WILSON (Shifting and Permanent Philia in Thucydides)

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Shifting and Permanent 'Philia' in Thucydides

Author(s): John R. WilsonSource: Greece & Rome, Second Series, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Oct., 1989), pp. 147-151Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/643167 .

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Greece

Rome,

Vol.

xxxvi,

No.

2,

October 1989

SHIFTING

AND PERMANENT

PHILIA IN THUCYDIDES

By

JOHN

R.WILSON

As

an ethical

principle, philia

represents

a continuum of attachment

that extends

in a stable

system

of

relationships

from the self to one's

immediate

family

and

friends and then outwards to one's

polis

and

one's

race.

Furthermore,

shared attachment

or

philia

also

involves

shared

hostility

or

echthra,

which can be as

permanent

as

philia.

But

already

in

Sophocles'

Ajax

the

idea

of

such fixed

relationships

is

seen as old-fashioned

and

incompatible

with

practical

life. In his

pretended transformation from a rigid adherence to the principles of

permanent

philia

and

permanent

echthra

(particularly

the

latter)

to

the

flexible

morality

of

an

'organization

man',

the

hero

realizes

that

'we

must hate

our

echthros

only

so

far,

since he

may

become

our

philos

again

later,

and

I am

only ready

to do so much to

aid and assist

a

philos,

since

he

may

not

remain

a

philos

forever

...'

(672-81).1

In

Thucydides'

world,

which is ruled

primarily

by

motives of self-

interest and

fear,

shifting

philia

of

this kind needs

no

justification.

It

is

spelled

out

very clearly

by

the Athenian

Euphemus

in his

diplomacy with the people of Camarina:

When a

man

or

a

city

exercises absolute

power,

the

logical

course is the

course

of

self-interest,

and ties of blood exist

only

when

they

can be relied

upon:

one

must

choose

one's

friends and enemies

according

to

the circumstances of each

particular

occasion.

(6.85.1)

Naturally

in this case the

particular

occasion demands a

relationship

of

philia

with the

people

of

Camarina.

The

frankness of

Euphemus

accords

with that of

the Athenians at

Melos,

and

as

a

principle

of

behaviour between

city

states the

pursuit

of

power

above

all

else is

recognized by the Syracusan statesman Hermocrates as a fact of life

which

cannot be blamed but

only guarded against (4.61.5).

But the

examples

of

Alcibiades and

Phrynichus

show

what can

happen

to the

polis

itself when

shifting

philia

is

applied

to

politics

at

the

personal

level. In

Thucydides'

view,

one of

the

things

that most

distinguished

Pericles

from his

successors was

the

overriding

steadi-

ness

and unselfishness

of

his

patriotism

(2.65).

In

this

matter,

the

contrast between

Pericles

and

Alcibiades

could

not

be

greater.

Alcibiades

refuses

to

distinguish

between his own

person

and the

polis.

The

confusion is

already

evident in

his

speech

before the

Sicilian

campaign.

His

private

extravagance,

whether at home or

abroad,

had

the beneficial

effect

of

making

the

power

of

Athens

seem



148

SHIFTING AND

PERMANENT

PHILIA

IN THUCYDIDES

even

greater

than

it

actually

was. But in

his definition of

patriotism,

to

philopoli,

there is no

doubt that

when there is a

conflict between

his

personal

advantage

and that of

the

city,

he chooses

the former. As an

exile he claims that what drives him to defect from Athens and join

the

Spartans

is the

wickedness of those who

force their

philoi

(their

fellow

citizens)

to

become their

enemies. In such

circumstances

the

duties of

patriotism

do

not

apply

-

indeed,

the

true

patriot

is not

the

one who

sits back

after

losing

his

country

but the one

who,

'in

his

passion,

attempts by any

means

available

to

regain

it'

(6.92.2ff.).

In contrast to

these

sophistries,

the selfishness of

Phrynichus

is

plain

and

unadorned.

Thucydides,

who

considers

him to

be consist-

ently intelligent

in

his initiatives

(8.27.2),

describes without

comment

a double act of betrayal. When his enemy Alcibiades seems likely to

return from

exile,

he

attempts

to

betray

him to

the

Spartan

admiral

Astyochus

as a traitor to the

Spartan

cause. He

justifies

this

betrayal

of

Athenian interests

on

the

grounds

of

personal

echthra:

'It

was

forgivable

that he

[Phrynichus]

should

plot

harm

against

a

man

who

was his

enemy,

even

if

it meant harm to his

country'

(8.50.2).

Alcibiades,

informed

of

the

betrayal, exposes Phrynichus

to the

Athenians.

Phrynichus responds by giving

vital

military

information

to

Astyochus

that

could

result

in

the destruction of the Athenians at

Samos.

Again

he

justifies

himself

on

the

grounds

of

personal

echthra,

for 'no one should blame him for

doing

this or

anything

else to

escape

being destroyed by

his

greatest

enemies'

(8.50.5).2

If

shifting

philia

needs

no

intellectual

justification,

permanent

philia

is

generally

unmasked as

hypocritical

or shown in

its violation.

In

political

terms,

permanent

philia/echthra

is

expressed mostly

in

terms of race. For

example

a

pretext

(but

not

the real

cause)

of

the

Athenian invasion of

Sicily

is

their racial

affinity

with the

dispossessed

people

of

Leontini.

They

act 'under the

specious

desire

of

helping

their kinsmen and their

newly

acquired

allies'

(6.6.1).

Such motives

are naturally dismissed as 'sophistries' by the Syracusan statesman

Hermocrates,

but Hermocrates himself is not above

speaking

of the

natural

hostility

between those of different

races.3

Political

reality,

however,

largely ignores

such

matters,

and the

catalogue

of

opposing

forces

at

Syracuse

is

structured

to

demonstrate this fact.

They

are

aligned

not

according

to

principles

of

right (dike)

or

race

(syggeneia)

but of

chance,

advantage,

or

necessity

(7.57.1).

There

is a

descending

scale from

willing

interracial conflict

(highly satisfactory)

to

willing

intraracial

conflict

(merely revolting).

Thus,

for

example,

Ionian

subjects of the Athenians, even if they are there by necessity, are

nevertheless

present

as

Ionians

against

Dorians

(a

mitigating factor).

Worse,

for

example,

is the lot of the Aeolians from

Lesbos,

who are



SHIFTING AND

PERMANENT

PHILIA

IN

THUCYDIDES

149

forced

to

fight

against

their fellow

Aeolians in

Sicily.

Positively

suspect

is the

position

of the

Corcyreans,

who

willingly fight

both

their

mother

city,

Corinth,

and

their

sister

city, Syracuse,

but

who

hypocritically pretend the excuse of necessity (anagkei men ek tou

euprepous,

boulesei de

kata

echthos,

7.57.7).

The

Plataeans,

on

the

other

hand,

because of

the

extremity

of

their

situation,

can

justifiably

fight

their fellow

Boeotians out

of

hatred

(eikotos

kata

to

echthos,

7.57.5).

Lowest

on the

scale are

mercenaries

such

as the

Cretans,

who

go

against

the

Cretan

colony

of

Gela

'willingly

and for

pay' (7.57.9),

or

the

Arcadians,

who

hire

themselves out

to both

sides.

It

is

evident,

however,

that

such a

catalogue

does more

than

simply

unmask

the

hollowness of

racial

philia.

There is a

definite

moral

feeling, expressed in degrees of negativeness, that the line-up should

ideally

be on

racial

grounds.

Unnatural

encounters

such as

Aeolians

against

Aeolians

are either

revolting

or

pathetic.

In

the Melian

dialogue,

which is

suffused with

both

irony

and

pathos,

the

ideal of

race is

again

unmasked as

unreliable.

The

Melians

believe

that

their

kinship

(syggeneia)

with

the

Spartans

guarantees

an

active

support,

while

the

Athenians

are

confident

that,

however

scrupulous

the

Spartans

may

be in

their

dealings

with

each

other,

in

external

affairs

they

'are most

conspicuous

for

believing

that

what

they

like

doing

is

honourable

and

what

suits their

interest

is

just'

(5.105).

On

a still

higher

and

more

generalized

plane,

the

captured

Plataeans

discover

that

their

appeal

to

the

pan-Hellenic

feeling

of

the

Persian

Wars

fifty years

earlier is no

longer

meaningful.

In

a

pathetic

appeal

that is

undercut

by

the

political

realities of

the

present,

they

invoke

the

Spartan

dead

on

the

battlefield of

Plataea

not

to

allow

them to

be

subject

to

the

Thebans

and,

as

the

Spartans'

greatest

philoi

(in

terms of

a

permanent

philia

established

by

the

events

of

479

B.C.),

not to

be

handed

over to

the

Spartans'

greatest

enemies

(in

terms of the permanent echthraestablished at the same time [3.59.2]).

Whatever the

Spartan

dead

may

have

felt,

the

Spartan

living

consult

their

present

interests

on

the

principle

of

shifting

philia.

In

the

case of

the

Melians

and

the

Plataeans,

permanent

philia

is

treated

with

a

certain

pathos

laced

by

grim

realism.

In

relations

between

cities

permanence

is

a

luxury

that

proves

inconvenient to

the

strong

and

costly

to

the

weak.

But

in

those

scenes of

confusion

where

permanent

philia

is

violated

by

members of

the

same

social

group,

pathos

is

intensified

by

horror.

Such events may be purely accidental, as in the night battle on

Epipolae

at

Syracuse,

where in

the

tumult

philoi

combat

philoi,

citizens

citizens

(7.44.7),

or

as

in

the sea

battle at

Sybota,

where

Corin-



150

SHIFTING

AND

PERMANENT PHILIA

IN THUCYDIDES

thians kill their own

men

out

of

ignorance

(tous

hauton

philous

...

agnoountes

ekteinon,

1.50.1).

Usually, though,

the

violation

of

philia

within a

society

is

deliberate,

and

its cause is

some unbearable

pressure or necessity, such as plague, civil war, or crushing defeat.

The outbreak

of

plague

at

Athens induced

a

breakdown of

normal

behaviour that included the

indifference

of

family

members

(oikeioi)

to

the

sufferings

of

victims,

who

were

generally

abandoned.

There

were,

however,

some who out of a

sense

of

virtue and

shame insisted

on

visiting

their

philoi,

but

they

soon

contracted the disease them-

selves and

perished

(2.51.5).

In the

course

of civil

war at

Corcyra,

even the closest

family

ties

are

regularly

violated. 'As

usually happens

in such

situations',

remarks Thucydides, 'people went to every extreme and beyond it:

there were fathers

who

killed their sons .

.

.'

(3.81.5).

In

the

vicious

partisanship

that

reigned, 'family

ties

(to

syggenes)

were

weaker

than

party membership

(to hetairikon),

since

party

members were more

ready

to

go

to

any

extreme

for

any

reason

whatsoever'

(3.82.6).

But

the

most

tragic example

of

violated

philia

in

Thucydides

occurs in

the

narrative

of the final

departure

of

the Athenian

army

from

Syracuse.

Immediately

before their ultimate naval

defeat,

Nicias had

appealed

to

his men's

self-pride, family pride,

and

patriotic

feeling

and had

indulged

in

'old-fashioned talk about

women, children,

and ancestral

gods'

(7.69.2).

But after the

defeat,

such

feelings

of

philia

had to be

vigorously suppressed.

In

breaking

camp

the

army

had to

violate the

sacred

duty

of

due burial: 'The dead were

unburied,

and when

any

man

recognized

one

of his

friends

lying

among

them,

he was filled

with

grief

and fear'

(7.75)

-

a blend

of

emotions

comparable

to

Aristotle's

pity

and

fear. Even

worse,

though,

was the violation of the

rights

of the

living:

The

living

who,

whether

sick or

wounded,

were

being

left

behind,

caused

more

pain

than did the dead to those who were still

alive,

and

were more

pitiable

than the lost.

Their

prayers

and their lamentations made the rest feel

impotent

and

helpless,

as

they begged to be taken with them and cried out aloud to every single friend or

relative

whom

they

could

see;

as

they hung

about the necks of those who had shared

tents

with

them

[i.e.

were

joined

in

ties

of

hospitality]

and

were now

leaving.

They

followed after them as far

as

they

could

and,

when their

bodily

strength

failed

them,

reiterated their cries to heaven

and

their lamentations as

they

were left behind.

The

pressures

that the

sick

apply

to

their friends

and

relatives

in 413

B.C.

resemble the

appeals

in

Sophocles' tragedy

of

409

B.C.

of

the

crippled

Philoctetes

to the

philia

of

Neoptolemus

not to

abandon

him

(Ph. 468ff.).

Thucydides

underlines the

tragic

nature

of this

departure

by recalling the auspicious start to the whole affair (7.75.7). In that

departure

from the Piraeus in

415,

just

two

years

before,

the whole

population

of Athens had been there

for the

send-off:



SHIFTING AND

PERMANENT

PHILIA

IN

THUCYDIDES

151

Those who

were natives of

the

country

all

had

people

to send off

on their

way,

whether

friends or relatives or

sons,

and

they

all came full

of

hope

and full of

lamentation t

the same

time.

(6.30)

The friends or relatives who are sent off correspond to the friends

and

relatives

who,

in

the

same

ascending

order of

philia,

are

appealed

to

by

the

sick

in

the anastasis from

Syracuse.

Our

review of

philia

in

Thucydides

reveals a

typical

complexity

of

attitude. In

relationships

between

cities it

is

merely

a

matter

of

convenience,

to

be

assumed or

discarded

according

to

circumstance.

But even

in such

relationships

this

hardnosed

attitude

may

not

really

benefit

the

players

involved. In

an

interesting plea

for

Sicilian

unity

in

the face of

Athenian

expansionism,

Hermocrates

suggests

that

strife between cities can at times be as fatal as strife within them:

We

should realize

that internal

strife

(stasis)

s

the main

reason for

the

decline of

cities,

and will be so

for

Sicily

too if

we,

the

inhabitants,

who

are all

threatened

together,

still

stand

apart

rom

each

other,

city

against

city. (4.61.1)

Certainly

there could

be no

question

about

the

dangers

of

internal

strife,

to

which the

unrestricted

practice

of

shifting

philia

by

such

individuals

as

Alcibiades

or

Phrynichus

contributed.

It must

be

admitted,

though,

that

Thucydides

rarely

criticizes

the

single-minded

pursuit

of

self-interest at

any

level. It

is

only

in

moments of dire distress, when traditional values are actively violated,

that he

passionately

asserts

their

validity.

Paradoxically,

he

comes

closest to

being

a

moralist in

those

very

passages

in

which

he

records

the death of

morality.

NOTES

1.

For

philia

in

Ajax

Bernard

Knox's

'The

Ajax

of

Sophocles',

HSCP 65

(1961),

1-37

is still

the best

discussion.

See

recently

Simon

Goldhill,

Reading

Greek

Tragedy

(Cambridge,

1986),

pp.

85-88.

2.

These

twin

self-justifications

are

considered

by

Anthony

Andrewes

(A

Historical

Commentaryon Thucydides,Vol. 5 ad 8.50.2 and 5) as a mark of Thucydides' own unease at the

high

praise

of his

intelligence.

There

is,

however,

no

reason to

think

this.

There is no

reason,

either,

to

think that

Phrynichus'

second

treachery

is

somehow

pretended (so Grote,

Brunt,

Delebecque,

and

others,

but

see

Andrewes ad

8.50.5).

Plutarch

(Alc.

25.9),

whose account

is

clearly

based on

Thucydides,

calls

Phrynichus'

second

approach

to

Astyochus

an

attempt

'to

cure

one evil

by

a

greater

evil'.

3.

See

Jacqueline

de

Romilly,

'Amis

et

ennemis

au

cinquieme

si cle

avant

J.C.'

in

Philias

Charin ...

Festschrift

E.

Manni,

vol. 3

(Rome,

1980),

pp.

741-6.

WILSON (Shifting and Permanent Philia in Thucydides)

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