Xenophibia and the Europian Union

8/13/2019 Xenophibia and the Europian Union

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Xenophobia and the European UnionAuthor(s): Sara De Master and Michael K. Le RoySource: Comparative Politics, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Jul., 2000), pp. 419-436Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/422387 .Accessed: 04/05/2013 17:07

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Xenophobia and the European Union

Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy

As the Soviet Union disintegrated n 1991, representatives rom the twelve nation-states of the European Community gathered in Maastricht in the Netherlands tonegotiate the Treaty on the European Union. This treaty promised to deepen eco-nomic and political integration; ts preamble resolved to continue the process ofcreating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions aretaken as closely as possible to the citizen. l While all twelve nations ratified thetreaty, some did so only with great difficulty. The French and Danish were deeplydivided. The former barely approved heir referendum by 50.7 percent), and the lat-ter required a second one after the first failed. The British House of Commonsdelayed its final vote until the Danes approved ratification, while founding memberGermany was the last to ratify the treaty due to a constitutional challenge that thefederal constitutional court did not dismiss until October 1993. The unexpected dif-ficulty in garnering adequate support suggested that the resolve to create an evercloser union among the peoples of Europe ay more with the drafters of the treatythan with the peoples themselves.2

In the decade preceding the Maastricht Treaty crisis and in the years since,increasing support for nationalist parties across Europe has also been accompaniedby the resurgence of antiimmigrant nd antiforeigner hemes in the political arena.The National Front (FN) in France was the strongest and most visible of thesegroups, but very few countries n western Europe escaped the rise of nationalist poli-tics. Nor were these sentiments limited to active supporters of the extreme right.Whereas support for the FN and the German Republikaner averaged approximately10 percent of the electorate in the early 1990s, opinion polls revealed that between

three and four of every ten respondents sympathized with their negative views ofimmigrants or foreigners.These two phenomena, enuous support or European ntegration and rising xeno-

phobia, suggest a common wariness towards external changes that threaten he per-ceived integrity of the nation. For the most part, current iterature on support or theEuropean Union has emphasized cost-benefit arguments n explaining variance inpublic opinion. Other than a brief nod at national traditions, these arguments havelargely disregarded he influence of such motivations as an inclination to preservenational integrity or a fear of foreign influences. Such motivations seem likely topredispose individuals towards a particular evaluation of European integration inaddition to considerations of economic self-interest. Xenophobic attitudes are possi-

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Comparative Politics July 2000

bly related to popular support or European ntegration, and their relationship can beexplained in terms of political culture theory. Cost-benefit theories miss important

cultural influences on public opinion about the European Union and integrationbecause they rely too heavily on objective maximization of self-interest as the prima-ry determinant of political behavior. This omission can be addressed by Eckstein'sculturalist heory of change to explain popular support or integration and an empiri-cal analysis to demonstrate he relationship between attitudes oward foreigners andpopular evaluations of European ntegration.

Theories of Popular Support for the European Union

Renewed scholarly interest in popular support for European integration since theMaastricht Treaty has been accompanied by the trend to explain public opinion bythe costs and benefits of European Union membership. This approach appears tohave replaced Inglehart's postmaterialist and cognitive mobilization theories as thepredominant explanation of variance in public opinion within and between membercountries and has been advanced in numerous articles debating the finer points ofcost-benefit analysis in support of integration.4

In one of the more influential articles, Eichenberg and Dalton argue that variousnational and international conomic conditions and political events, including infla-tion, intra-European Community trade, and national referenda on EC issues, com-bine to influence popular support.5 They extend the model of economic voting to thesupranational evel under the assumption hat the EC is primarily an economic orga-nization and citizens will partially credit it for the performance of their nationaleconomies.

This emphasis on the effects of the economic conditions and interactions ofnation-states on popular support for integration has been challenged. New theoriesinclude as essential components of their analyses the direct benefits individualsreceive from EU membership and not just indirect benefits as reflected by national

economic conditions such as low inflation and high intra-EU trade. Research hasfound that income, education, and occupation play significant roles in shaping pub-lic opinion towards European integration, with higher support among individualswith more education and greater socioeconomic status. According to this argument,the potential economic benefits of EU membership are greater for these individualsthan for poorer, ess educated, ower class individuals and explain their propensity oview integration more favorably. Another key argument proposes that individuals'perceptions of the benefits of membership strongly influence their support. Gabeland Whitten indicate that subjective evaluations of both personal and national eco-nomic conditions are more influential factors in support of integration han the actu-al conditions of the national economy.6

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While the majority of studies of popular support of integration advances theseexplanations, other theories have been formulated. Fraser and Nelsen argue that reli-gious affiliation affects individuals' attitudes toward integration; Roman Catholicsand Orthodox Christians demonstrate greater support than Protestants. They specu-late that the international haracter of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox raditionsfosters greater openness to European integration among their followers, while thehistorical links of many Protestant denominations o particular nation-states creategreater wariness toward he integration process.7 Deflem and Pampel argue that per-sistent national differences in support of integration over time and when controlledfor sociodemographic and ideological variables suggest that both favorable andunfavorable orientations toward the supranational European Community emanate

from national concerns. 8 Hence support for integration, whether positive or nega-tive, arises from individuals evaluating ntegration rom a national viewpoint.

The religious affiliation and national identity theories are set apart from the cost-benefit theories by the implication that underlying values and beliefs dispose peopletoward certain attitudes about integration and that economic considerations do notsolely mold public opinion. The emphasis on economic cost-benefit explanations sunderstandable, ince economic concerns have long been the focus of the EuropeanCommunity. However, this emphasis has overshadowed both the study and the sig-nificance of other influences on popular support. In particular, ultural factors havebeen largely ignored despite the great diversity among the EU's fifteen nation-statemembers and their numerous nationalities and ways of life.

One possible factor is attitudes towards foreigners, especially whether xenopho-bia, or fear of foreigners, negatively influences support for integration. The EU hasnot only increased the interaction among European nation-states, but has also multi-plied the points of contact between individuals of differing national and social back-grounds. Logically, the more an individual fears foreigners, the less likely he or shewill support integration. The foundation of this hypothesis lies in political culturetheory and in Eckstein's heory of political change.

Political Culture and Political Transformation

Although political culture theorists do not reject the premise that individuals attemptto maximize their interests by weighing the costs and benefits of certain actions,they refuse to accept it as the only significant determinant of political behavior.Almond characterizes his theoretical reliance on self-interest maximization as anavoidance of the complexity involved in explaining human behavior, political or oth-erwise.9 Political culture theory emphasizes the influential role of values, disposi-

tions,and beliefs on

political behavior. Values and beliefs dispose an individualtoward one conclusion or another prior to conscious deliberation, hus preventing a

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completely objective gauging of a situation's pros and cons. Eckstein identifies val-ues and beliefs as mediating orientations, r the learned methods of cognition and

evaluation hat dispose individuals to respond in a patterned manner to similar typesof situations.10 According to the underlying premise of political culture theory,actions patterned by individual-specific orientations characterize political behavior.The variability of such orientations contributes o a significant range of responses tothe same situation. Understanding n individual's actions and attitudes requires morethan an assessment of what serves his or her best interests. Mediating orientationsmust also be considered.

Culture consists of those widely shared mediating orientations hat incline mem-bers of a group or society to display similar attitudes and actions in a given

situation.11l Verba describes political culture as the system of beliefs about patternsof political interaction and political institutions that forms an important linkbetween the events of politics and the behavior of individuals in reaction to thoseevents. 'l2As a framework of values and beliefs, culture simplifies the process ofdecision making by providing points of reference from which to comprehend, valu-ate, and react to one's environment. Both nonpolitical experiences with family, peers,and education and interaction with political processes socialize individuals into aparticular political culture.'3

Because people are taught to think and behave like their predecessors and aresocialized with particular orientations o the political environment, patterns of politi-cal behavior will remain relatively continuous. However, political change is indis-putable. In this century alone European colonialism gave way to many new states,Nazi totalitarianism and Soviet Communism rose and fell, and the scope of civilrights in the United States was expanded. Such phenomena have tempted many cul-tural theorists to resort to what Eckstein calls improvised, post hoc accounts ofpolitical change. '4 He offers a response to the critique that political culture argu-ments fail to account adequately for either institutional or behavioral politicalchange.

Eckstein's Theory of Political Change Eckstein assumes two general categoriesof change in mediating orientations. The first results from situational or naturalchange, and the second is caused by political transformation r artificial change.Situational change evokes one of three responses from members of the affected cul-ture: pattern maintenance or the attempt to preserve basic cultural patterns throughadaptation o persistently ncongruous situations, the development of a more flexibleculture to accommodate situational changes more easily, and cultural discontinuity.The last response may occur when circumstances so severely deviate from the normthat the culture can not adapt and loses its ability to provide structure for society.While government authority may survive, political behavior alters as individualsstruggle to form orientations appropriate o the new situation.'5

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Unlike spontaneous situational change, political transformation reates an artifi-cial situation of cultural tension because it results from a conscious effort to enact

change. It is the use of political power and artifice to engineer radically changedsocial and political structures,...to set society and polity on new courses towardunprecedented objectives. 16Using revolution as an illustration, Eckstein questionsif such political engineering can successfully transform political and cultural pat-terns. Revolutionaries who command a great deal of power and control often havelittle trouble in disrupting raditional political structures and perhaps even in estab-lishing new ones. However, hey quickly confront the difficulties of reorienting peo-ple to act properly n their newly constructed society. The more entrenched theprerevolutionary ulture s, the less successful reorientation s likely to be. Instead of

political behavior guided by revolutionary deals, prior orientations may distort thenew culture toward the former culture, exhibiting a type of pattern-maintenance.Hence political transformation ften degenerates nto the mere translation of formercultural patterns o fit the effects of the attempt at political engineering. To establishand preserve order in the new polity, Eckstein posits that revolutionaries must relyon despotism or legalism as a substitute or the framework of shared orientations.17

While situational changes frequently challenge existing frameworks of politicalculture, political transformation has occurred much more rarely. It presents a diffi-cult task, and its success is dubious from the outset. One is hardly surprised o seerevolution as the most common mode of transformation, ince zealous ideologuesare the most likely to employ drastic methods of change and to attempt to replaceentire systems. In this respect, the politics of East Central Europe and Russia since1989 fit into Eckstein's model rather well, from the attempted imposition of newpolitical institutions and processes to the popular resistance to change arising frommediating orientations developed for a totalitarian ystem.

European Integration as Political Transformation On the other side of theEuropean continent, where stability is the rule rather than the exception, theEuropean Union embodies a new, post-cold-war type of political transformation.

Like a revolution, integration has been driven by the energies of a political eliteseeking artificially to alter and institutionalize economic, political, and social rela-tions among a collection of peoples. Such reorientation s perhaps even more formi-dable for integrationists han for revolutionaries. When faced with a resistant popu-lace, democratically minded political engineers find themselves subject to restraintsoften ignored by revolutionaries, uch as having to persuade rather han compel thepeople to support change. Attempting political transformation while simultaneouslymaintaining democratic structures s also likely to encounter greater resistance sincethe pretransformation ulture is more intact. Such modernization will most likelyoccur incrementally, t least at the outset, as the political architects seek to accustommembers of society to the idea of change.

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may reveal a disposition to view basic cultural patterns as flexible or perhapsimmune to that particular change. Integration s an instance of political transforma-

tion, and the examination of popular support should seek to identify cultural orienta-tions that may influence individual responses to it.

One orientation hat may potentially influence attitudes oward European ntegra-tion is the way individuals view foreigners in their society. As further integrationincreases the flow of peoples across national borders and the influence of foreignpolicymakers on domestic politics, the perception of foreigners will likely have agreater effect on support. To examine the effects of this orientation on support forintegration, a specific and measurable attitude has been chosen: xenophobia.

Xenophobia s only one of many attitudes regarding oreigners and represents oneof the

extremely negativeviews. This

extremitymakes it easier to identify and mea-

sure because it provides a very distinct feeling about foreigners. Its literal definitionfrom the Greek is the fear (phobos) of the strange or foreign (xenos). Its commonuse has come to signify the expression of mistrust, fear, and/or hatred of foreignerslinked to an identification of the nation as the representative f culture.'18 Foreignersare seen as carriers of a different culture with the potential to threaten he integrityof one's own nation. The assumption hat the nation embodies culture comes from abelief that the nation is the arena in which critical values and beliefs are transmittedto developing members. Since each culture consists of a unique mix of orientations,foreigners inevitably threaten o alter the domestic culture through the introductionof new orientations.

Because membership n a nation is often equated with an ethnic heritage, culturesmay appear relatively fixed and distinct in character rom each other. This nationalcultural dentity contributes o the xenophobic perception of stark, rreconcilable dif-ferences between cultural groups. The strangeness t the heart of xenophobia findsits source in the apparent disparity between nations and their associated cultures.Strangeness creates fear not only because the foreign culture is unknown, but alsobecause contact with it threatens o alter the known and make it strange as well. Forxenophobic individuals he establishment of the nation-state provides visible protec-

tion from the corrupting influences of other cultures by politically distinguishingtheir culture from surrounding ones. It alleviates xenophobia to a certain extent byassuring sovereignty over the arena n which culture s expressed and transmitted.

If equating nation with culture disposes an individual towards wariness of for-eigners, then it likely also disposes him or her to suspect political change that seeksto integrate nation-states and hence increase interaction with foreigners. An oppos-ing viewpoint might hold culture as transcending nationality, where a larger orsmaller group than the nation might share mediating orientations that give it aunique culture. Furthermore, ndividuals may identify with more than one cultural

group as they discover that they share common orientations with a variety ofgroups. Hence individuals may place themselves in a national (for example, French,

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Danish, Irish) culture, as well as a supranational for example, European, Islamic,Communist) culture that has orientations distinct from ethnonational origin. This

self-identification in a wider context of culture seems less likely to cause people toperceive foreigners as threatening heir culture since they have created consonanceamong several groups of mediating orientations. Because it perceives politicalchange as nonthreatening o cultural integrity, a supranational iew of culture sug-gests both a smaller likelihood of xenophobia and a greater possibility of support orEuropean ntegration.

If xenophobic individuals perceive the inviolability of the nation and hence cul-ture to be protected by a political institution, they are less likely to exhibit visiblexenophobia. While they may still fear the foreign as represented by other people or

institutions,the

security provided by the nation-state mitigates the necessity ofexpressing that fear. Should the sovereignty of the nation-state be threatened, activexenophobia may rise in response to the perceived danger to the nation and culture.European ntegration could present such a threat if seen as an attempt to subsumenation-states nto a larger entity that forces individuals from multiple nations withconflicting cultures into close proximity. Hence the expression of xenophobia inmember states of the European Union may represent a response to integration as aform of political transformation hreatening he sovereignty of the nation-state.

If an expression of xenophobic attitudes is partially a reaction to the politicalchanges represented by European ntegration, hen individuals displaying a fear offoreigners would be less likely to support he process of integration and the institu-tion of the EU. Alternately, hose individuals who do not express xenophobia wouldbe more likely to support ntegration or at least have a more positive opinion of it.Therefore, popular support for European ntegration will decrease as the expressionof xenophobic attitudes ncreases.

Data Measurement

While issues of national dentity have been more prominent n explaining support orEuropean ntegration n some EU members han in others, xenophobia s potentially across-national actor n understanding ariance n popular upport. Although citizens ofsome countries may generally be more suspicious of foreigners, he existence of xeno-phobic individuals n every EU member s very likely. For this reason and for the sakeof comparison, we include he twelve EU members as of 1994 in the following analysis.

To assess the relationship between support or European ntegration and xenopho-bia empirically, we use data from the public opinion survey Euro-barometer 41.1.The survey was conducted in member countries of the EU subsequent to the 1994European parliament elections and contains questions pertinent, not only to supportfor European ntegration, but also to perceptions of foreigners.19 Accurately measur-

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ing xenophobia and support for integration required he construction of two indicesfrom several variables n order o address different aspects of each concept.

Selecting Variables and Creating Indices Determining popular support for apolitical process such as European integration presents a challenge becauseEuropean ntegration almost certainly holds different meanings for different people.Some may equate it directly with the activities of the European Union, while othersmay take a broader view that includes interaction with nonmember European coun-tries. The definition of support for European ntegration n this article involves notonly a general affirmation of integration, but also a positive assessment of the EU asits institutional representative. To increase accuracy of measurement, hree variables

were selected to assess attitudes oward ntegration.The first variable, whether one is for or against efforts to unify western Europe,measures support or the idea of integration on a four point scale: very much for, forto some extent, against to some extent, and very much against. The other two vari-ables assess support or the institution of integration hrough a normative evaluationof EU membership as either good, bad, or neither and for a reaction of either verysorry, indifferent, or relieved to the hypothetical scrapping of the EU. Responsesof good and very sorry are coded as highly supportive of integration; bad andrelieved represent negative attitudes; and neither and indifferent are viewed as neu-tral reactions.20 For inclusion within a single index, the variables were coded in thesame direction, with integration-supporting esponses receiving higher scores andintegration-opposing esponses lower ones.21 The combination of these three vari-ables provides greater detail in the analysis of support for integration han a singlevariable would, and it partially corrects for variance in respondent nterpretation fsurvey questions by addressing he concept from several angles.

The support or integration ndex was created using the factor analysis method. Itextracted only one factor with an Eigenvalue greater than 1 (2.180), explaining 72.6percent of the combined variance of the three variables. High factor loadings foreach variable ndicate that the extracted factor is closely related to all three.22 From

the nature of the three variables, his factor is assumed to be the level of support forEuropean ntegration.The distribution of factor scores suggested a natural division into quintiles. Each

category measures a progressively higher level of support or integration. n creatingthe index as a measurement of support within the EU, the data was weighted so thateach nation-state's population was accurately represented relative to the others.When evaluating data for a single country, however, the weight variable s not used.Table 1 lists the percentage of each country's population within each quintile, dis-playing some rather wide variations n support. For example, nearly 40 percent ofDenmark's population is in the lowest category of support, while almost 35 percentof Luxembourg's opulation expresses the highest level of support or integration.

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Table 1 Support or European ntegration n EU Members, 1994

Support or Integration %) 7Count i Low 2 3 4 Iisth NWeitdAveragc 20.0 20. 7 f8.6 10.5 20.2 12,800France 20.8 20.7 15.5s 25.1 7.9 , 1,000Belgium 15.7 25.8 25.3 21.4 11.8 1,003Netherlands 12.1 14.9 26.0 27.1 19.9 1,005;G0nany 25,4 22.2 14.3 19.4 18.7 2,134Italy 7.3 17.6 17.9 27.3 29.9 1,067

'Luxembourg 10.8 12.9 14.7 27.3 34.3 502Denmark 38.4 11.6 14.9 170 181 1,0(X)0Ireland 7.7 15.1 21,5 25.5 30.2 1,000

.UnitedKingdom 29.6 23.1 22.0 12.0 13.3 1.383


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hensive measure of xenophobia by addressing perceptions of the specific ways inwhich the presence of foreigners harms society.

The xenophobia index was also created using factor analysis. Variables wererecoded in the same direction to measure increasing expressions of xenophobia.Factor analysis extracted one factor with an Eigenvalue greater han 1 (3.45), whichexplains 49.3 percent of the combined variance of the seven variables. While not ashigh as the support or integration actor, his factor is strongly related to these sevenvariables.24

Because cross-tabulation will be the main form of statistical analysis used and thesupport or integration ndex contains five categories, factor scores derived from thisanalysis were coded into a three point scale of xenophobia. This method makescross-tabulations easier to

interpret, althoughit sacrifices some detail. For the

exploratory purposes of this article, however, such a construction s not inappropri-ate. Each of the three categories in the scale of xenophobia consists of a third of thetotal sample, again permitting a comparison of individual EU member percentageswith the weighted average. Similar to support for integration, Table 2 reveals somenotable cross-national variation; Ireland and Luxembourg demonstrate significantlylower than average xenophobia, while Belgium exhibits fairly high xenophobia.

Table 2 Expressions of Xenophobia n EU Members, 1994

Xenophobia L,evet 4%)Country L,ow Medium Htigh N

'WebighedAverab e 33 3 32.4 34 3 l2 99France 278 28.7 43.5 1000

dBelgium i 169 29.5 53.5 1.003'Nethertlands 37.9 33.7 28.4 ,005Germany 27.6 33.0 39.4 2 134Italy 30.1 37.5 32.4 .1,067Luxembourg 663 25.3 8.4 502Denmark 36.7 31.9 314 t,00Ireland 74.7 19.5 5 8 1,001 1United Kingdom 40.5 34.3 25.2 1,383Greece 16.3 36.3 47.4 - 1.(02Spain 55.8 28.9 15.3 1000

Portual 55.6 30.1 14,3 1,00)

SOURCE: Eurobaroneter 411. June-Julyv 994.NOTES: Each rowv otals 100%. Weighted averagel calctlated fromll ata weightingeach country by its percentage of the total EU population.

Analysis and Interpretation Cross-tabulation f the two indices makes it possibleto determine if the percentage of individuals supporting European integrationdecreases as the level of xenophobia increases. We chose to control for xenophobiawhen examining stated opinions on integration and the EU to determine if attitudesregarding oreigners might indicate support or opposition to European ntegration.

Table 3 demonstrates a relatively strong negative relationship between levels of

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xenophobia and support for integration. For the total sample (the twelve membercountries of the EU), respondents who indicated higher xenophobic tendencies also

expressed less support for the European Union than more tolerant respondents. Thepercentage of individuals n the lowest category of support ncreases as xenophobiaincreases, while percentages in the two highest categories of support decrease withincreasing xenophobia. Thus, expressions of xenophobia correlate with popular sup-port for the integration of Europe.

Table 3j Support or European ntegration Controlled or Xenophobia, 1994 (in per-centages)

Support or Xenophobia aTotal Kle 5d;eIntevration Low Medium High Sample t T

Low 12.i ; 18.3 2.3 20.0 -0.1X972 17.6 22.4 22.1 20.73 187 20.3 17.1 18.64 23.6 19.8 18.1 20 ;

High C 28X0 19.3 13.5 t 20.2 : nin12800

SOURCE: Eoiometer 41 June-July 1994.NOTES: Columns otal 100%. Correlation oefficient is significant, p < 0.001.Weight variable employed n data correlation.

While the hypothesized relationship between xenophobia and support or integra-tion holds true for the population of the EU as a whole, the premise of the culturalistargument requires that the relationship be examined within a narrower context.Although the nation is not the sole purveyor of mediating orientations, xenophobesare likely to perceive it as the most important arena for the transmission of culture.Controlling or country when analyzing the relationship between support or integra-tion and xenophobia allows us to determine whether the correlation remains strongwithin each of the twelve member-states. To account for demographic variables thatmay influence cross-national differences in correlation, a multiple-classificationanalysis was conducted. This analysis controlled for the demographic variables ofeducation, gender, age, occupation, and social class. Its results indicated minimal

effects on the relationship n most countries. Only France, Germany, he U.K., andthe Netherlands experienced a change greater than 0.02 in eta values, the largestbeing 0.06 for France. Consequently, we proceed with an analysis of the relationshipthat controls for country.

Table 4 displays the percentage of individuals in each country who expressedhigh support for European ntegration, controlled for their expressions of xenopho-bia. For example, 30.9 percent of the French in the low xenophobia categoryexpressed high support for integration; 19.2 percent in the medium category hadhigh support for integration; and only 8.7 percent expressing high xenophobia alsohad high support for integration. When compared to the 17.9 percent of the totalFrench sample in the highest category of support for integration, hese percentages

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reveal a negative correlation between expressions of xenophobia and high supportfor integration. The Kendall's Tauc of -0.292 confirms the strength of this relation-

ship for France.

Table 4 High Level of Support or Integration n Individual EU Members,Controlled or Expressions of Xenophobia

Gt - 7-hf rt

)I ag? tS )Tt-*

; 0tt :: o canHg*

S;pl ' Tam N:

Twin?~ 9W 'l< 8. .T^ 31 1000UK 20.4 101 5.7 ? 13.3 . 1 3

tuxe urgs 42X6 19.7 11.9 X 34.3 '6,. ; 1

no y< 30.5 17,0 t11.9 , 18..7 ; .235 2,134

N.arlads - 27.0 17,7 13.0 - 19.9 -0.221 1,067Portgal - 19.6 13.0 1.5 16.3 1. 0150 502'Belgium a .18 11.1 8.9 :1.8 -0.137 1'ins E 1.3 12.S 17.0 8.1 6 117 ? LO

*Itay 36.8 29.0 24.6 99 , 0,15 ; lj38i 4:d < 32.5 2t3.6 22 302 -0072 1,002

nt L 19.3 21.6 13.1 18.1 1.:02) i'33.7 29.1 303,i 30$ ` (.003) I W

:r eythe . 80 93 .3 i, J; , - ?.4/W 2T 7SOURCE: urometer 4.1 le, -Jy 1994.

TES:CounIr ised in o of the s of coation (nKls TP entas r fome fin I c ote suppot l in ixnr senting ihest spport for tgraiion. ave ri' sppocalia a weiC a t by i ofX toal EUpopulaion A colaion conc areic ait p O.(0. xcp fr S

paratheses, where >0.05.

The cross-tabulations n Table 4 reveal a fairly sharp division of the countries ntothree groups-strong, moderate/weak, and insignificant-according to the strengthof their relationships between xenophobia and support for integration. The firstgroup shows correlation coefficients stronger han that of the total sample (-0.197);in fact, Kendall's Tauc exceeds -0.200 for all five countries. The second group con-sists of five states in which xenophobia and support for integration are more weaklyrelated than in the total sample but the relationships are still significant. Finally,Denmark and Greece demonstrate nsignificant correlations between the two mea-sures. In all cases except Spain, Denmark, and Greece, Table 4 demonstrates hat, as

the expression of xenophobia ncreases from low to high, the percentage of individu-als indicating high support for integration decreases. Spain's significant correlation,while not evidenced by the percentages n this highest category of support, s borneout in the other categories, where the percentage displaying low support ncreases asxenophobia ncreases.

Of the five members of the first group (France, he U.K., Luxembourg, Germany,and the Netherlands), four have foreign populations that constitute five percent ormore of the total population.25 The exception is the United Kingdom, where the for-eign population n 1995 was only 3.4 percent. Lincoln Quillian argues that prejudicetowards foreigners is based not only on reactions to individual characteristics andrelations with foreigners, but also on perceptions by the dominant national group

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that a subordinate or external group threatens their prerogatives.26 f foreigners areperceived to carry a different culture and the nation represents culture, then a sizable

foreign population within a country may bring to the surface fears that the nation isunder siege. Hence decreasing support for integration as the expression of xenopho-bia increases in this group of countries might demonstrate hat xenophobic individu-als perceive European ntegration as a threat o the integrity of the nation and henceto the dominant culture, ust as they perceive foreigners as a threat.

Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Ireland comprise the second group, charac-terized by moderate o weak relationships between xenophobia and support or inte-gration. Identification of common characteristics among these countries that mightexplain their weaker correlations requires examination of other possible influences

of support. Cost-benefit theories of maximizing economic self-interest offer onesuch possibility. With the exception of Belgium, these countries represent he poorrelatives of the EU, all on its geographic and economic periphery. They thereforereceive sizable aid from the EU, and their citizens are more likely to consider eco-nomic benefits when evaluating European ntegration. Indeed, people in these coun-tries and their government eaders may continue to perceive the EU primarily as aneconomic institution; hence the idea of European ntegration as political transforma-tion would be less salient in these countries than in the wealthier members of theEuropean Union.

Belgium's anomalous appearance n this group suggests that another factor mayinfluence the relationship between xenophobia and support for integration n thesecountries. Fraser and Nelsen's conclusions that those who come from Catholic orGreek Orthodox raditions are more likely to support ntegration han Protestants orsecular individuals may come into play here. All five of the countries displayingmoderate to weak relationships between xenophobia and support for integration aretraditionally Roman Catholic. In Ireland, which has the lowest correlation of thesefive countries, he large percentage expressing low xenophobic tendencies (74.7 per-cent) suggests that the ecumenical nature of Catholicism may not only contribute ogreater nternationalism, s Fraser and Nelsen contend, but also dispose its adherents

to be more open towards oreigners.27As another mediating orientation, he religiousfactor meshes well with the culturalist heory's explanation of support or integrationas colored by an individual's culture, n the sense of a collection of mediating orien-tations.

The last two countries, with insignificant relationships, are far apart not only ingeography but in many other characteristics as well. Denmark is wealthy andProtestant and exhibits levels of xenophobia on par with the European average. Italso has the highest percentage of respondents n the lowest category of support forintegration (39.1%). The general isolationism of the Danish people seems to begrounded n a much deeper orientation of independence han just the perception thatthe nation embodies culture; it is hesitant to join either a political or an economic

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union. Greece, in contrast, is second only to Luxembourg n the percentage of itspopulation that expresses the highest support for integration 30.4 percent). It is one

of the EU's poor relations and is Orthodox, but it also demonstrates high xenopho-bia (55.3 percent in the highly xenophobic category). For the Greeks, economic self-interest offers a strong explanation of the high level of popular support for integra-tion into wealthy western Europe.

Areas for Further Research The bivariate analysis has shown that in a majorityof EU member countries a significant and relatively strong relationship existsbetween the level of xenophobia and support for European ntegration. One consid-eration that may improve the measurement of xenophobia and its relationship with

support for integrationis the

constructionof an index that

targetsmore

specifictypes of foreigners. Large portions of the foreign populations n European countriesare non-European; respondents have pictured these groups when asked questionsabout foreigners. There has been much discussion about a European dentity, and itis probable that xenophobic individuals in EU countries would be less fearful ofEuropean foreigners than non-Europeans.28 n a future index of xenophobia, vari-ables specific to European foreigners may improve the validity of the relationshipbetween xenophobia and support or integration.

The analysis offered here provides initial evidence of a relationship betweenxenophobia and European ntegration. The apparent nfluence of religion and cost-benefit economic evaluations necessitates that future research account for these fac-tors through a multivariate nalysis controlling for representative ariables. The nextstep in determining he legitimacy of xenophobia and other cultural factors on sup-port for integration s to test the relationship in conjunction with other influentialfactors. This test would determine whether cultural arguments or cost-benefit theo-ries are stronger n explaining variance in support for European ntegration. Whilebeyond the scope of this article, such a test would certainly deepen our understand-ing of the importance of xenophobia among the factors shaping support forEuropean ntegration.

Conclusion

Despite the many conflicts between nations and nation-states n this century, even upto the present day, observers of the European Union lean toward explanations ofpopular support for European ntegration n terms of economic costs and benefits.By contrast, he theory of political culture outlined in this paper argues that individu-als also evaluate political transformations uch as European ntegration hrough thelens of particular orientations, one of which is their perception of the relationshipbetween culture and nation. The disposition to perceive foreigners and foreign insti-

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Compurative Politics July 2000

tutions as threatening o one's culture appears to influence how Europeans respondto integration. Those who identify themselves with a particular nation-state as the

embodiment of their culture instinctively fend off foreigners as threats to the group.Consequently, hose who fear foreigners will almost certainly feel an aversion to anorganization hat infringes upon their established cultural group, the nation-state.

Statistically, he correlation of xenophobia with support for European ntegrationvaries across the twelve members of the EU. For those countries where xenophobiadoes not have a strong relationship with support or integration, other factors such asreligion and economic development may play an important ole. Their effects on therelationship need to be explored, and the explanations need to be compared.Regardless of which theory explains the most variance n support or integration, he

strength of xenophobia n France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Luxembourg, andthe Netherlands has dismaying implications for proponents of integration. It signi-fies that garnering support for European ntegration s not a matter of merely sooth-ing the economic qualms of individual Europeans. The perception of irreconcilablenational differences plays a significant role in shaping public opinion, and the failureto recognize and address the issue of xenophobia may threaten he political transfor-mation of the European Union.

With the movement to integrate urther parts of eastern and southern Europe, thepotential for xenophobia is even greater. Increased mmigration has already fright-ened many Europeans into a more nationalist stance, as observed by increasinglyvocal nationalist parties. To ignore this phenomenon for the more economic, ratio-nally based explanations of popular support reveals a disregard both for the impactof the increasingly political nature of European ntegration on popular perceptions ofthe EU and for the ability of fear to influence individuals' reaction to change.

NOTES

The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Lyman As Kellstedt and Alex Bolyanatz in the devel-opment of this article.

1. Preamble o the Treaty on the European Union (The Maastricht Treaty), n Brent F. Nelsen andAlexander C-G. Stubb, eds., The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of EuropeanIntegration Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1996), p. 66.

2. David M. Wood and Birol A. Yesilada, The Emerging European Union (White Plains: Longman,1996), pp. 8 1-83.

3. Alec G. Hargreaves and Jeremy Leaman, Racism in Contemporary Western Europe: AnOverview, in Alec G. Hargreaves and Jeremy Leaman, eds., Racisms Ethnicity and Politics inContemporary Europe Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 9-10.

4. Christopher Anderson, Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity Revisited: Trends inPublic Support for European Integration, n Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey, eds., The State of theEuropean Union, Volume : Building a European Polity? (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1995), p. 114.

5. Richard C.Eichenberg

andRussell

J.Dalton, Europeans and the European Community: TheDynamics of Public Support or European ntegration,' nternational Organization, 47 (1993).

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6. Christopher J. Anderson and M. Shawn Reichert, Economic Benefits and Support forMembership n the E.U.: A Cross-National Analysis, Journal of Public Policy, 15 (1996), 241; MatthewGabel and Harvey D. Palmer, Understanding Variation n Public Support for European Integration,European Journal of Political Research, 27 (1995), 7-8; Matthew Gabel and Guy D. Whitten, EconomicConditions, Economic Perceptions and Public Support for European Integration, olitical Behavior, 19(1997), 92.

7. Cleveland R. Fraser and Brent F. Nelsen, Religion and Public Attitudes toward the EuropeanUnion, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, SanFrancisco, August 1996, pp. 2-6.

8. Mathieu Deflem and Fred C. Pampel, The Myth of Postnational Identity: Popular Support forEuropean Unification, Social Forces, 75 (1), 138.

9. Gabriel A. Almond, A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Politicaul cience (London: Sage,1990), p. 134.

10. Harry Eckstein, ACulturalist Theory of Political Change, ' n Harry Eckstein, Regarding Politics:Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 267.

11. In examinations of culture as a social phenomenon, the emphasis is naturally placed upon themediating orientations he group shares. However, even within the group individuals may exhibit differentbehaviors because of the sources of socialization that create orientations particular o subgroups.

12. Sidney Verba, Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture, n Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba,eds., Political Culture and Political Development Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 516.

13. Almond, p. 144.14. Eckstein, p. 271.15. Ibid. pp. 271-77.16. Ibid., p. 278.17. Ibid. pp. 278-80.

18. For the sake of simplicity and because of the literal definition of xenophobia, he term fear willbe used to express the variety of negative feelings toward strangers, with the understanding hat it mayrepresent more than ust apprehension n the part of the xenophobe.

19. Karlheinz Reif and Eric Marlier, Euro-barometer 1.1: Post-European Election, June-July 1994(Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1996). Current membersAustria, Finland, and Sweden were not included in the survey because they joined the European Union in1995.20. To reduce missing percentages, responses of don't know or missing were recoded based on the

responses given to other questions regarding he EU. Hence answers supporting or not supporting) nte-gration in the other variables led to the recoding of the missing into supporting or nonsupporting cate-gories. The remaining missing percentages were replaced with the mean during the factor analysis proce-dure used to construct he

support or integration ndex.21. Same direction coding was also necessary to conduct a reliability analysis of these three variables.This analysis produced an alpha score of 0.81 (standardized tem alpha 0.82), indicating that the scalecreated from these items is very reliable in measuring support or integration.

22. The three variables composing the support or European ntegration ndex have the following load-ings on the first principal component n factor analysis: reaction o scrapping he EU, 0.874; evaluation ofcountry's membership n the EU, 0.868; support or unification of Europe, 0.841.

23. Missing percentages were recoded similarly to those for the integration questions. If possible, theywere recoded based on responses to the other xenophobia questions. Otherwise, they were recoded to themean during he factor analysis that produced he xenophobia ndex.

24. The reliability analysis conducted for these seven variables produced an alpha value of 0.84 (stan-dardized tem alpha score = 0.85), indicating another very reliable scale. The seven variables composingthe xenophobia ndex have the following loadings on the first principal component in factor analysis: per-

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Xenophibia and the Europian Union

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