Senator Jon Tester (D-MT) tried to get

the amendment taken out of the spending billto no avail. While HR 933 expires in six months, I have little hope that we will see any major

changes in food safety while our Congress is controlled by big ag/corporate money. The AP reported onMaplight’s analysis, “Current members

of Congress have received $7,450,434 from the PACs of these organizations.” No matter who is in the White House,

Congress controls the purse strings and makes the laws , and they are more than adept at using current crises

(manufactured by them, of course) to attach corporate giveaways to big spenders. This is yet another beyond frustrating poison pill.

Political capital is low and executive orders have costs – they will erode PCEberly 13 (Todd Eberly – Coordinator of Public Policy Studies and assistant professor of Polsci @ St. Mary’s college, The Baltimore Sun, “The

Presidential Power Trap”, 1-21-13, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-

george-hw-bush-party-support) MaxL Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack Obama's narrow re-election victory,

coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and Democratic majority

Senate, hardly signals a grand resurgence of his political capital. The president's recent issuance of multiple

executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of

legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit

or cost and will likely further erode his political capital. Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to

avoid a power trap. Presidents in recent years have been unable to prevent their political capital from

eroding. When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble. Through leveraging public

support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the publicalready supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to

secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform —

that at the time received popular approval. However, short-term legislative strategies may win policy success for a

president but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital over time, as the difficult final years of both the

Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved the

political capital problem or avoided the power trap. It is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and one that

will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.

http://www.politicususa.com/2013/03/27/congress-sequester-crisis-slip-corporate-give-monstanto.html

http://action.fooddemocracynow.org/sign/obama_signs_monsanto_protection_act_time_to_label_gmos/?akid=807.705792.M8LrIr&rd=1&t=4


http://enidnews.com/featuredstory/x2000921140/GMO-supporters-reap-what-they-sow-in-government-funding-bill





http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-george-hw-bush-party-support








http://www.politicususa.com/2013/03/27/congress-sequester-crisis-slip-corporate-give-monstanto.html



Failing to use the legislative process wastes political capital

Miles 13 (Chris Miles, Policymic, “An Obama Gun Control Executive Order Could Sink the President's Favorability”, January 2013,

http://www.policymic.com/articles/23296/an-obama-gun-control-executive-order-could-sink-the-president-s-favorability) MaxL

Could Obama be wasting valuable political capital by issuing an executive order on gun control? If

Obama acts unilaterally on gun control, the event will likely fire-up conservatives and pro-gun advocates,

calling out the president for failing to use the legislative process. The conservative Drudge Report compared

executive action to dictators Hitler and Stalin. The backlash could be immense and could cost Obama leverage infuture political battles, most notably the coming debt ceiling fight next month. Obama has often pulled the "popular mandate" card,

saying that his re-election in November proves the American people are behind him ... almost unconditionally. But what do the American

people really think about the gun debate. Well, for starters, just 4% of Americans identify guns as the nation's top problem, per Gallup. Based

on that alone, Obama may think twice about pushing popcorn policies that will only splash onto headlines and divide Americans. Any

executive action could even hurt his favorability rating, and by extension his ability to negotiate in the

future.

http://www.policymic.com/articles/23296/an-obama-gun-control-executive-order-could-sink-the-president-s-favorability

http://www.policymic.com/articles/22692/hitler-gun-control-facts-u-s-pro-gun-advocates-have-more-in-common-with-hitler-than-they-think

http://goo.gl/NdL6M

http://goo.gl/NdL6M

http://www.policymic.com/articles/22692/hitler-gun-control-facts-u-s-pro-gun-advocates-have-more-in-common-with-hitler-than-they-think

http://www.policymic.com/articles/23296/an-obama-gun-control-executive-order-could-sink-the-president-s-favorability



SOP Disad

CP kills SOP

Turner 96 (Ronald, U of Alabama, Journal of Law and Politics, Winter 96, p. 1)//LA

The increased and aggressive presidential use of executive orders can present serious constitutionalquestions when there are no congressional or constitutional bases for a particular order. Orders not tethered

to or derived from statutes or the Constitution raise issues about the legitimacy of presidential

legislation because, as noted previously, lawmaking is a legislative function. Thus, the issuance of an executive order by a

President without a clear statutory or constitutional basis can be inconsistent with the principle of

separation of powers and the sequential trumping inherent in the constitutional system. A baseless and unauthorized

order provides a means for the President to subvert the system of checks and balances, for she can make laws free from

congressional involvement or agreement and is "able to make sweeping policy value choices without any check by either the federal courts or

by a majority of Congress." Such unchecked executive power allows a President to "alter the distribution of the

background set of private rights entitlements" and to evade the filtering mechanisms of the bicameral legislature and

judicial review. Evasion is particularly problematic when different political parties dominate different branches of government. An

executive order issued by the President of one party that declares national policy that is opposed by

the opposition party with a legislative majority can result in a clash of ideologies and views as to the law thatshould govern the nation. As a result "strengthening a particular institution may not only improve its effectiveness but also the relative

influence of a particular political party or ideology."

The impact is nuclear war

Forrester 89 (Ray, UC Hastings, George Washington Law Review , August 89)//LA

On the basis of this report, the startling fact is that one man alone has the ability to start a nuclear war. A basic

theory--if not the basic theory of our Constitution--is that concentration of power in any one person, or one group, is

dangerous to mankind. The Constitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances,

starting with the separation of powers between the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The message is that no one

of them is safe with unchecked power. Yet, in what is probably the most dangerous governmental power

ever possessed, we find the potential for world destruction lodged in the discretion of one person.



---AT Constitutionally Based

No constitutional basis

Carpenter 86 (Ted Galen, the CATO Institute, Global Interventionism and a New Imperial Presidency ,

Cato Policy Analyis No. 71, 5/16/86, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa071.html)//LARecent debate about U.S. policy with respect to Lebanon, Central America, and South Africa suggests that the

United States may be entering a new phase in the recurring conflict between Congress and the

executive branch over the control of foreign affairs. This conflict does not merely involve

constitutional or partisan political matters--as important as those might be--but reflects competing conceptions

about substantive policy issues. The current White House occupant is seeking to weaken or eliminate

congressional restraints imposed on the executive during the 1970s, in order to regain the flexibility he

believes is necessary to pursue America's cold war objectives. His congressional opponents are

attempting to preserve those constraints not simply to enhance the power and prestige of the legislative branch, but because

they fear that an unfettered president may pursue policies that would contravene fundamental American values or again plunge the United

States into ill-advised military interventions. As before in our history, the conflict will likely determine the

substance of American foreign policy, as well as which branch shall chart its course . Constitutional Intent

During the last decade and a half, Americans have grappled frequently and intensely with the

question of legislative versus executive power over foreign affairs. The aftermath of the disastrous and divisive

Vietnam War triggered a reassessment of the executive-supremacy doctrine that had held sway throughout the previous three decades. This

change, however, was only the most recent occasion when the locus of authority in foreign policy has shifted. Debates on the

question have flared periodically since the founding of the American republic. Indeed, a measure of

tension is built into the structure of the Constitution itself. The shared powers and overlapping

responsibilities of the legislative and executive branches create what renowned constitutional scholar Edward S.

Corwin has aptly termed "an invitation to struggle" over foreign policy.[1] The Framers of the Constitution

invested the president with a number of powers in the arena of foreign affairs. He was authorized to receive the diplomatic

representatives of other nations and to appoint, with the consent of the Senate, America's own diplomatic representatives. He was g iven the

authority to negotiate treaties with foreign states, subject to Senate concurrence in the result. The president was also invested with the power

and responsibility of commander in chief of the nation's armed forces. But the Founding Fathers also granted significant

foreign policy powers to the legislative branch. They gave Congress, not the president, the authority to declare war. In

addition, they declared that Congress would be responsible for authorizing the raising of military forces and providing funds for their continued

operation. Furthermore, foreign commerce was made subject to regulation by Congress, and the Senate was accorded the right to ratify or

reject treaties negotiated by the president. The delineation of power and responsibility between the two branches

was less than precise. The delegates to the constitutional convention apparently envisioned a partnership between Congress and the

president in foreign affairs, but they also applied the principle of checks and balances. What is clear is that the Founding

Fathers did not invest the president with the vast array of unilateral foreign policy powers--particularly those involving U.S. armed forces--

claimed by White House occupants during much of the 20th century, especially since World War II. One expert on constitutional history, W.

Taylor Reveley III, muses, "If we could find a man in the state of nature and have him first scan the war-power provisions of the Constitution

and then look at war-power practice since 1789, he would marvel at how much Presidents have spun out of so little."[2] Ambitious

presidents have relied upon allegedly "inherent" executive powers and the status of commander in

chief to justify this vast expansion of presidential authority. However, the context in which the

presidency was established fails to support claims to extensive executive power in foreign policy.

Although the Founding Fathers did create several ambiguities regarding authority over foreign affairs

(perhaps because foreign policy was not a priority concern at the time), where they did favor one

branch, they favored Congress, not the president. This tilt was entirely consistent with their British

Whig political bias, with its fear of excessive executive power.[3] While the president was to be the principal

spokesman for the republic in foreign affairs and the focal point for diplomatic relations with other

nations, the Framers had no desire to invest him with the foreign policy prerogatives of a monarch.

Even the president's powers as commander in chief are far less extensive than most recent presidents have alleged. The primary purpose of the

constitutional provision was to assert civilian supremacy over the military, lest an aggressive general succumb to Cromwellian temptations



during a wartime crisis. A subsidiary objective was to restrain legislative meddling in the day-to-day conduct

of military strategy once hostilities were authorized--a concern stemming from congressional interference during the American

Revolution. In addition, it implied that the president possessed the authority to repel attacks upon U.S. territory until Congress could act. But

Congress alone was to declare war , and in the parlance of the times, "declare" essentially meant "authorize" or "begin."[4] The

Founders would likely be mystified at recent presidential contentions that although Congress "declares" wars, the president has the right to

"wage" them with or without formal declarations. They would be astonished and probably appalled at the assertions of such chief executives as

Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon that a president may conduct foreign policy and utilize the armed forces in any manner he

deems necessary to foster his own conception of U.S. "interests." Executive supremacy in foreign affairs was not set forth

in the Constitution. That doctrine evolved from particular historical circumstances

CP not constitutional—trade Powell 99 (H. Jefferson, Prof @ Duke Law School, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An

Executive Branch Perspective, The George Washington Law Review March 99 Vol. 67 No. 3, p. 527,

http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1391&context=faculty_scholarship&sei-





lty_scholarship%26ei%3D3kfcUcLeCeT98AH04IH4Bw%26usg%3DAFQjCNHoPUm0q3wf09AANmj7ZMANxtDmLw#search=%22executive%20responsibility%20foreign%20policy%20congress%22)//LA

(1) Article I, Section 8 "expressly grants Congress, not the President, the power to 'regulate Commerce

with foreign Nations.' "101 As a consequence, "Congress-whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's"102-

possesses broad power to set United States foreign policy with respect to foreign trade and

investment.103 The President has no independent power directly to regulate, tax, or interdict foreign

commerce.104 The executive branch's views on the effect state legislation has on transnational markets, furthermore, are not dis- positive

on the question of whether the state is violating the dormant foreign commerce clause,105 and the President's authority to enter

into executive agreements concerning commerce without congressional approval is ex- tremely

doubtful. Congress's possession of substantive policy making authority, and the President's control

over the means and direction of negotiation, make accommodation between the political branches

over foreign commerce issues especially desirable. At least from a constitutional perspective, fast- track legislation (whichenhances the President's ability to negotiate on commercial issues) and a preference for statutorily approved executive agreements over

treaties (which ensures the participation of Congress as a body in commercial agreements with other countries) are desirable means of en-

abling both branches to play appropriate roles in this area.



AT Prez Powers





---AT PP K2 Heg

The technological revolution and governmental checks render prez powers obsolete – we start where

their evidence leaves off

Deans 2K (Bob Deans, Associate Director of Communications, Washington DC, 1/23/2000, “THEAMERICAN PRESIDENCY: White House power growing”, The Atlanta Journal the Atlanta Constitution,

ProQuest | JJ)Many scholars argue that global shifts are undermining the authority of all sorts of traditional institutions, even while making it possible for

nontraditional groups to step in and assume important new roles. Nobel Peace Prize winner Jody Williams, for example, used e-mail to

generate a worldwide grass-roots consensus for her International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Her high-tech end run around White House

policy-makers left Clinton virtually alone among world leaders in not supporting the ban. Under Clinton's presidency, the Internet has

gone from an obscure tool of the Pentagon and academia to potentially the most powerful

communications medium in the history of the world. The Internet, moreover, has both accelerated

and come to symbolize a much broader set of economic, political and social changes sweeping the

world. Nearly $7 trillion worth of goods and services will be sold across borders this year as workers from some of the poorest countries in

the world bid for a growing share of wealth. Currency traders move an estimated $1 trillion around the world each day, making decisions about

the futures of markets and entire national economies. Nearly 4 billion people, two-thirds of the earth's population, now

participate in some form of democratic system. Put it together, and the world is undergoing a populist

revolution of historic proportions. More and more it is people, not governments, who are taking control

of the issues affecting their lives , as politicians often appear to be watching from the sidelines. "In many respects, political

systems are increasingly at the mercy of technology," said presidential scholar Michael Genovese, political science professor at Loyola

Marymount University in Los Angeles. "What it probably will do is make central governments less important and,

therefore, presidents less important ," said Genovese, author of the forthcoming "Power and the American Presidency." Others

counter that the presidency is , by design, resilient to moments of great change . That, in fact, is part of the

genius of the founding fathers, said Nelson. "In the 20 years that I've been teaching political science, a recurrent prophecy

is that the presidency is being weakened by this or that," said Nelson. "It just doesn't seem to happen."



Congress K2 Heg

Congressional involvement is k2 heg Bennet 78 (Douglas J. Jr, Former Prez of Wesleyan U and Asst Secretary of State under Clinton and

Carter, Congress in Foreign Policy: Who Needs It? , JSTOR)//LAThe second benefit is that congressional attention to international issues offers some hope of developing a

public consensus which will support a positive American role in the world. Not only are policies scrutinized by

Congress more likely to reflect the public will, but members of Congress, once engaged in the policymaking process,

should be better able to teach and lead their constituencies through the intricacies of international

issues in a world where the United States is neither chief policeman nor economic czar. This is not to say that we can expect the rebirth of a

simple cold war type of consensus. What we can hope and work for is a consensus in which Americans, faced

with a fluid and confusing international scene, are sufficiently confident of their governmental

institutions and their own personal futures to be able to accept the adjustment being thrust upon them. Finally, if Congress really

does contribute actively to policy formulation and if it really does help educate the public, the result

should be greater stability and predictability in American foreign policy-a benefit not only to us but to

the world. Our allies should find us more predictable, and our opponents will find us stronger.



Vagueness – Presidential Directive

Their terminology is vague – there are at least 24 types of presidential directives

Gaziano 1 (Todd F., The Heritage Foundation, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other

Presidential Directives, 2/21/1, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/02/the-use-and-abuse-of-executive-orders-and-other-presidential-directives)//LA

Many Forms of Directives. One scholar has identified 24 different types of presidential directives,39 although

even his list is incomplete. A partial list includes administrative orders; certificates; designations of

officials; executive orders; general licenses; interpretations; letters on tariffs and international trade;

military orders; various types of national security instruments (such as national security action memoranda, national

security decision directives, national security directives, national security reviews, national security study memoranda, presidential review

directives, and presidential decision directives); presidential announcements; presidential findings; presidential

reorganization plans; presidential signing statements; and proclamations.



Prez Power Bad



Prez Power Bad – Nuclear War

Excessive presidential authority makes nuclear war inevitable

Forrester 89 (Ray Forrester, Professor at the Hastings College of the Law, University of California,

“Presidential Wars in the Nuclear Age: An Unresolved Problem” George Washington Law Review, August,57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1636, Lexis | JJ)

A basic theory--if not the basic theory of our Constitution--is that concentration of power in any one person, or one

group, is dangerous to mankind. The Constitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances, starting with the

separation of powers between the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The message is that no one of them is safe with

unchecked power. Yet, in what is probably the most dangerous governmental power ever possessed, we find the potential

for world destruction lodged in the discretion of one person. As a result of public indignation aroused by the Vietnam

disaster, in which tens of thousands lost their lives in military actions initiated by a succession of Presidents, Congress in 1973 adopted, despite

presidential veto, the War Powers Resolution. Congress finally asserted its checking and balancing duties in relation to the making of

presidential wars. Congress declared in section 2(a) that its purpose was to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United

States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed

Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the

continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such s ituations. The law also stated in section 3 that [t]he President in every possible instance

shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in

hostilities is clearly indicated. . . . Other limitations not essential to this discussion are also provided. The intent of the law is clear. Congress

undertook to check the President, at least by prior consultation, in any executive action that might lead to

hostilities and war. [*1638] President Nixon, who initially vetoed the resolution, claimed that it was an

unconstitutional restriction on his powers as Executive and Commander in Chief of the military. His successors

have taken a similar view . Even so, some of them have at times complied with the law by prior consultation with representatives of

Congress, but obedience to the law has been uncertain and a subject of continuing controversy between Congress and the President. Ordinarily,

the issue of the constitutionality of a law would be decided by the Supreme Court. But, despite a series of cases in which such a decision has

been sought, the Supreme Court has refused to settle the controversy. The usual ground for such a refusal is that a

"political question" is involved. The rule is well established that the federal judiciary will decide only "justiciable" controversies. "Political

questions" are not "justiciable." However, the standards established by the Supreme Court in 1962 in Baker v. Carr, 369

U.S. 186, to determine the distinction between "justiciable controversies" and "political questions" are far from clear. One writer

observed that the term "political question" [a]pplies to all those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is

impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences

that a decision on the merits might entail. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 344 (1924)(footnote omitted). It is difficult

to defend the Court's refusal to assume the responsibility of decisionmaking on this most critical issue. The Court has been fearless in deciding

other issues of "vast consequences" in many historic disputes, some involving executive war power. It is to be hoped that the Justices will finally

do their duty here. But in the meantime the spectre of single-minded power persists, fraught with all of the frailties of human nature that each

human possesses, including the President. World history is filled with tragic examples. Even if the Court assumed its

responsibility to tell us whether the Constitution gives Congress the necessary power to check the

President, the War Powers Resolution itself is unclear. Does the Resolution require the President to

consult with Congress before launching a nuclear attack? It has been asserted that "introducing United States Armed

Forces into hostilities" refers only to military personnel and does not include the launching of nuclear missiles alone. In support of this

interpretation, it has been argued that Congress was concerned about the human losses in Vietnam and in other presidential wars, rather than

about the weaponry. Congress, of course, can amend the Resolution to state explicitly that "the introduction of Armed Forces"

includes missiles as well as personnel. However, the President could continue to act without prior consultationby renewing the claim first made by President [*1639] Nixon that the Resolution is an unconstitutional

invasion of the executive power. Therefore, the real solution, in the absence of a Supreme Court decision, would appear to be a

constitutional amendment. All must obey a clear rule in the Constitution. The adoption of an amendment is very difficult. Wisely, Article V

requires that an amendment may be proposed only by the vote of two-thirds of both houses of Congress or by the application of the

legislatures of two-thirds of the states, and the proposal must be ratified by the legislatures or conventions of three-fourths of the states.

Despite the difficulty, the Constitution has been amended twenty-six times. Amendment can be done when a problem is so important that it

arouses the attention and concern of a preponderant majority of the American people. But the people must be made aware of the problem. It

is hardly necessary to belabor the relative importance of the control of nuclear warfare. A constitutional amendment may be, indeed, the

appropriate method. But the most difficult issue remains. What should the amendment provide? How can the problem be solved specifically?



The Constitution in section 8 of Article I stipulates that "[t]he Congress shall have power . . . To declare War. . . ." The idea seems to be that only

these many representatives of the people, reflecting the public will, should possess the power to commit the lives and the fortunes of the

nation to warfare. This approach makes much more sense in a democratic republic than entrusting the decision to one person, even though he

may be designated the "Commander in Chief" of the military forces. His power is to command the war after the people, through their

representatives, have made the basic choice to submit themselves and their children to war. There is a recurring relevation of a paranoia of

power throughout human history that has impelled one leader after another to draw their people into wars which, in hindsight, were foolish,

unnecessary, and, in some instances, downright insane. Whatever may be the psychological influences that drive the

single decisionmaker to these irrational commitments of the lives and fortunes of others, the fact remainsthat the behavior is a predictable one in any government that does not provide an effective check and

balance against uncontrolled power in the hands of one human. We, naturally, like to think that our leaders are above

such irrational behavior. Eventually, however, human nature, with all its weakness, asserts itself whatever the

setting . At least that is the evidence that experience and history give us, even in our own relatively

benign society, where the Executive is subject to the rule of law . [*1640] Vietnam and other more recent

engagements show that it can happen and has happened here. But the "nuclear football"--the ominous "black bag" --

remains in the sole possession of the President.



Prez Power Bad – Separation of Powers

Presidential power destroys separation of powers

Branum 2 (Tara, Editor in Chief Texas Review of Law and Politics, Texas Review of Law and Politics, 2002,

“President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America”, Lexis | JJ) The perception of Americans that the President is not only willing, but also able to solve their

problems is reinforced by the media and by the political process Congressmen and private citizens besiege the President with

demands that action be taken on various issues. To make matters worse, once a president has signed an

executive order, he often makes it impossible for a subsequent administration to undo his action

without enduring the political fallout of such a reversal. For instance, President Clinton issued a slew of executive orders

on environmental issues in the weeks before he left office. Many were controversial and the need for the policies he instituted was debatable.

Nevertheless, President Bush found himself unable to reverse the orders without invoking the ire of environmentalists across the country. A

policy became law by the action of one man without the healthy debate and discussion in Congress

intended by the Framers. Subsequent presidents undo this policy and send the matter to Congress for

such debate only at their own peril. This is not the way it is supposed to be. Restoration of our system

of separation of powers will require that the public be educated on what does—and does not—

constitute a constitutional use of executive orders and other presidential directives.

<<<IMPACT TO SOP>>>



Prez Power Bad – Terrorism

Executive powers meddle with Congressional oversight – that makes the war on terror fail

Dean 2 (John W. Dean, columnist, and commentator on contemporary politics, former White House

Counsel for Nixon, 4/12/2002, “TOM RIDGE'S NON-TESTIMONIAL APPEARANCE BEFORE CONGRESS:Another Nixon-style Move By The Bush Administration”,

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20020412.html | JJ)

Congressional oversight and the collective wisdom of Congress are essential in our dealing with

terrorism. Presidents don't issue press releases about their mistakes. Nor do they report interagency

squabbles that reduce executive effectiveness. They don't investigate how funds have been spent

poorly or unwisely. And they're not inclined to explain even conspicuous problems in gathering

national security intelligence. When did anyone hear of a President rooting out incompetent appointees (after all, they chose them

in the first place)? In contrast, Congress wants to do all these things, thereby keeping a President on his toes. Its oversight is crucial -

for the Presidential and Executive Branch limitations I've suggested are only a few of the myriad problems

that might hamper the efficacy of the Executive in its efforts to deal with terrorism, and that Congress

can help to correct. Justifiably, Americans are worried, but they are getting on with their lives. Shielding and hiding the man in charge of

homeland security from answering the questions of Congress is entirely unjustified. This talk of "separation of powers" and

"executive privilege" is unmitigated malarkey. It is a makeshift excuse to keep the Congress from

policing the White House .

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20020412.html

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20020412.html





Consult Congress CP



1NC

Text: The president of the United States should enter into prior and binding consultation with the

United States Congress to [PLAN.] The United States federal government should enact the

aforementioned legislation if and only if the United States Congress approves it after saidconsultation.

It solves and avoids the link to politics

Hamilton 99 (Lee H., Former Congressman and Currently on the US Homeland Security Advisory Council,

Foreign Policy Consultation between the President and Congress, remarks @ GW University, 10/14/99,

http://www.indiana.edu/~congress/in-depth/foreign_policy_speech.htm)//LA

This kind of tug-of-war between the President and Congress is not necessarily bad. Foreign policy

disagreements between the branches are inevitable, and even, sometimes, constructive. Debate and

tension can lead to useful refinements and improvements of our policies. But our foreign policy is poorly served

when the executive-legislative relationship is excessively adversarial. Congress should be an independent critic of the

administration, but its criticism should always be in the context of seeking a better partnership with the

administration. Cooperation between the branches is conducive to the formulation of a sound American

foreign policy. The importance of consultation An important element of cooperation is consultation.

Consultation is the process of discussion and mutual exchange between the branches designed to foster

cooperation in the making of policy. Foreign policy consultation can take many forms, including executive branch testimony at congressional

hearings, briefings by foreign policy officials, and informal conversations. More important than the form of consultation is the attitude of the

parties involved. Consultation is most effective when each branch makes a sincere effort to involve the

other branch in its decision-making processes. There are many benefits of good consultation.

American foreign policy always has more force and punch to it when the President and Congress

speak with one voice. Congress is our most representative branch of government. It best articulates

the concerns of different segments of the population. When the President takes these views into

consideration in formulating foreign policy, the policy that results is more likely to have strong public

support. And foreign policy with strong domestic support makes the U.S. more respected and effective

abroad. Consultation fosters mutual trust between the President and Congress, and encourages them

to develop our foreign policy together. It helps prevent the branches from taking our foreign policy in two different directions,

and discourages Congress from micro-managing programs out of frustration from being excluded.Consultation does not -- and should not -- ensure agreement between the branches. Differences will remain, especially on the toughest issues.

But even on those tough issues, consultation will smooth some of the hard edges of disagreement, and refine and

strengthen our policy. Consultation with Congress provides the President with a wider range of perspectives

than he may receive from his own advisers. The President is isolated in our system of government. Unlike the British Prime Minister, he rarely

faces his critics face-to-face. No one, as George Reedy once said, tells the President to go soak his head. Cabinet officials and other high-ranking

advisers serve at his pleasure. Their jobs depend on his favor, and they usually can decipher the direction in which the President wants to go.

Members of Congress do not serve at the President's favor. Their independence from the President

gives their advice added weight. The President may not like, or take, the advice of Congress, but his consideration of it is likely to

produce better policy. Consultation is necessary because the Constitution gives foreign policy powers to both the

President and Congress. The President is the commander-in-chief and head of the executive branch. Congress has the power to

declare war and the power of the purse. The President has the power to negotiate treaties, but the Senate must ratify them. Given this

shared responsibility for foreign policy, the branches must work together in order for our foreign policy to

have coherence. The ideal is not an identity of views between the branches, but a creative tension out

of which emerge policies that best reflect American national interests and the views of the American people. Edwin

Corwin, the great constitutional scholar, noted that the Constitution is an invitation for the President and Congress to struggle for

the privilege of directing American foreign policy. Seen from this perspective, tug-of-wars between the branches are just what the



founding fathers ordered. But too often our government's battles over our policy are destructive, rather than constructive. Improved

consultation could go a long way toward strengthening American foreign policy.



2NC Solvency

Prior consultation produces better policies and avoids the link to politics


How to Forge Ahead , The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2001)//LAAlthough Congress frequently acts irresponsibly in foreign policy, it can— and often does—play a constructive role. Congress is the

most accessible and responsive branch of government. It can provide the president with a wider range

of perspectives than he may receive from his own advisers; ar- ticulate better than any other

institution the diverse views of the American people; and refine and improve policy through its

deliberative processes. Congress can also help the president educate the public about foreign policy challenges. To take

advantage of these congressional strengths, Bush must make consultation with Congress a top

priority. Sustained consultation fosters mutual trust between the president and Congress and helps

prevent Congress from taking foreign policy in different directions. Although consultation does not, and should not,

ensure congressional support for the president's proposals, it does help remove some of the disagreement and almost always strengthens

policy. To consult effectively, Bush must involve both parties in Congress in the policymaking process.

Consultation should take place, to the extent feasible, prior to administration decisions to ensure

administration officials consider the perspectives of Congress seriously and respond to congres- sionalconcerns.

CP is key to engagement

Hamilton 2 (Lee H., president and director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,

vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission, serves on the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council,

previously served in the United States House of Representatives for 34 years, co-chair of the Iraq Study

Group, with Jordan Tama, formerly special assistant to the director at the Woodrow Wilson Center, a

graduate student at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton

University, A creative tension: the foreign policy roles of the President and Congress, Washington, D.C.:

Woodrow Wilson Center Press, pg. 47-48)

To foster bipartisanship, the president should work with Congress to build upon the areas of broadagreement in U.S. foreign policy. Despite significant disagreements over tactics, there is a substantial

national consensus on several central foreign policy principles and objectives. The president should work

to solidify and expand public support and congressional coalitions around these core principles and goals.

From that solid base, he can branch out to gain backing for his policies on more specific or controversial issues.

The fundamental principle that should guide the president's approach to foreign policy is that U.S.

engagement and leadership are essential to promote American national interests. Most Americans recognize

that the United States has a special responsibility and opportunity to make the world a better and safer

place—by marshaling the forces of peace and progress, combating international terrorism, extending the benefits of the global economy, and

strengthening democratic ideals and practices. At the same time, the president must be sensitive to the limits of our involvement. Our

engagement must be selective, closely tied to our interests and opportunities.



2NC Normal Means

Normal means is presidential action—we don’t support gendered language


vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission, serves on the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council,previously served in the United States House of Representatives for 34 years, co-chair of the Iraq Study





The president remains the most important foreign policy maker. Only he is accountable to, and speaks for,

all Americans, and only he can rally public or international support to a foreign policy cause. The president's

command of the bully pulpit gives him an unrivaled power to influence the foreign policy debate. When

he vigorously takes his case on a major foreign policy issue to Congress and the American people, he usually

wins their support. Moreover, though Congress plays an important role in formulating foreign policy, the

president is responsible for its implementation. The president directs our nation's diplomats, intelligence

agencies, and armed services, and he negotiates with foreign leaders. He has the primary responsibility for making

foreign policy work. The United States can achieve little internationally without strong presidential leadership. On rare occasions in

recent decades, Congress has taken the lead on foreign policy, but most actions have followed a proposal

by the president. Consider the major foreign policy initiatives of the past sixty years. The president played the central role in nearly all of

them:

Normal means isn’t consultation


vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission, serves on the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council,

previously served in the United States House of Representatives for 34 years, co-chair of the Iraq Study


graduate student at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at PrincetonUniversity, A creative tension: the foreign policy roles of the President and Congress, Washington, D.C.:


There are few signs of improvement under President George W. Bush. During his first months in office, members of

Congress criticized his administration for consulting inadequately on its plans to transform the

military and withdraw U.S. support for the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. Following the September 2001 terrorist

attacks, members generally praised the president's leadership, but some complained that the administration did not

brief members sufficiently on its intelligence information and its plans to respond to the attacks. Members were

particularly angered by Bush's decision in October 2001 to restrict intelligence briefings to just eight congressional leaders. A bipartisan

congressional outcry caused the administration to restore access to the briefings to a larger number of members. Bush also failed to

involve Congress in his controversial decision to authorize military tribunals to try suspected

terrorists. As the war on terrorism entered a new phase in early 2002 after the U.S. victories in Afghanistan, members of Congress

voiced frustration that the Bush administration was asking for huge increases in defense spendingwithout explaining its long-term goals for the war. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle said, "Before we make commitments in

resources, I think we need to have a clearer understanding of what the direction [of the war] will be." Members from both parties also urged

the administration to consult with Congress more frequently on its plans to topple Saddam Hussein.



2NC—Politics NB

Empirics prove bad consultation triggers congressional backlash


Foreign Policy Consultation between the President and Congress, remarks @ GW University, 10/14/99,http://www.indiana.edu/~congress/in-depth/foreign_policy_speech.htm)//LA

More recently, the Clinton administration has consulted poorly on a number of important issues. Perhaps the most politically

damaging example involved our intervention in Somalia. In October, 1993, eighteen American soldiers were killed in Somalia

during a botched military operation. The tragedy created a media furor, which called for some explanation. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin

and Secretary of State Warren Christopher came to Capitol Hill to brief Members on what had happened, but the

briefing failed to explain how the administration planned to proceed. No real consultation took place

because the administration had no policy proposals to discuss. The briefing inflamed congressional

criticism of the administration's policy, and cost Les Aspin his job. Consultation has not been good on our military involvement

in Bosnia and Kosovo. Following the end of the war in Bosnia, in late 1995, the Clinton administration decided the U.S. would participate in a

NATO-led deployment of peacekeepers. The administration did not adequately consult Congress on the decision,

and the President did not explain in a comprehensive manner the purpose of our engagement. The President also misled Congress

by saying the deployment would only be for a year, even though such a short time frame was unrealistic. Then, one year later, while Congresswas out of session after the 1996 election, the President decided to continue the deployment of U.S. troops in Bosnia for another year and a

half. Many in Congress believed the decision was intentionally made at a time when Congress could not

oppose it. The administration managed to get its way on this issue despite poor consultation, but it

paid a high price in lost good will of many Members. During the crisis in Kosovo, the administration only consulted

sporadically with Congress prior to the start of the NATO military action against Serb targets last spring. Once NATO began its air campaign,

the administration struggled to gain congressional support, in part because of distrust remaining from

the experience with our policy in Bosnia. The President exerted strong public and diplomatic

leadership in support of the NATO effort, but the Congress never authorized the action, and the lack

of firm congressional backing weakened the President's and NATO's position in the war. On other issues, poor

consultation has prevented the Clinton administration from achieving its policy goals. This has been the case

with its efforts to obtain funding for the United Nations and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The administration has

worked to build congressional support on these issues, but the efforts have been sporadic andoccasional. They have not been sustained. The President, in particular, has not been sufficiently involved in rallying support.

On the test ban treaty, the administration did not expend enough energy and resources on consultation over the past two years, and then was

unprepared to deal with the strong congressional opposition when the Senate finally took up the treaty during the past two weeks. The

result was Senate rejection of one of the most important foreign policy initiatives of the Clinton

administration.

Perm link to politics—it’s about the process


Foreign Policy Consultation between the President and Congress, remarks @ GW University, 10/14/99,

http://www.indiana.edu/~congress/in-depth/foreign_policy_speech.htm)//LA

II. Good consultation Despite these serious deficiencies in the consultative process, there have been a number of times in my experience

when consultation has worked well. Most presidents can gain support for major foreign policy issues when they

set their minds to it. Easy cases of good consultation Some cases of effective consultation are easy ones

because Congress and the President are generally in agreement on policy to begin with. Take NATO

expansion. Over several years, President Clinton's administration pushed for and achieved the expansion of NATO to include Poland, the Czech

Republic, and Hungary. The administration did a good job of making the case for the expansion, but Congressional support for expansion was

strong prior to the administration's efforts, thanks in part to vigorous lobbying efforts by Polish, Czech and Hungarian-Americans. Public opinion

was generally either supportive of expansion or neutral on the issue, and in the 1996 presidential campaign, both Republican leader Bob Dole

and President Clinton voiced their support for expansion. The administration therefore had a favorable environment for





2NC—LL NB

Independently, our mechanism solves a laundry list of extinction level threats

Hamilton 2 [Lee H., president and director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,

vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission, serves on the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council,previously served in the United States House of Representatives for 34 years, co-chair of the Iraq Study




Woodrow Wilson Center Press, pg. 3-7]

We face many dangers, however. The diversity of the security and economic threats around the globe is daunting. Terrorism,

which has already struck the United States brutally, will be a continuing threat in the years ahead, and it may become more deadly if

weapons of mass destruction proliferate and reach the wrong hands. The greatest security threat might be the danger that nuclear

weapons or materials in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nations and used against

Americans at home or abroad. Groups and individuals that do not wish us well will also attempt to attack us with

weapons of mass disruption, such as information warfare, which could assault our economic, financial, communications,

information, transportation, or energy infrastructures. There are numerous other threats to national security. The world's population

will increase substantially during the first half of the twenty-first century, placing added strain on natural resources,

including water, and possibly intensifying interstate conflicts and civil strife. Economic crises will likely be a

regular occurrence, throwing some nations into turmoil and occasionally creating widespread financial instability. International

crime, the illegal drug trade, global warming, infectious diseases, and other transnational problems

will challenge national sovereignty and threaten our security, prosperity, and health. Yet these dangerous threats are balanced by

many opportunities. As the world's most powerful nation, the United States has a tremendous capacity to

influence the world for good—to protect international peace, root out terrorism, resolve conflicts,

spread prosperity, and advance democracy and freedom. Other nations look to us for leadership and

to set an example of responsible and principled international action. Our values of freedom, justice, the rule of

law, and equality of opportunity are increasingly the values of peoples around the globe. In the coming decades, the

spread of these values and incredible advances in science and technology will give us the capacity to disseminateknowledge, cure diseases, reduce poverty, protect the environment, and create jobs in the farthest-

flung corners of the world. So our new world is as full of hope as it is of danger. To meet the threats and take

advantage of the opportunities, the United States will need strong leadership, expertise in many fields,

and large measures of foresight and resolve. Again and again, I have been impressed with the need for U.S.

leadership on the most pressing international challenges. If something important has to be done—

from fighting international terrorism to bringing peace to the Middle East—no other country can take

our place. We may not get it right every time, but our leadership is usually constructive and helpful.We must, however, be aware of the limits to American power. The United States is neither powerful enough to cause all of the world's ills, nor

powerful enough to cure them. So it is critical that we maintain good relations with our international allies and friends, manage prudently our

sometimes difficult relationships with Russia and China, and support and strengthen international institutions. A world that is committed to

working together through effective international institutions and partnerships will be the world most capable of protecting peace and security

and advancing prosperity and freedom. Equally important for a successful foreign policy will be cooperation

between the president and Congress. Today's moment of U.S. preeminence has not come to this

nation by chance. Sound policies shaped by past presidents and Congresses helped to place us in this

desirable position. To remain secure, prosperous, and free, the United States must continue to lead. That leadership requires

the president and Congress to live up to their constitutional responsibilities to work together to craft a

strong foreign policy. The great constitutional scholar Edward Corwin noted that the Constitution is an invitation for the president and

Congress to struggle for the privilege of directing foreign policy. Although the president is the principal foreign policy

actor, the Constitution delegates more specific foreign policy powers to Congress than to the

executive. It designates the president as commander-in-chief and head of the executive branch, whereas it gives Congress the power to



declare war and the power of the purse. The president can negotiate treaties and nominate foreign policy officials, but the Senate must

approve them. Congress is also granted the power to raise and support armies, establish rules on naturalization, regulate foreign commerce,

and define and punish offenses on the high seas. This shared constitutional responsibility presupposes that the

president and Congress will work together to develop foreign policy, and it leaves the door open to both of them to

assert their authority. On some basic foreign policy issues, the president and Congress agree on their respective roles. For instance, Congress

generally does not question the president's power to manage diplomatic relations with other nations, and presidents accept that Congress

must appropriate funds for diplomacy and defense. But on a panoply of other issues—from oversight of foreign aid and responsibility for trade

policy to authorization of military deployments and funding for international institutions—Congress and the president battle intensely to exertinfluence and advance their priorities. Of course, I approach the executive –legislative relationship from the perspective I gained during my

congressional experience. That experience has convinced me that Congress plays a very important role in foreign policy, but does not always

live up to its constitutional responsibilities. Its tendency too often has been either to defer to the president or to engage in foreign policy

haphazardly. I recognize that political pressures, institutional dynamics, and the heavy domestic demands placed on Congress can make it

difficult for it to exercise its foreign policy responsibilities effectively. But I believe that Congress could improve its foreign

policy performance markedly if it made a concerted effort to do so. Although the president is the chief foreign policy maker,

Congress has a responsibility to be both an informed critic and a constructive partner of the president.

The ideal established by the founders is neither for one branch to dominate the other nor for there to

be an identity of views between them. Rather, the founders wisely sought to encourage a creative

tension between the president and Congress that would produce policies that advance national

interests and reflect the views of the American people. Sustained consultation between the president

and Congress is the most important mechanism for fostering an effective foreign policy with broad

support at home and respect and punch overseas. In a world of both danger and opportunity, we

need such a foreign policy to advance our interests and values around the globe.



AT: Perm

1. PRIOR and BINDING consultation is key to avoid the net benefit

Crabb et al 0 (Cevil V. Jr, Gleen J. Antizzo, and Leila E. Sarieddine, Congress and the Foreign Policy

Process: Modes of Legislative Behavior, Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, pg. 84-85)As already emphasized, certain procedures in the decision making process are understood by and acceptable

to executive and legislative officials. As legislators view the matter (and judging by their actions, executive officials

do not always accord it the same high priority), heading the list is the requirement of consultation between policy

makers on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue in arriving at major diplomatic decisions.10 In turn,

acceptable consultations must meet a number of tests. For example, to the minds of legislators especially, they must

be what are often called "prior consultations." In Senator Vanden-berg's widely quoted phrase, if bipartisanship is to

prevail, legislators must be "in on the take-offs, as well as the crash landings" in the foreign policy

field. Bipartisan consultations, in other words, must take place early in the decision making process,

before the president has decided on a course of action abroad. Perhaps the most common complaint on

Capitol Hill about the foreign policy process (and unquestionably a factor leading in recent years to the kind of legislative assertiveness

witnessed after the Vietnam War, as discussed in chapter 1) is the belief of lawmakers that they were too often

confronted with a presidential fait accompli in external affairs. Under such conditions, as legislators view it,

impassioned appeals by the White House for a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs really amount to

little more than demands that Congress uncritically approve the actions of the president abroad. Acceptable

procedures must also entail a willingness by the president and his diplomatic aides to listen to the ideas of

legislators and to take congressional viewpoints into account in the formulation of external policy . Time

and again since World War II, lawmakers have complained that they were summoned to the White House primarily to be informed of what

actions the president had taken or intended to take overseas.12 In brief, legislators believe that authentic bipartisanship

demands effective and obvious "input," or meaningful contributions by members of the House and

Senate in determining the nation's course of action abroad.13

2. If the perm doesn’t link, it’s severance—First, PRIOR consultation delays the plan—“should” means

immediacySummers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8,

http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes

futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti .14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it

must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from

the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge

will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered

from the four corners of the entire record. [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE] 13 "Should " not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous

with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121

(1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075,

1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a

construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at

1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of

the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory ); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802

P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the

fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211,

215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the

triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately

http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13












http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813


















AT: Lie Perm/Nonbinding Consultation

1. Perm is intrinsic—neither the plan nor the CP fiats the president lying to congress—it’s bad and a

voting issue cuz it skews neg strategy and block time and means they can spike competition to all CPs

2. Turn—leaks

A. They happen, and congress finds out

Dean 6 (John W., former Counsel to the President of the United States, former hief Minority Counsel to

the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives, the Associate Director of a law

reform commission, and Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States, "The Problem with

Presidential Signing Statements: Their Use and Misuse by the Bush Administration," January 13,

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20060113.html)Watergate was about abuse of power. Nixon, not unlike Bush, insisted on pushing the powers of the presidency to, and beyond, their limits. But

as Nixon headed into his second term with even grander plans than he'd had in the first term, the Congress became concerned. (And for good

reason.) Bush, who has been pushing the envelope on presidential powers, is just beginning to learn what kind of Congressional

blowback can result. First, there are the leaks: People within the Executive branch become troubled by a

president's overreaching. When Nixon adopted extreme measures, people within the administration began leaking. The same is now happening to Bush, for there was the leak about the use of torture. And, more recently, there was the leak as to

the use of warrantless electronic surveillance on Americans. Once the leaks start, they continue, and

Congressional ire is not far behind. The overwhelming Congressional support for Senator John McCain's torture ban suggests, too,

that Congress will not be happy if leaks begin to suggest the President - as his signing statement foreshadows - is already flouting the ban.

B. Causes rollback and triggers the link to the net benefit

Hinckley 94 (Barbara, professor of political science at Perdue University, Less than Meets the Eye:

Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,

pg. 24)

Exaggerated views of presidential power can dismiss these policies as unimportant. Presidents, after all, are able to spend

discretionary funds or conduct secret negotiations independently of, and even in opposition to, the

legislated policy. But while presidents can do these things, a more balanced assessment suggests that they do them at theirperil, risking relations with Congress and jeopardizing their entire program. Institutional norms bring

Republicans and Democrats together against assaults on the congressional prerogative; and a policy

frustrated at one point will return to haunt the White House—in appropriations, authorizations,

amendments other legislation, or a congressional investigation. Certainly; Richard Nixon was in trouble in Congress

well before the Watergate hearings for what was called backdoor spending. Ronald Reagan’s second-term success rate in Congress, lowest of

all the modern presidents, I was clearly not helped by the Iran-contra revelations. Foreign policy legislation, we will see, is sufficiently

controversial that presidents cannot take it for granted that their own programs will prevail. They put their reputation at stake when they take

positions on these bills, winning some and losing others. Interest groups, foreign and domestic, also appear to treat these policies seriously,

given the amount of effort and money they spend influencing the outcome. Following these cues, we should assume the pol icies are important

and need to be understood.

3. Morality DA—lying must always be rejected

Mazur 93 (Tim C., COO of the Ethics & Compliance Officer Association (ECOA), the world’s largest andoldest professional association for ethics and compliance officers, an ethicist with 20 years of experience

managing ethics, compliance, and social responsibility issues in corporations, nonprofits, and other

organizations, Issues in Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 1, Fall 1993, "Lying," <online>

http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v6n1/lying.html)

The philosopher Immanuel Kant said that lying was always morally wrong. He argued that all persons are born with an

"intrinsic worth" that he called human dignity. This dignity derives from the fact that humans are uniquely rational agents, capable of freely

making their own decisions, setting their own goals, and guiding their conduct by reason. To be human, said Kant, is to have the rational power

of free choice; to be ethical, he continued, is to respect that power in oneself and others. Lies are morally wrong, then, for two reasons. First,



lying corrupts the most important quality of my being human: my ability to make free, rational choices.

Each lie I tell contradicts the part of me that gives me moral worth. Second, my lies rob others of their

freedom to choose rationally. When my lie leads people to decide other than they would had they

known the truth, I have harmed their human dignity and autonomy. Kant believed that to value ourselves

and others as ends instead of means, we have perfect duties (i.e., no exceptions) to avoid damaging,

interfering with, or misusing the ability to make free decisions; in other words - no lying.



---XT—Lying Bad

A utilitarian conception of lying is like the ZPH or something

Mazur 93 (Tim C., COO of the Ethics & Compliance Officer Association (ECOA), the world’s largest and

oldest professional association for ethics and compliance officers, an ethicist with 20 years of experiencemanaging ethics, compliance, and social responsibility issues in corporations, nonprofits, and other

organizations, Issues in Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 1, Fall 1993, "Lying," <online>

http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v6n1/lying.html)

While the above reasoning is logical, critics of utilitarianism claim that its practical application in decision making

is seriously flawed. People often poorly estimate the consequences of their actions or specifically

undervalue or ignore the harmful consequences to society (e.g., mistrust) that their lies cause. Following the

examples above, the son's abuse of his mother's faith in him and the doctor's lie undermine the value of trust among all

those who learn of the deceits. As trust declines, cynicism spreads, and our overall quality of life

drops. In addition, suggesting that people may lie in pursuit of the greater good can lead to a "slippery

slope," where the line between cleverly calculated moral justifications and empty excuses for selfish

behavior is exceedingly thin. Sliding down the slope eventually kindles morally bankrupt statements (e.g.,

"Stealing this man's money is okay because I will give some to charity.") Those who disagree with utilitarianism believe that there is potentially

great cost in tolerating lies for vague or subjective reasons, including lies in honor of "the greater good." Critics of utilitarian justifications for

lying further note how difficult it is for anyone, even honorable persons, to know that a lie will bring

more good than the truth; the consequences of actions are too often unpredictable. Lies frequently

assume "lives of their own" and result in consequences that people do not intend or fail to predict.

Moreover, it is very difficult for a person to be objective in estimating the good and the harm that his or her lies will produce. We have a vested

interest in the lies we tell and an equally vested interest in believing that the world will be better if we lie from one instance to the next. For

these reasons, critics claim, lying is morally wrong because we cannot accurately measure lies' benefits and

harms.





Sometimes administrations call Members to give them a "heads-up" on an issue because it will be appearing in the newspapers the next day.

These heads-ups are self-serving; consultation on the eve of a press leak is not consultation at all. --Administrations sometimes authorize only a few officials to discuss our policy. In several periods of crisis, I was distressed to learn that only

three or four officials were trusted by the President to consult -- at a time when administration spokespeople should have been consulting all

over Capitol Hill. During the months leading up to the Gulf War, only the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff were authorized by President Bush to discuss policy on Iraq with Members of Congress. -- The executive branch often

consults with only a limited number of Members. To be effective, consultation must target different

Members depending on the issue -- for instance, focusing on the ad hoc Caucus on Ireland when dealing with a matter pertaining

to Northern Ireland. Members with a strong interest in a particular foreign policy issue are sometimes left out of an administration's

consultation on that issue. The administration does not always do a good job of recognizing which Members are concerned with which issues.

Congress also has several shortcomings when it comes to consultation. -- Consultation with Congress

is difficult because power in Congress is so diffuse, and shifts with each issue. In the old days, the President could consult

with Congress effectively simply by talking to a few important congressional leaders and committee chairmen -- Speaker of the House Sam

Rayburn, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Arthur Vandenberg. Today, dozens of

Members of Congress and many congressional committees play important roles in foreign policy. Members are younger, more sophisticated,

more active, more diverse, more independent and less respectful of traditional patterns of authority. There is no single person -- or

group of people -- that the executive branch can consult with and conclude that it has gained

congressional support. -- Congress is often not receptive to consultation. There is a tendency in the Congress to want to be briefed by

the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of State, and an unwillingness to hear from lower-ranking officials. After the 1994 so-

called Agreed Framework with North Korea was negotiated, I thought it would be useful for Congress to be briefed on the agreement since it

was of major importance to our security interests in Asia. I helped organize two briefings for Members on Capitol Hill with the StateDepartment official who negotiated the agreement, and a total of one Member showed up. -- Congress is often poorly informed

about foreign policy. Most Members focus mainly on domestic issues, and many of them give little thought to foreign affairs except

when a vote is pending or a crisis breaks. This lack of sustained interest in foreign policy makes it more difficult for an administration to consult.

-- Congress tends to be heavily influenced by special interests, prominent ethnic groups in their districts, and short-term objectives. This narrow

perspective can complicate an administration's efforts to develop long-term policies that offer no immediate political benefit to Members. --

Congress is often unwilling to accept responsibility for formulating our foreign policy. Members

criticize the President's policy without offering any constructive alternatives. Then Members sit back

and let the President take the heat if our policy fails. For too many Members, foreign policy is just another battleground

for seeking political advantage over the President. -- Partisanship in Congress can weaken consultation. Early in the Clinton presidency, House

Speaker Newt Gingrich refused to be consulted by the administration while Democrats were present. This kind of attitude makes it harder to

develop bipartisan consensus. -- Congress can leak sensitive information. Executive branch fear of leaks can discourage officials from sharing

information with Congress. But it should also be said that leaks come from the executive branch as well. Many administration officials are

skillful at leaking information to Congress and the public to advance their own agendas.



AT: Unwieldy/Certainty Key

This argument assumes the squo—only consultation solves

Washington Times 93 (Our 535 Secretaries of State, 10/13/93, Lexis)//LAThe main complaint is that Mr. Clinton failed to consult with members of Congress before he switched U.S. policy in Somalia. Mr. Nunn feels

that he is, therefore, free to criticize the president. But, however needed it may be for someone to make Mr. Clinton wake up and take his

responsibilities as commander in chief seriously, lawmakers should be careful. Dissent on the Hill could embolden Mohamed Farah Aidid.

How can Congress participate in debate on foreign policy without jeopardizing American goals and

lives abroad? Consult. Legislators often complain that the executive does not consult with them. Mr.

Clinton has been a lot more reluctant to do so than was President Bush before him. But in many cases presidents have hesitated because not

everyone in Congress handles such information in good faith. In fact, many lawmakers have in the past just taken their

briefing materials and used them against the administration in hearings to no particular end. If Congress makes

it clear that it intends to consult constructively with the president, it is possible the president would

be more likely to let them in on key decisions. If lawmakers still disagree with the president, they

should voice their opposition legitimately. The endless procession of members in front of television

cameras starts to look like grandstanding. There is no room for grandstanding in foreign affairs. First,

because exploiting the deaths of American soldiers is noxious. And second, because the cacophony of dissenting voices makes a coherent U.S.

policy impossible. So, after consulting, if members still oppose the president, they have an obligation toform a resolution, debate it and vote . When Congress votes, there is no longer the problem of having

535 secretaries of state. With a vote, members have to go on the record, and the outcome is a single

coherent policy.



AT: Prez Flex Good

The president will still lead


Foreign Policy Consultation between the President and Congress, remarks @ GW University, 10/14/99,http://www.indiana.edu/~congress/in-depth/foreign_policy_speech.htm)//LA

III. Rules for good consultation These examples of good consultation suggest that the common deficiencies in the consultative

process can be overcome, or at least mitigated. Here are ten ways the branches could improve foreign policy consultation.

First, each branch must understand its proper role, powers and limitations in foreign policy. The

executive branch must recognize that Congress plays an important role in the formulation of foreign

policy, and can provide our foreign policy with stronger public support. Congress has responsibility for

refining policies, for providing informed consent, and for legislation. Yet Congress must recognize that

its role is generally limited to helping to formulate policy, and must give the executive branch some

flexibility in the day-to-day implementation of policy. For instance, Congress has a legitimate right to speak out in favor of

providing arms to Columbia, but it should not try to dictate how many and what types of helicopters we provide, or when and to whom they

should be delivered. Congress must strike a balance between responsible criticism, based on measured

oversight of the executive branch, and responsible cooperation. There should be an implicit agreement between the

branches that if Congress is seriously consulted, it will act with some restraint and allow the executive

branch to lead.





Aff Consult Congress CP



Perm—Advisory

Perm—do the plan and consult using a nonbinding committee framework

Kampelman 2 (Max M., The Washington Post, A New Structure for Foreign Policy , 1/5/2, Lexis)//LA

A foreign policy declared by a president, except in an emergency, is subject to criticism by the opposingpolitical party, by 535 members of Congress, by the press, by nongovernmental organizations and by other governments. Yet

democracies, such as ours, require a broad consensus behind a foreign policy; a bare majority is not

sufficient. Members of Congress tend to believe, particularly in foreign policy, that if, for the sake of

unity, they are expected to be in on a potential crash landing, they want to be in on the takeoff. This

comes face to face with the constitutional duty of the president to be in charge of foreign policy. What

to do, particularly given the congressional role to appropriate funds and the congressional right to

criticize? It is impractical and unwise to "consult" 535 members of Congress, whereas not to consult is to

deprive the administration of the cooperation it requires as well as the judgment and experience possessed by Congress. What is

required is for congressional leadership to create a joint committee on international strategic policy,

which would not deal with legislation and would not have any appropriation authority . In addition to the

speaker of the House and the majority and minority leaders of both houses, its membership should consist of the chairmen and rankingminority members of the Appropriations, armed services, foreign policy and intelligence committees from each house. Given his constitutional

role in the Senate, the vice president should chair this committee, but should the leadership resist this arrangement, the vice president could

also be an ex officio member as the president's representative. Such a structure would make cooperation with Congress

more than a superficial exercise, strengthen the president's leadership by enlarging it with input from

an experienced and powerful legislative group and overcome a major potential obstacle to an

effective foreign policy.



Prez Flex Solvency Deficit

Presidential oversight makes for better policy


Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business, andAgricultural Affairs, and Undersecretary of Commerce, also was United States Ambassador to the EU

from 1993-6, Very qualified individual, TESTIMONY FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE STUART E.

EIZENSTAT HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE JUNE 3, 1998 ,

http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1998_h/h980603se.htm)//LA

The President needs Flexibility The President should have the authority to tailor specific U.S. actions

to meet our foreign policy objectives. We recognize important Congressional prerogatives in foreign

policy, in particular where economic sanctions are involved. This Administration, or any Administration, must

take into account Congressional concerns over foreign affairs questions. At the same time, the President is, of

course, responsible under the Constitution for the conduct of the nation's foreign policy. Ideally, our foreign

policy should be the product of a bipartisan consensus focusing on U.S. national interests. One expression of that constitutional

responsibility and comity between branches of government is expressed in sanctions legislation

through the inclusion of appropriate Presidential waiver authority. Ultimately only the President can

weigh all the issues at stake at any given moment and tailor our response to a specific situation.

Legislation should set forth the broad objective but should allow the flexibility to respond to a

constantly changing and evolving situation. In this regard, there are two particular pieces of legislation, Mr. Chairman, which

are of particular concern: the Iran Missile Proliferation Act of 1997; and the Wolf-Specter Anti-Religious Persecution Bill, which passed the

House by a large margin. The President's senior advisors are recommending that the Iran Missile Proliferation Act of

1997 be vetoed because of its low standard of evidence, its unworkable waiver standard, and because its inflexible

and indiscriminate requirement to impose sanctions would be counterproductive to our nonproliferation objectives.

Similarly while we strongly support the goals of the Wolf-Specter Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1998, the President's senior

advisors have also said that they would recommend a veto of the Wolf-Specter Bill if passed in its current form, because of its automatic

sanctions, the confusing bureaucratic structure it would create, and the inappropriate hierarchy of human rights violations in U.S. law the bill

would establish. We believe that enactment of the bill would undermine many of our important foreign policy

interests, including ultimately the bill's own goal of helping those who face religious persecution. Mr. Chairman, this rapid pace ofchange, sometimes unanticipated change, highlights the absolutely critical need for flexibility in the

application of economic sanctions. Simply put, without flexibility we will not be able to tailor our

actions to meet our foreign policy objectives. There can be no "one-size fits all" approach. Only the

President can balance all the factors. It is important the President have the flexibility to respond in an

appropriate fashion to changing circumstances. That flexibility also provides the President appropriate leverage to achieve

the statute's goals while minimizing collateral damage to other important national interests. If the Congress feels that he has not

struck the right balance, then oversight and criticism in a spirit of comity are appropriate, but not

removal of the President's discretion -- that would make for bad policy. Using these general principles as a

standard against which to grade our - and your - efforts, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus on three specific cases where

the actual use or prospect of unilateral economic sanctions was an integral part of our policy: our use of

ILSA on Iran and Helms-Burton on Cuba to advance our cooperation with the European Union. Mr. Chairman, to illustrate and

underscore these guiding principles, I would like to focus on two specific cases, the Libertad Act and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. In both cases

the prospect of sanctions rather than their use effectively achieved greater cooperation in support of the

Acts' objectives without upsetting our political and economic relations with our allies and friends. In the Helms-Burton case, we decided our

success with the property disciplines we agreed upon with the EU merits seeking authority to waive Title IV.

Executive flexibility is best








res8.wpafb.af.mil/Pubs/Indexes/Vol%2021_2/Eizenstat.pdf)//LA

Restrictions on Executive Branch The LCH bill would also impose a number of specific procedural and

substantive restrictions on Executive Branch imposition of new sanctions imposed under IEEPA and all future

unilateral economic sanctions laws. We would propose instead that the President would be willing to issue an

Executive Order that would set guidelines--many of which are taken from the LCH proposal--which would apply in

two situations. First. they would apply to all future sanctions regimes under IEEPA. Second. they

would apply to imposition of sanctions under future sanctions laws passed by Congress. where appropriate.

LCH would impose many inflexible restrictions on the President's imposition of sanctions. e.g ..

requiring him to announce and publish his intent to do so forty five days in advance. and specifying

that all future sanctions shall include. among other things, a cost benefit analysis. a contract sanctity

provision, and a two year sunset clause. We support the general idea behind some constraints. but

the simple fact of life is that there are instances when such requirements would prove unworkable

and destroy the value of the sanctions as a foreign policy tool . For example, telegraphing in advance our intention to

seize the assets of suspected terrorists, narcotics traffickers, major international criminals. or indeed for any foreign policy purpose would

effectively rule out asset freezes as sanctions tool. Contract sanctity provisions maybe similarly unworkable andcounterproductive--for example. in dealing with front companies in the narcotics area-----particularly when combined

with the requirement for advance notice of intent to impose sanctions. They would encourage

businesses to negotiate quick deals to get in under the wire and avoid the effect of sanctions. Sunset

clauses tied to time rather than performance may also often not be appropriate. Many of the purposes tor which we may

impose sanctions-non-proliferation, to combat drug trafficking. to combat terrorism. to encourage

greater respect for human rights-are long term: they are simply not time bound. We should not give

the targets of such sanctions the ability to wait us out. What is the lesson? Flexibility is an absolute

necessity . In these as in all cases. the President needs the flexibility to tailor our response most

appropriately to the specific situation. LCH contains differing waiver standards for these restrictions, ranging from a national

interest standard to a national emergency standard to an armed conflict standard. and specifies that some provisions would never be waivable.

We need to modify such requirements to protect the President's flexibility. With such enhancedflexibility. the President would be willing to sign an Executive Order that would include the following

particular guidelines according to which the President should impose sanctions: a requirement to

analyze costs and gains to all relevant U.S. interests: contract sanctity unless the President determines

that it would detract from the effectiveness of the sanctions; a provision calling for an annual review

of future Executive Branch sanctions under which the President must determine that the sanctions are

meeting certain criteria in order tor the sanctions to continue in effect: narrow targeting: appropriate

exemptions to minimize adverse humanitarian impact; and prior consultations with Congress,

wherever possible.

Empirics prove presidential flexibility is key to successful policy

Eizenstat 98 (Stuart E., JD Harvard Law School, Jimmy Carter’s Chief Domestic Policy Advisor, BillClinton’s Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business, and





We believe that properly designed and implemented as part of a coherent strategy, sanctions, including

economic sanctions. are a valuable tool for advancing American interests and defending U.S. values.



Used in an appropriate way and under appropriate circumstances, sanctions can further important

U.S. policy goals. Mr. Chairman, as examples. without economic sanctions Serbia would not have come to the negotiating table to end

the war in Bosnia: Iraq would not be limited in its ability to sell oil and acquire weapons of mass destruction: Libya would not stand isolated for

its failure to hand over the Lockerbie suspects: and South Africa might not have ended Apartheid. These sanctions achieved some measure of

success because they are or were part of an integrated multilateral sanctions regime. There is also an important but more

limited role for unilateral sanctions. Our unilateral sanctions against Cuba . Iran, Sudan. Nigeria and Burma serve

vital U.S. interests. However. in recent years. there has been an explosion in the frequency with which we turn to unilateral economic

sanctions. According to one count by the National Association of Manufacturers. the United States has imposed unilateral

economic sanctions 92 times since the end of WWll; 62-well more than half-have been imposed since 1993. The President's

Export Council notes that more than 75 countries are now subject to some form of economic sanctions. Surely this must give us pause to

question whether we are on the right track. Most of the sanctions imposed since 1993 have been non-

discretionary measures required by Congress in law. In contrast. only three of the 62 unilateral

economic sanctions regimes imposed since 1993 have been imposed by the Executive Branch as a

discretionary matter using the President" s authority under the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (IEEPA}--the tightening of the U.S. embargo on Iran in 1995 and the imposition of a comprehensive embargo on the Sudan in

November 1997. In addition. after the President determined that certain factual predicates had been met concerning Burma. he used his

authority. again under IEEPA, to impose a new investment ban on Burma in May 1997, as required by law. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin

today by focusing on two specific cases in which flexible sanctions have been effective because of the waiver

authority Congress gave the President- The Libertad Act (Helms-Burton), and The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act(ILSA). Each of these cases illustrates how we were able to use presidential flexibility. such as the

prospect of a waiver. to advance effectively the objectives of the statute. I will then outline the overarching

principles that in the view of the Administration. should govern U.S. sanctions policy. F inally, I will make some specific comments on pending

legislation and present an outline of the Administration· s ideas about what sort of legislation would best embody the Administration·s

principles on sanctions policy.





Neg Theory



Process Debates Good

Congress/XO debates are good—k2 real world education and policymaking Powell 99 (H. Jefferson, Prof @ Duke Law School, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An

Executive Branch Perspective, The George Washington Law Review March 99 Vol. 67 No. 3, p. 527,http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1391&context=faculty_scholarship&sei-





lty_scholarship%26ei%3D3kfcUcLeCeT98AH04IH4Bw%26usg%3DAFQjCNHoPUm0q3wf09AANmj7ZMAN

xtDmLw#search=%22executive%20responsibility%20foreign%20policy%20congress%22)//LA

The United States government has enormous power to affect the lives of people all over the globe;

the decisions it makes in the name of American foreign policy and national security are of great

human importance. How those decisions are actually made is therefore of great importance as well.

Among the major factors shaping the process by which the United States determines policy and takes actions, one is directly a product of the

United States Constitution: even when one political party is dominant, American foreign and security policies are the

product of two quite distinct and often antagonistic institutions-the legislative and executive branches

of the federal government.1 Even if one is skeptical about the influence that constitutional law has or ought to have in these matters, the

political potency, real and potential, of Congress and the President makes the constitutional law

officially governing their relationship of more than academic concern.

There’s academic debate on this subject

Grimmett 99 (Richard F., US Dept of State Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Foreign Policy

Roles of the President and Congress, 6/1/99, http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm)//LA

The Constitution divides the foreign policy powers between the President and Congress but not in a

definitive manner. 1 Edward S. Corwin wrote: What the Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer

on the President certain powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and certain other powers of

the same general kind on the Senate, and still other such powers on Congress; but which of these

organs shall have the decisive and final voice in determining the course of the American nation is left

for events to resolve . 2 Events have confirmed that together the President and Congress make foreign

policy, but they have not resolved the question of which branch originates or finally determines

policy. The two branches share in the process and each plays an important but different role. The question of who makes

foreign policy does not have a more precise answer for several reasons. First, U.S. foreign policy is not created in a vacuum

as some sort of indivisible whole with a single grand design. Rather, making foreign policy is a prolonged process involving

many actors and comprising dozens of individual policies toward different countries, regions, and functional problems.

Second, the complex process of determining foreign policy makes it difficult to decide who should be credited with initiating or altering any

particular foreign policy. The two branches constantly interact and influence each other. Under these circumstances,it is difficult to trace an idea back to its origin, determine when a proposal actually influences policy, and decide when a modification creates a

new policy. 3 Third, the roles and relative influence of the two branches in making foreign policy differ from

time to time according to such factors as the personalities of the President and Members of Congress

and the degree of consensus on policy. Throughout American history there have been ebbs and flows of

Presidential and congressional dominance in making foreign policy, variously defined by different scholars. One study classified

the period 1789-1829 as one of Presidential initiative; 1829-1898 as one of congressional supremacy, and 1899 through the immediate post

World War II period as one of growing Presidential power. 4 Another study defined three periods of congressional dominance, 1837-1861,

1869-1897, and 1918-1936, with a fourth one beginning toward the end of the Vietnam War in 1973. 5 During the Reagan and Bush

Administrations the pendulum swung back toward Presidential dominance, reaching its height in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm against



Iraq. 6 In the post-Persian Gulf war era, both President and the Congress are confronted with issues in foreign policy that may well define which

branch of government will play the dominant role during the first decade of the twenty-first century.





Random

The president should have discretion, subject to a congressional veto, to terminate sanctionsunilaterally







A National Interest Waiver Certain existing sanctions laws contain inadequate or. in at least one case--the

Glenn Amendment-no waiver authority. We believe that flexibility accompanied by appropriate

national interest waiver authority in all legislation is the single most essential element if we want to

make sanctions work. We believe that the President should be authorized to refrain from imposing. ortaking any action that would result in the imposition of. any unilateral economic sanction. and be

authorized to suspend or terminate the application of such a sanction based on a national interest

determination. Congress should have a role here. Thus, we could consider the inclusion of expedited procedures

to allow Congress to pass legislation disapproving the President's decision within a certain number

of days. We would support applying this waiver authority to all existing and future legislation. A number

of recent cases underscore the importance of providing the President with this type of flexibility so

that he can decide how best to achieve U.S. objectives. But I think that the contrasting examples of the Glenn

Amendment and the use or promise of waiver authority in the cases of ILSA and Helms-Burton underscore this point. Using the waiver authority

in TLSA. we were able to achieve significant. enhanced cooperation on our Iran-related concerns with the European Union. Even though

cooperation was already at a high level, the EU has further tightened its dual use control system with respect to Iran and other countries. We

also made significant progress with Russia. which put into place for the first time the legal framework and detailed regulations for a "catch-all"

export control system. We used Title III waiver authority in Helms-Burton to encourage the EU in late 1996 to condition any improvements in

relations with Cuba on concrete changes in Cuba· s human rights policies. Also, the prospect of an amendment to Title IV helped the EU to

agree on May 18 of this year to new disciplines on limiting investment in illegally expropriated properties worldwide. including in Cuba. This

understanding with the EU establishes for the first time multilateral disciplines among major capital exporting countries to inhibit and deter

investment in properties which have been expropriated in violation of international law. In contrast, under Glenn. we have no

discretion. no waiver authority. and no ability to lift sanctions absent legislation. This clearly

complicates our ability to negotiate acceptable solutions with the Indians and Pakistan is-as the Senate has itself

suggested with its recent actions. These achievements in ILSA and Helms-Burton would not have been possible

without appropriate waiver authority. We use waiver authority not as an excuse to avoid sanctions.

but as an effective means of leverage to advance the purposes of the law. During our informal consultations with

staff. the question arose as to whether we should not consider a dual waiver standard. For example. legislation dealing with non-proliferation

issues might be subject to a national security waiver, other legislation to a national interest waiver. This is an idea worthy of further

consideration. I want to emphasize. however. that our very strongly held belief is that a broad national interest waiver applied

to all sanctions legislation, is the most effective way to advance our foreign policy goals. As I said earlier.

Congress and the Executive Branch share responsibility for helping shape our foreign policy. Comity

between branches of government is expressed in sanctions legislation through an indication of

Congressional interest along with the inclusion of appropriate Presidential flexibility. including broad

waiver authority. Congress speaks. but ultimately only the President can weigh all the foreign policy

issues at stake at any given moment and tailor our response to a specific situation. Congress's power

of the purse and of oversight are more-than-adequate tools with which to help shape our foreign

policy.



Only passing legislation modeled on the Lugar-Crane-Hamilton Bill can solves executive oversight







Let me begin with constraints on congressional consideration of future unilateral economic sanctions

legislation. The LCH bill constrains congressional consideration of future sanctions legislation in a

number of ways. It prescribes certain congressional procedures for consideration of future sanctions

bills. These procedures specify that the appropriate congressional committee must produce a report

that includes a statement whether the bill meets certain content criteria. The bill also requires reports

by the President and the Secretary of Agriculture on a covered bill that is reported by a committee.

Additionally, it provides that a motion to consider a bill on the floor shall not be in order unless the Congress

has previously received those Executive Branch reports. The Administration would like to build on but modify these ideas.

We endorse the constructive idea that a Member could raise a point of order if certain procedural steps are not met before a sanctions bill ismoved to the floor. But the trigger for raising a point of order in LCH is a mandatory Presidential report, and we think it is unrealistic and highly

burdensome to expect a detailed Executive Branch report each time any sanctions bill is voted out of a committee. Thus. we suggest

instead that sanctions reform legislation provide that a bill would not be in order to move to the floor

unless there has been a report of the relevant committees explaining whether the bill meets the

substantive criteria called for in LCH. The legislation could also provide that future unilateral economic

sanctions legislation be considered a '"federal private sector mandate". which would require that the

Congressional Budget Office prepare a report assessing the impact of the bill on the U.S. economy and

would trigger a point of order against a bill reported by Committee without the CBO report. LCH

would also impose certain substantive constraints on passage of future sanctions laws. including providing that future

unilateral economic sanctions legislation should include a statement of objectives. a "sunset" clause

(termination after two years). contract sanctity. a national interest waiver. be narrowly targeted, not

include restrictions on the provision of food and medicine. and seek to minimize adversehumanitarian impact. We would support the inclusion of these kinds of provisions in new sanctions bills. with

appropriate flexibility. A key question is the scope of these constraints. that is. to what future legislation they would apply. We support the

proposal in LCH that constraints on Congress would apply to future "unilateral economic sanctions"

legislation. The term is appropriately broadly defined. to apply to bills imposing both discretionary and mandatory sanctions, and to

sanctions imposed for a wide range of reasons. We agree with the sponsors of the LCH bill that these provisions should not apply to trade

legislation - but also believe they should not apply to labor-related or environmental legislation either. The Congress. of course. will

always retain the flexibility to depart from the LCH guidelines. because a subsequent. inconsistent

sanctions law would take precedence--through ''notwithstanding any other law" language--and because Congress can choose to

change or disregard the procedural rules applicable to it. None the less. we see these provisions as an important

baseline for congressional consideration of sanctions legislation.

Presidential authority waver solves flexibility Eizenstat 98 (Stuart E., JD Harvard Law School, Jimmy Carter’s Chief Domestic Policy Advisor, Bill








That said, the lack of flexible waiver authority under the Glenn Amendment has limited our ability to be

creative in encouraging India and Pakistan to cooperate in avoiding an arms race on the sub continent. Our purpose is not to

punish for punishment's sake. but to influence the behavior of both governments. But our ability to influence

requires greater flexibility . We do not wish for unnecessary harm to fall upon the civilian populations of either country-particularly

the poor and less fortunate on U.S: businesses. For this reason. we are pleased that the Senat: acted in July to correct an obvious unintended

consequence of the sanctions law--preventing the provision of credits tor agncultural commodities. As recent debates on the Senate floordemonstrate. the Administration and the Congress share a desire to inject a greater degree of consistency,

flexibility and effectiveness to the sanctions regimes against India and Pakistan. It is absolutely vital that we

build upon this very strong foundation to effect the requisite changes in our policy and in our laws.

For this reason we strongly supported the Senate's passage of the Brownback-Robb amendment to

give the President greater flexibility on the India and Paktstan sancttons. Ideally, we would want to go even

further and would prefer waiver authority for all of the sanctions currently in place. Of course, we

will not use any waiver authority until such time as substantial progress has been made toward achieving

our non-proliferation objectives or in the event that there were a serious negative and unintended consequence to a specific sanction such as

impending financial collapse leading to economic chaos and political instability. We also would like additional flexibility to

guard against an overwhelmingly disproportiOnate effect of the sanctions on one country versus another: ideally.

the sanctions should have roughly the same effect on India as they do on Pakistan. the latter being in more fragile economic condition and

more dependent on IFI funding. which the Glenn Amendment requires us to oppose.

XO and Consult Congress CPs - Michigan7 2013 BFJR

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