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2015WI85 SUPREMECOURTOFWISCONSIN
CASENO.: 2013AP296OA&2014AP417Wthrough2014AP421W&
2013AP2504Wthrough2013AP2508WCOMPLETETITLE:
StateofWisconsinexrel.TwoUnnamedPetitioners,
Petitioner,v.TheHonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoeJudgeandFrancisD.Schmitz,SpecialProsecutor,Respondents.StateofWisconsinexrel.FrancisD.Schmitz,Petitioner,v.HonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoeJudge,Respondent,EightUnnamedMovants,InterestedParty.IntheMatterofJohnDoeProceedingStateofWisconsinexrel.ThreeUnnamedPetitioners,Petitioner,v.theHonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoejudge,theHonorableGregoryPotter,ChiefJudgeandFrancisD.Schmitz,asSpecialProsecutor,Respondents.
ORIGINALACTION
PETITIONFORSUPERVISORYWRITBEFORETHESUPREMECOURT,APPEALANDBYPASSTOTHESUPREMECOURTFROM
CIRCUITCOURTORDER
PETITIONFORREVIEWBEFORETHESUPREMECOURT
OPINIONFILED: July16,2015SUBMITTEDONBRIEFS: ORALARGUMENT:
SOURCEOFAPPEAL: COURT: Circuit COUNTY:
Milwaukee,Iowa,Dodge,DaneandColumbia JUDGE:
GregoryA.Peterson(Reserve) JUSTICES: CONCURRED:
CONCUR/DISSENT:DISSENTED:
PROSSER,J.,ROGGENSACK,C.J.(joiningSectionsIVandV),ZIEGLER,J.(joiningSectionIV)andGABLEMAN,J.(joiningSectionIV)concur(Opinionfiled).ZIEGLER,J.concurs(Opinionfiled).ABRAHAMSON,J.concursanddissents(Opinionfiled).CROOKS,J.concursanddissents(Opinionfiled).
ccccc NOTPARTICIPATING:
BRADLEY,J.,didnotparticipate. ATTORNEYS:
For the Petitioners (case nos. 2013AP2504W through 2013AP2508W
and 2014AP296OA) and Interested Parties
(case nos. 2014AP417W through 2014AP421W) there were briefs by
Attorney Dean A. Strang, StrangBradley, LLC,
MadisonAttorneyStevenM.BiskupicandAttorneyMichelleL.Jacobs,Biskupic&Jacobs,S.C.,MequonAttorney
Dennis P. Coffey, Mawicke & Goisman, SC, Milwaukee Attorney
Matthew W. ONeill, Fox ONeill Shannon, S.C.,
MilwaukeeAttorneyJamesB.Barton,HansenReynoldsDickinsonCruegerLLC,MilwaukeeAttorneyEricJ.Wilson,
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Godfrey&Kahn,S.C.,MadisonandAttorneyJeffreyJamesMorgan,LeBell,Dobrowski&Morgan,LLP,Milwaukee.
For the Respondents (case nos. 2013AP2504W through 2013AP2508W,
2014AP417W through 2014AP421W and
2014AP296OA)therewerebriefsbyAssistantAttorneyGeneralDavidC.Rice,withwhomonthebriefswasAttorney
GeneralJ.B.VanHollen(termofofficeendingDecember31,2014)andAttorneyGeneralBradSchimel(termof
officecommencingJanuary1,2015)andSpecialProsecutorFrancisD.Schmitz(Petitionerincasenos.2014AP417W
through2014AP421W),Milwaukee.
Amici Curiae briefs were filed by Attorney Benjamin T. Barr (pro
hac vice), Cheyenne, WY and Attorney
StephenR.Klein(prohacvice),Cheyenne,WYonbehalfoftheWyomingLibertyGroupwithwhomonthebriefwas
AttorneyMatthewM.FernholzandCramer,Multhauf&Hammes,LLP,WaukeshaAttorneyJamesBopp,Jr.,TerreHaute,
IN,onbehalfoftheJamesMadisonCenterforFreeSpeechandonbehalfofWisconsinRighttoLife,Inc.
with
whomonthebriefswasAttorneyMichaelD.DeanandMichaelD.Dean,LLC,BrookfieldAttorneyJamesR.Troupis
andTroupisLawOffice,LLC,CrossPlains,onbehalfoftheEthicsandPublicPolicyCenterAttorney
Adam J.
White (pro hac vice), Washington, D.C. and Boyden Gray &
Associates, Washington, D.C., on behalf of Former
MembersoftheFederalElectionCommissionLeeAnnElliot,DavidMason,HansvonSpakovskyandDarrylWoldwith
whomonthebriefwereAttorneyJamesR.TroupisandAttorneyPaulM.Ferguson,CrossPlainsAttorneyJonathan
Becker, Attorney Nathan W. Judnic and Attorney Kevin J. Kennedy
on behalf of the Wisconsin Government
Accountability Board, Madison Attorney Richard M. Esenberg,
Attorney Brian W. McGrath and the Wisconsin
InstituteforLaw&Liberty,Milwaukee,onbehalfofTheHon.BradleyA.Smith,CenterforCompetitivePolitics,
and Wisconsin Family Action Attorney J. Gerald Hebert (pro hac
vice), Attorney Tara Malloy (pro hac vice),
AttorneyPaulS.Ryan(prohacvice),AttorneyMeganP.McAllen(prohacvice)andTheCampaignLegalCenter,
WashingtonD.C.,AttorneyFredWertheimer(prohacvice)andDemocracy21,Washington,D.C.andAttorneyDonald
J. Simon (pro hac vice) and Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson
& Perry, LLP, Washington, D.C. on behalf of
CampaignLegalCenter,Democracy21,CommonCauseinWisconsinandLeagueofWomenVotersofWisconsinwithwhom
on the brief was Attorney Susan M. Crawford and Cullen Weston
Pines & Bach LLP, Madison Attorney David B.
Rivkin, Jr. (pro hac vice), Attorney Lee A. Casey (pro hac
vice), Attorney Mark W. Delaquil (pro hac vice),
AttorneyAndrewM.Grossman(prohacvice),AttorneyRichardB.Raile(prohacvice)andBaker&HostetlerLLP,
Washington, D.C. on behalf of Citizens for Responsible
Government Advocates, Inc. with whom on the brief was
AttorneyChristopherM.MeulerandFriebertFinerty&St.John,S.C.,MilwaukeeAttorneyMatthewMenendez(pro
hacvice),AttorneyDanielI.Weiner(prohacvice),AttorneyAliciaL.Bannon(prohacvice)andBrennanCenter
forJusticeatNYUSchoolofLawonbehalfofProfessorsofLegalEthics,withwhomonthebriefwasAttorney
ThomasR.Cannon,Milwaukee.
2015WI85
NOTICEThisopinionissubjecttofurthereditingandmodification.Thefinalversionwillappearintheboundvolumeoftheofficialreports.
No.2014AP296OA&2014AP417Wthrough2014AP421W&2013AP2504Wthrough2013AP2508W(L.C.No.
2013JD11&2013JD9&2013JD6&2013JD1&2012JD23)
STATEOFWISCONSIN: INSUPREMECOURT
StateofWisconsinexrel.TwoUnnamedPetitioners,Petitioner,v.TheHonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoeJudgeandFrancisD.Schmitz,SpecialProsecutor,Respondents.
FILED
JUL16,2015
DianeM.FremgenClerkofSupremeCourt
StateofWisconsinexrel.FrancisD.Schmitz,
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Petitioner,v.HonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoeJudge,Respondent,EightUnnamedMovants,InterestedParty.
IntheMatterofJohnDoeProceedingStateofWisconsinexrel.ThreeUnnamedPetitioners,Petitioner,v.theHonorableGregoryA.Peterson,JohnDoejudge,theHonorableGregoryPotter,ChiefJudgeandFrancisD.Schmitz,asSpecialProsecutor,Respondents.
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment. Declaration of rights
relief granted John Doe investigation
orderedclosed.
PETITION for supervisory writ and appeal from an order of a John
Doe Judge for Milwaukee County, Iowa
County, Dodge County, Dane County, and Columbia County, Gregory
A. Peterson, Reserve Judge. Petition for
supervisorywritdeniedandorderaffirmed.
PETITIONforsupervisorywritandreviewofadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.Petitionforsupervisory
writdeniedanddecisionaffirmed.
1 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. These cases arise from a John Doe
proceeding originally initiated in
MilwaukeeCounty,andsubsequentlyexpandedtofouradditionalcounties,IowaCounty,DodgeCounty,DaneCounty,
andColumbiaCounty.Thoughnotconsolidated,theseproceedingshavebeenoverseenbyasingleJohnDoejudge
andorganizedbyasinglespecialprosecutor(FrancisSchmitz).Forthesakeofclarity,wewillrefertoall
fiveproceedingsasasingle"JohnDoeinvestigation."Theinvestigationhasbeenongoingforseveralyearsand
hasbeenthesubjectofmuchlitigation.[1]
2Accordingtothespecialprosecutor,thepurposeoftheJohnDoeinvestigationistorootoutallegedly
illegal campaign coordination between certain issue advocacy
groups and a candidate for elective office. To
further the investigation, the special prosecutor sought, and
received, wideranging subpoenas and search
warrantsfor29organizationsandindividuals,seekingmillionsofdocumentsthathadbeencreatedoveraperiod
ofseveralyears.Varioustargets(collectively"theUnnamedMovants")movedtheJohnDoejudgetoquashthe
subpoenasandsearchwarrantsandtoreturnanypropertyseizedbythespecialprosecutor.TheJohnDoejudge,
the Hon. Gregory A. Peterson, presiding, granted the motions to
quash and ordered the return of all property
seized.ReserveJudgePetersonstayedtheorder,however,andalsohaltedtheJohnDoeinvestigationpendingour
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resolutionofthecasesbeforeus.
3ThefirstcaseweaddressisanoriginalactionbroughtbyUnnamedMovantsNos.6and7,Stateexrel.
TwoUnnamedPetitionersv.Peterson("TwoUnnamedPetitioners").UnnamedMovantsNos.6and7seekadeclaration
ofrightsthatthespecialprosecutor'stheoryofthecaseisinvalidunderWisconsinlaw.Specifically,they
ask that we declare that coordinated issue advocacy of the kind
alleged by the special prosecutor is not
regulatedunderWis.Stat.Ch.11(201112),[2]
Wisconsin'scampaignfinancelaw.
4Thesecondcasewereviewisapetitionbroughtbythespecialprosecutorforasupervisorywritandan
appealofReserveJudgePeterson'sdecisionandorderquashingthesubpoenasandsearchwarrants,Stateexrel.
Schmitz v. Peterson ("Schmitz v. Peterson"). The special
prosecutor argues that Reserve Judge Peterson
improperlyquashedthesubpoenasandsearchwarrantsbecausetherecordsintheJohnDoeinvestigationestablish
areasonablebeliefthattheUnnamedMovantsviolatedWisconsin'scampaignfinancelaw.Thiscaseisbeforeus
ontheUnnamedMovants'petitionstobypassthecourtofappealspursuanttoWis.Stat.809.60(201314).
5Thethirdcaseweaddressisapetitionforasupervisorywritandareviewofadecisionofthecourt
ofappeals,Stateexrel.ThreeUnnamedPetitionersv.Peterson("ThreeUnnamedPetitioners").Thispetitionfor
supervisorywritwasbroughtbyUnnamedMovantsNos.2,6,and7,andbroadlychallengeswhethertheJohnDoe
investigationcanbeinitiatedinfiveseparatecountiesunderasingleJohnDoejudge,andwhetherthespecial
prosecutorwasproperlyappointed.ThecourtofappealsdeniedthesupervisorywritandUnnamedMovantsNos.2,
6,and7appealedthatdecisiontothiscourt.
6 Our order granting and consolidating[3]
each of these cases identified 14 issues presented by the
complexnatureofthecases.TheseissuesrelatedtotheproceduralnatureoftheJohnDoeinvestigation,as
well as whether the conduct alleged by the special prosecutor is
actually a violation of Ch. 11. Subsequent
briefingbythepartieshasrevealedthatthecasescanberesolvedonmuchnarrowergroundsthanthosethatwere
originallysubmitted,andwehavewrittenthisopinionaccordingly.
7Wecanresolvetheoriginalaction,TwoUnnamedPetitioners,byfirstexaminingwhetherthestatutory
definitionsof"committee,""contributions,""disbursements,"and"politicalpurposes"inWis.Stat.11.01(4),
(6), (7), and (16) are limited to express advocacy[4]
or whether they encompass the conduct of coordination
between a candidate or a campaign committee and an independent
organization that engages in issue advocacy.
Second, if the definitions extend to issue advocacy
coordination, what then constitutes prohibited
"coordination?"[5]
8 Next, we can resolve the supervisory writ petition in Schmitz
v. Peterson by answering whether the
evidencegatheredintheJohnDoeproceedingsprovidesareasonablebeliefthatWisconsinlawwasviolatedbya
campaigncommittee'scoordinationwithindependentadvocacyorganizationsthatengagedinexpressadvocacy.[6]
9Finally,wecanresolvethesupervisorywritpetitioninThreeUnnamedPetitionersbyexamining:(1)
Whether the Director of State Courts ("Director") violated a
plain legal duty in appointing reserve judge,
BarbaraA.Kluka,astheJohnDoejudgetopresideoveramulticountyJohnDoeproceeding(2)WhethertheChief
Judge of the First Judicial District violated a plain legal duty
in appointing reserve judge, Gregory A.
Peterson,astheJohnDoejudgetopresideoveramulticountyJohnDoeproceeding(3)WhetheraJohnDoejudge
violatedaplainlegaldutybyconveningaJohnDoeproceedingovermultiplecounties,whichisthencoordinated
bythedistrictattorneyofoneofthecounties(4)WhetheraJohnDoejudgeviolatedaplainlegaldutyby
appointingaspecialprosecutortoperformthefunctionsofadistrictattorneyinmultiplecountiesinaJohn
Doeproceedingwhen(a)thedistrictattorneyineachcountyrequeststheappointment(b)butnoneofthenine
groundsforappointingaspecialprosecutorunderWis.Stat.978.045(1r)apply(c)nochargeshaveyetbeen
issued(d)thedistrictattorneyineachcountyhasnotrefusedtocontinuetheinvestigationorprosecutionof
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anypotentialchargeand(e)nocertificationthatnootherprosecutorialunitwasabletodotheworkforwhich
thespecialprosecutorwassoughtwasmadetotheDepartmentofAdministrationand(5)If,arguendo,therewasa
defectintheappointmentofthespecialprosecutorintheJohnDoeproceedingsatissueinthesematters,what
effect, if any, would such a defect have on the competency of
the special prosecutor to conduct the
investigationorthecompetencyoftheJohnDoejudgetoconducttheseproceedings?[7]
I.HOLDINGS
A.
10 In Two Unnamed Petitioners, we hold that the definition of
"political purposes" in Wis. Stat.
11.01(16)isunconstitutionallyoverbroadandvagueundertheFirstAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitution
and Article 1, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution[8]
because its language "'is so sweeping that its
sanctionsmaybeappliedtoconstitutionallyprotectedconductwhichthestateisnotpermittedtoregulate.'"
Statev.Janssen,219Wis.2d362,374,580N.W.2d260(1998)(quotingBachowskiv.Salamone,139Wis.2d397,
411,407N.W.2d533(1987)).However,areadilyavailablelimitingconstructionexiststhatwewillapplyand
thatwillpreventthechillingofotherwiseprotectedspeechnamely,"politicalpurposes"islimitedtoexpress
advocacyanditsfunctionalequivalent[9]
asthosetermsaredefinedinBuckleyv.Valeo,424U.S.1(1976),and
Fed.ElectionComm'nv.Wis.RighttoLife,Inc.,551U.S.449(2007)(WRTLII).Withthislimitingconstruction
inplace,Chapter11doesnotproscribeanyoftheallegedconductofanyoftheUnnamedMovants.Thespecial
prosecutorhasnotallegedanyexpressadvocacy,andissueadvocacy,whethercoordinatedornot,is"beyondthe
reach of [Ch. 11]." Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751
F.3d 804, 815 (7th Cir. 2014) (Barland II).
Accordingly,weinvalidatethespecialprosecutor'stheoryofthecase,andwegrantthereliefrequestedbythe
UnnamedMovants.
11Tobeclear,thisconclusionendstheJohnDoeinvestigationbecausethespecialprosecutor'slegal
theoryisunsupportedineitherreasonorlaw.Consequently,theinvestigationisclosed.Consistentwithour
decisionandtheorderenteredbyReserveJudgePeterson,weorderthatthespecialprosecutorandthedistrict
attorneys involved in this investigation must cease all
activities related to the investigation, return all
propertyseizedintheinvestigationfromanyindividualororganization,andpermanentlydestroyallcopiesof
informationandothermaterialsobtainedthroughtheinvestigation.AllUnnamedMovantsarerelievedofanyduty
tocooperatefurtherwiththeinvestigation.
B.
12 In Schmitz v. Peterson, we hold that the special prosecutor
has failed to prove that Reserve Judge
Petersonviolatedaplainlegaldutywhenhequashedthesubpoenasandsearchwarrantsandorderedthereturnof
all property seized by the special prosecutor. In quashing the
subpoenas and search warrants, Reserve Judge
PetersonexercisedhisdiscretionundertheJohnDoestatute,Wis.Stat.968.26,todeterminetheextentofthe
investigation. Because the purpose of a supervisory writ does
not include review of a judge's discretionary
acts,Stateexrel.Kalalv.CircuitCourtforDaneCnty.,2004WI58,24,271Wis.2d633,681N.W.2d110,the
supervisorywritsoughtbythespecialprosecutorisdenied,andReserveJudgePeterson'sorderisaffirmed.
C.
13 Finally, in Three Unnamed Petitioners, we hold that the
Unnamed Movants have failed to prove that
eitherReserveJudgeKlukaorReserveJudgePetersonviolatedaplainlegaldutyby:(1)acceptinganappointment
asareservejudge(2)conveningamulticountyJohnDoeproceedingor(3)appointingaspecialprosecutor.
AlthoughthecircumstancessurroundingtheformationoftheJohnDoeinvestigationraiseseriousconcerns,and
althoughtheappointmentofthespecialprosecutormaywellhavebeenimproper,suchconcernsdonotsatisfythe
stringentpreconditionsforasupervisorywrit.[10]
Putanotherway,werewetograntthesupervisorywritin
this case, we would risk "transform[ing] the writ into an
allpurpose alternative to the appellate review
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process,"whichwecannotdo.Id. Accordingly, we deny the
supervisory writ and affirm the decision of the
courtofappeals.
II.FACTUALBACKGROUNDANDPROCEDURALHISTORY[11]
[12]
14 In the spring of 2010, a John Doe proceeding (John Doe I) was
commenced for the purpose of
investigating the alleged misuse of public resources in the
Milwaukee County Executive's Office. This
investigation resulted in criminal charges being filed against
four individualsTim Russell, Kevin Kavanaugh,
KellyRindfleisch,andDarleneWinkinJanuary2012.[13]
15JohnDoeIalsotriggeredasecondJohnDoeproceeding(JohnDoeII),theinvestigationatissuehere.
On August 10, 2012, Milwaukee County Assistant District Attorney
David Robles filed a petition for the
commencementofJohnDoeIIintheMilwaukeeCountycircuitcourt.Thispetitionsoughtleavetoinvestigate
alleged campaign finance violations under Wis. Stat. Ch. 11, and
requested a secrecy order to cover the
investigationinanticipationthatdocumentswouldbesoughtfromthetargetedindividuals.Insupportofhis
request,Robles'petitionreferredtoanaffidavitbyInvestigatorRobertStelter.
16 Stelter's affidavit indicates that emails obtained in
response to a search warrant in John Doe I
suggested that there may have been coordination of fundraising
between campaign committees and other related,
independentgroups.ReserveJudgeNealNettesheim,theJohnDoeIjudge,authorizedtheuseoftheinformation
obtainedinJohnDoeIforthepurposeofrequestingthecommencementofJohnDoeII.
17 On August 23, 2012, the Chief Judge of the First Judicial
District, Jeffrey Kremers, assigned and
forwardedtheJohnDoepetitiontoReserveJudgeKluka.OnSeptember5,2012,usingaformtitled"Application
and Order for Specific Judicial Assignment," Director of State
Courts John Voelker (with thenChief Justice
Shirley Abrahamson's name directly above)[14]
assigned Reserve Judge Kluka to preside over the John Doe
proceedinginMilwaukeeCounty.Thatsameday,ReserveJudgeKlukaauthorizedthecommencementoftheJohnDoe
proceedingandalsograntedtherequestedsecrecyorder.
18 On September 6, 2012, Investigator Stelter filed an affidavit
in support of a request for search
warrantsandsubpoenas.Therequestcoveredawideswathofdesiredinformation,includingemails,conference
call records, and bank records, dating from 2009 to 2012. In
support of this request, Investigator Stelter
provideddetailsofnumerousemailsbetweenacandidatecommitteeandindividualsand/orgroups.
19OnDecember13,2012,InvestigatorStelterfiledanotheraffidavitinsupportofarequestforfurther
search warrants and subpoenas. This affidavit provided
additional details about the parties and how they
operatedincoordinationwitheachother.Thetheoryofthecase,asputforwardbythespecialprosecutor,is
twofold: (1) that the independent groups and the candidate
committee worked "hand in glove" such that the
independent groups became mere subcommittees of the candidate's
committee, thus triggering reporting and
disclosurerequirementsunderWis.Stat.11.10(4)and(2)thatthecoordinatedissueadvocacyamountedtoan
unlawfulinkindcontributiontothecandidatecommitteeunderWis.Admin.CodeGAB1.20.
20OnJanuary18,2013,MilwaukeeCountyDistrictAttorneyJohnChisholmmetwiththenAttorneyGeneral
J.B.VanHollentodiscusstheongoinginvestigation.DistrictAttorneyChisholmsoughttodeterminewhether,
giventhestatewidenatureandgravityoftheinvestigation,theDepartmentofJustice("DOJ")wishedtobecome
involved.OnMay31,2013,AttorneyGeneralVanHollensentDistrictAttorneyChisholmaletterdecliningDOJ
involvementintheinvestigation.AttorneyGeneralVanHollencited,amongotherthings,potentialconflictsof
interestandtheappearanceofimpropriety.
21InJuly2013,threemorepetitionstocommenceJohnDoeproceedingswerefiled:DistrictAttorneyJane
KohlweyfiledapetitioninColumbiaCountycircuitcourtonJuly22,2013DistrictAttorneyLarryNelsonfiled
apetitioninIowaCountycircuitcourtonJuly25,2013andDistrictAttorneyKurtKlombergfiledapetitionin
DodgeCountycircuitcourtonJuly26,2013.
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22 On August 7, 2013, using a form titled "Application and Order
for Specific Judicial Assignment,"
DirectorVoelker(withthenChiefJusticeShirleyAbrahamson'snamedirectlyabove)assignedReserveJudgeKluka
topresideovertheIowaCountyJohnDoeproceeding.OnAugust21,2013,ReserveJudgeKlukaenteredanorder
commencingtheJohnDoeproceedinginIowaCountyandalsoenteredasecrecyorder.
23AlsoonAugust7,2013,usingaformtitled"ApplicationandOrderforSpecificJudicialAssignment,"
DirectorVoelker(withthenChiefJusticeShirleyAbrahamson'snamedirectlyabove)assignedReserveJudgeKluka
topresideovertheDodgeCountyJohnDoeproceeding.OnAugust21,2013,ReserveJudgeKlukaenteredanorder
commencingtheDodgeCountyJohnDoeproceedingandalsoenteredasecrecyorder.
24 On August 14, 2013, using a form titled "Application and
Order for Specific Judicial Assignment,"
DirectorVoelker(withthenChiefJusticeShirleyAbrahamson'snamedirectlyabove)assignedReserveJudgeKluka
to preside over the Columbia County John Doe proceeding. On
August 21, 2013, Reserve Judge Kluka entered an
ordercommencingtheJohnDoeproceedingandalsoenteredasecrecyorder.
25OnAugust21,2013,DaneCountyDistrictAttorneyIsmaelOzannefiledapetitioninDaneCountycircuit
courttocommenceaJohnDoeproceeding.On August 21, 2013, using a
form titled "Application and Order for
Specific Judicial Assignment," Director Voelker (with thenChief
Justice Shirley Abrahamson's name directly
above)assignedReserveJudgeKlukatopresideovertheDaneCountyJohnDoeproceeding.OnAugust21,2013,
ReserveJudgeKlukaenteredanordercommencingtheDaneCountyJohnDoeproceedingandalsoenteredasecrecy
order.
26AlsoonAugust21,2013,theDistrictAttorneysfromallfivecountiessentajointlettertoReserve
JudgeKlukarequestingtheappointmentofaspecialprosecutortooverseetheentireinvestigation.TheDistrict
AttorneysencouragedReserveJudgeKlukatoappointaspecialprosecutoronherownmotionandintheexerciseof
herinherentauthority.Theirletterexpressedconcernsthatitwouldbeinefficientforfivedistrictattorneys
tohandleoneinvestigationandthattheremaybeaperceptionofbiasgiventheirpartisanaffiliations.The
letterrecommendedFrancisSchmitzfortheposition.
27OnAugust23,2013,ReserveJudgeKlukaenteredseparate,butidentical,ordersinallfiveJohnDoe
proceedings appointing Francis Schmitz as special prosecutor
with jurisdiction across the five counties.
Mirroring the District Attorneys' position on the matter,
Reserve Judge Kluka cited, as the basis of her
appointment,concernsofefficiencyandtheappearanceofimpropriety.ReserveJudgeKlukamadetheappointment
pursuanttoherpurported"authority"underStatev.Carlson,2002WIApp44,250Wis.2d562,641N.W.2d451,as
wellasherpurported"inherentauthority"underStatev.Cummings,199Wis.2d721,736,546N.W.2d406(1996).
Eachorderfixedthespecialprosecutor'srateofpayat$130perhourandstatedthatacopyshouldbesentto
theDepartmentofAdministration.
28OnOctober1,2013,ReserveJudgeKlukaauthorized29subpoenasducestecumto,amongothers,Unnamed
Movants Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8, based on an affidavit
submitted to her by Investigator Stelter. These
subpoenascompelledproductionofdocumentsevidencingtheconductofcoordinationamongthesubpoenaedparties
and a candidate committee, particularly the interaction between
Unnamed Movants Nos. 1 and 2. That same day
ReserveJudgeKlukaauthorizedsearchwarrantsforthehomesandofficesofUnnamedMovantsNos.6and7.The
searchwarrantswereexecutedatapproximately6:00a.m.onOctober3,2013,inpredawn,armed,paramilitary
styleraidsinwhichbrightfloodlightswereusedtoilluminatethetargets'homes.
29Thebreadthofthedocumentsgatheredpursuanttosubpoenasandseizedpursuanttosearchwarrantsis
amazing.Millionsofdocuments,bothindigitalandpapercopy,weresubpoenaedand/orseized.Deputiesseized
businesspapers,computerequipment,phones,andotherdevices,whiletheirtargetswererestrainedunderpolice
supervisionanddeniedtheabilitytocontacttheirattorneys.Thespecialprosecutorobtainedvirtuallyevery
document possessed by the Unnamed Movants relating to every
aspect of their lives, both personal and
professional,overafiveyearspan(from2009to2013).Suchdocumentsweresubpoenaedand/orseizedwithout
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regard to content or relevance to the alleged violations of Ch.
11. As part of this dragnet, the special
prosecutor also had seized wholly irrelevant information, such
as retirement income statements, personal
financialaccountinformation,personalletters,andfamilyphotos.
30MotionstoquashthesubpoenaswerefiledbyUnnamedMovantNo.1onOctober17,2013,andbyUnnamed
MovantsNos.2and3onOctober25,2013.OnOctober29,2013,beforerulingonthemotions,ReserveJudgeKluka
recused herself from the Milwaukee County proceeding, citing
only an unspecified "conflict." The Milwaukee
CountyproceedingwasreassignedbyChiefJudgeKremerstoReserveJudgeGregoryPetersononOctober29,2013.
31Thenextday,onOctober30,2013,ReserveJudgeKlukadisqualifiedherselffromtheremainingJohnDoe
proceedings. On November 1, 2013, Chief Judge Potter of the
Sixth Judicial District assigned Reserve Judge
Peterson to preside over the John Doe proceedings in Columbia
County and Dodge County. On November 1, 2013,
ChiefJudgeDuvalloftheSeventhJudicialDistrictassignedReserveJudgePetersontopresideovertheJohnDoe
proceeding in Iowa County. On November 4, 2013, Chief Judge
Daley of the Fifth Judicial District assigned
ReserveJudgePetersontopresideovertheJohnDoeproceedinginDaneCounty.Thereafter,onNovember4,2013,
Director Voelker (with thenChief Justice Shirley Abrahamson's
name directly above) assigned Reserve Judge
PetersontopresideovertheMilwaukeeCountyJohnDoeproceeding.OnNovember11,2013,DirectorVoelker(with
thenChiefJusticeShirleyAbrahamson'snamedirectlyabove)assignedReserveJudgePetersontopresideoverthe
John Doe proceedings in Iowa County and Dane County. On November
14, 2013, Director Volker (with thenChief
JusticeShirleyAbrahamson'snamedirectlyabove)assignedReserveJudgePetersontopresideovertheJohnDoe
proceedingsinColumbiaCountyandDodgeCounty.
32AlsoonNovember14,2013,UnnamedMovantsNos.2,6,and7filedwiththecourtofappealsapetition
forsupervisorywritsofmandamusandprohibitiondirectedatReserveJudgesKlukaandPeterson(ThreeUnnamed
Petitioners). The Unnamed Movants alleged procedural defects
involving the appointment of a reserve judge to
overseeamulticountyJohnDoeinvestigationandtheappointmentofthespecialprosecutor.TheUnnamedMovants
askedthecourtofappealstodeclaretheJohnDoeinvestigationvoidabinitio.
33 In an order dated November 22, 2013, the court of appeals
summarily dismissed what it deemed the
UnnamedMovants'"firstandsixthclaims,"namely,thatthereisnostatutoryauthoritytoappointorassigna
reserve judge to preside over a John Doe proceeding, and that
the John Doe judge circumvented the statutory
functionsoftheclerksofcourtinfivecountiesbyrequiringcertaindocumentsbesenttoapostofficebox.
Three Unnamed Petitioners, Nos. 2013AP2504W2508W, unpublished
order 67 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2013).
Regarding the first claim, the court of appeals reasoned that
there is no statute that limits the ability of
reservejudgestooverseeJohnDoeinvestigations.Id.Moreover,thecourtofappealsnotedthatthestatute
authorizing the appointment of reserve judges explicitly states
that reserve judges "shall perform the same
dutiesasotherjudges."Id.(citingWis.Stat.753.075).Thecourtofappealsorderedtherespondentsto
addresstheremainingclaimsconcerningthelegalityofamulticountyJohnDoeproceeding,thelegalityofa
special prosecutor handling a multicounty John Doe proceeding,
and the legality of the special prosecutor's
appointmentunderWis.Stat.978.045.Id.
34Whilethatcasewaspendingatthecourtofappeals,UnnamedMovantNo.6alsofiledapetitionin
DodgeCountycircuitcourtonDecember4,2013,forthereturnofthepropertytakenpursuanttotheOctober1
searchwarrant.OnDecember20,2013,UnnamedMovantNo.7filedasubstantiallysimilarpetitioninDaneCounty
circuitcourt.Afteraresponsebythespecialprosecutor,ReserveJudgePetersongrantedthemotionstoquash
thesubpoenasandthepetitionstoreturnpropertyonJanuary10,2014.ReserveJudgePetersonreasoned:
Iconcludethesubpoenasdonotshowprobablecausethatthemovingpartiescommittedanyviolationsofthecampaignfinancelaws.Iampersuadedthestatutesonlyprohibitcoordinationbycandidatesandindependentorganizationsforapoliticalpurpose,andpoliticalpurpose,withoneminorexceptionnotrelevanthere...requiresexpressadvocacy.Thereisnoevidenceofexpressadvocacy.
...
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Beforethereiscoordinationtheremustbepoliticalpurposeswithoutpoliticalpurposes,coordinationisnotacrime.
...
As relevant here, acts are for political purposes when they are
made to influence the recall orretention of a person holding
office. Wis. Stat. 11.01(16). If the statute stopped here,
thedefinitionofpoliticalpurposesmightwellbeunconstitutionallyvague.Buckleyv.Valeo,424U.S.1,77(1976).Butthedefinitioncontinues:actsforpoliticalpurposesinclude,butarenotlimitedto,making
a communication that expressly advocates the recall or retention of
a clearly
identifiedcandidate.Wis.Stat.11.01(16)(a).InGAB1.28,theGABattemptedtofleshoutotheractsthatwouldconstitutepoliticalpurposes,butbecauseofconstitutionalchallengesithasstateditwillnotenforcethatregulation.Sotheonlyclearlydefinedpoliticalpurposeisonethatrequiresexpressadvocacy.
Thestateisnotclaimingthatanyoftheindependentorganizationsexpresslyadvocated.Therefore,thesubpoenasfailtoshowprobablecausethatacrimewascommitted.
35AsforthesearchwarrantsexecutedonthehomesandofficesofUnnamedMovantsNos.6and7,Reserve
JudgePetersonreasoned:
The same legal conclusions should apply to all parties who have
raised challenges in this
case.Therefore,forthereasonsstatedaboveregardingthelimitationsinthescopeofthecampaignfinancelaws,Iconcludethatthewarrantslackprobablecause.
36Thespecialprosecutorrequestedastayoftheorder,whichwasgrantedonJanuary27,2014.Inhis
ordergrantingthestay,ReserveJudgePetersonalsoclarifiedthathewasincorrectinstatingthattheprobable
causestandardappliedtosubpoenas.Nevertheless,heconcludedthatasubpoenaisnot"validwhenbasedonan
invalidinterpretationofthelaw."Asaconditionofthestay,ReserveJudgePetersonorderedtheStatenotto
examineanyofthepropertyseizedpursuanttosearchwarrants.
37 On January 30, 2014, the court of appeals issued an opinion
and order in Three Unnamed Petitioners
addressingtheremainingissuesanddenyingthesupervisorywrit.RegardingthelegalityofamulticountyJohn
Doeproceeding,thecourtofappealsreasonedthattherewerefiveseparateproceedingsinfiveseparatecounties
and that it is not unusual for courts to hold joint proceedings
or to issue joint orders in nonconsolidated
cases that share a common factual basis, raise the same legal
issue, or involve overlapping parties. Three
UnnamedPetitioners,Nos.2013AP2504W2508W,unpublishedslipop.&order34(Wis.Ct.App.Jan.30,2014).
The court of appeals used the same reasoning to justify the
legality of a special prosecutor handling multi
countyJohnDoeproceedings.Id.at47.AsforthelegalityofthespecialprosecutorsappointmentunderWis.
Stat.978.045,thecourtofappealsdeterminedthatthespecialprosecutorwasappointedpursuanttoReserve
JudgeKluka's"authority"underCarlson,and"inherentauthority"underCummings,notunderWis.Stat.978.045,
thespecialprosecutorsstatute.Id.OnFebruary19,2014,theUnnamedMovantsfiledapetitionforreviewin
thiscourt,whichwegrantedonDecember16,2014.
38Meanwhile,onFebruary7,2014,UnnamedMovantsNos.6and7filedapetitionforleavetocommencean
originalactionintheWisconsinSupremeCourtunderArticleVII,Section3(2)oftheWisconsinConstitution[15]
(Two Unnamed Petitioners). The original action sought a
declaration confirming the ruling of Reserve Judge
PetersoninhisJanuary10,2014,order.ThespecialprosecutorfiledaresponsetothispetitiononFebruary
25,2014.WegrantedtheoriginalactiononDecember16,2014.
39On February 21, 2014, the special prosecutor filed a petition
for a supervisory writ and a writ of
mandamusinthecourtofappeals(Schmitzv.Peterson).Thespecialprosecutorsoughtthesupervisorywritin
ordertovacateReserveJudgePeterson'sJanuary10,2014,orderandtodirectReserveJudgePetersontoenforce
the subpoenas and search warrants. Unnamed Movants Nos. 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 filed responses to the
petitiononMarch31,2014.Shortlythereafter,theUnnamedMovantsbroughtapetitiontobypassthecourtof
appeals.WegrantedbypassonDecember16,2014.
40Finally,onNovember3,2014,UnnamedMovantsNos.6and7filedamotionwithReserveJudgePeterson
requestinganordertoshowcauseastowhytheJohnDoeproceedingshouldnotbeended.ReserveJudgePeterson
denied that motion but concluded that if appellate courts agreed
with his interpretation of Ch. 11, the
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"consequencewillnodoubtbetheendoftheJohnDoeinvestigation."
III.TWOUNNAMEDPETITIONERS
41WeturnfirsttoTwoUnnamedPetitioners,theoriginalactionfiledwiththeWisconsinSupremeCourt.
ThiscaserequiresustointerpretWisconsin'scampaignfinancelaw,Wis.Stat.Ch.11.Byitsverynature,this
task involves fundamental questions regarding the scope of the
government's ability to regulate political
speech.Toresolvethiscase,wemustengageinstatutoryinterpretationofthephrase"politicalpurposes,"
whichincludesallactivities"doneforthepurposeofinfluencing[an]election."Wis.Stat.11.01(16).We
conclude,consistentwiththeFirstAmendmentoftheUnitedStatesConstitutionandArticleI,Section3ofthe
Wisconsin Constitution, that the plain language of "political
purposes" in Wis. Stat. 11.01(16) is
unconstitutionallyoverbroadandvagueifitisnotgivenalimitingconstructionandappliedtoonlyexpress
advocacyanditsfunctionalequivalent.Thisconclusioninvalidatesthespecialprosecutor'stheoryofthecase
and ends the John Doe investigation. Therefore, we agree with
the Unnamed Movants and grant their requested
relief.
A.StandardofReview
42Statutoryinterpretationisaquestionoflaw,whichthiscourtreviewsdenovo.CovenantHealthcare
Sys.,Inc.v.CityofWauwatosa,2011WI80,21,336Wis.2d522,800N.W.2d906.Inthiscase,ourstatutory
interpretationimplicatestheconstitutionalityofspecificprovisionsinChapter11,whichisalsoaquestionof
lawwhichwereviewdenovo.Janssen,219Wis.2dat370.
43Statutesarepresumedtobeconstitutional,"andthepartyseekingtoovercomethepresumptionmust
provethestatuteunconstitutionalbeyondareasonabledoubt."Id.Whenthestatuteimplicatestheexerciseof
FirstAmendmentrights,however,"[t]heburdenshiftstotheproponentofthestatute."Id.at37071.Here,
theproponentisthespecialprosecutor.
B.TheFirstAmendmentandtheDoctrinesofVaguenessandOverbreadth
i.FirstAmendmentPrinciples
44InaddressingthescopeofWisconsin'scampaignfinancelawwearekeenlyawarethatthistaskbears
directly on the ability of all citizens in our State to engage
in the democratic process. The special
prosecutor's theories implicate one of the foundational
principles of our nation: the freedom of speech,
specifically,politicalspeech.WethereforebeginouranalysiswiththewordsoftheFirstAmendment:"Congress
shallmakenolaw...abridgingthefreedomofspeech."U.S.Const.amend.I.[16]
ArticleI,Section3ofthe
WisconsinConstitutionguaranteesthat:"Everypersonmayfreelyspeak,writeandpublishhissentimentsonall
subjects,beingresponsiblefortheabuseofthatright,andnolawsshallbepassedtorestrainorabridgethe
libertyofspeechorofthepress."
45WhiletheFirstAmendmentprotectsabroadrangeofspeechandconduct,"thereispracticallyuniversal
agreementthatamajorpurposeofthatAmendmentwastoprotectthefreediscussionofgovernmentalaffairs...
.ofcourseinclud(ing)discussionsofcandidates...."Buckley,424U.S.at14(quotingMillsv.Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). Indeed, "[t]he right of citizens to
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
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informationtoreachconsensusisapreconditiontoenlightenedselfgovernmentandanecessarymeanstoprotect
it."CitizensUnitedv.Fed.ElectionComm'n,558U.S.310,339(2010)."Inarepublic[suchasours]wherethe
people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make
informed choices among candidates for office is
essential, for the identities of those who are elected will
inevitably shape the course that we follow as a
nation."Buckley,424U.S.at1415.Thesevaluesreflectour"profoundnationalcommitmenttotheprinciple
thatdebateonpublicissuesshouldbeuninhibited,robust,andwideopen."N.Y.TimesCo.v.Sullivan,376U.S.
254,270(1964)(emphasisadded).
46Ourprotectionofthefreedomofpoliticalspeechreflectsourfirmbeliefthat"[d]iscussionofpublic
issuesanddebateonthequalificationsofcandidatesareintegraltotheoperationofthesystemofgovernment
establishedbyourConstitution."Buckley,424U.S.at14."Atthefounding,speechwasopen,comprehensive,
and vital to society's definition of itself there were no limits
on the sources of speech and knowledge."
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353. Therefore, "[t]he First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to []
political expression in order 'to assure (the) unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
politicalandsocialchangesdesiredbythepeople.'"Buckley,424U.S.at14(quotingRothv.UnitedStates,
354U.S.476,484(1957)).
47Accordingly,"theFirstAmendment'hasitsfullestandmosturgentapplicationpreciselytotheconduct
ofcampaignsforpoliticaloffice.'"McCutcheonv.Fed.ElectionComm'n,134S.Ct.1434,1441(2014)(quoting
MonitorPatriotCo.v.Roy,401U.S.265,272(1971)).Thereexists"norightmorebasicinourdemocracythan
the right to participate in electing our political leaders." Id.
at 144041. Political speech is thus a
fundamental right and is afforded the highest level of
protection. Indeed, freedom of speech, especially
politicalspeech,istherightmostfundamentaltoourdemocracy.Tothatend,wemustconductaparticularly"
[c]loseexaminationofthespecificityofthestatutorylimitation...where,ashere,thelegislationimposes
criminalpenaltiesinanareapermeatedbyFirstAmendmentinterests."Buckley,424U.S.at4041."TheFirst
Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a
campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic
marketingresearch,orseekdeclaratoryrulingsbeforediscussingthemostsalientpoliticalissuesofourday.
Prolixlawschillspeechforthesamereasonthatvaguelawschillspeech:People'ofcommonintelligencemust
necessarilyguessat[thelaw's]meaninganddifferastoitsapplication.'"CitizensUnited,558U.S.at324
(quotingConnallyv.Gen.Constr.Co.,269U.S.385,391(1926)).
48 However, there are certain, limited circumstances in which
the government may regulate and impose
burdens upon the exercise of free speech. In the campaign
finance context, these include disclosure and
reportingrequirements,aswellascontributionlimitstocandidates.[17]
Thejustificationforimposingsuch
restrictionsisto"prevent[]corruptionandtheappearanceofcorruption."WRTLII,551U.S.at478(quotations
omitted). The interest in preventing the corruption of public
officials, however, does not justify the
regulationofallpoliticalspeech.Rather,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasdrawnanimportant"distinction
betweendiscussionofissuesandcandidatesandadvocacyofelectionordefeatofcandidates."Buckley,424U.S.
at42.Thecompellinggovernmentalinterestthatjustifiestheregulationofexpressadvocacy(thepreventionof
quidproquo[18]
corruption)"'mightnotapplyto'"theregulationofissueadvocacy.WRTLII,551U.S.at471
(quotingMcConnellv.Fed.ElectionComm'n,540U.S.93,209n.88(2003)).Indeed,
"[s]pending large sums of
money in connection with elections, but not in connection with
an effort to control the exercise of an
officeholder'sofficialduties,doesnotgiverisetosuchquidproquocorruption."McCutcheon,134S.Ct.at
1450."Nordoesthepossibilitythatanindividualwhospendslargesumsmaygarner'influenceoveroraccess
to'electedofficialsorpoliticalparties."Id.at1451(quotingCitizensUnited,558U.S.at359).
49AkeyreasonthatissueadvocacyisaffordedgreaterprotectionundertheFirstAmendmentisthat"
[f]reedomofdiscussion,ifitwouldfulfillitshistoricfunctioninthisnation,mustembraceallissuesabout
whichinformationisneededorappropriatetoenablethemembersofsocietytocopewiththeexigenciesoftheir
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period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
"Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply
becausetheissuesmayalsobepertinentinanelection."WRTLII,551U.S.at474.
50Inordertogivethefullestprotectionpossibletotherighttotheexerciseofpoliticalspeech,"the
government'sauthoritytoregulateinthisareaextendsonlytomoneyraisedandspentforspeechthatisclearly
election related[, that is, express advocacy] ordinary political
speech about issues, policy, and public
officials[,thatis,issueadvocacy,]mustremainunencumbered."BarlandII,751F.3dat810(emphasisadded).
Thus, in order to avoid a chilling effect on otherwise protected
speech, "when the regulatory scheme reaches
beyond candidates, their campaign committees, and political
parties. . . . [the] government may
regulate...onlywithnarrowspecificity."Id.at811(quotationsomitted)."Inshort,[we]mustgivethe
benefitofanydoubttoprotectingratherthanstiflingspeech."WRTLII,551U.S.at469seealsoMcCutcheon,
134S.Ct.at1451(quotingWRTLII,551U.S.at457)("'[T]heFirstAmendmentrequires[courts]toerronthe
sideofprotectingpoliticalspeechratherthansuppressingit.'").
51Tothatend,"inthedomainofcampaignfinancelaw,theFirstAmendmentrequiresaheighteneddegree
ofregulatoryclarityandaclosefitbetweenthegovernment'smeansanditsend."BarlandII,751F.3dat808.
This"closefit"requirementisintendedtopreventthedangerouschillingeffectanunclearorimpreciselawhas
on protected speech. Id. at 835. To guard against inhibiting
protected political speech, courts use the
overbreadthandvaguenessdoctrines.Thesedoctrines"reflect[]theconclusionthatthepossibleharmtosociety
fromallowingunprotectedspeechtogounpunishedisoutweighedbythepossibilitythatprotectedspeechwillbe
muted."Janssen,219Wis.2dat372(citationomitted).
ii.OverbreadthandVagueness
52"Astatuteisoverbroadwhenitslanguage,givenitsnormalmeaning,issosweepingthatitssanctions
maybeappliedtoconstitutionallyprotectedconductwhichthestateisnotpermittedtoregulate."Id.at374
(citation omitted). The overbreadth doctrine "recognize[s] that
broadly written statutes substantially
inhibitingfreeexpressionshouldbeopentoattackevenbyapartywhoseownconductremainsunprotectedunder
theFirstAmendment."Statev.Stevenson,2000WI71,11,236Wis.2d86,613N.W.2d90."Thedangerinherent
inoverbroadstatutesisthatsuchstatutesprovide[thegovernmentwith]practicallyunbridledadministrative
and prosecutorial discretion that may result in select[ive]
prosecution based on certain views deemed
objectionablebylawenforcement."Id.,13.Thus,"[o]verbroadstatutesmayundesirablydissuadepersonsfrom
exercising their rights by 'chilling' their protected speech or
expression." Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 372
(citation omitted). In other words, the threat to free
expression created by overbroad statutes is that, by
potentiallysweepinginconstitutionallyprotectedactivity,individualsandgroupsmayselfcensoroutoffear
ofvindictiveorselectiveprosecution.
53Whenfacedwithanoverbroadstatute,courtshaveseveraloptions.
First,courtsmayapplyalimitingconstructiontorehabilitatethestatutewhensuchanarrowingandvalidating
construction is readily available. Second, courts may cure the
constitutional defect bysevering the unconstitutional provisions of
a statute and leaving the remainder of the legislationintact.
Finally, courts may determine that the statute is not amenable to
judicial limitation orseverance and invalidate the entire statute
upon a determination that it is unconstitutional on itsface.
Stevenson,236Wis.2d86,15(internalcitationsomitted).
54Relatedtotheoverbreadthdoctrineisthevaguenessdoctrine,[19]
which"requireslegislaturestoset
reasonablyclearguidelinesforlawenforcementofficialsandtriersoffactinordertoprevent'arbitraryand
discriminatoryenforcement.'"Statev.PrincessCinemaofMilwaukee,Inc.,96Wis.2d646,657,292N.W.2d807
(1980)(quotingSmithv.Goguen,415U.S.566,57273(1974)).Avaguestatute"isonewhichoperatestohinder
freespeechthroughtheuseoflanguagewhichissovagueastoallowtheinclusionofprotectedspeechinthe
prohibitionortoleavetheindividualwithnoclearguidanceastothenatureoftheactswhicharesubjectto
punishment."Id.at656."WhereFirstAmendmentrightsareinvolved,aneven'greaterdegreeofspecificity'is
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required." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77 (citations omitted). Thus,
when a criminal statute implicates First
Amendmentrights,thestatutorylanguagemusthavethe"utmostclarityandexactitude."Stevenson,236Wis.2d
86,30.Thus,thevaguenessdoctrineconcernsthe
imping[ement]uponthreefirstamendmentvalues:(1)itdoesnotprovideindividualswithfairwarningof
what is prohibited (2) lacking precise or articulated standards, it
allows for arbitrary ordiscriminatory enforcement and (3) it causes
citizens to 'forsake activity protected by the
FirstAmendmentforfearitmaybeprohibited.'
Statev.Thiel,183Wis.2d505,521n.9,515N.W.2d847(1994)(quotingM.S.NewsCo.v.Casado,721F.2d1281,
1290(10thCir.1983)).In other words, "[b]ecause First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive,
governmentmayregulatein[this]areaonlywithnarrowspecificity."BarlandII,751F.3dat811(quotations
omitted).
C.TheDefinitionof"PoliticalPurposes"inWis.Stat.11.01(16)isOverbroadandVagueUnlessLimitedto
ExpressAdvocacyandItsFunctionalEquivalent.
55 The special prosecutor alleges that the Unnamed Movants
engaged in illegally coordinated issue
advocacy.However,thebasisforhistheoryhasevolvedoverthecourseofthevariouslegalchallengestohis
investigation,andheappearsunabletodecidejusthowtheUnnamedMovantshavebrokenthelaw.[20]
56Today,thespecialprosecutorallegestwotheoriesofillegalcoordination:(1)thatthecoordination
betweentheUnnamedMovantsissoextensivethatthesupposedlyindependentgroupsbecamesubcommitteesforthe
candidate'scampaignunderWis.Stat.11.10(4)and(2)thatthecoordinatedissueadvocacyamountstoanin
kindcontributionunderWis.Admin.CodeGAB1.20.Thespecialprosecutor'stheories,ifadoptedaslaw,would
requireanindividualtosurrenderhispoliticalrightstothegovernmentandretaincampaignfinanceattorneys
beforediscussingsalientpoliticalissues.SeeCitizensUnited,558U.S.at324.Wefindnosupportforthe
special prosecutor's theories in Wis. Stat. Ch. 11. Chapter 11's
definition of "political purposes," which
underliesWisconsin'scampaignfinancelaw,isbothoverbroadandvagueandthusunconstitutionallychillsspeech
because people "'of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at [the law's] meaning and differ as to its
application.'"Id.(quotingConnally,269U.S.at391).
57 However, by limiting the definition of "political purposes"
to express advocacy and its functional
equivalent,weensurethatallissueadvocacywillremainunencumbered.Thislimitingconstruction[21]
allowsus
toprotectpoliticalspeech,avitalFirstAmendmentright,andallowsustoguardagainstthetheoriesofthe
special prosecutor and those who would rely on overbroad and
vague statutes to silence those with whom they
disagree.
i.TheDefinitionandScopeof"PoliticalPurposes"inWis.Stat.11.01(16)MustBeLimitedtoOnlyExpress
Advocacy.
58WebeginouranalysisbynotingthatWisconsin'scampaignfinancelaw"islabyrinthiananddifficultto
decipherwithoutabackgroundinthisareaofthelaw."BarlandII,751F.3dat808.Indeed,"[t]oalayreader
[Chapter 11] require[s] almost any group that wants to say
almost anything about a candidate or election to
registerasapoliticalcommittee."Id.at810(citingWis.RighttoLife,Inc.v.Paradise,138F.3d1183,1184
(7thCir.1998)).However, in analyzing the statutes, it becomes
readily apparent that the entire regulatory
schemedependsonbutafewkeyterms:"committee,""contribution,""disbursement,"and"politicalpurposes."
59 "Committee" is defined in Wis. Stat. 11.01(4) as "any person
other than an individual and any
combination of 2 or more persons, permanent or temporary, which
makes or accepts contributions or makes
disbursements,whetherornotengagedinactivitieswhichareexclusivelypolitical,exceptthata'committee'
does not include a political 'group' under this chapter." As one
can see from the statutory definition,
committee status under Wisconsin campaign finance law depends on
the definitions of "contributions" and
"disbursements."
60 "Contribution" has a very lengthy definition, but the
relevant portion is contained in Wis. Stat.
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11.01(6)(a)1,whichstatesthat"contribution"means
[a]gift,subscription,loan,advance,ordepositofmoneyoranythingofvalue,exceptaloanofmoneyby
a commercial lending institution made by the institution in
accordance with applicable laws andregulations in the ordinary
course of business, made for political purposes. In this
subdivision"anythingofvalue"meansathingofmerchantablevalue.
(emphasis added). The definition of "disbursement" largely
parallels the definition of "contribution," the
relevantportionofwhichstatesthata"disbursement"is
[a] purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or
gift of money or anything of
value,exceptaloanofmoneybyacommerciallendinginstitutionmadebytheinstitutioninaccordancewithapplicablelawsandregulationsintheordinarycourseofbusiness,madeforpoliticalpurposes.
Inthissubdivision,"anythingofvalue"meansathingofmerchantablevalue.
Wis. Stat. 11.01(7)(a)1 (emphasis added). It is apparent from
the emphasized language that whether or not
somethingisacontributionordisbursementdependsonthedefinitionof"politicalpurposes."
61"Politicalpurposes"isdefined,inrelevantpart,asanact
doneforthepurposeofinfluencingtheelectionornominationforelectionofanyindividualtostateorlocaloffice,forthepurposeofinfluencingtherecallfromorretentioninofficeofanindividualholding
a state or local office, for the purpose of payment of expenses
incurred as a result of
arecountatanelection,orforthepurposeofinfluencingaparticularvoteatareferendum.Inthecase
of a candidate, or a committee or group which is organized
primarily for the purpose
ofinfluencingtheelectionornominationforelectionofanyindividualtostateorlocaloffice,forthepurposeofinfluencingtherecallfromorretentioninofficeofanindividualholdingastateorlocaloffice,
or for the purpose of influencing a particular vote at a
referendum, all administrative
andoverheadexpensesforthemaintenanceofanofficeorstaffwhichareusedprincipallyforanysuchpurposearedeemedtobeforapoliticalpurpose.
(a)Actswhicharefor"politicalpurposes"includebutarenotlimitedto:
1.Themakingofacommunicationwhichexpresslyadvocatestheelection,defeat,recallorretentionofaclearlyidentifiedcandidateoraparticularvoteatareferendum.
Wis.Stat.11.01(16)(emphasisadded).
62 Thus, the lynchpin of Wisconsin's campaign finance law is
whether an act is done for "political
purposes."Chapter11regulates"disbursements"and"contributions,"andthephrase"politicalpurposes"isused
in the definition of each of those words. See Wis. Stat.
11.01(7) (defining "disbursement"), 11.01(6)
(defining"contribution").Ifanactisnotdonefor"politicalpurposes,"thenitisnotadisbursementora
contribution,anditthereforeisnotsubjecttoregulationunderCh.11.
63TheSeventhCircuitinBarlandIIheldthatthephrase"politicalpurposes,"asdefinedinWis.Stat.
11.01,isbothvagueandoverbroad.BarlandII,751F.3dat833.ThecourtreasonedthattheU.S.Supreme
CourtinBuckleyheldthatthephrase"influenceanelection,"whichalsoappearsinthedefinitionof"political
purposes,"isvagueandoverbroad.Id.at833("The[Buckley]Courtheldthatthiskindofbroadandimprecise
languageriskschillingissueadvocacy,whichmaynotberegulatedthesamereasoningapplieshere.").Further,
thecourtconcludedthephrase"includebutarenotlimitedto"rendersthedefinitionof"politicalpurposes"
vagueandoverbroadbecause"[t]he'notlimitedto'languageholdsthepotentialforregulatorymischief."Id.
seealsoElectionsBd.ofStateofWis.v.Wis.Mfrs.&Commerce,227Wis.2d650,677,597N.W.2d721
(1999)
(WMC)(concludingthattheexpressadvocacystandardunderWis.Stat.11.01(16)(a)1muststillbeconsistent
withBuckley,lestitbecomeatrapfortheinnocentandunwary.)
64Thespecialprosecutorhascompletelydisregardedtheseprinciples.ThelackofclarityinCh.11,
whichthespecialprosecutorreliesupon,leadsustotheunsettlingconclusionthatitislefttogovernment
bureaucrats and/or individual prosecutors to determine how much
coordination between campaign committees and
independentgroupsis"toomuch"coordination.Inessence,underhistheory,everycandidate,ineverycampaign
in which an issue advocacy group participates, would get their
own John Doe proceeding and their own special
prosecutortodeterminetheextentofanycoordination.Thisisnot,andcannot,bethelawinademocracy.
65Morefundamentally,however,thefactthatthesequestionsariseatallisproofthatthedefinitionof
"politicalpurposes""holdsthepotentialforregulatorymischief.Perhaps[theexpressadvocacylanguage]was
includedtoleaveroomforregulationofthe'functionalequivalent'ofexpressadvocacyasthattermwaslater
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explained in [WRTL II]. Beyond that, however, the language
contains persistent vagueness and overbreadth."
BarlandII,751F.3dat833.Infact,theGovernmentAccountabilityBoard("GAB")concededthispointinBarland
II and suggested a limiting construction to the Seventh Circuit
that would "confine the definitions [of
"political purposes"] to express advocacy and its functional
equivalent." Id. That is precisely the
constructiontheSeventhCircuitadopted,andweconcludethatsamelimitingconstructionshouldapplyhereas
well.
66Tobeclear,thereasonthatthedefinitionof"politicalpurposes"in11.01(16)isunconstitutional
is because the phrase "influencing [an] election" is so broad
that it sweeps in protected speech, as well as
speechthatcanbesubjecttoregulation."Influencing[an]election"obviouslyincludesexpressadvocacy,but
withoutalimitingconstructionitcouldjustaseasilyincludeissueadvocacyairedduringtheclosingdaysof
an election cycle. This is precisely the kind of overbroad
language that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected. "Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply
because the issues may also be pertinent in an
election."WRTLII,551U.S.at474(emphasisadded).Wemusthaveclearrulesthatprotectpoliticalspeech,
andwemustcontinuetorejecttheideathatsomeprotectedspeechmaybechilledorrestrictedsimplybecauseit
is"difficulttodistinguishfromunprotectedspeech."Id.at494(Scalia,J.,concurring)."[L]awstargeting
political speech are the principal object of the First Amendment
guarantee. The fact that the line between
electoraladvocacyandissueadvocacydissolvesinpracticeisanindictmentofthestatute,notajustification
ofit."Id.
67 We therefore hold that the definition of "political purposes"
in Wis. Stat. 11.01(16) is
unconstitutionallyoverbroadandvague.Inordertocurethisoverbreadthandvagueness,weadoptaconstruction
of 11.01(16) that limits the definition of "political purposes"
to include only express advocacy and its
functional equivalent, as those terms are defined in Buckley and
WRTL II. This construction is "readily
available"duetotheSeventhCircuit'sdecisioninBarlandII.SeeStevenson,236Wis.2d86,15BarlandII,
751F.3dat834(explainingthat"[t]he[WisconsinSupremeCourt]and[]AttorneyGeneralhaveacknowledgedthat
when Chapter 11 is applied beyond candidates, their committees,
and political parties, it must be narrowly
construed to comply with Buckley's expressadvocacy limitation
the administration of the state's campaign
finance system has generally reflected this understanding for
many decades.").[22]
Given that Chapter 11's
requirementsdependonwhetheranactisdonefor"politicalpurposes,"theeffectofthislimitingconstruction
places"issueadvocacy...beyondthereachof[Wisconsin's]regulatoryscheme."BarlandII,751F.3dat815.
ii.TheSpecialProsecutor'sTheoriesofCoordinationDependonCoordinatedIssueAdvocacy,WhichIsNot
RegulatedUnderChapter11.
68HavingreachedourconclusionaboutthescopeofconductregulatedbyChapter11,wenowturntothe
specialprosecutor'stheoriesofcoordinationandwhethertheallegedconductisregulatedunderWisconsinlaw.
[23] The special prosecutor has disregarded the vital principle
that in our nation and our state political
speech is a fundamental right and is afforded the highest level
of protection. The special prosecutor's
theories,ratherthan"assur[ing][the]unfetteredinterchangeofideasforthebringingaboutofpoliticaland
socialchangesdesiredbythepeople,"Roth,354U.S.at484,insteadwouldassurethatsuchpoliticalspeech
willbeinvestigatedwithparamilitarystylehomeinvasionsconductedinthepredawnhoursandthenprosecuted
andpunished.In short, the special prosecutor completely ignores
the command that, when seeking to regulate
issue advocacy groups, such regulation must be done with "narrow
specificity." Barland II, 751 F.3d at 811
(quotationsomitted).
69 The limiting construction that we apply makes clear that the
special prosecutor's theories are
unsupportableinlawgiventhatthetheoriesrelyonoverbroadandvaguestatutes.Bylimitingthedefinitionof
"political purposes" to express advocacy and its functional
equivalent, political speech continues to be
protectedasafundamentalFirstAmendmentright.
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70Thespecialprosecutor'sfirsttheoryofillegalcoordinationisthatostensiblyindependent,advocacy
groupsoperated"handinglove"withthecandidate'scommittee,whichmadetheindependentgroupssubcommittees
underWis.Stat.11.10(4).Therelevantpartofthisstatutestatesthat
[a]ny committee which is organized or acts with the cooperation
of or upon consultation with acandidate or agent or authorized
committee of a candidate, or which acts in concert with or at
therequest or suggestion of a candidate or agent or authorized
committee of a candidate is deemed
asubcommitteeofthecandidate'spersonalcampaigncommittee.
Wis. Stat. 11.10(4) (emphasis added). The special prosecutor
argues that coordinated issue advocacy is
prohibited under this provision because the statute itself only
requires cooperation between a candidate's
committeeandanothercommitteeandthatthestatutedoesnotrequirethatsuchcooperationbelimitedtoexpress
advocacy.
71Thefirstflawinthespecialprosecutor'stheoryisthatitislefttothewhimofeachregulatory
bureaucratand/orprosecutortosubjectivelydeterminehowmuchcoordinationis"toomuch."Indeed,thespecial
prosecutor,becausehereliesonvagueandoverbroadstatutes,willbetheonlyonetoknowhowmuchcoordination
is"toomuch."Thiscannotbesuchaninterpretationof11.10(4)isunconstitutionallyoverbroadandvague
undertheFirstAmendment.SeePrincessCinema,96Wis.2dat657(citationsomitted)("Thevoidforvagueness
doctrine '. . . incorporates the notions of fair notice or
warning. . . . (i)t requires legislatures to set
reasonablyclearguidelinesforlawenforcementofficialsandtriersoffactinordertoprevent"arbitraryand
discriminatoryenforcement."'").
72However,thereisanother,moreobviousflawinthespecialprosecutor'stheory.Wisconsin
Stat.
11.10(4)referstoa"committee"thatcoordinateswithacandidate'scommitteeandinordertobea"committee,"
anentitymust"make[]oraccept[]contributionsormake[]disbursements."Inordertocomewithinthepurview
of regulated acts both "contributions" and "disbursements" must
be "made for political purposes." Wis. Stat.
11.01(6)(a)1 11.01(7)(a)1. Applying the necessary limiting
construction to the phrase "for political
purposes,"weconcludethatinordertomeetthestatutorydefinitionof"committee,"acommitteemustengagein
express advocacy and its functional equivalent. This conclusion
is fatal to the special prosecutor's
subcommitteetheorybecausehedoesnotallegethattheUnnamedMovantsengagedinexpressadvocacy.Putsimply,
because the Unnamed Movants did not engage in express advocacy,
they could not be considered a "committee"
subjecttoChapter11'sregulation.
73Thespecialprosecutor'ssecondtheoryofillegalcoordinationisthatthecoordinatedissueadvocacy
shouldhavebeenreportedas"inkindcontributions"bythecandidate'scommittee.This"inkindcontribution"
theoryrestsontheassumptionthatanyissueadvocacyengagedinbytheUnnamedMovantswasdoneforthebenefit
ofthecandidateandthereforeshouldhavebeenreported.Onceagain,thespecialprosecutor'stheoryfails.
74An"inkindcontribution"isdefinedintheGAB'sregulationsas"adisbursementbyacontributorto
procure a thing of value or service for the benefit of a
registrant who authorized the disbursement." GAB
1.20(1)(e)(emphasisadded).By its plain language, the definition
of an inkind contribution depends on the
makingofa"disbursement."Asaresultofthelimitingconstructionof"politicalpurposes,"therecanbeno
"disbursement" under Chapter 11, or the corresponding
regulations, without express advocacy or its functional
equivalent. Even assuming that the special prosecutor is correct
and the Unnamed Movants engaged in issue
advocacyatthespecificrequestofthecandidateorthecandidate'scommittee,thoseactionsdonotgiveriseto
areportable"inkindcontribution"becauseunderCh.11issueadvocacycannotbea"disbursement."
75Insum,weholdthat,consistentwiththeFirstAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitutionandArticle
I,Section3oftheWisconsinConstitution,thedefinitionof"politicalpurposes"inWis.Stat.11.01(16)is
unconstitutionallyoverbroadandvaguebecauseitslanguage"issosweepingthatitssanctionsmaybeappliedto
constitutionallyprotectedconductwhichthestateisnotpermittedtoregulate."Janssen,219Wis.2dat374.
However,thereisareadilyavailablelimitingconstructionthatwillpreventthechillingofotherwiseprotected
speech,andweholdthat"politicalpurposes"islimitedtoexpressadvocacyanditsfunctionalequivalentas
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thosetermsaredefinedinBuckleyandWRTLII.Withthislimitingconstructioninplace,Chapter11doesnot
regulate the alleged conduct of the Unnamed Movants. The special
prosecutor has not alleged any express
advocacy, and issue advocacy, whether coordinated or not, is
"beyond the reach of the regulatory scheme."
BarlandII,751F.3dat815.Accordingly,wegrantthereliefrequestedbytheUnnamedMovants.
76Tobeclear,thisconclusionendstheJohnDoeinvestigationbecausethespecialprosecutor'slegal
theoryisunsupportedineitherreasonorlaw.Consequently,theinvestigationisclosed.Consistentwithour
decisionandtheorderenteredbyReserveJudgePeterson,weorderthatthespecialprosecutorandthedistrict
attorneys involved in this investigation must cease all
activities related to the investigation, return all
propertyseizedintheinvestigationfromanyindividualororganization,andpermanentlydestroyallcopiesof
informationandothermaterialsobtainedthroughtheinvestigation.AllUnnamedMovantsarerelievedofanyduty
tocooperatefurtherwiththeinvestigation.
IV.SCHMITZV.PETERSON
77Weturnnowtothesecondcasepresentedforourreview,Schmitzv.Peterson.Thiscaseisbeforeus
onpetitionstobypassthecourtofappealsfiledbytheUnnamedMovants.Inthiscase,thespecialprosecutor
seeksasupervisorywritinordertoreverseReserveJudgePeterson'sdecisiontoquashthesubpoenasandsearch
warrantsissuedbyReserveJudgeKluka.Thespecificissuepresentediswhethertheevidencegatheredinthe
JohnDoeproceedingsprovideareasonablebeliefthatWisconsin'scampaignfinancelawwasviolatedbyacampaign
committee'scoordinationwithindependentadvocacyorganizations.
78WeholdthatthespecialprosecutorhasfailedtoprovethatReserveJudgePetersonviolatedaplain
legaldutywhenhequashedthesubpoenasandsearchwarrantsandorderedthereturnofallpropertyseizedbythe
special prosecutor. In quashing the subpoenas and search
warrants, Reserve Judge Peterson exercised his
discretion under the John Doe statute, Wis. Stat. 968.26, to
determine the extent of the investigation.
Becausethepurposeofasupervisorywritdoesnotincludereviewofajudge'sdiscretionaryacts,Kalal,
271
Wis.2d633,24,thesupervisorywritsoughtbythespecialprosecutorisdenied,andReserveJudgePeterson's
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orderisaffirmed.
A.StandardofReview
79ThedecisionsofJohnDoejudges"arenotsubjecttodirectappeal"tothecourtofappeals"becausean
orderissuedbyaJohnDoejudgeisnotanorderofa'circuitcourt'ora'courtofrecord.'"InreJohnDoe
Proceeding,2003WI30,23,41,260Wis.2d653,660N.W.2d260.Nonetheless,apartymayseekreviewofa
John Doe judge's actions "pursuant to a petition for supervisory
writ." Id., 41 see also Wis. Stat.
809.51(1).
80 It is well settled that "[a] writ of supervision is not a
substitute for an appeal." Kalal, 271
Wis.2d633,17(quotationsomitted).Inordertoprevailonasupervisorywrit,thepetitionermustprovethe
following:"(1)anappealisaninadequateremedy(2)gravehardshiporirreparableharmwillresult(3)the
dutyofthetrialcourtisplainanditmusthaveactedorintendstoactinviolationofthatdutyand(4)the
request for relief is made promptly and speedily." Id. (quoting
Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 9697, 589
N.W.2d 21 (1999)) (emphasis added). "A plain duty 'must be clear
and unequivocal and, under the facts, the
responsibility to act must be imperative.'" Id., 22 (quoting
State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42
Wis.2d368,37778,166N.W.2d255(1969)).
81"Asupervisorywrit'isconsideredanextraordinaryanddrasticremedythatistobeissuedonlyupon
somegrievousexigency.'"Id.,17(citationomitted).Theobligationofajudgetocorrectlyfindfactsand
applythelawisnotthetypeofplainlegaldutycontemplatedbythesupervisorywritprocedure,"asitwould
extendsupervisoryjurisdictiontoavirtuallyunlimitedrangeofdecisionsinvolvingthefindingoffactsand
applicationoflaw."Id.,24.Instead,
[t]heobligationofjudgestocorrectlyapplythelawisgeneralandimplicitintheentirestructureof
our legal system. The supervisory writ, however, serves a narrow
function: to provide for thedirect control of lower courts, judges,
and other judicial officers who fail to fulfill
nondiscretionaryduties,causingharmthatcannotberemediedthroughtheappellatereviewprocess.Toadopt
[a contrary] interpretation of the plain duty requirement in
supervisory writ procedure
wouldtransformthewritintoanallpurposealternativetotheappellatereviewprocess.
Id.(emphasisadded)(citationsomitted).
B.NatureofJohnDoeProceedings
82BeforeanalyzingReserveJudgePeterson'sdecisiontoquashthesubpoenasandsearchwarrants,itis
necessaryforustoprovidebackgroundregardingtheproperconductofJohnDoeproceedings,whichhavebeenin
useinWisconsinsinceitsdaysasaterritory.InreDoe,317Wis.2d364,13.Thisdiscussionisnecessary
toeducatethepubliconthenatureofthisimportantinvestigatorytool,andalsotoprovideguidancetothe
lowercourtsontheproperconductofJohnDoeproceedings.
83Wisconsin'sJohnDoeproceeding,codifiedinWis.Stat.968.26,servestwoimportantpurposes.State
exrel.Reimannv.CircuitCourtforDaneCnty.,214Wis.2d605,621,571N.W.2d385(1997)."First,andmost
obvious,aJohnDoeproceedingisintendedasaninvestigatorytoolusedtoascertainwhetheracrimehasbeen
committed and if so, by whom. Second, the John Doe proceeding is
designed to protect innocent citizens from
frivolousandgroundlessprosecutions."Id.(citationsomitted).Inordertofulfillthedualpurposesofthe
JohnDoestatute,aJohnDoejudge
serves an essentially judicial function. The judge considers the
testimony presented. It is
theresponsibilityoftheJohnDoejudgetoutilizehisorhertraininginconstitutionalandcriminallawand
in courtroom procedure in determining the need to subpoena
witnesses requested by the
districtattorney,inpresidingattheexaminationofwitnesses,andindeterminingprobablecause.Itisthejudge'sresponsibilitytoensureproceduralfairness.
Statev.Washington,83Wis.2d808,823,266N.W.2d597(1978)(footnoteomitted).
84 "Wisconsin Stat. 968.26 outlines a fourstep process for John
Doe proceedings." In re Doe, 317
Wis. 2d 364, 14. "First, the judge must determine whether a
complainant has alleged 'objective, factual
assertionssufficienttosupportareasonablebeliefthatacrimehasbeencommitted.'"Id.(citationomitted).
Second,ifthecomplainantmeetsthisburden,"thejudgemustproceedwithahearingatwhich'thejudgeshall
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examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses produced by
him or her.'" Id., 15 (quoting Wis. Stat.
968.26(200708)).Third,whenthishearingisover,"ajudgemustdeterminewhetherprobablecauseexistsas
to each essential element of the alleged crime." Id., 16.
"Finally, if the judge determines that probable
causeispresentthatis,thatacrimeprobablyhasbeencommittedandwhotheperpetratoroftheallegedcrime
is,thejudgemayorderthatacriminalcomplaintbereducedtowriting...."Id.,17.Thisprocessgivesa
JohnDoejudge"broaddiscretiontodecidewhethertofileacriminalcomplaint,evenuponafindingofprobable
cause."Id.
85InordertocommenceaJohnDoeproceeding,thecomplainant,whetheritbethedistrictattorneyor
anyone else, must demonstrate to the John Doe judge "that he has
reason to believe that a crime has been
committedwithinthejurisdiction."Statev.Doe,78Wis.2d161,165,254N.W.2d210(1977).
If "the judge
findsthatthecomplainanthasfailedtoestablish'reasontobelieve[]'[thatacrimehasbeencommitted,]that
judgemaydenytheJohnDoepetitionwithoutconductinganexamination."Reimann,214Wis.2dat625.Thus,the
JohnDoejudgemustactasagatekeeperandscreenout"petitionsthatarespurious,frivolous,orgroundless."
Id. at 624. "In determining whether the petition is worthy of
further treatment, a circuit court judge
[presiding over a John Doe proceeding] must act as a neutral and
detached magistrate." Id. at 625 (emphasis
added).
86Therefore,fromtheearlieststagesoftheproceeding,totheconclusionoftheinvestigation,"[t]he
proceedingsoftheJohnDoeareconstantlyunderthescrutinyofajudge."Doe,78Wis.2dat165.TheJohnDoe
judgedoesnotactas"chiefinvestigator"orasamerearmoftheprosecutor.Washington,83Wis.2dat823.
Rather, the John Doe judge serves as a check on the prosecutor
and on the complainant to ensure that the
subject(s)oftheinvestigationreceive(s)dueprocessoflaw.SeeDoe,78Wis.2dat16465.
87Inthisway,Wisconsin'sJohnDoeproceedingisverydifferentthanagrandjury,andwhenconducted
appropriately,providesmuchgreaterprotectionstothetargetofaninvestigation.Id.at165.Thisisduein
nosmallparttotheroleplayedbytheJohnDoejudge,whichistoensurethattheinvestigationstaysfocused
ontheconductallegedinthepetitiontocommencetheJohnDoeproceeding.Washington,83Wis.2dat84142.
Further,
[a]nyonefamiliarwiththefunctionsofthegrandjuryorwhohasdealtwithitknowsthehazardsofarunawaygrandjury,whichcangobeyondtherestraintsoftheprosecutor,theexecutive,orofthejudiciary.SuchhazardsdonotexistintheWisconsinJohnDoe.WhileJohnDoeproceedingscanbeabused,
the document produced by a John Doe does not ipso facto force the
defendant to trial. Thecomplaint which emanates from it is issued
under the aegis of a judge but nevertheless mustsubsequently stand
the scrutiny of an open court inspection in an adversary proceeding
at
thepreliminaryexaminationasaprerequisitetothefilingofaninformation,arraignment,andtrial.
Doe,78Wis.2dat17071.Thus,"[a]JohnDoeproceeding...servesbothasaninquestintothediscoveryof
crimeandasascreentoprevent'recklessandilladvised'prosecutions."Reimann,214Wis.2dat621(citation
omitted).
88ThetextoftheJohnDoestatutegivestheJohnDoejudgebroadpowers.Withinhisdiscretion,the
JohnDoejudgeisabletodeterminetheextentoftheinvestigationandwhethertheinvestigationisconductedin
secret.Wis.Stat.968.26(3).[24]
WehavelongrecognizedtheneedforsecrecyinJohnDoeproceedingsand
haveidentifiedseveralreasonsthatjustifysuchsecrecy.Cummings,199Wis.2dat736.
These include: (1) keeping knowledge from an unarrested
defendant which could encourage escape (2)preventing the defendant
from collecting perjured testimony for the trial (3) preventing
thoseinterested in thwarting the inquiry from tampering with
prosecutive testimony or secreting evidence(4) rendering witnesses
more free in their disclosures and (5) preventing testimony which
may bemistakenoruntrueorirrelevantfrombecomingpublic.
Id.ThesereasonsillustratehowimportantaJohnDoeproceedingcanbeasaninvestigativetool.Thesecrecy
ordersavailabletoaJohnDoeproceedingservetoprotecttheintegrityoftheinvestigation.[25]
Suchorders
help encourage witnesses who may be reluctant or fearful to
testify by keeping their testimony secret. The
secrecy of a John Doe investigation also protects innocent
targets of the investigation by preventing the
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disclosureof"testimonywhichmaybemistakenoruntrue."Id.
89Consistentwiththisbroadauthority,"[t]heJohnDoejudgeshouldactwithaviewtowardissuinga
complaintordeterminingthatnocrimehasoccurred."Washington,83Wis.2dat823.Accordingly,thescopeof
anyJohnDoeinvestigation"isessentiallylimitedtothesubjectmatterofthecomplaintuponwhichtheJohnDoe
iscommenced."Id.at822seealsoInreDoe,317Wis.2d364,23."TheJohnDoejudgehasnoauthorityto
ferretoutcrimewhereverheorshethinksitmightexist."Washington,83Wis.2dat
822 (emphasis added).
This final limitation is crucial to the fair administration of a
John Doe proceeding. Without it, John Doe
proceedingscouldeasilydevolveintojudiciallysanctionedgeneralwarrants.
90ThepurposeoftheFourthAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitution[26]
andofArticleI,Section11
oftheWisconsinConstitution[27]
"wastoabolishsearchesbygeneralwarrants,whichauthorizedsearchesinany
placeorforanything."Stateexrel.CityofMilwaukeev.Newman,96Wis.258,267,71N.W.438(1897).Such
general warrants, also known as Writs of Assistance, "were used
in the American colonies to search wherever
governmentofficialschosewithnearlyabsoluteandunlimiteddiscretion."Statev.Tye,2001WI124,8,248
Wis.2d530,636N.W.2d473."Theseearlywarrantslackedspecificityandallowedgovernmentofficersinthe
late eighteenth century to enter homes, shops, and other places,
and in the event the officers encountered
resistance, they could break down doors and forcibly search
closed trunks and chests." In re John Doe
Proceeding, 2004 WI 65, 36, 272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792. To
combat such unchecked power, the Fourth
Amendment requires reasonable searches and mandates that
warrants "particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched."U.S.Const.amend.IV.
91 Reasonableness and particularity are not just requirements of
search warrants, however. Subpoenas
issued by courts, and by extension John Doe judges, must also
satisfy these requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.InreJohnDoeProceeding,272Wis.2d208,38.AJohnDoeproceeding,withitsbroadinvestigatory
powers,mustneverbeallowedtobecomeafishingexpedition.
92Itisdifficult,ifnotimpossible,tooverstatetheimportanceoftheroleoftheJohnDoejudge.If
hedoesnotconducttheinvestigationfairly,asaneutralanddetachedmagistrate,theriskofharmtoinnocent
targets of the investigationand we remain mindful that all such
targets are presumed innocentis too great.
ThroughtheuseofaJohnDoeproceeding,"lawenforcementofficersareabletoobtainthebenefitofpowersnot
otherwiseavailabletothem,i.e.,thepowertosubpoenawitnesses,totaketestimonyunderoath,andtocompel
thetestimonyofareluctantwitness."Washington,83Wis.2dat82223.Suchpowers,ifnotwieldedwithcare
and skill may serve to transform a John Doe proceeding into an
implement of harassment and persecution by a
vengefulorunethicalprosecutor.Thus,JohnDoejudgesmustbemindfulofthisdangerandzealouslyguardthe
rightsofallcitizensagainstoverreach.
93TheforegoingdiscussionemphasizesthatJohnDoeproceedingsareanecessaryinvestigativetool"to
'ascertainwhether[a]crimehasbeencommittedandbywhom.'"Cummings,199Wis.2dat736(quotingWolkev.
Fleming,24Wis.2d606,613,129N.W.2d841(1964)).JohnDoeproceedingshavebeenutilizedinWisconsinsince
itwasaterritoryandhavenodoubtservedourstatewell.ButthesimplefactthattheJohnDoeproceedinghas
alongandnearconstantuseshouldnotblindustothepotentialforabuse.Wemustbemindfulofthepurpose
oftheJohnDoeproceedingandwhyitwasoriginallyinstituted.Thispurposewasaptlyexplainedbythiscourt
morethan125yearsago:
Whenthisstatutewasfirstenactedthecommonlawpracticewasforthemagistratetoissuethewarrantonacomplaintofmeresuspicion,andhewasprotectedindoingso.Thiswasfoundtobeaveryunsafepractice.Manyarrestsweremadeongroundlesssuspicion,whentheaccusedwereinnocentofthecrimeandtherewasnotestimonywhateveragainstthem.Thelawdelightsasmuchintheprotectionoftheinnocentasinthepunishmentoftheguilty.Thisstatutewasmadetoprotectcitizensfromarrestandimprisonmentonfrivolousandgroundlesssuspicion....'Ourstatuteisframedsoastoexcludeinagreatmeasuretheabusestowhichsuchapracticemightlead,andundoubtedlywasdesignedtothrowthedutyofjudging,inthisrespect,entirelyuponthemagistrate.Itshouldnotregardmereallegationsofsuspicion,butthegroundsofthesuspicionthefactsandcircumstancesmustbelaidbeforehim,and
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theseshouldbesufficienttomakeitappearthatacrimehasbeenactuallycommitted,andthatthereisprobablecauseforchargingtheindividualcomplainedoftherewith.'
Statev.Keyes,75Wis.288,29495,44N.W.13(1889)(citationsomitted).
94Insum,Wis.Stat.968.26grantsJohnDoejudgesbroadauthoritytoconductaninvestigationinto
allegedcrimes.AJohnDoejudgeisalsogiven"thosepowersnecessary"tocarryoutthisduty.Cummings,199
Wis.2dat736.Nevertheless,"[a]stoallaspectsoftheconductofthejudicialfunction,the[JohnDoe]judge
is the governor of the proceedings, and as such is responsible
for maintaining the good order, dignity, and
insofarasitiscompatiblewiththeadministrationofjustice,efficiencyofthoseproceedings."InreDoe,317
Wis.2d364,22.ThisdutyapplieswithequalforceinallJohnDoeproceedings,regardlessofthetarget's
stationinlife,orthecrimealleged,beitdrugtraffickingintheinnercity,malfeasanceinthecorporate
boardroom,orcorruptioninthehallsofgovernment.
C.ReserveJudgePetersonDidNotViolateaPlainLegalDutyWhenHeQuashedtheSubpoenasandSearchWarrants
IssuedinThisCase.
95Asisclearfromtheabovediscussion,JohnDoejudgesaregivenenormousdiscretiontocontrolthe
scopeandconductofaJohnDoeproceeding.Withthisimportantpointinmind,wenowturntothespecificissue
beforeus:whetherReserveJudgePetersonviolatedaplainlegaldutywhenhequashedthesubpoenasandsearch
warrantsandorderedthereturnofallseizedproperty.Hedidnot.
96"Aplainduty'mustbeclearandunequivocaland,underthefacts,theresponsibilitytoactmustbe
imperative.'"Kalal,271Wis.2d633,22(quotingKurkierewicz,42Wis.2dat37778).Althoughasupervisory
writisthepropervehicleforthespecialprosecutortoseekreviewofReserveJudgePeterson'sdecision,the
writprocedureservesaverynarrowfunctionwhichisdistinctfromthenormalappellateprocess.Id.,24.The
purposeofasupervisorywritis"toprovideforthedirectcontroloflowercourts,judges,andotherjudicial
officerswhofailtofulfillnondiscretionaryduties,causingharmthatcannotberemediedthroughtheappellate
reviewprocess."Id.(emphasisadded).
97 Here, the special prosecutor argues that Reserve Judge
Peterson failed to comply with his duty to
correctly apply the law and erroneously concluded that Wisconsin
campaign finance law does not regulate the
Unnamed Movants' alleged conduct. The special prosecutor
essentially argues that Reserve Judge Peterson
misapplied the law and prematurely ended the John Doe
investigation. This argument misses the point of the
supervisorywritprocedureandasksustoadoptastandardofreviewthatweexplicitlyrejectedinKalal.See
id.,2324("Inessence,theKalalsarguethatthejudge...hasaplaindutytocorrectlyfindfactsand
applythelaw.Wecannotacceptthisproposition,asitwouldextendsupervisoryjurisdictiontoavirtually
unlimitedrangeofdecisionsinvolvingthefindingoffactsandapplicationoflaw.").AswasthecaseinKalal,
ifweweretoadoptthespecialprosecutor'sunderstandingofaplainlegalduty,we"wouldtransformthewrit
intoanallpurposealternativetotheappellatereviewprocess."Id.,24.Thiswewillnotdo.
98A John Doe judge is given the discretion to determine the
extent of the investigation. Wis. Stat.
968.26(3).Indoingso,heorshe"shouldactwithaviewtowardissuingacomplaintordeterminingthatno
crimehasoccurred."Washington,83Wis.2dat823.Inhisdecisiontoquashthesubpoenasandsearchwarrants,
ReserveJudgePetersonconcludedthatthesubpoenasandsearchwarrantsdonotprovideareasonablebeliefthat
the Unnamed Movants "committed any violations of the campaign
finance laws." Reserve Judge Peterson further
concludedthat"[t]heStateisnotclaimingthatanyoftheindependentorganizationsexpresslyadvocated.[28]
Therefore the subpoenas[29]
fail to show probable cause that a crime was committed." In a
subsequent order
grantingastayofhisdecisiontoquash,ReserveJudgePetersonclarifiedthat,althoughhemistakenlyphrased
hisdecisioninthecontextofwhetherthesubpoenasshowedprobablecause,thesubpoenasandsearchwarrants
were premised "on an invalid interpretation of the law. That . .
. was the underlying problem with the
subpoenas."[30]
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99ReserveJudgePeterson'sdecisionisconsistentwithhisdiscretiontodeterminetheextentoftheJohn
Doeinvestigation.Inaddition,"[i]tiswithinthediscretionofthetrialcourttoquashasubpoena."State
v.Horn,126Wis.2d447,456,377N.W.2d176(Ct.App.1985),aff'd,139Wis.2d473,407N.W.2d854(1987).
Because supervisory writs are not appropriate vehicles to review
a judge's discretionary acts, see Kalal, 271
Wis.2d633,24,thespecialprosecutorhasfailedtoshowthatReserveJudgePetersonviolatedaplainlegal
duty by quashing the subpoenas and search warrants. Therefore,
the supervisory writ sought by the special
prosecutorisdenied,andReserveJudgePeterson'sorderisaffirmed.[31]
V.THREEUNNAMEDPETITIONERS
100Finally,weturntoThreeUnnamedPetitioners,inwhichtheUnnamedMovantsappealanopinionandorder
of the court of appeals denying their petition for a supervisory
writ. This case requires us to determine
whethereitherReserveJudgeKlukaorPetersonviolatedaplainlegaldutyby:(1)acceptinganappointmentasa
reservejudge(2)conveningamulticountyJohnDoeproceedingor(3)appointingaspecialprosecutor.[32]
101WeaffirmthedecisionofthecourtofappealsanddenytheUnnamedMovants'petitionforasupervisory
writ. We hold that the Unnamed Movants have not met the burden
of proof required for a supervisory writ.
Specifically,theyhavenotestablishedthateitherReserveJudgeKlukaorPetersonviolatedaplainlegalduty
by:(1)acceptinganappointmentasareservejudge(2)conveningamulticountyJohnDoeproceedingor(3)
appointingaspecialprosecutor."Theobligationofjudgestocorrectlyapplythelawisgeneralandimplicitin
theentirestructureofourlegalsystem."Kalal,271Wis.2d633,24.TheUnnamedMovants'argumentdoesnot
fitthepurposeofasupervisorywrit,whichrequiresa"clearandunequivocal"dutytoactonthepartofthe
judge.Id.,22.IfweweretoadopttheUnnamedMovants'argument,we"wouldtransformthewritintoanall
purposealternativetotheappellatereviewprocess."Id.,24.BecausetheUnnamedMovantshavenotidentified
aviolationofaplainlegalduty,theirpetitionforasupervisorywritisdenied.
A.StandardofReview
102 "[T]he authority of both judges and prosecutors in a John
Doe proceeding[] . . . are questions of
statutory interpretation which this court reviews de novo
without deference to the circuit court or court of
appeals."Cummings,199Wis.2dat733.Thus,"[w]hetheraJohnDoejudgehasexceededhisorherpowersisa
question of law that this court determines independently." State
ex rel. Individual Subpoenaed to Appear at
WaukeshaCnty.v.Davis,2005WI70,17,281Wis.2d431,697N.W.2d803(citingCummings,199Wis.2dat733).
103Forasupervisorywrittoissue,thepetitionerforthewritmustestablishthat:"(1)anappealisan
inadequateremedy(2)gravehardshiporirreparableharmwillresult(3)thedutyofthetrialcourtisplain
and it must have acted or intends to act in violation of that
duty and (4) the request for relief is made
promptlyandspeedily."Kalal,271Wis.2d633,17(emphasisadded).
104A"'writofsupervisionisnotasubstituteforanappeal.'"Id.(citationcommitted)."Asupervisory
writ'isconsideredanextraordinaryanddrasticremedythatistobeissuedonlyuponsomegrievousexigency.'"
Id.(citationomitted).
105Althoughacourtexercisesitsdiscretionindecidingwhetherornottoissueawrit,"[t]heexercise
of that discretion often involves . . . resolving questions of
law in order to determine whether the circuit
court's duty is plain." State ex rel. Kenneth S. v. Circuit
Court for Dane Cnty., 2008 WI App 120, 9, 313
Wis. 2d 508, 756 N.W.2d 573. "A plain duty 'must be clear and
unequivocal and, under the facts, the
responsibilitytoactmustbeimperative.'"Kalal,271Wis.2d633,22(citationomitted).Theobligationofa
judge to correctly find facts and apply the law is not the type
of plain legal duty contemplated by the
supervisory writ procedure, "as it would extend supervisory
jurisdiction to a virtually unlimited range of
decisionsinvolvingthefindingoffactsandapplicationoflaw."Id.,24seealsosupra80.
106Consequently,forawrittoissueinthiscase,theUnnamedMovantsmustdemonstratethattheJohnDoe
judgesviolatedaplainlegalduty,eitherinacceptinganappointmentasareservejudge,inconveningaJohn
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