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9317187Words' semantic constitution as a guide to reality: The
"Cratylus" reconsidered Levin, Susan Barbara, Ph.D. Stanford
University, 1993Copyright @1993 by Levin, Susan Barbara. AH rights
reserved.UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd.Ann Arbor, MI 48106Reproduced with
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WORDS' SEMANTICCONSTITUTION AS A GUIDE TOREALITY: THE CRATYLUS
RECONSIDEREDA DISSERTAnON SUBMITIED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
PHILOSOPHY, THE GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HUMANITIES, AND THE COMMlTfEE
ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITYIN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
INPHILOSOPHY AND HUMANITIESBy Susan LevinMarch 1993Reproduced with
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited
without permission. 6. Copyright 1993 by Susan Levin AH Rights
ReservediiReproduced with permission of the copyright owner.
Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7. 1 certify
that 1 haye read this dissertation and that in rny opinion it is
fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.kCh k ~,~::9 l.,Julius M. Moravcsik
(Principal Adyiser)1 certify that 1 haye read this dissertation and
that in rny opinion it is fulIy adequate, in scope and quality, as
a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.Alan Code1
certify lhat 1 haye read this dissertation and that in 111y opinion
it is fulIy adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.1 certify that 1 haye read this
dissertation and that in 111y opinion it is fulIy adequate, in
scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.~UL "~'--~Andrea Ni;;4ngale (Graduate Program in
Humanities)Approved for the University COI11miUee on Graduate
Studies:iiiReproduced with permission of the copyright owner.
Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8. Abstract
Accounts of the Cratylus' historical sources, which focus typically
on philosophers and sophists, have yet to explain why etymology has
such a pivotal role in the dialogue. Based on extant evidence one
may treat Plato's discussion of etymology as a critical response to
techniques and assumptions that were of central importan ce to a
non-philosopbical, literary tradition. Plato's initial positing of
'tXVll status for naming, based on criteria advanced in the
Gorgias, is followed by a sustained challenge thereto. Recognition
of tbis dynamic goes a long way toward addressing scholars'
persistent concem with the Cratylus' apparent lack of cohesion.
Though the dialogue's emphasis is negative, at the end Plato offers
hints of bis own metaphysical theory and associated view of
appropriateness in naming. He develops these elues in the Phaedo,
where the notions of naturalness and appropriateness are tied
directly to Platonic metaphysics. The literary tradition's handling
of eponyrny constitutes a precedent for Plato's use of it to treat
questions of appropriateness. Having rejected etymology in the
Cratylus, in the Phaedo Plato revises eponymy based on his
metaphysical theory. The most fundamental and closest links between
the two dialogues do not rest on the use of Fonns per se; they
center instead on the notions of naturalness and appropriateness,
whose treatment in the Phaedo is closely tied to Forms. In the
Sophist and Politicus, Plato concentrates on mutual relations
between Fonns. Connections between the Cratylus and these dialogues
do not rest on a shared interest in OlupEO'l 8p,OEt ~prov, OUOE
A~Etat 1tplv rov' oc; O' E7tElt' ECPU, tplaKtTl po~ OtXEtat tUXcv'
Zflva () tt~ 7tpo 9vte;ta 1tv'ta 1tpy~a'taleal. 1tcra; vo~a; dxov
(Hist. 2.52). As mentioned, there is another set of instances in
which considerations involving the namer constitute the basis on
which v~a'ta are assigned. Such v~a'ta ffiight be given based on
various features or aspects of the namer. This category divides in
tum into various subcategories. First, the assignment could be
grounded on a physicaI or related aspect of the namer. An example
of this type of case is found at the outset of Euripides'Helen,
where the poet says that when she was born Proteus and Psamathe
named their daughter Eim, 'to ~T'tpo; Ct.yAtcrlla (8-11). Second, a
name might be given based on the namer' s emotional state. One
finds a prominent instance of this in an Odyssey passage in which
Odysseus' grandfather Autolycus indicates the basis on which he
assigned his grandson's ovoJl.a: 1tOAAOtcrtV yap EYro ye
ooucrcrJl.evo; 'to' Kvro ... 't!> o'Cry aloud without fear the
victory of Zeus, you wilJ not have failed the truth. (tr. by
Lattimore) 67 "Etymologica," 147. 68 "Etymologica," 148. 69
"Etymologica," 148.43Reproduced with permission of the copyright
owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48.
'OOUOEU~OVOJ.1' EOtCO noovuJ.1ov (19.407-9).70 In another case,
which centers00theacquisition of a nickname, CIeopatra's parents
came to caJI their daughter "Alcyone" due to the mother Marpessa's
grief at being snatched away by Apollo: 'AAK')VTV KaAemcov
EnOOVUJ.10v, OVEK' ap' autii~ l.lltllP aAKuvo~ nOAunEv9o~ ottov
Exouoa KAalEvo J.1tvKEpyO~avTtpnaoeol~o~'AnMcov (!l. 9.561-4).1
1Tbird, a name rnight be given based on an attitude or character
trait of the namer. For example, Herodotus says that Cleisthenes
ehanged the names of the Dorian tribes so as to make fools of the
Sieyonians, Le., based on bis eontemptuous attitude toward them.
The names were derived from the words for "donkey" and "pig," with
the endings changed. While he named his owo tribe the 'ApXAao1.,ano
'tii~ COUtou apxii~, he named theothers Yi't(l1., 'OvEa.tat, and
XmpEitat. (Hist. 5.68). In another instanee Euripides says that the
son of Proteus and Psamathe was named eEOlCAJlEVO~ based on his
father' s piety (He/. 8-10).72The Furies, as depicted by the
tragedians, evoked great fear in mortaIs; this is evident from
their approaeh to the naming of these deities. In Oedipus at
Colonus Oedipus is toId, regarding the spot where he sits, that ai.
yap EI.UPO~Ot. 9Ea mp' XOU01., rii~ 'te Kal ~K'tOUKpa,1. (39-40).
Having asked under what name he shouId invoke them, he isinformed
that the people of CoIonus prefer to address them as ta~ 1tv9'
poooa~ EUJ.1EVoa~(42).1 3 The mortaIs in question assign them the
nameEUJ.1EVOE~based on70 There are other passages in which the same
verb is used with reference to Odysseus. These cases involve
others' anger toward Odysseus hirnself: Odysseus is singled out as
the object of Zeus' wrath (t v o taov roMaao, ZEU;) (1.62); Ino
asks Odysseus, t7ttE tOl ilOE noaEloCllv EvoaxSCIlv rooaat'
EK7tyI..CIl;, 'tOl KaKa 7tol..l..a CPUtEE1; (5.339-40); Odysseus
indicates that he knows ro; IlOl ooc>oUatal ICA.Utoe;
Evvoc:ryalO; (5.423); Odysseus tells Penelope (who do es not as yet
know his true identity) that ooaavto yap ati) ZE; tE Kal. 'HD..lOe;
because his cornrades had slain he kine uf Helios 09.275-6; om. in
sorne MSS). 71 Strictly speaking the mother, whose grief leads to
the additional assignrnent, is of course one of two namers. On this
interpretation atl; refers to the daughter, and JllV to her mother
Marpessa. Murray prints atr, rather than atfi;, and takes the JllV
as referring to Cleopatra rather than to Marpessa, as is evident
from his translation: 'The mother herself... wept because Apollo
that worketh afar had snatched her child away." One point in
support of the former reading is that the halcyon is known to cry
when separated from its mate; 00 this reading Horner has a direct
analogy in view. (1 owe this observation to Andl'ea Nightingale.)
72 The bracketed words oi SEOUe; a~CIlv ~ov Ol1veylC' are rejected
by Nauck (concerning the approach to narning evinced by this
passage cf. Plato, erar. 397a-c). The case of Theoclyrnenus is
actually rather more cornplex than Euripides' remark suggests since
presurnably the name was not given merely based on the father's
attitude, but a1so based on the parents' hopes that their son, once
mature, would display that same piety. Insofar as the name is given
based on a wish regarding the son's nature, it could be
accommodated in the first of the two basic categories as well,
i.e., that in which appellations are given based on important
considerations involving the bearer. 73 Lines 122ff. a1so show
rnortals' fear of these deities: one trembles to name them due to
their power to harmonon44Reproduced with permission of the
copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission. 49. their fear, that is, based on the attitude they
actually want these divinities to have toward them. This comes out
clearly when the Chorus in effect asks them to be true to this
assigned name with positive descriptive content: it teIls Oedipus
to repeat the prayer that "as we call them EUIlEvioac;, which means
the gentle of heart, may they accept with gentleness (~ eUIlEvrov)
the suppliant and his wish" (486-7).74 One sees the same
trepidation and reluctance to name the deities in Euripides' plays:
In Orestes Electra says ovollsEtv yap aiooUllat 8Eac; eIlEvloac;,
a't 'tvo' ~alltA.A.rov'tat
9apEv (34-6). (Nisetich's rendering of OallLrov EtEPO~ as "an
evil power" does nol convey the fear of naming involved here, but
rather masks it (Pindar's Victory Songs, 170).) In connection with
the giving of euphemistic VlLata it is also worth noting authors'
substitution of E'){>VU!1o~ for PlO"'tEPO~ as the adjective
meaning "Ieft," presumably on similar grounds, namely, out of fear
of the referent's power. In the case of Ec>VU!10~ this fear
would be generated specifically based on what is characterized as
being posirioned on the left: for instance, in Prometheus Bound
Prometheus says that ya!11jfrovxrov 'tE 1ttfjO"lV oicovrov O"Ke9p~
5lc>plO"', OltlV; 'tE 5E~lOl. q>O"lV EUrovlLou~ tE (48890).
The context makes clear that it is what occupies that position is
considered unfavorable or threatening. Conversely, the positive
character of what is on the right is mentioned also by Horner: as
Telemachus, taking leave of Menelaus, expresses his fervent desire
that Odysseus be at home when retums to Ithaca, E1t1ttato 5E~lO~
opVt~, aiEtO~ pyTv xlva q>pcov VXEO"O"l1tl..ropov, ~ILEpOV e~
aUI..f~ o 5' i~OV'tE~ E1tOVtO VPE~ ~OE yuvailCE~ 5 O"q>tO"lV
iyy9EV iA900v OE~lO; ~'~E 7tpcr9' l1t7troV o OE iOOVtE; yf9r,O"av,
Kal. 1taO"lV eVl q>PEO"l9u!1o~ iv9J, (Od. 15.160-5). a bird flew
by on the right, an eagle, bearing in his taIons a great, white
goose, a tame fowl from the yard, and men and women followed
shouting. But the eagle drew near to them, and darted off to the
right in front of the horses; and they were glad as they saw it,
and the hearts in the breasts of all were cheered. (tr. by Murray)
Similarly, as Telemachus raises the issue of Zeus' punishment of
the suitors, a hawk later flies by on the right; this leads
TheocIymenus to infonn him that oi) tOl aVEU geou E1ttato 5E~tO;
opVt~ eyvrov yp ILtv eO":vta iooov oirovov evta. !1E'tpou 5' OUK
EO"n yVEO~ ~aO"tl..EtEpoV aUo EV 5~1Lq 'I9KT1~, U' !1e"i~ KaptEpol
/lid (Od. 15.531-4). At the c10se of the poem, Odysseus-before
identifying himself as such to Laertes-telIs him that he last saw
Odysseus several years ago; moreover, ~ 't o ecr91..o1 EO"av
opvl9E~. In addition, one votes, for example, with the right hand,
as when Danaus telIs his daughters that the Argives acted in a
decisive fashion, 1tav5T]lLlat yap XEPO"l 5E~lCOV!10l~ Eq>pt~EV
aieT,p45Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission. 50. In addition,
anovo~amight be assigned based on a chance intersection of
pathsbetween the namer and the recipient individual. 77 In Ion,
Xuthus tells "Irov that he is receiving this name because he was
the first one Xuthus encountered as he left (E~tV'tt ~Ot)Apollo's
shrine (661-3). This analysis is later reiterated when the Chorus
leader statesthat Xuthus caBed him "Irov', E1tE1tEp 1tpYco~
T1vtTVUJ,10~ to mean "Ieft" in the sense of "west" (see for
instance 1.72). EuC>vuJ,lo~ is also employed in the literal sen
se of "well-named," as for example in Pindar' s mention of feet in
praising the speed of two victors (Nem. 8.47), and his reference to
justice as "named in loveliness" (EUroVUJ,10v OKIlV) (Nem. 7.48).
~uarovuJ.1o~ is also used, as at Ajax 914 where the phrase
oucrC>vuJ,10t; Atll~ appears; this reference assumes special
relevance given thal earlier in the play Sophocles highlights the
descriptive conlent of the hero's name. See in addition O.e. 528,
where the poel refers lo Oedipus' oUcrrovUJ,l1l I..Ktpll. With
regard to the issue of a reluctance lo name, it is interesting thal
three times in the Odyssey Penelope makes reference lo "ill-fated
Troy, not lO be named" (KIlICO'iAlOV OUK OVOJ,1llcrtiv) (19.260,
19.597, and 23.19). Finally, Herodotus declines to mention Osiris'
name in connection with a certain activity performed in his honor
(see 2.61). As concerns the omission of Osiris' OVOJ.11l see also
2.86; there Herodolus, discussing the Egyptian practice of
murnmification, says that embalmers first produce samples in wood,
of which the best and most expensive is said dVllt tO) OUK ocrlOv
1tOlEJ,1llt to ovoJ.11l Enl. tOtotCJl7tpiYJ.1lltl OVOJ.1~ElV. 77
Hirzel, somewhal more generally, mentions "ein zutaIliger Umstand
(tX11)" as "namenschtipferisch" in this instance (87).46Reproduced
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction
prohibited without permission. 51. said that KalVOV aE 'toVOfl' aya
xpvov 1I:E1I:Aaaflvov "1 rov , iv'tl afi8EV on auvtv'tE'tO
(830-1).1 8 Third and finaIly, an individual might receive his or
her ovofla based on sorne object associated with the namer. In this
connection Sophocles has Ajax tell his son Epuaxrc; that he was
named for the shield (aICoc;) which Ajax now gives to him (Aj.
574-6). Over and aboye the wide range of cases faIling in those
categories and subcategories treated in what precedes, it is
interesting to note that sometimes a particular ovofla will give
rise to a set of statements or story which takes on alife of its
own. For instance, in the Bacchae Euripides offers an explanation
of how the tale arose that Zeus bore Dionysus by way of his thigh.
Zeus gave an ether-formed Dionysus as hostage (oJ,Lllpov) to Hera.
Over time "men garbled the word (ovoJ,La fJ.E'tao..t~aav'tE~) and
said that Dionysus had be en sewn into the thigh of Zeus (EV
fll1P!> Lll~)."79 Whereas, what actuaIly happened was that Zeus
gave Hera a dummy as hostage for her son (ro/l~pEuaE) (288ff.). In
another case Herodotus makes reference to a well-known story bult
around the descriptive content of the name Kvro, which belonged to
the woman who, with her husband, tookcare of the boy who was to
become Cyrus. Once retumed to Cambyses' paIace he sang her praises:
oi OE 'tOlCEC; 1I:apaAa~v'tE~ 'to ovofla 'tolho, 1va eEto'tpro~
001(n 'tOtal I1pancrt 1I:EptEtva a'tlC; alhr KEXroPlllCE
(1.122).80In still another instance, also found in Herodotus, it
appears as though the writer draws conclusions about the nature of
the hippopotamus based on its name, which he gives as
'{1I:1I:0C;1I:0'tlltoe; (2.71): in this passage Herodotus claims
that it 'tE'tp1l:0UV Ea't,aXllAov, 01l:Aat 130e;, atllV, AO OE
oqaYlaa{}vn "tOtcp ovoJla ~v Arov' t:xa o' a.v "t1 "al "tOU
ouvJlatOe; EltapOltO (Hisl. 7.180). (In another case of aman
bearing the name of an animal Herodotus tells how Cleomenes
expresses his hostility by exploiting the descriptive content of
the name Kple;, which belonged 10 an especially conspicuous
Aeginelan opponent. As he was leaving the island, Cleomenes, having
discovered the name, offers the following response: "Holl vuv
lCatax;aAlCou, 6>lCPl, ta. lCpEa, Clc; O'JVOlOJlEVOe; JlEy:Acp
lCalCi> (6.50).) 83 On the subject of ties between elements of
language and reality, il is wOlth noting that Euripides draws
several contrasts between them (ofien using the tenninology ovo.ta
vs. EpyOV), which might be considered in sorne very Iimited sense a
precursor of Plato's exploration of ways in which the connection
between fragments of language and reality can be problematic or
discrepant. For instance, in The Trojan Women Hecuba cornments that
she functions as Astyanax's healer, OVOJl' Exouoa, ta.pya o' oi)
(1233); in The Phoenician Women Eteocles remarks that Ei 7t(XOl
tautov lCaAov EqU aoqv a' a.ta, OUlC ~v av aJlqlAElCtOe; av9pmole;
Eple;' VUV o' oe' OJlOlOV OUOEV Ot' lO"OV PPOto"iA.OC; 't 't' c1ta
'tv 'tE vouv 't 't' olllla't'd (O.T. 370-1).94Although these
writers do not enunciate views on links between phonemes and
elements of reality, several of the aforementioned passages
indicate sorne tendency to correlate certain consonants with
external phenomena based on connections between the way in which
the sounds in question are vocalized and important features of, or
factors involving, those entities under discussion. As mentioned,
there are many passages in which guttural consonants are associated
with expressions of hostility and references to various evils; if
their vocalization is considered to involve a certain harshness, or
other disagreeable features, then Itere too a similar connection
may perhaps be envisioned. In addition, it is worth noting another
case treated by Pindar, in which an individual originally narned
Aristoteles is said to have later received the name B't'to~ (i.e.,
"Stammerer") based on his suffering from that particular speech
impediment. In Pythian 5 Pindar says that the sound of this
individual's voice, with Apollo's aid, put to flight a pack of
lions, which were frightened by his exotic accent. In Pythian 4
Pindar mentions that Battus went to Delphi to ask the god to remedy
his starnmer (ou0"8pou q>rova~ ... 1tOtv.) (63-4); it is
interesting that certain of the term ~a't'toc;' constituents,
namely ~ and 't, might be considered of special relevan ce to the
malady whose sufferer it designates. A sensitivity to sound, and
henee repetition of various phonemes, occurs on a wide range of
levels in the literary tradition from Homer through Euripides. In
addition to cases in which a range of individual letters appear
with great frequency-for reasons ranging from the ostensibly
aesthetie to the substantive-authors many times utilize the
technique of repetition with regard to clusters of two or more
letters. These groupings oceur in a minimum of two words, and
involve no apparent interest in etyrnology: see for instanee 94
These Iines were drawn to rny attention in this connection by Sir
Kenneth Dover, who suggests that one could think of the letrer 't
in this context as an expression of harnmer blows.52Reproduced with
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited
without permission. 57. aAAE~JlEV aAA~A01.(nV (JI. 3.9) and .! ooC;
liOE'
'tEAEcr9at (663-4). 96 On the frrst two occasions Helen herself
is speaking. 97 Here the EA. combination is also present in
Menelaus' name. 53Reproduced with permission of the copyright
owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58.
axaptv (I.T. 566); ~'ltTlP ~'ltrop (Soph. El. 1154);98 1tVOC;
aU1tVOC; (Phi!. 847); and OEcrJ.lOV aOEcrJ.lOV (Eur. Supp. 32).
There are also several cases of complete repetition: 1t~ 1t~ 1t~
(Aj.867-8; see also 912); ail..tvov ail..lVov (Aj. 627); El..aXEV
EAaXEv (He/.214); E ZE, ta.n; once lived with Peleus apart from
men; for this reason the Thessalians caIl it E>etOEwv (Eur.
Andr. 17-20). Herodotus too notes several cases of the relevant
type. He mentions the 1tt~ called Archandropolis whieh seems to him
to be named after Arehander son of Phthius (Hist. 2.98). In
addition, Herodotus indicates his puzzlement as to why three
different women'snames were given to what is actuaIly a single land
mass. He notes the prevailing Greek assumption that Libya was named
after a native wornan, and that Asia was named after 107 Tr. by de
Slincourt 108 For additional cases falling in this subcategory see
Eur. Ion 1575-8, 1590-4 (on balance it seems preferable to place
these two passages here rather than in thal subcategory in which
parcels of land are in the recipient position); Rer. Hist. 1.7 (cf.
7.74),1.94, 1.171, l.l73 (cf. 7.92), 4.149, 5.68, 7.1 I (a people
and their land named after the conqueror Pelops), 7.62, 7.90-1, and
8.44 (in this instance Cecrops, not Ion, is in the primary role).
There is a noteworthy parallel between those Iiterary-tradition
cases involving individual s giving tbeir names to groups and
Plato's own handling of eponymy in tbe Phaedo: the former involve a
single individual giving his name to a group of individuals, while
in Plato's case it is preeisely a single entity, namely a Form,
that gives its name to a group of individual sensibles. That being
said, the differences are numerous and striking. Central among them
is the faet that in Plato's framework tbe two parties are native to
fundamentally different planes of reality; whereas, in tbe Iiterary
tradition the individual s and groups in question are viewed as
belonging to, or improperly aligned with, the empirical world. 109
For "1A.l0~ as a synonym for Troy see, e.g., /l. 1.71,15.66,15.71,
and 20.216. 60Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.
Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65. Prometheus'
wife; as for Europe, he says that one cannot detennine where it got
its name unless one cIaims that it comes from the Tyrian woman
Europa (4.45) (with regard to the threefold division ofthe earth
into Europe, Asia, and Libya, cf. Pindar, Pyth. 9.5-8).1 10 As
concems cases in wbich a deity is in the primary role, Bacchus is
said to have given his name to a parcel of land ('ta.cro'
E1tClVUJ.l.OV yat;) (Soph. O.T. 209-11). Moreover,on several
occasions the goddess Athena is associated with Athens as primary
name-bearer tonominatum. Regarding tbis connection between Athena
and Athens, Burkert notes that "whether the goddess is named after
the dty or the city after the goddess is an ancient dispute. Since
-ene is a typical place-name suffix ... the goddess most probably
takes her name from the city."Ill Such lioguistic arguments
notwithstanding, writers in the literary tradition claim on several
occasions that Athena gave her name to the city of Athens. For
instance, Oedipus addresses Athens as the "city named for great
Athena, Honored aboye all cities in the world!"
(Soph.O.e.107-8).112 EIsewhere Hermes refers to "the famousGreek
city named for Pallas of the golden spear" (Eur. Ion 8-9, cf.
29-30), and later in the same play Euripides has Athena herself
state that the city of Athens got its name from her (1555-6). In
such cases one canDot help but concIude that cIear implications
for-and expectations of-greatness follow from the assignment. 113
Fourth, natural inanimate entities may be named afier individuals.
In this connection, Pindar remarks that HeracIes "called [the hill
at Olympia] Kronos' Hill, for in former times .. .it had lain
beneath deep drifts of snow, without a name (vc>VUJ.l.Ot;)" (01.
10.49-51, cf. 01. 5.19). Moreover, drawing 00 lo's name, Aeschylus
foreteIls that the inlet ofthe sea which lo is driven to will be
caBed '1 VlOt; ... 'tlt; crlt; 7tOpEUt; J.l.vlJ.l.U 'tOlt;
7ta.cr1.V ~pO'tOlt;(Prom. 840-1).114 Fifih and lastIy, individual s
may give their names to certainhuman constructions, as when Pindar
reports that Apollo named a temple of his the "Ismenion" after the
son given him by the nymph Melea (Pyth. 11.5-6), and Herodotus 110
For additional relevant cases see Pind. 01.7.73-6; Her. Hist.
4.148, 6.47, and 7.178. Moreover, Pindar indicates on severa!
occasions that parcels of land have their eponyrnous nyrnphs. For
example, he treats Aigina both as a nyrnph (01. 9) and mother of
Aiakos (Nem. 7-8, Isth. 8), and as the island to which she gave her
name (Nem. 3-5). In Pythian 8, the poet depicts her explicitly as
the nyrnph who gave the island its name: he addresses her as Atytva
!pAa ~fm:p (98) and asks her to help Aigina gain its freedorn.
Theba and Thebes receive the same treatrnent: Theba is rnentioned
as Aigina's sister (lsth. 8), and Thebes as lhe Boiotian city
(lsth. 4). Pindar also depicts Theba explicitly as the nyrnph who
gave Thebes its name (lsth. 3 and 7). In Pythian 9, Pindar depicts
!he nyrnph Kyrana as the one who gave !he city of Cyrene its name;
in !hat same ode, Libya is treated both as a parcel of land and as
that land's eponyrnous nyrnph (in Pythian 4 she is depicted as
Epaphus' daughter). With regard to Rhodes see 01. 7. 111 Greek
Religion, 139. 112 Tr. by Fitzgerald. 113 Of course, strictly
speaking these can only be attached to the people of the city thus
named. 114 Also falling in this subcategory are Aesch. Eum. 689-90
and Prom. 299-300.61Reproduced with permission of the copyright
owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66.
comments that "the Delphians call this gold and silver which Gyges
sent the Gygean Treasure, after the donor's name (E1tl tOl>
ava.8vto~ E1tcovuJ.!iT)v) (Hist. 1.14) (with regard to human
constructions see also Eur. Hipp. 32-3).1 15 As concems human
practices, a feast is named for Agamemnon (Soph. El. 282-5), and a
banquet for Thyestes (tCx E1tCVUJ.!a. Oel1tva. 9uO"tou) (Eur. Oro
1008). The second category of assignments cornprises those
instances in which natural inanimate entities give their vJ.!a.ta.
to various types of entity. These might be individual s, as when
Horner notes that Telarnonian Ajax killed l:tJ.!oEO"toV, ov 1tOtE
J.!1tT)P "IoT)9EV KattOl>O"a. 1ta.p' OX9UO"lV l:tJ.!EVtoC;
yEva.t', E1tE pa. tOKE>O"tV aJ.!' E0"7tEtO J.!l1Aa. iaa8a.t
TOVEKeX. J.!lV KAEOV l:tJ.!oEO"tov (ll. 4.474-7). On other
occasions, the recipient entities are peoples. In this connection,
Herodotus reports that the people living around the rnountain
called "Atlas" were narned "Atlantes" after it (Hist. 4.184).
Sirnilarly, following their migration to Asia the Thracians becarne
known asBithynians, but say they were previously caBed Stryrnonians
after the river Stryrnon on which they lived(oiKovn:~E1tl
l:tPUJ.!V1) (7.75). In addition, there are several cases inwhich
natural inanimate entities function both as primary and recipient
ovoJ.!a-bearers. To give just one example, Herodotus mentions the
river Aegae on the Crathis, which is never dry ovoll
EO"nN~O"a.tov.tOUe; 'to (Her. Hist. 7.40). In addition, the
recipient entities might be natural inanimate entities; in this
connection, the115 Herodotus mentions Ismenian Apollo at 5.60. 116
For other relevant passages see Hist. 4.52. 7.58, and
9.51.62Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission. 67. town Therma on the
gulf is said to have given that gulf its name (Hist. 7.121),117
Moreover, individuals might receive their appelIations from places
associated with noteworthy events, as when a man named Archias
reports to Herodotus that 't> 1t
J.LEvO~ 1tAilv ~tC;, Ei to J.L,'tav a1tO 'PPov'tooC; iix90~ xpil
~otAeiv E'tT'tJ.LCO~ ... Z~va o n~ 1tpO'PPvco~ E1ttVlCUX 1CA.~roV
'tE~E'tat'Ppevrov 'to 1ta.v. (Ag. 160-75)121Euripides' tone
suggests that he is somewhat less awestruck: oO''tt~ 1tOt' d O',
ouO't1taO'to~Elovat, ZE~, Et't' av'J'K1l
,.U1t o' e:yro). While the first several words hearken back to
the aforementioned Agamemnon passage, what follows suggests a
marked difference in attitude andorientation. It is perhaps not
coincidental that a Euripidean character, having observed Hecuba' s
plight and condition, juxtaposes Zec; and 'tXTJ and muses about the
possible preeminence of the latter: J, ZEU, 'ti A,~ro; 7tn:p o'
avSpro7tOUC; piv ~ o~av&Uc.oc; 't1VOE KE1CTT10Sat J.L'tTJv
['I'EUOl1, OOKouv'tac; OatJ,lvrov dvat yvoe;], 'tXTv OE 7tv'ta
'tav~po'tOtC;E7ttOK01tEtV; (Hec. 488-91).1 22 (In this connection
see alsoCycl. 599-607 and Ion 1512-15.)1232. Writers sometimes
focus explicitly on descriptive content in their use of divine
epithets that are relevant in particular contexts. EIsewhere they
draw attention to the multiple appellations of particular deities;
they may also use forms of identification or address-some more
elaborate than others-which are tied to divine aid either hoped for
received. 124 Examples inelude: a) Aeschylus. Eum. 90-1, Apollo to
Hermes: 'EpJ.Ll1, q>A,aOOE, lCp'ta o' rov E7trovUJ,lOC;
7toJ,l7ta'ioe; tO'St. b) Aeschylus. Th. 8-9, Eteoeles: From this
disaster ZEUe;aA,E~TJnptoC;E7trovUJ.LOC;yVOt'to KaoJ.Leirov 7tA.et.
c) Herodotus. Hist. 7.192: Having discovered that the Persian ships
had been destroyed, the Greeks offered prayers and libations
nOO'EtOroVt oro'tl1 pl; nOOElorovoe; oro-riipoc; E7trovuJ,liTJv
a7tO 'to'tou En lCal Ee; 'tOEvOJ,li~ov'tEc;.d) Herodotus. Hist.
1.44: Croesus invokes Zeus under several epithets on a single
occasion, because all appear to him to be relevant to the goals he
has on that particular occasion. In his profound grief at his son'
s death, Croesus ElCA.EE J.lev ,1 ia. lCa9pO'lov, J.lap'tu
pJ,lEVOC; 'tel 1mo 'tOl> ~ei vou 7tE7tOvSroe; erTJ, h:A.EE OE
E7ttO'nv 'tE Ka!. halp~lOv, 'tov a'tov 'to>'tov ovoJ.l~rov SEV,
'tOV J,lEV E7tcr'tlov KaA.rov, Oln on OiK01.O'l imOOE~J.lEVOe; 'tov
~E'iVOV 7talOOe; EA.v8ave ~O'Krov, 'tov122o Zeus, what can 1 say?
That you look on roan and care? Or do we, holding that the gods
exist, deceive ourselves with unsubstantial dreams and Hes, while
random careless change and change alone control the world? (tr. by
Arrowsmith) Line 490 is bracketed in the ocr (del. by Nauck). 123
Cf. Burkert, who mentions these last three passages in sorne
remarks about TXll's "rise to farne" (Greek Religion, 186, with fn.
29). 124 Or perhaps received ami hoped for (in future), as in the
third case cited below. 66Reproduced with permission of the
copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission. 71. OE btalp~tOV, C>~ 1tOA,E/llc.l'ta'tov.
125crU/l1tI.Ll'a~(j)'A,aKaa'tovEPlKOle) Pindar. Isth. 5.1: The
mother of the sun, Theia, is addressed as 1tOA,Uc.lvU/lE. f)
Aeschylus. Prom. 209-10: Prometheus says of his mother that she is
called bothThemis and Earth, 1tOMrov vo/l'tcov/lOp~ /la.g)
Sophocles. Ant. 1115-16: The choros addresses Dionysus as 1tOA,
Uc.lVU/lE, Kao/lEa~ v/la~a:yaA/lCl ... h) Euripides. Hipp. 1-2,
where Aphrodite describes herself as follows: ~po'tOtO'lnOA,A,~/lEV
EVKOUK aVc.lvu/lo~ geeX KKAT/lal K1tpt~ opavou 't' ecrco.i)
Euripides. Bacc. 274-6: Teiresias says that mankind possesses two
supreme blessings, one of which is LlTl/ll'tTlP ge-rf o' Ecr'tv,
OVO/lCl o' 1t'tEPOV ~OA,n KAEt. j) For elaborate forms of address,
see the priest Chryses' prayer 'A1tAACOVtavaK'tt, 'tov ~'KO/lO~
'tKE Ar'tc.l: KA,u9 /lEU, apyup'tu~', OC; XpcrTv cl/lq>t~~TlKa~
KAA.av 'tE sa9rv TEVtOot 'tE tt avcrcrEt~, L/ltv9EU, El 1to't 'tOt
XClpEV't' E1tl. VTlOV epE'I'a, 11 d ol 1tOt 'tOl Kata 1tova /lTlp'
eKTJa tCl pCOV 1]0' a i yrov, tOE /lOl 1CPlTlVOV EAOCOp' tEcrEtaV
Llavaol. E/la oKpua crOtO'l ~A.ecrcrlv. (11. 1.35-42)126 Regarding
Apollo see also Rhesus 224-32. AIso noteworthy for the degree of
its elaboration is the way in which Hippolytus and his attendant
huntsmen address Artemis in Euripides' Hippolytus (62-71); see also
Hippolytus' prayer in what follows (73ff.). As previously
discussed, there are numerous cases in which the descriptive
content of the gods' names themselves is highlighted, e.g., vacious
writers connect Zeus' name with Ot. andlor s1v. Epithets depicting
vacious functions of deities are also plentiful. In these
instances, rather than the god's name itself being the linguistic
entity on which authrs125126In the violence of his grief Croesus
prayed to Zeus, calling on him as God of Purification to witness
what he had suffered at the hands of his guest; he invoked him
again under his titIe of Protector of the Hearth, because he had
unwittingly entertained his son' s murderer in his own house; and
yet again as God of Friendship, because the man he had sent to
guard his son had tumed out to be his bitterest enemy. (tr. by de
Slincourt) Hear me, lord of the sil ver bow who set your power
about Chryse and Killa the sacrosanct, who are lord in strength
over Tenedos, Smintheus, if ever it pleased your heart that 1 built
your temple, if ever it pleased you that I bumed a11 the rich thigh
pieces of bulls, of goats, then bring to pass this wish I pray for:
let your arrows make the Danaans pay for my tears shed. (tr. by
Laltimore)67Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.
Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72.
concentrate, attention is turned to the epithet as what does the
describing, i.e., as what designates the capacity in which the god
is being invoked in a particular context. This vast multiplication
of di vine appellations lies in sharp contrast to the situation
with regard to human names, where a single individual OVOIla. is
both expected and generally adequate. 127 In contrast, there are so
many specific duties-for instance-which humans assign to various
deities that it was simply not felt to be sufficient to rest
content with a single name. 128 One important factor motivating the
process must surely have been the profoundly asymmetrical relation
between gods and human beings, i.e., the felt dependence of the
latter on the former; this, in tum, generated the need for a
diversity of names to correlate with the manifold and diverse
functions which hurnans hoped andJor expected the gods to fulfill.
In fact, with regard to di vine narnes, it was not the case that
one arrived at a fixed, closed systern. Burkert conveys the
fluidity and dynamism of the process with great vividness: These
detached figures are linked ... to specific dornains and functions
in which their influence can be obtained and experienced. This link
is guaranteed in two ways, by the epithets and by the personified
abstractions in their retinue. Hyrnnic poetry, doubtless following
aneient tradition, loves to heap divine epithets one upon another
.. .in the eult it is the task of the officiant who speaks the
prayer to encircle the god as it were with epithets and to discover
the just and fitting name. In an established cult there will always
be a fixed, well proven Dame, but this does not inhibit the search
for further epithets. The epithets in tum are complexo Sorne are
uninteIligible and for that very reason have an aura of rnystery;
others result frorn the fusion of gods who at first were
independent.. .. Many are taken from sanetuaries ... or from
ritual, as if the god himself were performing the ritual aet. ...
Many are formed spontaneously to denote the dornain in whieh divine
intervention is hoped for; in this way each god is set about with a
host of epithets which draw a eornplex pieture of his activity.
(Greek Religion, 184)127 This being said, it is true, of course,
that writers mention certain cases involving name changes, or the
acquisition of additional appellations, i.e., niclmames. Alcinous
puts Ihe point about Ihe universal presence of human proper names
aplly when he asks Odysseus lo identify himself by name: ett'
OVOJl' Ottl crE KElfh KAEOV JlTt'tTlP tE 1taTlp tE, aAAol 9' o'i
Kata acrtu Kal. o'i 1tEplvalEtoucrtv. o .LEv yp tls 1tJl1tav
avrovuJlS Ecrt' av9pro1tCllv (Od. 8.550-2). Elsewhere Herodotus
distinguishes a people called Ihe "Ataran tes" as Ihe only ones
whose constituent members lack individual appeIlations: they
avrovuI.1Oi Eicrt JlOUVOl av9pro7wlv twv iJlElS lOJlEV' vI.1(X.~EV
6)0' ~ 'to 7tnv 't11't/l~, /l~ 'tle; ovnv' ox pOO/lEV 7tpovoatO'l
'tOl> 7tE7tpc.o/lvou yAroO'O'av EV 'tXal v/lc.ov, 'tav
oopya/lJ3pov cl/l 1tE1tProIlvOU belong only to a god or a
daimon."134 1 agree with this final statement about gods' and
daimons' capacities; however, what Fraenkel does not consider here
is whether Zeus himself-as Helen's male parent-might be envisioned
as namer. 1 would c1aim that Aeschylus' phrasing lends at least as
much support to the c1aim that the Chorus is here a1luding to his
possible role as namer. Any concerns about ambiguity
notwithstanding, what is ultimately of interest is the reasoning
process which one can trace in the Chorus' observations. Success
(tXTl) is said to be achieved in this instance because Helen's
effect on mortals has turned out to be precisely that predicted by
her name. In fact, in the passage's reflective sequence-versus that
of presentation-it is Ihis fact that leads to the Chorus' initial
musing about the name's source. This becomes evident in what
follows the long opening question, where the Chorus indicates its
underlying motivation in making the inquiry at ail; the phrase 1tet
1tPE1tVtroo~' E1td o' EUKvat, 'AAeXO''l:'OpOC; /lEV 1tPOOtOV, etta
oE 8vou !>vou tE 8avtou S' oO'a tE rii tp(j>Et KaK. o 'Yp
1tOt' axoo Zilv 'Y' E1C(j>UO'a. 0" E"{ro, 1tOAAolO't Kilpa
~apppOl.C; "EUllO'. tE. (766-71)70In the aforementioned Agamenuzon
passage Aeschylus does not raise the issue of patemity, being
content to use etymology to get his point across; in faet, far from
questioning Helen' s status as Zeus' daughter, one might view the
Chorus as a1luding to his possible role as namer of his progeny.7 1
Here, in contrast, Andromache insists that Zeus was not actually
Helen's father, and her remarks at least imply that Helen's
dreadful conduet makes her69 In one noteworthy passage Apollo makes
some dogmatic cornments about the basis of an individual's
entitlement to be called "parent" (tolCe;) (Eum. 657-61). In his
view it is categorically and only Ihe man who deserves to be called
a child's "parent"; for Ihe same sentiment expressed wilhout
raising the malter of appropriateness see Orestes 551-6 (cf. the
Loeb, which refers to Oro 552 in a note on the Aeschylus passage).
70 O flowering of Ihe house ofTyndareus! Not his, not Zeus'
daughter, never that, but child of many falhers 1 say; Ihe daughter
of Vindictiveness, of Hate, of Blood, Dealh; o" a11 wickedness that
swarms on earth. I cry it a1oud: Zeus never was your father, but
you were bom a pestilence to a11 Greeks and the world beside. (tr.
by Lattimore, slightly modified)71 It seems c1ear that in Ihe
Agamemnon passage Aeschylus' raising the issue of Helen' s namer is
not equivalent to his raising the malter of patemity. If one
assumes that an individual's progenitor serves as namer one would
conclude that Zeus' status as Helen's father is in question just
because the Choros expresses uncertainty about the name's source;
however, this interpretation would go far beyond anylhing one finds
in the tex!.103Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.
Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108. utterIy
unworthy of the appellation "daughter of ZeuS."72 Nevertheless,
while the two tragedians adopt different approaches, they accord in
their emphasis on the destructive character of her activity, and in
their inclination to make the point, at least in sorne sense, by
appeal to linguistic considerations.13 Finally, writers raise the
issue of a particular individual's right to be called "son." In a
striking case of this type Reracles informs Hyllus that he has a
duty to ease his father' s plight by building a pyre and buming the
body, lest he forfeit his entitlernent to be called Hecacles'
"son": you OE IlTlOEV eiaoro OellCpU, aAA' aatvalCtO~
lCaOellCpUtO~, El1tEp d touO' avop~, ep;ov' El OE Il~, Jl,Evro a'
eyro !Cal VpeEV rov ap(llo~ EiaaEl /3ap~. YA. OlllOt, 1teln:p, t
Ei1ta~; Orel Il' Elpyaaat. Hp. 1tOla opaat' eativ El OE Il~,
1tatpo~ aAAou YEVOU tOU IlTlO' ellO~ !CATleft~ En. (Soph. Tr.
1199-1205)74 In a somewhat analogous case Haemon, having tried
unsuccessfully to dissuade Creon from killing Antigone, states that
El 1l1l1tatllP ~ae', Et1tOV av a' OUlC El) "(UvatlCEC;, E~ tO
aUJ,l1tOVEtV J,lEt~o' 1t' aJJ..ou lC01>lC EJ,lo 1tElCatOv
(1367-9).Funetional entena eombined with theproposed etymology of
Antigone' s name would seem to grant Sophocles' treatment the
status of ajudgment of deserto More generally, this case, along
with those involving Ion's adopted "mother" and "father," indicates
a degree of flexibility present in assessments involving funetional
tenns: sueh eases provide the clearest evidence that the duties one
perfonns, rather than biological or gender considerations,
constitute the deeisive criterion.76 As previously noted, av't has
the sen se of "like" or "as good as" a1ready in Homer; for
references see rny treatment of Antigone's name in ch.
1.105Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission. 110. Appendix B
Terminology Writers Use to Assess Appropriateness 1 provide here
sorne analysis of the terminology which writers use to raise
questions of appropriateness in the three categories treated in
what precedes. When one examines the relevant passages, what is
most striking is the marked diversity of means which writers
employ; these range from single words to judgments which an author
offers through multiple features of his remarks.CATEGORY-ONE CASES
In several instances, adverbs introduce writers' assessments;
elsewhere verbs or participles combined with adverbs or adverbial
accusatives convey their judgments. In still other cases an author
uses a verb alone to malee the point, or, more frequentIy,
combinations of adjective and adverb. One adverb that writers
employ is ap9ro~. In Euripides' TrojanWomen one finds a passage in
which ap9roe; plays a central role: 'tel Jlropa YelP 1tv't' EcntV
'Apoavl1~ apXEl 8Eae; (989-90). Here it is this single word that
clearly introduces the dimension of appropriateness. In another
instance ap9roc; forms the core of a judgment of desert, when an
Aeschylian chorus, referring to Eteocles and Polyneices, says that
Ol 011't' ap9rne; K(n' E1toovuJlav ... Kal 1tOA.UVEt1Cel~ roA,oV't'
mE~E'i otavoat (Th. 829-31). Here the poet extends the descriptive
content of Polyneices' name to cover Eteocles as well;77 while in
the absence of ap9roc; the evaluation may be implied, this adverb
once again malees it explicit. 'AA,l1eroC; is another adverb used
to express judgments of appropriateness, as for example in
Aeschylus' Suppliants: "E1t(l(poC;, aA,119roc; pucroov E1tCVU/lOC;
(315). In this instance the adverb alone makes what would otherwise
be merely an etymology"E1taq>oc; ... puatoov E1tC.OvuJloc;-into
a judgment of veridicality; aA,119roc; here modifies the adjective
E1tC.OVUJlOC; which by itself here introduces only the basis on
which this 77 As previously discussed, Sophocles does the same with
regard to Antigone and Ismene, with the descriptive content of the
former individual's name being applied to both.106Reproduced with
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited
without permission. 111. individual received bis name. This adverb
is also of central relevance in another case: aA:r9&; o'
ovo,"I.(X nOAuvE,1CTJ 1ta't~p e8E't erOl 8E.~ 1tpovo~ VEllCc.oV
E1tCVUJlOv(Eur. Phoen. 636-7). Here aA1l8&; is one of two
factors making what would otherwise remain on the plane of
etymology into a judgment of deserto In fact, one can break the
statement down into three distinct levels: the words OVOIl
constitutes a judgment of appropriateness when Prometheus, giving
lo a foretaste of things to come, says that f~ElC;O' 'Ypptcr"C~v
1tO'tllJlOV Ol> 'JIEuOrovullov (Prom. 717).84 WhiIe these two
wordsneed not in principIe signal that a judgment of
appropriateness is at issue, in this ease they do: the idea is that
there is an extremeIy cIose fit between the river's appelIation and
the eharaeter of its activity. In yet another instanee,
'JIEUOroVUJlOC; combines with the modifying adverb rcavolCroC; to
raise the issue most emphatiealIy, when EteocIes asserts that
neither heretofore nor at present has Dike taken Polyneices' side:
~ 0~"C' av 81 Moreover, he proceeds to dwell on the strife
resulting from the course of action which the bearer has undertaken
(580-3). Strictly speaking of course, tOVO!Ul is the direct object
of the participle, while the remainder goes with lC!lAEi. 82 The
fonner is Wyckoffs, the lalter thal provided by Liddell and Scott,
A Greek-English Lexicon. 83 See Eum. 90-1 for Aeschylus' use of
these same two words in an expressed wish with reference to Hennes.
84 More generally see 717-24.109Reproduced with permission of the
copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission. 114. 1tavBlccoc; 'l'EuBc.vuJ.1oe; ~1CTl, ~UVOu()'(X
pa{av yeXJ.1COV, KaA.OUCJtv au'tllv 8EoVllv' tex BEta ri!Q 'teX 't'
ov'ta Ka. J.1A.A.ovta 1teXv't' in{CJ'ta'to. (He/. 10-14)87 Here the
relative adverb of timeMe is used to fix the perlod when the
original appellationwas used; then, the o in the phrase ene. o
rnarks this name and perlod off from those that follow, while the
temporal conjunction e1te.-as counterpart to &rE-highlights the
point at which the shift occurred. Finally, in lines 13-14
Euripides provides the reason for the change (as the presence of
yeXP indicates). One finds similar elues where nicknames are
assigned, as for example in the case of "Alcyone"; here a
combination of temporal marker ('tte) and grounds of
shift-introduced by ovEK'-signal Cleopatra's acquisition ofthis
additional ovoJ.1a (JI. 9.561-4).88 In future-directed cases
involving divine appellations wrlters often employ the imperative
mood of the verb to help indicate that the speaker is expressing a
wish that the85 Specifically, the adverb is what lends the remark
its emphatic quality. Note Eteocles' use of 1tavoilCCOATJJ.l.Ot
J.l.1l'tEp, o 'tEKO-Ucr 1tEP (Ion 1324). Ion conveys hisassessment
through this form of address combined with the participle that
follows; this participle has concessive force, which is highlighted
by the presence of 1tEp.9997 Moreover, it is possible that
Sophocles hints at a judgment of non-desert via a juxtaposition of
noun and adjeetive, when he has Eleetra speak of Clytaemestra as
LlTI1P clLltrop (El. 1154); he here uses the noun LltT1P, but
promptly retraets it by introducing a eorresponding privative
adjective. Strictly speaking, of eourse, what results is far more
than a mere retraction. 98 In the former instanee Orestes supplies
the alternate appellation, aceompanied by the explanation that
Llltp' aiOou.Lat A'yEtv. 99 Subsequently the priestess evinces her
agreement with Ion's view that she can fittingly be called his
mother on non-biological grounds: laov y
~ Ill't1lP analysis tied to the Derveni Papyrus specifically, or
Orphic "scholars" more generally (32. While Baxter is quite right
to recognize that the Iiterary tradition is important (though he
concentrates only on Homer and Aeschylus), systematic study of the
extant evidence justifies the c1airn that it is not merely one
source among nurnerous others. (Invoking the literary tradition in
a very different context, Seth Benardete asserts that the dialogue
sheds Iight on Plato's understanding of Greek tragedy. He has in
mind nOI their conunon use of etyrnology, but the general issue of
tragedy's stance toward human Jife and possibility, as when, in
discussing the etyrnologies of "A pollo" and "Pan," he c1aims that
"A poli o is tragedy's own view of itself. Pan is Socrates' ....
The goatishness ofPan is the laughably human about which tragedy
sings its rnyths and lies. Pan is the root of the tragic Apollo";
in what follows he identifies the idea that "the individual loses
nothing of himself in attaining significance" as "the essence of
tragedy, [which] was shown to obtain per impossibile only in the
realm of the arch-sophist Hades" ("Physics and Tragedy: On Plato's
Craty/us," 137). The interpretation advanced in this artiele is
highly speculative, and in any case does not speak to the issue of
the tragedians and other poets as Platonic opponents in the
Cralylus due to their own use of etyrnology specifically.) 75 This
is especially so of the Phaedo. The Cratylus and Phaedo are related
largely as negative to positive, with the Cratylus clearing the
ground for Plato's use of eponymy, also prominent in the Iiterary
tradition, to treat appropriateness in the Phaedo. Rosenstock
rightly highlights the existence of a cornplementary160Reproduced
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction
prohibited without permission. 165. are thus not completely wrong,
but simply have not properly identified the fono of that response.
Key here is the fact that both target the Iiterary tradition
directly: When Plato considers the Iiterary tradition he is not
concemed to refute the sophists; in faet, he has no deep or abiding
interest in their procedure in this regard. Plato is not responding
to the Iiterary tradition via the sophists, but to the poets
themselves, hence only indirectly to the sophists insofar as they
too used that material, albeit wrongly to bis way of thinking. 4.
391d4-392b2: Discussed frst are Homeric instances of different
ovJlo:ta used by gods and humans with reference to the same
entities; one can assume that those appellations the gods employ
are naturally-correct. Examples: l. riverXanthus and Scamander; 2.
bird-Chalcis and Cymindis; 3. mound before Troy-Batieia and
Myrine.Socrates notes that speaking directly of gods'assignments is
Iikely beyond their resources. 76 The issue of adivine component
involved in matters of naming frst arises here, as Plato makes the
transition from sophists to poets in grounding his treatment of
op9trc;. Plato would oot want to embrace this approach to
correctness since a suffcient explanation of appropriateness in
such cases is simply to invoke appellations' divine source. To
claim that particular names are superior simply because they are
associated with these superior beings lea ves no room for a
sustained investigation of the sort that Plato is interested in
pursuing. Theserelationship between the two dialogues; however, he
wrongly views the Cratylus as "the perfect complement to the
Phaedo"--rather than vice versa-privileging what he views as the
Cratylus' challenge to "the Phaedo's reliance upon simple logo; as
a medium oftruth" ("Fathers and Sons," 410). 76 There are severa!
Iliad passages in which Homer says that men give an entity one
name, while the gods employ another: I. l/. 1.403-4: Homer refers
to that son of Poseidon, having a hundred hands, "whom the gods can
Briareus, but all men Aegaeon"; yap an: ~TlV o{) 1tatpO~ aJ,LEvrov.
2. l/. 2.811-14: There is a mound before Troy, which men call
Batieia, "but the immortals can it the barrow (crllla) of Myrine,
Iight of step." (In this and Ihe preceding passage I employ
Murray's translations.) 3. JI. 14.290-1: There is a mountain bil'd,
which the gods call Chalcis, and men Cyrnindis. 4./1. 20.73-4:
There is a river, which the gods can Xanthus, and men can
Scamander. In his remarks here Plato mentions a11 except the frst.
In contrast, it is worth noting Hesiod's focus on parallels between
gods and men with regard lo naming: l. Th. 195-7: Gods and men call
the maiden Aphrodite. 2. Th. 270-2: There is no distinction belween
what men and gods can the progeny of Ceto and Phorcys, Le., the
Graiae. Moreover, Hesiod emphasizes such parallels in connection
with other matlers: I. Th. 220: The Fates pursue the transgressions
(1tapa1~acria~) of both men and gods. 2. Th. 406-7: Lelo is
characterized as ~1tlOV lo men and the irnmortal gods. 3. Th. 766:
Death is characterized as hateful even 10 Ihe irnmortal
gods.161Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission. 166. instan ces serve
to introduce Homer-and by extension the literary tradition in
general-as having treated correctness; however, it is the ensuing
treatment of the names given to Hector's son, which involves a
focus on semantic constitution, that typifies the brand of Op9tlle;
al issue for Plato in the Cratylus. The matter of names' possible
divine source will be a recurrent theme in the dialogue. 77
5.392b3-393b6:Etyrnology and the issue of
appropriateness:Scamandrius/Astyanax and Hector. a. 392b3-e8: The
fitness of Hector' s son' s name is explored. Socrates notes that
Homer gave him two oV/lata: Astyanax and Scamandrius. The more
insightful individuals, here identified as the men, are said to
have utilized the former appellation; the less insightful, here the
women, are supposed to have employed the latter:06lCOl>V
otcr9aon"O/ll1POe; tO nalBov tO tOl>i>1to toov Tpcrov v here
closely to the particular notions of life and death in the way
required by tbis interpretation. 117116 One might say that there is
a significant c1ash between those expectations generated by the
OVOIUX and the kind of impact which its bearer has on reality.
While use of the bow results in death, such ties as tbereare
between the bow itseIf and Jife are indirect, i.e., they exist
insofar as Jife and death are themseIves coincident opposites. 1be
fragment does not suggest a way in which the bow ilself couId
represent Jife or a coincidence of opposites invoIving Jife and
death; with Kahn (202), I do not find it IikeIy that Heraclitus had
in mind the obvious fact that hunters' activity of killing secures
the continuation of their own lives. Cf. Fr. 67: aEO~ f~PTJ
EepPVTJ, XE1ILCI)V apo~, 1C1..E~O~ Eip~vTJ, lCpO~ 1..1Il~
('tQvav'ta a7tav'ta' o{'to~ vou~), Ql..1..olOu'tal oE OICCOO'7tEp
(7tUp), 7t'tav c:ru~.Ll'yll auro.Lat:Jlv, Vo~~E'tal lCae' fOovTv
K:cJ'tou, with Kirk's coroment, which seems to me right, that "God
.. .is said to be the coromon connecting eIement in alI extremes,
just as tire is the common eIement of different vapours (because
these were conceived as a compound of tire with different kinds of
incense). Change from one to another brings about a total change of
name, which is misleading, because only a superficial component has
aItered and the most important constituent remains" (The
Presocratic Philosophers, 191, italics mine; this represents a
modification of his earlier, somewhat more positive stance (The
Cosmic Fragments, 118. The proliferation of names would seem to
reinforce the common and mistaken human tendency to greatly magnify
the importance of perceptible changes and contrasts. For the
contrary view see Marcovich who, in ,his comments on ~O~-f31~,
claims that DK 67 does not contradict the view that for Heraclitus
an ovo~a "reveaIs a greal deal of the true CPt:Jl~ of its object"
(192). In his remarks on Fr. 67 itself, he emphasizes a supposedly
close tit between the content of this fragment and the view that
"names reflect a certain pan of the very essence of things" (416;
italics mine in both cases); even this claim, which is notably
weaker than that on p. 192, is unsubstantiated by the text of the
fragment. For a clash between reputation and reality see Fr. 28:
OOlCov'ta yap oOlClllro'ta'to~ YlVromm, epUl..crcrEl; despite a
high reputation, which would ostensibly correlate with superiority
to ordinary human beings in terms of knowledge, for Heraclitus such
individuals emphaticaIly do not have this elevated status. While
there may well be inlenlional word-play here, there is no
suggestion that this play takes the form of a proffered etymology;
also, one would be hard pressed to find a clear explanatory
relation going in either direction. 117 Contra Kahn (The Arr and
Thoughl of Heraclilus, 270), who does see a tie to ~lv here, and
with Kirk (The Cosmic Fragments, 392) and Marcovich (445), both of
whom tind the link unlikely. (In The Presocratic Philosophers, ch.
6, Kirk says nothing about a possible etymology or other natural
link between name and referent.) Marcovich takes the phrases di1CT;
ovolla (Fr. 23) and ZllV~ 5vo~a (Fr. 32) to "imply that the name
corresponds to the very essence of its holder" (193) (regarding the
former, Marcovich notes (230) that in the former case "ovolla seems
to imply 'idea'"). One might view the latter178Reproduced with
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited
without permission. 183. The surviving fragments indicate a
sensitivity to and use of language quite similar in nurnerous ways
to that displayed in poetic creations from Horner through
Euripides. While Heraclitus certainIy evinces interest in word-play
in general, what one does not find is a rnarked interest in
etyrnology specifically, as treated in theCratylus and by Plato's
non-philosophical predeeessors. To the extent that HeracIitus may
be viewed as offering etymologies and/or granting an explanatory
role to certain parallels in descriptive content (as with
J.l.pO~-I.lO'ipa in DK 25, perhaps ~uv vcp-~uvcp in Fr. 114, along
with the substantially negative import and indirect ties
in~t~-~o~,Fr. 48), he is foIlowing a procedure initiated
anddeveloped far more by his literary predecessors, contemporaries,
and successors;1I8 in fact, in those two ofthe three aforementioned
eases which make sorne use (however lirnited) of etymology, the
same parallels are found in poets themselves (J.l.po~-J.l.o'ipa in
Aeschylus, and ~t~-po~ in SophocIes). Even if one were to lend more
positive import to a given example, notably, the ~t.~-po~ parallel,
the faet remains that insofar as HeracIitus does raise the issue of
etymology he is drawing on a non-philosophical, literary tradition
to which he-like Plato-is heavily indebted for the initial
formulation of this and related problems. Writers in that
tradition, unlike HeracIitus, make extensive use of etymology,
grant their analyses clear explanatory value, and use etymology on
numerous occasions to treat explicitIy the question of names'
appropriateness. Finally, mitigating stronglyas indicating that
Heraclitus' Ev 'to (Jo
'tO A,f:yEl~; 1:0. A'YEl 1tOU 'HpKA,El'tO~ on "1tv'ta xropet
Kal ouah Jlvel," Kal 1to'taJlol> poft a1tEllcl;rov 'tCx ov'ta
A,yel ro~ "Ol~ E~ 'tov au'tov 1to'taJl.ov OUK av EJl.Patll SEO>,
roe; tt OE1VOV 111lVOVtOe; (404e1-2). In what follows he offers
four derivations correlating with the god's four OuVIiE1e;. 127
Hesiod speaks of the goddess whom gods and men call 'A 9pcp9r (Th.
195-8). Euripides offers an etymology of the name 'AK a~lOv
'HcrlOcp aVtlI..yE1V, aAI..a crUyxropEtV en Ola ri1v tO} acppou
yvECJtV '''AcppoSfll'' E1CI..i9r (ElC added by Hermann). 128 There
is a notable Odyssey passage in which Athena's name may be
associated with vrlla and voue; (voe;). Odysseus, upon his anival
on Ithaca, asks his divine protector Athena-there disguised as a
mortal-whether he has in fact reached his island home. The goddess
responds by saying that aid tOl tOlO)tOV ivl crtf9Ecrcrl v1)ua' ti)
crE lCal o> ovallal ItpOA17tElV Ocrfllvov EVta, OlJVElC'
E7tTt1e; Emnano183Reproduced with permission of the copyright
owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 188.
lCai arxvoos lCal ExcpPOOV (13.330-2). This passage assumes
heightened inlereSI based on Plalo's own similar treatmenl of the
name in the Cratylus, combined with the facI thal a reference 10
the interprelers of Horner begins his analysis: wlCaal oit !Cal o
naAalOl n,v 'A9rv&v VO!l~ElV OOaltEp o vuv ltEpi "J.1rpov
OElVOl. lCal. yap tOtOOV o ltoiJ..oi ~rYOJ!EVOl tOV ltOlrtV cpaal
-riv 'A9rv&v autov vouv tE IClXi olvOlav ltEltOlr!Cval, !Cal.
ta OV!llXta ltOlroV EOllCE tOlOUtV tl ltEPl. aurii~ olavoEla9lXl,
Etl OE J.lEl~VOO~ 'Ayoov 9EOU vralV cOOltEP 'AYEl Otl ". 9eova"
Eat1.V atTI, t!! a1..cplX ~EVl!Cro~ aVtl tou ~ta xpraJ.lEvo~ lCal.
tO irota Kal. tO alYJ.la acpE1..c>v. raoo~ OE OUOE tatn, U' l~
ta 9Eta vooar~ lXutilc; olacpEpVtOO~ trov aUoov "9EOVrV"
E!C1..Eaev. OUOEV OE c:iltXEl 1C1x n,v EV t!! ~9El vralv ooe; oaav
n,v geov tatTIv '''H90vrv" J,LEV ~O1..ea91X1 ltpoaEutElv'
ltaplXyaywv OE ii auto~ ~ tlVEC; ;)atEpOv Eltl tO lCU10V lc;
ci>OvtO, ." A9rvav" ElC1..eaav (407 a8-c2). The men of old seem
lo have viewed Athena just as do the contemporary interpreters of
Homer. For many of these, interpreting the poet, say Ihat he
represented Athena as nous and dianoia. The one consrructing names
appears lO have believed sorne such thing about her. Moreover, the
name-giver appears 10 have had a still more elevated conception of
her as divine intelligence (Iheou noesis) hence the name he
Iheonoa, in which alpha appears in Ihe foreign way instead of eta,
and the iota and sigma are omitted. Maybe, however, on account of
her superlative knowledge of divine malters (la lheia noouses) he
called her Theonoe. And one would nol be far wrong in believing
Ihat the constructor of names conceived of her as moral
intelligence (en 10i ethei noesis), hence the name Elhonoe which
either he himself or others afler him modified lO whal they
believed a superior form, calling her Athena. AIso worth mentioning
here are Hesiod's cornments on Athena's binh, specifically, his
attribution of superlative intelligence both lO her mother Metis
and lo Athena herself. In the Theogony, the poet remarks that Zeus
first wed Melis, ltAelata 9EroV eiou'iav iOE 9vrtrov
av6pc>ltoov. c:iU' OtE ol p' ~J.lE1..1..e 9EaV YAaUlCronlV
'A9ivrv t~Ea91X1, tt' EltElta 001..q> cppvac; E~a1tatfaa~
aJ.lU1..l01al AyolalV ilv EalCt9EtO vrOv ... EIC yap rii~ elJ.lapto
ltEplcppova tlCVa YEVa9al, 1tpc>tTlV J.lEv ICOprV
YAaulCc>molX T pltoyvElav 'laov Exouaav ltatpl. J.lvo~ lCal.
ltlIPPOVa ~ouMv, autap EltElt' apa ltaloa 9EroV plXcrtAila Kal.
c:ivoprov ~J.leJJ..ev t~Ea9al, il1tp~lOV ~tOP exovta. (887-98) and
she was wisest among gods and mortal men. But when she was aboul 10
bring forth the goddess bright-eyed Athene, Zeus craftily deceived
her with cunning words and put her in his own belly ... for very
wise children were destined to be bom of her, first the maiden
brighl-eyed Trilogeneia, equal to her father in strength and in
wise understanding; bUI afterwards she was lo bear a son of
overbearing spirit, kind of gods and men. (tr. by Evelyn-White)
(For the binh of Athena from Zeus's head see, e.g., Th. 924 and
Pindar, al. 7.35-7.) 129 Aesehylus offers an etymology of the name
"Apr~, linking it with aplX: nllcp~ OE xprJ.ltoov !CalCoc;
olXtTJta~ "AprC; c:ipav ltatp'lav n9de; 'Aae~ (Th. 944-6). In a
possible, different attempt at etymology with regard to Ares'
nante, Homer has Hephaestus bemoan the faet that Aphrodite seoms
him due to his physieal deformity, cpl1..El o' a 'tor'Aov "Apra,
ove;( !lEv !CaA~ 'tE lCal. aptlto~ (Od. 8.309-10). Rather than
follow either of the aboye routes, Plato's analysis moves along
different lines: OUICOUV, Ei !lEV ~O1..el, lCata. 'tO appEV tE
lCal. lCata tO avopEiov "" APl1~" av Elr' ti o' a.o lCata
'to184Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission. 189. 408b7: Hermes
(including cornment on appropriateness of Hermogenes' name); q.
408b8-d5: Pan (tragedy is mentioned).l30 C. 408d6-410e5: Plato
analyzes a range of terms denoting natural bodies, elements, and
cyeles. At issue here, generally speaking, are ov'tcx which
Presocratic philosophers take tobe fundamental-whether as primary
substances (apxcx) or in sorne other way. Plato here moves
permanentIy away from proper narnes for the duration of the
Cratylus; I3l this shift coincides to a large extent with the dawn
of philosophy, insofar as the latter tradition rejects the notion
of personal, divine beings as explanantes with regard to the
formation and operation of the cosmos. Notable in this portion of
the Cratylus are those v)J.cx'tcx designating elernents; such
entities are granted vacious types of priority by Presocratics, and
are central to explanations of what they take to be problernatic.
1321. 408d6-409a5: fAtoC; (natural body); 2. 409a6-c3: O'EA~vll
(natural body; Anaxagoras rnentioned);133 3. 409c4-6: !lEC;
(natural cyele); 4. 409c6-9: aO''tpcx (natural bodies); 5, 6.
409clO-41Obl: 1tUp, ooop (elements; foreign origin); 7. 41Obl-6:
alp (element); 8. 41Ob6-8: cxi9lp (element); 9. 41Ob8-c3: yii/yatcx
(elernent; Horner rnentioned); 10, 11. 41Oc3-e5: Vtcx'l)'tc;!e'toc;
(natural cycle; this use of a dual etyrnology recaIls the earlier
twofold analysis ofZeus' name). D. 411al-421c2: At issue here are
the so-called KcxAa v!lcx'ta (41la2, a8-bl). This class neludes a
wide range ofterms whose referents are of great importance
fromoO'KAl1PV tE Kal aIlEt.O'tPOIjlOV, o~ "appatov" KaAE'ital, Kal
tatn av 7tavtax 7tOAElllKi!> 9Ei!> 1tp1tO ''''Apl1''
KaA.:'icr9a (407dl-4). 130 Notably, Plato's analyses of the final
two names center on language. Perhaps, in sorne way, the remarks on
Pan help bring the focus back to nature and the natural world. 131
This is so with the exception ofHermogenes' name, which comes
underdiscussion again in 429b-e. 132 To give several examples
ofelements as apxai: Thales privileged water. While Anaximander's
apX1, tO a7tElpOV, was not identical with any natural substance in
the developed world, his primary cosmogonic opposites, the hOI and
the coId, were none olher than "flame or fire and mist or air" (The
Presocratic Philosophers, 120). Anaximenes gave pride of place to
airo Heraclitus does not have an apxiJ in the standard Milesian
sense; notably, he does no! believe thal the cosmos had a genesis
(DK 30). However, Heraclitus views fire as the most fundamental
material substance, indeed, as crucial to the cosmos' operation,
and seems a! times to link c10sely or even identify tire with the
AyoC;. Notwithstanding important differences between Heraclitus'
tire and previous candidates for primary substance, it resembles
its predecessors in a crucial way: namely, to the extent that it is
a kind of "slufr' which is, on the one hand, unified (the worId
order as 7>p aEi~(j)ov, DK 30), yet, on the other hand,
distributed in those entities which constitute the cosmos.
Empedocles, in turn, in his concem lO address the argumenls and
objections of Parmenides, posits multipIe primary substances or
"roots": earth, air, frre, and water. 133 In his etymology of this
term Plato comments that !:EAavaiav o yE lCaAoucnv atTv 1toAAo. and
proceeds lo identify Ihe original form which, once hammered
togelher (cruYKEKPOt1lIlVOV), yieIds this appellation. The form
!:EAavaia is found in Euripides (Phoen. 176).185Reproduced with
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited
without permission. 190. Plato's own point of view, in the areas of
ethics, psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. Key here is the
fact that Plato ineludes tenns denoting entities which he takes to
have the highest ontological status, and to enjoy natural, logical,
and explanatory priority as well (ya9v, ~1ca.10V, and lCaA.v).l34
Rather than mentioning every term anaIyzed in this section of the
dialogue, 1 select a range of thev~a'taat issue.Terms designating
key elements of Plato'sphilosophical system are subject to the same
etymological analysis as other VIlpoO'vll (411e-412a); E1tlO't1~l1
(412a and 437a); O'oq>a (412b); ya.9v (412c); ~llCalOO'vr
(412c); ~tlCalov (412e-413d); v~pEa (413d414a); 'txvr (414b); pe't1
(415c-d); lWA.v (416c); EProC; (420a9-b4); A.1geta. (421bl-3); av
and oUO'ta. (42Ib-c).135 Plato also treats the term 11oov1
(419b7-el), and subjects the termavo~aitself to analysis
(421a7-bl), which is noteworthy giventhe fact that it is precisely
v~a.'ta whose status as "naturally correet" is here in question.
From within this framework Plato cannot privilege the
aforementioned terms and their referents in the way he believes
they deserve. Moreover, this structure provides no way for Plato to
draw fitting distinctions between eertain contrasting
terms-specifically, of course, their referents-mentioned in the
Cratylus, contrasts which play important roles in his metaphysics,
epistemology, ethics, and moral psychology. 1 have in mind here,
for instanee, the dichotomy between arolla and 'l'ux1 (399dl-40Oc9)
of which he makes so much elsewhere, as 134 The literary tradition
had trealed justiee as a deity. Aesehylus observes !hat .1Ka
received her name based on !he fact !hat she is Zeus' daughter
(CIw. 949), and in faet once compres sed .1l~ Kpa yields .1lKa.
Elsewhere Aeschylus refers to her as 'l.1l~ 7tate; xap9voe; .1ilCTl
(Th. 662). Hesiod before him had spoken of the maiden as 'l
7tCxp9voe; .1ilCTl, Lil0e; EKYEyauia (W.D. 256) Given Ihe
similarities between the formulations in Seven against Thebes and
Works and Days, it is possible Ihal Aeschylus intentionally recalls
Hesiod's treatment. Writers treated her as one whose aid mortal s
might hope for and enlist. In contrast to !he literary tradition,
Plalo views justice as a Form rather than a deity; as emerges most
strikingly in !he Republic (Books 2-9), for him it is something at
which one can and should aim. The differences in treatment are
marked though Ihe two entities, as trealed by poets and Plato, have
certain attributes in eornmon. (Among the Presocratics, for .1ilCT
as what might be tenned "the personification of normality and
therefore regularily" (Kirk, The Presocratic Philosophers, 202) see
Heraclilus, Fr. 94: "HA,10e; ya.p ox. ')7tEp~TaEtal ~tpa' El oE ~T,
'Eplvee; ~1V .11crle; E7tKOUpOl E~E')piGOu(nv. In the proem to his
hexarneler poem Parmenides too indulges in personification, here
closely folIowing Hesiod; !he mention of "avenging Justice" (.1ilCT
7tOA.lt01VOe;) makes the paralleI especially vivid (for .1ilC1l as
avenger see Hesiod, Works and Days 213-73; Aeschylus, Libation
Bearers 948-51, Seven Against Thebes 662ff.; and Sophocles, Ajax
1389-92).) 135 A key measure of Ihe futility, even danger of this
approach is found in the etymology conflating etval and ival ("10
be" and "to go"), which runs as follows: to oE "ov" Kal ~ "ouaia"
~ol..oyei t!> aA,11gei, 'to i&ta a7tOAa~v' iov ya.p
GTlj.lalVE1, Kal. tO "OUK ov" au, roe; 'tlVEe; Kal. OVOll~oUG1V at,
"OUK iv" (421b7-c2). Cf., e.g., !he etymologies of CIlPVl1Gle;
(CIlopae; ... Kai po VT]Gle;, 411d4) and aya9v (to 900 ... t!>
ayaG't!> atr 'l E7trovullia EGtiv, "taya9v,"
412c4-5).186Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.
Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 191. well as
that between apen and KaKa (415a9-el). AIso relevant here is the
contrast between lCaAv and aiaxpv (416alO-dll), and that involving
aA~gela and 'l'euOOC; (421bl-7).In addition, Plato includes the
terms 1tl9Ulla and 9UllC; in hisetymological discussion (419d8-e2).
Even more centrally, Plato provides the tenns of the contrast
between 7tUJ't1llT, VTO'lC;, qpVTcrtC;, and aoqa, on the one hand,
and o~a,on the other, a dichotomy which is essential to his
epistemological reflections.Key here are tenns denoting concepts
and distinctions which play crucial roles in the Phaedo, Republic,
and Symposium, and which, in many cases, are subject there to
sustained philosophical analysis. 136 One finds analyzed here tenns
designating entities with the highest ontological status from
Plato's perspective, in contrast to those entities to which poets
and Presocratic philosophers give pride of place. Ihis is not to
say that all three cIasses of entities share no common properties;
for example, neither gods nor natural elements nor Platonic Fonns
are subject ultimately to perishing, and all are invisible, at
least in part. 137 Notwithstanding this Iimited sharing of
attributes, for Plato it is the differences between the types of
entity that are ultimately decisive. On the issue of explanatory
priority in particular, Plato challenges the approaches taken both
by poets and by philosophers. As concems poets, this comes out
notably in the Cratylus itself; there, Plato disputes repeatedly
the paradigm of explanation in tenns of origin, insisting instead
that merely identifying a god as the source of sorne phenomenon or
product, e.g., an ovolla, constitutes merely an excuse for having
no genuine account to offer. As concems his philosophical
predecessors, Plato criticizes them sharply in the Phaedo for
privileging the notion of material causation (96aff.).138 He
accuses them-including Anaxagoras, whose approach Plato describes
as initially more promising-of conflating a merely necessary
condition (lCEtVO aveu oi}) with a136 The folIowing chapter
contains additional remarks on the aforementioned terms and
referents.137 Among the Milesians, though what was construed as
fundamental was something material, it was thought of as being only
partially visible, as in the case of water, or invisible yet
substantial, as in the case of airo Thales appeared to view water
not just as the original state from which the cosmos developed, but
also as the underlying constituent of entities in the developed
world; since it is not perceived as uniformIy distributed, sorne
ofthe water constituting entities must be invisible. Anaximander's
apXl, is not identical with any natural substance in the developed
world; it is qualitatively indefinite, hence not as such visible.
With regard to Anaximenes, Kirk notes that for him "aTp was not
mist, but ... the invisible atmospheric air.. Jt looks ... as
though Anaximenes simply assumed that sorne part, at least, of the
atmospheric air was substantial. and indeed the basic forro of
substance" (The Presocratic Philosophers. 146). 138 For present
purposes 1 need not address the question of precisely how much of
what is said regarding natural science there can be attributed to
the historical Socrates (for a discussion of this issue see
Hackforth,Phaedo. 127ff.).187Reproduced with permission of the
copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission. 192. genuine explanans, i.e., that on account of which
something happens or is accomplished (99b). Plato notes the
explanatory priority of Forms at the end of theCratylus, and treats
it at length in the Phaedo, Symposium, and Republic. This section
shows most vividly of all how wrong one goes by seeking insight via
the analysis of words' constitution: because it contains the most
important tenns treated, consideration of them and their referents
merely by etymology casts into sharpest relief the superficiality
of that approach to correctness and insight. 411b-c further extends
the scope of ~~rov~EVta OlEAoGal, E1tElta trov tProv lCata do" ta
tE acprova lCal aq>80yya-otrocrl yp 1tO) AyOUcrlV Ol OElVOl
1tEPl tOtmv-lCal ta a' q>rov1EVta J,1EV O, OU J,1VtOl yE
aq>80yya; lCal autrov trov q>rov"Vtrov o(m olq>opa do"
EXEl aAAlArov; lCal E1tElOaV 'Cauta OlEAwJ,tE8a [ta ovtaJ El)
1tavta a;) ot; OEl ov.ata E1tlBE1VIX1, Ei EcrtlV Ei~ avaq>pEtal
1tvta roO'1tEP ta crtolXEla, E~ 6>V EO'tlV iOElv at tE lCaL Ei
EV atoi~ EVEO'tlV do" lCata tov autov tP1tOV roO'1tEP EV tOl~
crtOlXEOlC;' 'Cauta 1tavta lCaAro~ olaBEacraJ,1vou~ E1tO'ta0'8al
E1tlq>PElV ElCaO'tov lCata t~v /lOltTJta, EvtE EV Vl o!1
E1tlq>pElV, EvtE (JU'Y!CEpavvvta 1tolla [v], rocr1tEp Ol
'roypljlOl !X>UM/lEVOl aq>o.owv EvOtE /lEv OOtPEOV J,1vov
E1tlVE)'ICav, EvotE oe tlOUV aAAo trov q>ap/lalCrov, EO'tl Oe
otE 1tOAAa O'uylCEpcraVtE;, otov otav avopElcEAov O'lCEua~roO'lV ~
aAAo tl trov tOlOtrov-lC; a.v ol.al &1CfI lcaGtTJ i Eilc:wv
oEi0'9al lCacrtou cpap/lalCou-otro ol lCal i'Ei~ ta O'tOlXEla E1tl
ta 1tpaY/lata E1toO'O/lEV, lCal EV E1tl EV, o{) a.v ooKi OEiv, lCal
O"/l1tOAAa, 1tOlOUvtE~ ol O'UAAaia; lCaAOUO'lV, lCal crUAAaia; a'
cruVtlaVtE~, E~ 6>V ta tE V/lata leal ta pilllata O'JVti9EVtal'
lCal 1tAlV ElC trov VO/lcltroV lCal p,,/latrov /lya To" tl lCal
!CaAov !Cal OAoV ov tii ypaq>lKi, Evtau8a toV Ayov tii
vo/lacrm:n i1 p"topt1Cfl i1 ittc; EO'tlv i tXV". (424c5-425a5) Then
must we not begin first of aIl by dividing vowels, then a1so
consonants and mutes, into c1asses-for this is how experts in these
matters speak-and in tum those letters which are neither vowels nor
mutes? And must we not also distinguish the different c1asses in
the case of vowels? And when we have thoroughly distinguished a11
the existent things to which, in tum, one must apply onomata, we
will proceed analogously on the side of ta onta, which inquiry
would allow one to see existents as they truly are and whether
there they have c1asses within them in the same way as do the basic
elements of language. After we have considered these things
thoroughly we will know how to apply letters based on the principIe
of Iikeness, whether there is need of a one-to-one correlation or
whether many letters are lo be combined, just as painters, wanting
to create a likeness, sometimes uses only purple or some other
single color, and other times mixes many colors together, as for
instance when creating a flesh-colored pigment or sorne otber such
thing. As the artist uses colors based in each case on what the
image requires, so too do we apply elements to things, making use
of one or many as required. From these elements we construct
syllables, and in tum put syllables logether lo get onomata and
rhemata. Combining these we arrive at language, large and fine and
whole-just as happens with the figure in painling-by Ihe art of
grammar or rhetoric, or whatever techne one wishes to invoke. An
interest in basic Iinguistic elements is evidenl in several later
dialogues. With this treatment of sounds compare Phi/. 18b6-d2,
where the Egyptian Theuth is Ihe one supposed to have engaged in
the inquiry there described (for Theuth as the inventor of writing
see Plulr. 274c5-275b2). For remarks on the combinalion of
ypa/l/lata see Soph. 252e9-253a12, and for extended discussion of
syllables and their crtOlXEia see Th. 202eff. Notably, these
discussions in the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Philebus a11 post-date
Plalo's introduction of the Method of Division, which occurs in the
Phaedrus (266b-c). For a treatment of olapEcn; that privileges the
markedly innovative character of the Sophist and PoliticlIs
investigations by contrast with earlier methodologies see Stenzel,
Plato's Method of Dialectic.ao189Reproduced with permission of the
copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission. 194. Here one finds an instanee of division. However,
one is not entitled to conclude that the Method of Division as such
is at issue, any more than one would justified in so concluding
with regard to the Gorgias based on its employment, in a speeific
context, of a classifieatory schema.l 42 In this passage, the
'txval of rhetoric and naming are mentioned together (425a4-5),
which is noteworthy given the faet that the 'txvTl status of each
is challenged in the Gorgias and Cratylus, respeetively. It is
possible, at any rate, that Plato here hearkens back to the earHer
Gorgias diseussion and the fate of rhetoric in that context. While
supposedly describing the original procedure of formation, Socrates
slips into the fiest person, then purports to correet himself:
Jl&AAOV O oux nJlEte;, aAAa. AyOlV ;TlvX~v. O'uvSEO'av JlEv
ya.p O'tOle; n1tEp O'"(KEt'tal o 1taAalOt nJl&e; OE oE'l,
Et1tEp 'tEXV1KOOe; 1tlO''tTlO'JlESa O'K01tE10'9al au'ta. 1tv'ta,
O'tOl 01EAO/lVOUe;, et'tE Ka'ta. 'tp1tOV 't 'tE 1tpoo'ta ov/la'ta
KEt'tat Kal. 'ta. O''tEpa Et'tE /ll, O'tOl SE&O'Sal" aAAOlC; OE
O'uvEPE1V /l~ J.1l] i8Aovn Ayov BtBvat 7tEpl trov 7tPc.trov
ovoJ.1'trov roe; p8roe; KEttat {426al-3).l48 These are precisely
the sorts of factors that were invoked throughout the investigation
to explain the genesis of tenns presently in use, and Plato's
remarks here are intended to showthat 424c-425a describes no
approach yet taken, and that in faet one cannot supply a rationa!
account of "proeedures" followed to date. It is not just su eh
"evasions" that Plato takes to be uoacceptable, but any falling
short with regard to the procedure outlined aboye. This comes out
in the lines direetIy followiog the aboye remark (io fact, Plato
highIights the continuity by use of KatOt): KatOt Otrp ne; tp7trp
trov 7tPCtrov voJ.1trov tl]v op8tT)'ta J.1l] OiOEV, aOva'tv 7tOU
trov yE -uatprov eioVat, a i~ KEVrov avYKT oT)Aoua8at Chv nc; 7tpt
J.1T)OEV OiOEV aAAa. OfiAoV o'tt,''''''"i' ,-. , tov epaaKOV'ta
7tEpt autrov tEXVtKov Etvat 7tEpt trov 7tprotrov ovo,k1trov
J.1A1.C1t tE Kal Ka8apc.>tata OEt EXEtV a7tOOE'i.~at, 11 E
eiOvat on t rE a'tEpa iOT) qlAUaplaEt. 11 aOl aAAroc; OOKEt;
(426a3-b3)149146 This is one of the two requirements mentioned in
rhetoric's exclusion from the c1ass of 1:XVat at the oulSet of
Socrates' conversaton with Polus: KOAaKElaV .lEY ot)v aU1:o KaA.ro,
Kal aiOXpv ltPOO
OelV, EltE 7tap' E9pel,OTJAOtbLClKpcxn:~, 'to
J.l.OtClJ.l.CX'tl OTJAOV O'tlav'tl~aMa. J.l.Tt 't) E1tl'tUxvn,
434al-2, ef. 433d8-e2); and that resemblance157 Once again, the
or.toupj'Oc; ovo.'tCov and vo.09trc; are identified (431eI-4), and
naming's 'tXVll status is assumed (e6-7, 11) though no Ionger with
any conviction. 158 Contrast Cratylus' remark on the ov.ata of
letters in 43Ie-432a. AIso, contrast the observation that something
can be designated when this "general character" is present, ICa.V
.il nv'ta 'ta npocrtlCov'ta eXl1 (43334-5), with the more
restricted acknowIedgment in 432e3. 198Reproduced with permission
of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission. 203. between VJ.UX'tCl and their referents is only
possible if a resemblance relation holds on the most basic level,
namely, that of letters. The elaim that representation by likeness
is infinitely superior (oA.cp KCll1tClv'tl BlCl(j)pEl) will be
evaluated in remarks made in 434b-440e. By posing the choice here
as one between resemblance and randomness (434al-2), Plato wishes
once again for choice of a nature-based view to appear temporarily
"obvious." Here, as in Hermogenes' early remarks, an extreme
position and a genuine convention-based approach are conflated (see
433e2-434a2). In what follows, however, Plato leaves the extreme
stance behind, and assesses the latter as an independent ground of
correctness when terms' constitution is at issue. C. 434b9-435d 1:
The resemblance theory is challenged.1. 434b9-435b6: Plato has
Socrates consider the noun aKA,l1P't11~ ("hardness").In addition to
the letters rho and sigma, which are expressive of rapidity,
motion, and hardness( VOJlOou "(E ~ o 01ClVOOJ.l.EVO~
(j)8yyOJ.l.Cll, Elm:p 'to A,elPoCl aVJ.l.olV E (JJeA,l1P'tT'!n El
BE 'toho o'twe; EXE1, 't aUo ~ ClU'tOe; ao:mep auv80u leCl
VJ.l.Cl'tOe; auv8fKTl, E1tElOf "(E 011A,Ot !Cal. 'ta. OJlOlCl KCll
'ta. aVJ.l.olCl "(pelJ.l.J.l.Cl'tIl, t80ue; 'tE KCll auv8fKTle;
'tUXV'tCl; El o' on J.l.elA,lV iO"~ av'tt 'tOl> A.~aapro ael
iyetv (434d12), this is rejeeted as whollyunnecessary since
thepresence of letters signifying opposites in no way inhibits
communication. The possibility of suceessful communication rests
ultimately on the faet that certain combinations of letters are
sanctioned by custom and convention as denoting particular
entities; likeness is not the basis of signification, but custom,
whieh signifies by like and unlike letters as such combinations
happen10be established.In the case of O"1CA.TlPtl1~, Plato focuses
on the presence of letters signifying opposites beeause this brings
into sharpest relief the faet that likeness is inessential.
Additional support for this conclusion les in the faet that the
word O"KATlPtTl (1555).224Reproduced with permission of the
copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission. 229. sprung from gold" (80); the poet refers here to
the hero Perseus, who was conceived following Zeus' approach to
Danae in a shower of gold. 26 Strictly speaking, any suggested
judgment of desert pertains not to the Persians as a group, but to
an individual Persian; nevertheless, Xerxes is no ordinary Persian,
but his people's supreme leader and representative. My research
shows that the literary tradition was quite con cerned with
etyrnology and eponymy, but never distinguished clearly between
them; in fact, authors use E1t>VUJlO~ and related terms
indiscriminately with reference both to etyrnology and to eponyrny.
In contrast, Plato distinguishes sharply between etymology and
eponymy; although he devotes much of the Cratylus to contesting an
etymology-based foundation of appropriateness, he does not, there
or elsewhere, argue similarly against eponymy. Instead, I suggest,
he taps its unexploited potential. In its use of eponymy, the
literary tradition typically rests content with identifying the
entity giving rise to an assignment. In contrast, Plato maintains
that a satisfactory theory must be grounded on a determination of
the nature and status of the primary entity; this, in tum, yields a
set of conditions under which that entity's OVOI.HI can properIy be
applied to a certain class of recipients. Wbile Plato manifests a
limited interest in individual sensibles, his main concem is with
the Forms; therefore, the eponymy relation's ultimate focus on the
primary entity, rather than on the recipient, is quite in keeping
with his own orientation. In the Phaedo, Plato embraces eponyrny as
the optimal framework for presenting the semantics of the
Fonnparticular relation; his transformed version of eponymy
incorporates those revisions necessitated by the structure and
content of his middle-period metaphysics.THE CRATYLUS In the
Cratylus, Plato explores rival conceptions of the ground of words'
appropriateness or correctness (oP8tllO'e1.~ of specific mortal or
divine individuals as the objects of etymological analysis). More
generally, Plato's approach exemplifies writers' conflation of
proper names and general terms, and of judgments of appropriateness
involving veridicality and desert;38 it also manifests the literary
tradition' s invocation of a range of different criteria, most
notably characteristics and extensions of bearers, as the basis of
its "deep" structural analyses. While the literary tradition
operated unreflectiveIy and unsystematically, Plato employs that
tradition's assumptions and analytic techniques quite consciously,
with the ultimate goal of discrediting them. As previously noted,
the literary tradition's etymology-based judgments of
appropriateness do not involve clear-cut and pervasive normative
criteria. In fact, Plato mounts a two-pronged attack on those
judgments' status as norm-govemed. First, he concentrates on the
literary tradition' s own assumptions, according to wlch one
attributes "natures" to mortal and divine individuals. Study of
this tradition suggests that namers' hopes for bearers' futures
underlie a large class of assignments, which may successfully
disclose mature bearers'
O'El~ or oUO'lal. In his view, any ta!k of so-called
individual natures would be, by definition. exclusively a matter of
O~a; one simply cannot have E1tlO't1'T) of the entities in
question. which would be the facuIty required to sustain c1aims of
the process' elevated status. As noled in the preceding chapter,
having q>O'El~ or oUO'lal as subject matter is the linchpin of
the tXvn enterprise: they are pivota! to specifications of a given
txv1l' s tA.O~; they are what expert practitioners understand; they
are the uItimate sources of a tXV1l' s benefit to human beings; and
they are pivota! to any rational account of a tXV1l' s procedures.
48 On the dialogue's negative emphasis cf. Mridier (38). As noted
in what precedes. severa! commentators see in the dialogue a great
deal ofPlato's own positive view. 1 readily acknowledge that the
Cratylus c1ears the ground for subsequent developments by disposing
of rival notions of the import of words and the basis of their
appropriateness; although Plato offers c1ues to his positive
stance, their development occurs elsewhere.235Reproduced with
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited
without permission. 240. number examples (434c-435c) shows that he
opts for the convention-based prong of the nature-convention
dichotomy; that is, he maintains that one judges correctness by
appeal to custom (eGoC;) and convention (O'uv9TK11).49 Plato's view
is not simply that custom and convention contribute to words'
appropriateness, but rather that ultimately they determineit.
Notably, the relevant norms are wholly detached from words'
constitution; this, Plato insists, neither refiects nor prescribes
standards. The conclusioo reached here applies to every OVOIla.,
whether proper name or general term: regarding any word's
constitu