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The International Journal of Human Rights

ISSN: 1364-2987 (Print) 1744-053X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjhr20

Ten flaws of just wars

Ken Booth

To cite this article: Ken Booth (2000) Ten flaws of just wars, The International Journal ofHuman Rights, 4:3-4, 314-324, DOI: 10.1080/13642980008406909

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642980008406909

Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

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Ten Flaws of Just Wars

KEN BOOTH

The ancient doctrine of the Just War is the ancestor of the verycontemporary notion of 'humanitarian war'. NATO's military campaignagainst Serbia in 1999 was justified on ethical grounds, not traditionalnational interests. This essay is a critique of the rationale of JustWar/humanitarian war, and of its accompanying political/strategicmindset. I will argue that the Just War tradition/doctrine is supposed torestrain war, but that it has not, cannot and will not do so; in practice itonly makes things worse by legitimising and honouring war. In particular,the construction a universal human rights culture - one of thefoundations for global human security - will be delayed rather thanadvanced by militarised humanitarianism.

1. Just Wars justify escalation. Over the centuries, the idea of Just Warwas developed to establish restraint in an area of politics in which rulestend to be weakest. War is seen as the ultimate cockpit of necessity, and'necessity knows no law'. But instead of becoming a force for restraint,Just War thinking has often served to excuse or provoke excess.

By the twentieth century, the combination of Westphalian statism,rampant nationalism, military-technological innovation and industrialgigantism had produced the potential for absolute war. There seemed noend to the escalation ladder. During the Cold War a strategic posturethreatening nuclear holocaust was dubbed the 'just deterrent'. Donald A.Wells, writing in the late 1960s against the background of a recent TotalWar and an increasingly violent 'Limited War' in Vietnam in theforeground, argued that states justify inflicting any horror upon anenemy as long as they claim their cause is just.1 Because a just cause

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demands unconditional commitment, the desire for justice and theinjunction to respect proportionality are necessarily in tension. Theformer pushes towards extremes, the latter towards restraint. In anideological age, and with the options opened up by technology, theancient doctrine of restraint became a modern justification for totality.A.J.P. Taylor noted this many years ago when he commented that in thenineteenth century Bismarck had fought necessary wars and killedthousands, whereas in the twentieth century we had fought just wars andkilled millions. If one's cause is 'just' it seems any level of escalation canbe justified, even nuclear armageddon.

When governments persuade themselves they are fighting a Just War,and try to propagandise their populations accordingly, escalation isinevitable unless the enemy quickly collapses. The danger-signals werethere in 1999 when NATO's leaders discovered that the war would notbe over in the few days they had predicted. The tension between justcause and proportionality kicked in immediately. Once NATO had sopublicly declared its hand for the refugees, what price justice? HadMilosevic kept his forces in the field for longer, one wonders just how farNATO would have escalated. Short of accepting a humiliatingclimbdown, or a massive escalation using ground forces, NATO couldonly intensify the bombing and expand the target list. Moreover, thedecisive strategic bombardment of Serbia would have become an absoluteimperative had NATO deployed ground forces, in order to reduce NATOcasualties. Then, had body bags been flown home, in dozens, orhundreds, one wonders what would have represented 'proportionality' inSerbian blood. Just Wars can be used to justify anything. In, around andover Kosovo through the summer of 1999, the combination of militantmoralism and democratic desperation was potentially deadly.

2. Just Wars degrade their proponents, as well as destroy their opponents.Just Wars are dangerous for the targeted enemy and the inevitable victimsof collateral damage, but they also degrade the society that convincesitself that it is fighting for Right against Evil. This was particularlyevident in Britain in 1999 where Blair's government was loud with JustWar rhetoric.

British public debate about the war was diminished by itsgovernment's crusading. Parliament was sidelined, and domestic criticspilloried. Democracy was a war aim, but was discouraged among theallies. 'The Serbs' were demonised. Milosevic's vicious ethnic cleansingwas inflated to be the ultimate crime of 'genocide'. Mindless comparisonswere made between Milosevic's Kosovo and the Nazi Holocaust.Innocent Serbs were killed, not intentionally but predictably, as a result

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of the decision to fight a zero-casualty campaign; and all the blame forwhat happened was shifted to the dictator in Belgrade.

Some in the West during the war suspected that manipulation hadreplaced reporting, and they questioned the 'truth' of the situation asstated by leaders or official spokespersons or uncritical reportersfollowing press conferences. But critical judgment in society generallytends to disappear once the bugle blows. Governments encourage it. In ahighly symbolic event, following an attack, in error, by NATO warplaneson a refugee convoy, the response from Downing Street was to send itsspinmeister to Brussels to ensure better media presentation. NATO wasdetermined to win not only in the air over Kosovo, but also over the air-waves more generally.

Historically, Just Wars have involved societies being willing to die fora cause, and not simply kill for one. Kosovo represented a change, and tomany it was chilling. Whatever humanitarian war does to the enemy, weshould also think of how it degrades us - just like nuclear strategy ortorture. In the Kosovo campaign our armed forces were asked to performnot the traditional heroic role of the warrior, or even of the policeman,but rather the cold and heartless trade of the executioner.

3. Just Wars are just war. The idea of the Just War is beguiling, because itennobles the profession of violence, and offers a set of conditions thatseem to suggest rational control and restraint. However, its definingconditions - 'just cause', 'right intention', 'proportionality' and the rest -have been criticised for as long as the tradition, and rightly so. In practicethey have been broadened, ignored, misused and manipulated.

Just cause is very subjective, including the application of 'self defence',widely seen as its only authentic case. Right intention is equallyproblematic. A decision-maker's reasons may well not be the causes foraction, so how are we to know? What constitutes legitimate authority isa matter of political preference rather than legal nicety. Last resort soundsa sensible guide to policy, but how can anybody ever know whether moreeffort might work, while in some strategic circumstances a first strikemight be thought to constitute a 'last' resort? The idea of a formaldeclaration of war has become increasingly anachronistic, whilereasonable hope is vague. War is a condition of uncertainty, in which eventhe most expert can disagree in advance about the prospects, and inwhich events have a habit of fooling everybody. Finally, proportionalitysounds more helpful than it is, in an activity in which changingcircumstances, vital interests and group emotion defy ethical arithmetic.

NATO's campaign against Serbia illustrates some of these problems.The issue of 'just cause' was controversial, as the war was clearly not for

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self-defence, while many believed the campaign to be a breach ofinternational law, regardless of claims about 'legitimacy' - another termof politics rather than principle. 'Right intention' was disputed by thosewho believed that behind the rhetoric of humanitarianism lay traditionalstate interests, especially the US desire to impose its authority on NATOand hence European affairs. The selectivity of the West's intervention wasseen by critics as a justification for suspecting a masking of reasons andcauses. As is expected these days, war was not declared. Was it a lastresort? Proponents say 'yes' and point to Belgrade's intransigence, butcritics point to the virtual ultimatum delivered at Rambouillet, and arguethat NATO was looking for a rationalisation for war, not a way ofavoiding one. Just War conditions provide a cover which allows power todo what power can do. If this is true, the Just War is best seen as acontinuation of war by other rhetoric.

4. Just Wars encourage bad strategy. Political leaders with Just Warmindsets are rarely professional specialists in violence. In Just Wars,strategy is therefore handed to amateurs, and this was the case in 1999.The campaign was characterised by strategic mishandling on the part ofthe political leadership, rather than military incompetence. Misjudgedwars can be fought competently.

When a politician 'wants' war, mistakes are bound to occur. This isespecially the case - to recall Tennyson - if someone believes that theirstrength is as the strength of ten because their heart is pure. The desire tocelebrate NATO's fiftieth anniversary in style almost certainly affectedthe timing of the war, but by the time they struck they could not protectthe refugees; they could only try to punish the ethnic cleansers, andthereby imperil the refugees further. It was a short war, but long onpolitico-strategic blunders. Long-range air strikes could not achieve theinitial objective declared by NATO. The will of the opponent wasseriously underestimated, while confidence in NATO's capability wasexaggerated. Cruise-missile humanitarianism and bombing from a safeheight could not stop the brutality being carried out against the AlbanianKosovars on the ground, and almost certainly exacerbated it. The earlyand public ruling out of the ground force option was nai've. Strategicmiscalculations were compounded by diplomatic errors, notably theoffending of the Russians, the failure to secure UN support, and theproblems with China following the bombing of its Belgrade Embassy.

To place NATO's 'victory' into context, it is instructive to comparethe relative strengths of the two belligerents: the collective GNPs of theNATO allies with that of Serbia, and the respective orders-of-battle of thecombatants. When Milosevic (still in power) felt compelled to withdraw

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his forces (still largely intact) from the field of battle into the nationalheartland (for the moment), it followed one of the most one-sidedmilitary contests in history. On the one side the most economically andmilitarily powerful alliance ever, and on the other a small nation with nocapability to strike back militarily. They had only the defencelessAlbanians to lash out against. A Just War encourages bad strategy byelevating amateur strategists. A zero-casualty victory, however, naturallydiscourages criticism.

5. Just Wars feed self-righteousness. Because the politicians leading NATObelieved they were engaged in a just struggle against the demonMilosevic, they developed a pious certainty of righteousness and anevident absence of guilt about what they did. Neither of these traits isconducive to true humanitarian politics. The best of the 'West' is notrepresented by the hubris of humanitarian imperialism, expressing itselfas claim to be universal judge, jury and executioner.

First, at the politico-military level the NATO allies claimed'legitimacy' in acting militarily in what some regarded as the internalproblems of another country. This polarised world politics. The actionwas widely seen as illegal, and failed to get unambiguous Security Councilendorsement. NATO thereby dealt a blow to the authority and future ofthe UN. This precedent can now be used by every regional hegemon. Itis worth recalling that in the 1930s the League of Nations began tocollapse when great powers disregarded its authority.

NATO's unilateralist posture had other negative consequences. Itincreased a West-versus-the-Rest polarisation, encouraging the former tofeel superior, fighting for civilised values, while the latter was made tofeel both inferior and threatened. Only the United States can projectmilitary power across the globe, and in recent years has zeroed in itsmissiles and bombs at a growing list of countries. The Pentagon talks of'full-spectrum dominance 2010' and the Secretary of State, MadeleineAlbright, argues that Americans stand taller than the rest - 'that is whywe can see further'. This mixture of self-righteousness and technologicalhubris represents a real and growing threat to those not identified as theWhite House's friends from the South. Potential targets will look towardstheir defences, including, perhaps, the building of primitive weapons ofmass destruction.

Second, at the tactical level (not to mention their role in the macro-situation) self-righteousness led Western leaders to avoid acceptingresponsibility for some events in the war. What happened was blamed onothers. War is always a deadly business and casualties are its first truth.Technical mistakes and bad luck are one thing when contemplating death

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and injury to those with some claim to be 'innocent', but in Kosovo (andSerbia) some of these casualties were directly and predictably the resultof the Blair/Clinton priority of overseeing a UK/US casualty-free war. Thedeaths of refugees from friendly fire - and of innocent Serbs from thatwhich was less friendly if not intentionally deadly - cannot simply beexplained away as one of the unavoidable 'frictions' of war. It was adirect result of NATO strategy, and any attempt to argue differently iscasuistic spin. To fail to take responsibility for one's actions is not a goodfoundation for humanitarian politics. Neither is hypocrisy. And herethere was much, from the gap between the sympathy expressed towardsthe Kosovar refugees and the increasing lack of sympathy in Britaintowards asylum-seekers, and the selectivity of the internationalcommunity's humanitarian interventions.

Third, at a psychological level, self righteousness begets self-righteousness. Predictably, cruise-missile humanitarianism could notprotect those being killed and terrorised by the Serb forces andparamilitaries on the ground. The opposite was the case; the bombingcreated circumstances in which they could carry out their ethniccleansing with yet greater ferocity. NATO was not responsible for theMilosevic campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1999, but its strategy didcreate the cover of war for the ethnic cleansers, and for inflaming thelatter's desire to extract revenge against the defenceless Albanians theydespised - victims who, unlike NATO's warplanes, were accessible.NATO's moralising and missiles also had the effect of pushing theSerbian population behind a leader whose unpopularity had grown in thespace opened up by peace following Dayton.

As piety grows and guilt diminishes, there is an ethic cleansing of theconscience; this may be the prelude to worse. Instead of takingresponsibility for innocent casualties, for the increased terror inflicted onthe Kosovar Albanians, for the damage done to the region's economy,and for the failure to prevent the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Serbs -all the direct result of NATO's strategy - the blame was shifted to theoffending demon in Belgrade. NATO did have choices. When self-righteousness expands, and blame is denied, the important still smallvoice of conscience is silenced - a necessary element in any truehumanitarian politics.

6. Just Wars promote militarisation. If guilt was silenced during the war,it had grown in Western minds during the preceding years: for not actingdecisively in Bosnia (and Rwanda), for allowing the massacre atSrebrenica, and for ignoring the developing Kosovo tragedy.Furthermore, it was surely not an accident that NATO's most militant

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leaders, Clinton and Blair, felt they had something to prove. In earlierincarnations, the former was an anti-Vietnam war rebel and the latter amember of CND. On military matters therefore, neither wanted to beoutflanked in toughness. In addition, when it comes to 'duties beyondborders' centre-left politicians always have stronger interventionaryinstincts than their counterparts on the right. All in all, Kosovo was anopportunity for feel-good punishment. It was the militarisation of guilt.

Militarised humanitarianism causes a number of problems. First, thevalorisation of military action flies in the face of humanitarianism, whichrequires the erosion of the legitimacy of using military force. Second, themore force is seen to be successful, the more it is likely to be used. Theinstrument will shape the will to use it. Third, high-tech, zero-casualtywars, fought for just causes are a godsend to arms manufacturers: justprofit. Finally, the new humanitarian militarism has promoted a changedattitude among some sections of society, in which imperialism, strategy,and warriors are being reinvented for the twenty-first century. We areseeing the rise of post-modern Midases of militarism: everything theytouch turns to 'new'. But there is more that is old than new in war,including the soundest lessons of all: military force is always a blunt tool,often used in error, and best left only to 'supreme emergencies'.

Militant humanitarianism risks leading Western societies down thedangerous path of ennobling the use of military force. Humanitarianwarriors are providing good copy for recruiting advertisements.

7. Just War thinking distracts attention from human security. As itintensified through the 1990s, the Kosovo tragedy revealed that theAnglo-American special relationship did not give priority to humansecurity. There were rhetorical flourishes, but little in the flourishing ofresources. Old thinking, once again, was caught out in Kosovo. It showedthat human rights are a critical security issue, and that when they arebeing massively violated, trouble usually follows. The same will be truenow the war has ended, unless appropriate resources are devoted topeace-building.

Kosovo for a decade at least had been a humanitarian disaster waitingto happen. Security via conflict prevention was notable by its absence.Specialists on the region tried to draw attention to the dangers, butWestern policy-makers avoided the issue(s), at Dayton and on otheroccasions. Meanwhile, the non-violent approach represented by Rugovagave way to the terrorist tactics of the KLA, which ultimately provokedthe desired overreaction on the part of Belgrade, and the recruitment ofthe NATO air force. It is not now possible to know whether conflictprevention measures would have worked, only that opportunities were

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missed. Because we know the end of the story, it is tempting to assumethat it had to be, but we know from other situations that different choicescan result in different outcomes. South Africa, for example, radicallyshifted its internal political arrangements without the long-fearedinterracial blood bath. Political crossroads are inevitable, whereas conflictis only inevitable if the key decision-makers approach cross-roads withthe wrong road-maps, and so turn in fateful directions.

Having overlooked human security before March 1999, the signssubsequently have not been encouraging. Typically, the stabilisation planfor the Balkans came far too late, when the air war was taking place, andat a much higher cost than would have been the case before the regionwas 'degraded' by NATO air power. It was predictable that it would takea long time before there could be a satisfactory security situation, and thisremains the case today, with a mono-ethnic Kosovo likely to becomeindependent, tension on the ground, approximately as many displacedpersons in Serbia as in Kosovo's neighbours a year earlier, and Serbiajoining the region's economic basket-cases. Military victory is easier thanhuman security, especially when, as some predicted, the allies havechosen not to give the same attention and resources to the reconstructionof the Balkans as they gave to the air campaign. Other issues now demandattention, resources are squeezed, and supplying reinforced doors forimproving the human security of frightened Serbian Kosovars still in theprovince does not have the priority that supplying bombs to coerceMilosevic had a year earlier.

8. Just Wars stimulate self-delusion. Self-delusion occurs when a decision-making group deceives itself about what is happening. Self-delusion ispart of the pathology of 'groupthink'; this was evident among NATOleaders in terms of both ends (jus ad bellum) and means {jus in hello).

The allies claimed that they stood on the moral high ground. This wasself-deception because their action was both selective and illegal. Theformer is particularly significant here, being an issue of ethics, not law:one surely cannot claim the moral high ground if one's moral reach isselective. Note here humanitarian disasters where the West also had goodcause to act, and reasonable capabilities, but did not. Westerngovernments do not 'do something' if there are serious costs, be theycommercial (Indonesia/East Timor) or strategic (Turkey/the Kurds). TheWest's knee-jerk defence of selectivity asserts: 'Because you cannot dogood everywhere does not mean that you should not do goodsomewhere'. This is a consequentialist defence of a particular action, nota principled defence of one's sense of moral duty. It merely says that ona particular occasion one acted in accordance with humanitarian

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objectives; not that as a matter of principle one acts out of respect forthem.

Second, when it comes to jus in hello, we should not be deceived bysurface impressions. The allies did try to fight according to the laws ofwar, not least because it might be politically beneficial in terms of theattitudes of wavering watchers. But it does not follow that the ends arejust, because the means attempt to be. We are mistaken if we think thatbecause we are fighting carefully, with discrimination, that we thereforehave justice on our side. Furthermore, fighting with discrimination iseasier when one has all the technical and economic resources, andstrategic advantages; when the enemy cannot fight back; when one hasno soldiers fighting and dying in the front line; and when one's civiliansare not under attack. This is the war-fighting of the 'culture ofcontentment', whose beneficiaries invariably mistake virtue for goodluck.

Hypocrisy and the lack of commitment among the G9 to building aglobal Just Peace contradicts the story our governments tell themselves,and us, about their humanitarian sensibilities and moral imaginations.The lives of the world's poor tell a different story. Just War is anotherdeception.

9. Just Wars perpetuate human wrongs. The claim to be motivated byhumanitarian impulses, I believe, necessarily implies a commitment to auniversalist perspective. Humanitarianism has to be universalist, thoughthere may be contingent reasons why action is not taken in particularcases. Power differentials, for example, might be overwhelming. Whengovernments do not act when human rights are being massively abused,we accept that national interests are determining; I think there is goodreason to think the same when they selectively do act and claim thathumanitarian motives are decisive. If there were selfish reasons why theWest did not act during the genocides in East Timor and Rwanda, then isit not reasonable to look for selfish motives when the West doesintervene, as in Kosovo?

Just War thinking is yet another example of the way Western elitesconnive in perpetuating human wrongs by always privileging the victimsof politics over the victims of economics. In this way the humanitarianwar over Kosovo again revealed a selective moral imagination. If savingthe lives of threatened people was their aim, then the rich governmentsof NATO could have saved far more by shifting resources away frommilitary spending and the victims of Milosevic's politics, towards thesouth and the victims of Western-dominated economics. But whilefighting a Just War burnishes the self-image, redistribution is a threat.

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The willingness to engage in a Just War shows a concern for politicalvictims (albeit selective) which the Washington Consensus does not revealfor economic victims. Cruise-missile humanitarianism is a psychologicaland material distraction from doing more to alleviate what is still thebiggest division between people(s), that between the haves and have-nots.

The NATO allies could have helped others, elsewhere, but they didnot. The bottom line is that if governments are not passably consistentwhen confronted by humanitarian disasters, their claim to behumanitarian crusaders in any circumstances is compromised. Thisselective morality is another version of ethic cleansing.

10. Just Wars legitimise war. NATO chose not to call its armed conflictwith Milosevic's regime a 'war' for a mixture of propaganda andlegalistic reasons, but by any sensible definition it was a war, albeit aparticularly one-sided encounter. Words matter, but so does matter: awar by any other name hurts as much.

The fundamental flaw, left to the last, is that at the heart of the JustWar tradition is the idea of war in some circumstances being 'just'.Following Kant, I want to argue that all wars should be regarded aswrong, though particular wars can be regarded as necessary orexcusable.2 Kant hated war, but believed that a pacifist position wasunrealistic in the world of states then existing and in the 'self-incurredimmaturity' of human society. But he did not believe this situation needlast forever. War for him was not an inevitable feature of human life; itwas a choice. Consequently he rejected those theories of internationalrelations - such as the doctrine of Just War or the Grotian internationalsociety position - that accepted war as a fatal necessity. War will remaincentral to human history, he argued, as long as we keep choosing it. Wecould choose for it to be different, based on common reason, anddevelop a set of global social relations in which the conditions of civilsociety operate. Until this new stage has been reached, Kant believed thatwar might sometimes be necessary, but should never be legitimised.

Whatever else it did, NATO's campaign has helped keep alive the ideaof the legitimacy of war. Indeed, the casualty-free victory (for NATO)probably enhanced the acceptability of such wars as an instrument ofpolitics. On ethical grounds, I believe that outsiders have a duty torespond to massive violations of human rights; they should 'dosomething', but undertaking actions that legitimise war is not one ofthem. The refugees could have been cared for. The resources spent onmilitary missions could have been used to improve the prospects forhuman security generally. Asylum-seekers to the West and the needyelsewhere could have been treated more humanely. Diplomacy could

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have engaged with creating a security community in south-easternEurope. The verdict of the UN could have been respected. For Kant,choices about war should be made in relation to his belief that creating aworld-wide legal order should be at the basis for actions; NATO did notchoose the unambiguously legal route. A Just War was not fought againstthe apartheid South African state, and need not have been in the Balkans.The construction of a human rights culture globally requires outsiders todo something in the face of human disasters, but it does not requiremaking war.

It is a mistake to describe any war as just. Reviving the Just Wartradition for the twenty-first century, as in seeking to use its criteria toassess a war, represents the legitimisation of a practice the world needs tomarginalise. The presumption should always be against war, both ingeneral and in particular, though as an instrument of politics it cannot yetbe ruled out. War can be necessary or excusable; it is such when it isfought clearly in self-defence or with the endorsement of the UN SecurityCouncil. This is not perfect, but it the best that can be done at this stageof world society. To do other is to continue to legitimise war, and all thatgoes with it, at all levels of human society: from nuclear strategies thatthreaten environmental and human catastrophe, through the opportunitycosts created by militarised economies, to the daily realities of domesticviolence perpetuated by macho images of man-the-warrior.

NOTES

1. Donald A. Wells, 'How Much Can the "Just War" Justify?', Journal of Philosophy,Vol.66 (23), December 1969, pp.819-29. On the 'just deterrent', see Rev. RichardHarries (ed.), What Hope in an Armed World? (London: Pickering and Inglis, 1982)p.108, and his 'In search of a just deterrent', The Times, 1 Mar. 1984.

2. See Howard Williams and Ken Booth, 'Kant: Theorist beyond Limits', pp.71-98 in IanClark and Iver B. Neumann (eds), Classical Theories of International Relations(London: Macmillan, 1996).

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