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World Bank’s DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project Kym Anderson University of Adelaide and Australian National University [email protected] Seminar on Monitoring Agricultural Incentives: A Global Perspective, IFPRI, Washington DC, 18 November 2016
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World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

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Page 1: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

World Bank’s DAI (Distortions to

Agricultural Incentives) project

Kym AndersonUniversity of Adelaide and Australian National University

[email protected]

Seminar on Monitoring Agricultural Incentives: A Global Perspective, IFPRI, Washington DC, 18 November 2016

Page 2: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Outline

Key hypotheses

Methodology

Sample

Findings

Lessons

Page 3: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Key hypothesis

As countries develop economically, they tend to switch from taxing to assisting farmers relative to other producers

At least until agric. sector becomes very small and begins to lose support

• Cassing, J.H. and A.L. Hillman, ‘Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse’, American Economic Review 76(3): 516-23, June 1986

Page 4: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Additional hypothesis

Countries transmit international food price changes only partially so as to reduce domestic price fluctuations, esp. when prices suddenly spike up or down

Loss aversion literature

Page 5: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Methodology

Based primarily on annual comparison of domestic and border prices

to capture NTBs, as well as trade taxes that may be a mix of specific & ad valorem

Nominal rate of assistance (NRA) and consumer tax equivalent (CTE)

Similar to OECD’s PSE and CSE, except expressed as % rise in undistorted prices

Page 6: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Methodology (continued)

Also estimated NRA for non-ag tradables so as to be able to calculate a relative rate of assistance to farmers (RRA)

in spirit of Symmetry Thm. of Lerner (1936)

Simple criterion for anti-agricultural bias in policy in year t: Is RRAt< 0, where

RRAt = [(1+NRAagt)/(1+NRAnonagt) – 1]

Page 7: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Sample: 80 x 80 x 50

Countries: 82 included, covering >90% of global popn, GDP, agric trade, …

Products: as with OECD, enough to cover >70% of national value of agric prodn

Total of almost 80, av. of 11 per country

Years: Almost 50 years per country (except for ECA), from 1955 to 2004-7, then updated to 2011

Page 8: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Findings

As countries develop economically, they:

(1) do indeed tend to switch from taxing to assisting farmers relative to other producers

(2) … and at the same rate in DCs as previously in HICs during 1955-2004

Page 9: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

RRA rises with per capita income-1

00

0

100

200

300

400

Rel

ativ

e R

ate

of A

ssis

tanc

e (%

)

-1 0 1 2 3Ln real GDP per capita

HIC RRA obs HIC fitted values

DC RRA obs DC fitted values

Page 10: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Findings

As countries develop economically:

(3) the strong anti-trade bias in DC agricpolicies persists

Page 11: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

In DCs: NRA ag export taxation disappearing,

but ag import-competing NRA is >0 & growing

-60

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04

perc

en

t

Covered import-competing agricultural products

Covered exportable agricultural products

Linear (Covered import-competing agricultural

products)

Page 12: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Findings

(4) Rise in RRA in DCs was due as much to reductions in manuf. protection as in taxation of farming

Page 13: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

RRA for all DCs: moved from very

negative to slightly positive after 2000

13

Page 14: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Findings

(5) In some cases, removal of overvalued exchange rates played a non-trivial role, e.g. China

1981-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99

RRA -61 -50 -31 -3

RRA (ignoring

exchange rate distortion)

-52 -41 -26 -3

Page 15: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Findings

(6) Much year-to-year fluctuation in NRAs around longer-run trends

… NRAs are negatively correlated with int’l price fluctuations, aimed at insulating domestic markets

Page 16: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Rice NRA, global wted. av. 1970-2010

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

NR

A (

%)

Inte

rn.

Pri

ce

Intern. Price in USD

NRA all countries

Page 17: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Agric NRA for DCs (%)

Page 18: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Ups & downs of ag NRA for HICs

Page 19: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Findings

(7) With agric RRAs in HICs & DCs converging toward zero during 1985-2011, global disarray in ag and food markets at end of DAI project was much less than at end of K/S/V project

Page 20: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Proportions of global farm

population facing various RRAs:

1980-89 2000-09

-1

00

-5

0

05

01

00

150

200

Rela

tiv

e R

ate of A

ssis

tance

(%

)

0 20 40 60 80 100

Cumulative share in agricultural population (%)

-1

00

-5

0

05

01

00

150

200

Rela

tive

Rate

of A

ssis

tance

(%

)

0 20 40 60 80 100

Cumulative share in agricultural population (%)

Page 21: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Findings

(8) However, some emerging economies are not stopping at neutral RRA=0 point

Rather, they are following NE Asia, in now increasingly assisting their farmers

Page 22: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

RRAs to 2004: would RRAs for

China and India keep rising?

-50

050

100

150

200

RR

A (

%)

7 8 9 10Ln real GDP per capita

China Japan Korea Taiwan India

Page 23: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Agric NRAs (%): China & Indonesia

already exceed average for EU countriesSources: Huang et al. (2009), Warr (2009) and OECD (2016)

Page 24: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Findings

(9) World is still a long way from being free of agric distortions, because:

Still very wide cross-country dispersion of NRAs within HIC and DC country groups

Still very wide cross-product dispersion of NRAs within each country’s agric sector

Page 25: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

NRAagric trends for DCs, 1955-2009

(%, 5-year averages, and spread in 2005-09)

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1955-59 1965-69 1975-79 1985-89 1995-99 2005-09

Page 26: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Global NRA averages by product, 2005-09

(%)

-40.0

-30.0

-20.0

-10.0

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

Page 27: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Lessons

Page 28: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

To avoid exaggerating av. NRA/CTE:

Expand product coverage to also cover 70% of value of consumption of farm products

Assume something about NRAs and CTEs for the missing 30% of products

Improve price comparisons by estimating price transmission along the value chain

back to farm, forward to consumer

Page 29: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

To provide better indicators of the welfare and trade

reductions associated with price distortions (using no more than the data needed to estimate NRAs/CTEs)

… also estimate partial equil. variants of TRIs pioneered by J. Anderson/P. Neary

Welfare (or Trade) Reduction Index

= that uniform agric. trade tax rate which, if applied to all goods in place of all actual ag. producer and consumer price distortions, would result in the same reduction in national economic welfare (or in value of trade)

Page 30: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

NRA global av. understate true welfare-

and trade-reducing effects of policies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1960-64 1970-74 1980-84 1990-94 2000-04

NRA WRI TRI

Page 31: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Databases and booksAll Agric Distortions Research Project working papers, regional and poverty e-books, and global distortions database are freely available at: www.worldbank.org/agdistortions

BOOKS:Anderson, K and A. Valdés (eds.), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Latin America, World Bank, 2008

Anderson, K and J. Swinnen (eds.), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Europe’s Transition Economies, World Bank, 2008

Anderson, K and W. Martin (eds.), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Asia, World Bank, 2009

Anderson, K and W.A. Masters (eds.), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa, World Bank, 2009

Anderson, K. (ed.), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives: A Global Perspective, 1955-2007, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009

Anderson, K., J. Cockburn and W. Martin (eds.), Agricultural Price Distortions, Inequality and Poverty, World Bank, 2010

Anderson, K. (ed.), The Political Economy of Agricultural Price Distortions, Cambridge University Press, 2010

Page 32: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Summary journal articles

Anderson, K. “Reducing Distortions to Agricultural Incentives: Progress, Pitfalls and Prospects” (AAEA Fellows Address), American Journal of Agricultural Economics 88(5): 1135-46, December 2006.

Anderson, K., M. Kurzweil, W. Martin, D. Sandri and E. Valenzuela, “Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, Revisited”, World Trade Review 7(4): 675–704, October 2008.

Anderson, K. “Policy Reform Affecting Agricultural Incentives: Much Achieved, Much Still Needed”, World Bank Research Observer 25(1): 21-55, February 2010

Anderson, K. “Krueger/Schiff/Valdés Revisited: Agricultural Price and Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries Since 1960”, Applied Econ Perspectives and Policy 32(2): 195-231, Summer 2010

Anderson, K., J. Cockburn and W. Martin, “Would Freeing Up World Trade Reduce Poverty and Inequality? The Vexed Role of Agricultural Distortions”, The World Economy 34(4): 487-515, April 2011

Anderson, K., G. Rausser and J.F.M. Swinnen, “Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets”, Journal of Economic Literature 51(2): 423-77, June 2013

Anderson, K. “Agricultural Price Distortions: Trends and Volatility, Past and Prospective”, Agricultural Economics 44(S): 163-71, November 2013

Page 33: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

TRI/WRI journal articles

Croser, J.L., P.J. Lloyd and K. Anderson, “How Do Agricultural Policy Restrictions to Global Trade and Welfare Differ Across Commodities?” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 92(3): 698-712, April 2010

Lloyd, P.J., Croser, J.L. and K. Anderson, "Global Distortions to Agricultural Markets: New Indicators of Trade and Welfare Impacts, 1960 to 2007" Review of Development Economics 14(2): 141-60, May 2010

Anderson, K. and J.L. Croser, “New Indicators of How Much Agricultural Policies Restrict Global Trade, Journal of World Trade 44(5): 1109-26, October 2010

Anderson, K. and J.L. Croser, “Novel Indicators of the Trade and Welfare Effects of Agricultural Distortions in OECD Countries”, Review of World Economics 147(2): 269-302, June 2011

Croser, J.L. and K. Anderson, “Changing Contributions of Different Agricultural Policy Instruments to Global Reductions in Trade and Welfare”, World Trade Review 10(3): 297-323, July 2011

Croser, J.L. and K. Anderson, “Agricultural Distortions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Trade and Welfare Indicators, 1961 to 2004”, World Bank Economic Review 25(2): 250-77, 2011

Page 34: World Bank's DAI (Distortions to Agricultural Incentives) project

Food price insulation articles

Martin, W. and K. Anderson, “Export Restrictions and Price Insulation During Commodity Price Booms”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 94(2): 422-27, January 2012

Anderson, K. and S. Nelgen, “Agricultural Trade Distortions During the Global Financial Crisis”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28(2): 235-60, Summer 2012

Anderson, K., M. Ivanic and W. Martin, “Food Price Spikes, Price Insulation, and Poverty”, Ch. 8 in The Economics of Food Price Volatility, edited by J.-P. Chavas, D. Hummels and B.D. Wright, University of Chicago Press for NBER, 2014