Xiong and AP

john makeham

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF XIONG SHILI’SINTERPRETATION OF DIGNAGA’S

ALAMBANA-PARIKS· A (INVESTIGATION OFTHE OBJECT)

Abstract

This essay is an exercise in intellectual archaeology in which I seekto show that already in Xiong Shili’s first account of Yogacara,Weishixue Gailun (A General Account of Yogacara Learning)(1923), we are able to find the first indications of a critical attitude toYogacara that would grow in intensity over the following twodecades. These critiques served the rhetorical purpose of bolsteringthe authority of Xuanzang (seventh century). Before long, however,Xiong even rejected that authority.

I. Introduction

After the establishment of Chinese philosophy as an academic disci-pline in late-Meiji Japan, the attitude of many Japanese scholars toChinese philosophy and to the history of Chinese philosophy washighly critical. There was widespread consensus that Chinese philoso-phy lacked systemization; that in method and organization it wassimple and naive; and that it fell far short of the standards set byWestern philosophy. More particularly, many late-Meiji Sinologistsand intellectual historians identified logic as the hallmark of order(soshiki組織) and system (keito系統; taikei體系), and the prerequi-site for genuine philosophical discourse, thus throwing into questionthe status of Chinese philosophy as philosophy. These criticisms sub-sequently influenced the high regard that Chinese scholars such asWang Guowei 王國維 (1887–1927), Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), Liu Shipei 劉師培 (1884–1919), and Zhang Binglin 章炳麟(Taiyan 太炎) (1869–1936) came to place on logic—the hallmark ofsystem and order—as a precondition for the development of philoso-

JOHN MAKEHAM, Professor, Department of East Asian Studies, The AustralianNational University. Specialties: Chinese philosophy and intellectual history. E-mail:[email protected]

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Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40:S (2013) 205–225© 2014 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

phy; as indeed did the views of Japanese scholars such as KuwakiGenyoku桑木嚴翼 (1874–1946), who found evidence of the develop-ment of logic in early China, particularly in the writings of Xunzi荀子.These developments in turn stimulated Chinese scholars to makesignificant efforts to identify logic in the writings of the pre-Qinmasters, in particular in Xunzi and in Mozi墨子.

Just as this emphasis on logic played a formative influence on thedevelopment of the academic discipline of Chinese philosophy, sotoo the revival of Yogacara thought by leading Chinese intellectualsfrom the late 1890s to the 1930s played a key role in shaping Chinesephilosophy and modern Chinese thought more generally. Yogacara(yujia xing pai 瑜伽行派) (Yogic practice) is one of the two mostinfluential philosophical systems of Indian Buddhism, along withMadhyamaka. As the name implies, it focuses on meditative practice,as well as epistemology and logic. Competing traditions of Yogacarathought were first introduced into China during the sixth century,with the weishi 唯識 (Vijñaptimatra) (nothing but consciousness)school rising to preeminence in the seventh century. By the YuanDynasty (1271–1368), however, a number of key commentaries ofthis school had ceased being transmitted in China, and it was notuntil the end of the nineteenth century that a number of them werereintroduced into China from Japan where their transmission hadbeen uninterrupted. Crucial to this revival was the friendshipbetween Japanese scholar Nanjo Bun’yu 南條文雄 (1894–1927) andlay Chinese Buddhist scholar Yang Wenhui 楊文會 (1837–1911).Between 1891 and 1896, Nanjo sent a total of 235 Buddhist texts toYang, including thirty Yogacara texts that had long ceased beingtransmitted in China.

Within the context of a broader renewal of interest in tradi-tional philosophical writings (including other indigenous ChineseMahayana texts) in the late Qing, the corpus of Yogacara writingsattracted unparalleled attention. Why was Yogacara so attractive toChinese intellectuals of that period? A key factor was the judgmentthat just like modern scholarship derived from the West, Yogacaralearning was characterized by organized, systematized thought andconcepts, and provided a superior means to establish verification.Yogacara learning was regarded to be a sophisticated knowledgesystem which could serve as an authoritative alternative to the knowl-edge systems being introduced from the West. For many, it was anindigenized intellectual resource that could be co-opted to counterthe challenges posed by the logic, philosophy (then including psychol-ogy), and science of the West. For others, it exemplified Buddhistthought as philosophical or scientific rather than as religious andhence was perceived to be compatible with the spirit of modernity.

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II. Xiong Shili and Yogacara

Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968) is conventionally regarded as afounding figure of the modern New Confucian school of philosophyand widely recognized as one of the most original and creativeChinese philosophers of the twentieth century. He began his Yogacarastudies in Nanjing at the Institute of Inner Learning (Zhina NeixueYuan 支那內學院) in 1920 under the tutelage of the Institute’sfounder Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871–1943). Two years later,Xiong was appointed to teach Yogacara philosophy in the PhilosophyDepartment of Peking University where he initially taught for twoyears. He subsequently led a peripatetic and frequently interruptedacademic career. Over the thirty-year period from the early 1920s tothe early 1950s, he moved from a largely uncritical belief in Yogacaraphilosophy to a position where it served as a foil for his own construc-tive philosophy. His criticisms of Yogacara grew progressively moretrenchant over this period.

The incremental nature of this transition is reflected in the differentversions of his major philosophical writing, Xin Weishi Lun《新唯識論》 (New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness).1

In 1923 he published Weishixue Gailun 《唯識學概論》 (A GeneralAccount of Yogacara Learning), based on his lectures at Peking Uni-versity. In 1926 this book was revised but the original title wasretained. The title of the next revised version, Weishi Lun《唯識論》(Treatise on Yogacara), was published in 1930. The literary redaction(wenyanwen ben 文言文本) of New Treatise was published 1932 andrepresents Xiong’s mature rejection of Yogacara philosophy althoughhe still retained many elements of Yogacara, deploying them for hisown purposes. It was with the publication of the 1932 literary redac-tion that Xiong was catapulted to national prominence (and contro-versy). A vernacular redaction (yutiwen ben 語體文本) of NewTreatise was published in 1944, and an abridged edition of the ver-nacular redaction was published in 1953.

This short essay is an exercise in intellectual archaeology in whichI seek to show that already in Xiong’s first account of Yogacara,Weishixue Gailun—a work in which Xiong is conventionally consid-ered to adopt a wholly positive attitude to Yogacara—we are able tofind the first indications of a critical attitude to Yogacara that wouldgrow in intensity over the following two decades.This earliest critiqueconcerns Xiong’s interpretation of Indian logician Dignaga’s陳那 (ca.480–540) Alambana-parıks·a (Investigation of the Object), a debatetext in which Dignaga sets out to refute various early Indian Realistaccounts of atomism. (Historically this text has different Chinesetitles, just as it has different Chinese translations. Xuanzang’s

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rendering, Guan Suoyuan Yuan Lun《觀所緣緣論》, can be trans-lated as “Treatise on Discerning the Conditions for the CausalSupport of Consciousness.” This was the rendering Xiong followed.)Against the backdrop of a renaissance of interest in logic andYogacara philosophy in the late-Qing and early Republican periods,this text commanded considerable interest in China during the 1910sand 1920s. As Dan Lusthaus notes:

While eventually the Alambana-parıks·a was superseded in India(and later Tibet) by more sophisticated and complex critiques ofatomism, none of those later works reached China and East Asiauntil the twentieth century. Thus, Alambana-parıks·a represents thehigh water mark in the East Asian appropriation of Indian Buddhistcritiques of atomism, and as such received much attention amongtwentieth century Chinese intellectuals for its seeming relevance tomodern scientific atomic theories as well as contemporary trends inthe psychology and philosophy of perception.2

Perhaps as early as 1912 Zhang Kecheng 張克誠 (1865–1922) hadpublished Guan Suoyuan Yuan Lun Qianshuo 《觀所緣緣論淺說》(Interpretation of Discerning the Conditions for the Causal Support ofConsciousness). In 1914 Ouyang Jingwu published his more influen-tial commentary, Guan Suoyuan Yuan Lun Shijie《觀所緣緣論釋解》 (An Explication of Discerning the Conditionsfor the Causal Support of Consciousness),3 drawing on the interpre-tations of two Ming Dynasty commentators on the text, Zhixu 智旭(1599–1655) and Mingyu 明昱 (1527–1616), as well as translatorYijing’s 義淨 (635–713) notoriously “challenging” but intellectuallyrobust early eighth-century translation of sixth-century IndianYogacara exponent Dharmapala’s 護法 commentary on Alambana-parıks·a. In his 1920 discussion of Alambana-parıks·a in WeishiShuyi《唯識述義》 (Outline of Yogacara), Liang Shuming 梁漱溟(1893–1988) also critically refers to the popular commentary writtenby Zhang Kecheng.4 (As with both Liang Shuming and Xiong Shiliafter him, Zhang was appointed in 1917 as an adjunct faculty tolecture on Buddhism at Peking University.) And in 1928 Lü Cheng呂澂 (1896–1989), assisted by the cleric Shi Yincang 釋印滄 (1906–1943), published his important study of Alambana-parıks·a, central towhich is his translation of the text into Chinese from Tibetan.5

To underscore the contemporary fascination with issues ofBuddhist logic, inference, and epistemology, we might furthernote that in 1926 Lü published his summary translation-cum-description of Dignaga’s Praman· asamuccaya (Jilianglunshi Lüechao《集量論釋略抄》) (Excerpts from Compendium on Epistemology);“On the Fallacies of Reasoning in the Nyayapravesa” (RulunShisi Yinguo Jie 〈入論十四因過解〉);6 and Yinming Gangyao

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《因明綱要》 (A Primer of Buddhist Logic). Two years later he pub-lished his study of Dignaga’s Nyayamukha (Yinming Zhengli MenLunben Zhengwen 《因明正理門論本證文》) (Evidential Study ofthe Text of Gate to Logic) and his translation of Dignaga’s Hetu-cakra-d· amaru (Yinlun Juezelun《因輪決擇論》) (The Drum Wheelof Reason). Similarly, in 1926, Xiong published his lecture notes onKuiji’s窺基 (632–682) Yinming Dashu因明大疏 (Large Commentaryon Introduction to Logic).7

III. ALAMBANA-PARIKS· A in WEISHIXUE GAILUN (1923)

The Sanskrit text of Alambana-parıks·a is not extant but the work ispreserved in three Chinese versions and two Tibetan translations.The three Chinese versions are Paramartha’s mid-sixth-centurytranslation; Xuanzang’s 玄奘 mid-seventh-century translation (657,to be precise); and Yijing’s early eighth-century translation ofDharmapala’s commentary. Xiong’s decision to use Xuanzang’s trans-lation in all of the various redactions of Weishixue Gailun and XinWeishi Lun was no doubt influenced by the fact that Xuanzang’sCheng Weishi Lun also developed certain key ideas first adumbratedin Alambana-parıks·a. Indeed, as I will show in this essay, Xiongregarded Cheng Weishi Lun to be a work in which Xuanzang devel-oped certain ideas on perception first set out by Dignaga inAlambana-parıks·a, while avoiding the theoretical shortcomings ofthose ideas. In turn, the significance of Cheng Weishi Lun for Xiong isthat it was the work that most comprehensively shaped the subse-quent Chinese reception of Yogacara thought.

Alambana-parıks·a is a debate text in which popular Indian Realisttheories about atoms are subjected to sustained analytical critique.Some of these theories proposed that an alambana (suoyuan所緣)—acognitive object from which mental impressions are derived—iscomposed of individual or clustered groups of atoms. In Alambana-parıks·a Dignaga sets out a deconstructive argument and a construc-tive argument. The deconstructive argument refutes the thesis thateither individual atoms or groups of atoms are capable of functioningas an alambana; the constructive thesis is the proposition that what weactually cognize are mental images (akara; xiang 相) of our ownmaking.

The context in which Cheng Weishi Lun most explicitly engagesAlambana-parıks·a is Xuanzang’s account of the Four Conditions (siyuan四緣): causes as condition (yin yuan因緣); continuous sequenceof sameness condition (deng wujian yuan等無間緣); condition for thecausal support of consciousness or alambana condition (suoyuan yuan

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所緣緣) (alambana-pratyaya); and contributory factors as condition(zengshang yuan 增上緣). The Four Conditions are central toYogacara accounts of causality, particularly for explaining the causalrelationship between seeds, consciousness, and cognitive objects.8

In his Weishixue Gailun Xiong defines alambana condition byciting the following line in Cheng Weishi Lun which, based on Xiong’sunderstanding, might be translated as follows:

The third [condition] is the alambana condition. That is, it is a realdharma and it conveys an image of itself that is of cognitive concern(suolü所慮) to the mind or mental associates and is what [cognition]depends upon (suotuo 所託). Such real [dharmas] will be of twokinds: direct and remote. (三所緣緣。謂若有法是帶己相心或相應所慮所託。此體有二。一親二疏。)9

Xiong glosses you fa 有法 as you ti fa 有體法 “dharmas10 whichare real,” be they unconditioned dharmas (suchness) or conditioneddharmas (material and mental). Jars, just as much as “sky flowers,”11

however, are not dharmas which are real:

Although the sixth [or mental] consciousness erroneously constructsa jar and interprets it accordingly, there is a “referent alambana”12

[*alambanartha] (suoyuan yi所緣義). It is not, however, the case thatthis [jar] is the condition [for the alambana] because the jar itselfdoes not really exist. Although “a given condition exists, it is not thealambana”; and although “a given alambana exists, it is not the con-dition.” For these quotations, see Dignaga’s Alambana-parıks·awhere you can try to trace their [full import]. (意識雖妄作瓶解，有所緣義，而非是緣，瓶體實無故也。有是緣非所緣，有是所緣非緣。說見陳那《觀所緣緣論》，可試尋之。)13

The Yogacara school distinguished eight types of consciousness. Thefive sense consciousnesses are the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory,and tactile. The sixth consciousness or mano-vijñana (mental con-sciousness) is the thinking consciousness. It also brings together anddifferentiates the sensory impressions derived from the five sensoryconsciousnesses. That is, it can think about what the other fiveconsciousnesses perceive; the five consciousnesses do not have thisreflective capacity. The seventh or self-centered consciousness(manas) is the source of self-attachment; and the eighth, or basisconsciousness (alaya-vijñana), retains the impressions of past experi-ences and “perfumes” new experiences on the basis of that previousconditioning. Clearly, for Xiong, there is a condition that enables thesixth consciousness to construct a jar. In the next paragraph he eluci-dates what that is:

Opponent: A jar That which is attached to through imaginatively constructeddiscrimination ([bianji] suo zhi [遍計]所執).14 has no reality and is unable tolead to the production of consciousness. How can you say that it is analambana?

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Reply: An alambana that is devoid of reality relies upon a realcondition. [Drawing] from real dharmas, by erroneous imputation itcomes to exist. That is, by depending on [dharmas] of solidity, white-ness and so forth, characteristics of a jar That which is attached to throughimaginatively constructed discrimination. are erroneously imputed and sothere is the interpretation of a jar. This is the alambana.

難曰： “瓶 所執。無體， 不能率生識，何得說為所緣？”

曰：“無體所緣，依有體緣，於有體法上，妄增益而有，即依堅白等增益瓶相。所執。有瓶解故，是所緣也。”15

In sum, it is erroneous imputation, based on the “raw material” ofdharmas, that leads to the mental construction of objects.

(1) First sense of “to convey”

As for dai ji xiang帶己相, Xiong glosses dai帶 as having two senses:biandai變帶 and xiedai (jiadai)挾帶:

The first sense means that the cognizing capacity [of consciousness]The mind and mental associates. is transformed by conveying the form ofthe alambana, and is called the image part. In relation to the basicstuff (benzhi本質 [bimba]) of the remote [alambana] condition (shu[suoyuan] yuan 疏[所緣]緣) it is called the reflected image aspect.Some call it the direct object part.

第一義者，謂能緣心、心所。變帶所緣相狀，名為相分，對疏緣本質云影像相 或云親相分。16

Asanga’s Mahayanasam· graha (She Dasheng Lun《攝大乘論》;Ornament for Great Vehicle Discourses) had already referred to twosuch “parts” or aspects: xiang fen 相分 (nimitta [*bhaga]) and jianfen 見分 (darsana [*bhaga]), i.e., the object/image part and theperceiving/seeing part. Dignaga, in turn, added a third part, the self-verifying aspect or that part which confirms the perceiving part(zizheng [fen]自證[分]; svasam· vr·tti).17 The significance of this theory isthat it relates to Xuanzang’s opening comments in Cheng Weishi Lun(apparently following the lead of Dharmapala) to the effect that selfand the external world are to be explained by the transformation ofconsciousness. According to Cheng Weishi Lun, the transformation ofconsciousness is the result of consciousness’ being bifurcated into animage part and a seeing or perceiving part:

Transformation [of consciousness] refers to consciousness itselfturning to appear as two parts. This is because both parts, the imagepart and the seeing part, arise due to the self-verifying part of con-sciousness.18 Self and dharmas are posited on the basis of these twoparts.

變謂識體轉似二分。相見俱依自證起故。依斯二分施設我法。19

Charles Muller relates that benzhi本質 is “The raw sensate aspectof something that impinges on our consciousness (Skt. bimba; Tib.

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gzugs nyid); the original form of something as contrasted to its reflec-tion, projection 影像 (pratibimba), or perceived manifestation. Asubstance as it is before it undergoes the transformations of con-sciousness.Thus, the raw substance of things that can’t ever be directlyreceived, but can only be ‘represented.’”20 The contrast Xiong isdrawing in the above passage is between bimba (benzhi 本質) andpratibimba (yingxiang影像), which is the reflection (as in a mirror) ofthe “basic thing” (bimba).

Direct and remote alambana conditions are defined in the samepassage in Cheng Weishi Lun where Xuanzang defines alambanacondition:

If [the alambana] itself is not separate from the cognizing capacity [ofconsciousness] (nengyuan 能緣), then internally this [nonseparatedalambana itself] is what the seeing part, etc. are cognitively con-cerned about and what [cognition] is dependent upon and should beunderstood to be a direct alambana condition. If, however, [thealambana] itself is separate from the cognizing capacity, and is a stuff[bimba] capable of giving rise internally to what is of cognitiveconcern and to what [cognition] is dependent upon, then you shouldunderstand it to be a remote alambana condition.

若與能緣體不相離。是見分等內所慮託。應知彼是親所緣緣。若與能緣雖相離。為質能起內所慮託。應知彼是疏所緣緣。21

In terms of the three or four partitions of cognition (into the imagepart, the seeing part and the self-verifying part22), the “directalambana” is immediately accessible to the perceiver. Since the imagepart is not separate from the cognizing mind, the cognizing minddirectly bears this image part, taking it as cognitive object. If what istaken up as the “object” of a cognition is something that is not inner(that is, some perceptual object rather than a cognitive activity itself),then it is a “remotely” accessed alambana. In order to arise, the basic“stuff” has to have the ability to give rise to an inner cognition suchthat it is what the inner cognition is mentally concerned with and iscausally dependent upon. Xiong proposes that the distinctionbetween direct and remote alambana conditions is already implicit inAlambana-parıks·a:

These real dharmas [referred to in the account of the “alambanacondition” in Cheng weishi lun] are of two kinds: direct and remote.In Alambana-parıks·a Dignaga implicitly distinguished them but pro-vided very little in the way of an explicit account. Alambana-parıks·asays: “Alambana condition means giving rise to a cognizing consciousness in whichthe image of that [that which functions as the condition] is conveyed, and it is real.It causes the cognizing consciousness to be produced through dependence on it.”23

Upon examination of this, an “alambana condition” must then have two senses/referents: 1. the generation of consciousness must have that which supports it;2. [consciousness] identically supports the transformed image of that (bi彼) [i.e., the

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alambana]. That which is transformed is, of course, the direct alambana condition.That which supports, of course, is the remote alambana condition. With Chengweishi lun the distinction between these two began to be revealed,with the principles of analysis made detailed and explicit. This lateraccount is superior.

此體有二，一親一疏者。陳那《觀所緣緣論》隱判親疏，猶少明文。《觀所緣緣論》云： “所緣緣者，謂能緣識帶彼相起，及有實體，令能緣識托彼而生。”詳此，則所緣緣者必具二義：一，識生須有所托；二，即托彼變相。所變者自是親所緣緣；所托者自是疏所緣緣。至《三十論》此二分別乃始昭揭，析理詳明，後起者勝矣。24

Xiong’s comment about the two senses required by “alambana con-dition” means that (1) consciousness is causally conditioned by thealambana (for example, a blue alambana causes a blue cognition); and(2) it is consciousness itself which becomes the identical image (nimitta)of what is conveyed to it. Cognition of blue means the blue that istransmitted is a consciousness-image, a mental image (representa-tion) of blue. Consciousness is turned into an image of that which hasbeen conveyed to it:

This blue25 [color I see] is the seeing part of my visual consciousness’This includes reference to the mental associates. depending on the eighth[consciousness’] being altered into the image of a sense-object26 Thatbimba. and transforming to appear as a blue image The image part. andtaking it as cognitive object.27

此青青者乃吾眼識兼心所言。見分，仗第八所變塵相本質。變似青相相分。而緣之 。28

The blue image is a product of the seeing part of visual consciousness’taking as its object the remote alambana condition as it is mademanifest by the eighth consciousness.

The transformation of consciousness into an image of that whichhas been conveyed to it, in turn, relates to Dignaga’s rejection ofrealist claims that either individual atoms or clusters of atoms canfunction as an alambana condition. Individual atoms fail the secondcriterion because no image of individual atoms appears in conscious-ness; consciousness does not “convey the image of that.” As for acluster of atoms, such as the jar example, it is a mere conceptualabstraction, a nominal convenience (prajñapti), and as such is not anobject which consciousness can be causally dependent upon. It isimportant to note that in making these arguments, any implicitassumption about the existence of atoms made by Dignaga is purelyto enable debate to be possible and not because of any realist com-mitment to a belief in atoms on Dignaga’s part. As we will see below,the reason Xiong deems the Cheng Weishi Lun account superiorrelates principally to the idea that images in consciousness must becognized; it is not enough for them merely to be passively reflected inconsciousness.

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Xiong concludes his account of dai帶 in the sense of biandai變帶as follows:

Irrespective of whether the image parts of the first sevenconsciousnesses rely upon bimba or not, they are all transformationsof the seeing parts . . . hence [the first sense of dai 帶] is named“transformed/altered by what was conveyed.” This sense was originallybased on Dignaga’s Alambana-parıks·a. However, because Dignaga was attackingHınayana schools for accepting external matter (wai se外色), he elucidated only thesense of the transformation of images’ reliance on bimba.

前七相分仗質或否，皆由見變為 . . . 故名變帶。此義本以陳那《觀所緣緣論》為根據，然陳那破小宗許五識緣外色，但明仗質變相一義也。29

Here Xiong proposes that the sense of biandai—in which the seeingpart of consciousness transforms to appear as the image part, andthen takes this transformed image as a cognitive object—was madeexplicit in Alambana-parıks·a where it was deployed specifically tochallenge Hınayana Realist schools for accepting that phenomena areexternal.30

Although Dignaga does not refer to the notion of bimba inAlambana-parıks·a Xiong based his own interpretation on the follow-ing passages from Xuanzang’s translation of Alambana-parıks·a:

The Treatise [on Discerning the Conditions for the Causal Support ofConsciousness] says:“[An alambana condition] means that cognizingconsciousness (nengyuan shi 能緣識) arises conveying the image ofthat.”31 “That” refers to the “bimba”;“convey” refers to “transformedby what was conveyed”; ‘image” refers to the “reflected imageaspect” (yingxiang xiang 影像相)—it is also called the image part.This passage says that consciousness relies on the bimba and is trans-formed into an image that resembles the bimba. The Treatise alsosays: “In this way, the alambana condition for the consciousnesses isnothing other than the image of an internal cognitive object.This hasbeen well proven logically.” This “image of an internal cognitiveobject” refers to the image part.

《論》云：謂“能緣識帶彼相起。”彼者本質，帶者變帶，相者影像相，又云相分。言識托質，變似質之相也。《論》又云：“如是諸識唯內境相為所緣緣。理善成立。”內境相，謂相分也。32

In other words, the alambana—a cognitive object from which mentalimpressions are derived—is functionally synonymous with bimba.

Xiong then turns to discuss the distinction between “what [cogni-tion] depends upon” and “that which is of cognitive concern” and theimport of the distinction:

Real dharmas are able to function as conditions, causing mind andmental factors [i.e., cognition] to convey their own image and to arise.Ji己 (“their own”) refers to the condition. “To convey an image” has two meanings,both discussed above. Subsequent discussion follows this usage. Supposing thatto which [real dharmas] conveyed their own image (dai ji xiang zhe

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帶己相者) This word zhe 者 (“that to which”) refers to mind and mental associ-ates. did not take their [i.e. the dharma’s] own image as that withwhich it [mind and mental associates] was cognitively concerned,then the potency/active force (gongyong 功用; *sakti) of mind andmental associates would be the same as a mirror etc: “Etc.” refers to [apool of still] water and so forth. it could merely reflect.

If this were really so, then we can suppose that an objection might beas follows. “If a real dharma was able to function as the condition,causing that which reflects a dharma to arise bearing its own image,it would be said that this The real dharma that functions as a condition. wasthat That which reflects a dharma. [On this account,] the alambana Readingfrom “If”. . . to this point provisionally affirms the Mahayana position. is theexternal stuff reflected in a mirror etc. This “external stuff” gets its namevis-à-vis the reflection in the mirror. It too is able to function as the condi-tion, causing its own image to arise in the mirror etc. The reflection in themirror is precisely this conveying of external stuff’s own image. The stuff exter-nal to mirrors etc. should thus be the alambana for mirrors etc.” Shuji,juan 44, page 12 records this objection.33 Today, [Bertrand] Russell also claims thatcameras are able to see things. The meaning is close to this [example of the mirror].This is because the reflection that a camera takes in also conveys an external stuff’sown image.

If there is no better way to explain it [i.e., what is required forsomething to be an alambana], then this objection will say that mindHere mind includes mental associates; subsequent examples follow this. is nodifferent from a mirror or other material dharmas [i.e. materialthings]—how can the “nothing but consciousness” [thesis] be estab-lished? For this very reason, an explanation of the meaning of “thatwhich is of cognitive concern” (suolü 所慮) serves to show that thismind is different from matter. This is because if a real dharma, You fa有法 is fully expressed as youti fa有體法. functioning as the condition, is ableto cause that (bi彼) to arise conveying its own (ji己) image, “Its own”refers to the condition; in contradistinction to that which is able to convey it [i.e.,mind and mental associates]. See above. then it is also necessary for that to be ableto be cognizant of this. “This” refers to its own image. Only then will this be analambana condition. Here, what is referred to as yuan緣 [in the term suoyuan所緣] has the meaning of “cognizing” (yuanlü緣慮).34 Subsequent examples in thetext follow this. The alambana’s being cognized by the cognizing capac-ity [of consciousness] is called the alambana condition. Mirrors etc.are able to reflect but are unable to cognize.35 That is, when stuffexternal to mirrors etc. faces a mirror etc., it is not cognized by themirror. If that is the case, then even if we were to grant that [theexternal stuff] is a condition [for what the mirror reflects], it is stillnot an alambana condition. So how could [the external stuff] consti-tute an alambana condition? Dignaga drew a distinction between conditionand alambana. If either of these two components is lacking then it would not becalled an alambana condition. This warrants profound reflection. Vis-à-vis mirrorsand so forth, stuff external to them has the sense of condition. This stuff, however, isnot the alambana for the mirrors and so forth because the mirrors and so forth areunable to cognize. Since one of the components is missing it is not called analambana condition.

蓋有體法能為緣，令心、心所帶己相而起。己，即為緣者。帶相具二義，並如前說。後準知。藉使帶己相者，此者字，即謂心、心所。不以己相為所

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慮，則心、心所功用，同於鏡等，等謂水等。但為能照耳。誠如此，設有難云：“若有體法，是能為緣，令能照法帶己相起，說此為緣之有體法。為彼能照法。所緣緣者，若字至此長讀為一逗，假以牒大乘義也。即鏡等所照外質。此外質言，對鏡中影得名。亦能為緣，令鏡等帶己相起，鏡中影，即是帶外質己相。鏡等外質，應是鏡等所緣緣。” 《述記》四十四弟二十葉，載有此難。今人羅素亦言照相器能見物，義復近此。蓋照相器所攝之影，亦是帶外質己相也。此難若無以解之者，將謂心言心亦賅所，下準知。與鏡等色法不異，唯識云何成立？即由此故，說所慮義，便顯此心不同於色。蓋有法具云有體法。為緣，能令彼帶己相起，己即為緣者，對能帶之彼而名己。參觀前文。亦須彼能慮於此，此謂己相。方是所緣。此云緣者，緣慮義。餘隨文準知。為所緣緣於能緣者，名所緣緣。鏡等能照非能慮，即鏡等外質，望鏡等不為所慮。若爾，縱許為緣，無所緣義，如何得成所緣緣。陳那分別緣與所緣，二支缺一，便不名所緣緣，最宜深玩。鏡等外質於鏡等容有緣義。然非鏡等之所緣，以鏡等非能慮故。即缺一支，故不名所緣緣也。36

As the raw material that is re-presented in/to/by consciousness as animage, a real dharma constitutes the condition for consciousness to begenerated. In turn, it also functions as the alambana by virtue of beingable to cause consciousness to bear it as an image. In order for a realdharma to function as the alambana condition—condition for thecausal support of consciousness—it must also be cognized by thecognizing consciousness.

In stipulating this further condition, Xiong might seem to be fol-lowing Alambana-parıks·a, as translated by Xuanzang: “Alambanacondition means giving rise to a cognizing consciousness in which theimage of [that which functions as the condition] is conveyed, and it isreal. It causes the cognizing consciousness to be produced throughdependence on it.”This is not, however, the case.We should also recallXuanzang’s definition of the “alambana condition” provided in ChengWeishi Lun (already translated above):

The third [condition] is the alambana condition.Where there is a realdharma and it conveys an image of itself that is the cognitive concernof the mind or mental associates and is what [cognition] dependsupon, then such real [dharmas] will be of two kinds: direct andremote.37

For Xiong, the crucial difference is the stipulation in Cheng weishi lunthat the images in consciousness must be cognized. After discussingthe distinction between “being dependent on” and “that which is ofcognitive concern,” Xiong relates that even though this distinctionwas developed on the basis of the yuan緣 and suoyuan所緣 pairingin Alambana-parıks·a:

Nevertheless, to talk of suoyuan所緣 in terms of suolü所慮 was aninnovative interpretation on the part of Cheng weishi lun38 employedto redress the shortcomings of Dignaga’s [account]. Alambana-parıks·a says: “Atoms are not the alambana because no image ofatoms appears in the visual and so forth consciousnesses.”39 Upon

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examination, Dignaga uses only one sense of “convey its ownimage”—that is, the sense of “transformed by what is conveyed”—todiscuss alambana. If this were the case, then the mind’s conveying ofan image would be just like a mirror etc., as discussed above. WithMaster Xuanzang’s notion of “to carry along; to bear” Dignaga’sshortcomings were corrected and so forth.

然以所慮言所緣，則《三十論》中之創解，用補陳那之缺。案《觀所緣緣論》言：“極微非所緣，眼等識無彼相故”云云。詳此，則陳那但以帶相一義，即變帶義，說為所緣也。若爾，心之帶相，便同鏡等，如前所難，下逮奘師挾帶義，其失正等。40

In other words, Dignaga neglected to provide something that woulddifferentiate cognitive concern from mechanical reflection. Moreover,he neglected to explain clearly how consciousness is turned into animage of that which has been conveyed to it; how the conveying itselfis an activity in which consciousness constructs its own representa-tions, becoming them.What did Xuanzang’s notion of “to carry along;to bear” add that enabled Dignaga’s shortcomings to be corrected?

(2) Second sense of “to convey”

The second sense of “to convey” (dai帶) as stipulated by Xuanzang is“to carry along; to bear” (jia/xie dai挾帶).

The second sense means that the cognizing capacity [*alambaka]arises by closely bearing the image of the alambana itself. Just aswhen the seeing part takes the image part as cognitive object, thisimage part is directly conveyed [i.e., without mediation], one does notagain rely on this image and take a doubly transformed image as thealambana. Thus, in the mutual encounter between the image [part][*nimitta] and the seeing [part] [darsana] they are not two separate[entities]; similarly subject (neng能) and object (suo所) are perfectlyunited, which is valid cognition [*praman· a] that is, perception. Just asthe seeing part takes the image [part] as its object, the self-verifyingpart takes the seeing part as its object; the two internal parts41 takeone another as objects; correct cognition takes suchness as object;and true principle is properly ordered. Accordingly, the cognizingcapacity [the cognizer] directly carries and clasps the image of thealambana, taking it as cognitive object, and so is called “carryingalong.” Xie 挾 [“carry”] means “draw near and closely adhere to.”

第二義者，謂能緣挾帶所緣體相而起。如見緣相親挾此相，不更托此相而重變相以緣也。故相見相望中無間隔亦復以此，能所冥合，得成證量。即現量。見緣相如是自證緣見，內二分互緣，正智緣如，真理例然。由此，能緣親挾附所緣體相而緣，故名挾帶。挾者，逼近親附義。42

In stating that the seeing part does not additionally rely on the image(nimitta) of the alambana to create a doubly transformed image butinstead takes the image of the alambana itself as its object, the pointXiong is making is that there is no superimposition of mental abstrac-tion. Direct awareness means that no “jars” are created as perceptual

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objects. Xuanzang’s notion of “to carry along”; “to bear” means notonly that cognition cognizes “that which is cognized” but also that thatcognition is the valid cognition of direct perception. (Since Dignaga,direct perception [pratyaks·a] [xianliang 現量] and logical inference[anumana] [biliang 比量] were held to be the only valid sources ofknowledge.)

Xiong understands biandai變帶 (“convey by being transformed”)to mean that the cognizing capacity of consciousness is transformedby conveying the features of the alambana whereas xiedai 挾帶(“convey by bearing closely”) emphasizes that the cognizing capacityof consciousness directly bears the image of the alambana as cognitiveobject without having to transform itself into that image.

Thus already in Xiong’s first work on Yogacara, Weishixue Gailun(1923), critiques of Yogacara master Dignaga, based on selectionsfrom Alambana-parıks·a are evident. These critiques served therhetorical purpose of bolstering the authority of Xuanzang.Before long, however, even that authority came to be fundamentallyquestioned.

IV. Xiong’s Volte-Face in WEISHIXUE GAILUN (1926)

Because tradition followed Kuiji, whose commentaries onXuanzang’s Cheng Weishi Lun attributed all authoritative opinions toDharmapala, in subsequent East Asian treatments “Dharmapala”effectively functions as a metonym for views expressed in ChengWeishi Lun which is typically labeled as Dharmapala’s commentary.43

Xiong follows this practice. Xiong’s first real criticism of Dharmapalais introduced in Weishixue Gailun (1926) and builds upon an earliercritique44 of “Dignaga and other masters” for presenting the imagepart as common to each one of the eight consciousnesses. GivenXiong’s repeated criticisms in this and subsequent publications ofthe view that consciousness can be broken down into eightconsciousnesses, the foundational role that Dignaga occupies inXiong’s critical genealogy is noteworthy, even if sustained anddetailed criticism is reserved specifically for Dharmapala.

Cheng weishi lun defined remote alambana condition (shuyuan疏緣)The full name of which is shu suoyuan yuan疏所緣緣. as what is separate fromthe cognizing capacity [of consciousness] itself. This is ridiculous. Justas the basic stuff, such as colors, etc. that are considered the remotealambana conditions, are already conjoined with the consciousnesses,such as visual consciousness, etc., then one cannot say that they areutterly distinct and separate from each other. If it were supposed thatthe two entities [i.e., consciousness and its object] are detached fromeach other, then inner and outer are marked off from each other as if

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separated by a huge chasm. Being inherently unconnected, howcould [such an inaccessible object] be called a condition [that givesrise to consciousness]? Examining the views of Dharmapala, headvocates the position that takes each and every one of the eightconsciousnesses to be an independent entity. Hence [on his view], abasic stuff (bimba) such as color etc. would belong to the image partof the eighth consciousness yet when viewed from the perspective ofthe visual etc. consciousnesses it would be an external dharma and sosaid to be separate from consciousness. This is to separate the eightconsciousness too mechanically, and simply amounts to misguidedconceptual elaboration (xilun戲論; *prapañca).

《成唯識論》定疏緣俱云疏所緣緣。義界曰：與能緣體相離。此甚謬也。如色等本質，既與眼等識為疏所緣緣，則不得說為截然相離。假其兩體相離，則內外劃若鴻溝，本不相涉，何如名緣？詳護法立論，以八識為個個獨立之體。故色等本質屬第八相，自眼等識望之，即是外法，所以說為相離，然將八識割得太死，祇成戲論。45

Xiong is complaining that Cheng Weishi Lun is not sufficiently ideal-istic and monistic. He correctly understands that “remote alambana”is defined as the objects of extrovertive cognition (in contrast to theintrospective cognitions that take the seeing part, self-aware part, andaware of being self-aware parts as cognitive objects, and are thus“inner”) that are separate and distinct from the cognizing conscious-ness that is perceiving them. He is upset that something resembling an“external object,” something not always already within and intimatelyconjoined with mind, is admitted; and to compound the problem eachof the eight consciousnesses is an independent whole with its ownrange of operations.

Xiong46 continues to rebuke Dharmapala for establishing eightconsciousness; dividing each consciousness into fifty-one independentmental associates; and using Dignaga’s three-part distinction not onlyto divide each consciousness into three parts, but also to divide eachof the fifty-one mental associates into three parts; and for positingseeds as the cause of each mind and mental associate. Xiong furtherargues that when Dharmapala (channeled by Xuanzang) discussedtransformation, he analyzed it into two types: seeds functioning ascauses capable of bringing about transformation (yin nengbian因能變) in consciousness; and manifestly activated consciousnessitself (xianti 現體)—the self-verifying aspect (zizheng fen 自證分)unique to each mind and mental associate—functioning as effectswhich are simultaneously capable of bringing about transformation(guo nengbian 果能變) in consciousness. Because each and everyself-verifying part is, in turn, able to transform and be manifest as aseeing part and an image part, they are referred to as “effects capableof bringing about transformation.”The seeing part and the image partrepresent what consciousness becomes, what it transforms into(suobian 所變). The reason the seeing part and the image part

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together represent what consciousness transforms into is that both areneeded in order for perception to occur. Consciousness-as-transformer (nengbian能變)—the capacity of consciousness to trans-form into a seeing part and image part—provides the raw materialthat one re-presents to oneself as what consciousness transforms into.Central to Xiong’s objections is the bifurcation of consciousness:subject (neng能) and object (suo所) are each made separate. “This isjust like taking something that is already whole and then breaking itapart into fragments.”47

Xiong then criticizes48 Dharmapala for adopting seeds as a meta-phor of productive power—which Xiong treats as the dynamic aspectof Fundamental Reality—as this reinforced the impression that seedswere real entities; and for adopting a view of seeds that alignedDharmapala with the views of the proponents both of atoms and ofthe atman,49 as well as proponents of a mechanistic theory of theuniverse. He also objected more generally to the techniques of“breaking-down analytically” (fenxi分析) and says that Dharmapalawas influenced here by Asanga (fl. late fourth century) andVasubandhu: “when they brokedown mind-consciousness, the con-tents were extremely fragmented, in order to accommodate multipleseeds. It is just as if a material object was analyzed into atoms, mol-ecules, right down to electrons.”50 The idea here is that consciousnesswas brokendown into eight clusters and these clusters were in turnattributed to seeds.

Xiong also accuses Dharmapala of misusing the Four Conditions,51

maintaining that instead of understanding them to be an expedientteaching to aid in removing attachment and gaining understanding ofdependent origination, Dharmapala’s account of the Four Conditionseffectively presents them as a structuralist account of consciousness.For Xiong,Yogacara philosophy (as principally represented by ChengWeishi Lun) had hypostasized the doctrine of dependent arising intoa doctrine of seeds, which, as Liu Shu-hsien points out, suggests astructural realism.52 It also entails various forms of ontological dual-isms (seeds and consciousness [or so-called manifest activity]; seedsand mind/tathata [Suchness]; pure and impure seeds) and even onto-logical pluralism, with seeds posited as the ontological basis of allthings. He found all of these perspectives to be antithetical to his ownontological monism.

These and related criticisms of Dharmapala/Cheng Weishi Lunwere further developed and amplified in Xiong’s subsequent publica-tions, reaching their fullest expression in the literary and vernacularredactions of New Treatise published 1932 and 1944, respectively. Inthis short essay I have sought to demonstrate that the origin of thesecriticisms is already evident in Xiong’s 1923 account of Yogacara,

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Weishixue Gailun, in his critical portrayal of Dignaga’s Alambana-parıks·a. Ironically, in that early work, that critical portrayal wasdesigned to bolster the authority of Xuanzang.

V. Concluding remarks

As this special double issue of the journal is published under thegeneral theme, Chinese Philosophy as World Philosophy: Creativityand Humanity, it is worth reiterating the fact that Xiong’s system ofcreative philosophy—which I have addressed elsewhere53—would nothave been possible without a sustained engagement with Buddhistphilosophy and its Indian roots.Yet, too often, Xiong’s uncompromis-ing critiques of Yogacara philosophy—in particular, the Vasubandhu,Dharmapala, Xuanzang, and Kuiji tradition54—seem to have provideda convenient pretext for ignoring other key elements of Buddhistphilosophy in his constructive philosophy such as his profoundrespect for Madhyamaka philosophy (a topic beyond the scope of thisshort essay). Madhyamaka provided a deconstructive method, aradical apophasis, central to which are the concepts of emptiness andconditioned arising. Beyond this, Xiong also drew ssubstantial (albeitlargely unacknowledged) philosophical inspiration from the Treatiseon the Awakening of Mahayana Faith and the doctrine of natureorigination (xingqi性起).55

Xiong is not the only “New Confucian” to suffer such a fate.ThierryMeynard makes the following observations about Liang Shuming,another early New Confucian:

in the last twenty years, many studies in Mainland China have ana-lyzed Liang’s thought from the standpoint of Confucianism, consid-ering him to be the forerunner of today’s Contemporary NewConfucianism. . . . Those studies acknowledge a Buddhist period inLiang’s life, but they usually reject the Buddhist writings of hisyouth and concentrate on selected texts which were written later,considering the core of Liang’s mature thought to be Confucian. . . .[The] labelling of Liang as a Confucian or as a New Confucianprevents a comprehensive understanding of his thought and lifethat would articulate, in a meaningful way, both Confucianism andBuddhism.56

Over a decade ago, John Hanafin argued that throughout his lifeLiang did not relinquish his personal commitment to Buddhismeven though his philosophy of culture argued for the relative meritsof Confucianism (and later Marxism) for Chinese culture at its par-ticular stage of development. Hanafin insists that even this conces-sion to Confucianism was, in fact, an expression of a social concern

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grounded in Liang’s Buddhist beliefs. Moreover, he argues, Liangactually believed that China’s ultimate future lay in the realizationof a Buddhist, rather than a Confucian, cultural ideal. He shows howLiang’s views on consciousness, attachment, and the self were drawnfrom Yogacara theory and how Liang integrated his metaphysicalview of life and the self with his theory of the three stages or pathsof cultural development (Indian, Western, and Chinese). Believingthat Chinese culture was not yet developed to a stage that wouldenable it to enter a Buddhist cultural period (unlike India), Liangpromoted Confucian moral values as a necessary preparatorystage on the path to Buddhism—a sort of convenient/skillful means(upaya).57

Similarly, as Jason Clower and Wing-cheuk Chan have eachrecently shown, Mou Zongsan’s philosophical system similarly cannotbe grasped without also understanding the role of Sinitic Buddhistphilosophy within that system,58 further reinforcing the importance ofrecognizing the vital role that Buddhist philosophy has played inthe construction of New Confucian philosophy, and the ongoing pres-ence it still retains in the historical constitution of New Confucianphilosophy. Despite this, the Indian roots of Chinese philosophy—traditional or modern—continue largely to be ignored.

THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITYActon, ACT, Australia

Endnotes

Acknowledgment of Rights and Credentials: I am indebted to Dan Lusthaus for detailedconstructive feedback on a draft of this essay. I am also grateful to the Chiang Ching-kuoFoundation for International Scholarly Exchange; the Nederlandse Organisatie voorWetenschappelijk Onderzoek; and the Australian Research Council for grants which, inpart, have supported this research. I additionally wish to express my thanks l to theEditor-in-Chief, the Managing Editor and the blind readers for review comments on thedraft of this essay.

1. This English rendering of the title is based on Xiong’s own idiosyncratic gloss of weishi 唯識. The Chinese title may well have been intended to carry a second level ofmeaning. Given that Xin Weishi Lun is presented as a commentary on, or criticalresponse to, Xuanzang’s 玄奘 (602–664) Cheng Weishi Lun 《成唯識論》 (Demon-stration of Nothing but Consciousness), an argument could be made that the title ofXiong’s work has the additional implicit sense of New Demonstration of Nothing butConsciousness.

2. Dan Lusthaus, “Lü Cheng, Epistemology, and Genuine Buddhism,” in TransformingConsciousness: The Intellectual Reception of Yogacara Thought in Modern China, ed.John Makeham (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 324–25.

3. Foxue Congbao《佛學叢報》, 11 (1914): 1–29.4. Liang Shuming Quanji 《梁漱溟全集》 (The Complete Works of Liang Shuming)

Vol. 1 (Ji’nan: Shandong Renmin Chubanshe, 1994), 289.5. Guan Suoyuan Shi Lun Hui Shi《觀所緣釋論會譯》 (Combined Translations of

Interpretations of the Texts of Alambana-parıks·a), Neixue 4 (1928): 123–64.

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Alambana-parıks·a in eight verses with Dignaga’s auto-commentary (vr·tti). As Lüexplains in his prefatory Conventions (Fanli〈凡例〉), because his translation isbased on a Tibetan redaction which translates both the verses and Dignaga’s auto-commentary (as distinct from the other Tibetan redaction which translates the versesalone), in order to distinguish it from Dharmapala’s translation, rendered by Yijingas《觀所緣論釋》, Lü decided to use釋論 in the title.

6. This is a study of Sankarasvamin’s Nyayapravesa based on Kuiji’s commentary.7. Xiong Shili Quanji 《熊十力全集》 (The Complete Writings of Xiong Shili), Vol. 1.

(Wuhan: Hubei Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2001), 269–410. These notes were based on lec-tures on Buddhist logic delivered by Xiong at Peking University in 1925. Kuiji’sYinming Dashu or Yinming Ru Zhengli Lun Shu 《因明入正理論疏》is a commen-tary on Nyayapravesa (Yinming Ru Zhengli Lun《因明入正理論》; Introduction toLogic): an introductory text on Dignaga’s logic, compiled by Sam· karasvamin (sixthcentury) and translated by Xuanzang.

8. See, for example, Xuanzang (trans. and compiler), Cheng Weishi Lun《成唯識論》,CBETA, Taisho, 31, no. 1585: 40, a20–41, b06; translated in Francis H. Cook, ThreeTexts on Consciousness Only (Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation andResearch, 1999), 242–50.

9. Xiong Shili, Weishixue Gailun, 103; Xuanzang, Cheng Weishi Lun, Taisho, 31, no. 1585:40, c15–16. Xiong’s Fojia Mingxiang Tongshi 《佛家名相通釋》 (Dictionary ofBuddhist Terms) (Taipei: Mingwen Shuju, 1994 [1937]), B.337, punctuates thisas：謂若有法，是帶己相，心或相應，所慮所託，此體有二，一親二疏。

10. Constituent factors of the entire material and mental world.11. “Sky-flowers” are the equivalent to the Western philosopher’s “unicorns” or “round

squares,” actual things erroneously juxtaposed.12. An alambana is that from which a cognitive image (akara) (xiang相) is produced.An

alambanartha is the alambana (“perceptual object”) toward which intention isdirected.

13. Xiong Shili, Weishixue Gailun, 103. Xiong used Xuanzang’s translation of Alambana-pariks·a (Lü Cheng’s 1928 translation from Tibetan did not yet exist). The passages herefers to are as follows:

[Even if the Sarvastivadins] posit that atoms are the condition for the fiveconsciousnesses, they are not the alambana, since there is no image of themin consciousness.Taisho, 31, no. 1624: 0888, b10–11： 極微於五識設緣非所緣。彼相識無故。

[Sarvastivadins] posit that collections of clustered [atoms] such as solidityand so forth are the condition for the eye and so forth consciousness, yet it isnot the case that such [collections] are alambana since it is agreed [or theymust agree] that it is images of atoms [which appear in consciousness].Taisho, 31, no. 1624: 888, b25–26：和集如堅等，設於眼等識是緣，非所緣，許極微相故。

14. Xiong’s auto-commentary.15. Xiong Shili, Weishixue Gailun, p. 103.16. Ibid., 104.17. Cheng Weishi Lun Shu Ji, Taisho, 43, no. 1830: 319, a22.18. This self-verifying or self-corroborating part is seen to be theoretically required

because every moment of consciousness needs to be aware of itself if memory is to bepossible; otherwise there would be just an array of unconnected moments.

19. Cheng Weishi Lun, Taisho, 31, no. 1585: 1, b1–2. Drawing on the scholarship ofKatsumata Shunkyo勝又俊教,Tao Jiang points out that this was a departure from theoriginal verse seventeen of Vasubandhu’s Thirty Verses on Nothing but Consciousness,and by adopting Dharmapala’s explanation Xuanzang was able to interpret the verseas stating that “the transformation of consciousness is the result of its being bifurcatedinto the discriminating and the discriminated. Because neither of the two existsoutside consciousness, there can be nothing but consciousness.” Tao Jiang, Contexts

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and Dialogue: Yogacara Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal Mind(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 52.

20. Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, http://www.buddhism-dict.net, under the entrybenzhi本質; accessed September 3, 2012.

21. Taisho, 31, no. 1585: 40, c15–19.22. Later, a fourth part was distinguished—confirmation of the self-verifying part—but

Xiong does not address it.23. In his Chinese rendering of Dharmapala’s commentary (which Yijing translates as

Guan Suoyuan Lun Shi《觀所緣論釋》),Yijing also refers to the notion of alambanacondition in connection with Alambana-parıks·a:

“Because [each individual atom] is the cause [of visual etc. consciousnesses]”:Because it is the cause of the visual etc. consciousnesses this means that [theatoms] are the direct factor in the arising of that [cognition]. And, there aresome who say that, among the [four] conditions (pratyayas), it is the vis·aya-as-alambana which gives rise to cognition.彼因性故。彼眼等識之因性故。是彼生起親支分義。然而有說。其所緣境是識生因在諸緣故。 Taisho, 31, no. 1625: 889, b24.

In other words, the vis·aya-as-alambana is the condition for the causal support ofconsciousness or alambana condition (suoyuan yuan所緣緣; alambana-pratyaya).

24. Xiong, Weishixue Gailun, 109.25. The standard Buddhist example in India, Tibet, and China is “blue” (nıla in Sanskrit,

which can also mean green, but is invariably treated in the literature as “blue”).26. Chen塵 “dust” refers to the five types of sense-objects: visual, aural, etc.27. Xiong explains that an exception to this is the sixth consciousness which does not arise

by relying on a bimba.28. Xiong, Weishixue Gailun, 105.29. Ibid., 105.30. This sense of “transformed/altered by what was conveyed” can also be seen to have

been proposed by Xuanzang, who in turn seems to have derived if from Alambana-pariks·a:

It is the matter transformed by one’s own inner consciousness that consti-tutes the alambana condition. . . . A verse in Alambana-pariks·a says: ‘Inter-nally, matter appears as if it were external, and for consciousness it serves asthe alambana condition. [It should be] agreed that because that is the imagein consciousness and that it is able to generate consciousness [it therefore isthe alambana condition].Taisho , 43, no. 1830: 271, c18–c20: 以自內識所變之色為所緣緣 .. . .所緣頌云。內色如外現。為識所緣緣。許彼相在識。及能生識故。

31. Alambana-pariks·a (Xuanzang trans.): “Alambana condition means giving rise to acognizing consciousness in which the image of that [that which functions as thecondition] is conveyed, and it is real. It causes the cognizing consciousness to beproduced through dependence on it.”Taisho, 31, no. 1624: 888, b12–13: 所緣緣者。謂能緣識帶彼相起, 及有實體。令能緣識託彼而生。

32. Xiong Shili, Weishixue Gailun, 106.33. Kuiji, Cheng Weishi Lun Shu Ji《成唯識論述記》 (Commentary on the Cheng weishi

lun), Taisho, 43, no. 1830: 500, c20–501, a1.34. Xin Weishi Lun, vernacular edition, Xiong Shili Quanji, Vol. 3, p. 33 and also in Fojia

Mingxiang Tongshi, p. 342 Xiong glosses yuanlü 緣慮 as silü 思慮. This is a mentalappropriation of cognitive objects (including mental objects).

35. Xiong is taking lü慮 both in the sense of being cognizant of, being sentient, and in thesense being concerned with, i.e., a type of mental engagement.

36. Xiong Shili, Weishixue Gailun, 107.37. Taisho, 31, no. 1585: 40, c14–16.38. Even though Xiong refers to Sanshi Lun《三十論》, he is actually referring to Cheng

Weishi Lun.

JOHN MAKEHAM224

39. The implication that Xiong wishes to draw (and does specifically draw on p. 109) isthat for Dignaga, the alambana itself is a transformed image.

40. Xiong Shili, Weishixue Gailun, 108.41. The two internal parts are the seeing part (jian 見) (darsana) and the self-verifying

part (zizheng 自證) (svasam· vitti); the image/object part (xiang 相) (nimitta) is theexternal part.

42. Xiong Shili, Weishixue Gailun, 105.43. Kuiji claimed that Cheng Weishi Lun was strictly based on ten Indian commentaries,

with the opinion of sixth-century Indian Yogacara exponent Dharmapala護法 invari-ably prevailing. In reality, it is often the interpretations of the seventh-centuryYogacara master Sthiramati安慧 that is the authoritative position (demonstrable bycomparing Sthiramati’s commentary, the only one of the supposed ten that is extanttoday, with Cheng weishi lun). See Hidenori Sakuma, “On Doctrinal Similaritiesbetween Sthiramati and Xuanzang,” Journal of the International Association of Bud-dhist Studies 29, no. 2 (2006): 357–82; Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology: APhilosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih Lun.Curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism Series (London: Routledge, 2002), Chapter 15.

44. Xiong Shili, Weishixue Gailun (1926), Xiong Shili Quanji, 438.45. Ibid., 441.46. Ibid., 458ff.47. Ibid., 459.48. Ibid., pp. 461–62.49. In Brahmanistic thought, the self that grounds living beings.50. Xiong Shili, New Treatise, 92.51. Xiong Shili, Weishixue Gailun (1926), 444.52. Liu Shu-hsien, “Hsiung Shih-li’s Theory of Causation,” Philosophy East and West 19,

no. 4 (1969): 403.53. John Makeham, “Xiong Shili’s Critique of Yogacara Thought in the Context of his

Constructive Philosophy,” in Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought inModern China, ed. John Makeham.

54. Xiong identified Paramartha (499–569) as a representative figure in the “old” tradi-tion of Yogacara as transmitted in China in contrast to the “new” tradition which heassociates with to Xuanzang and Kuiji but which has its roots in the teachings ofDharmapala and Vasubandhu.

55. The Huayan Buddhist doctrine of nature origination played a central role in Xiong’sconstructive philosophy, in which he integrated concepts, problems, and themes fromtraditional Chinese philosophy with elements emblematic of Sinitic Buddhist philoso-phy to articulate an ambitious philosophical syncretism. The theory of nature origi-nation provides an ontological basis for all phenomena by presenting phenomena asmanifestations of the nature (which, in turn, is the functional equivalent of suchness,the absolute, fundamental reality, dharma realm [dharmadhatu], and so on). Theinfluence of this doctrine is particularly evident in Xiong’s conception of the ti-yong體用 (fundamental reality and function) conceptual model.

56. Thierry Meynard, The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming: The Hidden Buddhist(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), ff. xi, xii, xiii.

57. John Hanafin, “The Last Buddhist,” in New Confucianism, ed. John Makeham (NewYork: Palgrave, 2003), 187–218.

58. Jason Clower, The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou Zongsan’s NewConfucianism (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010). Wing-cheuk Chan, “On MouZongsan’s Hermeneutic Application of Buddhism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy,38, no. 2 (2011): 174–5. For a discussion of the role of Huayan Buddhism in NewConfucian Tang Junyi’s thought, see Yau-Nang William Ng, Tang Chün-i’s Idea ofTranscendence: With Special Reference to His Life, Existence, and the Horizon ofMind-Heart, PhD dissertation (University of Toronto, 1996), 194–202.

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