Author: Myers, Jennifer January 22, 2015 Judge Brian Price 1 Cause No. 14-11959-C RALPH STARMER and LINDA STARMER, individually and as next friends of SHEILA STARMER, deceased, and JOHN DONOVAN and LINDA DONOVAN, individually and as next friends of STACY DONOVAN, deceased § § § § § § § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiffs § § v. § 68th JUDICIAL DISTRICT § STEVEN DONOVAN and CHARLES DUNCAN, JR. § § § Defendants § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS PLAINTIFFS RALPH STARMER AND LINDA STARMER’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT DONOVAN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE PRICE: Plaintiffs Ralph and Linda Starmer, individually and as next friends of Sheila Starmer, deceased, file this Response to Defendant Donovan’s Motion for Summary Judgment, asking the Court to deny that motion for the following reasons. I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 1. Ralph and Linda Starmer, individually and as next friends of Sheila Starmer, deceased, filed a negligence action against Steven Donovan for his actions surrounding the September 1, 2012 boating collision in which Sheila lost her life.
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Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
1
Cause No. 14-11959-C
RALPH STARMER and LINDA
STARMER, individually and as
next friends of SHEILA STARMER,
deceased, and JOHN DONOVAN
and LINDA DONOVAN,
individually and as next friends of
STACY DONOVAN, deceased
§
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§
§
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§
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
Plaintiffs §
§
v. § 68th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
STEVEN DONOVAN and
CHARLES DUNCAN, JR.
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§
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Defendants § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
PLAINTIFFS RALPH STARMER AND LINDA STARMER’S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT DONOVAN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE PRICE:
Plaintiffs Ralph and Linda Starmer, individually and as next friends of
Sheila Starmer, deceased, file this Response to Defendant Donovan’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, asking the Court to deny that motion for the
following reasons.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
1. Ralph and Linda Starmer, individually and as next friends of Sheila
Starmer, deceased, filed a negligence action against Steven Donovan for his
actions surrounding the September 1, 2012 boating collision in which Sheila
lost her life.
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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2. Sheila Starmer, then fifteen years old, spent Labor Day weekend of
2012 at Lake Texoma with friends. On Saturday, September 1, 2012, she
spent the day with Steven Donovan, Stacy Donovan, and Shannon Sherrard
at an island in Lake Texoma called Treasure Island, waterskiing and
picnicking. After spending the day at the island, Sherrard needed to call his
parents to tell them when he would be home, so the four teens went back to
the Tanglewood development to use the telephone at the Donovan’s lakeside
vacation home. The Tanglewood development is off of the area of Lake
Texoma known as Buzzard’s Bay.
3. Steven Donovan requires vision correction. However, he was not
wearing glasses on September 1, 2012. Nor was he wearing contact lenses, as
he had a habit of not wearing contacts when he would be waterskiing.
4. The teenagers needed to get home. As it was getting dark, Steven
Donovan, then fifteen years old, piloted a boat containing the four of them out
of Buzzard’s Bay. The boat was headed out of Buzzard’s Bay back to Treasure
Island, traveling along the left-hand side of Buzzard’s Bay.
5. The Donovan boat is a 2008 model Taylor SJ, eighteen feet in length.
The Taylor SJ is a type of jet ski boat that operates based on water
propulsion: water is forced through a pump at the back of the boat, and the
boat travels in the opposite direction. The Taylor SJ has no propellers. Its
design causes the boat to sit very low in the water. The lighting on the boat is
a simple push-pull on-off: all lights are either lit or not, depending on
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January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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whether the switch is pushed in or pulled out. When the boat planes, there is
a blind spot for the driver for a few feet in front of the boat.
6. The boat’s seating was arranged similarly to an automobile’s. Steven
Donovan sat in the front on the left side in the captain’s chair, Sheila
Starmer sat to his right at the front of the deck, Shannon Sherrard sat
behind Steven, and Stacy Donovan sat behind Sheila.
7. Steven Donovan was in a hurry to get back. He stepped on the gas;
at one-quarter throttle, the boat was going 20 miles per hour. The boat had
hit such a speed that it began planing, a condition where the front point of
the boat lifts several degrees higher above the water than normal. This
created a blind spot in front of Steven.
8. At the same time, as it was getting dark, Charles Duncan, Jr. was
piloting his boat from the eastern tip of Treasure Island toward Loe’s
Highpoint, the marina where his houseboat was docked. During the day,
Duncan had consumed several alcoholic beverages—he had begun drinking at
eleven o’clock that morning and had continued drinking through at least
eight o’clock that evening. Duncan requires corrective lenses, and he was
wearing glasses while on his course towards Loe’s. Duncan’s boat at this
point had hit such a speed that it began planing.
9. At around 9:15 P.M. on Saturday, September 1, 2012, the sun had
set and it was full dark. The boats were on a collision course, set to crash as
both boats came around opposite sides of a jut of land marking the entrance
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January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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to both Buzzard’s Bay and Loe’s Highpoint. As the boats approached each
other, they were neither directly head-on nor directly perpendicular, but
somewhere in-between; the Donovan boat’s vector was about 135 degrees
from the Duncan boat’s vector. The Donovan boat was traveling at 20 miles
per hour; the Duncan boat was traveling at 40 miles per hour. There was
very slight wind, and the water conditions were normal. Aside from being
dark, the night was clear. Visibility was around 10 miles.
10. Boaters are expected to follow certain rules of conduct on bodies of
water: the rules of the road. The rules of the road work the same on lakes as
they do with automobiles. Boats are expected to stay on the “right-hand side”
of the body of water, just as automobiles are expected to stay on the right-
hand side of the road. When approaching head-on, boats are expected to pass
left-to-left. If a boat wishes to pass another, the faster boat is expected to pass
the slower boat on the right-hand side. At a perpendicular intersection, boats
are expected to yield to the boat to the right. Slower boats have privilege over
faster boats, because slower boats are less maneuverable.
11. In addition, this was Labor Day weekend of 2012. Lake Texoma
was busier than usual: Memorial Day, Fourth of July, and Labor Day are the
three busiest times on the lake. Labor Day is busier than most, as September
marks the end of the boating season and boaters want to have a last hurrah.
Lake Texoma, in particular the Loe’s Highpoint area, was crowded with
boaters, most of them from out of town. Both Steven Donovan and Charles
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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Duncan, Jr. are from Dallas, not the Lake Texoma area; they have to
specifically bring their boats to Lake Texoma. Because of how busy the
holiday weekend is, and because of the influx of out-of-towners and
inexperienced boaters, the rules of the road become even more important to
follow to avoid crashes and collisions.
12. Steven Donovan noticed the Duncan boat five seconds before the
collision. At this point, Steven had three choices: go left to pass the boat
head-on right-to-right in direct opposition to the rules of the road; go right
and step on the gas to become the privileged boat at a perpendicular
intersection; or go straight and attempt to stop before the point at which the
boats would collide. Steven chose to turn the Donovan boat to the left, defying
the rules of the road.
13. The crash took place around the breakwater. The breakwater is a
partition between the harbors and the lake proper: inside the breakwater, the
speed limit for boats is five miles per hour, to keep the boats from creating
excessive wakes and damaging other boats. However, both boats were
traveling well in excess of five miles per hour.
14. At the point around the breakwater where the boats collided,
Steven Donovan was piloting his boat on the left-hand side of Buzzard’s Bay,
in direct opposition to the rules of the road. Charles Duncan, Jr. stayed close
to the shoreline, which created a blind spot as he rounded the jut of land that
demarcated Buzzard’s Bay from Lake Texoma proper.
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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15. The front of Duncan’s boat collided with the right side of Donovan’s
boat. Because Duncan’s boat was twice as long, much heavier, and had more
momentum, Duncan’s boat actually traveled over the top of Donovan’s boat,
so much so that the Duncan boat’s propellers, situated in the midline of the
bottom of the boat, chopped rhythmic gashes in the right side of the Donovan
boat’s hull.
16. The collision was brutal. The right-hand side of the Donovan boat
bore the brunt of the crash, and the girls sitting on that side of the boat
sustained the worst injuries. Sheila Starmer’s spine was snapped—her body
simply could not withstand the extreme weight and size of the Duncan boat
bearing down on her. As the Donovan boat was towed into Loe’s, she was
slumped over and could not pull her body straight, even with assistance from
Shannon Sherrard. Sheila was pronounced dead once the Donovan boat
arrived at Loe’s and once emergency medical technicians had the first
opportunity to render assistance to the teenagers.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT GROUNDS
17. Steven Donovan filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on
Monday, January 5, 2015. His motion alleges that the Starmers cannot
establish breach of a duty or causation. Both are essential elements of the
Starmers’ negligence claim against him.
18. In reply, the Starmers file this Response to Steven Donovan’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. The evidence as it stands creates a genuine
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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issue of material fact for both breach and causation. Because of this, the
factual elements will survive summary judgment and go to the jury.
III. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE
19. In responding to Steven Donovan’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
the Starmers rely on portions of the deposition of Sammy Brown, included as
Appendix A. The Starmers also rely on portions of Oscar Taylor’s deposition,
which is Appendix B to this motion. Steven Donovan’s deposition also
contains statements which raise genuine issues of material fact; the relevant
portions are contained in Appendix C. Finally, relevant portions of Francis
Harkrider’s deposition, included as Appendix D, contain statements which
raise genuine issues of material fact.
20. In addition, the Starmers rely on Exhibit A, a United States Coast
Guard publication, which is attached to this response as Appendix E. They
also rely on Starmer Exhibit #001, which Francis Harkrider created during
his deposition; it is attached to this response in Appendix F. Appendix G,
containing Exhibit B, and Appendix H, containing Exhibit C, support the
Starmers’ procedural argument.
IV. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
21. To prevail on a traditional summary judgment motion, the movant
bears the burden of proving that no genuine issues of material fact exist and
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
“A defendant who conclusively negates at least one of the essential elements
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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of each of the plaintiff's causes of action . . . is entitled to summary
judgment.” Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). Thus, it is
Steven Donovan’s burden to conclusively negate at least one of the essential
elements of the Starmers’ negligence cause of action against him.
22. Assuming this burden is met, and only if it is, the burden shifts to
the Starmers to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as
to Steven Donovan’s claims. See Ayeni v. State, 440 S.W.3d 707, 709 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). In this response, the Starmers take up the
burden of presenting evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on
breach and causation. Because the Starmers’ evidence raises a fact issue,
summary judgment is not appropriate. Id.
V. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
23. Steven Donovan owed Sheila Starmer a duty of reasonable care. He
breached that duty on the night of September 1, 2012, by participating in the
boat collision that is at issue in this case. In addition, the type of collision
that occurred, and the harm resulting from it, was reasonably foreseeable,
thus showing that Donovan’s conduct was a proximate cause of Sheila’s
death.
A. Steven Donovan Owed Sheila Starmer a Duty of Reasonable Care.
24. “The existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide
from the particular facts of the case.” Golden Spread Council, Inc. No. 562 of
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. 1996). “If there is no
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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duty, there cannot be negligence liability,” because a negligence cause of
action rests on a breach of duty. Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 637
(Tex. 1999). While duty is a question of law and Steven Donovan attacks only
breach, the Starmers must provide a genuine issue of material fact that
Steven Donovan had a duty to Sheila Starmer, as his passenger, to exercise
ordinary care in operating his boat.
1. All Factors Determining Existence of a Duty Weigh in Favor
of Placing Steven Donovan Under a Duty.
25. In determining whether Steven Donovan was under a duty, several
interrelated factors combine, including the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood
of injury weighed against the social utility of Donovan’s conduct, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the
consequences of placing the burden on Donovan. See Greater Houston
Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990). “Of all these factors,
foreseeability of the risk is the foremost and dominant consideration.” Id.
(internal quotations removed).
26. Sammy Brown, a game warden, testified that there is a likely and
foreseeable risk of boating collisions when boaters do not meet the standard
of care for proper boating conduct. See Brown Dep. 537-50, 579-94, Dec. 9,
2014. The standard of care is in place for safety reasons, creating a social
utility in following the rules; there is little to no social utility in breaking
those rules. See Brown Dep. 537-38. Because Steven Donovan was one of the
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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drivers of the boats involved in the collision at issue in this case, he was in
the best position to prevent injury to himself, his passengers, and other
boaters from operating his boat. Finally, the consequence of placing this
burden on Steven Donovan is to hold boat drivers accountable for the
consequences of their actions. All these factors weigh in favor of placing
Steven Donovan under a duty of care to Sheila Starmer.
2. Steven Donovan Was Under an Obligation to Follow the
Standard of Care Found in the Texas Water Safety Act.
27. In addition to establishing a duty, the Starmers must also establish
a standard of care by which to judge Steven Donovan’s conduct. “Whether or
not a breach has occurred is determined by comparison to the applicable
standard of care.” Harris v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate, Inc., 345 S.W.3d 756,
759 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.). The Texas Water Safety Act, found in
Chapter 31 of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code, contains the standard of
care applicable to a boating collision like the one at issue in this case.
28. One statute in the Texas Water Safety Act restates the common-
law duty of an operator to act with reasonable care. See Tex. Parks & Wild.
Code Ann. § 31.094 (Vernon). Another statute states that the Coast Guard’s
Inland Rules—the “rules of the road” for bodies of water—apply to all public
water in the state. See Tex. Parks & Wild. Code Ann. § 31.093 (Vernon).
Because of this, the Coast Guard’s Inland Rules, or the “rules of the road,”
constitute the standard of care in this case.
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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29. The Coast Guard promulgates its “rules of the road” in official
publications. See generally App. E Ex. A. Boats are expected to pass port-to-
port, or left-to-left—the same as on roads with cars. Id. at 4. Passing
starboard-to-starboard, or right-to-right, should be done only “when
necessary.” Id. When passing starboard-to-starboard, boats need to signal
their intent with two short blasts, waiting for the other boat’s confirmation of
two short blasts before performing the maneuver. Id. In a crossing situation,
the boat to which right-of-way is yielded is expected to “maintain its course
and speed.” Id. at 5. Under § 31.093 of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code,
Steven Donovan is expected to follow these “rules of the road” when accepting
responsibility as the operator of a jet boat—that is, he operates under this
standard of care.
30. The Texas Water Safety Act also provides a specific statutory duty
to operate one’s vessel at a “reasonable and prudent” speed. See Tex. Parks &
Wild. Code Ann. § 31.095 (Vernon). A “reasonable and prudent” speed is the
speed which “will permit [the boat’s operator], in the exercise of reasonable
care, to bring the boat to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.” Id.
The principles in sections 31.094 and 31.095 combine in another statute:
No person may operate a vessel . . . on the water of
this state in wilful or wanton disregard of the
rights or safety of others or without due caution or
circumspection, and at a speed or in a manner that
endangers, or is likely to endanger, a person or
property.
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January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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Tex. Parks & Wild. Code Ann. § 31.096 (Vernon). As a vessel operator, Steven
Donovan falls under these provisions. These statutes provide another
standard of care for Donovan’s conduct.
B. Steven Donovan Breached His Duty of Care to Sheila Starmer by
Not Operating Within the Standards of Care Provided in the Texas
Water Safety Act.
31. To establish breach of duty, the Starmers must show either that
Steven Donovan did something an ordinarily prudent person exercising
ordinary care would not have done under those circumstances, or that Steven
Donovan failed to do that which an ordinarily prudent person would have
done in the exercise of ordinary care. See Caldwell v. Curioni, 125 S.W.3d
784, 793 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). Steven Donovan breached his
duty of care to Sheila Starmer because he violated more than one standard of
care described in the Texas Water Safety Act. Not only did Donovan violate
the “rules of the road” that he is required to follow under Texas Parks and
Wildlife Code § 31.093, Donovan also operated his boat at an unsafe speed as
forbidden by Texas Parks and Wildlife Code § 31.096.
1. Steven Donovan Breached the Standard of Care in Not
Following the “Rules of the Road.”
32. In ¶ 29 of Steven Donovan’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
Donovan admits that he swerved to avoid a collision. The boats were angled
similarly to the figure on page 5 of Exhibit A under Crossing Situation
(Navigation Rule 15), with the blue boat representing the original vector of
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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Duncan’s boat and the green boat representing the original vector of
Donovan’s boat. According to the rules of the road, Donovan should have
continued straight. See Ex. A at 5; Taylor Dep. 142-43, 289-90, Dec. 5, 2014.
33. Instead, Donovan swerved to the left. See ¶ 29 of Steven Donovan’s
Motion for Summary Judgment; see also S. Donovan Dep. 446-47, Nov. 25,
2014. The Duncan and Donovan boats thus passed right-to-right. See Brown
Dep. 469-76. Although discovery has not yet ended and not all potential
witnesses have been deposed, no evidence currently suggests that either
driver signaled his intent using a boat horn.
34. The Starmers have therefore produced some evidence that Steven
Donovan did not follow the “rules of the road” on September 1, 2012, leading
up to the collision. This evidence is enough to raise a fact issue on whether
Steven Donovan breached the standard of care found in the Coast Guard
Inland Rules as published in Exhibit A. Because there is a fact issue,
summary judgment on this theory of breach of duty is improper.
2. Steven Donovan Breached the Standard of Care When He Did
Not Operate His Vessel at a “Reasonable and Prudent” Speed.
35. Under the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code, local authorities have
the ability to set speed limits and no-wake zones on particular areas of
navigable waters. See Tex. Parks and Wild. Code Ann. § 31.095(b) (Vernon).
On Lake Texoma, near Loe’s Highport and Buzzard’s Bay where the collision
resulting in this lawsuit occurred, there is a series of five-mile-per-hour buoys
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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demarcating the harbor from the rest of Lake Texoma. See Harkrider Dep.
299-300, Dec. 4, 2014; see also Starmer Exhibit #001. Steven Donovan said he
was going twenty miles per hour when the bats collided. See S. Donovan Dep.
440-43. However, the boat crash took place inside the buoys. See Starmer
Exhibit #001. Therefore, Steven Donovan was speeding, going four times the
legal speed limit inside the five-mile-per-hour buoys. Speeding this recklessly
violates the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code. See Tex. Parks and Wild. Code
Ann. §§ 31.095, 31.096 (Vernon). By not following this standard of care,
Steven Donovan breached his duty to Sheila Starmer.
C. In Breaching These Duties of Care to Sheila Starmer, Steven
Donovan Was a Proximate Cause of the Collision at Issue in This Case.
36. To establish causation, the Starmers must prove that Steven
Donovan’s conduct caused an event and that this event caused the Starmers
to suffer compensable injuries. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d
497, 499 (Tex. 1995). In a negligence case, causation consists of two elements:
cause in fact and foreseeability. See Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d
94, 98 (Tex. 1992). Therefore, the Starmers must show that Steven Donovan’s
breach of the standards of care creates a genuine issue of material fact of
whether that breach caused Sheila Starmer’s death.
1. Steven Donovan’s Conduct Was a Cause-in-Fact of Sheila
Starmer’s Death.
37. “‘Cause in fact’ means that the act or omission was a substantial
factor in bringing about the injury, and without it harm would not have
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
15
occurred.” Id. In Travis, the plaintiff sued the City of Mesquite because the
City’s police officers chased Adkins’s vehicle; Adkins’s vehicle then collided
with Travis’s vehicle. Id. at 96. During the summary-judgment phase, Travis
produced evidence that “raise[d] the inference that Adkins drove down the
access road at an excessive speed because of the police decision to give chase.”
Id. at 98. This evidence, therefore, raised a genuine issue of material fact that
the police officers were the but-for cause, or cause-in-fact, of the collision. Id.
38. In the instant case, Steven Donovan drove his boat at four times
the speed limit. See S. Donovan Dep. 440-43. Because of this, he had only five
seconds to see Duncan’s boat. Id. at 444-45. Because he had such a limited
time to react, Steven Donovan made a decision which violated the “rules of
the road:” he turned left so that his boat would pass right-to-right with
Duncan’s boat. See Brown Dep. 469-76. And because the boats passed each
other right-to-right, the passengers on the right side of Donovan’s boat died
in the collision. This is evidence enough to raise a genuine issue of material
fact that Steven Donovan’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of the collision, and
therefore of the injuries for which the Starmers seek recovery. See Travis,
830 S.W.2d at 98.
2. Steven Donovan’s Conduct Was a Proximate Cause of Sheila
Starmer’s Death.
39. “Foreseeability” means that Steven Donovan, as a person of
ordinary intelligence, should have anticipated the dangers that his negligent
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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act created for others. Id. Foreseeability of the risk is also the prime factor in
determining whether Steven Donovan’s conduct was negligent. See Greater
Houston Transp. Co., 801 S.W.2d at 525. Sammy Brown, who has been a
game warden for 23 years, testified that boaters violating the Texas Water
Safety Act anticipate causing collisions in which people can get seriously hurt
or even die. See Brown Dep. 27-28, 589-94. This deposition testimony raises a
genuine issue of material fact that Steven Donovan’s breach of the standards
of care in the Texas Water Safety Act was a foreseeable cause, or proximate
cause, of Sheila Starmer’s death and the Starmers’ injuries.
VI. ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
40. Steven Donovan’s Motion for Summary Judgment was untimely.
The Practice Court Rules provide that motions for summary judgment should
be submitted by 5:00 P.M. three days before the summary judgment hearing.
See P.C. Rule 6.3(c)(7)(a). The summary judgment hearing was scheduled in
December for Wednesday, January 7, 2015 at 7:00 P.M. by agreement of the
parties. See App. G Ex. B. P.C. Time technically did not run during the
Christmas holiday period. See P.C. Rule 7.6(a)(2)(ii). The deadline for Steven
Donovan’s Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore, was technically on
Friday, December 19 by 5:00 P.M. Even invoking a rule of leniency and
counting back three literal calendar days from the date of the hearing, Steven
Donovan’s Motion for Summary Judgment would have been due on Sunday,
January 4 at 5:00 P.M.
Author: Myers, Jennifer
January 22, 2015
Judge Brian Price
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41. Instead, Steven Donovan’s motion for summary judgment was
submitted Monday, January 5 at 1:14 P.M. See App. H Ex. C. By any
measure, this is an untimely filing. “Late-filed motions will not be accepted
and are deemed denied.” P.C. Rule 7.13(b)(4) ¶ 2. Because of this, the Court
should deny Steven Donovan’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
VII. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
For these reasons, the Starmers respectfully request the Court to deny