Document o The World Bank FOROFFICIAL USEONLY Report No. 7940 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PHILIPPINES SECOND SMALL AND MFDIUM INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMFNT PROJECT (LOAN 1727-PH) JUNE 30, 1989 Asia Region Country Department II Industry and Energy Operations Division Thisdocument has a restrieted distribution andmay be used by recipients onlyin the perfornance of their official duties. LIscontents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bankauthorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
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Document o
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No. 7940
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
SECOND SMALL AND MFDIUM INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMFNT PROJECT(LOAN 1727-PH)
JUNE 30, 1989
Asia RegionCountry Department IIIndustry and Energy Operations Division
This document has a restrieted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfornance oftheir official duties. LIs contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
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PHILIPPINES
SECOND SMALL AND MEDIUM INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOA" 1727-PH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPOR:
AB'REVIATIONS
ADB - Asian Development SankBOI - Board of InvestmentCB - Central Bank of the PhilippinesCEO - Chief Executive Officer (of IGLF)CSMI - Commission on Small and Medium IndustriesDBP - Development Bank of the PhilippinesDCP - Design Center of the PhilippinesDLC - Department of Loans and Credit (of CB)DOF - Department of FinanceDTI - Department of Trade and IndustryIGLF - Industrial Guarantee and Loan FundKKK - Kapisanang Kabuhayan at KaunlaranMASICAP - Medium and Small Industries Coordinated Action ProgramNACIDA - National Cottage Industries Development AuthorityNBFI - Non-Bank Financial IntermediariesOIA - Office of the Internal Audit (of CB)PDB - Private Developmenz BanksPDCP - Private Development Corporation of the PhilippinesPISCO - Philippine Investments Systems OrganizationPNB - Philippine National BankRC - Review Committee (of IGLF)SBAC - Small Business Advisory CentersSMI - Small and Medium IndustriesSTD - Special Time DepositsUPISSI - University of the Philippines Institute for Small-Scale IndustriesUSAID - United States Agency for International Development
COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES
Name of Currency (abbreviation) PesoYear:Appraisal Year Average 1978 Exchange Rate: US21 = 7.37Intervening Yearo Average 1979-82 US31 = 8.00Completion year 1983 USS1 = 11.JO
KO OFF'ICAL US ONLYTl WORLD BANK
Washanton. DC 2041USA
Opkw di DtmiNw
June 30, 1989
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Phi.ippinesSecond Small and Medium T-iustries Development Project(Loan 1727-PH) _
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "ProjectCompletion Report on Philippines Second Small and Medium Industries DevelopmentProject (Loan 1727-PH)" prepared by the Asia Regional Office. No audit of thisproject has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
i-4 CILt. ,ONY
PHILIPPINES
SECOND SMALL AhD MEDIUM INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1727-PH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Table of Contents
Page No.
PREFACE. i
BASIC DATA SHEETS ............................................. ii
HIGHLIGHTS ...................... ....................... iv
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 1
Loan Effectiveness and Start-up. 6Loan Allocation. 7Disburse ments. 7Subproject Characteristics and Performance. 7Sectoral Distribution of Subprojects. 8Regional Distribution of Subprojects. 8Subproject Firm Size .Operational Results of Sample Projects. 9Economic Performance of Sample Subprojects .10Status of Subloans .10Institutional Sponsorship .10Reporting .11Procurement .11
V. OPERATING PERFORMANCF .11
Overall Operations .11IGLF Operations .12Regional Development Under Loan 1727-PH .13Interest Rates and Foreign Exchange Risk .14Diversification of IGLF Portfolio .15Experience with Cottage Industry .15
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
Table of Contents (cont'd.)
Page No.
VI. FINANCIAL P2UFORMANCZ OF IGLC ........................... 15
Financial Position . ..................................... 15Capital Structure and Liquidity ........................ . 15Profitability ......................... 16Guarantee Schen ............ ....................................... 16Audit ................................................... 16
VII. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT ....... ........ 17
1. Structure of Interest Rates - 1974-84 ................... 222. Schedule of Estimated end Actual Disbursements .......... 243. List if Subprojects Financed ............................ 25
4/4-A Analysis of Subprojects Financed ........................ 345. Characteristics of Subprojects Financed ................. 396. Economic Indicators of Subprojects Financed ............. 427. Financial Indicators of Subpro3ects Financed ............ 458. Reasons for Delay in Completion of Subprojects
Overruns in Excess of 15? of Estimated Project Cost ... 489. Organization Chart of the IGLF Unit ..................... 5010. Summary of Operations, 1978-84 .......................... 5111. Summary of Operations by Industry Size, 1978-84 ......... 5212. Characteristics of STD Approvals by Sector, Region,
Size, Purpose, and Maturity, 1978-84 .................. 5913. Summarized Balance Sheets, December 31, 1978-84 ......... 6514. Summarized Income Statements, 1978-84 ................... 66
15/15-A Projected and Actual Income Statements, 1978-84 ......... 6716. Collection Performance by Financing Institutions Under
the IGLF Scheme ................ ............. 6917. Status of Subprojects as of December 31, 1984 ........... 7017-A Status of Subprojects Affec_.ed bv Arrears as of
December 31, 1984 ................ 75
Table of Contents (cont'd.)
Page No.
18. Comparativ- Statement of Arrears Position btweenParticipating Institutions and End-Users of IGLF,December 31. 1978-84 . .. .. ...... 77
19. List of Accredited Financial Institutions . . 8220. List of IGLF TrainLng Programe and Seuinnrs ............. 8321. IGLF Review Camittee as of December 31, 1984 . . 8422. Fschange Rate Movements, 1975-84 . . 8523. Borrower Comients .................... 86
PHILIPPINES
SECOND SMALL AND MEDIUM INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1727-PH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Preface
This report covers the Second Small and Medium Industries DevelopmentProject in the Philippines bupported by Loan 1727-PH. The loan of $25.0 mil-lion to the Government of the Philippines was approved on June 12, 1979,became effective on November 9, 1979 and was closed on June 30, 1983 aqoriginally planned. $84,465.33 was cancelled effective July 8, 1983, leavingthe total amount disbursed $24,915,534.67.
This report was prepared by the Asia Region Country Department IIIndustry and Energy Division, based on a project completion report by IGLF andother information in files at the Bank.
This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED).The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower for comments and they are attached tothe report as Annex 23.
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PROJECT COMPLElTION REPORT BASIC DATA SHET.
PHILIPPINES: SECOND SMALL AND MEDIUM IMDUSTRISE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1727-PM)
KEY PROJECT DATA
Appriasl As.wtu'. orItem *t ei X^ curr6at *bp_t_ t_
Loan/Credit Amount (USS mlllion) 25.00 -Disbu sed ) 2401Cance ll d ) 0.0Re aId to ) 7/31/93 5.68Outstanding to ) 7/J1/99 19.09
Proportion of Time Underrun or Overrun (N) -Financial Perforoance (SCLF) Satiofactory SatisfactoryInstitutional Performnce (ILf) Satisfactory Satisfactory
PROJECT DATES
Or;ginal Actual orItem Plan Revision* Est. Actual
First Mention in Filos or Ti mtable 04/14/76Negotiations 04/28/79Board Approval 06/12/79Loan/Credit Agroement Date 06/27/79Elfectivenoos Date 1109/79Closing Date 6/30/63 06/30/33
Superiselo I 0/U0 2 3 6 10/0*/90Suprviul II 11/91 4 4 16 04/18/02
Tot l 18 44
VN PO CT DATA
Borroe-r Gov.rnmemt of the Phi lippinesExecuting '9ency Industrial Guaranteo and Loan Fund, D*pem t of
Loans and Credit, Contral BankFiscal Yoar of Borror January 1 - Decembr 31Follow-on Project Nao Third Small and MIdium Industries Dvoxlo_nt Project
Loan/Credit Numbr 2169-PHAmount (USS million) 3112 million (inclusivo of a front end fee of 32
million)Looan/Credit Agreemmnt Date Juo 80, 1922
DATA Oi SWPOJECTS
Appraisal*etiate. Actual.
Increnental employment 11,500 10,497
Inv,.t"nt cost per job P 4, 17 P s OOO
Incremental saleo (million) P271.9
Incromental profit (million) P 10.4
Incre_mntal export. (mlillo) P 70.
Incremntel *xporte as X of Incrementel sales 19i
Incremental vale added (illilon) P 142.5
Arrears from subborrwers to Mi (under both aceroditetionand spo _ership schemes) as a per oet of IGIF-funded loanojittandikn (1964) 4.0
Arroars from subborr.,era to PFIs as a percent of IGLF-fundedloane outstanding (aceredltetlon echoem only (1964) s.5X
Arr re e rm PWI* to ILF an a pereetb of IOLF loamaetet"eein (low) 3
PHILIPPINES
SECOND SMALL AND MEDIUM INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1727-PH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Hiahlidhts
InstiLutional Framework
i. The Small and Medium Industry (SMI) Sector in the Philippines is animportant contributor to the manufacturing sector, accounting for 212 ofvalue-added and 432 of employment in 1983. SHI firms are important in a widerange of manufacturing subsectors contributing over 302 of value added in foodprocessing, machinery and equipment, chemicals, rubber, printing, plasticproduc.ts, furniture and wood products, and wearing apparel. Within thesesubsectors, about half of SMI activity is concentrated in two areas, foodprocessing and chemicals.
ii. During the implementation period of Loan 1727-Ph, the Governmentoperated a number of specialized loan programs channeled through financialinstitutions to hel.p SMI firms with entrepreneurial and management skills butshort of capital. Pre-eminent among these programs was the Central Bank'sIndustrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF) to which the bulk of Loan 1727-PHfunds were extended. Other programs directing credit to SKI firms during theproject period included the Development Bank of the Philippines' Small andMedium Industries Lend3ng (SMILE) Program, the agri-business loan programs ofboth the Central Bank (CB) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), thePhilippine National Bank's Small and Medium Scale Industries Financing Schemeand the Kapisanang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK). Most of the programis (otherthan IGLF) have in the past few years been discontinued or sharply curtailed.
iii. The Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF), created in 1952, is arediscount and guarantee mechanism operated by the Central Bank (CB) underwhich term loans (fixed asset and permanent working capital) made to eligibleSMI firms by accredited financial institutions (commercial banks, rural andthrift banks, private development banks and nonbank financial institutions)are rediscounted. IGLF also offers guarantees to cover credit and collateralshort risks taken by the participating financial institutions (PFIs) on IGLFrediscounted loans. IGLF has sourced its funds primarily from fundstransferred from the Government budget and from World Bank borrowings.
iv. The Second Small and Medium Industries Development Project is afollow-on project from ShI I (Loan 1120-PH). Under that loan, the Bank forthe first time lent for funding the IGLF and, in the context of the loan, mademajor changes to an on-going program. Specifically, under SMI I, IGLFimplemented the accreditation prog& m under which financial institutions wereapproved for participation and eligible for IGLF rediscounting of loans to SMIfirms. The reformulated IGLF program expanded under both SMI I and II withthe infusion of IBRD loans and Go%ernment counterpart funds.
Proiect Obiectives and Goals
v. An important objective of the project was to ensure that long-termresources were available for the long-term financing needs of both the smalland medium scale industry sectors. In this regard IGLF was to be a vehiclefor providing _mloyuent opportunities. improving income distribution andregional developmes.t, and a catalyst for promoting general economic growth andexports. It was also Intended to expand and upgrade the network of financialinstitutions through vhich IGLF's credit was provided, and in particular topromote expertise in project evaluation and preparation.
Project Description
vi. The loan consisted of two parts: (a) the financing of the IndustrialGuarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF) for on-lending through accredited institutionsto SMI for fixed assets and permanent working capital; and (b) thestrengthening of the Department of Industry's Medium and Small IndustriesCoordinated Action Program (MASICAP) in providing assistance to entrepreneursin project preparation. All but 22 of the loan proceeds were allocated forthe IGLF financing.
Overall Operations
vii. T?e objec ives of the project were largely fulfilled. Loan 1727-PHwas disbursed qui(,ly, with the IGLF component of the loan ($24.5 million ofthe total $25.0 million) being fully utilized within two years of loaneffectiveness. The loan was used to finance 264 IGLF-funded projects with anaverage subloan size of P 1.0 million. The fast rate of disbursement was dueto the rclatively long maturities offerea by IGLF, the active participation ofan increajed number of accredited financing institutions, the inclusion ofmedium scale industry under the IGLF eligibility criteria, the low interestrates charged by IGLF and the increase in spreads allowed the PFIs (increasedfrom 72 to 82 for small industry loans and from 52 to 6? for medium industryloans). Disbursements under the MASICAP component ($0.5 million) were slowerthan anticipated because of (i) the merger of the Small Business AdvisoryCenters (SBAC) and MASICAP programs; (ii) a Government-imposed freeze onhiring by Ministries; (iii) bureaucratic disbursement procedures betweenMinistries; and (iv) Government-issued procurement guidelines which restrictedthe purchase of vehicles and computers. $84,465.33 originally allocated tothe MASICAP technical assistance program was cancelled effective July 8, 1983.
IGLF Operations
viii. The loan enabled the lGLF program, which already was operating well,to expand and improve its successful performance. The loan clearly fulfilledits primary objective of channeling long-term funds to the SMI sector. By1984, IGLF had become such an important source of term finance for SMI firmsin the Philippines that it represented 62 of all long-term loanb outstandingin the country. When compared to the SMI share (21?) of value added inmanufacturing, it is evident that IGLF represented a substa,itial portion oflong-term credit extended to SMI in the industrial sector. During theimplementation period of Loan 1727-PH, the IGLF expanded to finance medium
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scale firms. Loans approved increased by almost 50Z a year (242 in realterm.), from 1 47 million in 1978 to P 435 million in 1984, with projectsfinanced by those loans generating about 10,497 new jobs.
iX. The project also realized its goal of expandAng and upgrading thenetwork of financial institutions through which IGLV cLedit was provided, andspecifically of helping the institutions develop expertise in project*valuation and preparation. By December 31, 1981, 32 financial institutionswere accredited under IGLF, as compared to 20 accredited institutions at thetime of the 1978 project appraisal. Training pregrams organized by IGLF forPFI staff helped to upgrade appraisal and supervision capabilities of thefinancial institutions. The resulting improvements in portfolio performanceduring the project period can be seen in the collection ratios betweenparticipating financing institutions and end-lasers, which improved steadilyand substantially between 1978 and 1984. Whereas in 1978 collections hadamounted to only about 171 of principal and interest falling due and past due,they had improved to 542 by 1984. The proportion of PFI portfolios affectedby arrears from end users decreased substantially from 42Z by amount and 51Zby number in 1978 to 122 by amount and 222 by number in 1984. At year end1984, arrears amounted to only 4.52 of all IGLE' loans outstanding, and wereeven lower (3.5Z) for institutions participating in the program under theaccreditation scheme. In addition, collection performance betweenparticipating institutions and IGLF improved substantially. Loan arrears toIGLF in 1978 represented 162 of the loan portfolio while in 1984 arrearsaccounted for only 2.12 of the portfolio. The introduction of theaccreditation scheme (under SMI I), the increase in average subloan size withthe new eligibility of medium-scale industry (under SMI II) and the increasedattention to training, all contributed to the better results.
X. The one explicit project objective that was not fulfilled under theloan was channeling of a majority of project funds outside Metro-Manila. Theproportion of project funds lent to the regions was significantly lower thanexpected (392 vs 60Z), with Metro-Manila absorbing a greater than anticinatedshare of the total IGLF credit. The failure to achieve the desired regionaldisbursement is due largely to the fact that most SMI firms are located nearManila, which is the country's major port and largest consumer market ind haseasy access to communication and transportation. The proportion of subloansthat went to the regions was similar to the 1983 share of value added in theSMI industrial sector originating in the regions (42?).
xi. Organization. IGLF was reorganized during the project period. In1979, there were only two divisions involved in IGLF operations--the Induc-trial Loans Division and the IGLF Accouiting, Securities Control and Collec-tion Division--and the total personnel complement of the organization was 48people. With the approval of 18 new positions for IGLF by the Monetary Boardof the Central Bank, the IGLF organizational structure was reorganized intofour divisions, as follows: (a) the Industrial Projects Division, responsiblefor processing IGLF financing applications, guarantees, and requests fordeferment or restructuring; (b) the IGLF Examination Division, responsible forevaluating potential institutions for accreditation, for reviewing alreadyaccredited institutions, and for performing end-use verification surveys ofprojects assisted; (c) the IGLF Accounting, Securities Control and CollectionDivision, which handles the accounting, securities control and collection
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functions of IGLF; and (d) the IGLF Special Studies Staff, which handlesresearch and technical information activities and various reportingrequirements.
xii. Trainins. Because of the clear importance within both IGLF and thePFIs of analyzing credit risk and assessing projects and institutions, IGLFinitiated a number of programs under Loan 1727-PH to further develop theexperience of its staff and that of the PFIs. In addition, the staff of IGLFand the PFIs participated in relevant local training programs and traveledabroad to acquire additional knowledge on small enterpr4se financing andrelated fields.
Lessons to be Learned
xiii. Several lessons which may be learned from the Bank's and IGLF'sexperiences under Loan 1727-PH are outlined below:
(a) There are inherent difficulties in pricing subloans to fully reflectall costs, including risk of potential foreiga exchange losses, ineconomies with regulated interest rates. At the outset of SMI II,IGLF funds to the PFIs were priced at an average rate of 8.6Z, whichwas 0.7Z higher than the 7.92 interest rate charged by the Bank onLoan 1727-PH. While this spread enabled World Bank financed projectsto contribute to IGLF's administrative costs, it did not provide apremium to cover the foreign exchange risk on the World Bank loan.When the peso was devalued after disbursement of the loan (decliningfrom an average disbursement rate of P 7.7 to the dollar, to the mid-1988 rate of P 21.0 to the dollar), the Government was left with alarge foreign exchange loss towards which the accredited financialinstitutions and SMI borrowers had made no contribution. Experiencewith the loan indicates that loans to apex institutions for onlendingin regulated financial sectors should be tied to policy reform andderegulation of the financial sector. Once financial markets arederegulated and interest rates reflect expected inflation and foreignexchange adjustments, then apex program lerding rates (to bothparticipating financial institutions and end-users) should be market-based. Such a rate should reflect the premium for foreign exchangeas perceived by the market and should provide adequate cover to theGovernment. A proposed 4th SMI World Bank loan to the Philippinestakes these recommendations into account.
(b) During the implementation period of Loan 1727-PH. IGLF did not limitthe participation of individual financial institutions in order toensure that the IGLF portfolio as a whol. was balanced ordiversified. The weakened financial situation of some of the PFIsduring 1980 to 1984 period suggests that this failure to diversifywas unwise. In 1981, after the bankruptcy of one PFI holding a largeportion of the IGLF portfolio, IGLF adopted a policy limiting theparticipation of individual PFIs and specifying that a PFI's
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portfolio of IGLF rediscounted loans may not exceed thatinstitution's total net worth.
(c) The experience of IGLF under Loan 1727-PH suggests that the apexarrangements which are appropriate for lending to small and mediumfirms may be inappropriate for effectively reaching cottage firms.IGLF's record vith cottage industry during the project period showedpoor repayment and suggested that making and supervising cottageindustry loans was overly cumbersome and expensive for the financialinstitutions participating in the IGLF program. The data suggestthat a different vehicle for financing cottage industry should becreated and that IGLF should not be pushed to fill the financing gapto that sector.
PdILIPPINES
INDUSTRIAL GUARANTEE AND LOAN FUND
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT - LOAN 1727-PH
I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 This Project Completion Report (PCR) on Loan 1727-PH (Loan Agreementdated June 27, 1979) reflects the utilization of that loan for strengtheningand expanding the IGLF lending facility to small and medium industries and foran SHI technical assistance component. The IGLF component amounted to $24.5million of the total IBRD loan of $25.0 million, extended to the Republic ofthe Philippines. The remaining $0.5 million represented a technical assis-tance program to strengthen the Medium and Small Industries Coordinated ActionProgram (MASICAP), a Department of Industry program Intending to stimulateinvestment in small and medium industries in regions outside Metro-Manila.Loan 1727-PH was the Bank's second loan to IGLF and accordingly this is thesecond completion report on lending to that institution. To date, IGLF hasreceived three loans from the World Bank totaling US$99.5 million; the thirdloan of US$63.0 million was made on June 30, 1982. Information on the threeloans is given below. A fourth SMI project, which would include an IGLFcomponent of approximately $60 million, is currently under consideration.
Year ofeffect- Loan IGLP Term Interestiveness Amount Portion (Years) Rate (C)
Loan 1120-PH 1975 30.0 12.0 11-1/2 8.5
Loan 1727-PH 1979 25.0/a 24.5 14-1/2 7.9
Loan 2169-PH 1982 132.0/b 63.0 14-1/2 11.6
/a $84,465.33 was cancelled effective July 8, 1983.
/b $64.6 million of the loan was subsequently cancelled due to financialtroubles of DBP and the unattractively high interest rate on the loan.
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1.2 The basic data concerning Loan 1727-PH are presented in the introduc-tory basic data shorts. Specific data for the IGLF portion of the loan (98?of the total) are as follows:
review; subloansover P500,000 wereto be reviewed on apost-approval basis
Start of implementation February 1, 1980Date of full utilization of September 10, 1981IGLF portion of the loan
1.3 Although the fourth SMI project, currently under consideration, isexpected to include funding from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and possiblythe ASEAN Japan Development Fund (AJDF), IGLF previously depended solely onthe World Bank in raising funds from foreign sources. The IBRD loans weremade to the Government of the Philippines, which bore the full foreignexchange risk. Under Loans 1120-PH and 1727-PH, the World Bank reimbursed 75?of the total loans released and the remaining 25Z came from the counterpartfunds contributed by the Philippine Government. For Loan 2169-PH, 60? wasreimbursed by the World Bank and 40Z came from the Philippine Government.
1.4 The following data base and approach was used in drafting this PCR:
(a) The time period 1978 (the appraisal year) through 1984 was chosen asthe key period for assessing results of the loan. Although the loanclo ed in 1983, results of subloans made prior to 1983 were feltafter the closing date and are reflected in IGLF's information for1984. While the nature of the IGLF program has not changed substan-tially since the closing of Loan 1727-PH, some alterations wereinstituted under SMI III so that data after 1984 would be lessrelevant to an analysis of SMI II. This PCR focuses largely on the1978-84 time period but draws implications for subsequent years.
(b) For the implementation period of the loan, data on all IGLF subpro-jects were analyzed, even though some of the projects fmnded by IGLFduring the period were not financed by the World Bank but ratherthrough internal IGLF or Government counterpart funds. The informa-tion assessed and presented reveals the overall health and contribu-tion of the IGLF program.
(c) In conRidering the allocation of loan proceeds, a full listing of the264 sub-projects financed by the loan was made (see Annex 3) andanalyzed. Releases to firms were evaluated against the objectives ofthe loan.
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(d) IGLF staff collected and analyzed detailed data on a representativesample of projects constituting about 291 of the total loansreleased. The diverse group of sample projects was chosen afterconsideration of industry and regional classification, size andpurpose of the loans, and sponsoring financial institutions.
II. THE SMI SECTOR
2.1 The Small and Medium Induszry (SMI) Sector in the Philippines is animportant contributor to the manufacturing sector, accounting for 21? ofvalue-added and 432 of employment in 1983. SMI firms are important in a widerange of manufacturing subsectors contributing over 30? of value added in foodprocessing, machinery and equipment, chemicals, rubber, printing, plasticproducts, furniture and wood products, and wearing apparel. Within thesesubsectors, about half of SMI activity i3 concentrated in two areas, foodprocessing and chemicals.
2.2 The Government included the promotion of SMI as one of its majorindustrial objectives in the 1978-1982 Five-Year Development Plan. During theimplementation of Loan 1727-PH, various Government agencies, including theDepartment of Trade and Industry (DTI), the National Economic and DevelopmentAuthority (NEDA), the Department of Finance, and the University of theP ilippines' Institute for Small-Scale Industries (UP-ISSI), coordinated theirefrorts to help change the policy environment in the Philippines to promoteSHI growth. They initiated efforts to abolish inappropriate cottage industryincentives, restructure BOI incentives, and increase the registration of SMIfirms for incentives. Also, the Government sponsored a range of technicalassistance and training programs for SMI firms.
2.3 In addition, the Government operated a number of specialized loanprograms channeled through financial institutions to help individuals or firmswith entrepreneurial and management skills but short of capital. Pre-eminentamong these programs was the Central Bank's Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund(IGLF) to which the bulk of Loan 1727-PH funds were extended. Other programsdira;cting credit to SHI firms during the project period included theDevelopment Bank of the Philippines' Small and Medium Industries Lending(SMiILE) Program, the agri-business Loan programs of both the CB and DBP, thePhilippine National Bank's Small and Medium Scale Industries Financing Schemeand the Kapisanang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK).
III. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL
3.1 The Second Small and Medium Industries Development Project is mfollow-on project from SMI I (Loan 1120-PH). Under that loan, the Bank forthe first time lent for funding the Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF)and, ir the context of the loan, made major changes to an on-going program.Specifically, under SMI I, IGLF implemented the accreditation program underwhich financial institutions were approved for participation and eligible forIGLF rediscounting of loans to SMI firms. The reformulated IGLF programexpanded under SMI I with the infusion of IBRD loans and Government
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counterpart funds. Loan 1727-PH continued this financing and facilitated therapid expansion of the program which occurred between 1979 and 1984. A Bankmission visited the Philippines in June 1976 to identify the SMI II project.The Bank pre-appraisal mission visited the Philippines in June 1978. Theproject was appraised in November/December 1978. Negotiations were held theweek of April 23, 1979 and the loan was approved by the Bank Board on June 12,1979. The Loan Agreement was signed on June 27, 1979 and became effective onNovember 9, 1979.
3.2 The Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF) was created in 1952 forthe purpose of encouraging the establishment and expansion of economicallysound SMIs that would contribute to the Philippines' economic development andto a more equitable distribution of income among the people. IGLF is arediscount and guarantee mechanism operated by the Central Bank (CB) underwhich term loans (for fixed assets and permanent working capital) made byaccredited financial institutions (commercial banks, rural and thrift banks,private development banks and nonbank financial institutions) arerediscounted. IGLF also offers guarantees to cover credit and collateralshort risks taken by the participating financial institutions (PFIs) on IGLFrediscounted loans. IGLF has sourced its funds primarily from fundstransferred from the Government budget and from World Bank borrowings.
3.3 IGLF is owned by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)and administered by the Department of Loans and Credit (DLC) of the CentralBank of the Philippines (CB). The fact that IGLF operates as an apex unit,with the basic objective of providing resources to financial institutions foronlending to SMI, enables the program to have a wide geographical reach, sincemany of the institutions have an extensive regional branch network. Decisionson policy issues affecting IGLF's operations are made by an interagency ReviewCommittee (RC) which includes representatives from NEDA, CB, Departme-t ofTtade anc Industry (DTI), Department of Finance (DOF) and UP-ISSI.
3.4 Under the IGLF accreditation scheme implemented in 1976 under SMI I,IGLF approves participation in the program of specific financial institutionsand then delegates all subloan appraisa' and supervision responsibilities tothose accredited financial institutions. Before granting accreditationstatus, IGLF undertakes a thorough review of the institution to determine itsoverall financial viability and the adequacy of its staff to implement an SMIlending program. The performance of each accredited institution is reviewedannually by IGLF and the Bank is informed of the findings of these reviews.
3.5 Although only accredited institutions are eligible for Bank funding,IGLF also has a 3mall sponsorship program for rural banks, under which itbecomes more actively involved in the credit evaluation of the end-user.While the participating financial institutions under the sponsorship scheme dotake the credit risk, their inadequate analytical capabilities necessitate adetailed review of the subloans by IGLF staff prior to rediscounting. Sincethe rural banks would not otherwise qualify for the IGLF program, the sponsor-ship scheme enables IGLF to promote industrial growth outside metro-Manila andto contribute to development in rural areas. The Aponsorship scheme has notbeen financed by the World Bank under any of its projects, including SMI II.
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3.6 The participating financial institutions (PFIs) are free to selecttheir own projects for financing, with IGLF financing assured if the projectmeets broad eligibility criteria (appropriate asset size, acceptable financialposition and credit-rating, etc.). Full repayment rests with the financialinstitution unless the loan also carries an IGLk guarantee. Accordingly, therisk to IGLF is limited to insolvency or inability to repay by the participat-ing financial institution. Default by the end-user is borne by the PFI andnot by IG_F.
Proiect Obiectives
3.7 IGLF operates with the basic objective of providing resources toparticipating financial institutions for relending to SMIs. In this regard animportant objective of the project was to ensure that long-term resources wereavailable for inv-stment financing needs of both the small and medium scaleindustry sectors. Under the project, IGLF was intended by the Government andthe Bank to be a vehicle for developing the SMI sector and thereby providingemployment opportunities, improving income distribution and regionaldevelopment, and providing a catalyst for promoting general economic growthand exports. It was also intended to expand and upgrade the network offinancial institutions through which IGLF's credit was provided, and topromote expertise in project evaluation and preparation.
Project Deacription
3.8 The loan consisted of two parts: (a) the financing of the IndustrialGuarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF) for on-lending through accredited institutionsto SMI for fixed assets and permanent working capital; and (b) the strengthen-ing of the Department of Industry's Medium and Small Industries CoordinatedAction Program (MAP:CAP) in providing assistance to entrepreneurs in projectpreparation. 98% of the loan proceeds were allocated for the IGLF financing.
Covenants
3.9 In addition to the Bank's standard covenants, the Loan Agreement for1727-PH required the Government (as Borrower) to adopt formally a new IGLFPolicy Statement which included the following major operational policies,outlined in the Staff Appraisal Report:
(a) inclusion of medium-scale industries in the IGLF program by raisingthe maximum loan size rrom the former limit of IF 500,000 to P 2.5million;
(b) increasing the effective interest rate to the end-user of IGLF from13.2Z to 14.7-15Z;
(c) increasing the interest spread allowed to the participating institu-tiorns from 5Z to 82 on small industry loans and from 5Z to 6Z onmedium industry loans;
(d) adopting a new guarantee scheme; and
(e) introducing a penalty charge on defaults by end-users.
It included an agreement with the Central Bank to furnish the Bank with aperiodic summary of loans made by IGLF along with copies of appraisals ofsubloans exceeding R 500,000, and arrears data on IGLF funded loans betweenfinancial institutions and end-users. In adeition, the Central Bank and/orthe Government agreed to the following:
(f) further delegation of authority to the CEO of IGLF regarding thehandling of routine matters;
(g) the reorganization and appropriate staffing of the IGLF unit;
(h) the calculation of ERR and FRR in appraisal of subloans over 1 1.5million;
(i) the preparation of a revised policy manual for IGLF; S
(j) an exemption of IGLF financed loans from the requirements set out inCB/Government circulars and regulations governing money marketoperations;
(k) an on-going monitoring of the performance of accredited institutionsby IGLF;
(1) a program to review the IGLF's portfolio of participating financialinstitutions;
(m) the adequacy of CB's fee for administering IGLF;
(n) the reorganizatiin of MASICAP;
(o) the submission to the Bank by BOI of quarterly reports on MASICAP;and
(p) the use of at least 802 of the IGLF loan component for financingsubprojects with: a cost per job created no greater than the Bank'surban poverty guidelines; or with fixed assets at the time of loanapplication not exceeding $250,000.
These covenants were met during the implementation period of the loan.
IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Loan Effectiveness and Start-Up
4.1 Conditions for loan effectiveness included approval by the Governmentof the draft IGLF policy statement which had been agreed at negotiations,along with approval of the Loan Agreement by the Monetary Board of thePhilippines. These conditions were met by October 1979, which was later thanexpected because evidence that the IGLF Policy Statement had been adopted wasnot received by the Bank as quickly as originally anticipated. The loan wasdeclared effective on November 9, 1979.
4.2 The project started very smoothly. IGLF's actual performance for1980 exceeded its operational targets substartially with IGLF approving 170projects amounting to 1 147.2 million during 1980. By year end 1981, the IGLFoutstanding loan portfolio to the PFIs totalled 1 415.8 million, compared withthe appraisal estimate of 1 361.1 milliot.
Loan Allocation &
4.3 Under the loan, $0.5 million was earmarked for technical assistanceto strengthen the Department of Industry's Medium and Small IndustriesCoordinated Action Program (MASICAP) in providing assistance to entrepreneursin project preparation. The remainder ($24.5 million) was allocated to theIndustrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF) for on-lending through accreditedinstitutions to SMI for fixed assets and permanent working capital. IGLF usedits full allocation, while MASICAP cancelled about $85,000 of its funds. Noreallocation of the loan by categories was made.
Disbursements
4.4 Annnex 2 shows the estimated and actual quarterly disbursements forthe $24.5 million IGLF portion of the Loan. IGLF's utilization of the loanwas satisfactory, with disbursements ahead of the estimated schedule atappraisal. The MASICAP component of the loan disbursed more slowly thanexpected at appraisal. Delays were caused by (i) a merger of the SmallBusiness Advisory Centers (SBAC) and MASICAP programs; (ii) a Government-imposed freeze on hiring by Ministries; (iii) bureaucratic disbursementprocedures between Ministries; and (iv) restrictive Government-issuedprocurement guidelines regarding the purchase of vehicles and computers.
Subproiect Characteristics and Performance
4.5 The table below summarizes data for subprojects financed under Loan1727-PH and compares the estimates at the time of appraisal with actualperformance. Annexes 3 to 7 present detailed information on thecharacteristics of these subprojects.
Table 4.1: SUMMARIZED DATA ON SUBPROJECTS
Appraisal Actuals based onestimates projects surveyed
No. of subprojects 510 264
Average subloan size (million) P 0.5 /a P 1.0
Incremental employment 11,500 10,497
Investment cost per job P 34,167 P 38,000 /b
Incremental sales (million) P 373.9
Incremental profit (loss) (million) P 10.4
Incremental exports (million) P 70.9
Incremental exports as Z ofincremental sales l9Z
Incremental value added (million) P 142.5
/a The appraisal estimate adjusted for actual domestic inflation would beP 0.8 million.
/b This cost per job compared well with the overall cost per job of thePhilippines' modern industrial sector, which was P 53,000.
4.6 Sectcral Distribution of Subpro4ects. The IGLF subloans made underLoan 1727-PH were extended to a wide-variety of subsectors within thePhilippine manufacturing sector. Construction, tourism and service industrieswere also subborrowers of the IGLF facility. From 1978 to 1984, the manufac-turing sector accounted for over 952 of approvals of total subloans by amount,the more important subsectors being metal products (20Z), food and foodproducts (18Z); footwear, apparel and garments (112), and plastic products(see Annex 12). The sectoral distribution was good and in line with thedistribution of SMI assets and value-added within the industrial sector.
4.7 Regional Distribution of Subproiects. The regional distribution ofsubprojects financed under Loan 1727-PH is presented in Annex 4. The share ofsubprojects outside Metro Manila totaled 47Z by number and 391 by amount, asshown below. This did not meet the appraisal target that 602 of IGLF funds bechanneled outside Metro-Manila.
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Table 4.2: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF IGLF SUBLOANS
No. of Amountprojects Percent (1 million) Percent
Metro Manila 140 53 153.9 61Outside Metro Manila 124 47 99.3 39
Total 264 100 253.2 100
4.8 Subproiect Firm Size. Medium scale industries received the bulk ofthe subloan proceeds, with 84Z cf the funds and 612 of the projects going tomedium scale firms. The details of the funding breakout are shown below. Thedistribution of IGLF subloans was in line with the relative shares of value-added by small and medium scale industry generally, with medium industryproviding 811 of the value-added of those sectors.
Table 4.3: FIRM SIZE DISTRIW'JTION FOR IGLF SUBLOANS
No. of AmountSize of industry projects Percent (P '000) Percent
Due to the inclusion of medium industr, loans under the prcject, the averagesize of IGLF loans grew steadily from P 336,000 in 1978 to P 1.b million in1984, and averaged $1.0 million for the 1978 to 1984 as a whole.
4.9 ORerational Results of Sample Proiects. Operational. data on a 292sample survey of subprojects are provided in Annexes 5 to 7. Cost estimatesmade by financing institutions proved to be realistic with an average costoverrun of about 102. Cost overruns were mainly due to changes in projectdesign, machinery and equipment, and to extended delays in projectimplementation. Large underruns in some projects occurred because the projectswere scaled-down after subproject appraisal had been implemented.
4.10 About 50! of the subprojects surveyed faced delays in implementationranging from one to fourteen months. The delays were caused by changes insupplier and machine specifications, changes in project design, contractors'delays in project construction, equity deficiencies, difficulties in securingsufficient financing, changes in project site, delays in the processing ofdocuments on imported machinery, and late compliance with pro-disbursement
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requirements. Annex 8 provides information regarding the subprojects whichsuffered implementation delays of six months or longer and cost overruns inexcess of 152 of estimated project cost.
4.11 Estimated and actual sales data -were avalable for the 76 subprojectssurveyed. As shown in Annex 6, actual total sales for 1982 for those projectsamounted to 732 of appraisal estimates. Actual profits were significantlyless than estimated for the sample group as * whole, although profits earnedby 17 projects exceeded estirates for 1982 operations. Significantly, how-ever, out of the 76 projects, only seven incurred losses of varying deg ees.To some extent, actual profits were understated because they were based onsurveys done in 1982, which was only the first or second year of initial orexpanded operation of subprojects financed under the loan. Furthermore, inlight of the increase in oil prices, rising inflation and deteriorating busi-ness climate, the project period was a more difficult time to do business inthe Philippines than had been expected at appraisal.
4.12 Economic Performance of Sample Subproiects. Annex 6 presents thedetails of the economic performance of the subprojects surveyed. Based ondata available for 76 subprojects, it is calculated that 10,497 jobs werecreated under the project as a whole (compared to the appraisal estinate of11,500). The average cost per job was P 38,000, compared to the estimatedaverage of P 34,167. The increase in cost per job resulted in the financingof some capital intensive subprojects such as Baguio Summit Inn (constructionof tourist inn), Aracelli Plastic Products (factory building), Sy's Bros.Printing Press (machinery/equipment) and Pagsanjan Aggregates (machinery/equipment). The subprojects surveyed suggest that the total project ccntri-buted P 373.9 million in incremental sales. While export sales were projectedto represent 29X of total sales, according to the survey data they actuallyamounted to only 192 because the projects were operating in a recessionaryperiod during which export demand was not very strong. The overallperformance of the subprojects was satisfactory, especially given thedifficult economic euvironment in which the project was inplemented.
4.13 Status of Subloans. As of December 31, 1984, 34 out of 264 loansunder Loan 1727-PH had been either repaid or prepaid in full. Arrearages ofthe PFIs to IGLF were 2.1? of all loans outstanding, while arrearages of end-users to participating institutions amounted to 4.5? of total loans outstand-ing. Of the 76 subprojects sampled, 20 end-users were affected by arrearstotalling P 2.8 million or 17.2Z of total loans affected by arrears.
4.14 Institutional Sponsorship. Releases under Loan 1727-PH were coursedthrough the following financial institutions:
Private development banks 2 8 3,950 1.6Savings and mortgage banks 2 9 9,379 3.7
Total 21 264 1 253.195 100.0
Nonbank financial intermediaries led the other financial institutions in IGLFfinancing both by value and iiumber of projects, accounting for P 181.9 millionor 71.8Z of total credits. The remaining 1 71.3 million or 28.2? weresponsored, in descending order, by commercial banks, savings and mortgagebanks and private development banks.
Reporting
4.35 IGLF kept the Bank informed of major developments of its organizationand maaagement, operational and financial targets and achievements adequatelyand in a timely manner.
Procurement
4.16 Of the 76 projects surveyed, 57 projects utilized the loan proceedsfor the acquisition of machinery and equipment. The suppliers were chosen onthe basis of several factors: suitability of equipment, availability of spareparts, efficiency of service, reliability of supplies, compatibility withpresent equipment, and price. Goo-ds for 34 subprojects were procured locallywhile 23 subprojects directly imported items under proprietary contracts.
V. OPERATING PERFORMANCE
Overall Operations
5.1 The objectives cf the project were largelv fulfilled. Loan 1727-PHwas disbursed quickly, with the IGLF component of the loan ($24.5 million ofthe total $25.0 million) being fully utilized within two years of loan effec-tiveness. The loan was used to finance 264 IGLF-funded projects with anaverage subloan size of 1 1.0 million. The fast rate of disbursement was dueto the relatively long maturities offered by IGLF, the active participation ofan increased number of accredited financing institutions, the inclusion ofmedium scale industry under the IGLF eligibility criteria, the attractiveinterest rates charged by IGLF and the increase in spreads allowed to the PFIs(increased from 7? to 8? for small industry loans and from 5? to 6? for medium
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industry loans). Disbursements under the MASICAP component ($0.5 million)were slower than anticipated because of (i) the merger of the SBA- and MASICAPprograms; (ii) a Government-imposed freeze on hiring by Ministries;(iii) bureaucratic disbursement orocedures between Ministries; and(iv) Government-issued procurement guidelines which restricted the purchase ofvehicles and computers. Effective July 8, 1983, $84,465.33 originallyallocated to the MASICAP technical assistance program was cancelled. Underthe MASICAP component, resources were provided to hire permanent staff andupgrade the facilities of thb regional SBAC/MASICAP offices.
IGLF Operations
5.2 The loan enabled the IGLF program, which already was operating well,to expand and improve its successful performance. During the implementationperiod of Loan 1727-PH, the IGLF expanded to finance medium scale firms.Loan 1727-PH clearly fulfilled its primary objective of channeling long-termfunds to the SMI sector and the IGLF provided a major portion of total long-term credit borrowed by the Philippines' small and medium industry sectors.Loans approved increased by almost 50Z a year, from P 47 million in 1978 toP 485 million in 1984, with projects financed by those loans generating 10,497new jobs. By 1984, IGLF had become such an important source of term financefor SMI firms in the Philippines that it represented 6Z of all long-term loansoutstanding in the country. When compared to the SMI share (21Z) of valueadded in manufacturing, it is evident that IGLF represented a substantialportion of long-term credit extended to SMI in the industrial sector.
5.3 The project realized its goal of expanding and upgrading the networkof financial institutions through which IGLF credit was provided, and specifi-cally of helping the institutions develop expertise in project evaluation andpreparation. By December 31, 1981, 32 financial institutions were accreditedunder IGLF, of which 14 were commercial banks, 12 were nonbank financialintermediaries (NBFIs), 2 were savings/mortgage banks and 4 were privatedevelopment banks (PDBs). At the time of the 1978 appraisal of the project,there had been 20 accredited institutions, of which 10 were commercial bankr.9 were nonbark financial intermediaries and 1 was a savings/mortgage bank.Accordingly, the program increased in size 60? during the disbursement periodin terms of the number of participating financial institutions accredited.Furthermore, training programs organized by IGLF for PFI staff helped toupgrade appraisal and supervision activities of the institutions. Althoughthe percentage of total funds allocated to areas outside Metro-Manila did notequal the minimum 60Z projected at the time of appraisal, the 39Z of all fundswhich did go to firms outside the ce?ital compared well with the share of SMIvalue-added contributed by firms outside Metro-Manila (42Z).
5.4 That the goal not only of expanding but also of improving the IGLFProgram was realized during the project implementation period can be seen inthe collection performance between participating financing institutions andend-users, which improved steadily and substantially during the implementa-tion period of the loan (see Annex 16). In 1978, collections amounted to onlyabout 17Z of principal and interest falling due and past due, improving to 372in 1980, to 50Z in 1981 and 1982, and to 54Z in 1984. The proportion of PFIportfolio affected by arrears from end-users decreased substantially from 422
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by amcint and 512 by number in 1978 to 121 by amount and 221 by number in1984. At year end 1984, arrears amounted to only 4.5! of all IGLF loans out-standing, and were even lower (3.5) for institutions participating in theprogram under the accreditation scheme. A comparative statement of arrearsposition and an analysis of loans in arrears between participating institu-tions and end-users of IGLF from 1978 to 1984 are shown in Annex 18. In addi-tion, collection performance between participating institutions ar.d IGLFimproved substantially. Loan arrears to IGLF in 1978 represented 16! of theloan portfolio while in 1984, arrears accounted for only 2.1! of the 1984 loanportfolio. Several changes in IGLF policies brought about these improvements.First, a major change had occurred in 1976 when, under the first Bank loan forIGLF, the accreditation scheme was introduced. Previously, all subprojectshad been apprais i and supervised by IGLF, which had neither the experiencenor the branch network reqaired for proper review and control. Under theaccreditation scheme, IGLF adopted a rigorous appraisal system to approvespecific financial institutions for participation in the program; the PFIswere then given re3ponsibility for project approval and supervision. Inaddition, the arrears ratio improved under the loan because average subloansize increased substantially with the new eligibility of medium-scaleinCustry, and the larger industries showed a better repayment rate.
5.5 Information collected on a sample of IGLF projects financed under-Loan 1727-PH shows significant contributions made to sales, profits, exports,import substitution and employment. This is consistent with the positiveeconomic impact of IGLF throughout its history. The total number of incremen-tal jobs generated by IGLF projects financed under Loan 1727-PH is estimatedat about 10,497. The IGLF projects funded under the Loan were expected at thetime of appraisal to generate P 5,675 million in sales, of which about 11Zwould come from exports. Although actual figures obtained for a sample ofprojects financed under Loan 1727-PH indicate that these estimates were opti-mistic, the net impact was still quite Gubstantial. In addition, the facthat the overwhelming majority of firms financed by the loan were profita. eand operational as of end-1984 shows the success of the program. A sample ofsubprojects reviewed revealed that only about 10! of operations funded we-eincurring losses at the time of evaluation in 1982.
5.6 Regional Development Under Loan 1727-PH. The one explicit projectobjective that was not fulfilled under the loan was channeling of a majorityof project funds outside Metro-Manila. The proportion of project funds lentto the regions was significantly lower than expected (39Z vs 60Z), with Metro-Manila absorbing a greater than anticipated share of the total IGLF credit.The failure to achieve the required regions-to-capital ratio is attributablein part to lack of interest of the participating financing institutions, whichconsidered solicitation, approval and supervision of projects in remote areasas impractical owing to the high cost of maintaining these accounts. But moreimportantly, it was a result of the fact that most firms prefer to be locatednear Manila, since it is the country's maior port and largest consumer market,with easy access to communication and transportation. Indeed, the proportionof subloans that went to the regions was similar to the share in 1983 of valueadded in the SMI industrial sector originating in the regions (42z).Additionally, it may be that the failure of IGLF to support more projects inrural areas relates to IGLF's focus away from cottage industry. Theexperience of Loan 1727-PH suggests that rather than compelling the banks or
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providing subsidies or even undertaking direct IGLF lending to stimulatelending in the regions, the issue of regional dispersion probably should beaddressed through specially-designed micro-enterprise projects since a majorpart of the problem is the IGLF's inability to reach cottage firms, the vastmajority of which are located in the regions.
5.7 The experience of Loan 1727-PH suggests that several lessons may belearned from the implementation of the project, particularly with regard toibsues of (i) interest rates and foreign exchange risk; (ii) proper diversifi-cation of the apex lending institutions portfolio to the financial institu-tions; and (iii) the appropriate vehicles for lending to cottage industries.Aspects of the project relating to these three element, are discussed inparas. 5.8 to 5.13 below.
5.8 Interest Rates and Foreign-Exchange Risk. The loan shows thedifficulties of lending through financial institutions in an economy with aregulated interest rate structure such as that of the Philippines at the timeof the loan. The overall interest rate structure was set artificially low andeven within that long-term rates were set particularly low. In order toensure disbursement, the IGLF rates were set consistent with this structure.However, this meant that (i) the rate to the final beneficiary wassignificantly less than market conditions would have determined (on-lendingrates were about 152 while inflation was in the range of 13-18z); and (ii) inorder to give the PFIs adequate spreads to engage in long-term lending, theywere advanced the IGLF money at a rate much less than they could borrowdomestically (IGLF lent to the PFIs at 8.6? while 90 day deposit rates were11.0?).
5.9 Since the regulated rate structure generally failed to reflect theeconomy's perception of foreign exchange risk and domestic inflation, thelong-term rates charged by IGLF to the PFIs notably incorporated little or nopremium to cover foreign Pxchange risk. The 8.6? average rate charged forIGLF funds at the outset of SMI II was 0.7? higher than the 7.9Z interest ratecharged by the Bank on Loan 1727-PH. While this spread enabled the Bank-financed projects to cover a portion of IGLF's total administrative costs(which amounted to 0.9Z of average total assets), it was not enough to allowit to compensate the Government for taking the foreign exchange risk on theWorld Bank loan. Since the peso was devalued substantially against thecurrencies in which the loan was disbursed, the Government incurredsignificant foreign exchange losses on the Bank loan. The average rate ofexchant for disbursement against the dollar was P 7.73, while the mid-1988rate is about P 21.
5.10 By 1982, when interest rates in the Philippines had begun to be dere-gilated and ceilings on savings deposit rates had been removed, the IGLFprices were re-examined and adjusted upwards so that the PFIs paid 11? forsmall industry loans and 16? for medium industry. These increased interestcosts were closer to the still-administered cost of time deposits. Howeverthe $24.5 million portion of Loan 1727-PH allocated to IGLF had been fullydisbursed by that time.
5.11 The experience of Loan 1727-PH suggests that in such environments,apex lending should be linked to financial sector reform in which interest
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rates are liberalized. Once rates are market-determined, interest rates fromapex institutions to PFIs and to end-users can include a premium for foreignexchange risk. A oroposed fourth SMI World Bank loan which would providefurther funding to IGLF will be made in the context of financial sectorreforms and will include a provision that subloans be priced at market ratesand hence provide reasonable cover to the Government for the foreign exchangeand interest rate risks.
5.12 Diversification of IGLF Portfolio. Of the 32 accredited institutionsas of December 31, 1981, 11 were particular.y active and accounted for 942 (byamount) of IGLF loans outstanding. Two institutions accounted for 54Z of theportfolio as of year end 1981. Over 30Z of the portfolio was held by a singleinstitution, Manphil Investment Corporation, which later went bankrupt.Another 231 was held by the Private Development Corporation of thePhilippines, which also experienced financial problems in the mid-1980's. Thefailure during the loan implementation period to highlight the excessive domi-nance of these two firms put IGLF in a potentially dangerous situation.Fortunately, Manphil's IGLF portfolio was reduced substantially before thedefault, but IGLF was left with sizeable arrears from that institution. Sincethe Manphil default, IGLF has imposed a limit on loans to any single institu-tion at 100Z of that institution's total capital, net of reserves. Such arestriction provides reasonable protectionL to IGLF in the case of default byindividual PFIs.
5.13 Experience with Cottage Industry. IGLF's experience during theimplementation of Loan 1727-PH suggests that the p;ogram is not an effectivevehicle for extending credit to cottage or micro-enterprises. No cottageindustry projects were financed under the lrn. For those subloans to cottageindustry which were in repayment during 1980 and 1981, 88Z were affected byarrears of more than three months (compared to 14Z for small and medium indus-try loans during the same two-year period). The high costs of administeringcottage industry loans makes them inappropriate for such a program. Sincelending to cottage industries is incompatible with conventional bankingoperating practices, they cannot be administered by a majority of financialinstitutions in a cost-effective manner. The project illustrates that theapex arrangements which are appropriate for lending to small and medium firmsmay be inappropriate for effectively reaching cottage firms.
VI. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF IGLF
6.1 Financial Position. IGLF's projected and actual balance sheets for1978 through 1984, presented in Annex 15, reflect the high growth in IGLF'sloan portfolio under Loan 1727-PH. Total assets grew at an average rate of37Z annually (see Annex 13), which growth was almost entirely financed bydrawdowns on the two IBRD loans and Government counterpart funds. As ofDecember 31, 1984, total assets stood at P 1,088 million. The loan portfoliohad grown by about eight times over the period 1978 to 1984 and, as of the endof 1984, amounted to P 1,037 million.
6.2 Capital Structure and Liquidity. IGLF's net worth increased by morethan three times between 1978 and 1984, growing from P 75.4 million in 1978 toP 333.7 million in 1984. The increase was due to the accumulation of
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counterpart funds from the Philippine Government plus retained earnings duringthe seven year period. IGLF's total debt Lo c-;1 ity ratio fluctuated from1.2:1 to 2.5:1 over the period. IGLF's liquidity position was erratic, movingfrom a high of 12.3 in 1978 to a low of 0.3 in 1982 and 1984. The tightliquidity position was largely due to additional funding requirements for termloans and to the increase in principal and interest payments on IGLF's long-term loans.
6.3 Profitability. IGLF's income statements for the period 1978-84 (seeAnnexes 14 and 15-A) show that IGLF's total operating income increased at anaverage of 442 per annum over the seven years under review and stood at P 89.5million in 1984. The sources of income were interest on loans, interest ontemporary investments and guarantee fees. Interest income from term loans asa proportion of total income increased from an average of 73Z for 1978-83 and87Z for 1984. IGLF's return on assets fluctuated during the project yearsfrom 1.82 in 1978 to 3.1Z in 1984. Its return on equity improved from 3.71 in1978 to 8.52 in 1980; it declined in 1981 and 1983 and later improved again to10.4Z in 1984. Financial expenses as a percentage of gross income steadilyincreased from 512 in 1978 to 69Z in 1981 and decreased to 57Z in 1984. Thedecrease was partly due to the marked increase in interest income from termloans with only a slight increase in interest expenses on IBRD loans.
6.4 Because the Government absorbs the full foreign exchange risk on theWorld Bank loans, the financial losses resulting from deterioration of thepeso do not affect IGLF. If IGLF were required to cover its foreign exchangelosses, the financial picture during the 1978 to 1984 period would have beensignificantly less healthy.
6.5 Guarantee Scheme. One of the IGLF features embodieu under Loan1727-PH is the optional guarantee coverage wherein the IGLF shareg in thelosses with a financing institution in case of ultimate failure by theborrower to pay. Two kinds of guarantee coverage were offered. Under thecredit risk guarantee (up to 602 of the loan for small industry and 402 of theloan for medium industry), the 22 guarantee fee is absorbed by the financinginstitution while under the collateral-short guarantee (maximum 25Z of theloan), the 22 guarantee fee is passed on to the borrower. A reserve accountof P 1.0 million was set up in 1975, in accordance with the Master Agreement,to take care of losses on guaranteed loans. As of year-end 1984, the balanceof the Provision for Losses on Guaranteed Loans amounted to P 11.6 million,which was intended to cover the estimated total losses of P 7.4 million, basedon claims submitted by the various sponsoring financing institutions. Basedon guarantee fees collected during the period, the amount of P 4.7 million wasset up for possible losses in 1984. Losses on 18 foreclosed loans totallingP 3.7 million were written-off in 1984.
6.6 Audit. IGLF is audited yearly by the Commission on Audit and theCentral Bank is provided with a copy of the audit report including anycomments and findings of the auditor. The Office of the Auditor issued itsreport for 1984 without qualifications.
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VII. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
Institutional Aspects
7.1 Manaaement. Policy issues affecting IGLF's operations during theimplementation period of the loan were decided by a Review Committee composedof the deputy ministers from NEDA, DTI, the Department of Finance, a deputygovernor of CB, the director of the UP-ISSI and the director of the Departmentof Loans and Credit at the Central Bank, as ex-officio member, and chaired bythe Minister of the Budget (see Annex 21). The Technical Advisory Groip(TAG), composed of all agencies forming the IGLF Review Committee, exercisedrecommendatory and advisory powers dealing with policy and operationalmatters. The TA' was under the supervision of the Chief Executive Officer forIGLF.
7.2 Organization. IGLF was reorganized during the project period. In1979, there were only two divisions involved in IGLF operations--the Indus-trial Loans Division and the IGLF Accounting, Securities Control and Collec-tion Division--and the total personnel complement of the organization was 48people. With the approval of 18 new positions for IGLF by the Monetary Boardof the Central Bank, the IGLF organizational structure was reorganized. Theorganization was changed to its present :tructure of four divisions (see Annexe) witsi cht Lr,-L,,I-iZg res;-~n.ibilities:
Industrial Proiects Division - responsible for the desk processing/evaluation of applications for IGLF financing under the accredita-tion/sponsorship schemes, the servicing of guarantees, requests fordeferment/restructuring, and portfolio review of accounts in arrears.
IGLF Examination Division - primarily responsible for evaluatingpotential institutions for accreditation and for the annual institu-tional performance review of accredited institutions, as well as end-use verification surveys of projects assisted.
IGLF Accounting, Securities Control and Collection Division - handlesall the accounting, securities control and collection functions ofIkLF
IGLF Special Studies Staff - handles research and technical informa-tion activities, and the reporting requirements to the World Bank,NEDA, CB and the Review Committee.
7.3 Training. Because of the clear importance within both IGLF and thePFIs of analyzing credit risk and assessing projects and institutions, IGLFinitiated a number of programs under Loan 1727-PH to further develop theexperience of its staff and that of the PFIs. In addition, during the projectyears, the staff of IGLF and the PFIs attended relevant local trainingprograms, and 13 IGLF staff were sent abroad to acquire additional knowledgeon small enterprise financing and related fields. They attended such trainingprograms as Small Industry Promotion in Developing Economies, and SmallIndustry Financing Courses in India; Advanced Training on Financial Managementin the Netherlands, and training at the Federal Business Development Bank inVancouver and Montreal, Canada. Programs attended arE listed in Annex 20.
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Procedures and Standards
7.4 Proiect ADDraisal. Because of the importance of the projectappraisal to the success of the program, IGLF developed and refined specificstandards and procedures for appraisal under Loan 1727-PH. Under the accredi-tation scheue, project appraisal is the responsibility of the accreditedfinancing institutions, which undertake the necessary detailed research andevaluation of the project, assess the appropriateness of the proposed financ-ing package based on the real needs of the borrower, and determine the overallfeasibility of the project. The appraisal follows preliminary analysis of therelevant industries, as well as of the marketing, technica:, management andfinancial aspects of the projects. Plant visits provide first-hand views ofthe operations. Project feasibility studies or project evaluation reports areprepared for the approval of the PFIs executive committees and are submittedusually with only minor changes to IGLF.
7.5 An analysis of reports prepared under the project suggested somedeficiencies which IGLF has sought to correct through training programsinitiated under both this project and the follow-on SMI III project. A reviewof Loaii 1727-PH financed subprojects showed that evaluation procedures of thePFIs were deficient in their lack of attention to marketing and technicalaspects, and in their over-estimation of financial benefits. For example, amere list of competitors often was the sole marketing document. There was noattempt to identify existing and possible potential customers. No study wasmade to establish existence of sufficient demand in the locality. Regardingtechnical aspects, little consideration was given to the necessity for thebuildings proposed for renovation or expansion, or to the benefits of theexpansion project to the borrower in terms of production and space. The PFIswere generally optimistic in their financial forecasts, and actual subprojectperformance under Loan 1727-PH was lower than estimated (see Annexes 6 and 7).Some accredited institutions tended to rely more on the value of collateralthan on project analysis.
7.6 To strengthen the quality of project evaluation, training programswere implemented during the project time period to assist financial institu-tion staff to screen loan applications and to identify possible strengths andweaknesses of projects and potential problems. The programs helped PFIpersonnel to analyze project technical and marketing data in greater depth,and to adjust financial forecasts from optimistic scenarios, and to undertakesensitivity analysis.
7.7 Proiect Supervision. Most of the accredited financing institutions,although primarily responsible for project supervision, were found under theSMI II Project not to have any established, definitive system of supervisionand account monitoring in their IGLF lending. Post-audit surveys of IGLFprojects were not conducted by the PFIs on a regular basis. The repaymentperformance of IGLF borrowers was used as a gauge as to whether or not therewas a need for visual inspection. Results of plant visits, if any, weresummarized in post-audit inspection reports which contained limited informa-tion on the utilization of the loans and on the operating performance andfinancial status of the borrowers. The value of collateral was not reassessedduring the project period. No records were maintained to systematicallymonitor the status and performance of each IGLF borrower. Credit file folders
- 19 -
maintained by participating financial institutions were poorly kept and datatherein were not updated. The submission of periodic financial statements byeach IGLF subborrower was not strictly imposed but was enforced only duringthe IGLF examiners' end-use verification of selected projects. While thedeficiencies could be partly explained by the limited number of personneldirectly assigned to supervise these projects, IGLF has since the completionof the project stressed the importance of adequate supervision by the PFIs andhas included guidelines for appropriate supervision in its training programs.
7.8 Although at the outset of Loan 1727-.?H there was no regular reviewconducted on the performance of participating financing institutions, ad hocmonitoring of PFIs was performed and the PFI's were required to correct orremedy deficiencies or shortcomings as they emerged. With the establishmentof the IGLF Examination Division under the loan, however, institutionalappraisal of financing institutions began to be conducted regularly. Reportson findings and deficiencies were transmitted to the institutions concernedand were accompanied with recommendations. Financing institutions wererequired to submit reports to IGLF on any action to correct or remedy thesefindings, and on any recommended measures implemented.
VIII. BANK PERFORMANCE
Proiect Justification and Overall Performance
8.1 The project achieved its basic objective which was to expand IGLF'slending to the SMI sector in the Philippines. Long-term resources not other-wise being provided within the banking system were made available for long-term financing needs of both small and medium scale industries. Furthermore,substantial progress was made in improving repayment performance, which hasreached a level to effectively sustain the IGLF program. IGLF played acatalytic role in providing employment opportunities, improving income distri-bution and regional development, and stimulating exports and general economicgrowth. Under the project, IGLF'S network of financial institutions wasexpanded significantly, and expertise in project evaluation and preparationwas gained. Bank involvement helped IGLF to develop its institutional frame-work, organization, and operating policies and procedures.
Supervision
8.2 The Bank's supervision effort on thG project was generally adequate,although more frequent supervision, specifically a mission in 1981, may haverevealed earlier that the IGLF interest rate was out of line with the generaleconomic environment and may have resulted in an earlier change of the IGLFprice charged to PFIs and end-users.
Working Relationship
8.3 The Bank maintained good working relationships with the Governmentand IGLF. IGLF made all relevant information readily available to Bank staffand the response to inquiries was always prompt and adequate.
- 20 -
IX. SUMHARY AND CONCLUSIONS
9.1 The Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund continued under Loan 1727-PHto act as a key instrument in the Philippine Government's program to promoteand develop small and medium-scale industries on a nationwide scale. Duringthe implementation period of Loan 1727-PH, the IGLF expanded to includefinance for medium scale firms, and the IGLF provided a major portion of totallong-term credit borrowed by the Philippine.' small and medium industrysectors. Loans approved increased by almost 502 a year, from P 47 million in1978 (the date of project appraisal) to P 485 million in 1984, with projectsfinanced by those loans generating about 10,497 new jobs. Total disbursementof the loan proceeds was realized ahead of the projected schedule. Most ofthe 264 subprojects financed under the loan proved to be economically andfinancially viable in addition to being labor-intensive.
9.2 IGLF's network of accredited institutions' branches throughout allregions of the country was expanded significantly during the time period ofthe loan. Although the percentage of total funds allocated to areas outsideMetro-Manila did not equal. the minimum 60? projected at the time of appraisal,the 39? of all funds which did go to firms outside the capital compared wellwith the share of SMI value-added contributed by firms outside Metro-Manila(42Z). As intended, the sectoral distribution of IGLF's loan portfolio wasdominated by loans to the manufacturing sector although some service andtourism oriented industries also were beneficiaries.
9.3 During the implementation period of loan, the IGLF programsubstantially improved its arrears and collection ratios, which by 1984 wereat satifactory levels. The proportion of the PFIs' portfolio to end-usersaffected by arrears was only 12Z by amount and 22? by number in 1984, andarrears themselves amounted to only 4.5? of all IGLF loans outstanding (or of3.5? of IGLF loans made under the accreditation scheme). Loan arrears fromthe PFIs to IGLF amounted to only 2.12 of the IGLF's loan portfolio in 1984.
9.4 IGLF's financial position was acceptable. Return on assets fluctu-ated during the years from 1.82 in 1978 to 3.1X in 1984. Return on equityimproved from 3.7Z in 1978 to 8.5? in 1980; it declined in 1981 and 1983 andlater improved again to 10.4? in 1984. Financial expenses as a percentage ofgross income steadily increased from 51? in 1978 to 692 in 1981 and decreasedto 57? in 1984. The decrease was partly due to the marked increase ininterest income from term loans with only a slight increase in interestexpenses on IBRD loans. The continuous growth in total assets during the1978-84 period was financed almost entirely through IBRD loans and Governmentcounterpart funds. Since IGLF relied heavily on foreign borrowings and sincethe Philippine Government took the foreign exchange risk on the loans, theGovernment incurred substantial losses from foreign exchange adjustments. Thepeso-dollar exchange rate (see Annex 22) declined from P 7.4 in 1978 to 1 11.0in June 1983, to P 14.0 in October 1983, to 1 18.4 in December 1984, andP 21.0 in June 1988. The proceeds of Loan 1727-PH were disbursed at theaverage rate of P 7.7 to US$1.00.
9.5 IGLF staff was reorganized and strengthened during the projectperiod. IGLF expanded from two to four divisions, and staff numbers wereincreased accordingly. IGLF offered technical assistance and training to both
- 21 -
financing institutions and end-users, to enhance staff expertise in projectappraisal, project evaluation, and project supervision and monitoring. Publicrelations efforts to help expand the usage of IGLF were implemented and wereinfluential in promoting the program.
9.3 Several lessons which may be learned from the Lank's and IGLP'sexperiences under Loan 1727-PH are outlined below:
(a) In pricing subloans made by apex institutions in interest rateregulated economies, it may be difficult to ensare that end-usfrs payan appropriate foreign exchange risk premium. The experience of Loan1727-PH suggests that in such environments, apex lending should belinked to financial sector reform in which interest rates generallyare deregulated. Once rates are market-determined, then interestrates from apex institutions to PFIs and to end-users can include apremium for foreign exchange risk. A currently proposed Bank loanwhich would provide further funding to IGLF will be made in thecontext of financial sector reforms and will price subloans atmarket-linked rates.
(b) During the implementation period of Loan 1727-PH, IGLF did not limitthe participation of individual financial institutions in order toensure that the IGLF portfolio as a whole was balanced or diversi-fied. The weakened financial situation of some of the PFIs during1980 to 1984 period suggests that this failure to diversify wasunwise. In 1981, after the bankruptcy of one PFI holding a largeportion of the IGLF portfolio, IGLF adopted a policy limiting theparticipation of individual PFIs and specifying that a PFI's port-folio of IGLF rediscounted loans may not exceed that institution'stotal net worth.
(c) The experience of IGLF under Loan 1727-PH suggests that the apexarrangements which are appropriate for lending to small and mediumfirms may be inappropriate for effectively reaching cottage firms.IGLF's record with cottage industry during the project period showedpoor repayment and suggested that making and supervising cottageine'istry loans was overly cumbersome and expensive for IGLF. Theda;a suggest that another vehicle for financing cottage industryshould be created and that IGLF should not be pushed to fil] thefinancing gap to that sector.
Saving s? 4Apoits /1Ceircial lIs- 5-3/4 6 6 6 7 7 1 9 NMD eiling NO Ceiling NO Oeiliu MD cilingmnift BCnk 5-3/4 6 6 6-1/2 7-1/2 7-1/2 7-1/2 9-112 MD Ceiling No Oli biftiNng lb ilingRuml 3anks 5-3/4 6-1/2 6 6-1/2 7-1/2 1-1/2 7-1/2 9-1/2 ND Ceiling No Cailing No Ce ling Mb CidlingNon Stut* SIAs 7-1/2 No Ceiling No Cailing No aCilig lb ilin"NOW' wmoxats Thrift Wbi's 5 7 MD Ceiliug MD Callg o Ceidling IID CaiL
SdvJnU Deptbits /2hands with Denaia Deposi-S 9 9 No CilIng No Ceiling NO Celing lOb CelingBadw witkout xADn Deporits 9-1/2 9-1/2 No Ceiling ND Ceiling lb Cailint No Ceiling
Tim Deposits90 days 5-3/4 5-3/4 8-112 9 9 9 11 11 11 it lbN iling180 days 6 6 6-1/2 9 9-1/2 9-1/2 9-1/2 11-1/2 11-1/2 11-1/2 11-1/2 No Ceiling270 days 6-1/4 6-1/4 9-1/2 11-112 11-1/2 11-1/2 111-/2 No aCiling360 days 6-1/2 6-1/2 7 10 10-1/2 10-1/2 10-1/2 12-1/2 12-1/2 12-112 12-1/2 No Oeiling540 days 11-1/2 11-1/2 11-1/2 13-1/2 13-1/2 13-1/2 13-1/2 No CeiLing730 days 11-1/2 12-1/2 12-1/2 12-1/2 14-1/2 14-1/2 14-1/2 14-1/2 No CeilingOve 730 days N o C E I L I N G
Deposit SdsutiLutes 17 17 17 No Geing No Ceiling No Ceiling No GCilingAU Naturities 17 17 17 No CilUi NO Ciin No cilig No Ceiling
Dank LuiJir' katesSuavised (rxdit 10 10 10 12 12 12 Im 90-2Msupm 4ed c'di t 12 12 12 14 14. 14 m 90-2
Nw.-Tdit iiid 9 9 9 12 12 MR 90-2 f4# - 2bwiitiwnl 12 12 12 14 14 mm ligo it o/1 ) > Nov. 10, 1965 to May 28, 1979, banks wre classified into the diftfat oateewies.f7 As of Dec. 1, 1976, banks wae classified'into those buds with mid withit d_Gd%qwits./I )mm July 1, 1981 to present, al ceilings in deposit rates m 2KWd IpOF t tme lygo. ,/ n90 retenI to tht mnila referenoe mate fer 90 dAy datowwid aW wm.mred by % O cw floating ruts PIpi orH
miniS a rate to be cieteumin by tte CB an the basis of the pmiliz. Ut tmti.O
ILUX Int:rest Rates (CB to Pll)S lU InurBty loan 5 5 5 5 7 7 7 6.7 6.7 11 11
Medium In dustry loa 9 9 36 16 16
ICLF Intemest kites (Pfl to Erd4ker)SAll nu1try Ioan 10 10 10 10 13 13 13 13.2 13.2 18 11 23
Medium In.stry loan 1 is 15 21 21 23
MlI' Interest RatesSaoU In)ixy loan 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 14 1J la 1 Qad
IW.um Inuurt r Ioan 14 1I 1 14 1% 1F 14 14 16 16 21 2L
/3 1s July 1, 1981 to pre wAt, all ceilinp in deposit mtes ns rmd wampt tlve applyin4 far shaat tam liiu.
0ia'4'
- 24 -
AMMx 2
PFOJECT COMPLETION REPORT - LOAN 1±727-PH
Schodule of Estimated and Actual Disbursements Under Loan 17.7-FHFor The VGLF Portion of th Loan
sin thousands)
~O .AL D: S3URSCxEMUsE * t i a t * d Ac t u X
First Quarter S 2,850 P 21,37S U.6 S 1,216 ? 9,165 4.8Second Quarter 2,aso 21,375 23.3 2,130 16,061 13.3Third Quarter 2,aso 21,375 34.9 4,444 33,574 40.3Fourth Quarter 2.Sa 21.37S 46.5 3.833 29.141 4 .3
Sub-Total U.4(M p 95.500 46.5 1.1.62S p 97 941 46.3
First Quarter S 3,277 P 24,581 59.9 S 3,883 P 30,375 62.3Second Quarter 3,277 24,561 73.3 4,I4S 36,33S 81.7Third Quarter 3,277 24,51 '.7 '4,345 34,742 100.0Fourth Quarter 3.269 24.507 100.0
Sub-Total 313.100 P 96.250 100.0 512.67S ?U1.9S2 100.0
T 0 7 A L S24 500 P183O750 1T.0 L2 4 6 0 p .O993 100.O
pwmtsom~ ~~ am
RIIUWI3PADOIrUIAL C.MWIU IMD LIOM UID
PRwJCF OFIGG -9 - LOM 1727-RIList of SltMiec rts on UAd, Amn 1727-lw
s~~~~~~~~~~~~~oo Gr t % ofN
Ji rog of iou Total 1111 SUU1OM
Iisti Sib- LOc. EP TloTaint Total Profut,, pm- (- Total Ap- Pija:t TotTot al et Si2d of n1U c tics Idust tyca £, ra im) Msets htu tiia Cost Pleed t S_l_n S_ _t_ - -
AcxAi-t, Inc. NUIl Printng/publishinu r IV 3,U10 90 65 2,000 2,000 100 1.000 1 301 - -
A.C. Ik:n%,vdL-z (-. wAr Oam. & ch-. pel-ccs E IV 1,097 31 g .,D75 1,300 63 1,300 a 1M0 - -
ALhr SSt1yclZ 1.t tU Io .mtal pno&cts E IV 2.70 127 S1 2,137 1,510 70 1'sm 6 1,500 - -
h Ic1 PI-Ant Moi r(nd a faod pso(kets c IV-A 7S0 2'4 200 200 10 100 a in - -
t- ikv. t, KIM. uri fb.ax I food pmuksts N IX %12 - 25 1,919 00 512 4101 7 500 - -
Atei.D Lnt. Cctr. I PIN la-ntaIJic mI pnxk.E IV-A 1,03 37 71 153 in0 SS o0 10 300 - -
Al.ihs i.IamL. (W. ,lj:. Nbil lct. tNadi./dppLian E VIl 3,765 1512 33 1,110 20 11 1,750 S 1,KI _ -
10 2SO
Alainohua Qa.t .U..... NsIh .&taJ piudLcts E AV 2,07 16 70 1,707 1,100 eS I.S00 S 1.S00 _ _
Au tc-d tAam (X4D mnots Hal-. *.et.4l pexkmts E IV 2,597 301 25 5,297 2,0 517 2.100 7 200 3 1S00
hAmhb liuJ'L. mV-. dIUII .. ntetr £ leathe p.1ds. E IV 925 Sl IS no 600 71 3o l loo - -
Amig stwel rFaicatws; NBI1 'L.a1 pec1wts E IV 1,23S IS0 SS 2.670 2,0 71 2.000 10 2,000 - -
Aw Ind.tr.fit:s tSIll Plastuc psodur4s E IV 76 36 12 S00 m00 O 1U 006 o - -
ligele's 61a: 41)p tA ,bot_ar E IV l,S1S 1SO 1S 1,112 1,000 90 l.Op 7 9003 100
1Lit,S Djive: ("Mqi l1u1-UI Touwi!m C IV-A 153 22 - 1.231 60 65 do 12 7 :hAtauLo AIVu6 C-)p NUI1 taxd I tow p mkucz. E Vil 1.931 90 510 I,0511 730 70 710 * 730 - -
Antacio Valv ,its PiMo. dOI'l l I oa>* pmdshs E VI 51so is le U 100 26 100 6 100 - _
vaImmLk PI,-tic huak.,. (1)5 t LxtJzmc mflducts E IV 1,0t7 26 5 1,300 1,300 10 1,3110 7 1.1S0 3 1 151
Aag mtdhfluft 1411fleIfw l jwhtMdPs E IV 1,251 1 16 200 200 100 200 - - 3 200
Asdikil.. IIg. U.M11. "all mdtw IadEts N III 1,207 - 0 3,216 2.500 7 2,100 _0 2,200 3 6
Aitis QAtilil t WD1 111Wr lriauac/pubiahft E VI 1.n1 ss s ISO lao 100 ISO 6 ISO -
.iAa flanituu'- I1lII luniiumc t. fixtures C VI 708 30 17 SOO SaO 100 S0 10 mSe -
AAtI n.' hijdwa L lulihy .il5rl "a-cioc. aicinery E IV 9u9 2S is 60 we IS O 0 00 10 _ _
AU.tJs :...i b Null S1A IWkkWtS £ IV 1,167 U? - 2,300 I,SO 65 1 10 10 _
A. T. IjI#. NlOll l:XtjJ.b E IV 51,60 103 516 2,j00 2,300 100 2,300 7 2" _ _
Av.- IIFI. IiV. (lAll..3141( 1.1.l6 I..L t 1:kC Vil ?,-3J 75 29 I. J54 1,2SO S2 smn C
*,
-- - ll~~~~~~. xua, uai ssII'S *f iouing d 1 lbbl "OI w 9l~~~~~~~~~I 6Insti- Sab lac. TO Tatetu po- (1b- Total - > Amjet aot l jctt SiM of r _CSuk!g0ecl tier ln&sg tr t Rpm) Iof &a tilt ot IItI_ed et sulmS X1 1
b4auo S.mat i lI ToLn 20 1 ,235 - 62 1,00 6W 'A No is m - -LaaiLi Ltas Sqply ml ktl p"xta c XI 2,091 so I 1,9V Soo 26 10 la so -fl.-A B"s. IJ. Vcis 1ginl w.-elec. adeinVy E IV 1,2'. S0 5 39. 0 3W 7 50 - 1&kany lam Me. Lui. JIMl .4pav1 _ -mats c IV 2,552 73 4.7 1,110 1,260 6o 1.200 1 tam25 -
lit us Ahr Pnxbuts MNm i(ypm eamtylmw p E IV-A 1,6I5 5 '3 2,UI3 1,700 57 is so - -@:um Lriterprss WIn .xbmrtallic mizwml pE.-E III 371 10 13 s10 910 0 37m a m -6em1) Nt. 01 .. 1mat & prits E IV 3,226 I1- 26 2,16' 2,1' 165 2,la0 m 7 1,91] 3 e*taom Ditempses CD fare-atallt: inijul pjuuthE IV 1,066 1 1 2.007 1,'m Sl 1.165 1 320 200 hitigCs Textile 1z. WM Ttxtil.s E IV 2,09' a S 6 Sll O 56o 92 ini - - I so15Slm FlawCL (b. Anul am. din. pnt;cr E IV 3,043 26 57 2,500 2,560 100 2. 2,0S0 3 SOWhe Ger Outdor Ac . W5n Spxetuz g E IV 411 1S S 3J0 300 1410 U ll O -_3uan le PLant NlirIlibd Ib fod ptxhts f X 3,23 3 23 we 1 I S Is us - _CA&Z .uii slixp iaDl *a. elect. m.iinny E VI IS7 3] 23 000 lO 100 000 S 32 3 2tOC_o PaSnt Mg. Cat. NWil SnI. LdI. puu MMS E IV 3,971 107 26 3,3%6 2,006 60 1,0m I 123 3Cabm HIS & Sae.gs aB "xxid I tod pet C III Mg9 50 in SO0 gOD 100 Sll I 1OD - -ctimadami (cc Plat PUB bxal food poles N IV-A 370 - 20 755 ?S 57 .S,D 10 '*26 3 25Cgding n5i Slp IUFM Am-elect. Mdiam slop E IV l.SI0 IS 11 Sus 100 540 S we - -.afel Shlal Cmqctz. COB '"hcic tts C E IV 719 55 - m5e S00 sOD SOD - - 3 SOoCAHien Pdt IG (COB riDd I food psiacts c IV 312 1' 16 90so 760 70 700 N 1o0 I l41Guouse I tilcCUBs ( AppamB I piuts E IV 3,015 160 206 2,S20 2,0S0 s , 12 1.S00 3 ; 30C.uyetateri Hii L.. N13 Textii E IV 3,150 103 7 I3,00 1,2S0 3 1,20 0 1.250 - -
CsAaLS Mfg. 1Om:. WJF'1 usther £ leawr pod. C IV 1.32 160 - 100 Soo 100 s1o S Om 3 160W rlod Ptamx Nun r-id f food p nats E IV 203 51 1 s1O 5105 3 S1ID 7 00 -Qu-AibetiOu"s Inc. Iffll Fbd I ftwd pu E VU 1l,16 70 S1 2,411DD 2,0D0 62 .6 51 1,55 3 6S5CAAb StAr TM&n IalM. Nnl frumitumI it fit E VIl 1,'0 250 a 2,10 2,50 110 2,w16 7 2.33 3 1 50OChlcr trIM&Lm. 3I*bn -;bez £ nU r pndemcs E X 217 is 1,06 10 O 6 - 100 1l llO -Qwrith Hug. C.. lWBn Pldstic prodwts c IV 2,126 16 36 2,n9 162 25 1I3 7 n1 -QCkme "Of' ('I. Cobs. N#6l Optia Il puiduts E IV 2,1 6 0 a St 100 U100 1O - - 3 weOja,rdIf M. a-Yaj, Irst'l. 01 lbotiaar E IV 2,1ll 1,20 0 16 1 200 D100 6 7 I - -3llv,-reTiGa..iits CuB Np'l t gi L Bumts L VIl 7S^ 31 Is go0 6O 100 331 2 no 3 1b.i,w T. wr-* I ... 114415 -.VI .I r IV 97? 67 110 2.960 1.JH) ' I.1 7 1.3 _ _ I
~0
I
tul Gao- s oFtlug of toal total 11101 or SUIUIe
Iwati- Sot- Loc. lbtal . -
tu- po- (le- Total S P.ect Total ject Size of nxmd "ac mi
dtioun Indisstry t &ion) Asta Actual ;.1 tial stt IRi-ased Okst Subloan 1i F1- i! - -_
Cd,tIM9.b PrintU% het:> tbil Printing/pulhshisn E Xl 938 31 is 933 7OU 75 700 a 610 3 10
(b.a.ac Lnter)rast, Nbrl Poedr £ pqer products E IV 3,103 92 60 4,303 2,600 S6 2.5UO 9 1,000 3 S01)
C. W. T. hfl*. CM ku-mE tallic mism' prods. £ IV 3,620 64 06 4,415 2,000 4'5 1,000 7 1,668 -
tid-tdu Lle..tmuc Mfg. MD -Ic:c. mmdwiney/appianu E IV 1,S02 133 - 4,002 2,800 62 2,50 7 2,2$0 3 260
At (Qmn t&Iune Wilts NFOl N m-elect. a.ciinery E 1 544 12 113 '00 3D0 75 300 6 300 - -
Luvao Lum. L Kincnrul Uxl.MIII *m-ntallic manwiul psxo. E Xl 379 12 ll As 300 66 ]D0 6 230 3 70
1MM hlnine^ NOWTz%&-m wBCI oLbeILntbrpsuhats a MXI 1,92'4 - 32 1,400 600 43 6lia SO 1 I 2
l" r M. NBl awd t foodp us V .v71 I.6 23 156 100 6S 1005 1.0 3 w
DLl1xcaw rFo-id hokvtl Nbnf rbod I food prodwats E IV-A 935 21 24 S65 0SW 90 SoO 6 SOO - -
Ltwmr llui& lrd! S44,1y LOB tital pnXhCta E IV 2,302 153 17 2,050 2,500 *0 2.,00 12 2,500 - -
C.H. WIud r, lducts aliFL rbodl food p.xv Acts E VI 1,979 52 a 666 250 32 250 250 - -
Did'.l Cer.&uic, MfC tirl hsc. mgft-oaaics E IV 1,022 195 - 1,697 1,000 59 1,000 9 1,000 - -
Oilda tritenui,es lil4 lisc. mtg-dcwtau1 E IV 3,631 170 - 1,060 100 16 O S am - -
D.J.Liuswiria Mtg.Cb ag. Nli A ipaI L SmuxIts E VII 1,1.6 152 1.9 200 200 300 1,000 1 10 ,00m -
DXC at.rjariies Nell isoc. mfg- .1edemm,Imm elets E VII ig 37 20 10 1.SO 100 2257 200 3 2S
DuM Carlos Hilling dbrl !bad I food pdhacts E X 1,401 42 65 2,000 2,000 100 2,000 5 I,S00 3 Soo
CLgle -loa In1ii. WcV. NHI1 raud I food pdwoU t5 N )a i,i' 1.2 1,614 200 19 S6O a w - -
Ede l9etalcr4t (118 Llect. .Khimiry/appianm E IV 659 3C 12 927 420 415 120 6 350 3 lu
F.Abricatinm tUg. Spec. M1IIi Mtal pjwX&dcts E IV 3,353 as S6 3,510 2,500 70 2,50 a 2,100 - -
rF.ut K4it.I (Lip. tll &tal pmbrdts E IV 2,013 62 3 1,061 nO0 75 So0 - - 3 * Ua
rams 1,ir IUg.Lit. Iltlll Azpmnl I L imts E IV 1,292 U - 0 200 25 2m0 6 200- _
FAV G(.llu A1lui. L 't. S1ll Mtal pjuucts E la 1,M 52 37 13114 600 54 W0 10 %" 3 13h
Fil-,tcofl.L.'I ji,.l.Cual.. (3 u tb:.c. mai-ttyp &bicycles C IV 970 1S 1 2,917 1,200 %1 600 7 Go - _
14AXIBd. Id1j, oil Ixid !. t1x puh5cts E IV 1,36 S _ 2,92 1,15 140 1,155 * 1,156 - -
hI dl 1 u I III0' I. 11111 ostmgr E IV 2,676 16 - 1,26 1, 96 1200 6 I'm6 - -
I.-d lut *. .. I. It t-tIal ,isaJucts C IV 31.05O 41 12 1,200 1,200 100 1,M a I' a 111 k
1lt:tS [**i.tIII ' Iio:- Ilbal 1Ulog/pU I C IV 901 20 6 235 230 is 23D 0 23 - _Z Z' r s1W
sag of aca Total ori SUN"
tu- pro~~~- (No- Total Adi Pnwj.ct Total jwt Sa frm
tidiluict ionIn*____ea___n maste Actuul timnal (nt blind (Ost SsMo
i:' *u1dmn PWrtdRs u.ki. ,.OUB m5Iisc. art. -po1yp.~mwm rbap M VI 1.2003 - 46 2,130 600 30 600 m - -
Gzaw2 Eabtem M1g. *BFl Paprn L pqwer pnAwts E TV 329 25 20 620 SW0 31 AS S Su5 - -(OuWi LLngg. I. Faaun& ISFI f-tal prndts E IV 1,796 32 35 3,625 1,250 3'. 1,M50 S 125 - -(Vbsaaots Phi Is. fell ..aSC. ag.-tavs III 676 33 20 '.20 275 65 Z7$ 7 211- -ijato Mf1g. (Drp. iblF Me.tal pu5wts E IV 1,517 '.0 35 300 go 100 300 3 406 3 %.0Hamv k%AzI".ide Nbr1 Asc. afg4.mIdievfts E VII '.,210 1'.S 25 1,500 1,500 100 150 I 560 3 160
IL*k& Lng%j. E M&ad. :hap WnO Lj*.-elec. mAchimss-y E IV 918 1'. 16 25.0 200 35 20 16 U - -ILwm ?bD1ia', Fhils. ilbEl l-ta1 p.gxhcts £ IV 1,150 '.5 33 2,1010 1,200 31 1,2N0 7 1,313 3 1INakawy Oaaiuy Prop. rnOE rFd L foo pmxhawt N VI 015 so5 1,025 so0 '. we0 la No - -lke'tlo Lithder IntL. a* Lmte'w& 1eaths rgodB. E III 2,601 .7 so 1,005 1,000 100 1.3 7 1,0115 - -AbDly Calte PiliJaut Casiiy hIrl riXXI food jgUhstS E V '.31 1' '. 15 100 11 l - - 3 3*)) Iksmui Ubod.k.Qmp. 1NOE I hiod L food prosduta E IV 3,013 as 63 2,500 2,150 00 2,150 6 2,150 - -liw jAaterwjr±,k.. ... (DO ?tiic.migg-hwadcrafted 1ais £ 'IV 1.020 200 300 3,.??7 2,2W 6'. 2,2.6% 5. 1,950 3 33n1b.mw lateui.rizova. 111Ffl juod 1. food pruubfts E V 1,.493 59 13 1,'.20 600 i2 i05 a '.0 I 20ImioevLal Alma. lisc. .11111 I&fla1 jiuo1ts C VII 1,1'? pi 11 '.0 605 100 lO 6 200 - -I1rlex Spec-i.ity tK'IL.. .1111 Caim. L cd. pea&. £ IV 2,.251 60 U 515 SW0 67 56 6 120 J 361.e;uLar kAtt.2m 111ffl urnitAmm L fixtures £ VII 3,128 33 '.0 1,%O 1,500 100 1.50 10 1,500 - -Inte awstin,wst. bAkmiaagMbil1 '"sic intal1 iznhstrAie £ VII 2,77 17 60 3,510 2,500 71 ?.AO 113 2,5d - -IhathJqddS Hij,. CO. An01 Njsc. alg-P?VC fittinp~ £ IV 3,015 90 190 6,510 2,500 29 1,25.0 7 1,250 - -IsaIa loKt*isi, Wur*.ir #1311 gaxin-eec. mschLtay E X 2,171 i2 23 1,00 1,000 100 1,300 10 1.000 - -ti:.dnd 0isLxuti., lic. Nit] F-ood & food pnx5ats c IV 2,921 33 62 2,500 2,500 100 2,500 5 1I600 3 100
Irifpi1DtzbI L kI-jrt NOEl1 Tourlm. £ xi 1.773 is '.6 500 500 100 S00 S.5 5so - -Jade IFuuicmo jkiqze cubi To-E'im c XII £25 1'. 15 300 20 17 20 10 26 - -J.Limam Llect.IiXc~Ali. 1401 E.Lect. macki.zy/applianm C TV 791 22 A5 300 300 100 150 5. 1SO - -JdvOidIia led ILlast an1 rowd I fowd prowta E VI 2,211 11 2. 300 300 100 US0 7 U - -
cuAutwi. Nuln L.U dim. producta C VII 2.W'. 173 '.6 2,100 1,750 65 1,750 3 1,150 - -JIA lIat'l. I.uuai,t. 0! I jpaml L. gaiwts £ IV 3,.'.7 14. U 2,233 2,233 100 2,000 7 2,0M - -J.L. PLe.tac 1NXudit., Nl!r] I tastic pr.1dwts £ IV Su3 '9 22 1,733 go 'S 30 I m - -J.Ii.c. mei. tuAr. 11111 I in-m.ta11ic Mir.-ni1prxk. C VII 977 75 25 650 500 77 250 7 25 - -- 1J."... I1 0 14. dBUI I xxi oLxi PiPkcts E VI lI6S Its Is $Jo3 ME 9. M0O 0 -- 3 uSA 0
...i-t . e6vl..* vi wn.i~r iar .~*.. IV 1. 71 '.0 30 0Y .v:1 37 :3.) £ U 3 1?.'
0
~~~~ ~~~~~ ~N- SCiw-~ _ ~ F- -u&
ug ~~~~~of wI_ Ibh6u^~~~~~~~~~~~tb LO. R%Lk _ olfe
pm- bs- Tota M- hoet TOW Jot SiS of rA eScf2ojelt tim tXz jt. NM) hE tua tinal a t blame- ct Subl1arum1m TM
J. ht. CxitK e vrJwt:s 5F! N-m-lic mu,.lpm. VI 1,000 .0 15 500 w511 100 50D 6 31 1 WJ. .evAila L Wa. nI OGi. L dim. pethmals c IV 1,313 54 21 699 C00 57 200 5 2 - -IJuaing's FAnutum- MD l1nirim I fixtm E IV 11506 6O IS 1,0.51 500 34 50 7 W6 3 78JisLior 1Dtor Iuciks oBF- iliac. EIg.-ieomw bhoMe £ VI 201 12 3 231 U 35 30 - - i soK.bimtt liam, Ia=. NMF rwmiu. fixtwm E iii 1,20S m - 600 soo 3 we 7 1.13 3 SoL. A. L rumEUU n Cct. 1 r, iwy/rl.imm E IV-A 967 30 2S 630 5b0 79 wei I we - -
Li latuIa Gnmxts J 51 Apprl 1 ps. £ I E n 1.65 275 67 2, J0 -,.SO 100 2,00 le 2 "1 3 XiLagwu tg. (br- NSF! Tmctes E 1II 14,403 130 16 3,100 2,001 61 2,030 5 2.010 - -LI _sAw G.awsmts ?W Ap1a Is L uints £ TV-A 672 '.5 53 s65 so 36 we le 1'e0 3 5I
LAWtiJea Ga%ts n Vpan-lI pitts E IV '71 30 10 20 203 3M 2W S 3 3 3UlLUcWA Ni. fibers PMl (e2tiles 1 IV-A 'S9 - 22 '603 200 S0 is0- -Lira L"j'1. (b^v. SFi rle4 pstdwots £ IV 3,30S Go 37 I,2 1,21 100 700 * no -LiU& Kimio MaIwuaule Co. IIFI letal 1 auLztos E vnI 3,763 91 7n 3,613 2,%D 66 2,10 1,003 _
lacky xitmrytbiLs (nWS Appmz & pL9ms C IV 1,171 67 '2 3,170 2,0 63 2,000 7 1,11 3 1hzd Hfg. bakttrse.; WSr ibod 1 f pnad E VX 1 SIO 3,100 W Go 3,0 U 22 '00 1 -
n liaa Msg. "^ , (b ftpawl L Iu p mc C IV P 1 2' 31 1,673 o U 7 1O - _thLW Il1,110 duloUL. IW1 lnoitallic 1isue pWet. C VI 253 25 _ 200 100 So 10 I ISO - _NotalwgJd bub. c&ap. mlen Mttal. pM=" c IV 3,965 122 5S 2,000 2,00 100 2,00 - - 3 2,0UJn11tallo.a h.1i CLQr. NSF! ilect. midiimi/a4plIim N IV 1,2I' - 93 t',01 we 20 MDI 1 ON I '65)l0etgo Sot.an#hm Hfg&irp. NS! lbod L fad tmAsms C IV 3,015 120 'S3 1,200 1,200 103 I,20D 7 I, - -hetalm Iaditwres NFll Metal pm&acts E IV n32 26 IS 500 SOD 100 SO 11f1 1 50" - -W. Ktwkriu (bep. cmi metw Wo&Cts C IV 3,720 6 ISI 2,510 2,560 100 2,501 10 2,.0 3 SuHiyu,*.i JnhAtriei bnB .. c.mfg-omwmamw,bm.E VII UD 20 10 276 22 62 225 * 116 3 SulK inteeus NSf! dc-aeteIic imI po. E IV 175 %7 2S 1,616 S 0 S0 0 7 I _ _
P0dngs Lui,Ats . In..*. .An. bAAer I nr_w suoAf C 1" 116 33 65 2,500 WI 20 WI S - -Ifti Pmus Weifpl bminittnpublialvia E IV 2,11B I'.? 3S 2,000 2,000 110 2.m 12 1,1 3 20%mitia.4e Luttear MI g. NtM .mel L paiwts C IV 2,591 13 30 1,WI 1,000 67 1,200 5 l_ -_
lanjY littitC, iwc. Ntll *1tl praukta £ IV 270 10 16 %0 400 lo 3 - I N0Ui; IIW')'. * stk3dIi<$L.-j-"ll io-, let . ach. labA C IV "S n . 20 345 20 n2 PA 7 rA -Ilj*-,ng* li.rw- ilill hI*ti.iiIit'/f.AsbU'g CE IV 3,.26 92 20 3,0325 2,51tO 73 2,0 10 2,I ' f ii @;. l.gj.|. .ti 1 battls 4an-tleLtee..../4X 1.-. L 'I1 951 31 _ 20 ll 2050 12 CS0 7@ Slll 3 S0 tU
... ~~~~~~~~ . .I.U gar I ... ~~~~. .1.6. tIll ii~~~~~ti I~~. C ~~~ 51t 8? to3~ 65 57 fi10 10 so0 J3 W
Of OIbta r l1swt~~~~~~- ~~Sob- To. ital fto-
tu pso- (- lota ftmm Pmj).ct iTal jat San of rm vf~!~-jEEL tian In6mi__OM) Aints ktal dm1a ant ibimod amt Sin*m W, o
Nmur RWIMS . Sorvims Ebrp. MM lkNwi-mlact. ~dm sywr E IV 2,030 3' 6an m 91 "a6 66 Nam Asia bkt..rpnise ll Klisc. nf&-kwmdcmuftm E V 3,232 l,'69 '165 1,136 666 53 36 3Naw Asi IbavKty Nonl ,btal pudacta E IV 2,278 11.5 55 2,506 2,50 no0 2,i66 2,50 -dew. fmxea1th Ebundry eMM ':v-um-.bt. madiiniV E VI 1,25 W0 22 56 566 300 s0o is w66 Ma. Lie kmu Plant PCII rod & food puoi5fts £ V 1,1#21 i6 27 625 50 61 10 3i6 so -Na. (riaita PLastic PwadWl Plastic poduou K ViI 2,093 35 III $50 556 3in S50 a SW - -
NJiami Siime. ntbtal NBC! e1taA pfaU&NO £ IV 976 106 5 I,6M A 6a of 30 VA - -INmiai Hfg. 0b. IWI ftMa 6 nibr puhwts £ IV 1,5U3 '6 2 1,133 VA is meg 3 - - LNoema Mg. NMSFI baumw E IV 6111 36 22 1,050# 306 26 20 7 260 3 '.0 0OLdVa's Unepm'ses NFOI Paibc uu.hm:ts c IV 323 17 2 623 we 6£1 *5 1. 250 - -Onex Inds. Piulsi. NSF! Plastic mi,&wts C IV 967 20 36 300 MO 10 3o s0 mO - -Owerland Pru)tu'.g Invcs SElF Nintinmjpublishilg E TV 9. 56 9 30 30 313 36 - 3 300
Ow~Ste -A rp. lUll A4Aa1 p.u1mts c IV 11,763 '65 25 2,733 NO 26 360 6 '650 3 2WdP4A.deKnitting LGurwant W6 Aupin I &pvits E IV 629 167 '66 6,333 2,506 39 2,500 7 2,500 - -Papunj.wn Age5g*tt- 01 I s- rn- t&Wilicneisa prods. E IV-A 3,066 1'0 71 1.566 00 53 l S Non - -Pacific Franu tSfl -bod I kxad prodchts E I 3,6 560so 1,150 A 73 300 5 kwS 3 2U.PvayN Bajoo Factoiry NSF! food I food puuiwta E VI 1,307 SS 10 652 M0G 77 SW0 10 '60 3 5.41PdMmif* CdO..png lquiPt. tONrI flSC. aWg-sgomtizr SOO& C IV '671 29 7 300 300 100 200 - - 3 301Paaiaq Wuod Imilmtries a)b .ood I oark prouhMt £ IV-A 1,669 56 '66 2,506 2,500 100 NoS 10 60 - -P. C.Javie~r LSoos 01 me-ta products E IV 2,220 101. - 1,697 1,500 79 1,50 a 1,500- -Pearl IsLrnKL- CAm'l. (brp.NbnF Pr'intinapubtishing E IV 3,351 67 G0 2,600 2,100 61 1,050 l0 1,050 - -1Pow Plastucs Mlfg. aDO PL&.tic proucEts £ IV 2,016 13U - '6,61.' 2,000 '69 2,000 7 I'mW 3 201uPemams, IkUa.w Blxd.s NulI L....-wtaUic ninema prod. C VI 767 35 - 200 100 so l00 - - 3 113P. C. TCmh- L Clu. Null Ele~ct. mmchinw/appLim'm C IV 2,3r. 116 - S00 500 100 So0 - - 3 5soIh%ao1Fhi 1!.. MD0 0i Ldchm. pso&Etc C IV 3,375 6 69 3,97$ 1.000 25 1,0100 7 1L006 - -.E2 9ujJm 11g. U:jP. Null Aji.C. matg.-sDKlSIeci £ III 1,.105 73 '65 1,50 600 53 61 7 60 - -HlUI. Ailaa l.i At"i1 -z NB1131 ktdl~ prodcthfs E IV 2,51.6 91 - 2,156 1,000 '66 SW0 l0 50 - -Flhu). N.JiaS& I'..Ak- NtOll 1ou L toad pxudwts E VI 1,300 33 33 7110 600 6I 1.230 is 1.20 - -Ilijil I.u'a. 14XAKA'I.. N11f11 Fand 1 fou.. prodwts C VIl 206 70 6 692 350 51 175 1 7 - -litil. Is'iJ.11'.5 sum, ..4% illilI 'i'll" Us,./jwAAU1~Ung E IV 1,936 '65 S 300 300 100 336 - - 3 Apoiflul I. kda.u,t Vtt4mIL,M t. sb ij,~. IsaJC-~.urV1C41 alcwes N )a1 '5.-01~f W i -
_ _ _ _ _ ~~ ~S ' l- urns- ' - liil||
ins atof l Total £N.mW o 0 Miuti- St- LOC. 1t lbta, 1to-tu pro- lb- Ibtol A ftoject Tal )et Size of r
sui4aJeac t ti Inbdutry jet M ) 1ssts tl timal olst 1aume ot S - m Q 1nt
pllt. Wurlidod: KfgPlasti NBFn Plastc I Into E IV 3,670 102 36 1,100 1,700 100 1,700 9 1,00 - -
llilips rcd Cup. tBll bd L food pro&.mts E IV 3,617 136 56 2,325 2,000 86 2,001 - - I 2,i1PIC.0o Sh.e Shop e ram,a E TV 695 J3 30 350 310 0 310 0 26 3 51PFu2 1.jd Pndwtsi Ne1l .wod L toad pmicts £ X 26 11 529 500 95 250 * ISO 3 10,5p.".C. wwtvafut Pak metal prkmlts E VI 637 26 s w 5SW 100 SW 6 30 3 lkPI.:r Iid'1.LVfg. WM. 11 Mbetal pguuuts E IV-A 2,10W so 95 3.8U 2,20W 5 2,a0o 7 1,00) 3 01t.ar Synthetic kbs±r N911 .him L nmbbw pj t E VW-A 1,907 106 _ 1,56O 1,200 76 120 la 1,20 - -Prins lnd'. Orp. Nell *Asic mtal izdustrim E IV 3,67 Us 52 2,000 16 Os 1,100 6 1,0 - -Prinb.±l, l.c. tell ArincWpablishiag E IV 3,U i 100 in 18,675 2.50 56 2,500 le 2,51J0 - -
Piopn lIduiries on %*WWI u , _ts E VIl 2,12; 25 33 Go 0 67 %00 0 A00 - -Q.C. Styropad% amp. COO lisc. .fg-styvralmtwiasE 111 2,173 56. 165 2,500 2,500 100 2,500 6 2,030 3 SW Q Awuuan A e SIlA mll 'oo;utar E IV U6 72 10 900 9 100 SW 7 700 3 20.jQL&mn Frcood odlgA. cm iXi 1 fA P ucts C' IV 1,U US 30 1,600 1,10 100 1,;IU 7 1,600 -Plpid nduatrese Ntel M.atl wxtcts E IV 3,21 159 30 3,500 1,500 100 750 - - 3 iSAPayat Ljqxmt nLkxtvies (DB 1jaet & gwauto E III 716 s0 365 S1O 500 100 SOO a 325 3 175
Rv,, woj1ntt amp. Nir. W E I ork prodwts E IV-A 2-901 110 2 1,000 1,0m0 100 1,000 7 700 3 3usDWwd Stee l **gcstews WWFI ttal prodcts E IV 5 92 0 120 tg 50 50o SO 6 m0 -Lao's FlanishingI aIS %nLitU fit m £ IV 207 26 is 331 300 90 ISO a we0 3 50ApmbLic Ajr'l. Prodievt US Frod & food pu&wt E IV 2.06 37 60 jbhiaU.t.I900-52 1,00 le 1,10 3 24,3.
Ridpo Papw aaqi. NUFl Paper L ppwpr poxduh E IV 3,317 tS 0S 3,000 2,5D0 33 2,000 10 2,000 -lizal htdal l'nEbAXts eln Smic mtil idustriAm E IV-A 3,3S i 66 ,110 1,10 100 'ISO 6 60o 3 19 "fDIty ftuIyc Entepris*es OM Iiparel L Uinu E IV-A 1,6? 200 100 3,263' I,O '3 1,60 6 I,1W 3 30J -fbtoum l'ruitu.g lItg. tell tiantia hia z C IV 1,201 0 10 1,m0 1,000 53 1,300 7 1,0=0 - -So" Af-Ld'L. &Lv.
(bu. 0(i road f food pW acts E VI 3,937 .s 16 2,5D0 2,S00 100 2,500 12 2,10W 3 WSlmad uje 1Lxudl NOU7 7b. f dc-. pEk-s E IV 1,1x '6 32 759 Soo 6 ;00 7 SUO -
Sdnt &qp % te 1-1. tBrl i&a-etallic ma lmi pdos. r III 96 36 - 30 300 100 300 - - 3 Ws&Avr ri. V,. CAoP. aS rood L food prl _WU E If-A 1,66 so 9 710 70 100 100 - - 3 7&sWr l1suAj.li. (Ia flmutum I fixtui c IV 1, 300 100 2,102 1,000 '6 3,JO0 £ 7.00 3 b32iAtdgIA1i lii, w1Ai1 irxLb.. 4iHn *xxx p cnt puuduts E NV-A 1,26 U 22 655 210 0 2a0 - -
a;1eiss .L.L.ticPbo-.Ol Phistic pmw.ts E IV 2,033 26 30 736 526 71 526 1 2X 3 2U L1... U.,SL.Wt.r l.> lI.umLt ilttn liLJ I lcxap pducts C VI 2,22 1% 17 300 lUU 100 .1 0 - -
RuWIE F W IDISUIM.L sWMi1 AM lMu RuDPMJ O aUwnzEMW - IM 31274
Olamateinstims of FiwAd Ibdu law. 1727-
-~~~~~. _G_o_
w'gi- SZOFturmmmw sm orof Ic. EinUS A'sss WOML Cr2 ar (Lf FIE nNm!I 11_1SS*b- Ionc- Al M lor or g!1NZGIflFO- ticn of IJa At poj- pmi- Ouma- TOW lba 51 uKr
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SuL _ _ _ 4 ~ ! i. tiinto at Id 1.o (mt Isubilm CrA vc Suec t :lassi fication a/ altnti 10tS k I zEz
Aleoo nt ru'ses N-elect. wchinery E VI 535 1,073 142 S92 S0 'SO 76 154 a - I-a 1-Q * i
Alph1imnt. Oxmtr.Prm. 'km-ctallic min.pisu. E IV-A 1,60 2,251 SO3 130 ( 13) 300 SS 300 10 - 7-60 aso a
Al... Cznt:ainzs, Inc. Nttal producis c IV 2,07 5,30S 1,701 1,707 - 1.500 1,100 5 - 2-S1 2-U 0
A)a1 tad LAne cmp. rietal pgsubits E IV 2,917 1,593 5,297 5.297 - 2.500 is? 2,100 7 3 's- '-S s
hin e's Shoe Ship toear E IV 1,S15 2,'67 1,000 1,112 112 1.000 90 1,000 7 3 1-Ui -U * 3
hAsl.i elastic PRsi. Plitic prsxbts E IV 1,097 3,066 1,300 1,300 - 1,310 100 1,303 7 3 55-0 111-0U 0
Asia rum. I Woxdcntt Fbmitums & fixtwm E VI 739 1,310 SW0 500 - 500 100 S00 10 - I-di. li-U 0
Awerle Ir.'I.Dev. (DrP. PIastic pdi Cts E VII 2,936 4,030 1,35S 1,3514 - 1,250 92 50 10 - 1-02 -r *6 S
bir Am lxi K4g. Faod probsts E V 16 I'S 15 5 3 lOS 13 13 5 3 54a1 * I
DeLicioat rood Mfg. rbod products E IV-A 135 1.966 13 SSS 17 10O u 6 - 's-Il 1_-U a
Fr_ Shirt Mfg. Lit. Cmwnts E IV 1,292 2.0 no w0 - n0o 25 NO I - 11we 2-e1 *'
FAV C.da aAu. L Steel 1tal pnxbwits E XI 1,90 2,262 1.1 1.11's - 0OO 6S G0 3 5 I 01 6 -1 a
aI-SJ'UJLni'.Lorp. ltsc.-Tys L bicycles * IV 973 2,253 2,897 2,917 20 1,200 161 600 7 - 6_3 3I .6
0"
~- Gin-
009 f link mi mP ow a iw~ -mLowia AR itsmIF orup o IQ Ait p. w- O_S'- TOW Ib-
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f T Int'l .I'oxsuw E IV 2,6X 3.6S 1,0 1,2W W 1.210 1,2' 6 - S-U 641 aIWIU Ms. (up. ktal pmatS I IV 1,517 2,216 m m - m 100 m 3 3 T-a +ailNw33b ridM Wi. liac.- hri ifts 3 vi 10,210 1,21* 1,15 1,9%3 - I,SO6 1G0 75 7 3 WU 1041NH1UaIB l rdma Indk. *j'AUUmr pw t. . III 2,101 %,262 16 1,000 - 1,600 100 1,m 7 - 3-U 1U *i "bIya PiLi*t Cm rFod puudts £ V 103 1,1U3 1111 16 - 100 1011 10 - 3 3-U 3U |hqp.ial Alu. Inc. a metal psacts E vII 1,1102 2,075 o00 to - Wo 1o0 200 6 - WUn 3 5In peialty hu. 0 1ca p!" £ IV 2,2S1 2,351 S75 P7S - 506 67 100 6 3 -0 We * I
IrsuLd R.tta .n mitum * fiitwus E Vil 3,121 3,313 1,50 1,10D - 1,50 1.6 1,500 I - G-5 9-1 * IIsainl Kachim Wafts wa-elec. mhinny E X 2,111 2,S72 1,000 1,660 - I,m 1a 1,1M to - u-s 6-a * 7InUa 'ot1.Blooming Smic mtal Aintriw E VWU 2,775 5,639 3,510 3,*10 - 2,100 71 2,100 10 - 1-6 1-00 aJa Int'l. GIumts Lunts c IV 3,317 *,09 2,233 2,233 - 2,233 100 2,000 7 - 8-4U * 1 IJ.H.C. t.&. Cbrp. -Ilf tullic miin prb. E Vm 977 2,221 6S0 6S0 - w00 n 2S0 7 - 3-*1 1WU * 1Jojo's rood PIro&Es -Txd pjmduts c Vll 2,51 7,%07 4.116 1,20 %10 2,i00 2,0 10 3 1-51 1-U * S,J.L Ozicmte Pno&. icui-mtallic minprbs. E VI 1,000 1,130 S00 1S0 S 5W0 n 10 s 3 40 S- a.izmtt nlan, Inc. P itumF. fixtne. E III 1,31& 1,1 100 121 2n be 9f S01 7 3 1-U 2-I 0*
Matlal.lIiuitrxes Meal pro ; E IV 002 1,179 362 972 iu w0 51 500 10 - -61 S-U2 * 5ltdn L Eq.ni_nt I
OicAl Lnt. IU*w prodcts E IV-A 1V9 1,611 1.0 2,500 600 S00 20 S00 9 - 07 1-U *1 1Monti Prsi* PrintinJpubuishing E IV 2,1U 3,951 20 2.000 - 2,000 1W0 2,000 p i &-40 -00 0dm Asia Critexumrses i Sc. -handicvifts E V 3,332 10,763 1,111 1,135 - 600 53 600 - 3 7-S0 7-00 9aimtat Frod PxLts lhod product E IV 1,1012 6,695 2,000 2,600 - 2,000 100 2,000 7 3 3-0s 3_6 01iagm Safmet Metal tal products E IV 178 2,185 100 1,00 - 6W 0 m 10 - 6-U1 2-6 *SP.panjan Aa5rvit-s No)-uet-Ilic win.pnb. E IY-A 3,066 3,1100 1,500 1,100 - 600 S3 900 S - 7-S0 714 Paftmy kumd Inds. Woa3d phIchmts E IV-A 1'm" 2,3n7 2 2,00 - 2,500 100 No 10 - f-6 _ *toP.G. Toma t Wo. ELect. midh./applimnce E IV 2,391 1,063 71n so - 5W 0 s1 - s-0 6-0 5Ptul.Am.limSAtors P tal psoducts E IV 2,S5% 1,S92 1,216 2,IA 660 1,000 6 00 10 - S-6 102 * II%IL. Koh.int PcjkrL tfc. -sagical g1o,ws Nf )a 5 I,S6 000 1,U (200) 600 10 in 7 - wit 3-6 *1Purn HxA lilr . JxA4 prun -&at E X 6s 1,il11 12 529 - 500 9 250 I 3 3-U 1541 aI1L M:tatlTutt Pmtsk peauht. E VI 667 1,213 m0 S00 - S0 100 SW0 6 3 4.AJ 3 II
N,
tu.g u"b- SUE orof 4os 065 MS M DAL PON= aU1 I(3 FDiIII(31 iDn1U rSub-Lo- mUAt' O- t7 or % MMpo- tim. of II Al IUoj. 0woR- T t- 11a1 Tioal Slfnatbty Igt (Bl- h'is. lb- ,_ b- ft j. Sim at s ,M1 )SubnjoJec¶t c3mifiosti si _im tit_ t- - -twl b - -_e -a S MC -5@
J.C. Stynup.duI4 (mp. nisc.-Bty,qw £ IU 2,173 .,267 2,500 2,510 - 2,500 10N 2,506 6 3 J-61 r41 # .(Jka rn roi iouk Fad pFana . IV 1,S0 2,326 1,600 1,012 (1U) 1,60 100 1,600 7 - U-0 12-00 alsgt Eqmt Inkwe Aumtm 1 III 71m I S0o SQO - so o 0 U 6 3 12-1 3t8 * Ikm&e lJcureft y. bad pwdwts : IW 2,16 3,%35 1,000 1,000 - 1,000 100 1,000 7 3 5-6 S 3-61 * I*Ped Steel raricetoa IHl Prodcts p IV St? 2,611 9% 13 - No0 50 NO 6 - 12-U 2-t1 * 2fun's Jlaiishiag nfLitu S fixtai £: IV 207 52' 330 331 30 3in to a 3 1-6 0-05 * Isnwr foo Hfg. ud emdubctE IV-A 1,500 1,600 700 700 - 200 10 in - 3 1 -61 6-1 aSea3_ ticPListic Pohdael. tac prots £ IV 2,033 2,220 75 75 - 520 71 520 S 3 1-02 S-4 * 'Sftet* Ecu PLdnt rood podtw s VI 2,22n 2,662 100 360 - 30 in0 1 * - s-U '-f 0Sha Cbmm&vAl P;8c..-Qsaegl r IV-A 970 1,711 o0 63. 3. 61 35 M S - 7-61 1-61 * 3sb1cIlft Pnui5. Inc. tusc.-hwadicrafts £ IV 3,311 0,622 2,1S0 1,67 - l,S06 1,S06 12 - 7-U 7-U1 0Sy'slbrs. ht-. Pess erintiapublihii E VI 1,506 2,561 1,23 1,020 (1N) NI as m 10 - 3-S0 -U 0STrbi *inod pr dwtsbacts f IV 2,006 3,012 2,6 2,001 - 2,0_0 1N 2. 7 13 3-S 12-S * STruassne (s.An'i.Cbp. Chnical puoducts E Vm 3,60 2,0 3,60 3,560 500 2,500 20 2,1 10 - U-U1 "61 *2AmvbrIeni ubd Inrti. foid mdwt5s E IV 1,26 1,7 3,56 3,50 - 2,_ S7 2,0 a - %-U 6-61 * IYu l1 La ref tere Pnss Prinuntjpibliug, E VI 769 1.05 233 226 - 2n 7 2no * - 12-0 12-66 0r o T A L 23575 2 ?.O2 6 lJU 112.S 707 70.320No.o l - 76
AVCNAf 1.f2 3.1" 163 1.6 '05 7 913-31.2 v".
J/ E - ii. N NuG/ An eYxpLwti lor pm)ect ut overiw in .e of 15% of antinomd
x)Ject a5bt is piuvi&d in hwx *.i A aeplvrt.n for pr.)Jact i+_mntatin dhlqs of 6 or mois psoindbd us A *k 0.
0I0oi
DG&F M. a@uW = lm -La IEAic Indiotn f SOf &o600 hnmd thdm Lam 1727-M
(DI bon an dM"o pgow *WW,O(Amt in t'O)
IWFECIL MMI ZDToime a=r PEIoI JB c AO= 1)mm WUA n E IOzLc sM.A LDYS A1. SM %
jti- jti- rau- tit- Esti- ti- o is uz____j___c mated Actua1 Mted Actuul mted Actual teld AL_tual mud Actual mted Actiag I*uau) (Am11
The prolect was delayed due to late nfLiace .at. the pm-disbursemntrequxwwts, speci'icaLly the apletion of the goze 1pdoc=nts.
alays of six (6) *9nthiorr oour.
_ 4Q - Annx SzPage 2 of 2
COST OVERRUNS IN EXCESS OF 152 OF ESTIMATED PROJECT COST
1. Canaan Ham and Sausage (Estimated-P500,OOO; Actual-P815,OOO)
Overrun represented the costs incurred in fencing and construction ofworkers' quarters and restaurant which were not originally included in theestimated project cost.
2. Modern Equipment and Chemical Enterprises (Estimated-Pl,900,000;Actual-P2,500,000)
Cost overrun was caused by long delays in project implementation dueto high construction costs which were not anticipated before the grant ofthe loan.
An overrun in the actual cost of the building resulted because of thedeviation from the original plan of a two-storey to a three-storeybuilding, not discounting the increasing cost of building materials.
4. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation (Estimated-P3,060,000;Actual-F3,560,000)
Cosc overrun represented the additional cost incurred in theconstruction of the factory building which was originally estimated at P2.2millien but was finished at P2.7 million.
- 50 -ANNEX 9
.111}.-~~~ isa
PPDJGT COMM£JON RPT-LDM" 1727-PHIndustA Quar w lam *n L w P
bwhsnat Qamtians 197 -19f4
1 37 a 1979 1 91I0 1 9801 1 96? 1 9603 1 9 6'
No._ ZesrKb SDnt N. et MD. h out No. Aoeotn N W "DAnqm b.ie>n
1 o t a 1 21 551 100.0 6 113.175 OD0.O 115 338,715 100.0 8S9 22,711 100.o.d F'U1,0O0 d. beltw d/ All STDsar ao rmbized with a 60% uarm n in 1978-79. After November 1979 te lJar puarantuJ.1 nv.t P!M,1%l r s . umi available at ttwahn of tw ppLiaut finncial institution.i/ (ver r uJI,uu e/ 4111 - Nti-Lbik finscial tatutuR2M.
I! I*Iii; - prjvate Devecnpmt lunIks Olea
0 '-
-C Y 1 9 8 3
Cotta IrnduBts al Sl Indutry b/ Ikbdium. IndUStV C t o t a I
T o t a 1 169 100.C 211.6 100.0 273 100.0 484.7 100.0
a/ Piojects with total assets below P250,000Sl hojects with total Assets bet_m P250,000 - P2.5 millionc/ h ojocts with total assets betwen P2.5 - P10.0 millionI/ L dividual nuAbers dD not add up to total b.cue of mati-purose loans. IV
0'
o ii
1e
- 65 -
ANNEX 13
?^.rDc1E 'MPLETrDN R£P0R- LGA*l 172 1-PiLdidustial 3uarentee and Loaw Fund
;wrarzed Balance Sheets - As of 2ccencer 31, 1478 to Decber 31, 13Ia*(P'COO)
A s o f e:. e- b e r 3 1_5r-' 19'9 2.98) 138 1362 1383 1384
Collecton %P ef bFir ancint lrntitutiom" L%* t.-:m ?w*eil7a-1904
Amont fall--, ; of CollectionNo. f due luirin the A t cn amut fal-8nR csJnig year Unrclud.g actuall-v =us ir.clud:rrgIr-siir.-tions pasc due) cDilec-ed past due)
: U:r 1.t: X -1 v L it t:,C P.Ak Or.I V*I:.. .. j.. t a i d I.* ~....J: !Air-- 141 canly.
I ai P%
-82- i
IPHLIPPINES IM.XZrRIAL QARA= AND LAN MUD
PRJECr COMPLETION REPORr - LWAN 1727-PH
LIST OF ACCIRTrrm FINANCIAL I7TITtnYIm'sAs of December 31, 1984
Cae7.cial Banks Date Accredited
1. Philippine Bank of Commznications Sept. 17, 19762. Rizal Conmercial Banking Corporation Sept. 27, 19763. Far East Bank and Trust Co. Dec. 14, 19764. Bank of the Philippine Islands Feb. 17, 19775. The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation March 9, 19776. Allied Banking Corporation Sept. 9, 19777. Pacific Banking Corporation Sept. 13, 19778. Producers Bank of the Philippines May 15, 19789. Insular Bank of Asia & America July 14, 197810. Prudential Bank Nov. 2, 197911. China Banking Corporation March 18, 198012. Republic Planters Bank May 23, 198013. Uhion Bank of the Philippines July 22, 198014. Metropolitan Bank S Trust Co. Sept. 27, 198215. Philippine Commercial S International Bank Feb. 11, 198316. Family Bank & Trust Coapan;, Nov. 10, 1983
.on-Bank Finan-ial Intermediaries
1. Private Develop,nent Corporation of the Philippines Sept. 17, 19762. State Investment House, Inc. April 11, 19773. Manphil Investment Corporation April 4, 19784. Philippine Armerican InvestlTnt Corp. (PAIC) Jan. 22, 19805. AEA Development Corporation Feb. 18, 19806. Paramount Finance Corporation >lov. 20, 19807. BA Finance Cornoration Dec. 3, 19818. Investors Finance Corp. (FNCB-Finance) Aug. 22, 1984
Savings & Mortgage Banks
1. PA.C Savings S Mortgage Bank July 10, 19802. Banco de Drc Savings S Mortgage Bark July 7, 19923. Asian Savings Bank 'yov. 22, 1983
Private Develooment Banks
1. PISO Development Bank Sept. 22, 19842. Peoples Development axnk Sept. 22, 19943. Asiatrust Development Bpr;j Sept. 22, 19844. Urtan Development Bank Oct. 15, 19845. Southern 'begros Development Bank Oct. 18, 1984
Specialized Governrent Bark
1. Land Bank of the ?hilippines June 30, 1981
- 83 -
Annex 20
PHILIPPINESINDUSTRIAL GUARANTEE AND LOAN FUND
PROJECT C6OTPLETION REPORT - LOAN 1727-PH
IGLW Trainins ProaramslSominars
Seminar ohi Productivity Improvement through Work SimplificationSupervisory Development CourseBasic Course for SES ExaminersAdvanced Course for SES ExaminersPublic Relations SeminarSeminar on Effective CommunicationEDP Development Seminar
CB Institute Courses
Seminar on Credit EvaluationSeminar on Project EvaluationSeminax on Project Feasibility Study Preparation and AppraisalSeminar on Export FinancingSeminar on Aspect% of Universal Banking and Project Financing--Appraisal, Evaluation and Supervision
Seminar on Export Financing for Nontraditional ExportersCB-Finex Seminar cn Credit EvaluationCB-IGLF ImplemAntors' Course 1!Institutional Appraisal Course
UP-ISSI Courses
Analysis and Evaluation of Investment Projects 1/
Management Consultancy Course 1/
Regional Industrial Development Course 1/
Business Technology Corporation Courses
Seminar on SMSI Financing
Asian Institute of Management Courses
Master in Bu-siness Manigement
1/ Participated in by PFIVs representatives.
- 84 -
Annex 21
PHILIPPINESIhDUSTRI'.L GtARANTEE AND LOAN FUND
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT - LOAN 1727-Ph
IGLF REVIEW COHMITTU3As of December 31, 1984
MANUEL S. ALBADeputy Director-Generallational Economic and Development AuthorityChairman
EUGENIO NIERRAS, JR.Deputy GovernorCentral Bank of the PhilippinesVice-Chairman
JOSE P. LEVISTE, JR.Deputy MinisterMinistry of IndustryMember
VICTOR C. MACALINCAGAssistant MinisterMinistry of FinanceMember
MELITO S. SALAZAR, JR.Director, Institute for Small-Scale IndustriesUniversity of the PhilippinesMember
CECILIA T. ARGUELLESActing Director, Department of Loans and CrediLCentral Bank of the PhilippinesActing Chief Executive Officer for IGLFEx-Officio Member
- 85 -
Annex 22
PHILIPPINESINDUSTRIAL GUARANTEE AND LOAN FUND
PROJZCT COKPLETION REPORT - LOAN 1727-PH
EXCHANGZ RATE MOVDEMNTS, 1975 - 1984
Year Peso/US$ Rate*
1975 7.25
1976 7.44
1977 7.40
1978 7.37
1979 7.38
1980 7.51
1981 7.90
1982 9.17
March , 1983 9.74
June , 1983 11.00
October , 1983 14.00
June , 1984 18.00
December, 1984 18.40
* All data are period averages
- 86 -ANNEX 23
BORROWER COMMENTS
.TCF HC*** '1* ** .t
* OED112 *t*:*j +.44 *
RCA5636248423 WORLDIPANK27550 CBP PH
MAY 187 1989
MR. ALEXANDER NOWICKICHIEF, POLICY-BASErE LENfDING
THANK YOU FOR URLFT OF AF'RIL EIGHTEENTH TRANSMITTINGYOUR PROJECT COMPLETION REFPORT ON THE SECOND, SMALL AND MEDIUMINDIUSTRTES LOAN 1727 PH. IN GENERAL, WE CONSIDER YOURDtFPAFTMENT'S OVER-ALL. ASSESSMENT OF THE PROJECT AS FAVORABLE.ALSO NOTED WITH APPRECIATION ARE YOUR POSITIVE COMMENTS ONTHF SATISFACTORY PERFORIMANCE OF iGLF, I.E. SUBSTANTIAL ATTAIN-MENT OF ITS OBJECTIVES, EXPANSION AND, UPGRADING OF THE NETWORKOF PARTICIF'ATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SEMICOLON IMPROVEDCOLLECTION AND SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS OF IGLF-FINANCEDPROJECTS TO SALES, PROFITS, EXPORTS, IMPORT SUBSTITUTION ANDEMPLOYMENT. WE ADMIT THAT THE REGIONAL DISPERSAL OF INDUSTRIESATARGET OF 60-40 IN FAVOR OF THE COUNTRYSIDE HAS NOT BEENACHIEVED AND TO THIS DATE WE ARE STILL TRYING. THE CB PREPAREDFfR' FOR LOAN ?169 PH HArD ALREADY BEEN SUBMITTEII TO IPRD. PLEASErOMMLiNICATF TO !!S THE RcSULTS OF YOUR EVALUATION OF SAID PROJECT.