Working-class power and left opposition in Russia: new union activism under authoritarianism

Working-class power and left opposition in Russia: new union activism under

authoritarianism

Dr Jeremy Morris, University of Birmingham, UK [email protected]

Sarah Hinz, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany

ESA Prague 27 August 2015

Summary Focus: alternative trade unions in the transnational automotive industry in Russia.

traditional unions associated with state control; new alternative unions in Russia are particularly associated with political opposition and radicalism.

Analysis of recent (2008-present) activities to mobilise automotive workers in multinational and domestic owned plants.

Due to draconian labour laws, often activists resort to work-to-rule and indirect methods of resistance/protest.

At the same time their activities resemble both political entryism and left agitation in the face of a hostile and authoritarian state.

Is this a barometer of wider working-class power and opposition in post-socialism? What are the prospects for their semi-formal, semi-informal insurgency against neocapitalism?

The field regionKaluga region: high internal migration from other regions

3hrs by car from Moscow

Significant investment from car manufacturers and other TNCs; many informants had worked for German, French, Italian and Far-Eastern employers

poor infrastructure outside Moscow-Kiev corridor

Old and new unions in Russia

Russia’s trade union umbrella organization (FNPR) is the largest of its kind in Europe with 24 million members (Bizyukov and Grishko, 2012). Unions belonging to this huge association are the inheritors of the former socialist unions, which were directly subordinated to the communist party.

With neoliberalization of the labour market 1990- serious attempts at alternative union building in Russia - focusing on conflict and agitation. However, these attempts failed, partly due to internal organisational conflicts of leaders and to some considerable extent to the strong support the old unions enjoy from the state.

Two models of unionism Old unions are Soviet legacies,

responsible for administering and distributing social benefits to the workforce under management’s guidelines (Ashwin and Clarke, 2001; Mandel, 2004).

Still enjoy strong institutional power due to their intensive cooperationalist nature with the state, they are dependent thereon to such an extent that their associational power is inexorably eroding.

Massive loss of members since 1990 and the lack of serious organisational restructuring = institutional power is very fragile.

Rarely initiate strikes or other forms of protest action following workers’ growing discontent with structural and plant-specific issues, despite the increasing demand by workers to have their interests represented in terms of wages, working time and security and safety.

Rise of foreign firms in Russia 2000s sees emergence of alternative trade unionism (Chetvernina, 2009; Olimpieva, 2012).

Quickly took the chance to address workers’ rights and interests in these transnational companies.

Small but effective unions at company level emerge out of concrete conflict situations between workers and management. They manage to make use of workers’ traditionally strong marketplace and workplace bargaining power in the automotive industry by mobilizing workers in production.

Typical workers’ demands evolving around wage, working time as well as health and safety at the workplace. Most of these small, local unions are affiliated to MPRA, (Krzywdzinski, 2011; Olimpieva, 2012).

Theoretical approach working class power approach offers analysis of employment relations from a supranational and diachronic perspective (Schmalz and Dörre, 2014; Silver, 2005; Wright, 2000).

Why use WCP in Russia? Workers’ primary power is STRUCTURAL power – both as marketplace bargaining power and workplace bargaining power.

The former significant in Russia: tight labour markets characterized by 1) the possession of scarce skills demanded by employers, 2) low unemployment, and 3) workers’ ability to withdraw labour and get income from other sources than wage labour (Silver, 2005: 31).

Workplace bargaining power

Traditionally weak or patchy under socialism – highly individualised IRs given lack of real union rep.

New alternative unions sees first real flexing of workplace bargaining power in automotive plants – local strikes and protests, organised campaigns around wages and conditions – work to rule (aka ‘Italian strikes’).

Other two WCP sources 2. Associational power =workers’ capabilities to establish functioning collective organizations, such as trade unions, to represent their peculiar interests opposite to capital (Wright, 2000: 962).

3. Workers’ institutional power: the result of negotiations and conflicts carried out through structural or associational power.

Dilemma to unions: as they gain legal legitimacy there is a tendency for them to become less conflict-oriented, but they risk losing members and therefore associational power if they do become more amenable–vicious circle.

Case of VW Plant in Russia

Russian economy’s heavy reliance on natural resources, but automotive a key sector: government aim to diversify +high-tech. Car production potential for innovation and therefore enjoys significant support and subsidies.

The Kaluga region, directly bordering the Moscow area in the southwest, particularly attractive to foreign carmakers, not only because of numerous incentives of the regional government, but also because of the close geographical proximity to Moscow and Western Europe

Volkswagen, the largest foreign car producer in Russia, and focus of our research, settled here in 2008, accompanied by a number of significant foreign suppliers. The producer employs around 6000 workers. (nearby – Volvo, Peugeot-Citroen-Mitsubishi, Samsung + others)

Rise of MPRA in VW Comprehensive unionization supported by MPRA shortly after factory first opened in 2008.

Only in 2012, with some 1200 workers organized, did the union gain formal recognition by management.

two significantly smaller rival unions are present at plant.

Despite relatively low membership – around 23 per cent of production operatives, MPRA is the dominant union at the plant, which makes it the official collective bargaining partner for management and the other unions to become subordinate elements in negotiations.

Mayday union-socialist movt parade

Unconventional picket of dealership

Union plant activity lack of communication and low levels of interactions: union-management.

tense and difficult relations between unions.

frequent outbursts of protest. Trade unions manage to mobilize members for concrete protest actions that sometimes use unconventional means, i.e. work-to-rule actions, sabotage, solidarity pickets and leafletting.

Main achievements: reduction in contract workers (employed through agencies), increase in ‘permies’, reduction in working week below 37 hours; collective agreement in 2013 = recognition of union by management.

Backlash ‘anti-extremism security services’ detain leaders;

arrests and disruption by police at union meetings;

security guards of other plant (PC) illegally detain activists trying to distribute literature in plant car parks (2012);

threats by FSB of fabricated evidence.

Indicators of TU politicisation

1. national ‘Agitprop’ literature distribution (Profsoiuznyi navigator 4-page newsletter produced in St Petersburg) – clever mix of national news on strikes and actions throughout Russia in automotive industry but also including write-ups of restaurant dispute involving US firm which failed to pay severance.

Articles include ‘dispelling myths’ about corporative models of IR – ‘vaccine against employers’; highlighting ‘austerity’ policy of govt during economic downturn whilst continuing financial support to corps;

‘Lay’ articles on the imbalance between the rewards of labour and capital with open references to Marx and labour exploitation.

Above are also visible to lesser extent on MPRA plant-level website. Research showed that many non-members read both site and newsletter.

Indicators of TU politicisation 2

2. agitation for participation in wider political activism – Russian Socialist Movement.

3. conflict model of activist perspective – highly politically motivated activists, ‘cell’-like organisation – wary of outsiders.

Conclusions 1 Despite local success of MPRA in Kaluga is this really rise in associational or institutional power? No.

Excellent activist cadres linked to RSM (and therefore highly politically motivated) able to use niche of transnational corp with little experience of Russia.

Refraction and concentration by union of pre-existing structural power – high turnover of workers leading to dependency on employment agencies which in turn gave union a point of ‘leverage’. – cultural issues such as stringent labour discipline and control at plant leading to worker dissatisfaction. Ready availability of work in informal economy makes ‘exit’ from plant real option.

In the end, even confrontational union gives management some ‘comfort’ that these complex issues are addressed. Indeed, in some ways radical union becomes more like traditional Soviet ones.

Conclusion 2Q. Is this a barometer of wider working-class power and opposition in post-socialism? A. Remains hope that local success of union indicates ongoing strong structural position of W-C in Russia. Problem is the lack of links and solidarity between industries; v. weak political opposition and perception that it serves only middle-class elite in Moscow.

Conclusion 3Q. What are the prospects for their semi-formal, semi-informal insurgency against Russian neo-capitalism?A. Given activation of only structural WCP (and not associational or inst.), struggle will remain semi-formal and fragmented. Russian economic crisis will continue to fall on workers – they need an alliance with ‘budgetniki’ – who will see incomes squeezed in 2016.