-
Battle of Stalingrad
For the 1949 Russian lm, see The Battle of Stalingrad(lm). For
the Russian Civil War battle at the same city,see Battle for
Tsaritsyn.The Battle of Stalingrad (23 August 1942 2 Febru-
Operation Blau: German advances from 7 May 1942 to 18November
1942to 7 July 1942to 22 July 1942to 1 August 1942to 18 November
1942
ary 1943)[8][9][10][11] was a major battle of World War IIin
which Nazi Germany and its allies fought the SovietUnion for
control of the city of Stalingrad (now Vol-gograd) in Southern
Russia, on the eastern boundary ofEurope.Marked by constant close
quarters combat and direct as-saults on civilians by air raids, it
is often regarded asthe single largest and bloodiest battle in the
history ofwarfare.[12] The heavy losses inicted on the
GermanWehrmacht make it arguably the most strategically de-cisive
battle of the whole war.[13] It was a turning point inthe European
theatre of World War IIthe German forcesnever regained the
initiative in the East and withdrew avast military force from the
West to replace their losses.[1]
The German oensive to capture Stalingrad began in latesummer
1942 using the 6th Army and elements of the4th Panzer Army. The
attack was supported by intensiveLuftwae bombing that reduced much
of the city to rub-ble. The ghting degenerated into
building-to-buildingghting, and both sides poured reinforcements
into thecity. By mid-November 1942, the Germans had pushedthe
Soviet defenders back at great cost into narrow zonesgenerally
along the west bank of the Volga River.
On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launchedOperation Uranus, a
two-pronged attack targeting theweaker Romanian and Hungarian
forces protecting theGerman 6th Armys anks.[14] The Axis forces on
theanks were overrun and the 6th Army was cut o and sur-rounded in
the Stalingrad area. Adolf Hitler ordered thatthe army stay in
Stalingrad and make no attempt to breakout; instead, attempts were
made to supply the army byair and to break the encirclement from
the outside. Heavyghting continued for another two months. By the
begin-ning of February 1943, the Axis forces in Stalingrad
hadexhausted their ammunition and food. The remaining el-ements of
the 6th Army surrendered.[15]:p.932 The battlelasted ve months, one
week, and three days.
1 Historical backgroundBy the spring of 1942, despite the
failure of OperationBarbarossa to decisively defeat the Soviet
Union in a sin-gle campaign, the Germans had captured vast
expansesof territory, including Ukraine, Belarus, and the
Balticrepublics. Elsewhere, the war had been progressing well: the
U-Boat oensive in the Atlantic had been very suc-cessful and Rommel
had just captured Tobruk.[16]:p.522In the east, they had stabilized
their front in a line run-ning from Leningrad in the north to
Rostov in the south.There were a number of salients in the line
where So-viet oensives had pushed the Germans back (notablyto the
northwest of Moscow and south of Kharkov) butthese were not
particularly threatening. Hitler was con-dent that he could master
the Red Army after the win-ter of 1942, because even though Army
Group Centre(Heeresgruppe Mitte) had suered heavy losses west
ofMoscow the previous winter, 65% of Army Group Cen-tre infantry
had not been engaged and had been restedand re-equipped. Neither
Army Group North nor ArmyGroup South had been particularly hard
pressed over thewinter.[17]:p.144 Stalin was expecting the main
thrust of theGerman summer attacks to be directed against
Moscowagain.[1]:p.498
With the initial operations being very successful, the Ger-mans
decided that their summer campaign in 1942 wouldbe directed at the
southern parts of the Soviet Union.The initial objectives in the
region around Stalingradwere the destruction of the industrial
capacity of the cityand the deployment of forces to block the Volga
River.The river was a key route from the Caucasus and theCaspian
Sea to central Russia. Its capture would disrupt
1
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2 2 PRELUDE
commercial river trac. The Germans cut the pipelinefrom the
oilelds when they captured Rostov on 23 July.The capture of
Stalingrad would make the delivery ofLend Lease supplies via the
Persian Corridor much moredicult.[15]:909[18] Hitler proclaimed
that after Stalingradhad been captured, all male civilians were to
be killed andall women and children were to be deported because
Stal-ingrad was dangerous with its communist inhabitants.[19]
On 23 July 1942, Hitler personally rewrote the opera-tional
objectives for the 1942 campaign, greatly expand-ing them to
include the occupation of the city of Stal-ingrad. Both sides began
to attach propaganda value tothe city based on it bearing the name
of the leader ofthe Soviet Union. It was assumed that the fall of
the citywould also rmly secure the northern and western anksof the
German armies as they advanced on Baku with theaim of securing
these strategic petroleum resources forGermany.[16]:p.528 The
expansion of objectives was a sig-nicant factor in Germanys failure
at Stalingrad, causedby German overcondence and an underestimation
of So-viet reserves.[20]
The Soviets realized that they were under tremendousconstraints
of time and resources and ordered that any-one strong enough to
hold a rie be sent to ght.[21]:p.94
2 Prelude
Main article: Case Blue
If I do not get the oil of Maikop andGrozny then I must nish
[liquidieren; killo, liquidate"] this war.Adolf
Hitler[16]:p.514
Army Group South was selected for a sprint forwardthrough the
southern Russian steppes into the Caucasus tocapture the vital
Soviet oil elds there. The planned sum-mer oensive was code-named
Fall Blau (Case Blue).It was to include the German 6th, 17th, 4th
Panzer and1st Panzer Armies. Army Group South had overrun
theUkrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1941. Poised inEastern
Ukraine, it was to spearhead the oensive.Hitler intervened,
however, ordering the Army Group tosplit in two. Army Group South
(A), under the com-mand of Wilhelm List, was to continue advancing
southtowards the Caucasus as planned with the 17th Armyand First
Panzer Army. Army Group South (B), includ-ing Friedrich Paulus's
6th Army and Hermann Hoth's4th Panzer Army, was to move east
towards the Volgaand Stalingrad. Army Group B was commanded
initiallyby Field Marshal Fedor von Bock and later by
GeneralMaximilian von Weichs.[15]:p.915
The start of Case Blue had been planned for late May1942. A
number of German and Romanian units thatwere to take part in Blau,
however, were besieging Sev-astopol on the Crimean Peninsula.
Delays in ending thesiege pushed back the start date for Blau
several times,and the city did not fall until the end of June. A
smalleraction was taken in the meantime, pinching o a Sovietsalient
in the Second Battle of Kharkov, which resultedin the envelopment
of a large Soviet force on 22 May.
The German advance to the Don River between 7 May and
23July.
Blau nally opened as Army Group South began its at-tack into
southern Russia on 28 June 1942. The Ger-man oensive started well.
Soviet forces oered littleresistance in the vast empty steppes and
started stream-ing eastward. Several attempts to re-establish a
defen-sive line failed when German units outanked them. Twomajor
pockets were formed and destroyed: the rst,northeast of Kharkov, on
2 July, and a second, aroundMillerovo, Rostov Oblast, a week later.
Meanwhile, theHungarian 2nd Army and the German 4th Panzer Armyhad
launched an assault on Voronezh, capturing the cityon 5 July.The
initial advance of the 6th Army was so successfulthat Hitler
intervened and ordered the 4th Panzer Armyto join Army Group South
(A) to the south. A mas-sive trac jam resulted when the 4th Panzer
and the 1stPanzer both required the few roads in the area.
Botharmies were stopped dead while they attempted to clearthe
resulting mess of thousands of vehicles. The delaywas long, and it
is thought that it cost the advance at leastone week. With the
advance now slowed, Hitler changedhis mind and re-assigned the 4th
Panzer Army back tothe attack on Stalingrad.By the end of July, the
Germans had pushed the Sovi-ets across the Don River. At this
point, the Don andVolga Rivers were only 65 km (40 mi) apart, and
the Ger-mans left their main supply depots west of the Don,
whichhad important implications later in the course of the bat-tle.
The Germans began using the armies of their Italian,Hungarian and
Romanian allies to guard their left (north-
-
3Infantry and a supporting StuG III assault gun advance
towardsthe city center.
ern) ank. The Italians won several accolades in o-cial German
communiques.[22][23][24][25] Sometimes theywere held in little
regard by the Germans, and were evenaccused of having low morale:
in reality, the Italian di-visions fought comparatively well, with
the 3rd Moun-tain Infantry Division Ravenna and 5th Infantry
Divi-sion Cosseria proving to have good morale, according toa
German liaison ocer[26] and being forced to retreatonly after a
massive armoured attack in which Germanreinforcements had failed to
arrive in time, according toa German historian.[27] Indeed the
Italians distinguishedthemselves in numerous battles, as in the
battle of Niko-layevka.The German 6th Army was only a few dozen
kilome-ters from Stalingrad, and 4th Panzer Army, now to
theirsouth, turned northwards to help take the city. To thesouth,
Army Group A was pushing far into the Cauca-sus, but their advance
slowed as supply lines grew overex-tended. The two German army
groups were not posi-tioned to support one another due to the great
distancesinvolved.After German intentions became clear in July
1942,Stalin appointed Marshal Andrey Yeryomenko as com-mander of
the Southeastern Front on 1 August 1942.Yeryomenko and Commissar
Nikita Khrushchev weretasked with planning the defense of
Stalingrad.[28]:p.25, 48The eastern border of Stalingrad was the
wide RiverVolga, and over the river, additional Soviet units
weredeployed. These units became the newly formed 62ndArmy, which
Yeryomenko placed under the command ofLt. Gen. Vasiliy Chuikov on
11 September 1942. Thesituation was extremely dire. When asked how
he inter-preted his task, he responded We will defend the cityor
die in the attempt.[29]:p.127 The 62nd Armys missionwas to defend
Stalingrad at all costs. Chuikovs general-ship during the battle
earned him one of his two Hero ofthe Soviet Union awards.
3 Attack on Stalingrad
The German advance to Stalingrad between 24 July and
18November
On 23 August the 6th Army reached the outskirts of Stal-ingrad
in pursuit of the 62nd and 64th Armies, which hadfallen back into
the city. Kleist later said after the war:[30]
The capture of Stalingrad was subsidiaryto the main aim. It was
only of importance asa convenient place, in the bottleneck
betweenDon and the Volga, where we could block anattack on our ank
by Russian forces comingfrom the east. At the start, Stalingrad was
nomore than a name on the map to us.[30]
The Soviets had enough warning of the Germans advanceto ship
grain, cattle, and railway cars across the Volgaand out of harms
way but most civilian residents werenot evacuated. This harvest
victory left the city shortof food even before the German attack
began. Before theHeer reached the city itself, the Luftwae had
renderedthe River Volga, vital for bringing supplies into the
city,unusable to Soviet shipping. Between 25 and 31 July, 32Soviet
ships were sunk, with another nine crippled.[2]:p.69
The battle began with the heavy bombing of the cityby
Generaloberst Wolfram von Richthofen's Luftotte 4,which in the
summer and autumn of 1942 was the mostpowerful single air formation
in the world. Some 1,000tons of bombs were dropped in 48 hours,
more than inLondon at the height of the Blitz.[2]:p.122 Much of
thecity was quickly turned to rubble, although some facto-ries
continued production while workers joined in theghting. The 369th
(Croatian) Reinforced Infantry Reg-iment was the only non-German
unit[31] selected by theWehrmacht to enter Stalingrad city during
assault opera-tions. It fought as part of the 100th Jger
Division.Stalin rushed all available troops to the east bank ofthe
Volga, some from as far away as Siberia. All theregular ferries
were quickly destroyed by the Luftwae,which then targeted troop
barges being towed slowly
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4 3 ATTACK ON STALINGRAD
across the river by tugs. Many civilians were evacu-ated across
the Volga.[28] It has been said that Stalin pre-vented civilians
from leaving the city in the belief thattheir presence would
encourage greater resistance fromthe citys defenders.[29]:p.106
Civilians, including womenand children, were put to work building
trenchworks andprotective fortications. A massive German
strategicbombing on 23 August caused a restorm, killing thou-sands
and turning Stalingrad into a vast landscape ofrubble and burnt
ruins. Ninety percent of the livingspace in the Voroshilovskiy area
was destroyed. Be-tween 23 and 26 August, Soviet reports indicate
955 peo-ple were killed and another 1,181 wounded as a resultof the
bombing.[2]:p.73 Casualties of 40,000 were
greatlyexaggerated,[5]:p.188189 and after 25 August, the Sovietsdid
not record any civilian and military casualties as a re-sult of air
raids.[Note 4]
Approaching this place, [Stalingrad], soldiers used to
say:"Weare entering hell." And after spending one or two dayshere,
they say: "No, this isn't hell, this is ten times worsethan
hell."[32]
Vasily ChuikovThe Soviet Air Force, the Voyenno-Vozdushnye
Sily
October 1942: German ocer with a Russian PPSh-41submachine gun
in Barrikady factory rubble. Many German sol-diers took up Russian
weapons when found, as they were moreeective than their own in
close quarter combat.
(VVS), was swept aside by the Luftwae. The VVS basesin the
immediate area lost 201 aircraft between 23 and 31August, and
despite meager reinforcements of some 100aircraft in August, it was
left with just 192 serviceable air-craft, 57 of which were
ghters.[2]:p.74 The Soviets con-tinued to pour aerial
reinforcements into the Stalingradarea in late September, but
continued to suer appallinglosses; the Luftwae had complete control
of the skies.The burden of the initial defense of the city fell on
the1077th Anti-Aircraft Regiment,[29]:p.106 a unit made upmainly of
young female volunteers who had no train-ing for engaging ground
targets. Despite this, and withno support available from other
units, the AA gunnersstayed at their posts and took on the
advancing panz-ers. The German 16th Panzer Division reportedly
hadto ght the 1077ths gunners shot for shot until all 37
German soldiers on their way in Stalingrad
anti-aircraft guns were destroyed or overrun. The Ger-man 16th
Panzer Division was shocked to nd that, dueto Soviet manpower
shortages, it had been ghting femalesoldiers.[29]:p.108[33] In the
early stages of the battle, theNKVD organized poorly armed Workers
militias" com-posed of civilians not directly involved in war
productionfor immediate use in the battle. The civilians were
of-ten sent into battle without ries.[29]:p.109 Sta and stu-dents
from the local technical university formed a tankdestroyer unit.
They assembled tanks from leftover partsat the tractor factory.
These tanks, unpainted and lackinggunsights, were driven directly
from the factory oor tothe front line. They could only be aimed at
point blankrange through the gun barrel.[29]:p.110
Soviets preparing to ward o a German assault in
Stalingradssuburbs
By the end of August, Army Group South (B) had nallyreached the
Volga, north of Stalingrad. Another advanceto the river south of
the city followed. By 1 September,the Soviets could only reinforce
and supply their forces inStalingrad by perilous crossings of the
Volga under con-stant bombardment by artillery and aircraft.On 5
September, the Soviet 24th and 66th Armies orga-nized a massive
attack against XIV Panzer Corps. TheLuftwae helped repulse the
oensive by heavily attack-ing Soviet artillery positions and
defensive lines. The So-
-
3.1 Fighting in the city 5
viets were forced to withdraw at midday after only a fewhours.
Of the 120 tanks the Soviets had committed, 30were lost to air
attack.[2]:p.75
A street ght in Stalingrad
Soviet operations were constantly hampered by the Luft-wae. On
18 September, the Soviet 1st Guards and 24thArmy launched an
oensive against VIII Army Corps atKotluban. VIII. Fliegerkorps
dispatched wave after waveof Stuka dive-bombers to prevent a
breakthrough. Theoensive was repulsed. The Stukas claimed 41 of
the106 Soviet tanks knocked out that morning, while es-corting Bf
109s destroyed 77 Soviet aircraft.[2]:p.80 Amidthe debris of the
wrecked city, the Soviet 62nd and 64thArmies, which included the
Soviet 13th Guards Rie Di-vision, anchored their defense lines with
strongpoints inhouses and factories.Fighting within the ruined city
was erce and desperate.Lieutenant General Alexander Rodimtsev was
in chargeof the 13th Guards Rie Division, and received one oftwo
Heroes of the Soviet Union awarded during the bat-tle for his
actions. Stalins Order No. 227 of 27 July 1942decreed that all
commanders who ordered unauthorizedretreat would be subject to a
military tribunal.[34] How-ever, it was the NKVD that ordered the
regular army andlectured them, on the need to show some guts.
Throughbrutal coercion for self-sacrice, thousands of desertersand
presumed malingerers were executed to discipline thetroops. At
Stalingrad alone, 14,000 soldiers of the RedArmy were executed in
order to keep the formation.[35]"Not a step back!" and There is no
land behind the
Volga!" were the slogans. The Germans pushing forwardinto
Stalingrad suered heavy casualties.
3.1 Fighting in the cityBy 12 September, at the time of their
retreat into thecity, the Soviet 62nd Army had been reduced to 90
tanks,700 mortars and just 20,000 personnel.[29] The remainingtanks
were used as immobile strongpoints within the city.The initial
German attack attempted to take the city in arush. One infantry
division went after the Mamayev Kur-gan, one attacked the central
rail station and one attackedtoward the central landing stage on
the Volga.
A German sniper in Stalingrad
Though initially successful, the German attacks stalled inthe
face of Soviet reinforcements brought in from acrossthe Volga. The
13th Guards Rie Division, assigned tocounterattack at the Mamayev
Kurgan and at RailwayStation No. 1 suered particularly heavy
losses. Over 30percent of its soldiers were killed in the rst 24
hours, andjust 320 out of the original 10,000 survived the entire
bat-tle. Both objectives were retaken, but only temporarily.The
railway station changed hands 14 times in six hours.By the
following evening, the 13th Guards Rie Divisionhad ceased to exist.
So great were Soviet losses that attimes, the life expectancy of a
newly arrived soldier wasless than a day, and the life expectancy
of a Soviet ocerwas three days.Combat raged for three days at the
giant grain elevatorin the south of the city. About fty Red Army
defend-ers, cut o from resupply, held the position for ve daysand
fought o ten dierent assaults before running outof ammunition and
water. Only forty dead Soviet ght-ers were found, though the
Germans had thought therewere many more due to the intensity of
resistance. TheSoviets burned large amounts of grain during their
retreatin order to deny the enemy food. Paulus chose the
grainelevator and silos as the symbol of Stalingrad for a patchhe
was having designed to commemorate the battle aftera German
victory.German military doctrine was based on the principleof
combined-arms teams and close cooperation betweentanks, infantry,
engineers, artillery and ground-attack air-
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6 3 ATTACK ON STALINGRAD
craft. Some Soviet commanders adopted the tactic ofalways
keeping their front-line positions as close to theGermans as
physically possible; Chuikov called this hug-ging the Germans. This
slowed the German advanceand reduced the eectiveness of the German
advantagein supporting re.[36]
The Red Army gradually adopted a strategy to hold for aslong as
possible all the ground in the city. Thus, they con-verted
multi-oored apartment blocks, factories, ware-houses, street corner
residences and oce buildings into aseries of well defended
strongpoints with small 510 manunits.[36] Manpower in the city was
constantly refreshedby bringing additional troops over the Volga.
When a po-sition was lost, an immediate attempt was usually madeto
re-take it with fresh forces.
Soviet soldiers in the Red October Factory
Bitter ghting raged for every ruin, street, factory,
house,basement, and staircase. Even the sewers were the sitesof
reghts. The Germans, calling this unseen urban war-fare Rattenkrieg
(Rat War),[37] bitterly joked about cap-turing the kitchen but
still ghting for the living room andthe bedroom. Buildings had to
be cleared room by roomthrough the bombed-out debris of residential
neighbor-hoods, oce blocks, basements and apartment high-rises.Some
of the taller buildings, blasted into rooess shells byearlier
German aerial bombardment, saw oor-by-oor,close quarters combat,
with the Germans and Soviets onalternate levels, ring at each other
through holes in theoors.[36]
Fighting on and around Mamayev Kurgan, a prominenthill above the
city, was particularly merciless; indeed, theposition changed hands
many times.[28]:p?[38]
In another part of the city, a Soviet platoon under thecommand
of Sergeant Yakov Pavlov fortied a four-story building that oversaw
a square 300 meters from theriver bank, later called Pavlovs House.
The soldiers sur-rounded it with mineelds, set up machine-gun
positionsat the windows and breached the walls in the basement
forbetter communications.[29] The soldiers found about tenSoviet
civilians hiding in the basement. They were not re-lieved, and not
signicantly reinforced, for two months.The building was labeled
Festung (Fortress) on German
Pavlovs House (1943)
maps. Sgt. Pavlov was awarded the Hero of the SovietUnion for
his actions.
Soviet marines landing on the west bank of the Volga River.
The Germans made slow but steady progress throughthe city.
Positions were taken individually, but the Ger-mans were never able
to capture the key crossing pointsalong the river bank. The Germans
used airpower, tanksand heavy artillery to clear the city with
varying degreesof success. Toward the end of the battle, the
giganticrailroad gun nicknamed Dora was brought into the area.The
Soviets built up a large number of artillery batter-ies on the east
bank of the Volga. This artillery was ableto bombard the German
positions or at least to providecounter-battery re.Snipers on both
sides used the ruins to inict casualties.The most famous Soviet
sniper in Stalingrad was VasilyZaytsev,[39] with 225 conrmed kills
during the battle.Targets were often soldiers bringing up food or
water toforward positions. Artillery spotters were an
especiallyprized target for snipers.A signicant historical debate
concerns the degree ofterror in the Red Army. The British historian
AntonyBeevor noted the sinister message from the StalingradFronts
Political Department on 8 October 1942 that:The defeatist mood is
almost eliminated and the num-ber of treasonous incidents is
getting lower as an ex-ample of the sort of coercion Red Army
soldiers expe-
-
3.2 Air attacks 7
rienced under the Special Detachments (later to be re-named
SMERSH).[40]:p.154168 On the other hand, Beevornoted the often
extraordinary bravery of the Soviet sol-diers in a battle that was
only comparable to Verdun,and argued that terror alone cannot
explain such self-sacrice.[29]:p.154168 Richard Overy addresses the
ques-tion of just how important the Red Armys coercive meth-ods
were to the Soviet war eort compared with othermotivational factors
such as hatred for the enemy. Heargues that, though it is easy to
argue that from the sum-mer of 1942 the Soviet army fought because
it was forcedto ght, to concentrate solely on coercion is
nonethe-less to distort our view of the Soviet war eort.[41] Af-ter
conducting hundreds of interviews with Soviet veter-ans on the
subject of terror on the Eastern Front andspecically about Order
No. 227 (Not a step back!")at Stalingrad Catherine Merridale notes
that, seeminglyparadoxically, their response was frequently
relief.[42]Infantryman Lev Lvovichs explanation, for example,
istypical for these interviews; as he recalls, "[i]t was a
nec-essary and important step. We all knew where we stoodafter we
had heard it. And we all its true felt better.Yes, we felt
better.[43]
Soil after the battle of Stalingrad in the Vladimir Military
Mu-seum
Many women fought on the Soviet side, or were underre. As
General Chuikov acknowledged, Rememberingthe defence of Stalingrad,
I can't overlook the very impor-tant question ... about the role of
women in war, in therear, but also at the front. Equally with men
they bore allthe burdens of combat life and together with us men,
theywent all the way to Berlin.[44] At the beginning of thebattle
there were 75,000 women and girls from the Stal-ingrad area who had
nished military or medical training,and all of whom were to serve
in the battle.[45] Womenstaed a great many of the anti-aircraft
batteries thatfought not only the Luftwae but German tanks.[46]
So-viet nurses not only treated wounded personnel under rebut were
involved in the highly dangerous work of bring-ing wounded soldiers
back to the hospitals under enemyre.[47] Many of the Soviet
wireless and telephone oper-ators were women who often suered heavy
casualtieswhen their command posts came under re.[48] Thoughwomen
were not usually trained as infantry, many So-viet women fought as
machine gunners, mortar operators,and scouts.[49] Women were also
snipers at Stalingrad.[50]Three air regiments at Stalingrad were
entirely female.[49]At least three women won the title Hero of the
Soviet
Union while driving tanks at Stalingrad.[51]
For both Stalin and Hitler, Stalingrad became a matter
ofprestige far beyond its strategic signicance.[52] The So-viet
command moved units from the Red Army strategicreserve in the
Moscow area to the lower Volga, and trans-ferred aircraft from the
entire country to the Stalingradregion.The strain on both military
commanders was immense:Paulus developed an uncontrollable tic in
his eye, whicheventually aicted the left side of his face, while
Chuikovexperienced an outbreak of eczema that required him tohave
his hands completely bandaged. Troops on bothsides faced the
constant strain of close-range combat.[53]
3.2 Air attacks
Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bomber over the neighborhood west ofthe
Red October factory; some of the administration buildings areat
lower right; Bayonet Gully is at top right.
Determined to crush Soviet resistance, Luftotte 4sStukawae ew
900 individual sorties against Soviet po-sitions at the
Dzerzhinskiy Tractor Factory on 5 October.Several Soviet regiments
were wiped out; the entire staof the Soviet 339th Infantry Regiment
was killed the fol-lowing morning during an air raid.[2]:p.83
In mid-October, the Luftwae intensied its eortsagainst remaining
Red Army positions holding the westbank. Luftotte 4 ew 2,000
sorties on 14 October and550 t (610 short tons) of bombs were
dropped whileGerman infantry surrounded the three factories.
Stuk-ageschwader 1, 2, and 77 had largely silenced Soviet
ar-tillery on the eastern bank of the Volga before turningtheir
attention to the shipping that was once again tryingto reinforce
the narrowing Soviet pockets of resistance.The 62nd Army had been
cut in two, and, due to inten-sive air attack on its supply
ferries, was receiving muchless material support. With the Soviets
forced into a 1-kilometre (1,000-yard) strip of land on the western
bankof the Volga, over 1,208 Stuka missions were own in aneort to
eliminate them.[2]:p.84
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8 4 SOVIET COUNTER-OFFENSIVES
The Luftwae retained air superiority into November andSoviet
daytime aerial resistance was nonexistent. How-ever, the
combination of constant air support operationson the German side
and the Soviet surrender of the day-time skies began to aect the
strategic balance in the air.After ying 20,000 individual sorties,
the Luftwae ' soriginal strength of 1,600 serviceable aircraft had
fallento 950. The Kampfwae (bomber force) had been hard-est hit,
having only 232 out of a force of 480 left.[5]:p.95The VVS remained
qualitatively inferior, but by the timeof the Soviet
counter-oensive, the VVS had reached nu-merical superiority.
Romanian IAR 80 ghter planes.
The Soviet bomber force, the Aviatsiya Dal'negoDeystviya (Long
Range Aviation; ADD), having takencrippling losses over the past 18
months, was restrictedto ying at night. The Soviets ew 11,317 night
sortiesover Stalingrad and the Don-bend sector between 17 Julyand
19 November. These raids caused little damage andwere of nuisance
value only.[2]:p.82[54]:265
On 8 November, substantial units from Luftotte 4 werewithdrawn
to combat the Allied landings in North Africa.The German air arm
found itself spread thinly across Eu-rope, struggling to maintain
its strength in the other south-ern sectors of the Soviet-German
front.[Note 5] The Sovi-ets began receiving material assistance
from the Ameri-can government under the Lend-Lease program.
Duringthe last quarter of 1942, the U.S. sent the Soviet
Union45,000 t (50,000 short tons) of explosives and 230,000
t(250,000 short tons) of aviation gas.[55]:p.404
As historian Chris Bellamy notes, the Germans paid ahigh
strategic price for the aircraft sent into Stalingrad:the Luftwae
was forced to divert much of its air strengthaway from the oil-rich
Caucasus, which had been Hitlersoriginal grand-strategic
objective.[56]
3.3 Germany reaches the Volga
After three months of slow advance, the Germans nallyreached the
river banks, capturing 90% of the ruined cityand splitting the
remaining Soviet forces into two narrowpockets. Ice oes on the
Volga now prevented boats and
tugs from supplying the Soviet defenders. Nevertheless,the
ghting, especially on the slopes of Mamayev Kurganand inside the
factory area in the northern part of the city,continued.
4 Soviet counter-oensives
Soviet soldiers attack a house, February 1943
Recognizing that German troops were ill prepared for of-fensive
operations during the winter of 1942, and thatmost of them were
redeployed elsewhere on the southernsector of the Eastern Front,
the Stavka decided to conducta number of oensive operations between
19 November1942 and 2 February 1943. These operations opened
theWinter Campaign of 19421943 (19 November 1942 3March 1943),
which involved some 15 Armies operatingon several fronts.
4.1 Weakness on the German anks
During the siege, the German and allied Italian, Hungar-ian, and
Romanian armies protecting Army Group Bsanks had pressed their
headquarters for support. TheHungarian 2nd Army was given the task
of defending a200 km (120 mi) section of the front north of
Stalin-grad between the Italian Army and Voronezh. This re-sulted
in a very thin line, with some sectors where 12km (0.621.24 mi)
stretches were being defended by asingle platoon. These forces were
also lacking in eec-tive anti-tank weapons.Because of the total
focus on the city, the Axis forces hadneglected for months to
consolidate their positions alongthe natural defensive line of the
Don River. The Sovietforces were allowed to retain bridgeheads on
the rightbank from which oensive operations could be
quicklylaunched. These bridgeheads in retrospect presented aserious
threat to Army Group B.[15]:p.915
Similarly, on the southern ank of the Stalingrad sectorthe front
southwest of Kotelnikovo was held only by theRomanian 7th Army
Corps, and beyond it, a single Ger-man division, the 16th Motorized
Infantry.
-
94.2 Operation Uranus: the Soviet oensiveMain article: Operation
UranusIn autumn, the Soviet generals Georgy Zhukov and
The Soviet counter-attack at StalingradGerman front, 19
NovemberGerman front, 12 DecemberGerman front, 24 DecemberSoviet
advance, 1928 November
Aleksandr Vasilevsky, responsible for strategic planningin the
Stalingrad area, concentrated forces in the steppesto the north and
south of the city. The northern ankwas defended by Hungarian and
Romanian units, oftenin open positions on the steppes. The natural
line of de-fense, the Don River, had never been properly
establishedby the German side. The armies in the area were
alsopoorly equipped in terms of anti-tank weapons. The planwas to
punch through the overstretched and weakly de-fended German anks
and surround the German forcesin the Stalingrad region.During the
preparations for the attack, Marshal Zhukovpersonally visited the
front and noticing the poor organi-zation, insisted on a one-week
delay in the start date of theplanned attack.[29]:p.117 The
operation was code-namedUranus and launched in conjunction with
OperationMars, which was directed at Army Group Center. Theplan was
similar to the one Zhukov had used to achievevictory at Khalkhin
Gol three years before, where he hadsprung a double envelopment and
destroyed the 23rd Di-vision of the Japanese army.[57]
On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launched Opera-tion Uranus.
The attacking Soviet units under the com-mand of Gen. Nikolay
Vatutin consisted of three com-plete armies, the 1st Guards Army,
5th Tank Army, and21st Army, including a total of 18 infantry
divisions, eighttank brigades, two motorized brigades, six cavalry
divi-
sions and one anti-tank brigade. The preparations forthe attack
could be heard by the Romanians, who contin-ued to push for
reinforcements, only to be refused again.Thinly spread, deployed in
exposed positions, outnum-bered and poorly equipped, the Romanian
3rd Army,which held the northern ank of the German 6th Army,was
overrun.Behind the front lines, no preparations had been made
todefend key points in the rear such as Kalach. The localresponse
by the Wehrmacht was both chaotic and indeci-sive. Poor weather
prevented eective air action againstthe Soviet oensive.On 20
November, a second Soviet oensive (two armies)was launched to the
south of Stalingrad against pointsheld by the Romanian 4th Army
Corps. The Romanianforces, made up primarily of infantry, were
overrun bylarge numbers of tanks. The Soviet forces raced west
andmet on 23 November at the town of Kalach, sealing thering around
Stalingrad.[15]:p.926 The link-up of the Sovietforces, not lmed at
the time, was later re-enacted for apropaganda lm which was shown
worldwide.
5 Sixth Army surrounded
Romanian soldiers near Stalingrad
German soldiers as prisoners of war. In the background is
theheavily fought-over Stalingrad grain elevator
About 265,000 German, Romanian, and Italiansoldiers,[58] the
369th (Croatian) Reinforced Infantry
-
10 5 SIXTH ARMY SURROUNDED
German dead in the city
Regiment, and other volunteer subsidiary troops in-cluding some
40,000 Soviet volunteers ghting forthe Germans (Beevor states that
one quarter of thesixth armys frontline strength were HIWIs, as
collab-orationists recruited from the ranks of Soviet POWswere
called)[59] were surrounded. These Soviet HIWIsremained loyal,
knowing the Soviet penalty for helpingthe Germans was summary
execution. German strengthin the pocket was about 210,000 according
to strengthbreakdowns of the 20 eld divisions (average size
9,000)and 100 battalion sized units of the Sixth Army on 19November
1942. Inside the pocket (German: Kessel,literally cauldron), there
were also around 10,000Soviet civilians and several thousand Soviet
soldiers theGermans had taken captive during the battle. Not all
ofthe 6th Army was trapped; 50,000 soldiers were brushedaside
outside the pocket. These belonged mostly to theother 2 divisions
of the 6th Army between the Italianand Romanian Armies: the 62nd
and 298th InfantryDivisions. Of the 210,000 Germans, 10,000
remainedto ght on, 105,000 surrendered, 35,000 left by air andthe
remaining 60,000 died.The Red Army units immediately formed two
defen-sive fronts: a circumvallation facing inward and
acontravallation facing outward. Field Marshal Erich vonManstein
advised Hitler not to order the 6th Army tobreak out, stating that
he could break through the Sovietlines and relieve the besieged 6th
Army.[60] The Ameri-can historians Williamson Murray and Alan
Millet wrotethat it was Mansteins message to Hitler on 24 Novem-ber
advising him that the 6th Army should not break out,along with
Grings statements that the Luftwae couldsupply Stalingrad that "...
sealed the fate of the SixthArmy.[61] After 1945, Manstein claimed
that he toldHitler that the 6th Army must break out.[62] The
Ameri-can historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that Manstein dis-torted
his record on the matter.[63] Manstein was taskedto conduct a
relief operation, named Operation WinterStorm (Unternehmen
Wintergewitter) against Stalingrad,which he thought was feasible if
the 6th Army was tem-porarily supplied through the air.[64][65]
Adolf Hitler had declared in a public speech (in theBerlin
Sportpalast) on 30 September 1942 that the Ger-man army would never
leave the city. At a meet-ing shortly after the Soviet
encirclement, German armychiefs pushed for an immediate breakout to
a new line onthe west of the Don, but Hitler was at his Bavarian
re-treat of Obersalzberg in Berchtesgaden with the head ofthe
Luftwae, Hermann Gring. When asked by Hitler,Gring replied, after
being convinced by Hans Jeschon-nek,[5]:p.234 that the Luftwae
could supply the 6th Armywith an "air bridge. This would allow the
Germans inthe city to ght on temporarily while a relief force
wasassembled.[15]:926 A similar plan had been used a yearearlier at
the Demyansk Pocket, albeit on a much smallerscale: a corps at
Demyansk rather than an entire army.
A Ju 52 approaching Stalingrad
The director of Luftotte 4, Wolfram von Richthofen,tried to get
this decision overturned. The forces under6th Army were almost
twice as large as a regular Germanarmy unit, plus there was also a
corps of the 4th PanzerArmy trapped in the pocket. The maximum 107
t (118short tons) they could deliver a daybased on the num-ber of
available aircraft and with only the aireld at Pit-omnik to land
atwas far less than the minimum 750 t(830 short tons)
needed.[5][Note 6] To supplement the lim-ited number of Junkers Ju
52 transports, the Germanspressed other aircraft into the role,
such as the HeinkelHe 177 bomber (some bombers performed
adequatelythe Heinkel He 111 proved to be quite capable and wasmuch
faster than the Ju 52). General Richthofen in-formed Manstein on 27
November of the small transportcapacity of the Luftwae and the
impossibility of supply-ing 300 tons a day by air. Manstein now saw
the enormoustechnical diculties of a supply by air of these
dimen-sions. The next day he made a six-page situation reportto the
general sta. Based on the information of the ex-pert Richthofen, he
declared that contrary to the exampleof the pocket of Demjansk the
permanent supply by airwould be impossible. If only a narrow link
could be estab-lished to Sixth Army, he proposed that this should
be usedto pull it out from the encirclement. He acknowledged
theheavy moral sacrice the giving up of Stalingrad meansbut this is
made easier to bear by the conservation of thecombat power of Sixth
Army and the regaining of the ini-
-
11
tiative ...[66] He ignored the limited mobility of the armyand
the diculties of disengaging the Soviets. Hitler re-iterated that
Sixth Army would stay at Stalingrad and thatthe air bridge would
supply it until the encirclement wasbroken by a new German
oensive.The Luftwae was able to deliver an average of 85 t (94short
tons) of supplies per day out of an air transportcapacity of 106 t
(117 short tons) per day. The mostsuccessful day, 19 December,
delivered 262 t (289 shorttons) of supplies in 154 ights.In the
early parts of the operation, fuel was shippedat a higher priority
than food and ammunition becauseof a belief that there would be a
breakout from thecity.[20]:p.153 Transport aircraft also evacuated
technicalspecialists and sick or wounded personnel from the
be-sieged enclave. Sources dier on the number own out:at least
25,000 to at most 35,000. Carell: 42,000, ofwhich 5000 did not
survive.
The center of Stalingrad after liberation
Initially, supply ights came in from the eld atTatsinskaya,
called 'Tazi' by the German pilots. On 23December, the Soviet 24th
Tank Corps, commanded byMajor-General Vasily Mikhaylovich Badanov,
reachednearby Skassirskaya and in the early morning of 24
De-cember, the tanks reached Tatsinskaya. Without any sol-diers to
defend the aireld, it was abandoned under heavyre; in a little
under an hour, 108 Ju 52s and 16 Ju 86stook o for
Novocherkasskleaving 72 Ju 52s and manyother aircraft burning on
the ground. A new base was es-tablished some 300 km (190 mi) from
Stalingrad at Salsk,the additional distance another obstacle to the
resupplyeorts. Salsk was abandoned in turn by mid-January fora
rough facility at Zverevo, near Shakhty. The eld atZverevo was
attacked repeatedly on 18 January and afurther 50 Ju 52s were
destroyed. Winter weather con-ditions, technical failures, heavy
Soviet anti-aircraft reand ghter interceptions eventually led to
the loss of 488German aircraft.In spite of the failure of the
German oensive to reach6th Army, the air supply operation continued
under evermore dicult circumstances. The 6th Army slowlystarved.
Pilots were shocked to nd the troops too ex-hausted and hungry to
unload. Germans fought over the
slightest scraps of bread. General Zeitzler, moved by
theirplight, began to limit himself to their slim rations at
mealtimes. After a few weeks on such a diet, he had lost12 kg (26
lb) and had become so emaciated that Hitler,annoyed, personally
ordered him to start eating regularmeals again.The toll on the
Transportgruppen was heavy. 160 air-craft were destroyed and 328
were heavily damaged (be-yond repair). Some 266 Junkers Ju 52s were
destroyed;one-third of the eets strength on the Eastern Front.The
He 111 gruppen lost 165 aircraft in transport oper-ations. Other
losses included 42 Ju 86s, 9 Fw 200 Con-dors, 5 He 177 bombers and
1 Ju 290. The Luftwaealso lost close to 1,000 highly experienced
bomber crewpersonnel.[5]:p.310 So heavy were the Luftwae ' s
lossesthat four of Luftotte 4s transport units (KGrzbV 700,KGrzbV
900, I./KGrzbV 1 and II./KGzbV 1) were for-mally
dissolved.[2]:p.122
6 The end of the battle
6.1 Operation Winter Storm
Main article: Operation Winter Storm
Soviet forces consolidated their positions around Stalin-grad,
and erce ghting to shrink the pocket began. Oper-ation Winter Storm
(Operation Wintergewitter), the Ger-man attempt led by Erich von
Manstein to relieve thetrapped army from the south, was initially
successful. Thecross country ability of German tanks in the snow
mayhave slowed the relief attempts. By 19 December, theGerman Army
had pushed to within 48 km (30 mi) ofSixth Armys positions. The
encircled forces at Stalin-grad made no attempt to break out or
link up with theMansteins advance. Some German ocers requestedthat
Paulus defy Hitlers orders to stand fast and insteadattempt to
break out of the Stalingrad pocket. Paulus re-fused. On 23
December, the attempt to relieve Stalingradwas abandoned and
Mansteins forces switched over to thedefensive to deal with new
Soviet oensives.
6.2 Operation Little SaturnMain article: Operation Little
SaturnOn 16 December, the Soviets launched Operation Little
Saturn, which attempted to punch through the Axis army(mainly
Italians) on the Don and take Rostov. The Ger-mans set up a mobile
defense of small units that wereto hold towns until supporting
armor arrived. From theSoviet bridgehead at Mamon, 15
divisionssupportedby at least 100 tanksattacked the Italian
Cosseria andRavenna Divisions, and although outnumbered 9 to 1,
theItalians initially fought well, with the Germans praisingthe
quality of the Italian defenders,[67] but on 19 Decem-
-
12 6 THE END OF THE BATTLE
Soviet gains (shown in blue) during Operation Little Saturn
ber, with the Italian lines disintegrating, ARMIR head-quarters
ordered the battered divisions to withdraw tonew lines.[68]
The ghting forced a total revaluation of the German sit-uation.
The attempt to break through to Stalingrad wasabandoned and Army
Group A was ordered to pull backfrom the Caucasus.The 6th Army now
was beyond all hope of German relief.While a motorised breakout
might have been possible inthe rst few weeks, the 6th Army now had
insucient fueland the German soldiers would have faced great
dicultybreaking through the Soviet lines on foot in harsh
winterconditions. But in its defensive position on the Volga,
6thArmy continued to tie down a disproportionate numberof Soviet
Armies.
6.3 Soviet victoryMain article: Operation Koltso
The Germans inside the pocket retreated from thesuburbs of
Stalingrad to the city itself. The loss of the twoairelds, at
Pitomnik on 16 January 1943 and Gumrak onthe night of 21/22
January,[69] meant an end to air sup-plies and to the evacuation of
the wounded.[70]:p.98 Thethird and last serviceable runway was at
the Stalingrad-skaja ight school, which reportedly had the last
landingsand takeos on the night of 2223 January.[31] After
day-break on 23 January, there were no more reported land-ings
except for intermittent air drops of ammunition andfood until the
end.The Germans were now not only starving, but running outof
ammunition. Nevertheless, they continued to resist,in part because
they believed the Soviets would executeany who surrendered. In
particular, the so-called HiWis,Soviet citizens ghting for the
Germans, had no illusionsabout their fate if captured. The Soviets
were initiallysurprised by the number of Germans they had
trapped,and had to reinforce their encircling troops. Bloody
urban
759,560 Soviet personnel were awarded this medal for the
de-fence of Stalingrad from 22 December 1942.
warfare began again in Stalingrad, but this time it wasthe
Germans who were pushed back to the banks of theVolga. The Germans
adopted a simple defense of x-ing wire nets over all windows to
protect themselves fromgrenades. The Soviets responded by xing sh
hooks tothe grenades so they stuck to the nets when thrown.The
Germans had no usable tanks in the city, and thosethat still
functioned could, at best, be used as makeshiftpillboxes. The
Soviets did not bother employing tanksin areas where the urban
destruction restricted their mo-bility. A low-level Soviet envoy
party (comprising Ma-jor Aleksandr Smyslov, Captain Nikolay
Dyatlenko anda trumpeter) carried an oer to Paulus: if he
surrenderedwithin 24 hours, he would receive a guarantee of
safetyfor all prisoners, medical care for the sick and
wounded,prisoners allowed to keep their personal belongings,
nor-mal food rations, and repatriation to any country theywished
after the war; but Paulusordered not to surren-der by Hitlerdid not
respond.[71]:p.283
-
13
Generalfeldmarschall Friedrich Paulus (left), with his chief
ofsta, Generalleutnant Arthur Schmidt (centre) and his aide,Wilhelm
Adam (right), after their surrender.
Soviets defend a position
On 22 January Paulus requested that he be granted per-mission to
surrender. Hitler rejected it on a point of hon-our. He telegraphed
the 6th Army later that day, claim-ing that it had made a historic
contribution to the greateststruggle in German history and that it
should stand fast tothe last soldier and the last bullet. Hitler
told Goebbelsthat the plight of the 6th Army was a heroic drama
ofGerman history.[72]
On 26 January 1943, the German forces inside Stalin-grad were
split into two pockets. A northern pocket cen-tered on the tractor
factory and a smaller southern pocketin the city center. The
northern pocket was tactically
commanded by General Walter Heitz while the southernpocket was
commanded by Paulus.On 30 January 1943, the 10th anniversary of
Hitlerscoming to power, Goebbels read out a proclamation
thatincluded the sentence: The heroic struggle of our sol-diers on
the Volga should be a warning for everybody todo the utmost for the
struggle for Germanys freedom andthe future of our people, and thus
in a wider sense for themaintenance of our entire continent.[73]
Hitler promotedPaulus to the rank of Generalfeldmarschall. No
Germaneld marshal had ever surrendered, and the implicationwas
clear: if Paulus surrendered, he would shame him-self and would
become the highest ranking German o-cer ever to be captured. Hitler
believed that Paulus wouldeither ght to the last man or commit
suicide.[74] Paulus,however, commented, I have no intention of
shootingmyself for this Bohemian corporal.[75][Note 7]
The next day, the southern pocket in Stalingrad collapsed.Soviet
forces reached the entrance to the German head-quarters in the
ruined GUM department store. GeneralSchmidt negotiated a surrender
of the headquarters whilePaulus waited in another room. When
interrogated by theSoviets, Paulus claimed that he had not
surrendered. Hesaid that he had been taken by surprise. He denied
thathe was the commander of the remaining northern pocketin
Stalingrad and refused to issue an order in his name forthem to
surrender.[76][77]
Four Soviet armies were deployed against the remainingnorthern
pocket. At four in the morning on 2 Febru-ary, General Strecker was
informed that one of his ownocers had gone to the Soviets to
negotiate surrenderterms. Seeing no point in continuing, he sent a
radiomessage saying that his command had done its duty andfought to
the last man. He then surrendered. Around91,000 exhausted, ill,
wounded, and starving prisonerswere taken, including 3,000
Romanians (the survivors ofthe 20th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry
Division and Col.Voicu Detachment).[78] The prisoners included 22
gen-erals. Hitler was furious and conded that Paulus couldhave
freed himself from all sorrow and ascended intoeternity and
national immortality, but he prefers to go toMoscow.[79]
7 AftermathBased on Soviet records, over 10,000 soldiers
continuedto resist in isolated groups within the city for the
nextmonth.The German public was not ocially told of the impend-ing
disaster until the end of January 1943, though pos-itive media
reports had stopped in the weeks before theannouncement.[80]
Stalingrad marked the rst time thatthe Nazi government publicly
acknowledged a failure inits war eort; it was not only the rst
major setback forthe German military, but a crushing defeat where
German
-
14 7 AFTERMATH
The aftermath of the Battle of Stalingrad
losses were almost equal to those of the Soviets was
un-precedented. Prior losses of the Soviet Union were gen-erally
three times as high as the German ones.[80] On 31January, regular
programming on German state radio wasreplaced by a broadcast of the
somber Adagio movementfrom Anton Bruckner's Seventh Symphony,
followed bythe announcement of the defeat at Stalingrad.[80]
On 18 February, Minister of Propaganda JosephGoebbels gave the
famous Sportpalast speech in Berlin,encouraging the Germans to
accept a total war that wouldclaim all resources and eorts from the
entire population.
A Red Army soldier marches a German soldier into captivity.
According to the German documentary lm Stalingrad(1993), over
11,000 soldiers refused to lay down theirarms at the ocial
surrender. Some have presumed thatthey were motivated by a belief
that ghting on was betterthan a slow death in Soviet captivity. The
Israeli historianOmer Bartov claims they were motivated by National
So-cialism. He studied 11,237 letters sent by soldiers insideof
Stalingrad between 20 December 1942 and 16 Jan-uary 1943 to their
families in Germany. Almost everyletter expressed belief in
Germanys ultimate victory andtheir willingness to ght and die at
Stalingrad to achievethat victory.[81] Bartov reported that a great
many of thesoldiers were well aware that they would not be able
toescape from Stalingrad, but in their letters to their fami-lies
boasted that they were proud to sacrice themselvesfor the
Fhrer.[81]
The remaining forces continued to resist, hiding in cel-lars and
sewers, but by early March 1943, the remainingsmall and isolated
pockets of resistance had surrendered.According to Soviet
intelligence documents shown in thedocumentary, a remarkable NKVD
report from March1943 is available showing the tenacity of some of
theseGerman groups:
The mopping-up of counter-revolutionaryelements in the city of
Stalingrad proceeded.The German soldiers - who had hidden
them-selves in huts and trenches - oered armedresistance after
combat actions had alreadyended. This armed resistance continued
until15 February and in a few areas until 20 Febru-ary. Most of the
armed groups were liqui-dated by March ... During this period of
armedconict with the Germans, the brigades unitskilled 2,418
soldiers and ocers and captured8,646 soldiers and ocers, escorting
them toPOW camps and handing them over.
The operative report of the Don Fronts sta issued on 5February
1943, 22.00 said:
The 64th Army was putting itself in order,being in previously
occupied regions. Locationof armys units is as it was previously.
In theregion of location of the 38 Motorized RieBrigade in a
basement 18 armed SS-men (sic)were found, who refused to surrender,
the Ger-mans found were destroyed.[82]
Out of the nearly 110,000 German prisoners captured
inStalingrad, only about 5,000 ever returned.[83] Alreadyweakened
by disease, starvation and lack of medical careduring the
encirclement, they were sent on death marches(75,000 survivors died
within 3 months of capture) toprisoner camps and later to labour
camps all over the So-viet Union. Some 35,000 were eventually sent
on trans-ports, of which 17,000 did not survive. Most died
ofwounds, disease (particularly typhus), cold,
overwork,mistreatment, and malnutrition. Some were kept in thecity
to help rebuild.A handful of senior ocers were taken to Moscow
andused for propaganda purposes, and some of them joinedthe
National Committee for a Free Germany. Some, in-cluding Paulus,
signed anti-Hitler statements that werebroadcast to German troops.
Paulus testied for the pros-ecution during the Nuremberg Trials and
assured familiesin Germany that those soldiers taken prisoner at
Stalin-grad were safe.[28]:p.401 He remained in the Soviet
Unionuntil 1952, then moved to Dresden in East Germany,where he
spent the remainder of his days defending hisactions at Stalingrad,
and was quoted as saying that Com-munism was the best hope for
postwar Europe.[28]:p.280General Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach
oered to raise
-
15
an anti-Hitler army from the Stalingrad survivors, but
theSoviets did not accept. It was not until 1955 that the lastof
the 5-6,000 survivors were repatriated (to West Ger-many) after a
plea to the Politburo by Konrad Adenauer.
8 SignicanceStalingrad has been described as the biggest defeat
in thehistory of the German Army.[84] It is often identied asthe
turning point on the Eastern Front, and in the waragainst Germany
overall, and even the greatest turningpoint in the Second World
War. Before Stalingrad, Ger-many had gone from victory to victory,
with a limitedsetback in the winter of 1941-42. After Stalingrad,
theywon no signicant battles, even in summer.[85] The RedArmy had
the initiative, and the Wehrmacht was in re-treat. A year of German
gains during Case Blue had beenwiped out. Germanys Sixth Army had
ceased to exist,and the forces of Germanys European allies, except
Fin-land, had been shattered.[86] In a speech on 9 November1944,
Hitler himself blamed Stalingrad for Germanysimpending
doom.[87]
Stalingrads signicance has been downplayed by somehistorians,
who point either to the Battle of Moscow orthe Battle of Kursk as
more strategically decisive. Oth-ers maintain that the destruction
of an entire army (thelargest killed, captured, wounded gures for
Axis sol-diers, nearly 1 million, during the war) and the
frustra-tion of Germanys grand strategy made the battle a
wa-tershed moment.[88] At the time, however, the battle
wasperceived as having global strategic consequences. On1 January
1943, British General Alan Brooke, Chief ofthe Imperial General
Sta, reected in his diary on thechange in the position from a year
before:
I felt Russia could never hold, Caucasus wasbound to be
penetrated, and Abadan (ourAchilles heel) would be captured with
the con-sequent collapse of Middle East, India, etc.After Russias
defeat how were we to handlethe German land and air forces
liberated? Eng-land would be again bombarded, threat of inva-sion
revived... And now! We start 1943 underconditions I would never
have dared to hope.Russia has held, Egypt for the present is
safe.There is a hope of clearing North Africa ofGermans in the near
future... Russia is scoringwonderful successes in Southern
Russia.[88]
At that point, the British had won the Battle of El Alameinin
November 1942. However, there were only about50,000 German soldiers
at El Alamein in Egypt, whileat Stalingrad 200,000 Germans had been
lost.[88]
Regardless of the strategic implications, there is littledoubt
that Stalingrad was a morale watershed. Germanysdefeat shattered
its reputation for invincibility. It dealt
a devastating blow to German morale. On 30 January1943, the
tenth anniversary of his coming to power, Hitlerchose not to speak.
Josef Goebbels read the text of hisspeech for him on the radio. The
speech contained anoblique reference to the battle, which suggested
that Ger-many was now in a defensive war. The public mood
wassullen, depressed, fearful, and war-weary. Germany waslooking in
the face of defeat.[89]
The reverse was the case on the Soviet side. There wasan
overwhelming surge in condence and belief in vic-tory. A common
saying was: You cannot stop an armywhich has done Stalingrad.
Stalin was feted as the heroof the hour and made a Marshal of the
Soviet Union.[90]In recognition of the determination of its
defenders, Stal-ingrad was awarded the title Hero City in 1945. A
colos-sal monument called The Motherland Calls was erectedin 1967
on the Mamayev Kurgan, the hill overlookingthe city where bones and
rusty metal splinters can stillbe found.[91] The statue forms part
of a war memorialcomplex which includes the ruins of the Grain Silo
andPavlovs House.The news of the battle echoed round the world,
withmany people now believing that Hitlers defeat
wasinevitable.[92] The Turkish Consul in Moscow predictedthat the
lands which the Germans have destined for theirliving space will
become their dying space.[93] Britainsconservative Daily Telegraph
proclaimed that the victoryhad saved European civilisation.[93] The
country cele-brated Red Army Day on 23 February 1943. A cer-emonial
Sword of Stalingrad was forged by King GeorgeVI. After being put on
public display in Britain, this waspresented to Stalin by Winston
Churchill at the Tehranconference later in 1943.[90] Soviet
propaganda spared noeort and wasted no time in capitalising on the
triumph,impressing a global audience. The prestige of Stalin,the
Soviet Union, and the worldwide Communist move-ment was immense,
and their political position greatlyenhanced.[94]
9 Other information
9.1 Orders of battle
Red Army
Main article: Red Army order of battle at the Battle
ofStalingrad
During the defence of Stalingrad, the Red Army deployedve armies
(28th, 51st, 57th, 62nd and 64th Armies)in and around the city and
an additional nine armies inthe encirclement counter
oensive.[29]:435438 The ninearmies amassed for the counteroensive
were the 24thArmy, 65th Army, 66th Army and 16th Air Army fromthe
north as part of the Don Front oensive and 1st
-
16 9 OTHER INFORMATION
Collage.The Eternal Flame inMamayev Kurgan.Volgograd,
Rus-sia
Guards Army, 5th Tank, 21st Army, 2nd Air Army and17th Air Army
from the south as part of the SouthwesternFront.
Axis
Main article: Axis order of battle at the Battle
ofStalingrad
9.2 CasualtiesThe calculation of casualties depends on what
scope isgiven to the battle of Stalingrad. The scope can vary
fromjust the ghting within the city and suburbs itself to
theinclusion of almost all ghting on the southern wing of
theSoviet-German front from the spring of 1942 to the endof the
ghting in the city in the winter of 1943. Dierentscholars have
produced dierent estimates depending ontheir denition of the scope
of the battle. The dierenceis comparing the city against the
region.The Axis suered 850,000 total casualties (wounded,killed,
captured) among all branches of the Germanarmed forces and its
allies; 400,000 Germans, 200,000Romanians, 130,000 Italians, and
120,000 Hungarianswere killed, wounded or captured.[95]
On the material side, the Germans losses were 900aircraft
(including 274 transports and 165 bombersused as transports), 500
tanks, and 6,000 artillerypieces.[2]:122123 According to a
contemporary Soviet re-port, 5,762 artillery pieces; 1,312 mortars;
12,701 heavymachine guns; 156,987 ries; 80,438 sub-machine
guns;10,722 trucks; 744 aircraft; 1,666 tanks; 261 other ar-mored
vehicles; 571 half-tracks; and 10,679 motorcycleswere captured by
the Soviets.[96] An unknown amount ofHungarian, Italian, and
Romanian material was lost.The USSR, according to archival gures,
suered1,129,619 total casualties;[97] 478,741 personnel killed
ormissing, and 650,878 wounded or sick. On the materialside, the
USSR lost 4,341 tanks destroyed or damaged,15,728 artillery pieces,
and 2,769 combat aircraft.[98]
Anywhere from 25,000 to 40,000 Soviet civilians died
inStalingrad and its suburbs during a single week of aerial
bombing by Luftotte 4 as the German 4th Panzer and6th Armies
approached the city;[99] The total number ofcivilians killed in
Stalingrad is unknown.In all, the battle resulted in an estimated
total of 1.72million Axis and Soviet casualties.
9.2.1 Luftwae losses
Aircraft losses of the Luftwae for the supply of the 6thArmy at
Stalingrad, and the recovery of wounded from24 November 1942 to 31
January 1943:The losses of transport planes were especially
serious, asthey destroyed the capacity for resupply of the trapped
6thArmy. The destruction of 72 aircraft when the aireld
atTatsinskaya was overrun meant the loss of about 10% ofthe entire
Luftwae transport eet.[100]
These losses amounted to about 50% of total aircraftcommitted.
In addition, the Luftwae training programwas stopped and sorties in
other theaters of war were sig-nicantly reduced to save fuel for
use at Stalingrad.
9.3 In popular culture
Main article: Battle of Stalingrad in popular culture
The events of the Battle for Stalingrad have been cov-ered in
several lms of German, Russian,[101] British, andAmerican
origin.The struggle is also remembered and reected upon innumerous
books, for its signicance as a turning point inthe Second World War
and for the loss of life associatedwith the battle.In the 2011
video game Red Orchestra 2: Heroes of Stal-ingrad, the single
player campaign focuses on the Battleof Stalingrad, and several
maps in the game portray fa-mous locations of the battle, such as
Pavlovs House, theRed October Factory and Mamayev Kurgan, among
oth-ers. The Multiplayer also consisted of several famous
lo-cations from the single player so people could experiencefor
themselves what it was like, to an extent.The 2013 game, Company of
Heroes 2, portrayed the bat-tle in certain missions, but was
heavily criticized by someRussian players for being historically
inaccurate,[102]and on 7 August DVD sales of the Russian version
ofthe game were halted in Russia, while the game is stillavailable
for downloading from Steam.[103]
The Battle of Stalingrad was also portrayed by theSwedish power
metal band Sabaton in their song Stal-ingrad.Stalingrad (2013 lm)
focused on 5 individuals holding abuilding along with various units
to defend Stalingrad andVolga River from German attacks.
-
17
10 See also Barmaley Fountain Hitler Stalingrad Speech Italian
participation in the Eastern Front List of ocers and commanders in
the Battle of
Stalingrad
11 ReferencesFootnotes
[1] The Soviet fronts composition and names changed severaltimes
in the battle. The battle started with the South West-ern Front. It
was later renamed Stalingrad Front, then hadthe Don Front split o
from it.
[2] The Front was reformed from reserve armies on 22 Octo-ber
1942.
[3] This force grew to 1,600 in early September by withdraw-ing
forces from the Kuban region and South Caucasus:Hayward (1998), p.
195.
[4] Bergstrm quotes: Soviet Reports on the eects of airraids
between 2326 August 1942. This indicates 955people were killed and
another 1,181 wounded
[5] 8,314 German aircraft were produced from JulyDecember 1942,
but this could not keep pace with a three-front aerial war of
attrition
[6] Shirer p. 926 says that Paulus radioed that they wouldneed a
minimum of 750 tons of supplies day own in,while Craig pp. 206207
quotes Zeitzler as pressing Go-ering about his boast that the
Luftwae could airlift theneeded supplies: Are you aware ... how
many daily sor-ties the army in Stalingrad will need? ... Seven
hundredtons! Every day!"
[7] Fr so einen Schweinehund wie den bhmischen Gefreitenerschiee
ich mich nicht! (I am not going to shoot myselffor such a swine as
this Bohemian corporal!), quoted in:Ich bitte erschossen zu werden,
Der Spiegel, 1949-01-29.
Citations
[1] Bellamy, (2007)
[2] Bergstrm (2007)
[3] Glantz (1995), p. 346
[4] Anthony Tihamer Komjathy (1982). A Thousand Yearsof the
Hungarian Art of War. Toronto: Rakoczi Founda-tion. pp. 14445. ASIN
B001PHB3N0. ISBN 978-0-8191-6524-4. ASIN is for the version cited.
ISBN is fora dierent printing from a dierent publisher.
[5] Hayward, (1998)
[6] Bergstrom (2005)
[7] Glantz (1995), p. 134
[8] McDougal Littell, (2006)
[9] Roberts (2006: 143)
[10] Biesinger (2006: 699): On August 23, 1942, the Ger-mans
began their attack.
[11] Battle of Stalingrad. Encyclopdia Britannica. By theend of
August, ... Gen. Friedrich Paulus, with 330,000of the German Army's
nest troops ... approached Stal-ingrad. On 23 August a German
spearhead penetratedthe citys northern suburbs, and the Luftwae
rained in-cendiary bombs that destroyed most of the citys
woodenhousing.
[12] Luhn (8 June 2014). Stalingrad name may return to cityin
wave of second world war patriotism. theguardian.com(The Guardian).
The Guardian. Retrieved 16 February2015.
[13] Taylor (1998) Vol IV, p. 142
[14] Beevor (1998: 239)
[15] Shirer (1990)
[16] Kershaw, (2000)
[17] Taylor and Clark, (1974)
[18] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar,
Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, p 96
[19] Michael Burleigh (2001). The Third Reich: A New His-tory.
Pan. p. 503. ISBN 978-0-330-48757-3.
[20] Walsh, Stephen. (2000). Stalingrad 19421943 The In-fernal
Cauldron. London, New York: Simon & Schuster.ISBN
0-7432-0916-8.
[21] McDonald (1986)
[22] German High Command (communique) (27 October1941). Text of
the Days War Communiques. New YorkTimes (28 October 1941).
Retrieved 27 April 2009.
[23] German High Command (communique) (10 November1942). Text of
the Days War Communiques on Fightingin Various Zones. New York
Times (10 November 1942).Retrieved 27 April 2009.
[24] German High Command (communique) (26 August1942). Text of
the Days War Communiques on Fightingin Various Zones. New York
Times (26 August 1942).Retrieved 27 April 2009.
[25] German High Command (communique) (12 December1942). Text of
the Days War Communiques. New YorkTimes (12 December 1942).
Retrieved 27 April 2009.
-
18 11 REFERENCES
[26] In spite of the unfavourable balance of forces - the
'Cosse-ria' and the 'Ravenna' faced eight to nine Russian
divisionsand an unknown number of tanks - the atmosphere
amongItalian stas and troops was certainly not pessimistic....
TheItalians, especially the ocers of the 'Cosseria', had con-dence
in what they thought were well built defensive posi-tions. All or
Nothing: The Axis and the Holocaust 1941-43, Jonathan Steinberg, p.
?, Routledge, 2003
[27] The attack at dawn failed to penetrate fully at rst
anddeveloped into a grim struggle with Italian strongpoints,lasting
for hours. The Ravenna Division was the rst tobe overrun. A gap
emerged that was hard to close, andthere was no holding back the
Red Army when it deployedthe mass of its tank forces the following
day. Germanreinforcements came too late in the breakthrough
battle.The Unknown Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht and HitlersForeign
Soldiers, Rolf-Dieter Mller, p. 84, I.B.Tauris,28 Feb 2014
[28] Craig, (1973)
[29] Beevor (1998), 198.
[30] Clark, Lloyd, Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern
Front1943, 2011, page 157
[31] Poji, Milan. Hrvatska pukovnija 369. na Istonom bojitu1941.
1943.. Croatian State Archives. Zagreb, 2007.
[32] Clark, Lloyd, Kursk: The greatest battle: Eastern
Front1943, 2011, page 164165
[33] Stalingrad 1942. Retrieved 31 January 2010.
[34] Beevor (1998), 84-5, 97, 144.
[35] Krivosheev, G. I. (1997). Soviet Casualties and
CombatLosses in the Twentieth Century. Greenhill Books. pp.5197.
ISBN 978-1-85367-280-4.
[36] TV Novosti. Crucial WW2 battle remembered.Archived from the
original on 9 March 2009. Retrieved19 February 2009.
[37] Bellamy (2007), 514-517.
[38] Beevor (1998), 135-137.
[39] Beevor (1998), 203-206.
[40] Beevor (2004)
[41] Overy, Richard. Russias War (New York: 1997), 201.
[42] Merridale, Catherine. Ivans War (New York: 2006), 156.
[43] quoted in Merridale, Catherine. Ivans War (New York:2006),
156.
[44] Bellamy (2007), 520-521.
[45] Pennington, pp. 180182.
[46] Pennington, p. 178.
[47] Pennington, pp. 189192.
[48] Pennington, pp. 192194.
[49] Pennington, p. 197.
[50] Pennington, pp. 201204.
[51] Pennington, pp. 204207.
[52] Alexander Werth, The Year of Stalingrad (London:1946),
193-194.
[53] Beevor (1998), 141-142.
[54] Golovanov, (2004)
[55] Goodwin (1994)
[56] Bellamy (2007), 516.
[57] Maps of the conict. Leavenworth Papers No. 2 Nomon-han:
Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939; MAPS. Re-trieved 5 December
2009.
[58] Manstein (2004)
[59] Beevor, Antony (1999). Stalingrad. London: Penguin. p.184.
ISBN 0-14-024985-0. Beevor states that one quarterof the sixth
armys frontline strength were HIWIs. Note:this reference still does
not directly support the claim thatthere were 40,000 HIWIs
[60] Weinberg, Gerhard A World In Arms, Cambridge: Cam-bridge
University Press, 2005 page 451
[61] Murray, Williamson & Millet, Alan War To Be
Won,Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000 page 288.
[62] Weinberg A World In Arms, 2005 451.
[63] Weinberg, 2005 A World In Arms, page 1045.
[64] Weinberg, Gerhard A World At Arms, Cambridge: Cam-bridge
University Press, 2005, pp. 408; 449; 451.
[65] Manstein 2004, pp. 315; 334.
[66] Kehrig, Manfred Stalingrad, Stuttgart: Deutsche
VerlagsAnstalt, 1974 pages 279,311-312,575.
[67] During this phase, the Germans praised the steadfastnessof
Italian infantry, who held out tenaciously even in iso-lated
strongpoints, but eventually reached their breaking-point under
this constant pressure. " The Unknown East-ern Front: The Wehrmacht
and Hitlers Foreign Soldiers,Rolf-Dieter Mller, p. 83-84,
I.B.Tauris, 28 Feb 2014
[68] Paoletti, Ciro (2008). A Military History of Italy.
West-port, CT: Praeger Security International. p. 177.
ISBN0-275-98505-9. Retrieved 4 December 2009.
[69] Deiml, Michael (1999). Meine Stalingradeinstze
(MyStalingrad Sorties). Einstze des Bordmechanikers Gefr.Michael
Deiml (Sorties of Aviation Mechanic PrivateMichael Deiml).
Retrieved 4 December 2009.
[70] MacDonald, (1986)
[71] Clark (1995)
[72] Kershaw (2000), p. 549.
[73] Kershaw (2000), p. 550.
-
19
[74] Bellamy (2007), 549.
[75] Beevor, p. 381
[76] Beevor, p. 390
[77] Bellamy (2007), 550.
[78] Pusca, Dragos; Nitu, Victor. The Battle of Stalingrad 1942
Romanian Armed Forces in the Second World War(worldwar2.ro).
Retrieved 4 December 2009.
[79] Victor, George (2000). Hitler: Pathology of Evil.
Wash-ington, DC: Brasseys Inc. p. 208. ISBN 1-57488-228-7.Retrieved
23 August 2008.
[80] Sandlin, Lee (1997). Losing the War. Originally pub-lished
in Chicago Reader, 7 and 14 March 1997. Re-trieved 4 December
2009.
[81] Bartov, Omer Hitlers Army Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress,
1991 pages 166167
[82] Google Video: Stalingrad OSA III Stalingradintaistelu pttyy
(Stalingrad, Part 3: Battle of Stalingradends) (ADOBE FLASH)
(Television documentary. Ger-man original: Stalingrad Episode 3:
Der Untergang,53 min, Sebastian Dehnhardt, Manfred Oldenburg
(direc-tors) IMDB) (in Finnish; interviews in German &
Russianand with Finnish subtitles). broadview.tv GmbH, Ger-many
2003. Retrieved 16 July 2007.
[83] How three million Germans died after VE Day. NigelJones
reviews After the Reich: From the Liberation of Vi-enna to the
Berlin Airlift by Giles MacDonogh. The Tele-graph, 18 Apr 2007.
[84] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar,
Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, p 104
[85] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar,
Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, pp 95, 108.
[86] Georey Roberts, Stalins Wars: From World War to ColdWar,
19391953, Yale University Press, New Haven andLondon, 2006, pp
154155.
[87] Antony Beevor, Berlin: The Downfall 1945, PenguinBooks,
London, 2007, p xxxiii.
[88] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar,
Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, p 107.
[89] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar,
Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, pp 104-105,
107.
[90] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar,
Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, p 106
[91] Historical Memorial Complex To the Heroes of the
Stal-ingrad Battle at Mamayev Hill. Ocial web site. Re-trieved 17
July 2008.
[92] Georey Roberts, Stalins Wars: From World War to ColdWar,
19391953, Yale University Press, New Haven andLondon, 2006, pp
154155.
[93] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar,
Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, p 95
[94] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar,
Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, p 108.
[95] Craig, William (1973). Enemy at the Gates: the Battlefor
Stalingrad. New York: Penguin Books (ISBN 0-14-200000-0 & ISBN
1-56852-368-8).
[96] ". """.
[97] (Russian). Retrieved 4 December2009.
[98] : , : . . / . . , . ., . . . .: , 1993.. 178182, 369370.
ISBN 5-203-01400-0
[99] Georey Roberts (2002). Victory at Stalingrad: the
battlethat changed history. Pearson Education. p.77. ISBN
0-582-77185-4
[100] Beevor, 1999. p. 301
[101] The Great Battle on the Volga (1962)".Video.google.com.
Retrieved 12 November 2010.
[102] Why gamings latest take on war is so oensive to Rus-sians.
Polygon (2013-07-25). Retrieved on 2013-09-18.
[103] Company of Heroes 2 sales stopped in Russia.PCGamesN
(2013-08-06). Retrieved on 2013-09-18.
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12 Further reading Antill, Peter (2007). Stalingrad 1942, Osprey
Pub-
lishing, London. ISBN 1-84603-028-5
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Third Reich. New York, NY: Publi-cAairs. ISBN
978-1-61039-496-3.
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0-582-77185-4).
(2006) Stalins wars: from World War to ColdWar, 19391953. Yale
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Zhukov, Georgi Konstantinovich & Harrison E.,Salisbury
(1969). Marshal Zhukovs Greatest Bat-tles. New York: Harper &
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Joly, Anton (2013) Stalingrad: Battle Atlas,
StalDataPublications (paperback, ISBN 979-10-93222-03-5).
13 External links Detailed summary of campaign Story of the
Stalingrad battle with pictures, maps,
video and other primary and secondary sources Volgograd State
Panoramic Museum ocial home-
page The Battle of Stalingrad in Film and History Written
with strong Socialist/Communist political under
andovertones.
Roberts, Georey. Victory on the Volga, TheGuardian, 28 February
2003
Stalingrad-info.com, Russian archival docs trans-lated into
English,original battle maps,aerial pho-tos,pictures taken at the
battleelds,relics collection
H-Museum: Stalingrad/Volgograd 19432003.Memory
Battle of Stalingrad Pictures View footage from the Battle of
Stalingrad in Jan-
uary 1943 The photo album of Wehrmacht NCO named
Nemela of 9. Machine-Gewehr Bataillon (mot)There are several
unique photos of parade and awardceremony for Wehrmacht personnel
who survivedthe Battle of Stalingrad.
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22 14 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES
14 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses14.1 Text
Battle of Stalingrad Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad?oldid=671416561
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