Worksheet #2: Brian Davies
A Paper Submitted to Dr. Robert Stewart of the New Orleans
Baptist Theological Seminary
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Course
Philosophy of Religion: PHIL5300RS in the Division of
Philosophy
Matthew C. Jolley B.S., Shorter College, 2007 April 28, 2011
RESEARCH Question 1 When J.L Mackie proposes the idea that evil
shows that there is no God, he brings several good points, but his
basic issue is the contrast of God being wholly good and
omnipotent, while there is evil in the world (this is the basic
problem of evil). He believes that if a good and omnipotent God
exists, evil would be done away with. He writes, From these it
follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely,
and then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists, and
that evil exists, are incompatible (582). Mackies observance of a
few adequate solutions (such as denying Gods omnipotence or
goodness) by various thinkers is what makes Swinburnes argument
strong. Swinburne does not go the route of stripping God of his
omnipotence or goodness, but rather supports and uplifts his
sovereignty and divine right to allowing what He will allow, for
His sovereign purposes- for good purposes. Also within this line or
argument lies the question of Who decided that God is liable? This
comes as a blow to the one who would argue that God has
responsibility to quell suffering and evil. Swinburne tells the
story of his responsibility for his own children. Since he is a
Father, he has the right to let his children suffer somewhat for
the good of their souls. So then, if indeed God is creator, He too
has the right to allow suffering for a purpose. Swinburne writes, I
have this right because in a small part I am responsible for his
existence, its beginning and continuance. If this is correct, then
a fortiori, God who is ex hypothesi, so much more the author of our
being than are our parents, has so many more rights in this
respect. (607). For the theodicist, Swinburnes argument is helpful.
From the standpoint of belief in a divine sovereign God, there is
no logical fallacy with Swinburnes argument, and this makes it
strong. Swinburne definitely supports a free-will defense, and one
could purport that he may even support a soulbuilding theodicy. So,
another strength for Swinburne is his reasoning for evil. Right out
of the
box he assigns evil a purpose. This is Swinburnes basic
position- God is using evil for a greater good, saying, Hence a God
who sees far more clearly than we do the consequences of quarrels
may have duties very different from ours with respect to particular
such quarrels. He may know that the suffering that A will cause B
is not nearly as great as Bs screams might suggest to us and will
provide (unknown to us) an opportunity to C to help B recover and
will thus give C a deep responsibility which he would not otherwise
have (606). This ties in with Swinburnes other basic remarks that
ask the questions, of is it better to live free or as robots? To
Swinburne, it is a much greater good that a Creator would create a
half finished universe and create immature creatures, who are
humanly free agentsthat he should allow them to exercise some
choice over what kind of creatures they are to become (611). One
sees the soul-building theodicy and free-will defense all wrapped
up within this statement. What evils may occur not only provides
for the completion of a greater good, but also gives purpose,
meaning, and motivation to the lives of those living on the earth.
A clear weakness may be seen in the location of the good that has
come from evil. One may ask, Where is the good of a Tsunami in
Japan to be seen? Where is the good in my daughter committing
suicide? Theodicists and anti-theodicists alike may struggle with
these questions. Swinburnes biblical defense is based in faith that
Gods goodness, faithfulness, and plan remain intact, despite
suffering (see Romans 5:1-6). This is the central thread that runs
through the kind of theodicy that Swinburne presents, that there is
a greater good in Gods mind when it pertains to the creation of a
place where there are free agents and sufferings. McCabes argument
of lions, lambs, and washing machines makes for a very readable and
understandable dealing with the problem of evil, and his basic
strength in addressing the problems lies (like Swinburne) in his
interesting angle on what good is, and the value to be found in
that good. He also finds good and value in what could be considered
evil, especially in the
recurring example of the lion and the lamb example. A lamb may
consider being eaten by a lion to be a bad or evil thing. However,
to the lion, there is much good in eating a lamb. From a creative
standpoint (that is, from Gods creation standpoint), making a good
lion necessarily means that a lamb will be eaten. Thinking on
Swinburnes early comment that God has created an immature world
that matures through choice (and some of those choices being bad),
one may see the link here. In the lion and lamb scenario, both the
lion and the lamb (not the lamb being eaten, but perhaps the nearby
watching lambs) experience some sort of learning. The lion learns
that the lamb is good for food and for being full. The lambs nearby
learn to run away from the lion. Their lifespan may experience an
extension. McCabe writes, But in creating good lions we can
certainly say that God brings it about indirectly that there shall
be evil suffered. He brings it about because it is not possible to
bring about this good without allowing for the concomitant defects
(619). One may say in response to this (which may be a seemingly
inherent weakness), Why Lions?! This seems to be the natural
question, to which McCabes argument comes to a point. In McCabes
view, suffering, evil, pain, etc. are necessary for survival. Take
for example this scenario: To have a world with no lions at all
would mean to have a world with no growth, no forward movement at
all. What he means is that in almost every situation of life, pain
(some may say conflicts of sorts) is a catalyst for future good as
a result of learning a response to said pain. God could have
certainly created a world where the lion is fed, ones two year old
is never burned by a hot stove, and a world where there is no
consequence for action. But this would be to have no material world
at all. There would be no law in this world, no order, no reasons.
In the common thread of reason for evil, sufferings, or pain,
Swinburne and McCabe could be used together as a common theodicy.
These two together could effectively give at least
a logical explanation of why evil. What they both also
(importantly) do is establish a difference between passive evils
(that is, evils experienced) and active evils (McCable calls these
morally evil acts). The explanation given of the difference between
the two redeems Gods character. Though it need no redemption to
Christians, it needs defending to unbelievers. Where Swinburne
talks of passive and active evils, McCabe talks about them
practically. Basically, there are sorts of evils which God can use
directly. Natural disasters, sicknesses, etc. can be used for God
as they are being felt, not inflicted by an individual. The moral
evils that McCabe describes (murder, rape, etc.) are evils that not
only defile and cause suffering and pain to the one receiving, but
also to the one doing. If the definition means that evil is more
the lack of a key element that makes something fully itself, one
may easily see that (by some standard derived somewhere) that these
moral acts are devoid of good at all, seeing that their conception
and execution hurt people on both ends. McCabe writes, I mean that
acting unjustly is a bad effect on me, it is a diminishment of me,
just as not being able to rinse the clothes is a diminishment of
the washing machine. And the point is that the diminishment is
brought about by me. So there is no separate agent to achieve
something by diminishing me, as the lion achieves something by
diminishing the lamb; evil done is evil to the perpetrator himself.
It is a dead loss with no good aspect to it (622). Though this
argument lays a burden (at least partially) on human shoulders, the
weakness here is that there is still no argument here from McCabe
(or Swinburne) for the present conflict with omnipotence, that is,
if God has omnipotence, why didnt he stop said wicked actions? Is
he a careless helmsman who fails to steer the ship clear of the
rocks (624)? But the bottom line for McCabe, as with Swinburne, is
that for one to blame God for evil, that person will have to prove
that the Almighty has a obligation to relieve evil. However, there
can be no rule for God, for if He is the highest, and omnipotent,
omnibenevolent, and as the Bible describes him, there is no one
above him. Thus there can be no sense in the idea that God has any
job or is
under any obligation; if he were, there would be something
greater than God which constrained him. And this does not fit the
picture of the God of the bible, who is mostly the One who receives
the blame for evil. Based on Romans 11:33-35, and particularly the
story of Joseph, I like Swinburnes argument the most. If one finds
themselves in a conversation about God and evil, at least
Swinburnes argument gives a possible and logical reason why God
might allow evil to occur. Freedom and a greater good are what
people are fighting for anyway (well, for the most part). To me
this argument not only rings true to scripture, but to the hearts
of every altruistic person desiring to find good in the bad. It
also points logically to the human situation of being finite and
self-absorbed. So what if there is NO God? What then? The problem
of evil is not solved because evil would still be in the equation,
and then this argument begins to ask the question, What then is the
source of this evil? One would quickly discover his or her hearts
intentions. To give a reason for suffering, whether it be Gods
greater good, soul building, or even looking forward to an
eschatological redemption not only seems logically possible, but
provides hope. Question 2 Wolsterstorffs basic argument for God
being everlasting and not eternal clearly hinges on his definition
of what eternality is. And his view is very narrow. In
Wolsterstorffs estimation, the definition of eternality is a being
who is not at all temporal. This being would not be aware of my
actions, any temporal event, nor have any knowledge that said event
was occurring. This being could also not remember that it had
occurred, nor could be plan to bring these events about for any
reason at all. The reason that I feel his definition is weak is
that he leans too much on Gods actions in the world. His whole
position doesnt really rest on Gods everlasting nature, but rather
on the everlasting nature of his actions. To Wolsterstorff, God
is
everlasting because his actions have a past, a present, and a
future. Since his definition of being eternal looks more like
deism, his position is wobbly. He points to two major themes. (1)
Gods actions are temporal, and they take place in our world. God is
also changed by our actions (thus he is changed by temporal
things). He knows what is happening in our history, what has
happened, and what will happen. Hence, some of Gods actions are
temporal events (499). Using the language of non-occurrence,
occurrence, and then non-occurrence, he posits that God must be
everlasting (that is, a part of our world) because the
nonoccurrence followed be the occurrence followed by the
nonoccurrence of such knowing constitutes a change on Gods
timestrand. Accordingly, God is fundamentally noneternal (499). The
change in Gods time-strand is something that he keys in on a lot,
and it manifests itself in his belief in Gods change-ability. He
writes of Gods actions being infected by temporality: they are
infected by the temporality of the events or for some other reason.
One way of developing this latter alternative would be to show that
some of Gods actions must be understood as a response to the free
actions of human beings-that what God does he sometimes does in
response to what some human being does (499). His basic idea is
that for God to be eternal, God would operate on some timeline that
is other than ours. But since, Wolsterstorff would say, Gods
actions have a beginning and end, a nonoccurrence, occurrence, and
nonoccurrence, and sometimes these actions are affected by men,
that he must indeed operate within a timeline, even a human
timeline, and so it follows that he must not be eternal.
Wolsterstorffs arguments are logically sound. His argument is very
interesting because he upholds Gods absolute fidelity and
faithfulness while saying that The theological tradition of Gods
ontological immutability has no explicit biblical foundation (503).
But is mutability really a reason to say that God is simply
everlasting? I think not. Perhaps on the scale of acting within the
world God seems mutable to us. The bottom line for Wolsterstorff is
that God is not outside our timeline (his definition of eternal),
but rather that
God is inside our time and we share time with God. This is based
in his summation of Gods mutability and change based on human
interjections, as well as his actions taking place in our realm and
being infected by mutability. But how could God even remain
everlasting if this were the case? This is the part of the argument
that to me, Wolsterstoff seems to miss. God obviously does not
simply exist in our timeline. To say that he simply existed within
our timeline (which seems to be what he means by everlasting),
perhaps heaven would be in the universe someplace? If this is not
the case, then what timeline is heaven on? Also ours? In a
different realm? Wolsterstoffs argument seems incomplete. While God
does indeed work within our timeline, He is also outside our
timeline. Though there are some comparisons between Stump/Kretzmann
and Wolsterstorff, the contrast in the two positions comes out
quite strongly (or rather, S&K complete Wolsterstorff). This
misunderstanding of eternality is what Stump and Kretzmann address
right away saying that eternality is sometimes construed simply as
atemporality, eternity being understood in that case as roughly
analogous to an isolated, static instant (505). In this first
instant, there is a contrast rather than a comparison. However,
S&K do acknowledge that God isnt simply atemporal, but that
although He is eternal (that is, possessing his life all at once
(508)), it is in his eternality that He is able to have present
existence, a touch of temporality. And by touch I mean to say that
S&K combine the two terms everlasting and eternal to come out
with a definition of what God actually is: transcendent yet
immanent. S&K use the example of God being atemporal to show
how he can be outside of time yet operate within our time as well.
Jeremiah 23:23-24 show us that God is a God near, yet a God who
fills the earth. But his ability of knowing all is severely limited
by Wolsterstorff, as he changes based on something that occurred to
him in time, potentially through a person or event. What S&K
make clear is that God knows. God does not
learn, He cannot reason, or infer. To do these means that
something would have to occur to God, and within the understanding
of Gods omniscience, this cannot be. However, supporting the fact
that God is Spirit and (from what Aquinas says) is a mind, his life
as an eternal entity and as a mind does in fact mean that he is
alive, and so his mind does things that make a difference in a
temporal world, although he is atemporal. S&K write, We do not
see that anything prevents such an entity from being angry, a state
the components of which might be, for instance, being aware of an
injustice, disapproving of it, and willing its punishment. It seems
then that ht enotion of an atemporal mind is not incoherent, but
that, on the contrary, it is possible that such a mind might have a
variety of faculties or activities (517). So the comparisons
between Wolsterstorff, Stump, and Kretzmann lie in the fact that
they both, without a doubt, agree that God works within our
timeline. However, the major difference lies in their definition of
eternality. Paul Helm takes what feels like the most biblical
argument when he boils everything with three statements: 1) Either
there was a time when God began to exist, which is impossible (See
Genesis 1:1, Ps 41:13, Ps. 90:2, Ps. 106:48). Therefore, God exists
timelessly (529). He explains himself well by using the example of
Gods existence in our lifetimes as humans. He writes, It makes
sense to say that God endures all through my life and the history
of the universeas regards individuals in time it makes no sense to
say, at any time in their lives, that God does not exist. But to
license such expressions is not to imply that God exists in time
(528). 2) His writing, being in time, is simultaneous with what he
writes, but the act of writing is not simultaneous with any of the
events that occur in the work, not even if the author writes
himself into the story. Since God is time-less in the sense of
being time-free (529), it follows logically that one may talk of
times as they relate to when God created the heavens and the
earth. That is, this time is put into human framework for
understanding, just as Ezekiel described the four living creatures
as having the likeness of a human, or Daniel who described what he
saw as one like a Son of Man. Their understandings of what they
wrote down (though inspired) were perceived from a human framework.
However, this time as persons would consider it cannot be thought
to be simultaneous with how God though of time to be when he (from
HIS framework) was creating the heavens and the earth, or even men
and women. Helm writes, In other words, the analogies indicate how
it is possible and natural to talk of two different times, but not
how it is possible to talk of the relation between timelessness and
time, the timelessness of Gods eternity and the time of His
creation (524). The frameworks are completely different. This is
how there are no temporal relations (that is, relating to a time,
or a tense of when). And so the final point is: 3) Gods eternal
existence has no temporal relations whatever to any particular
thing which He creates (that is, He exists outside of our
framework). This does not mean that there are no relations at all
between the eternal God and his creation, only no temporal
relations. Compared to Wolsterstoff, Helm gives a much fuller
definition of what eternality means, because of the fact that
Wolsterstoff gives such a narrow definition of eternality. This is
why Im sticking with Helm. He paints the best picture of the
always-existing God and also puts a nice touch on helping the
reader to think about timelines more through the lens of whose
framework one may be thinking through. This will help to consider
the difference between the timeless reality of God and the timed
reality of man.
Question 3 Swinburne and Hume both agree that there is at least
a logical possibility of miracles (that is, a violation of the law
of nature, according to Hume). Hume more than once comments on the
sheer plausibility of things happening that are not bound by the
laws of nature. He writes, Though experience be our only guide in
reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknoldged that
this guide is not altogether infallibleone who in our climate,
should expect better weather in any week of June than in one of
Decemberbut it is certain that he may happen, in the event, to find
himself mistaken (430). Swinburne writes, All claims about what are
the laws of nature are corrigible. However much support any
purported law has at the moment, one day it may prove to be no true
law (428). If this is the case, and corrigibility is really on the
table, no law can really be taken to be sure. It can be reasonably
relied upon based on past experience. What the reader may find in
their contrast is that Hume unabashedly sticks to empiricism. To
Hume, miracles simply cannot happen because there is not a proof
that can reasonably show that said miracle really happened. He
comments that there is no real way a miracle can be confirmed or
established, for sheer lack of testimony in a way that to not
believe it would actually be the miracle. This is logically
fallible. C.S. Lewis writes of a man like this. He says, The man I
have in view believes that mere experience (and specially those
artificially contrived experinces which we call Experiments) can
tell us what regularly happens in Nature. And he thinks that what
we have discovered excludes the possibility of miracles. This is a
confusion of mind. 1 For Hume, miracles are simply contrary to what
we know empirically,
1
C.S. Lewis, Miracles.
though he does assert that logically there could be a black swan
out there, even if all we have observed are white swans. As said
earlier, the two compare here. However, for Swinburne, miracles (if
one were to occur) are not necessarily a breaker of the laws of
nature. He astutely points out that the laws of nature are merely
place holders, not true laws. He says, When an event apparently
violates such laws, the appearance may arise simply because no one
has thoughts of the true law which could explain the event. In this
sense, Swinburne is not as rigid as Hume on the laws of nature. He
is more willing to bend in lieu of the fact that all the laws are
corrigible, that is, capable of being corrected or reformed. In
this, he addresses the physical improbability of said occurrences,
believing, I think, that most laws are merely purported and that we
may be reasonably sure that such things as levitation,
resurrection, turning water into wine without the assistance of a
chemical apparatus or catalyst (429) are physically impossible.
Hume calls upon testimony and evidence, while Swinburne more or
less relies on physical possibility while not being certain that
our laws of nature would really be violated. Rather, they would be
newly informed. Both agree that there could be a black swan. What I
consider to be two of the most dangerous objection to miracles are
twofold. If one were to take the principle logic that miracles can
happen and turn it around on its head, the argument is just as
strong as the one of corrigibility. If all we know about the
physical world is corrigible, then what we know about a
supernatural world is certainly corrigible. And if thoughts about
this world are corrigible, it is completely reasonable to say that
said world (and the God who rules it) are also corrigible ideas.
This is a logically sound argument. Alongside that is the
development issue--that is, one may say "this is not a miracle; it
is merely an instance of happenings that we cannot yet explain,
much like medical advances that have been made over
the past 100 years. Some may have been considered miracles then,
when we know now that apparent healings, etc. could have been
simply explained by the removal of a toxic or infectious element
accidentally or otherwise. But it is precisely the lack of
supernatural speak that causes me to form my definition of
miracles, and thus deals with what I consider to be some of the
most dangerous arguments against. I define miracles as supernatural
events brought about by supernatural beings imposing their power on
a certain situation in order to alter the situation and thus the
perceived understanding of the laws of nature. I believe this deals
with the problems in the only way that I can combat the problems,
and that is by operating under the biblical truths of how God
performed miracles in the OT and the NT. The defense I would have
to make could start logically by positing that there could be black
swans (miracles) because it is simply logical to say that something
might be there, since we have no proof to say otherwise. The
defense I would have to make would inevitably end with faith in a
supernatural God, and a supernatural Enemy, both who are shown in
the bible to bring about miracles (i.e. Jobs sores, the temptation
of Jesus by the enemy, and various healings, multiplying food, and
raising the dead to life by Jesus). This stands in harmony with my
definition that miracles are supernatural events. Our natural
understandings are just that-natural. Question 4 Davis concludes
that the mind and the body are not separate, and that in order for
the mind to function, there must be a body, for the mind is part of
the body, and to have true and genuine life after death, there must
be a resurrection of the body. Davis writes that when the body
dies, I no longer exist (704). This is because he sees validity in
the mind-body unity argument, save the fact that the issue of the
immortality of the soul being unresolved. Though I do not find that
Davis really settles on a belief, he does seem to give a lot of
thought to the
immortality of the soul, referencing the thought that if there
is something that lives despite the death of the body (mind, soul,
spirit, or whatever), then it must survive death and carry on to
somewhere. The problem lies in personal identity i.e. who am I? A
body, or the soul that is within me? Death ends all theorists say
that all which we are is wrapped up in our bodies, and that death
ends everything. Davis believes (I think) that life after death is
possible, but only with a bodily resurrection. How that happens
(say, for a man ripped to shreds and eaten by sharks) remains a
mystery to Davis, though He does posit that perhaps God will use
them (atoms) as building blocks around which to reconstruct the
rest of Joness body out of new atoms (707). He concludes, Genuine
and true human life, to the extent that it is possible after bodily
death, is only possible via resurrection of the body (707).
Bertrand Russell completely ignores resurrection, and honestly
equates belief in life after death with a human attempt to cope
with fear. To him, there is no self besides a series of memories,
feelings, or experiences. He writes, ..I regard as myself of
yesterday; but, in fact, myself of yesterday was only certain
mental occurrences which are now remembered and are regarded as a
part of the person.all that constitutes a person is a series of
experiences connected by memory...and habit (721). It does not seem
that Russell carries any belief of life after death. And so this
muddled mess that we are in really provides no evidence of a
incorporeal soul that would carry on. Russell would posit that the
end of our existence bodily is just that. Peter Geach basically
argues that there cannot be existence apart from some sort of
living body. The body and the spirit complete the human person, and
so it would be impossible to be
something while being disembodied. Disembodiment is
non-existence to Geach, and so he fights against the Platonic view
that the makeup of a person is immaterial, since there seems to be
no
precedent for understanding how an immaterial being would see,
hear, think, etc. For life after death to occur (in Geachs
summation), there must be at least a persistent possibility of the
souls again entering into the make-up of a man who is identifiably
Peter Geach (728). To Geach, without a body recognizable as me,
there can be no sameness between me now and me after death, as me
isnt complete without the material conditions of identity being
fulfilled. So what I believe Geach to be saying is that if there is
life after death, it must be a resurrection life, in order to have
life at all. Geach writes, So the upshot of our whole argument is
that unless a man comes to life again by resurrection, he does not
live again after death. At best some mental remnant of him would
survive death; and I should hold that the possibility even of such
survival involves at least a permanent capacity for resurrection
(731).
Further, he writes, ..Apart from the possibility of
resurrection, it seems to me a mere illusion to have any hope for
life after death. Geach touches on some biblical truth here, and so
it is with him that I find to be the most insightful/compelling
because he sees that there must be a recognizable me to have life
after death. For who else would be existing if it wasnt me, who
else would be thinking, experiencing, or feeling? And what body
would said mind have to do such? Perhaps the most crucial question
is: how is a body resurrected from a pile of ashes, or
reconstructed from particles of dust, or put back together after
being cremated? And how is said consciousness reunited as a mind to
that body? On a naturalistic level, and even on a philosophical
level, there is no reason to expect that from a human corpse there
will arise at some future date a new human body, continuous in some
way with the corpse (731). My response is what Paul writes to the
Corinthians in 1 Cor 15:35-37, 42-44, and 50.
But someone will ask, How are the dead raised? With what kind of
body do they come? You foolish person! What you sow does not come
to life unless it dies. And what
you sow is not the body that is to be, but a bare kernel,
perhaps of wheat or of some other grain So is it with the
resurrection of the dead. What is sown is perishable; what is
raised is imperishable. It is sown in dishonor; it is raised in
glory. It is sown in weakness; it is raised in power. It is sown a
natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a natural
body, there is also a spiritual body I tell you this, brothers:
flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the
perishable inherit the imperishable. When addressing life after
death, these philosophers do not address the power of an eternal
God promises in his word that we will receive new bodies, that is,
heavenly bodies. The picture given in Luke 9:30-33 says that Moses
and Elijah stood with Jesus on the mount of transfiguration. These
men were recognizable, as was Jesus, even in his transfigured
state. They had received the imperishable body, but it was not an
unrecognizable body. Also I believe that there is too much
quibbling over what constitutes identity. Even in the language of
the perishable putting on the imperishable, one may not fully
understand this, for the secret things belong to the Lord our God.2
The Spirit gives life, the flesh is no help at all. The picture of
the resurrection body should be one of a mind settled upon the fact
that God will give a new body, however he chooses to do so. BIBLE
INVESTIGATION Question 1 The free will defense comes in basically
two threads, 1) God did not make people to be robots, but he made
them free to live freely. Since people are free, what they do is up
to them. 2) Considering that much evil is explicable by human
actions, it is possible to think of evil in terms of God allowing
for the possible consequences of him willing a great good (574).
Alvin Plantinga writes, If a person is free with respect to a given
action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain
from performing it; no antecedent conditions an/or causal laws
determine that he will perform the action, or that he wont.3 He
further goes on to explain that in
2 3
Deut. 29:29 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil.
order for there to be moral good, there must be moral evil, that
is, one doing something that offends someone else, and also creates
a situation in which he or she is made to be sub-human. The heart
of the free-will defense then, is that it is indeed possible that
God could not have created a world with moral good unless he
created one that also contained moral evil. And so it follows (if
indeed God is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good) that He may
very well have a good reason for creating a world containing evil.
Two passages for supporting this free-will defense are Genesis
2:15-17 and 3:15. The story shows all the elements of the Free will
defense. 1) God gave Adam a commandment not to eat of the fruit of
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. As it were, he did not
force Adam (or Eve) to obey (which can be clearly seen in chapter
3). The two chose to eat the fruit. They were not robots, but were
in relationship and exercised a will. Secondly, considering the
above argument, the evil that came about (and the subsequent curse)
was brought about by mens choosing. But it was because of this
moral evil that moral good could exist, and God could use this good
to restore sub-humanity to perfect humanity. In the mind of God,
being omniscient, He had well considered the consequences of this,
but had a greater good planned which the reader will find in 3:15:
I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your
offspring and her offspring; he shall bruise your head, and you
shall bruise his heel. This protoevangelium was the prophetic voice
of God speaking of the greater good to come in Christ. It is
through this greater good that God could look forward to and pass
over former sins (Rom. 3:25), and through which men could find
redemption from the curse found in Genesis 3. This paints the
picture of a greater good that God would accomplish through the
evil done by men and women. This good found in Christ is not only
for the spiritual good of peoples souls, but also for the good of
the creation that would also be redeemed. Romans 8:18-20 points
this out, and
also provides more grounds for the coming of Gods greater good,
which leads into defense of eschatological theodicy, but this will
come later. Question 2 John Hick writes, And so man, created as a
personal being in the image of God, is only the raw material for a
further and more difficult stage of Gods created work.4 1 Peter
2:2-3, 10 and Romans 5:3-5 strongly show that the soul-building
theodicy is scripturally credible. Romans 5:3-5 shows that
sufferings (evil) are actual occurrences, but one should not simply
sit down in ashes and wish that said suffering was over. For it may
be that God has an intention of building that person up into
something stronger and better for His glory, and for their good.
Paul makes it overtly clear in 5:3-4 by suggesting that one should
dare to rejoice in sufferings knowing that suffering produces
endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces
hope. It can be clearly seen here that this person is moving
forward in growth, gaining something (or more of something) that
was not there before. This paints a clear picture of Gods
intentions of soul-building in the face of evil. 1 Peter 2:2-3
describes the believers as newborn babies. These babies were ready
only for pure spiritual milk in order to grow up to salvation. This
is also seen when Paul, in a very frustrating way, berates the
Corinthian church for not growing like they should, that is, to
spiritual solid food (see 1 Cor 3:1-2). Both instances, both
Timothy and 1 Corinthians insist that there are those Christians
who are infants, and those who are not (or who should be growing
out of infancy). 1 Peter 2:10 describes the process even more so,
giving the result of Gods work of grace in the lives of people,
Once you were not a people, but now you are Gods people; once you
had not received mercy, but now you have received mercy. There
4
John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 290.
is a growth of the spiritual self taking place (even in the face
of sufferings and evils) in all of these examples, which provide a
rich explanation for the soul-building theodicy. Question 3 2
Corinthians 4:7-18 is a section of 2 Corinthians that deals with
the New Covenant power of the resurrection. And since the
resurrection is the conduit through which Christians will be
brought into realization of hope, this passage deals an
eschatological theodicy. In 7-14, Paul paints a picture of the
initial results of the sufferings that the church is experiencing
(being afflicted, perplexed, persecuted, and struck down). He also
shows what this hope in Christ delivers (not being crushed, driven
to despair, forsaken, or destroyed). This hope is described in v.
14, knowing that he who raised the Lord Jesus will raise us also
with Jesus and bring us with you into his presence. The
eschatological hope found here is that though the church suffers
now, it may look forward to the day when the church will be raised
to new life with Jesus Christ (into his presence). 7-14 show that
they not only have reason for persevering now, but look to this
power in the face of adversity as a sure sign that they will
experience resurrection life at the end of the age (v. 16-18). The
theodicy comes through here and reflects all three (Gods greater
good, soul-building, and eschatological) theodicies. They are
suffering, but are not crushed, and so press forward for the
kingdom (they are living for a greater good). All the while they
are growing in hope and being renewed day by day (soul-building),
as well as looking forward to the end of the age where the same
power that raised Jesus Christ from the grave will raise them also,
and bring them into His presence. There is a point to the evil that
is being experienced. Secondly, 2 Cor 5:1-5 speaks more clearly
about the heavenly home that believers in Christ are looking
forward to going home to the heavenly dwelling, after getting out
of the tent of a body in which they now dwell. While tent paints
the picture of moveable, temporary, put up
and taken down, a dwelling paints the picture of a house with a
foundation that is lasting; a place to dwell long term (and as we
understand, eternally). Paul writes of groaning and being burdened
in this tent (body), but looking forward to the day when what is
mortal may be swallowed up in life (an eternal body), something
heavenly, eternal, something better to look forward to that is the
next step after groaning and being burdened in the earthly tent. In
this the eschatological theodicy is well represented, as John Hick
writes, ..Christian theodicy must point forward to that final
blessedness, and claim that this infinte future good will render
worth while all the pain and travail and wickedness that has
occurred on the way to it. Theodicy cannot be content to look to
the past, seeking an explanation of evil in its origins, but must
look towards the future, expecting a triumphant resolution in the
eventual perfect fulfillment of Gods good purpose.5 Question 4
Biblical authors chiefly explains Gods power as Creator. Isaiah
writes in 25-26, To whom then will you compare me, that I should be
like him? says the Holy One. Lift up your eyes on high and see: who
created these? He who brings out their host by number, calling them
all by name, by the greatness of his might, and because he is
strong in power not one is missing. Isaiah 40:25-26 allows the
reader to understand that God is powerful (all powerful) over all
that has been made, as He is Creator. Whats more, it shows his
control over these things, a part of divine omnipotence by 1)
Asking the question To whom then will you compare me, that I should
be like him? The begged answer is nobody. God is most Holy. 2)
Making creation into a wtiness: Lift up your eyes and see: who
created these? The stars in the sky, some say, have been numbered
at trillions upon trillions. But God has placed them there, and
knows them by name. Indeed, who else could know this? Gods
omnipotence is represented in creation, and
5
Hick, 376.
within His omnipotence, the ability to control that nature;
because He is strong in power not one is missing. Job 26:7-14 also
speaks of Gods omnipotence. The author of Job writes, He stretches
out the north over the void and hangs the earth on nothingBehold
these are but the outskirts of his ways, and how small a whisper do
we hear of him! But the thunder of His power who can understand? If
one were to take a moment to consider the intricacies of how our
world is suspended in space hanging on nothing, it may be difficult
to conceive how such a feat has been accomplished and remains
stable. However, the bible sustains its argument to show the reader
that he upholds the universe by the word of his power.6 It is only
an omnipotent God who for him nothing will be impossible. 7
However, some scriptures do indicate that God is limited, but as as
a precursor, I believe that omnipotence and Gods limits harmonize.
In Hebrews 6:17-18 show that God cannot lie. This is not a strike
against his power, but rather bolsters his good character. Not
having the ability to lie does not weaken Gods power, nor does the
biblical writer intend for this to be the case. In fact, it
harmonizes with Gods omnipotence that he is able to uphold such a
promise made to Abraham. If he was weakened by the ability to lie,
his reliability and omnipotence could not be trusted. But it is the
cosmic power of faithfulness that God has in order to keep such a
promise to make a people his people in the face of disobedience and
filth. What human could keep an oath so faithfully? None.
Furthermore, James 1:17 states that Every good and perfect gift
comes down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no
variation or shadow due to change. So secondly, God
6
Hebrews 1:3 (ESV) Luke 1:37
7
cannot change. Some may take this argument and run with it to
say that this weakens Gods strength because humans have this power
to learn and to grow and to become smarter over time. Seeing God as
stuck may influence some to believe that he is somehow weaker
because He cannot change. However, James is operating under
perfect-being theology. That is, God is a perfect being. He knows
all, he is fully aware, and he needs not learn anything because he
already knows everything. Nothing occurs to him. If something did
occur to God, the reader would find themselves in open theism. God
would then be reduced to a divine creature who is waiting for the
next thing to come so that He might decide what is best based on
sociological and cultural events. This indeed limits God. To sum
up, Aquinas writes, As we have shown , God is called omnipotent
with regard to ative power, not passive power. That he cannot be in
motion or undergo action does not disagree with omnipotence. To sin
is to fall short of full activity. Hence to be able to sin is to be
able to fall in doing, which cannot be reconciled with omnipotence.
It is because God is omnipotent that he cannot sin. In Gods
omnipotence he is unable to sin and change. Inability does not
prove Gods omnipotence as it pertains to these two things. Rather,
it proves his omnipotence since it is sin and change that mark
humans as finite beings, broken from what they should really be.
Question 5 As a buffer, it must be said that the passages described
forthwith only seem to imply an intermediate state. 1 Peter 3:18-19
is perhaps one of the most complex passages to think about when it
comes to where Jesus was when he was made alive in the spirit.
Despite other interpretations of this passage, we will focus on a
single interpretation, that there is a place of holding in between
death and the final resurrection. Peter writes,
For Christ also suffered once for sins, the righteous for the
unrighteous, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in
the flesh but made alive in the spirit, in which he went and
proclaimed to the spirits in prison.. This passage may seem to
imply an intermediate mainly because of the phrase being put to
death in the flesh but made alive in the spirit, in which he went
and proclaimed to the spirits in prison. The intermediate state
shows that we could alternatively understand alive in the spirit to
refer to the activity of the spirit of Jesus during the period
between this bodily death and resurrection.8 Otherwise, the spirits
who are in prison seem to be in some sort of holding place (i.e.
prison) that is somewhat ambiguous, and if taken at face value,
seems to be a place where these spirits are being preached to as a
second chance to respond positively to the Gospel before the time
when they will move from prison (perhaps this could be a
translation of said passage). For the purposes of seems to imply,
this translation could work. Secondly, Revelation 6:9-11 gives a
pretty clear picture (not nearly as ambiguous as 1 Peter) that
indeed there is a state of being with Christ before the final
judgement. John writes, When he opened the fifth seal, I saw under
the altar the souls of those who had been slain for the word of God
and for the witness they had borne. They cried out with a loud
voice, O Sovereign Lord, holy and true, how long before you will
judge and avenge our blood on those who dwell on the earth? Then
they were each given a white robe and told to rest a little longer,
until the number of their fellow servants and their brothers should
be complete, who were to be killed as they themselves had been. One
would observe here that these faithful martyrs are waiting upon the
vindication of their martyrdom, and since there are more left to be
martyred, this snapshot of heaven seems to be before the general
resurrection. This implies an intermediary state with the Lord
after death, but before the general resurrection. Looking at
passages that might imply an unconscious existence, 1 Thess.
4:13-15 may be interpreted to this understanding. Paul writes, But
we do not want you to be uninformed,8
D.A. Carson, New Bible Commentary, 1380.
brothers, about those who are asleep, that you may not grieve as
others do who have no hope. For since we believe that Jesus died
and rose again, even so, through Jesus, God will bring with him
those who have fallen asleep. This passage could be interpreted to
understand those who have fallen asleep as dead physically, but
consciously alive, though their soul be asleep and waiting for the
day when God will bring them (at the coming of the Lord) with him
to heaven. This passage insinuates a state of unconscious soul
sleep, and also shows that the person (in some sense) will be
brought to be with the Lord (in a recognizable fashion, hence
those). Ecclesiastes 9:5-6 says, For the living know that they will
die, but the dead know nothing, and they have no more reward, for
the memory of them is forgotten. Their love and their hate and
their envy have already perished, and forever they have no more
share in all that is done under the sun. The phrasing but the dead
know nothing may be interpreted to mean that the dead have no
consciousness, but that they are rather in a state of
non-consciousness or even non-existence [they have no more reward]
(the only problem here is that there is not mention of whether or
not the soul carries on at all, and to take this passage out of
context is theologically unsound and does not line up with the
whole counsel of scripture). The other problem with this passage is
that it does not follow the testimony of scripture of a future
judgment, dwelling with God, or separation from God. It simply
addresses an unconscious or non-existence. Personally, I see Pauls
writings in 2 Corinthians 5:6-8 to be compelling enough to convince
me that after I die, I will immediately be with the Lord in an even
more personal sense, as I am away from the Lord when I am in the
body. He writes, So we are always of good courage. We know that
while we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord, for we
walk by faith, not by sight. Yes, we are of good courage, and we
would rather be away from the body and at home with the Lord.
The understanding that I glean here is logical. If one is away
from the Lord while in the body, then it follows (and is actually
said later in the passage) that to be apart from the body means to
be with the Lord. And so there does seem to be an intermediate
state before the resurrection when believers will be with the Lord.
See also the fact that Jesus told the criminal in Luke 23:43 that
he would be with him in paradise that day. Since Jesus second
coming didnt happen during the day that Jesus body was in the
ground, and since Jesus said that the criminal would be with him in
paradise, it follows that 1) to be apart from the body means to be
with the Lord or apart from him (see also Luke 16:23 as an example)
and 2) Jesus himself went to be in paradise with the criminal, and
it is not logically fallible to say that if the criminal went to be
with Jesus in paradise, that one may reasonably say that paradise
is heaven and 3) Going to be with the Lord (or not) is an
intermediate state after death and before the general resurrection.
INTEGRATION AND APPLICATION QUESTION 1 I might first make sure that
the husband was in a place where he could have a really honest
conversation about the suicide. I would perhaps first ask him what
his thoughts on her suicide were, instead of just right away
telling him my thoughts about the death of his sister. I would then
perhaps ask if he thought that God has a plan for what happens on
the earth, or if he believes that God has control. Perhaps his
answer would be yes. Since he came asking about Gods involvement, I
do not think that this would be going too far. We may visit the
story of Job, and of Joseph in Genesis. In both cases, the main
character of the story faces an unbelievable amount of suffering.
Job faced the death of his children, the loss off all his material
things, and even suffers personal affliction. Joseph is betrayed by
his own brothers (despite his lofty dreams), sold into slavery,
wrongfully accused by Potiphars wife, and thrown into prison.
However, Joseph himself sees at the end of the day that you meant
evil against me, but God
meant it for good Jobs story is not so clean. God never gives an
answer. He simply outlines his power in creation and upholding the
universe. Job simply replies with Behold I am of small account;
what shall I answer you? I lay my hand on my mouth. I would
encourage my friend to trust in Gods goodness, or else, trust in
his sovereignty. If we believe and hold in faith that God is indeed
wholly good (which may or may not be the case of our dear friend
here), then we must believe that even if God allowed a suicide to
happen, He had good in His mind all along. To challenge the
Almighty is not healthy, and whats more, ..who has known the mind
of the Lord, and who has been his counselor? I would not urge my
friend to get over it, but to begin searching for Gods good plan
revealed (theodicy), after a time of mourning the loss of a sister.
It may be that God was preparing my friend to grow, preparing him
for a future of ministry opportunities, or preparing him to cling
closer to the goodness of God. The issue isnt really the fairness
here, my friend is really wondering How could God let this happen
IF.? Question 2 I might first tell my friend what I believe about
God-that he is a perfect being and that there is none greater than
Him. There is no way I could start this conversation without
stating my presupposition about God. Logically it would follow that
if God had a beginning, or a cause, there would be something
greater than God, and my entire life would then be bent upon
finding and worshipping that god who was ultimately the ruler and
creator of all. And then if that creator had a creator and so on,
my search would be infinite. I might also mention that in order for
the world to exist, it is necessary that a Creator God exist
because indeed, everything created must have a cause. I would tell
my friend that it makes no logical sense for me to believe in
something with no beginning. However, it would be inevitable for me
to make any sort of argument with my friend apart from faith. It is
by faith that I believe God exists. And if what
the bible says about this God is true, is it worth it for my
friend to deny this God and his salvation? True, this is not fully
answering his question, nor could it. However, it could be a good
starting point for an apologetic. At this point, I would rather my
friend to begin considering the existence of God as the bible
portrays him. It would not be the time to launch out into a full
philosophical discussion on the necessity of Gods existence
(because there is really no explanation anyway). Question 3 To my
instructor I might ask, Is science certainly not concerned with
faith? Is any hypothesis that a scientist makes not a faithful
conclusion? Is a hypothesis not based on faith when scientists have
made such a proposed explanation (about whatever) that is not
currently totally verifiable? Surely there is not a scientist
anywhere who would say that there isnt at least a possibility that
a law of nature could be suspended. I might say, Granted,
experiments measure what goes on normally in nature. Insofar as
science relies on experiments and experience (facts) to come to
reasonable conclusions, so do the religious. Perhaps I would share
with the professor about text criticism, social studies, or the
great endeavor to uncover the original manuscripts of the bible, or
documents citing Jesus resurrection. We too have a basis of what we
believe to be fact on which we rest our faith in God and his
ability to work miracles and suspend Nature. Does science not do
the same thing when it comes down to natural law? Further, how
could natural science, which measures the measurable, be able to
measure whether or not the supernatural occurs? My professor may be
a man that says that what can be measured by experiments (regularly
occurring natural events) rule out miracles, but how can this be so
if they only measure what regularly occurs? My instructor would
have to rule out the logical possibility of natural law being
suspended, and that is impossible to do. For even if every
swan he had ever seen was white, he has only seen what swans his
eyes can behold, and it logically follows that there may be a black
swan somewhere. What science has come to report certainly does not
rule out the possibility of miracles which, being supernatural in
essence, could not be measured nor disproved by a lonely
experiment. Therefore, laws of nature merely report to us what
occurs in nature. What of the chance that this something that
occurs could change? It is possible, and the law would be
re-written when A is no longer true and B is true. So, science has
not disproved miracles, and cannot. However, I would agree with my
professor that faith does absolutely play a role in what I believe,
though my belief in impossible things is completely rational and
logical. Faith cannot be flippantly regarded to be ridiculous.
Religious people believe in the possibility of the impossible
happening. We believe by faith alone, but with good logic as well.
Question 4 I assume that my friend is a Christian if she is
speaking about faith in scripture. So I might say, What do you have
faith in? Words? Timothy Keller reminds us that weak faith in a
strong branch is infinitely and eternally more significant than
strong faith in a weak branch. If my friend is putting faith in her
ability to have faith, she is mistaken. For it is Jesus who is a
guarantor of a better covenant, and it is him who upholds our
salvation, not our works. Besides, I might say, what do you think
the resurrection was? Or what is your definition of a miracle? Was
the Resurrection a normal everyday thing, or was it the
supernatural power of God who raised Jesus from the grave? If
miracles are supernatural events brought about by supernatural
beings imposing their power on a certain situation in order to
alter the situation and thus the perceived understanding of the
laws of nature, then the resurrection must be a miracle. Even if
that is not the definition, one cannot say definitively that the
resurrection of
Christ from the dead was normal. Paul wrote, If Christ has not
been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins.
If then the resurrection is a miracle (and it is), we believe
nothing if we are putting our faith in nothing. And from that it
follows that our faith is futile if this miracle didnt actually
happen. Our entire faith hinges on the resurrection, and if it
didnt happen (a miracle), we are utterly lost. And what of the
Incarnation? I might ask my friend, Was the virgin birth of Christ
a miracle? No doubt she would say yes. How could she disagree? The
prophet Isaiah prophesied in Isaiah 7 that Christ would come, born
of a virgin. It is by his unique birth that he is crowned the
God-man. Is this a normal occurrence, or is this a miracle? If we
do not put faith in this miracle, then we cannot effectively
believe that Christ is God incarnate, we cannot believe that what
he did in feeding 5,000, turning water into wine, or giving the
blind sight to be true. If he did not do these things, he was
nothing more than a man. And a mere man cannot bear the wrath of
God on our behalf on the cross. It is by faith that we believe
these things happened which are the basis for our belief that
Christ is who He says he is. We must believe in the miracles.
Question 5 Assuming that cloning could happen, I do not see a need
of the mind or body for the soul to live on. Indeed we can see in
scripture, that though the body dies, the soul carries on with
eternal life or eternal death (See Luke 16:18-31). It would be
impossible to say that there isnt a relationship between what one
experiences spiritually or religiously and what they then decide to
use their body for. I think Descartes has something interesting to
consider in the Dualistic Theory. It does not seem too far of a
stretch to say that there is an aspect of human beings that does
the thinking, that is, the soul or mind (incorporeal) and a part of
humans that is raw, mechanical, and driven by the senses or used to
complete actions or mathematical equations
(corporeal). That part would also be controlled by the mind, not
the brain. The brain would be the conduit through which the mind
uses to complete physical activity. However, there is something
deeper than just genetics and mechanics when it comes down to a
human person, and what Isaiah 49:1 says about being called from the
womb certainly rings in accordance with Psalm 139:13-18 when the
psalmist speaks of God knowing the substance and form of a person
before birth, and knitting them together in their mothers womb. So
it does not seem that the biblical doctrine is dualistic, but that
the whole person is comprised of both body and soul, however the
two may work together, even though the example of the rich man in
torment insinuates memories in the afterlife. In light of this, if
a person is to carry on after death, it must be that the soul or
the mind is what keeps the memories a person makes, though the
mental (brain) faculties of a person were put into use during life
to recall facts, memories, process mathematics, etc. Further, it
does make sense of something immaterial or incorporeal relating to
something material, as I have suggested above. 2 Tim 1:7 speaks of
a spirit that God has given us that elicits power and self control
over actions, and further John 16:13 tells that the Spirit
(incorporeal) will guide us into all truth. This truth related
through an immaterial Spirit guides our actions (into all truth)
and makes us sow to the Spirit and not to the flesh; that is to
turn from certain actions in the flesh (material) and obey the
Spirit influence (immaterial). And so, an immaterial Spirit
influences material (brain and body) actions. As it pertains to
cloning then, we should consider the tower of Babel. Just as it
wasnt a problem that the people at Babel made bricks, the problem
isnt with biotechnology; it is with what people would do with said
biotechnology. At Babel the people decided to build a city and a
tower: it would be their prize and a great feat of human ingenuity
and self-sufficiency apart from
God. They even went as far as to try and go against Gods will to
disperse humans all across the face of the planet. This technology
of the day would have given them supreme confidence in themselves,
believing that they had no need for God. They could build a tower
to Him! The situation with cloning/biotechnology is verily similar.
Further, it wouldnt make sense, for example, to clone a loved one,
hoping that they would be just like grandmother, or father, or
brother. What constitutes a persons identity, reactions, etc. is
what they have gone through in life. Their experiences with God,
experiences on the earth, experiences elsewhere make up how they
respond to family, friends, situations, and contexts. A newly
cloned brain would not contain such content, and in that particular
instance, would be just like an infant: tabula rasa. Genetic
duplication could not reproduce grandmother in her fullness. To do
so would be a major let down, and no help at all. I see the holes
in my argument. One may say, So perhaps we shouldnt use medicine or
go to hospitals, etc. I am not saying that this is an infallible,
or that it is meant to be. It is merely an attempt to deal with the
issue biblically, and provide some sort of response.