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Workshop on Mathematical Models of Cognitive Architectures December 5-9, 2011 CIRM, Marseille Abstract This presentation will look at action, perception and cognition as emergent phenomena under a unifying perspective: This Helmholtzian perspective regards the brain as a (generative) model of its environment. The imperative for any brain is then to optimize a free energy bound on the (Bayesian) evidence for its model of the world. We will see that this is not just mandated for the brain but for any self-organizing system that resists a natural tendency to disorder in a changing environment. More specifically, maximizing Bayesian evidence leads in a fairly straightforward way to an understanding of action as active inference, and perception in terms of predictive coding. I hope to illustrate these points using simulations of perceptual categorization and action observation. Active inference, free energy and the Bayesian brain Karl Friston University College London
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Workshop on Mathematical Models of Cognitive Architectures December 5-9, 2011 CIRM, Marseille Workshop on Mathematical Models of Cognitive Architectures.

Jan 19, 2016

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Slide 1

Workshop on Mathematical Models of Cognitive Architectures December 5-9, 2011CIRM, Marseille

Abstract

This presentation will look at action, perception and cognition as emergent phenomena under a unifying perspective: This Helmholtzian perspective regards the brain as a (generative) model of its environment. The imperative for any brain is then to optimize a free energy bound on the (Bayesian) evidence for its model of the world. We will see that this is not just mandated for the brain but for any self-organizing system that resists a natural tendency to disorder in a changing environment. More specifically, maximizing Bayesian evidence leads in a fairly straightforward way to an understanding of action as active inference, and perception in terms of predictive coding. I hope to illustrate these points using simulations of perceptual categorization and action observation.

Active inference, free energy and the Bayesian brain

Karl FristonUniversity College London

Objects are always imagined as being present in the field of vision as would have to be there in order to produce the same impression on the nervous mechanism - Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand von Helmholtz

Thomas BayesGeoffrey HintonRichard FeynmanFrom the Helmholtz machine to the Bayesian brain and self-organizationHermann Haken

Richard Gregory

Gerry EdelmanStephen Grossberg

Overview

Ensemble dynamicsEntropy and equilibriaFree-energy and surprise

Free-energy principleAction and perceptionHierarchies and generative models

PerceptionBirdsong and categorizationSimulated lesions

ActionActive inferenceAction observation

temperatureWhat is the difference between a snowflake and a bird?

Phase-boundary

a bird can move (to avoid surprises)

4What is the difference between snowfall and a flock of birds?Ensemble dynamics, clumping and swarming

birds (biological agents) stay in the same place They resist the second law of thermodynamics, which says that their entropy should increase

This means biological agents must self-organize to minimize surprise - to ensure they occupy a limited number of states (cf homeostasis).

But what is the entropy?

entropy is just average surpriseLow surprise (we are usually here)High surprise (I am never here)

But there is a small problem agents cannot measure their surpriseBut they can measure their free-energy, which is always bigger than surprise

This means agents should minimize their free-energy?

Change sensory inputsensations predictionsPrediction errorChange predictionsActionPerceptionaction and perception to suppress prediction errors and minimise surpriseWhat is free-energy?free-energy is basically prediction error

Action to minimise a bound on surprisePerception to optimise the bound

Action

External states in the worldInternal states of the agent (m)Sensations

More formally,

Free-energy is a function of sensations and a proposal density over hidden causes

and can be evaluated, given a generative model comprising a likelihood and prior:

So what models might the brain use?

Action

External states in the worldInternal states of the agent (m)Sensations

Backward(modulatory)Forward(driving)lateral

Hierarchal models in the brainAnd their hidden states, causes and parameters

Synaptic gainSynaptic activitySynaptic efficacyActivity-dependent plasticityFunctional specializationAttentional gainEnabling of plasticity

Perception and inferenceLearning and memoryThe proposal density and its sufficient statistics

Laplace approximation:Attention and salience

Synaptic activity

Synaptic plasticity

Synaptic gaincf Hebb's Lawcf Rescorla-Wagnercf Bayesian filtering or Predictive coding

Laplace code assumption

Free energy minimisation

Generative model

Backward predictionsForward prediction error

Synaptic activity and message-passing

David MumfordPredictive coding

Adjust hypothesessensory inputBackward connections return predictionsby hierarchical message passing in the brain

prediction

Forward connections convey feedbackPerceptual inference hierarchical message passingPrediction errorsPredictions

Summary

Biological agents resist the second law of thermodynamics

They must minimize their average surprise (entropy)

They minimize surprise by suppressing prediction error (free-energy)

Prediction error can be reduced by changing predictions (perception)

Prediction error can be reduced by changing sensations (action)

Perception entails recurrent message passing in the brain to optimise predictions

Action makes predictions come true (and minimises surprise)Overview

Ensemble dynamicsEntropy and equilibriaFree-energy and surprise

Free-energy principleAction and perceptionHierarchies and generative models

PerceptionBirdsong and categorizationSimulated lesions

ActionActive inferenceAction observation

Generating bird songs with attractorsSyrinxHVC

time (sec)FrequencySonogram0.511.5

causal stateshidden states

102030405060-505101520prediction and error102030405060-505101520hidden statesBackward predictionsForward prediction error102030405060-10-505101520causal statesPerception and message passing

stimulus0.20.40.60.82000250030003500400045005000time (seconds)

Perceptual categorization

Frequency (Hz)Song a

time (seconds)Song b

Song c

Hierarchical (deep) birdsong: sequences of sequencesSyrinxNeuronal hierarchy

Time (sec)Frequency (KHz)sonogram0.511.5

Christoph vonder Malsburg

Frequency (Hz)perceptFrequency (Hz)no top-down messagestime (seconds)Frequency (Hz)no lateral messages0.511.5-40-200204060LFP (micro-volts)LFP-60-40-200204060LFP (micro-volts)LFP0500100015002000-60-40-200204060peristimulus time (ms)LFP (micro-volts)LFP

Simulated lesions and false inference

no structural priorsno dynamical priorsOverview

Ensemble dynamicsEntropy and equilibriaFree-energy and surprise

Free-energy principleAction and perceptionHierarchies and generative models

PerceptionBirdsong and categorizationSimulated lesions

ActionActive inferenceAction observation

predictionsReflexes to action

action

dorsal rootventral hornsensory errorActive inferenceAction can only suppress (sensory) prediction error. This means action fulfils our (sensory) predictions

Descendingproprioceptive predictionsvisual inputproprioceptive inputAction, predictions and priors

Exteroceptive predictions

Autonomous behavior and action-observation00.20.40.60.811.21.40.40.60.811.21.4actionposition (x)position (y)00.20.40.60.811.21.4observationposition (x)Descending predictionshidden attractor states(Lotka-Volterra)

Thank you

And thanks to collaborators:

Rick AdamsSven BestmannJean DaunizeauHarriet BrownLee HarrisonStefan KiebelJames KilnerJrmie MattoutKlaas Stephan

And colleagues:

Peter DayanJrn DiedrichsenPaul VerschureFlorentin Wrgtter

And many others

Perception and Action: The optimisation of neuronal and neuromuscular activity to suppress prediction errors (or free-energy) based on generative models of sensory data.

Learning and attention: The optimisation of synaptic gain and efficacy over seconds to hours, to encode the precisions of prediction errors and causal structure in the sensorium. This entails suppression of free-energy over time.

Neurodevelopment: Model optimisation through activity-dependent pruning and maintenance of neuronal connections that are specified epigenetically

Evolution: Optimisation of the average free-energy (free-fitness) over time and individuals of a given class (e.g., conspecifics) by selective pressure on the epigenetic specification of their generative models.

Time-scaleFree-energy minimisation leading to