Xiong, Ying - Confucianism and the Failure of Japanese Pan-Asianism in Manchukuo

1

Confucianism and the Failure of Japanese Pan-Asianism in Manchukuo:

A Study of Tachibana Shiraki’s Sinology1

Ying Xiong

The University of Sydney

[email protected]

Two remarkable phenomena of recent times that signal an emerging Asian era are

the resurgence of the notion of Asian regionalism and the burgeoning of Chinese

Confucius centres worldwide. This promising vista also prompts an opportunity to

engage in reflections on shared aspects of recent East Asian history and cultural resources

such as Confucianism and pan-Asianism.

In the modern history of East Asia, Japanese pan-Asianism has the same

conceptual embarrassment as fascism: it is a catch phrase without a clear definition. As

Takeuchi Yoshimi observes, it is nigh impossible to ascertain what Japanese pan-

Asianism really stood for.2 Nevertheless, this has not deterred Duara from concluding

that, “Pan-Asianism was more than a Japanese intellectual-political development; it had

enormous consequences on the ground in much of Asia.”3 By appraising the Sinology of

Tachibana Shiraki (橘樸) and his endorsement of Confucian concepts in Manchukuo in

the 1930s, this article explores both the intimacies and discrepancies that marked the

relationship between pan-Asianism and imperialism during that period.

1 This paper was presented to the 18

th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies

Association of Australia in Adelaide, 5-8 July 2010. It has been peer reviewed via a

double referee process and appears on the Conference Proceedings Website by the

permission of the author who retains copyright. This paper may be downloaded for fair

use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and other relevant legislation. 2 Takeuchi Yoshimi, Nihon to Ajia, Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1966, p. 287

3 Prasenjit Duara, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism

and Borders (review)”, Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 35, No.1, 2009, p. 186

2

Tachibana travelled to China in 1906 at the age of 25; seeking renown as a

distinguished Sinologist, he undertook a vast journey that spanned Shanghai, Qingdao

and Northeast China, working for many journals and newspapers along the way as a

journalist, commentator and editor. Tachibana showed an interest in Sinology after

witnessing a series of transformations in China, from the Wu Chang uprising in October

1911 that forced the abdication of the last Qing Emperor to the establishment of Yuan

Shikai‟s short-lived monarchy between November 1915 and March 1916.4 His initial

interest in Confucian precepts and Chinese history persisted throughout his stay in

Manchukuo, shaping the terms of his participation in Manchurian affairs. This article,

which aims to investigate the interplay between Confucianism, Japanese imperialism and

agrarianism in pan-Asianism, argues that imperialism was not averse to espousing

Tachibana Shiraki‟s pan-Asianism during the foundation of Manchukuo, and that the

acceleration of imperialism after 1932 was based on the abandonment of the pan-

Asianism of Tachibana's agrarianism.

The Discourse of the Kingly Way in Manchukuo

Confucianism was officially adopted as Manchukuo‟s guiding ideology after its

founding. Warren Smith notes that the case of Manchuria offers a good example of “how

the Japanese took advantage of the appeal of Confucianism in attempting to rationalize

their expansion on the Asiatic continent and to maintain social and political control.”5

Smith‟s study reveals that the Japanese imperial power endorsed Confucianism in

Manchuria as a means of emphasising the ties between Japan and China, of countering

Chinese nationalism, and of stressing the anti-communist character of the Manchukuo

project. The classical Confucian doctrines “Four Books and Five Classics” were even

officially endorsed as school textbooks to replace the previous education system of the

Chinese Nationalist government. Organisations such as the Manchuria Morality

Association and the Confucian Association were established to encourage the spread of

4 Nomura Kōichi, Zhang Xuefeng (trans.), Jindai Riben de Zhongguo renshi, Beijing:

Central Compilation & Translation Press, 1999, p. 209 5 Warren Smith, Confucianism in Modern Japan, Hokuseido Press, 1973, p.184

3

Confucian morality.6 Although the range of Confucian ideas deployed in Manchuria was

broad, the entire intellectual enterprise was succinctly encapsulated in the single slogan

“The Kingly Way in Paradise”（王道乐土), a concept with pan-Asian appeal; as Hotta

notes: “Both Japanese and Chinese supporters of Sun Yat-sen had earlier referred to the

Confucian concept of the „Kingly Way‟ (王道) as a specifically Asian phenomenon.”7

The problem with the Kingly Way was that the frequency with which it was cited

in contemporary research on Manchukuo robbed it of much of its clarity of definition and

meaning. It is not uncommon to find it used in the literature with no apparent

understanding of what it referred to and how it was contextualised. As early as 1933,

Naitō Konan expressed his exasperation as follows: “This Kingly Way slogan is being

repeated and celebrated as the nation-building ideal for Manchukuo, … but could

someone please explain what it actually means?” Naitō knew an explanation would be

difficult, given that “even in the birthplace of the term itself, in China, the Kingly Way

has almost never existed as a historical reality. It has always been, since ancient times,

not much more than a proverbial ideal.”8

As Naitō suggests, the meaning of the Kingly Way was ambiguous. This is partly

because the discourse of the Kingly Way is formed in an interplay among the following:

1) Yano Jin‟ichi (矢野仁一);9 2) Zheng Xiaoxu (郑孝胥); 3) Yu Chonghan (于冲汉),

head of the Department of Local Autonomy (自治指导部) established shortly after the

Manchurian Incident;10

4) Tachibana Shiraki; 5) Ishiwara Kanji, the Army Staff College

6 Ibid, pp. 193-194

7 Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,

2007, p. 117 8 Joshua Fogel, Politics and Sinology: the Case of Naitō Konan (1866-1934), Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1984, pp. 255-258. 9 For research on Yano Jin‟ichi, see Joshua Fogel, Politics and Sinology.

10 Research that has elaborated on Yu Chonghan‟s Kingly Way includes Eri Hotta, Pan-

Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945, Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity:

Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. pp. 64-

65, Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in

Modern China, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, pp. 94-95, Kenichiro

Hirano, “The Japanese in Manchuria 1906-1931: A Study of the Historical Background

of Manchukuo”, published PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1983, p. 419

4

instructor and consultant to the Kwantung Army in Manchuria;11

6) contributors to a

journal named Si Wen (斯文);12

and 7) Sun Yat-sen‟s speech delivered in Kobe in 1924.

The Kingly Way concept appeared in both the proclamation of Manchukuo‟s

establishment (建国宣言) on 1 March 1932 that was drafted by Zheng Xiaoxu, and the

“Proclamation of a Chief Executive” (执政宣言) announced by Zheng Xiaoxu eight days

later, when Pu Yi officially assumed the position of Chief Executive (1932-1934) (执政

).13

Immediately after the Manchurian Incident of 18 September 1931, the preferred

ideology of Manchukuo was “the Imperial Way” (皇道), rather than the later widely

known the Kingly Way. The Kwangtung Army's official proclamation, issued on 4

October 1931, declared that in the best interests of the 30 million people living in

Manchuria and Mongolia, the Kwangtung Army was determined to build "a happy land

of co-prosperity and co-existence". In order to ensure an enduring peace in the East,

Manchuria would implement the Imperial Way.14

However, after March 1932,

represented by the proclamation of Manchukuo‟s establishment, the Kingly Way was

adopted by both the Japanese and the Chinese in Manchukuo. The Confucian notion of

the Kingly Way, which became the dominant ideology during the period between late

October 1931 and early 1932, was endorsed by both the Chinese and the Japanese.

11

Research that has elaborated on Ishiwara Kanji‟s Kingly Way includes Joshua Fogel,

Politics and Sinology, Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with

the West, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. pp. 34, 55-56, 142-145 12

A magazine in Japan that was exclusively dedicated to Confucianism. When

Manchukuo was established in 1932, Si Wen, assembling many scholars, launched a

special issue to laud the establishment of Manchukuo. For research on Si Wen‟s discourse

on the Kingly Way, see Warren Smith, Confucianism in Modern Japan, Joshua Fogel,

Politics and Sinology. 13

Manshūkoku shi Hensan Kankōkai (ed.), Manshūkoku shi, Tokyo: Manmō Dōhō

Engokai 1970, p. 219 14

Katakura Tadashi, “Manshū jihen kimitsu kōryaku nisshi”, in Kobayashi Tatsuo and

Shimada Toshihiko (eds.), Gendaishi shiryō, Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1977, Vol.7, pp.

200-201. Also see Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō,

Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996, p. 241

5

The Kingly Way as a Collaboration

The Kingly Way discourse which prevailed by 1932-1933, was produced in late

October and November 1931 through the joint effort of the Japanese and Chinese elites in

Manchuria. During the initial period of Japanese occupation, due to the strong Chinese

reaction to the Manchurian Incident it was crucial for the Kwangtung Army to gain the

cooperation of the Chinese elites at the local level. After it had been propagated as a

popular concept by China experts and intellectuals in newspapers and journals, the

Kingly Way was adopted by the Kwangtung Army in order to coordinate local support.

On the other, the Kingly Way not only existed as a result of Japan‟s strategy of enlisting

the collaboration of the Chinese, as noted by Rana Mitter; it also helped the Japanese

military to develop an alliance with key intellectual figures such as Tachibana, Koyama

Sadatomo (小山貞知 ) and Noda Ranzō (野田蘭蔵 ) among the Japanese settler

community on the Kwantung peninsula.

As Komagome Takeshi suggests, the slogan of the Kingly Way started to emerge

in Manshū nippō as early as 29 September 1931, in the context of resistance to Zhang

Xueliang‟s regime in Northern China.15

Commentary articles argued that the principle of

Chinese politics was the Kingly Way, a historical Confucian notion of rulership that

follows the Will of Heaven and sanctions revolution to purge corrupt rule contrary to the

heavenly mandate. This political philosophy of the Kingly Way stemmed from the

Chinese sage Mencius (or Meng-Tsu, c371-289 BC). Sun Yat-sen‟s Nationalist

Revolution of 1911, which dethroned the Qing, was considered a classic example. But,

the rule of Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek was seen as a deviation from the

authenticity of Sun‟s philosophy of the Kingly Way.

These articles were surprisingly well received by members of the local Chinese

elite such as Yuan Jinkai (袁金铠). Kanai Shōji (金井章次), the Director-General of the

Manchurian Youth League (满洲青年连盟) wrote in his memoirs that he visited Yuan on

30 October 1931 to elicit Yuan‟s support.16

During their meeting, Yuan disclosed his

15

Ibid. 16

The Manchurian Youth League was established on 4 May 1928 with the founding of

the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR). Kanai Shōji, who was then head of the

6

inclination to favour the Kingly Way elaborated in editorial articles in Manshū nippō and

asked whether this could be accepted by the Kwangtung Army. Yuan and Kanai together

met with the Army commander Honjō Shigeru (本庄繁), who agreed to endorse the

notion of the Kingly Way.17

At the same time, the Kwangtung Army approached Yu Chonghan, who had a

long history of working for the Japanese dating back to the Russo-Japanese War, when he

had functioned as a spy on their behalf.18

In semi-retirement at the time of the

Manchurian Incident, Yu received a visit from Morita Fukumatsu on behalf of the

Kwantung Army on 1 November 1931. During this visit, Yu generously contributed his

wisdom on how to rule the Manchurian area, proposing the Kingly Way as the basis for

Sino-Japanese cooperation in Manchukuo. Yu subsequently met Honjō Shigeru on 3

November 1931 to outline his eight points for the effective rule of Manchuria. He also

reasserted his opinion of the Kingly Way, convincing Honjō that, though the Kingly Way

seemed an outmoded concept, it could be loaded with new meaning and new content

according to need, since it had “Eastern spirit and culture.”19

Two weeks later, on 14

November 1931, the Department of Local Autonomy was founded in Shenyang.20

Yu

was appointed its director: Tachibana Shiraki and Noda Ranzō were consultant.21

SMR‟s health ministry, was elected Director-General of the Manchurian Youth League.

On 23 October, 1931, the League proposed “The Outline of Establishing a Free Land of

Manchuria and Mongolia” (东北自由國建設綱領) on 23 October 1931. The “Outline”

was drafted by Kanai Shōji and addressed to Honjō Shigeru, the general commanding the

Kwangtung Army. Ranging from the autonomy of Manchuria to isolating Manchuria

from the rest of China, this outline contained many ideas similar to those of the

Department of Local Autonomy. However, there was no mention of the Kingly Way. See

"Tōhoku Jiyūkoku kensetsu kōryō", in Inaba Masao (ed.), Gendaishi shiryō, Tokyo:

Misuzu shobō, 1965, Vol. 11, p.561 This visit was also recorded in Kanai Shōji‟s memoir;

see Kanai Shōji, Manshū kenkoku senshi, p. 24 17

Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō, Tokyo: Iwanami

shoten, 1996, p. 254 18

Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in

Modern China, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, p. 83 19

“Yu Chonghan no shutsuro to sono seiken”, in Inaba Masao (ed.), Gendaishi shiryō,

Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1965, Vol. 11, pp. 564-566 20

The Department of Local Autonomy draw its staff from the Manchurian Youth League

and the Daiyūhōkai (大雄峰会). The Daiyūhōkai was created by Kasagi Yoshiaki (笠木

良明) at the end of 1929 when he was transferred from Tokyo to the SMR in Dalian.

7

Tachibana was actively involved in the Department of Local Autonomy. Through

his editing of the journal Manshū hyōron, Tachibana maintained a degree of interaction

with Yu. They shared some similarities in their understanding of the Kingly Way. They

both believed that this Confucian concept had new viability, and argued that, above all,

the Kingly Way meant "the Local Autonomy of Manchukuo". “Great Harmony” (大同)

was the ultimate goal of the Kingly Way while harmony of peoples (民族協和 )

functioned as the means towards it. Tachibana‟s “Local Autonomy as the Realization of

the Kingly Way” (王道の実践としての自治) was originally a speech delivered to the

Department of Local Autonomy when Yu was director. According to Tachibana, the

major achievement of the Department of Local Autonomy would be its contribution to

paving the way for the politics of the Kingly Way in Manchukuo.22

Tachibana also

formed a relationship with the Manchurian Youth League, many members of which also

became members of the Department of Local Autonomy. Tachibana‟s journal Manshū

hyōron was established in August 1931. Its legal proprietor was Koyama Sadatomo, who

at the time was an executive of the Manchurian Youth League.23

Tachibana‟s views on China and the Kingly Way in turn influenced Ishiwara

Kanji‟s perception of China and his Manchurian policy. Tachibana confessed in his “My

Change in Direction” that he once attempted to persuade Ishiwara Kanji to adopt the

Kingly Way discourse. Tachibana first met Ishiwara on 12 March 1931 as recorded in

Ishiwara‟s diary,24

although Tachibana insisted that he only started to associate with the

Kasagi was heavily influenced by Ōkawa Shūmei (大川周明). See Okabe Makio,

Manshūkoku, Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1978, p. 29 21

Yamaguchi Masao, “Zasetsu” no Shōwa shi, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995, pp. 239-

241 22

Tachibana Shiraki, “Tanmei narishi Jichi Shidōbu”, Manshū hyōron, Vol. 3, No.4,

1932.7.23, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakushū, Tokyo, Keisō shobō, 1966, Vol.

2, p. 94 23

Yamamoto Hideo, Manshū hyōron kaidai sōmokuji, Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1982, p. 3 24

Sagakuchi Yūko, “Tachibana Shiraki to Ishihara Kanji”, Yamamoto Hideo, Tachibana

Shiraki to Chūgoku, Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1990, p.194. Also see the diary of Ishihara

Kanji, in Tsunoda Jun (ed.), Ishihara Kanji shiryō: kokubō ronsaku hen, Tokyo: Hara

Shobo, 1978, p.14

8

Kwantung Army after September 1931.25

As Mark R. Peattie notes, “Ishiwara ‟s

discussion with Tachibana in the spring of 1931 is of particular interest, covering as it did

a wide range of China problems, and considering the fact that Tachibana, on the basis of

extensive historical research, had recently come to the conviction that China was not a

stagnant society and that, by itself, the force of Chinese nationalism was capable of

modernizing China from within.”26

It was in 1931 that, through his contact with

Sinologists such as Tachibana, Ishiwara changed his stance from advocating the

occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia to supporting their independence.

In October 1931, they had a second meeting, during which Tachibana discussed

the issue of the Kingly Way with Ishiwara.27

Noda Ranzō and Koyama Sadatomo were

also present on that occasion. The meeting officially marked Tachibana‟s joining with the

Kwantung Army to promote the Kingly Way ideology for Manchukuo. As recorded by

Katakura Tadashi, Noda and Koyama were assigned the task of dealing with the

ideological issue of Manchuria on 25 September 1931, immediately after the Incident.28

On 31 October 1931, Noda was virtually the first writers to publish articles regarding the

Kingly Way of Manchukuo in Manshū hyōron, which was then under the direct

supervision of Tachibana.29

Thus, through Noda and Koyama and through the output of

Manshū hyōron, Tachibana was drawn into the founding of Manchukuo from October

1931 onwards. In the early stage of the founding of Manchukuo, Sinologists such as

Tachibana played a significant role in deciding Manchurian policy alongside the military

power.

Chinese landlords, former Qing loyalists, Japanese Sinologists and Kwantung

military officers all participated in the promotion of the Kingly Way discourse in 1931. It

was a joint effort to harmonise different interests in Manchukuo. This seems to testify

what Duara calls Manchukuo's "new imperialism", which was expressed not as a strategy

25

Tachibana Shiraki, “Manshū jihen to watashi no hōkō tenkan”, in Tachibana Shiraki

chosakushū, Vol.2, p.18 26

They met on 12 March 1931; see Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s

Confrontation with the West, p. 156 27

Tachibana Shiraki, “Tairiku seisaku jūnen no kentō”, Manshū hyōron, Vol. 7, No. 6, 11

August 1934, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakushū, Vol.3 p. 550 28

Katakura Tadashi, “Manshū jihen kimitsu kōryaku nisshi”, p. 192 29

Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō, p. 249

9

of assimilation and homogenization-as manifested in Taiwan and Korea-but as

independence and alliance.30

However, as I will demonstrate later, this effort eventually

failed: Manchukuo was, after all an imperialised site for rival interests. The schism

between pan-Asianism and "new imperialism" was irreconcilable although in some

phases a degree of intimacy was shared.

Tachibana Shiraki’s Kingly Way as a Representation of Pan-Asianism

Tachibana was an active participant in the fostering of Confucian concepts; thus,

the question of what differentiated his Kingly Way from that of others merits further

investigation. Although it was adopted by the colonial authority as a means to conceal

colonial discrimination and to lessen social tensions, the Kingly Way was not merely a

political slogan. Manchuria was a point of confluence for imperial expansionists and pan-

Asianists. As Louise Young observes: “Circumstances brought left-wing researchers and

right-wing officers together in the puppet state and there they remained, strange

bedfellows, until the early 1940s when a wave of arrests ended this bizarre

collaboration”.31

It is through this examination of Tachibana‟s early thought on the

Kingly Way that we can understand how pan-Asianism once worked as a utopian

alternative to Japanese imperialism in the early 1930s and how this nascent utopianism

was thwarted by imperialism.

To Tachibana in late 1931 and 1932, the Kingly Way was not a set of fixed

concepts; rather, it contained many opportunities to develop new meanings in response to

new eras. The goal of the Kingly Way was to realise the Great Harmony, which had two

meanings: harmony of peoples and agrarian autonomy (農民自治). As Tachibana noted:

“The relation between the Kingly Way and local autonomy is as the relation between

principles and methods”.32

In the context of Manchukuo, the Kingly Way was inseparable

from local autonomy.

30 Prasenjit Duara, "Nationalism, Imperialism, Federalism, and the Example of

Manchukuo", Common Knowledge Vol.12, No.1, 2006, p. 56 31

Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime

Imperialism, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 269 32

Tachibana Shiraki, “Han Ajia undō no shinriron”, Manshū hyōron, Vol.5, No.2, 8 July,

1933, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakushū, Vol. 2, p. 587

10

Tachibana‟s concept of the Kingly Way soon grew from its origins in state

philosophy to develop economic aspects. In December 1931, Tachibana joined a

complementary organisation entitled “The State Founding Association” (建国社), for

which Noda Ranzō drafted the political manifesto. In this manifesto, Noda stated that the

Kingly Way was not simply a Confucian moral philosophy but also a politics for the

production and distribution of wealth, for the protection of people‟s lives, for the

eradication of all reactionary elements in society, and for the realisation of the Great

Harmony.33

Tachibana saw Manchuria as “a familistic agricultural society” (家族主義的

な農業社会). In his opinion, the politics of the Kingly Way would liberate people from

their semi-feudal status and maximise their potential for local autonomy according to

Chinese traditional values. In this way, the Confucian concept of the Kingly Way was

transformed by Tachibana from a moral or religious concept in a new political idea of

agricultural autonomy that would ultimately lead Manchukuo to the Great Harmony.

The active discourse surrounding the Kingly Way in 1932 and 1933 soon elicited

a new discourse of pan-Asianism. In July and August 1933, Tachibana developed his

theory of pan-Asianism by criticising the Greater Asian faction (大亞細亞派) led by

Kuchida Yasunobu. Tachibana held many ideas similar to those of the Greater Asian

faction; but, he criticised the latter for being "idealist". While giving them credit for

recognising that “the Kingly Way aims to overcome Western civilisation and to revive

Eastern spirit,” at the same time he asserted that “the Greater Asian faction seems to

imply that as long as Japan follows the Kingly Way or the Imperial Way, anything can be

resolved.”34

Tachibana saw this as nothing more than purely an idealist and religious

stance.

In contrast, he believed that “the economic and material power Japan holds

derives from Western materialist civilisation. In addition, in order to exert its power,

Japan has also followed in the footsteps of western imperialism. Japan and Japanese

people have already abandoned the Eastern social form in favour of Western

33

Tachibana Shiraki, “Manshū kenkoku shokōsō hihan”, Manshū hyōron, Vol.3, No.7,

13 August, 1932, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakushū, Vol. 2, p. 106 34

Tachibana, “Han Ajia undō no shinriron”, p. 598

11

capitalism.”35

Tachibana seriously doubted Japan‟s capacity to exercise leadership in

agrarian pan-Asianism; he held that neither nationalism (国家主義) nor capitalism could

develop pan-Asianism or cosmopolitanism. What he was pursuing was “national,

industrial and geographical” unification dominated by non-capitalism and opposed to any

form of class and industrial monopoly.36

This unification would eventually liberate Asia

from the domination of Western imperialism. This ideal vision left room for the

possibility of reforming Japan itself, a reformation in which Tachibana believed the

Japanese Army should play a significant role.

From the Kingly Way to the Imperial Way: the Failure of Agrarianism in

Manchukuo

The Department of Local Autonomy was disbanded on 15 March 1932, after

existing for a fleeting four months only. Subsequently, many former members of the

Department formed a new institution called the Finance and Politics Bureau (資政局).

According to Tachibana, whereas the Department of Local Autonomy was founded

spontaneously as a response to the Manchurian reality in 1931, the Finance and Politics

Bureau was established in full accordance with the law of Manchukuo and supervised by

the State Council (国務院).37

However, its attempt to act as a ruling organ irritated

Itagaki Seishirō, who disbanded it in July 1932.38

In total, these two institutions that

advocated local autonomy were in existence for a mere seven months.

In the same year, the Manchurian Youth League was dissolved. In August 1933,

the Civil Minister of Manchukuo announced the reformation of the counties of

Manchukuo. This indicated the waning of local autonomy and the acceleration of the

centralisation of authority, despite the fact that at that time the movement towards local

autonomy had developed into on large scale in Shenyang.39

In general, the influence of

35

Ibid, p. 597 36

Ibid, p. 600 37

Tachibana Shiraki, “Manshū kenkoku shokōsō hihan”, p. 100 38

Zhongyang danganguan, Zhongguo di‟er lishi danganguan, Jilinsheng shehui

kexueyuan (eds), Riben diguo zhuyi qinhua dangan ziliao xuanbian, Vol.3, Beijing:

Zhonghua shuju, 1994, p. 438 39

Ibid, pp. 436-437

12

Tachibana and the intellectual group associated with the Department of Local Autonomy

declined in central government circles although Tachibana continued to enjoy

considerable influence at the local level.

However, Tachibana‟s Kingly Way, which strongly opposed the idea of restoring

the monarchy, met with failure when on 1 March 1934 Manchukuo was declared an

empire and Pu Yi was crowned emperor. The era known as “Datong”(大同) was replaced

by that of “Kangde” (康德). Zheng Xiaoyu justified the imperium, arguing that China

had experienced twenty years of chaos following its adoption of democracy, thus

showing itself as unsuited to the Republican form of state.40

By advocating monarchy

under Pu Yi for Manchuria, Zheng sought to realise his dream of restoring the Qing.

However, Zheng‟s argument was not acceptable to Tachibana, who rejected the

notion that the Qing had permanent entitlement to rule. As long as the Qing emperor

failed to obey the Mandate of Heaven, he should be dethroned and replaced by a more

progressive regime.41

Tachibana criticised not only Zheng‟s hypocrisy but also the

ignorance of Manchuria's Japanese elites. He complained that after the establishment of

Manchukuo in March 1932, Japanese officers flooded from Japan into Manchuria with

little knowledge of Manchukuo and Manchukuo‟s history and culture. All they achieved

was transferring Japanese capitalistic bureaucracy to Manchukuo. They failed to

understand the true meaning of the Mandate of Heaven. 42

However, Tachibana could no

longer influence the Kwangtung Army‟s decision-making as he had in 1931 and 1932

after Honjō Shigeru, Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishirō, the initial founders of

Manchukuo, were replaced and transferred back to Japan in July 1932. In 1935, while

Tachibana was lecturing on the Kingly Way at Datong College (大同学院), which was

founded by the Department of Local Autonomy, Zheng Xiaoxu was promoting his

40

Tachibana Shiraki, “Nikkei kanshi no teisei riyū hihan”, Manshū hyōron, Vol. 6, No. 5,

2, February, 1934, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakushū, Vol. 2, p. 149 41

Ibid, p.150 42

Tachibana Shiraki, “Nikkei kanshi e no kigo”, Manshū hyōron, Vol. 6, No. 5, 2,

February 1934, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakushū, Vol. 2, p. 154

13

version of the Kingly Way to a summer lecture hosted by the Xinjing municipal

government..43

1935 in fact saw the start of Japan‟s accelerating penetration into Manchuria. The

restoration of Pu Yi‟s emperorship was merely a by-product of intensified centralisation

in Manchukuo. Tachibana‟s ideal of the Great Harmony was adopted by the Kwangtung

Army in the initial stage of the founding of Manchukuo because it was associated with

Chinese revolutionary thought. This helped to justify Japan‟s military action in

Manchuria. However, it was abandoned immediately when Manchukuo headed towards a

stable stage of development.44

The tension between Tachibana and the Kwantung Army

grew particularly evident when the slogan Japan and Manchuria Are Inseparable (日満不

可分) began to gain more prominence.

The tension between Tachibana‟s agricultural autonomy and the Manchurian

reality became irreconcilable in 1936 and 1937 when Manchukuo adopted a five-year

industrialisation plan and Ayukawa Gisuke of Nissan Industries invested three billion yen

to establish the Manchurian Heavy Industries Corporation.45

Industrialism and the

monarchy, rather than agricultural autonomy and democracy, reigned over Manchuria. Of

the various competing theories surrounding the establishment of Manchukuo in October

1931, the Kingly Way of local agricultural autonomy as the leading principle actively

existed for less than a year.

Post-1933, when the Honjō era was over and Tachibana‟s advocacy of non-

capitalism and agrarianism ceased to be popular in Manchukuo, Ishiwara's notion of an

East Asian League started to gain currency.46

It was at this juncture that Tachibana began

to voice his opinion on pan-Asianism.47

Tachibana and Ishiwara had more frequent

contact after 1937, a time when Tachibana was shocked by the outbreak of the Second

43

Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō, p. 275 44

Ibid, p. 276 45

Lincoln Li, The China Factor in Modern Japanese Thought : the Case of Tachibana

Shiraki, 1881-1945, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 60 46

The idea of an East Asian League first appeared in “Gunjijō yori mitaru kōkoku no

kokusaku narabi kokubō keikaku yōkō”; see Tsunoda Jun (ed.), Ishihara Kanji shiryo:

kokubō ronsaku hen, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1978, pp.113-114 47

Hamaguchi Yūko, “Tachibana Shiraki to Ishiwara Kanji”, in Tachibana Shiraki to

Chūgoku, p. 201

14

Sino-Japanese War and Ishiwara was demoted from Japan to Manchukuo due to his

opposition to the war with China. Both Tachibana and Ishiwara believed that Japan

should cooperate with China to contain the threat of the Soviet Union in the Far East. So

it comes as no surprise that Tachibana supported Ishiwara‟s East Asian League proposal

after July 1938 when the latter resigned from the Kwantung Army to concentrate

exclusively on this project. Tachibana visited Ishiwara to discuss politics in Kyoto in

1939.48

Around this time, Tachibana was recruited into the Shōwa Research Association

formed by Prince Konoye Fumimaro.

The Kingly Way, which had its origins in Manchukuo, became a crucial concept

of Ishiwara‟s “Theory on Showa Restoration” (昭和維新論). According to Ishiwara, the

final battle would be between the Kingly Way and the Imperial Way, a basic theme of

Sun Yat-sen‟s speech delivered in Japan in 1924. Tachibana not only agreed with this

theme but also applied his own understanding to develop the Kingly Way aspect of

Ishiwara‟s “Theory”. He theorised that the history of Asian countries progressed from

confrontation to co-operation and harmony. The end point of this progress would be the

Great Harmony.49

Tachibana saw this form of the Kingly Way, a new guidance for a new

era with the goal of Great Harmony, already expressed in Sun Yat-sen‟s concept of

Conciliationism (調和主義).50

In 1941, Tachibana was a frequent contributor to Ishiwara‟s journal East Asian

League (東亜聯盟), in which he published some modifications to his early thought on the

Kingly Way.51

In order to secure Japan‟s leadership of the East Asian League, Tachibana

made a distinction between two different forms of the Kingly Way: the general and the

specific. Japan‟s Imperial Way belonged to the general Kingly Way; therefore, it was

legitimate for it to assume the leadership of the East Asian League. And, as Manchukuo

was in lockstep with Japan, the specific concept of the Kingly Way of Manchukuo should

48

Ibid, p. 220 49

Tachibana Shiraki, “Seijiryoku to kokumin soshiki”, Tachibana Shiraki chosakushū,

Vol. 3, p. 393 50

Ibid, pp. 393-394 51

From December 1939 to February 1943, Tachibana contributed 9 commentary articles

to Ishihara‟s East Asian League. See Sakaguchi Yūko, “Tachibana Shiraki to Ishihara

Kanji”, pp. 221-222

15

eliminate its revolutionary tone to ensure the eternal rule of Japan‟s emperor. Finally,

national harmony between the Asian nations became a significant element of the Kingly

Way.52

In fact, Tachibana‟s early interest in pan-Asianism and Manchukuo paved the

way for his interest in how to reform Japan to meet the requirements of leadership. In his

On Nationality (国体序説) he gave equal space to the emperor system and to the Kingly

Way in early Manchukuo. As Koyasu Nobukuni notes, the East Asia depicted by

Tachibana was actually a picture of Japan‟s community as “one emperor leading the

masses”53

(一君万民の共同社会).

Conclusion: The Demise of Pan-Asianism and its Consequences

Many researchers, such as Hashikawa Bunzo and Nakajima Makoto, have opted

to list Tachibana under the category of ultranationalism (超国家主義) alongside Kita

Ikki, Okawa Shumei, and Tōyama Mitsuru. Ultranationalism, to the Japanese means,

ideas dealing with issues above national concerns. However, “almost without exception,

all of them failed to realise their dreams. At the beginning they stood for the liberation of

Asian peoples, admiring and assisting China‟s national revolution, but ended as the

catalyst for Japanese imperialism.”54

Nakajima‟s words summarise well the contradictions that marked Tachibana‟s life.

Similar to Kita Ikki, who was attracted to the cause of the Chinese National Revolution of

1911, Tachibana‟s stance in Manchuria sprang from his early experience of the Chinese

Revolution. The Chinese intellectual resources that had developed in the Republican era

were deftly used by Sinologists such as Tachibana in Manchukuo to realise their Japanese

pan-Asianism. The Kingly Way proposed in Sun Yat-sen‟s speech in 1924 severed as a

warning vis-à-vis Japan‟s accelerating imperialism and was the precursor to his later

“Theory of the Five Peoples” (五族共和) that intended to secure China‟s hegemony.

Kang Youwei‟s theory of “Great Harmony” also had the explicit intention of unifying

52

Ibid, pp. 400-401 53

Koyasu Nobukuni, Nihon nashonarizumu no kaidoku, Tokyo: Hakutakusha, 2007, p.

233 54

Nakajima Makoto, Ajia shugi no kōbō, Tokyo: Gendai Shokan, 2001, p. 64

16

China against foreign invasion. However, these intellectual resources, which were

appropriated in Japan‟s occupation of Manchukuo, transformed into Tachibana‟s theory

of “the harmony of the peoples” and “agrarian autonomy”. Tachibana felt sympathetic

towards China‟s national revolution, a sympathy derived from his understanding of the

Chinese farmers‟ suffering ironically that led him to become an accomplice to Japan‟s

expansion in China.

Based upon his early experience of the Chinese national revolution, Tachibana

believed the best way to revive China was to destroy the country's warlords, which was

also the priority issue in the founding of Manchukuo which Tachibana saw as in the best

interests of both China and Asia. This was not unusual for Japanese intellectuals at that

time. Many of them followed a mental route similar to that of Tachibana, having lost

confidence in China‟s future due to the failure of China‟s 1911 revolution; yet, at the

same time they assumed the leadership of liberalising Asia.

In 1931, immediately after the Manchurian Incident, when the Kwantung Army

leadership was unsure about how to organise Manchurian society and politics, Sinologists

including Tachibana played a crucial role in helping the Army to found Manchukuo.

During this process, Sinologists‟ knowledge of China as well as of traditional values such

as Confucian thought, were tactically deployed in the political sphere by the Army.

Tachibana himself seized the opportunity of cooperating with the Army to realise his

dream of reforming and liberating Asia. In the short period between 1931 and 1932,

Tachibana‟s pan-Asianism almost matched that of the Japanese imperialist Army.

However, what distinguished Tachibana‟s pan-Asianism and his yearning for a

Japanese-controlled Manchurian state was his insistence on agrarianism, based on his

study of Chinese history. However meagre his influence may have been, Tachibana‟s

early ideal of agrarian autonomy, beyond Japan‟s imperialistic capitalistic advancement,

formed a significant part of Japan‟s pan-Asianism. Tachibana‟s case offers an

opportunity to reflect on the many theories of Japanese imperialism in Manchukuo,

making a differentiation of pan-Asianism from Manchukuo's "new imperialism" possible.