Wills and Succession 1Case Digest
In Re Summary Settlement of the Estate of Melodia Ferraris
Filomena ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs. Gaudencia
FERRARIS, et al., oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-19382, August
31, 1965FACTS: Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City
consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt Rosa Ferraris.
Ten years have elapsed since the last time she was known to be
alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening
her succession and distribute her estate among heirs. Hence, a
petition for the summary settlement of her estate was filed.
Melodia left no surviving descendant, ascendant or spouse, but was
survived only by collateral relatives: 1) an aunt and half-sister
of decedents father; and 2) her nieces and nephews who were
children of Melodias only brother of full blood who predeceased
her. In the settlement proceeding, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, who
is the decedents half-sister, was excluded as an heir pursuant to a
resolution issued by the lower court. A motion for reconsideration
was denied hence this action. ISSUE: Who should inherit the
intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived
only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a
brother who predeceased him? Or will the aunt concur with the
children of the decedents brother or will the former be excluded by
the latter. RULING: As an aunt of the deceased she is as far
distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in
the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong,
degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and
descending to the heir (Art. 966, Civil Code). Appellant is
likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do
not inherit by right of representation unless concurring with
brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Art.
975. Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that,
in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces exclude all other
collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004,
1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code.
Wills and Succession 2Case Digest
Constantino C. ACAIN, petitioner vs. Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987FACTS: Constantino Acain
filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the
will of his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the
latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and
sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for
hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a
legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased
respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1)
Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow
and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was
denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongsons petition and ordered the
trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due to
the denial of Acains motion for reconsideration, he then filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been
pretirited. RULING:Article 854 of the Civil Code: The preterition
or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory
heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be
effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of
the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is
concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted
daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter
and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot
be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will
and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at
least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition
of the legally adopted child. The universal institution of Acain
together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of
the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any
other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration
that nothing at all was written.
Wills and Succession 3Case Digest
Danilo ALUAD, et al., petitioners vs. Zenaido ALUAD, respondent
G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008FACTS: Petitioners mother, Maria
Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless
spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six
lots of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After his death, Matilde adjudicated
the lots to herself and thereafter, she executed a Deed of Donation
of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of Maria covering all the six
lots. The Deed provided that such will become effective upon the
death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die
before the Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded.
Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or
anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even
dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land. Matilde sold
one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a
last will and testament devising four (4) of the lots to Maria and
the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after
Matildes death. Thereafter, Marias heirs (herein petitioners) filed
before the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of
ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to
Zenaido, alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the
latter because such lots have been previously alienated to them to
Maria via the Deed of Donation. The lower court decided in favor of
the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of
Zenaido which held that the Deed of Donation was actually a
donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but
did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Due to the denial
of the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the present Petition
for Review has been filed. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Deed of
Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or not such deed is
valid. 2. If so, whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to
convey the lots in question to Zenaido Aluad. RULING: The Court
finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioners mother) one of
mortis causa, it having the following characteristics: 1. It
conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor, or what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control
of the property while alive; 2. That before the death of the
transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at
will, ad nutum, but revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed; and 3. That the transfer should be void of the transferor
should survive the transferee. The phrase in the earlier-qouted
Deed of Donation to become effective upon the death of the DONOR
admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not
intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners
mother during the formers lifetime. Further the statement, anytime
during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should
survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even
all the parcels of land herein donated, means that Matilde retained
ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose
them. For the right
Wills and Succession 4Case Digest to dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of
ownership. The phrase, anyone of them who should survive is out of
sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take
effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only
have referred to the donor. The donation being then mortis causa,
the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were
not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses
following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and transmitted
no right to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the
formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to
the two lots was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly
disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and testament, subject
to the qualification that her will must be probated. With respect
to the conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to
Zenaido.
Wills and Succession 5Case Digest
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of
the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, Cesar ALVARADO, petitioner vs. Hon.
Ramon GAVIOLA G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993FACTS: Brigido
Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled, Huling Habilin wherein
he disinherited an illegitimate son, Cesar Alvarado, and expressly
revoked a previously executed a holographic will at the time
awaiting probate before RTC. As testified to by the three
instrumental witnesses, the notary public and Cesar, the testator
did not read the final draft of the will, instead, Atty. Rino, as
the lawyer who drafted the document read the same aloud in the
presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the
notary public. While the testators will was admitted to probate, a
codicil was subsequently executed changing some dispositions in the
notarial will to generate cash for the testators eye operation
because he was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance
and the revocatory clauses remained and as in the case of the
notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft
of the codicil. Instead, it was Atty. Rino who read it alound in
his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental
witnesses and of the notary public. Upon the testators death, Atty
Rino as executor filed a petition for probate of the notarial will
which was in turn opposed by Cesar alleging that the will sought to
be probated was not executed and attested as required by law. Upon
failure of Cesar to substantiate his Opposition, a Probate Order
was issued from which an appeal was made to IAC stating that the
probate of the deceaseds last will and codicil should have been
denied because the testator was blind within the meaning of the law
at the time his Huling Habilin and the codicil thereto was
executed;and that since reading required by Art. 808 was admittedly
not complied with. CA concluded that although Art. 808 was not
followed, there was, however, as substantial compliance. ISSUES: 1.
Whether or not Brigido Alvarado was blind within the meaning of
Article 808 at the time his Huling Habilin and codicil were
executed. 2. If so, whether or not the requirement of
double-reading in said Article was complied with such that whether
or not, they were validly executed. RULING: Art. 808 applies not
only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or
another, are incapable of reading their wills. Since the deceased
was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil
on the separate occasions of their execution due to his poor,
defective, or blurred vision, there can be no other course but to
conclude that he comes within the scope of the term blind as used
in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of
ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and
codicil did so conformably with his instruction. Hence, to consider
his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is
essential to ascertain whether or not Art. 808 had been complied
with. There is no evidence and Cesar does not allege that the
contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known
and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to
the Huling Habilin, the day of the execution was not the first time
that the testator had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the
contents of the draft. Moreover, with four persons following the
reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely
concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was
read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten
documents. This is especially true considering the fact that the
three instrumental witnesses were persons known to the
testator.
Wills and Succession 6Case Digest The spirit behind that law was
served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict
compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to
insure authenticity of the will, the formal imperfection should be
brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when
taken into account may only defeat the testators will. Substantial
compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been
satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of will are intended to protect the testator from all
kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid
and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
Wills and Succession 7Case Digest
Ruben AUSTRIA et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Andres REYES, et
al., respondents. G.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970FACTS: Basilia
Austria filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate ante
mortem of her last will and testament which was opposed by Ruben
Austria and others who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. However,
such opposition was dismissed and the probate was allowed after due
hearing. The bulk of the estate was destined under the will to pass
on the Perfecto Cruz and others whom had been assumed and declared
by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. Subsequently, upon
Basilias death, Perfecto was appointed executor in accordance with
the provisions of the formers will. Ruben and the other petitioners
filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for
partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest kin and
that the five private respondents (Perfecto et al.) had not in fact
been adopted by the testator in accordance with law, hence they
should be rendered mere strangers and without any right to succeed
as heirs. The court then allowed the said intervention by
petitioners which the court delimited to the properties of the
deceased which were not disposed of in the will and disregarded the
matter of the genuineness of adoption. Upon denial of two motions
for reconsiderations, the petitioners filed before the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari praying for the annulment of the
lower courts orders restricting their intervention. ISSUE: Whether
or not the institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event
there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the
decedent is false. RULING:Article 850 provides: The statement of a
false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as
not written, unless it appears from the will of the testator would
not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such
cause.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Art. 850,
the following requisites must concur: 1. The cause for the
institution heirs must be stated in the will; 2. The cause must be
shown to be false; and 3. It must appear from the face of the will
that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause. The article quoted above is a
positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may
have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such
institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an
examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have
made the institution of he had known the cause for it to be false.
The words used in her will to describe the class of heirs
instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance offer no
absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate
other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound
by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free
portion of her estate which largely favored Cruz, et al. shows a
perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more
than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Testacy
is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where
the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to
dispose of practically his whole estate. Moreover, so compelling is
the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of
the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the
language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.
Wills and Succession 8Case Digest
In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the
decease Anacleta Abellana Lucio BALONAN, petitioner-appellee vs.
Eusebia ABELLANA, et al., oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-15153,
August 31, 1960FACTS: The last Will and Testament sought to be
probated consists in two (2) typewritten pages. The first page is
signed by Juan Bello and on the left margin appears the signatures
of the three (3) instrumental witnesses. On the second page appears
the signature of said witnesses, at the bottom of which appears the
signature of the notary public and below said signature is his
designation as notary public. On the left margin of the second page
(last page of the will) appears the signature of Juan Bello under
whose name appears handwritten the phrase, Por la Testadore
Anacleta Abellana (For the Testate of Anacleta Abellana). The will
is duly acknowledged before the notary public. ISSUE: Whether or
not the signature of Juan Bello above the typewritten statement,
Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana comply with the requirements of
law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be executed.
RULING:Article 805 of the Civil Code provides: Every will, other
than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end there of by
the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction and attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.
The law requires that the testator himself sign the will, or if
he cannot do so, the testators name must be written by some other
person in his presence and by his express direction. In this case,
the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana does not appear
written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan
Bello. There is therefore, a failure to comply with the express
requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the
will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in
his presence and by his express direction. Hence, the will of the
deceased Anacleta Abellana must not be admitted to probate.
Wills and Succession 9Case Digest
Maria Gervacio BLAS, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Rosalina
SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Administratix of the Estate of
the deceased Maxima Santos, et al., defendants-appellants. G.R. No.
L-14070, March 29, 1961FACTS: Simeon Blas contracted a first
marriage with Marta Cruz and had three children, only one of whom,
Eulalio, left children namely: Maria Gervacio Blas (one of the
plaintiffs), Marta Gervacio Blas (one of the defendants), and
Lazaro Gervacio Blas. Lazaro died and is survived by three
legitimate children who are plaintiffs herein namely, Manuel,
Leoncio and Loid. Subsequently after Martas death, Simeon
contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of
second marriage, no liquidation of the properties of Simeon and
Marta was made. A week before Simeons death, he executed a last
Will and Testament, and he also ordered a preparation of a document
(Exhibit A) because the properties he had acquired during his first
marriage with Mart had not been liquidated and were not separated
from those acquired during the second marriage. Such document
contains promises by Maxima to respect the disposition of said will
and to give one-half (1/2) of the properties she and her husband
will leave to the heirs, legatees or beneficiaries named in the
will. Pursuant to this document, the plaintiffs instituted an
action against the administration of the estate of Maxima Santos to
secure a judicial declaration that one-half (1/2) of the properties
left by Maxima be adjudicated to them. Upon filing of opposition by
the administratix, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence,
this appeal. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the heirs of Simeon Blas and
wife Marta Cruz can make any claim for the unliquidated conjugal
properties acquired during their marriage. 2. Whether or not
Exhibit A is a valid and enforceable contract. RULING: The heirs of
Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim
for the unliquidated conjugal properties acquired during said first
marriage because the same were already included in the mass
properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and
in the adjudications made by virtue of his will. Exhibit A appears
to be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil Code of
Spain, in force at the time of the execution of such document,
which provides as follows: Compromise is a contract by which each
of the parties in interest, by giving, promising, or retaining
something avoids the provocation of a suitor terminates one which
has already provocation been instituted. The agreement or promise
that Maxima Santos made in Exhibit A is to hold one-half of her
share in the conjugal assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of
her husband in his will, with the obligation of conveying the same
to such of his heirs or legatees as she may choose in her last will
and testament. This kind of agreement pr promise is not void.
Wills and Succession 10Case Digest
Wencesla CACHO, petitioner-appellee vs. John G. UDAN and Rustico
G. UDAN, oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-19996, April 30,
1965FACTS: Silvina Udan, single, died leaving a will naming her son
Francisco and one Wencesla Cacho as her sole heirs, share and share
alike. Cacho then filed a petition to probate the said Will which
was opposed by the testators legitimate brother, Rustico.
Therafter, Francisco filed his opposition to the probate of the
Will while Rustico withdrew his opposition. After Franciscos death,
another legitimate brother of the testator, John, together with
Rustico, filed their respective oppositions. Consequently, Cacho
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Oppositions filed by John and
Rustico. CFI issued an order disallowing the two oppositions for
lack of interest in the estate. The subsequent Motions for
Reconsiderations were denied hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or
not John and Rustico Udan may claim to be heirs intestate of their
legitimate sister, Silvina. RULING: It is clear from Article 988
and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force
at the time of the death of the testatrix that the oppositor
brothers may not claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate
sister, Silvina.Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants
or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. Art. 1003. If there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one
who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants,
ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and
sister can concur with the widow or widower, they do not concur,
but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or
illegitimate. Further, the death of Francisco does not improve the
situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only
transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the
appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, pursuant to
Article 992.Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit the
same manner from the illegitimate child.
However, the hearing on the probate must still proceed to
ascertain the rights of Cacho as testamentary heir.
Wills and Succession 11Case Digest
Tedoro CANEDA, et al., petitioners vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and
William CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo
Caballero, respondents. G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993FACTS: Mateo
Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a last will and
testament before three attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted
by his lawyer and a notary public. It was declare therein that,
among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of
legacies and devises his real and personal properties to specific
persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long
after, he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the
probate of his last will and testament but the scheduled hearings
were postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition
could finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of
the legatees named in the will, sought his appointment as special
administrator of the testators estate but due to his death, he was
succeeded by William Cabreara, who was appointed by RTC which is
already the probate court. In the course of the hearing, herein
petitioners claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator,
appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the
testators will on the ground that on the alleged date of its
execution, the testator was already in the poor state of health
such that he could not have possibly executed the same; and that
the signature of the testator is not genuine. The probate court
rendered a decision that such will is the Last Will and Testament
of Mateo Caballero and that it was executed in accordance with all
the requisites of the law. Upon appeal to CA, the petitioners
asserted that the will in question is null and void for the reason
that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to
specifically state the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed
the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. However, CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court ruling and ruling that the attestation clause in
the Last Will substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil
Code. Due to denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration,
hence this appeal before the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or
not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is
fatally defective such that whether or not it affects the validity
of the will. 2. Whether or not the attestation clause complies with
the substantial compliance pursuant to Article 809 of the Civil
Code. RULING: An attestation clause refers to that part of an
ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the
instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the
execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the
facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the
witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with
the essential formalities required by law has been observed. Under
the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack
of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state:
1. The number of pages used upon which the will is written; 2. That
the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses;
and 3. That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the
testator of the will and all its pages, and that the said witnesses
also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
Wills and Succession 12Case Digest It will be noted that Article
805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to
the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Attestation and subscription differ in meaning. Attestation is the
act of sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The
attestation clause herein assailed is that while it recites that
the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the
presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state
therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other. What is then clearly lacking, is the statement
that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another. The absence of the
statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which
must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is
here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in
pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause obviously
cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or
the language used therein which would warrant the application of
the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of
the Civil Code: In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or
undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfection
in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall
not render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will was
in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all
the requirements of Article 805. The defects and imperfection must
only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language
employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a
will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed
and attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations
do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact
that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will
in the presence of the testator and of each other. In such a
situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the
attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element
required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect
complained of in the present case since there is no plausible way
by which it can be read into the questioned attestation clause
statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness
did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the
will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also
signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
Wills and Succession 13Case Digest
Pascual COSO, vs. Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al., G.R. No.L-
16763,December 22, 1921FACTS: The testator, a married man, became
acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her
for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will
gives the tercio de libre disposicion to the illegitimate son and
also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to
Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her
in talking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered
from severe illness. The will was set aside on the ground of undue
influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the
testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised
some influence over the testator. ISSUE: Whether or not the
influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.
RULING: Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not
sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that effect, the influence
must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has
been variously stated, but the substance of the different
statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the
mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him
express the will of another rather than his own. Such influence
must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to
the execution of the will in question, either at the time of the
execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative,
with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties,
and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which
the testator would not otherwise have made. And while the same
amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying
an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that
some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation
does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the
influence destroys the testators free agency. The burden is upon
the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence
existed at the time of its execution. While it is shown that the
testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does
not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his
mind as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if illegitimate,
is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will. Influence
gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if
no imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the
testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property
in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and
ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily
made.
Wills and Succession 14Case Digest
Agapita N. CRUZ, petitioner vs. Hon. Judge Guillermo P. VILLASOR
and Manuel LUGAY, respondents. G.R. No. L-32213, November 26,
1973FACTS: Agapita Cruz is the surviving spouse of the deceased
Valente Cruz. Agapita filed before the CFI an opposition for the
allowance of the will of his late husband alleging that the will
was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue
influence because the said instrument was executed without the
testator having been fully informed of the content thereof,
particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the
supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance
with law. However, due to unfavorable decision, Agapita appealed by
certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the
supposed last will and testament was executed in accordance with
law. RULING: Of the three instrumental witnesses, one of them is at
the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed
to have been acknowledged. The Supreme Court is inclined to sustain
the last will and testament in question was not executed in
accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness
since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the
will. To acknowledge before means to avow. Consequently, if the
third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow
assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself.
This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into
two. To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of
the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of
having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in
contravention of the provisions of Article 805 requiring at least
three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which
requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses
must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The
result would be that only two witnesses appeared before the notary
public for or that purpose. In the circumstance, the law would not
be duly observed.
Wills and Succession 15Case Digest
Paula DE LA CERNA, et al., petitioners, vs. Manuela
REBACA-POTOT, et al., and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents. G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964FACTS: Spouses
Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will
and testament whereby they willed that their two parcels of land
acquired during their marriage together with all improvements
thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece. Bernabe died
and the will was probated in 1939 after due publication as required
by law and there being no opposition. Upon the death of Gervasia
Rebaca, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar
as Gervasia was concerned was filed by Manuela but the court
dismissed it for failure of Manuela to appear. Paula de la Cerna
questioned for the nullity of the joint will of Bernabe being
prohibited in the Philippine law. The Court of First Instance
ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and
void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills
in the Civil Code but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court
of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in
1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive
on the due execution of the testament. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an error of law affects the conclusive effect of
its decision. 2. Whether or not the joint will is valid as to the
share of Gervasia who died later than Bernabe. RULING: The appealed
decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered
in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator,
Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last
will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code
already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of
the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party
(Art. 669, old Civil Code). A final judgment rendered on a petition
for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world. The
probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased
husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition
of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still
alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the
probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her
estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to
the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the
testator's lifetime. It follows that the validity of the joint
will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be,
on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint
will is considered a separate will of each testator. Therefore, the
undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to
her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir,
unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or
unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
Wills and Succession 16Case Digest
Gertrudes De Los SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Maximo De La
CRUZ, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-29192, February 22,
1971FACTS: Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She
had a niece named Marciana who is the mother of herein defendant,
Maximo. Gertrudes, who is Pelagias grandniece, and several coheirs
including Maximo, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition Agreement
purposely for the distribution of Pelagias estate. They agreed to
adjudicate three (3) lots to Maximo, in addition to his share, on
condition that the latter would undertake the development and
subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the
agreement. Due to Maximos failure to comply with his obligation,
Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance. In Maximos
answer, he stated that Gertrudes had no cause of action against him
because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the
reason that she was not an heir of Pelagia and was included in the
agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo, being a
party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from
raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from
Pelagia, hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. Maximo
filed a Motion for New Trial but was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not, Gertrudes de los Santos, a grandniece of the
decedent, is an heir of the latter. RULING: Plaintiff-appellee
being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, could not inherit
from the latter by right of representation.Article 972. The right
of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but
never in the ascending. In the collateral line, it takes place only
in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of
the full or half blood.
Much less could plaintiff-appelle inherit in her own
right.Article 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place.
In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia
de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is
defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece
is excluded by law from the inheritance.
Wills and Succession 17Case Digest
Francisca Tioco DE PAPA, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
Dalisay Tongko CAMACHO, et al., defendants-appellants. G.R. No.
L-28032; September 24, 1986FACTS: The plaintiffs are the grandaunt
and granduncles of the defendant, Dalisay. They have as a common
ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister named Romana
Tioco), father of the plaintiffs and great grandfather of Dalisay.
During the lifetime of Romana, she gratuitously donated four (4)
parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of
plaintiffs). The latter died intestate survived by her husband
Estacio Dizon and their two (2) legitimate children, Faustino and
Trinidad (mother of Dalisay) and leaving the said four (4) parcels
of land as the inheritance of the children in equal pro-indiviso
shares. Subsequently, Balbino died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children and bu his wife (among the plaintiffs) and
legitimate grandchildren, Faustino and Trinidad. In the partition
of his estate, three (3) parcels of land were adjudicated as the
inheritance of Toribia but as she had predeceased her father, the
said three (3) parcesl of land devolved upon her two legitimate
children, Faustino and Trinidad in equal proinidiviso shares.
Faustino died intestate, singled and without issue, leaving his
one-half (1/2) proindiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land
to his father, Eustacio, as his sole intestate heir, who reserved
the said property subject to a reserva troncal. When Trinidad died
intestate, her rights and interests in the land were inherited by
her only child, Dalisay and not long after, Eustacio died intestate
survived also by his only legitimate child, Dalisay. Dalisay now
owns onehalf (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land as her
inheritance from Trinidad. Dalisay also claims the other half of
the said parcels of land by virtue of reserva troncal imposed
thereon upon the death of Faustino but the plaintiffs opposed such
claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half
pro-indiviso interst in said parcel of land, which was inherited by
Eustacio from Faustino, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels
of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino. The lower court declared that the parties are entitled to
one-half (1/2) of the seven (7) parcels of land in dispute, as
reservatarios, in equal proportions. Not satisfied, the defendant
appealed. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not all the relatives of the
propositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed
without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of
the reservista. 2. Whether or not the rights of the plaintiffs are
subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate
succession. RULING:Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.
The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives
reservatarios to whom the property should be returned, but within
that group, the individual right to the property should be decided
by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since
Article 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is
strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an
exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is
strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. Reversion of
the reservable property being governed by the rules on instestate
succession, the plaintiffs must be held without any right thereto
because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of
Wills and Succession 18Case Digest Faustino (the propositus),
they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant,
although they are related to him within the same degree as the
latter. Had the reversionary property passed directly from the
propositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs would have been
excluded by the defendant under the rules of intestate succession.
There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply
because the transmission of the property was delayed by the
interregnum of the reserva, i.e., the property took a detour
through an ascendant thereby govong rise to the reservation before
its transmission to the reservatario. Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is
entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the
exclusion of the plaintiffs.
Wills and Succession 19Case Digest
Eugenio C. DEL PRADO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. Aurea S.
SANTOS, legal guardian of the minor Jesus Santos del Prado,
defendant appellee. G.R. No. L-20946, September 23, 1966FACTS:
Eugenio del Prado is a legitimate brother of Anastacio del Prado,
who died single and intestate. Anastacio cohabited with Aurea
Santos (who was legally married) without the benefit of matrimony
and they begot a son named Jesus del Prado whom Anastacio admitted
as his son in Jesus birth certificate. At the time of Anastacios
death, a parcel of land in his name was adjudicated to Jesus del
Prado. Eugenio then filed a complaint before CFI to annul the deed
executed by Aurea adjudicating to her son a parcel of land left by
Anastacio alleging that he (Eugenio) was deprived of his rightful
share in the estate of his brother. The lower court dismissed the
petition, and upon appeal to CA, the appellate court certified the
case to Supreme Court that such involved purely legal questions.
ISSUE: Who has the better right to the parcel of land? Is it the
minor left by Anastacio or the latters brother? RULING: Since
Anastacio del Prado died in 1958, the new Civil Code applies
(Article 2263). Illegitimate children other than natural are
entitled to successional rights (Article 287). Where, as in this
case, the deceased died intestate, without legitimate descendants
or ascendants, then his illegitimate child shall succeed to his
entire estate (Article 988), to the exclusion of appellant who is
only a collateral relative.
Wills and Succession 20Case Digest
In the Matter of the Intestate Estates of the Deceased Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Delgado, Heirs of Luis DELGADO, petitioners
vs. Heirs of Marciana RUSTIA, respondents. G.R. No. 155733. January
27, 2006FACTS: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a
will. The claimants of their estates may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her
half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews
and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia,
particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate
child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the
decedents. The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado The deceased Josefa
Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo.
Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple,
namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all
surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo,
hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children
of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only
man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom
Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.
Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. The Alleged
Heirs of Guillermo Rustia Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never
had any children but they took into their home the youngsters
Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never
legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local
dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa, however,
Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. ISSUES: 1. Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?
2. Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa
Delgado can inherit by right of representation? 3. Who are the
lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia? RULING: 1. The Lawful Heirs of
Josefa Delgado It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa
Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,
were her natural children.
Wills and Succession 21Case Digest The above-named siblings of
Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all
illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of
them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado. However, the
petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972
of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot
be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only
collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake
of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their
children who were still alive at the time of her death on September
8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now
for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers
and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of
her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the
new Civil Code:Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other one-half.
2. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia Guillerma Rustia is an
illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be
entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or
recognition of paternity. She failed to present authentic proof of
recognition. Together with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were
held legal strangers to the deceased spouses and therefore not
entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. Under Article 1002 of
the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews.
Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit
half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half
shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado
who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados
full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving
at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby
ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate. Guillermo Rustias
estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate)
shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the
children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo
Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes).
Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain
to their estates.
Wills and Succession 22Case Digest
Marcelina EDROSO, petitioner-appellant, vs. Pablo and Basilio
SABLAN, opponent-appellees. G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913FACTS:
Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named,
Pedro who inherited two parcels of land upon the death of his
father. Subsequently, Pedro died, unmarried and without issue, the
two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother. Hence
the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for
registration of her ownership. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and
Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed the
registration claiming that either the registration be denied or if
granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be recorded in
the registration of each parcel. The Court of Land Registration
denied the registration holding that the land in question partake
of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that
in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the
names of the mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the property in question is in the nature
of a reservable property. 2. Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has
the absolute title of the property to cause its registration.
RULING: A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary
title is one without a valuable consideration (gratuitous tile),
and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for he
who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he
receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the
uncles are within the third degree of blood relationship.Article
811. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which
the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another
descendant, or form a brother or sister, is under obligation to
reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives
who are within the third degree and belong to the line where the
property proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him
the two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable
consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquire them by operation of law, she is
obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the
line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of
Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The trial courts ruling
that they partake of the nature property required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law. The conclusion is
that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the right has,
beyond any doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has,
moreover, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he has under an express provision of the law
the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is
to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to
recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess
it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a
word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition,
reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner
can do. On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree
in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is no way, either actually or
constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover,
because they have no title of
Wills and Succession 23Case Digest ownership or of the fee
simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that
only when the person who must reserve the right should die before
them will they acquire it.
Wills and Succession 24Case Digest
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, Francisco GAGO, petitioner, vs.
Cornelio MAMUYAC, et al., opponents. G.R. No. L-26317, January 29,
1927FACTS: Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament on
July 1918 and almost 4 years later, Francisco Gago presented a
petition in the CFI for the probation of such will which was
opposed by Cornelia Mamuyac et al. The petition was denied upon the
ground that Mamuyac had executed a new will on April 1919. An
action was filed to secure the probation of the said new will. The
opponents alleged (a) that the said will is a copy of the second
will executed by Miguel; (b) that the same had been cancelled and
revoked during the lifetime of the testator; and (c) that the said
will was not the last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac. The
petition was then again denied upon the ground that the will of
1919 had been the cancelled and revoked based on the evidence
adduced by the trial court that the 1918 will is a mere carbon of
its original which remained in the possession of the deceased, who
revoked it before a witness, who typed the 1919 will of the
testator, and before another person who witnessed the actual
cancellation by the testator in 1920. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE:
Whether or not the will in question has been revoked and cancelled.
RULING: The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or
cancellation of a will to be preserved. Where a will which cannot
be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator,
when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other
competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The
same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had
ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It
will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other
person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. In view
of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after
the death of the testator and in view of the positive proof that
the same had been cancelled, the conclusions of the lower court are
in accordance with the weight of evidence. After a careful
examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the
will presented for probate had been cancelled by the testator in
1920.
Wills and Succession 25Case Digest
Pedro D. H. GALLANOSA, et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Ubaldo Y.
ARCANGEL, et al., respondents G.R. No. L-29300; June 21, 1978FACTS:
Florentino Hitosis, a childless widower executed a will wherein he
beaqueathed his one-half share in the conjugal estate to his second
wife, Tecia Dollentas, and should Tecia predecease him, as was the
case, his one-half share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro
Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecias
son by her first marriage, grew up under the care of Florentino and
had treated Perdo as his foster child. Florentiono likewise
bequeathed his separate properties to his protg, Adolfo Fortajada,
a minor. A petition for the probate of his will was filed in CFI
which was opposed by his legal heir, his brother Leon Hitosis and
his nephews and nieces. The court admitted the will to probate and
appointed Gallanosa as executor. Subsequently, the testamentary
heirs submitted a project of partition which was approved by the
court, thus confirming the heirs possession of their respective
shares. The testators legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of
probate and from the order of partition and distribution. Leon
instituted an action against Pedro for the recovery of the
sixty-one parcels of land alleging that the former had been in
continuous possession of said land however, the complaint was
dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The legal heirs of the
testator did not appeal from the order of dismissal instead, 28
years after the probate of the will, they filed an action for the
annulment of the will of Florentino and for the recovery of the
parcels of land. Pedro filed for the dismissal of the complaint but
the respondent judge set aside his order of dismissal and granted
trial. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not
the private respondents have a cause of action for the annulment of
the will of Florention Hitosis and for the recovery of the parcels
of land. RULING: The lower court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in reconsidering its order of dismissal and in ignoring
the testamentary case. It is evident from the allegations of the
complaint that the action is barred by res judicata. The decree of
probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of
the will. The decree of adjudication rendered by the trial court in
the testate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Florentino Hitosis having been rendered in a proceeding in rem, is
binding upon the whole world. The private respondents did not even
bother to ask for the annulment of the testamentary proceeding and
the proceeding on partition. Obviously, they realized that the
final adjudications in those cases have the binding force of res
judicata and that there is no ground, nor it is timely, to ask for
the nullification of the final orders and judgments in those two
cases.
Wills and Succession 26Case Digest
Testate Estate of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap deceased Fausto E.
GAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. Ildefonso YAP, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-12190; August 30, 1858FACTS: After the death of
Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap, Fausto Gan filed a petition for the
probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the fomer.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted
that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament
during her lifetime. The will itself was not presented. Gan tried
to establish its contents and due execution by the statements of
allegedly four (4) witnesses to the execution of the alleged will.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the court
refused to probate the alleged will. Due to the denial of motion
for reconsideration, Gan appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not a
holographic will may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses
who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the
handwriting of the testator. RULING: The Rules of Court allow proof
(and probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the
testimony of witnesses in lieu of the original document. Yet such
Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could not
then be validly made here. The difference between holographic wills
and ordinary will lies in the nature of the wills. In the first,
the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself, in
the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental
witnesses (and of the notary). The loss of the holographic will
entails the loss of the only medium of proof, if the ordinary will
is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
The evidence of presented by Gan is refused to be credited. In
addition to the dubious circumstance described in the appealed
decision, we find it hard to believe that the deceased should show
her will precisely to relative who had received nothing from it.
These could pester her into amending her will to give them a share,
or threaten to reveal its execution to her husband. Further, if she
wanted so much to conceal the will from her husband, why did she
not entrust it to her beneficiaries? In fine, even if oral
testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost
holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by petitioner is
so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails
to measure up to that :clear and distinct proof required by the
Rules of Court.
Wills and Succession 27Case Digest
In the Matter of the Will of Antero Mercado, deceased, Rosario
GARCIA, petitioner, vs. Juliana LACUESTA, et al., respondents. G.R.
No. L-4067, November 29, 1951FACTS: A will was executed by Antero
Mercado wherein it appears that it was signed by Atty. Florentino
Javiwe who wrote the name of Antero. The testator was alleged to
have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of First
Instance found that the will was valid but the Court of Appeals
reversed the lower courts decision holding that the attestation
clause failed: 1) to certify that the will was signed on all the
left margins of the three pages and at the end of the will by Atty.
Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence of
the testator and each and every one of the witnesses; 2) to certify
that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier
at the formers request said testator has written a cross at the end
of his name and on the left margin of the three pages of which the
will consists and at the end thereof 3) to certify that the
witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the presence
of the testator and of each other. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE:
Whether or not the attestation clause is valid. RULING: The
attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that
Antero Mercado caused Atty. Javier to write the testators name
under his express direction, as required by section 168 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. It is not here pretended that the cross
appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or
even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature
reflection, the SC is not prepared to liken the mere sign of the
cross to a thumbmark and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot
and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
Wills and Succession 28Case Digest
Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, petitioner, vs. Hon. Conrado M.
VASQUEZ, respondent. G.R. No. L-26808, March 28, 1969FACTS:
Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried and leaving no
descendants, ascendants, brother or sister thereafter, Consuelo S.
Gonzales Vda. De Precilla, niece of the deceased petitioned for
probate the alleged last will and testament of Gliceria dated
December 1960 and that she be appointed as special administratrix.
Various parties opposed the petition contending that the 1960 will
was not intended by Gliceria to be her true will and that there was
a 1956 will executed by Gliceria were the oppositors were named as
legatees. Consequently, Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis an ophthalmologist
testified that Glicerias left eye suffered form cataract in 1960
which made her vision mainly for viewing distant object but not for
reading prints. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 808 regarding blind
testator be followed in the instant case to make Glicerias will
valid? RULING: For all intents and purposes of the rules on
probate, the deceased Gliceria del Rosario was like a blind
testator and the due execution of her will would have required
observance of the provisions of Article 808 of the Civil Code. Art.
808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice;
once, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the
testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself,
is to make the provisions of the will known to the testator, so
that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with
his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the
dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and
understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly
reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the
will should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two
different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the
range of his (the testators) other senses.
Wills and Succession 29Case Digest
Rizalina Gabriel GONZALES, petitioner, vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS
and Lutgarda SANTIAGO, respondents. G.R. No. L-37453, May 25,
1979FACTS: Lutgarda Santiago and Rizalina Gonzales are nieces of
the late Isabel Andres Gabriel. Lutgarda filed a petition for the
probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased and
designated Lutgarda as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
There is no dispute that Isabel died as a widow and without issue.
The will submitted consists of five (5) pages and includes the
pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the
notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel
Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left
margin of all the pages. The petition was opposed by Rizalina
assailing that the will is not genuine and was not executed and
attested as required by law. The lower court disallowed the probate
of said will and as a consequence, Lutgarda appealed to Court of
Appeals reversed the lower courts decision and allowed the probate
of the will. Rizalina filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence this present action. ISSUE: Whether or not
the will was executed and attested as required by law. RULING:
Article 820 of the Civil Code provides for the qualifications of a
witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the
disqualification from being a witness to a will. In probate
proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses
for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and
affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And we agree
with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases cited
by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization
proceedings are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills
executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the case at
bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental
witnesses are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by
the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which
findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon.
Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any
of the said witnesses.
Wills and Succession 30Case Digest
Beatriz L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, et al., respondents. G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981FACTS:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason,
died and was survived by his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven
children. The real properties left by Benito were partitioned in
three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the
heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were
represented by Benito F. Legarda. Filomena Legarda y Roces died
intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother,
Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit
adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. As a result
of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces succeeded her
deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children. Mrs. Legarda executed
two hand-written identical documents wherein she disposed of the
properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the
children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen
grandchildren in all). She later died and her will was admitted to
probate as a holographic will in the Court of First Instance of
Manila which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In the testate
proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the testatrix,
filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate
the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable
properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three
sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito,
Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed
by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda. Without awaiting the
resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed an ordinary civil
action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her
mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the
said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could
not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons. The lower
court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzalez. Mrs. Gonzales appealed
under Republic Act No. 5440 and contends that the lower court erred
in not regarding the properties in question as reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code. ISSUES: 1. Whether
or not the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal?
2. Whether or not Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of
the properties in question in her will in favor of her
grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children? RULING: The
properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in
the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The
reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the
reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus
Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Wills and Succession 31Case Digest Mrs. Legarda could not convey
in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable
properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena
because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate.
The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the
reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor. The said properties, by operation of article 891, should
go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second
degree from Filomena Legarda. The reservable property bequeathed by
the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's
estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the
seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the
third degree. It should be repeated that the reservees do not
inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservor.
Wills and Succession 32Case Digest
Tomas JIMENEZ, et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, et al., respondents. G.R. No. 75773, April 17,
1990FACTS: Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez married Consolacion Ungson with
whom he begot four (4) children, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr.,
Alejandra and Angeles. During such marriage, Lino acquired five (5)
parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. When
Consolacion died, Lino contracted a second marriage with Genoveva
Caolboy with whom he begot the seven petitioners herein: Tomas,
Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and Virginial, all
surnamed Jimenez. After Lino and Genovevas death, Virginia filed a
petition before CFI praying to be appointed as administratix of the
properties of the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva upon which
Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. filed a motion for exclusion of his fathers
name and those of his uncle and aunts contending that they have
already received their inheritance consisting of five (f) parcels
of land. However, the petition of Virginia wherein she included the
said five (5) parcels of land in the inventory of the estate of
spouses Lino and Genoveva. Consequently, Leonardo Jimenez, Jr.
moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory
contending that such parcels of land were already adjudicated to
his father and to his uncle and aunts. The probate court ordered
the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land and denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by Virginia. The latter went to CA on a
petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the annulment of
the orders of the probate court, of which the CA dismissed.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed an amended complained before
the RTC to recover possession/ownership of the five (5) parcels of
land as part of the estate of Lino and Genoveva. Private
respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds
that the action was barred by prior judgments and by prescription
and laches. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the complaint on
the ground of res judicata. A motion for reconsideration was denied
as well as the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed before
the appellate court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not in a settlement procceding (testate or
intestate) the lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions of
ownership. 2. Whether or not the petitioners present action for the
recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of
land is barred by res judicata RULING: Petitioners present action
for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed
because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally. The patent reason is the probate
courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of
title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate
action. It has been held that in a special proceeding for the
probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This
pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to intestate
proceedings as in the case at bar. Res judicata does not exist
because of the difference in the causes of actions. The other
action was for the settlement of the intestate estate of Lino and
Genoveca while the other one was an action for the recovery of
possession and ownership of the five (5) parcles of land. Moreover,
while the CFI had jurisdiction, the same was merely limited
jurisdiction. Any pronouncement by said court as to title is not
conclusive and could still be attacked in a separate
proceeding.
Wills and Succession 33Case Digest Indeed, the grounds relied
upon by private respondents in their motion to dismiss do not
appear to be indubitable. Res judicata has been shown to be
unavailable and the other grounds of prescription and laches
pleaded by private respondents are seriously disputed.
Wills and Succession 34Case Digest
Rosa K. Kalaw, petitioner, vs. Hon. Judge Benjamin RELOVA and
Gregorio K. KALAW, respondents. G.R. No. L-40207, September 28,
1984.FACTS: Natividad K. Kalaw made a holographic will executed on
December 24, 1968. Originally, the will named Rosa K. Kalaw, sister
of Natividad, as the sole heir. However, Natividad eventually
changed the name on the will by crossing out Rosas name and
replacing it with Gregorio K. Kalaw as sole heir instead. Natividad
failed to properly authenticate such alteration with her full
signature. Because of this, the parties decided to submit the
holographic will for an examination by the National Bureau of
Investigation. The Bureaus findings confirmed that the original
writings and those of the alterations were written by the same
person. Rosa argued that the probate should be denied since the
alteration on the will is invalid for failing to comply with Art.
814 which states that In case of any insertion, cancellation,
erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature. Further, Rosa asserted
that the will should be probated on its original content before the
alteration was made. Gregorio contends that the mere fact that Rosa
agreed to submit the will for examination estoppes her from
questioning the validity of the alteration and invoking Art. 814 of
the Civil Code. Judge Benjamin Relova denied the probate on the
will. Rosa now sought for the probate on the will as to its
original unaltered text. ISSUE: May the will, in case of
alterations, corrections, or cancellations, without the proper
authentication, be submitted for probate as to the original content
prior to such alteration, correction, or cancellation. RULING: No,
this cannot be done. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures,
corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, the Will
is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects
the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. However, when
as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the
original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the
requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the
testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or
revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will
after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as
first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming
change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can
neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in
the manner required by law by affixing her full signature. As it
is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the
testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with
certitude.
Wills and Succession 35Case Digest
RIcardo LARCERNA, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. Agatona
Paurillo VDA. DE CORCINO, defendant-appellee. Jacoba MARBEBE,
intervenor-appellee. G.R. No. L-14603, April 29, 1961FACTS:
Valentine Marbebe begot a daughter, Jacoba Marbebe, before his
marriage with Bonifacia Lacerna. Valentine and Bonificia had an
only son, Juan. Valentine and Bonifacia died leaving three parcels
of land to their only son Juan. Juan, then, executed a power of
attorney authorizing the sister of his mother or his aunt, Agatona
Vda. de Corcino take care of the disputed land. Eventually, Juan
died intestate and without any issue. The Court of First Instance
declared that the land is property of Jacoba being the half sister
of Juan. Agatona Vda. de Corcino and the nephews and nieces of
Bonifacia questioned the decision of the court. According to them,
the case should be based upon Article 891 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which establishes what is known as "reserva troncal."
According to them, under this principle, the properties in dispute
should pass to the heirs of the deceased within the third degree,
who belong to the line from which said properties came. Thus, since
Juan Marbebe inherited the land from his mother, they should go to
his nearest relative within the third degree on the maternal line
or to his aunt and cousins and not to Jacoba Marbebe for she
belongs to the paternal line. This, however, was protested by
Jacoba Marbebe. She contends that pursuant to Articles 1003 to 1009
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, brothers and sisters exclude
all other collateral relatives in the order of intestate
succession, and that, as Juan Marbebe's half-sister, she has,
accordingly, a better right than plaintiffs herein to inherit his
properties. ISSUE: Who has the better right to succeed Juan?
RULING: The provision on reserve troncal cannot be applied in this
case. In reserve troncal, the ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came. (Emphasis supplied.) This article applies only to properties
inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an ascendant
from a descendant, and this is not the scenario in the given case,
for the lands in dispute were inherited by a descendant, Juan
Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna. Said
legal provision is, therefore, not applicable in this case.
Furthermore, the Trial Judge, correctly awarded the land to Jacoba
Marbebe. The said decision is in accordance with the order
prescribed for intestate succession, particularly Articles 1003 to
1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, pursuant to which a
sister, even if only a halfsister, in the absence of other sisters
or brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters, excludes all
other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter
belong to the line from which the property of the deceased came.
Based on the foregoing, Jacoba Marbebe has the better right to
succeed Juan.
Wills and Succession 36Case Digest
Testacy of Sixto Lopez, Jose S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs.
Agustin LIBORO, oppositor-appellant. G.R. No. L-1787FACTS: The will
of Don Sixto Lopez was submitted for probate by Jose Lopez and
Clemencia Lopez, the Dons sister. The probate was opposed by
Agustin Liboro who contended that the will is not valid due to the
following grounds: (1) that the deceased never executed the alleged
will; 2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery;
(3) that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting
in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced age; (4)
that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and
attested as required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental
witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by
duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted
therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and
the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of
the testator was procured by fraud or trick. Liboro pointed out
that the first page of the will, which was contained in two pages
in all, was not numbered in letters or Arabic numbers as what
should have been required by law. It was also argued that the
testator should have signed the will with his signature and not
only with his thumb print if he indeed had the capacity to execute
the will. Furthermore, the will did not expressly state that the
language used is a language which the Don understood; in this case,
it was in Spanish. ISSUE: Whether or not there was substantial
compliance to qualify the will for probate. RULING: There has been
substantial compliance even in the presence of the averred
irregularities. The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of
wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the
substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. In the
present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet,
if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification
more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or
characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first
page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation
to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence,
the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a
continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the
attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding
page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption
"TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that
the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, all of
which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for
the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two
contains only the two lines