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Women in Arab Countries:
Challenging the Patriarchal System?
Philippe Fargues
Director, Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on
International Migration, Robert SchumanCentre for Advanced Studies,
European University Institute, Florence, Italy, and Institut
national d’étudesdémographiques (INED), Paris, France. E-mail:
[email protected]
Abstract: Progress in the empowerment of Arab women was found to
be low in a 2002 report.Yet Arab women’s status is not reflected in
continuing high fertility, which in 2000 had droppedsharply in one
generation to 3.4. This paper discusses why fertility decline could
neverthelesshave taken place in the Arab countries. Islam has not
stood in the way of fertility decline, as Iranand Algeria show.
From the mid-1970s to 1980s, subsidised consumption through oil
wealthredistribution reduced the cost of children, and social
conservatism kept married women out of thelabour force, both of
which promoted higher fertility. The early stages of fertility
decline were mainlydue to longer length of education of girls,
rising female age at first marriage, e.g. 28 in urbanMorocco and 29
in Libya, and entry into the labour force of young, single women.
There is also agrowing population sub-group of never-married young
women. Collapsing oil prices and structuraladjustment reduced
household resources and became an effective fertility regulation
factor. Girlsborn since the 1950s have not only been educated
longer than their mothers, but also their fathers,which increases
their authority. These factors, and women’s activism and civil and
political lobbyingfor the reform of personal status now underway in
a number of Arab countries, could all challengethe patriarchal
system. A 2003 Institut national d’études démographiques. All
rights reserved.
Keywords: fertility, education, marital status, women’s status,
Middle East and North Africa region
THE stark picture of human development inthe Arab world painted
in a report writtenfor the United Nations by leading Arab
researchers became the subject of impassioneddebate in late
summer 2002. They found thatit was being seriously undermined by
failingson three fronts: civil and political freedom,knowledge
production and dissemination, andempowerment of women.1 All – but
especiallythe latter – are seen as the main factors of demo-graphic
transition, especially fertility reduction.Women’s status,
therefore, should be reflected incontinuing high fertility. But is
that the case?
The average total fertility rate (TFR) for theArab world was 3.4
children per woman in 2000.Still high compared to the world average
(2.7),it is low compared to the six to eight children
per woman which was the norm for the previousgeneration. So
fertility has dropped sharply.Compared to Asian or Latin American
countriesat the same level of economic development, thedecline
onset later in the Arab world, but onceunder way progressed so fast
that internationalstatistical yearbooks were taken unawares
andalmost invariably overestimate the true TFRs(Table 1).
Arguably, then, the Arab countries wouldpresent a paradox of
fertility decline withoutwomen’s empowerment. And yet the causes
offertility decline are universal: in the Arab worldas elsewhere,
it stems from the changing role ofwomen and the place of children
in the familyand society, in the wake of the radical changesin
today’s world, not least urbanization, the shift
A 2003 Institut national d’études démographiques.All rights
reserved.
Reproductive Health Matters 2005;13(25):43–480968-8080/05 $ –
see front matterPII: S0968-8080 (05 )25161-3www.rhm-elsevier.com
www.rhmjournal.org.uk
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P Fargues / Reproductive Health Matters 2005;13(25):43–48
to service economies and the spread of education.Why have these
causes been so late-acting in theArab world? Is it down to the
Islamic religion andculture, or to economic and political
factors?
Oil and fertilityLate-starting fertility decline in the Arab
world –and in other parts of the Muslim world – is com-monly
attributed to the influence of Islam4 insupposedly holding back the
two agents of demo-graphic change – women’s autonomy and
theemergence of civil society organizations that pro-mote community
self-empowerment – by har-nessing the former to the yoke of male
authorityand the latter to that of political authority. Andyet,
whether as a State or grassroots religion,Islam has not stood in
the way of radical demo-
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graphic changes. Cases in point are the IslamicRepublic of Iran
– a country which, though ruledby the most fundamentalist of
clergies, maywell have experienced one of the most rapidfertility
declines in history5 – or Algeria, wherefertility collapsed in the
1990s at the very timewhen Islamic fundamentalism was gaining
moststrength among the population.
Islam, however, is not all that Arab countrieshave in common;
they also have a heavy eco-nomic dependence on oil revenues: either
directlyin the case of major oil exporters (Saudi Arabia,Iraq and
the Gulf States in the east, Libya andAlgeria in the west), or
indirectly for the othercountries, where oil wealth has a major
impactthrough development assistance, private invest-ment and
migrant workers’ remittances. The oileconomy experienced an
unprecedented boom
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P Fargues / Reproductive Health Matters 2005;13(25):43–48
in the 10–12 years after the 1973 Arab–Israeliwar, one immediate
consequence of which wasto send oil prices soaring. The sudden
change inscale of oil revenues (crude oil rent) enabled
Arabgovernments to establish welfare state systemsthrough financing
development (health, educa-tion, etc.) and subsidising
consumption.
While development activities were conduciveto fertility decline,
subsidised consumption, byreducing the cost of children, could work
to theopposite effect. This is what happened in a num-ber of Arab
countries, especially the most oil-richones, whose governments, by
keeping the popu-lation in check through generous oil
wealthredistribution, were able to play the forces of con-servatism
and change off against one another.Social conservatism was
reflected in particularby a continuing very low labour force
partici-pation rate among married women. So, byboth cutting the
costs of fertility and keepingwomen in the home, oil revenues
indirectly pro-moted high fertility. To some extent, oil
revenues‘‘generated’’ population.
The onset of the oil crisis in the mid-1980sput an end to this.
Collapsing oil prices slashedrevenues and all countries, apart from
the GulfStates, were quick to bring in economic reformsfrom which
families lost out. Age at marriagerose, a trend fuelled by the
practice acquired inthe heady oil-rich days of amassing a
substan-tial marriage dowry, which now took many yearsto scrape
together. Married couples had smallerfamilies, as they continued to
nurture the aspi-rations held for their children during the
goodtimes, while life grew dearer. This succession ofeconomic
cycles widened the generation gapbetween the children of the
welfare state andthose of structural adjustment.6
Women’s Medical Faculty, Al-Azhar University,Cairo, 1994
ABBAS/MAGNUM
PHOTOS
An emerging group: young never-marriedwomenThe early stages of
fertility decline in the Arabworld were mainly due to the rising
female ageat first marriage.3,7 Three quarters of girls inthe 1950
birth cohort married under the age of20, compared to just one third
in the 1970 birthcohort. Mean age at marriage had risen fromunder
20 to over 25 in barely a generation.
Why should women’s age at marriage haverisen so fast? A longer
length of education isone reason. That explains the decline in
early
marriages, but not the high incidence of verylate marriages: the
vast majority of girls arenow educated up to the age of 15, but
still onlya minority remain in education after age 20.
Theproportion single among young women aged20–24 is therefore much
higher than their enrol-ment ratio: 47% against 10% in Syria (1994
cen-sus), 84% against 17% in Tunisia (1994), 56%against 18% in
Egypt (1996).
Employment is another reason for delayedmarriage. It is not yet
wholly acceptable in Arabsocieties for a married woman to work
outsidethe home. In the Arab countries covered by thefertility
surveys of the 1990s, the average partici-pation rate was 31% among
single 25–29 year-old females against 18% among married womenof the
same age group with (18%) or without chil-dren (17%): clearly,
marriage more than mother-hood is what prompts women to forsake
workinglife. By putting a growing number of women onthe labour
market, the economic changes under
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P Fargues / Reproductive Health Matters 2005;13(25):43–48
way – growth in women-dominated occupations(teaching, health,
administration, etc.) and declin-ing living conditions from the end
of the welfarestate – have therefore arguably contributed todelayed
marriages.
Delayed marriage tends to be construed asevidence of the
empowerment of Arab women.The two reasons cited above – rising
educationallevels and entry into the labour force – argue infavour
of that interpretation, in that for manyyoung women, their
unattached years are a timefor acquiring skills or material assets,
and for self-fulfilment. But empowerment is not absolute,as single
women remain under the authority oftheir father or legal guardian.
They live withtheir family until marriage, as do the overwhelm-ing
majority of young people: in the working-class districts of a large
metropolis like Cairo,male students and soldiers are the only
singlepeople to live away from their family of origin.The
lengthening premarital period, sometimesbeyond age 25 and even to
almost 30 (28 in urbanMorocco, 29 in Libya), has created a
populationsubgroup of never-married young women. Thisnew group has
not yet carved out its own placein society, still less secured
legal recognition.
Increasingly better educated, but lesseconomically active than
menThe number of veiled women about the streetsof many Arab cities
is growing. Is this a reflec-tion of resurgent religious devotion?
Or simplythat more women are to be seen in the publicspace because
the Islamic veil allows them tomove around freely? Education is
what has reallyallowed girls, previously confined to
domesticityfrom the age of puberty, into the public space.But has
it gone as far as full gender equality ineducation? Egypt has
witnessed a steady birthcohort-specific improvement in the deficit
ofgirls in the school population (Figure 1). Egypt,which is
averagely-placed in this respect, reflectsa reassuring picture of a
steady advance towardsgender equality. The once chiefly male
schoolpopulation (barely one girl to three boys in thecohorts born
around 1930) has now becomenearly gender equal in primary and
secondaryeducation (90 girls to 100 boys in the cohortsborn around
1980), and seems well-advanced inuniversity education (66 girls to
100 boys in the1970 birth cohort).
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Unlike school, many workplaces remain rela-tively closed off to
women. Labour statistics(Table 1) show that Arab countries have
theworld’s lowest female participation rates. How-ever, the
evidence of a series of time-use surveysis that traditional
statistical sources (censuses)underestimate Arab women’s real
contribution tothe economy, because it partly comprises home-maker
activities, and census takers’ questions areusually answered by men
who are unwilling toacknowledge the economic nature of such
activ-ities. Is it to take account of unrecorded femaleactivities
that international publications havesignificantly revalued (albeit
on an unknownbasis) the female participation rates reported
inrecent censuses: revalued from 14% (1996 census)to 35% in Egypt,
from 15% (1998) to 30% inAlgeria, from 21% (1994) to 41% in
Morocco, from23% (1994) to 37% in Tunisia? The fact remainsthat,
even revalued, these rates remain low com-pared to the world
average (55%).
Might not women’s low participation rateshold the clue to one
means by which Islam hashelped delay fertility decline? Lawyers
argue thatby recognising women’s right to own personalproperty, but
not an obligation to contribute tofamily finances out of their
income, the Shari’ah(Islamic law) increases husbands’ reluctance
toallow their wives to work. But we must be wary
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P Fargues / Reproductive Health Matters 2005;13(25):43–48
of syllogism: legal provisions do not produceactual practices.
The evidence of anthropologicalresearch is that economic realities
outweigh legal-ism: in the crisis-hit urban classes, families
notuncommonly rely on the wife’s income, prompt-ing husbands to
forego standing on their legalrights to restrict the main
breadwinner’s move-ments. In terms of family finances, women’s
workis a response to the decline in men’s real wages.
Under the welfare state, women’s low partici-pation rates could
partly explain their high fer-tility. Is the modest rise in female
economicactivity recorded in times of economic hardshipsreason
enough for the collapse in fertility?Probably not. A more likely
explanation is lowhousehold incomes compounded by low
femaleparticipation. The welfare state had raised
parents’aspirations and the level of their financial invest-ment
for their children, while structural adjust-ment now undermines
their real resources. So,women’s partial empowerment reflected by
theirlow contribution to household incomes becomesan effective
fertility regulation factor.* This couldexplain the paradox stated
above of a fertilitytransition unaccompanied by (total)
empower-ment of women.
The end of the patriarchal systemWhat prospects might these
trends foreshadow?Demographic change is undermining the
patri-archal system which has governed the familysystem since time
immemorial. That system restedon two pillars: younger brothers’
subordination tothe eldest brother in sibling relationships,
andgirl–women subordination to males within thefamily or marriage
unit. Fertility decline under-mines the first pillar. The modern
trend towardstwo-child families – on average a boy and a girl
–quite simply lessened the scope for a hierarchybetween brothers,
for lack of brothers.
The second pillar can still be based on law, stillmodelled as
regards personal status on theShari’ah. But the gap between law and
actualpractices is widening. The rise in education levelshas not
only affected gender, but also generation,
*Married women’s non-participation increases the rela-
tive cost of children, while participation increases their
opportunity cost (loss of earnings during spells out of
employment for child-rearing).
hierarchies. Measured by mean length of educa-tion, the
educational attainment gap betweenchildren and their parents has
grown steadily(Figure 2). From the 1950s’ birth cohorts, girlshave
not only been educated longer than theirmothers, but also than
their fathers. And sinceeducation is an element of authority,
girls’ over-achievement compared to their fathers could
wellchallenge the patriarchal system. On a cohort-for-cohort basis,
women are now almost as well-educated as men, their labour force
participationis bringing them in growing numbers into closecontact
with non-relative males with whom theyare competing in the
labourmarket.Women’s activ-ism and civil and political lobbying for
the reformof personal status now under way in a number ofArab
countries are likely to topple the patriarchalsystem from its
increasingly shaky foundations.
Note
This is a reprint of Philippe Fargues. Womenin Arab countries:
challenging the patriarchalsystem? Population & Societies
No.387, INED,February 2003, available at bwww.ined.frN,reproduced
in full with kind permission of theauthor and INED.
47
http:www.ined.fr
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48
RésuméD’après un rapport de 2002, les femmes
arabesprogressent lentement vers l’autonomisation.Pourtant, leur
statut ne va pas de pair avecle maintien d’une fécondité élevée
: en unegénération, celle-ci a été ramenée à 3,4 en
2000.L’Islam n’a pas fait obstacle au déclin de lafécondité,
ainsi que le montrent l’Iran et l’Algérie.À partir de la moitié
des années 70 et pendantles années 80, les subventions à la
consommationprovenant de la redistribution des revenuspétroliers
ont réduit le coût de l’éducation desenfants, et le
conservatisme social a maintenules femmes mariées à la maison,
deux mesuresqui ont stimulé la fécondité. La fécondité
acommencé à diminuer principalement du faitde l’allongement des
études des filles, ce qui aretardé l’âge du premier mariage, par
exemple 28ans pour les Marocaines urbaines et 29 pour lesLibyennes,
et l’entrée sur le marché de l’emploides célibataires. Les
jeunes célibataires sont aussiplus nombreuses. La chute des prix
pétroliers etl’ajustement structurel ont régulé efficacementla
fécondité. Les filles nées depuis les années50 sont plus
instruites que leur mère, mais aussique leur père, ce qui
accroı̂t leur autorité. Cesfacteurs, ainsi que l’activisme des
femmes et lespressions pour la réforme du statut personnelen cours
dans plusieurs pays arabes pourraientsaper le système
patriarcal.
ResumenEn un informe del 2002 se encontraronmuy pocosavances en
la empoderación de las mujeres árabes.No obstante, el estatus de
las mujeres árabes nose refleja en la continua fertilidad elevada,
queen 2000 habı́a disminuido marcadamente a 3.4en una generación.
En este artı́culo se examinanlas causas de esta disminución en los
paı́sesárabes. Islam no ha obstaculizado el descenso dela
fertilidad, como se observa en Irán y Argelia.Desde mediados de
los años setenta hasta losochenta, el consumo subsidiado mediante
laredistribución de la riqueza petrolera redujo elcosto de tener
hijos, y el conservadurismo socialmantuvo a las mujeres casadas
fuera de lafuerza de trabajo; ambos factores promovieronuna
fertilidad elevada. Las etapas iniciales dela disminución de la
fertilidad se debieronprincipalmente a una duración más larga de
laeducación de las niñas, un ascenso en la edadde las mujeres al
primer matrimonio, p. ej., 28 enMarruecos urbano y 29 en Libia, y
la entrada delas mujeres jóvenes solteras en la fuerza detrabajo.
Existe, además, un creciente subgrupodemográfico de mujeres
jóvenes que nunca se hancasado. Los bajos precios del petróleo y
el ajusteestructural disminuyeron los recursos hogareñosy
constituyen un factor eficaz en la regulaciónde la fertilidad. Las
niñas nacidas a partir delos años cincuenta han recibido una
educaciónmás larga que ambos padres, lo cual aumentasu autoridad.
Estos factores, y el activismo ycabildeo civil y polı́tico de las
mujeres con el finde reformar su estatus personal, actualmenteen
curso en varios paı́ses árabes, podrı́an retarel sistema
patriarcal.
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P Fargues / Reproductive Health Matters 2005;13(25):43–48
Women in Arab Countries: Challenging the Patriarchal System?Oil
and fertilityAn emerging group: young never-married
womenIncreasingly better educated, but less economically active
than menThe end of the patriarchal systemNoteReferences