-
Battle of Kursk
The Battle of Kursk was a Second World War engage-ment between
German and Soviet forces on the EasternFront near Kursk (450
kilometres or 280 miles south-west of Moscow) in the Soviet Union
during July and Au-gust 1943. The German oensive was code-named
Op-eration Citadel (German: Unternehmen Zitadelle) andled to one of
the largest armoured clashes in history,the Battle of Prokhorovka.
The German oensive wascountered by two Soviet counter-oensives,
OperationPolkovodets Rumyantsev (Russian: -) and Operation Kutuzov
(Russian: ). For theGermans, the battle represented the nal
strategic oen-sive they were able to mount in the east. For the
Soviets,the victory gave the Red Army the strategic initiative
forthe rest of the war.The Germans hoped to weaken the Soviet
oensive po-tential for the summer of 1943 by cutting o a
largenumber of forces that they anticipated would be in theKursk
salient.[22] The Kursk salient or bulge was 250kilometres (160 mi)
long from north to south and 160kilometres (99 mi) from east to
west.[23] By eliminat-ing the Kursk salient, the Germans would also
shortentheir lines of defence, nullifying Soviet numerical
superi-ority in critical sectors.[24] The plan envisioned an
envel-opment by a pair of pincers breaking through the north-ern
and southern anks of the salient.[25] German dictatorAdolf Hitler
thought that a victory here would reassertGerman strength and
improve his prestige with his allies,who were considering
withdrawing from the war.[26] Itwas also hoped that large numbers
of Soviet prisonerswould be captured to be used as slave labour in
the Ger-man armaments industry.[24]
The Soviets had intelligence of the German intentions,provided
in part by the British intelligence service andTunny intercepts.
Aware months in advance, that the at-tack would fall on the neck of
the Kursk salient, the So-viets built a defence in depth designed
to wear down theGerman panzer spearheads.[27] The Germans delayed
theoensive, while they tried to build up their forces andwaited for
new weapons, mainly the new Panther tankbut also larger numbers of
the Tiger heavy tank.[28][29][30]This gave the Red Army time to
construct a series ofdeep defensive belts. The defensive
preparations includedmineelds, fortications, artillery re zones and
anti-tank strong points, which extended approximately 300km (190
mi) in depth.[31] Soviet mobile formations weremoved out of the
salient and a large reserve force wasformed for strategic
counter-oensives.[32]
The Battle of Kursk was the rst time a German strate-
gic oensive had been halted before it could breakthrough enemy
defences and penetrate to its strategicdepths.[33][34] The maximum
depth of the Nazi advancewas 812 kilometres (5.07.5 mi) in the
north and 35kilometres (22 mi) in the south.[35] Though the
SovietArmy had succeeded in winter oensives previously,their
counter-oensives following the German attack atKursk were their rst
successful strategic summer oen-sives of the war.[36]
1 Background
German soldiers in Orel pass by the Church of the
Intercession,early 1943.
As the Battle of Stalingrad slowly ground to its conclu-sion the
Soviet army moved to a general oensive inthe south, pressuring the
exhausted German forces whohad survived the winter. By January
1943, a 160 to300 km (99 to 186 mi) wide gap had opened betweenArmy
Group B and Army Group Don, and the advanc-ing Soviet armies
threatened to cut o all German forcessouth of the Don River,
including Army Group A oper-ating in the Caucasus.[37][38] Army
Group Center cameunder signicant pressure as well. Kursk fell to
the Sovi-ets on 8 February 1943, and Rostov on 14 February.[39]The
Soviet Bryansk, Western, and newly-created CentralFronts prepared
for an oensive which envisioned the en-circlement of Army Group
Center between Bryansk andSmolensk.[37][40] By February 1943 the
Wehrmacht wasin danger of a general collapse.Hitlers belief in his
own iron will as the deciding factor inthe conict resulted in
German forces being left tied downin a rigid defence that did not
permit them the liberty tomove.[41][42] Since December 1942 Field
Marshal Erichvon Manstein had been strongly requesting
unrestricted
1
-
2 1 BACKGROUND
operational freedom to allow him to use his forces ina uid
manner.[43] Hitlers policy of holding at all costsmay have averted
a general collapse in the winter of 1941-42, but thereafter it
consistently resulted in forces hold-ing ground until their
position became cuto, resulting intheir inevitable destruction.[44]
The 6th Army isolated inthe Stalingrad pocket surrendered 2
February.On 12 February 1943, the remaining German forces
werereorganised. To the south, Army Group Don was re-named as Army
Group South and placed under the com-mand of Manstein. Directly to
the north, Army GroupB was dissolved, with its forces and areas of
responsibil-ity divided between Army Group South and Army
GroupCenter. Manstein inherited responsibility for the
massivebreach in the German lines.[45] On 18 February, Hitler
ar-rived at Army Group South headquarters, at Zaporizhia,hours
before the Soviets liberated Kharkov. Hitlers dis-trust of the
General Sta and traditional ocer corps,and of Manstein in
particular, put him at odds with thehigh command of the
Wehrmacht.[43][46] Though Hitlerdesired to relieve Manstein and
blame him for the fail-ure at Stalingrad,[47] he concluded he could
ill aord tolose the man called Hitlers most able general by
theAmerican media.[48][42] Instead, Hitler grudgingly gavehim the
freedom he had requested.[43] The II SS PanzerCorps had arrived
from France in January 1943, rettedand up to near full
strength.[49] Armoured units from the1st Panzer Army of Army Group
A had pulled out of theCaucasus and further strengthened Mansteins
forces.[50]Once given freedom of action, Manstein explained howhe
intended to utilize these forces in making a series
ofcounterstrokes into the anks of the Soviet armoured for-mations,
with the goal of destroying them while retakingKharkov and
Kursk.[45][51]
Waen-SS soldiers aboard a Panzer IV in Kharkov, March 1943
The Third Battle of Kharkov commenced on 19 February,spearheaded
by the three SS divisions of the II SS PanzerCorps. Mansteins
oensive cut o the Soviet spear-heads, and then encircled and
destroyed the main force.The Germans retook Kharkov on 15 March and
Belgorodon 18 March.[51] The German oensive wrested the ini-tiative
from the Soviets. A Soviet oensive launched on25 February by the
Central Front against Army GroupCenter had to be abandoned by 7
March to allow the at-
tacking formations to disengage and redeploy to the southto
counter the threat of the advancing German forces un-der
Manstein.[52][53] Exhaustion of both the Wehrmachtand the Red Army
coupled with the loss of mobility dueto the onset of the spring
rasputitsa resulted in the cessa-tion of operations for both sides
by mid-March.[54] Thecounteroensive left a salient extending into
the Germanarea of control, centered around the city of
Kursk.[54]
1.1 German plans and preparation
German plan of attack
The heavy losses sustained by the Heer since the open-ing of
Barbarossa had resulted in a shortage in infantryand artillery.[55]
Units were in total 470,000 men under-strength. For the Germans to
undertake an oensive in1943, the burden would have to be carried by
the panzerdivisions. In view of the exposed position of Army
GroupSouth, Manstein proposed that his forces should take
thestrategic defensive. He anticipated that a Soviet oensivewould
attempt to cut o and destroy Army Group Southby a move across the
Donets River toward the Dnieper.In February, he proposed waiting
for this oensive todevelop and then delivering a series of
counterattacksinto the exposed Soviet anks.[56] Hitler, concerned
aboutthe political implications of taking a defensive stance,and
preoccupied with holding the Donbass, rejected thisplan.[57] On 10
March, Manstein presented an alterna-tive plan whereby the German
forces would pinch o theKursk salient with a rapid oensive
commencing as soonas the spring rasputitsa had
subsided.[58][59]
-
1.1 German plans and preparation 3
On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5,which
authorised several oensives, including one againstthe Kursk
salient.[60][61] As the last Soviet resistance inKharkov petered
out, Manstein attempted to persuadeGnther von Kluge, commander of
Army Group Centre,to immediately attack the Central Front, which
was de-fending the northern face of the salient. Kluge
refused,believing that his forces were too weak to launch such
anattack.[59] Further Axis advances were blocked by Sovietforces
that had been shifted down from the Central Frontto the area north
of Belgorod.[59][51] By mid-April, amidpoor weather and with the
German forces exhausted andin need of retting, the oensives of
Operational OrderNo. 5 were postponed.[50][62]
On 15 April, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6,which called
for the Kursk oensive operation to be-gin on 3 May or shortly
thereafter. The talented, re-sourceful Kurt Zeitzler, the OKH Chief
of Sta, providedthe logistical planning for the operation.[63] The
oen-sive was codenamed Zitadelle (Citadel).[64] For the of-fensive
to succeed it was deemed essential to attack be-fore the Soviets
had a chance to prepare extensive de-fences or to launch an oensive
of their own.[65][66] Ac-cording to some military historians, the
operation envi-sioned a blitzkrieg attack;[lower-alpha 10] other
military his-torians and the German participants who wrote about
itafter the war, including Manstein, make no mention ofblitzkrieg
in their accounts of the operation.[lower-alpha 11]Historian Pier
Battistelli asserts that the operational plan-ning marked a change
in German oensive thinking awayfrom blitzkrieg.[67]
Operation Citadel called for a double envelopment, di-rected at
Kursk, to surround the Soviet defenders and sealo the salient. Army
Group Centre would provide Gen-eral Walter Model's 9th Army to form
the northern pin-cer. It would cut through the northern face of the
salient,driving south to the hills east of Kursk, securing the
railline from Soviet attack.[68] Army Group South wouldcommit the
4th Panzer Army, under Hermann Hoth,and Army Detachment Kempf,
under Werner Kempf, topierce the southern face of the salient. This
force woulddrive north to meet the 9th Army east of
Kursk.[69][70][71]Von Mainsteins main attack was to be delivered
byHoths 4th Panzer Army, spearheaded by the II SS PanzerCorps under
Paul Hausser. The XLVIII Panzer Corps,commanded by Otto von
Knobelsdor, would advance onthe left while Army Detachment Kempf
would advanceon the right.[72] The 2nd Army, under the command
ofWalter Weiss, would contain the western portion of
thesalient.[73][71]
On 27 April Model met with Hitler to review and ex-press his
concern for reconnaissance information whichshowed the Soviets
constructing very strong positions atthe shoulders of the salient
and having withdrawn theirmobile forces from the area west of
Kursk.[74] He arguedthat the longer the preparation phase
continued, the lessthe operation could be justied. He recommended
com-
Ernst-Georg Buchterkirch (left) in discussion with General
Model
pletely abandoning Citadel, allowing the army to awaitand defeat
the coming Soviet oensive, or radically re-vising the plan for
Citadel.[75][76] Though in mid-AprilManstein had considered the
Citadel oensive protable,by May he shared Models
misgivings.[76][65] He assertedthat the best course of action would
be for the Germanforces to take the strategic defensive, ceding
ground toallow the anticipated Soviet forces to extend
themselvesand allow the German panzer forces to counterattack inthe
type of uid mobile battle they excelled at.[77] Con-vinced that the
Red Army would deliver its main eortagainst Army Group South, he
proposed to keep the leftwing of the army group strong while moving
the rightwing back in stages to the Dnieper River, followed bya
counterattack against the ank of the Red Army ad-vance. The
counteroensive would continue until the Seaof Azov was reached and
the Soviet forces were cut o.Hitler rejected this idea; he did not
want to give up somuch terrain, even temporarily.[77]
In early May, Hitler called his senior ocers and advi-sors to
Munich for a meeting. Hitler spoke for about 45minutes on the
current situation and the plans for the of-fensive. Model then
spoke, and produced reconnaissancephotos revealing some of the
extensive preparations theSoviets had made in preparation for the
attack.[78] A num-ber of options were put forth for comment: going
on theoensive immediately with the forces at hand, delayingthe
oensive further to await the arrival of new and bet-ter tanks,
radically revising the operation or cancellingit all together.
Manstein spoke against the oensive,but not forcefully. Albert
Speer, the minister of Arma-ments and War Production, spoke about
the diculties ofrebuilding the armoured formations and the
limitationsof German industry to replace losses. General
HeinzGuderian argued strongly against the operation, statingthe
attack was pointless.[79] The conference ended with-out Hitler
coming to a decision, but Citadel was notaborted.[76][80][81] Three
days later, OKW, Hitlers con-duit for controlling the military,
postponed the launchdate for Citadel to 12 June.[81][82][83]
Following this meeting, Guderian continued to voice his
-
4 1 BACKGROUND
Guderian being transported to the Eastern Front, 1943
concerns over an operation that would likely degrade thepanzer
forces that he had been attempting to rebuild. Heconsidered the
oensive, as planned, to be a misuse of thepanzer forces, as it
violated two of the three tenets he hadlaid out as the essential
elements for a successful panzerattack.[lower-alpha 12] In his
opinion, the limited German re-sources in men and materiel should
be conserved, as theywould be needed for the pending defence of
Western Eu-rope. In a meeting with Hitler on 10 May he asked,
Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, andindeed in the east
this year at all? Do you thinkanyone even knows where Kursk is? The
entireworld doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not.What is the
reason that is forcing us to attackthis year on Kursk, or even
more, on the East-ern Front?
Hitler replied, I know. The thought of it turns mystomach.
Guderian concluded, In that case your re-action to the problem is
the correct one. Leave italone.[84][lower-alpha 13]
Despite reservations, Hitler remained committed to theoensive.
He and the OKW, early in the preparatoryphase, were hopeful that
the oensive would revitaliseGerman strategic fortunes in the east.
As the challengesoered by Citadel increased, he focused more and
moreon the expected new weapons that he believed were thekey to
victory: principally the Panther tank, but also theElefant tank
destroyer and greater numbers of the Tigerheavy tank.[28] He
postponed the operation in order toawait their arrival.[75][85]
Receiving reports of powerfulSoviet concentrations behind the Kursk
area, Hitler fur-ther delayed the oensive to allow for more
equipment toreach the front.[86] With pessimism for Citadel
increas-ing with each delay, in June, Alfred Jodl, the Chief ofSta
at the OKW, instructed the armed forces propa-ganda oce to portray
the upcoming operation as a lim-ited counteroensive.[87][81][88]
Due to concerns of an Al-lied landing in the south of France or in
Italy and delaysin deliveries of the new tanks, Hitler postponed
again,this time to 20 June.[lower-alpha 14] Zeitzler was
profoundlyconcerned with the delays,[89] but he still supported
the
oensive.[76][60] On 1718 June, following a discussionin which
the OKW Operations Sta suggested abandon-ing the oensive, Hitler
further postponed the operationuntil 3 July.[90][87][91] Finally,
on 1 July, Hitler announced5 July as the launch date of the
oensive.[90][91][92]
A Raupenschlepper Ost, designed in response to the poor roadsof
Russia, moves material up shortly before the Kursk oensive.
A three-month quiet period descended upon the EasternFront as
the Soviets prepared their defences and the Ger-mans attempted to
build up their forces. The Germansused this period for specialised
training of their assaulttroops.[93] All units underwent training
and combat re-hearsals. The Waen-SS had built a full-scale
duplicateSoviet strong point that was used to practice the
tech-niques for neutralizing such positions. The panzer divi-sions
received replacement men and equipment and at-tempted to get back
up to strength. The German forcesto be used in the oensive included
12 panzer divisionsand 5 panzergrenadier divisions, four of which
had tankstrengths greater than their neighboring panzer
divisions.However, the force was markedly decient in infantry
di-visions, which were essential to hold ground and to se-cure the
anks.[94] By the time the Germans initiated theoensive, their force
amounted to around 777,000 men,2,451 tanks and assault guns (70
percent of the Germanarmour on the Eastern Front) and 7,417 guns
and mor-tars.[73][95][lower-alpha 15]
1.2 Soviet plans and preparationIn 1943 an oensive by the Soviet
Central, Bryansk andWestern Fronts against Army Group Centre was
aban-doned shortly after it began in early March, when thesouthern
ank of the Central Front was threatened byArmy Group South.[37][53]
Soviet intelligence receivedinformation about German troop
concentrations spottedat Orel and Kharkov, as well as details of an
intendedGerman oensive in the Kursk sector through the Lucyspy ring
in Switzerland. The Soviets veried the in-telligence via their spy
in Britain, John Cairncross, atthe Government Code and Cypher
School at BletchleyPark, who clandestinely forwarded raw decrypts
directlyto Moscow.[96][97][98] Soviet politician Anastas
Mikoyanwrote that on 27 March 1943, Soviet dictator Joseph
-
1.2 Soviet plans and preparation 5
Stalin notied him of a possible German attack in theKursk
sector.[99] Stalin and some senior ocers were ea-ger to strike rst
once the rasputitsa ended,[100][101] but anumber of key ocers,
including Deputy Supreme Com-mander Georgiy Zhukov, recommended a
strategic de-fensive before going on the oensive. In a letter to
theStavka and Stalin, on 8 April, Zhukov wrote:
Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov, 1941.
In the rst phase the enemy, collectingtheir best forcesincluding
1315 tank divi-sions and with the support of a large num-ber of
aircraftwill strike Kursk with theirKromskom-Orel grouping from the
north-eastand their Belgorod-Kharkov grouping from thesouth-east...
I consider it inadvisable for ourforces to go over to an oensive in
the near fu-ture in order to forestall the enemy. It wouldbe better
to make the enemy exhaust himselfagainst our defences, and knock
out his tanksand then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go overto the
general oensive which would nally n-ish o his main
force.[102][103]
Stalin consulted with his frontine commanders and se-nior ocers
of the General Sta from 12 to 15 April1943. In the end he and the
Stavka agreed that the Ger-mans would probably target Kursk.[104]
Stalin believedthe decision to defend would give the Germans the
ini-tiative, but Zhukov countered that the Germans wouldbe drawn
into a trap where their armoured power wouldbe destroyed, thus
creating the conditions for a majorSoviet counteroensive.[105] They
decided to meet theenemy attack by preparing defensive positions to
wearout the German groupings before launching their
ownoensive.[103][106] Preparation of defences and fortica-tions
began by the end of April, and continued until theGerman attack in
early July.[107][104] The two-month de-lay between the German
decision to attack the Kursksalient and its implementation allowed
the Red Army am-ple time to thoroughly prepare.[82][83]
General Nikolai Vatutin
The Voronezh Front, commanded by Nikolai Vatutin,was tasked with
defending the southern face of thesalient. The Central Front,
commanded by KonstantinRokossovsky, defended the northern face.
Waitingin reserve was the Steppe Front, commanded by
IvanKonev.[108][109] In February 1943, the Central Front hadbeen
reconstructed from the Don Front, which had beenpart of the
northern pincer of Operation Uranus and hadbeen responsible for the
destruction of the 6th Army atStalingrad.[110][111]
The Central and Voronezh Fronts each constructed threemain
defensive belts in their sectors, with each sub-divided into
several zones of fortication.[112] [113][114]The Soviets employed
the labour of over 300,000civilians.[lower-alpha 16] Fortifying
each belt was an inter-connected web of mineelds, barbed-wire
fences, anti-tank ditches, deep entrenchments for infantry,
anti-tankobstacles, dug-in armoured vehicles, and
machine-gunbunkers.[115] Behind the three main defensive belts
werethree more belts prepared as fallback positions; the rstwas not
fully occupied or heavily fortied, and the lasttwo, though
suciently fortied, were unoccupied withthe exception of a small
area in the immediate environsof Kursk.[116][117] The combined
depth of the three maindefensive zones was about 40 kilometres (25
mi). Thesix defensive belts on either side of Kursk were
130150kilometres (8193 mi) deep.[117] If the Germans man-aged to
break through these defences they would stillbe confronted by
additional defensive belts to the east,manned by the Steppe Front.
These brought the to-tal depth of the defences to nearly 300
kilometres (190mi).[116]
The Voronezh and Central Fronts dug 4,200 kilome-tres (2,600 mi)
and 5,000 kilometres (3,100 mi) oftrenches respectively,[118] laid
out in criss-cross patternfor ease of movement.[115] The Soviets
built more than686 bridges and about 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi)
ofroads in the salient.[118] Red Army combat engineerslaid 503,663
anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnelmines, with the highest
concentration in the rst maindefensive belt.[113][115] The mineelds
at Kursk achieveddensities of 1,700 anti-personnel and 1,500
anti-tankmines per kilometre, about four times the density used
-
6 1 BACKGROUND
If the 4,200 km of trenches dug by the Voronezh Front had
beendug in a straight line, they would have stretched from Moscow
toMadrid.
in the defence of Moscow.[119][120][121] For example, the6th
Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, was spreadout over nearly 64
kilometres (40 mi) of front and wasprotected by 69,688 anti-tank
and 64,430 anti-personnelmines in its rst defensive belt with a
further 20,200 anti-tank and 9,097 anti-personnel mines in its
second defen-sive belt.[112][122][123] Furthermore, mobile obstacle
de-tachments were tasked with laying more mines directly inthe path
of advancing enemy armoured formations.[124]These units, consisting
of two platoons of combat en-gineers with mines at division level
and one companyof combat engineers normally equipped with
500700mines at corps level, functioned as anti-tank reserves
atevery level of command.[125]
In a letter dated 8 April, Zhukov warned that the Germanswould
attack the salient with a strong armoured force:
We can expect the enemy to put [the] great-est reliance in this
years oensive operationson his tank divisions and air force, since
his in-fantry appears to be far less prepared for oen-sive
operations than last year ... In view of thisthreat, we should
strengthen the anti-tank de-fences of the Central and Voronezh
fronts, andassemble as soon as possible.[103]
Nearly all artillery, including howitzers, guns, anti-aircraft
and rockets, were tasked with anti-tankdefence.[125] Dug-in tanks
and self-propelled gunsfurther strengthened the anti-tank
defences.[115][125]Anti-tank forces were incorporated into every
levelof command, mostly as anti-tank strong points withthe majority
concentrated on likely attack routes andthe remainder amply spread
out elsewhere.[125] Eachanti-tank strong-point typically consisted
of four tosix anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank ries, and veto
seven heavy and light machine guns. They weresupported by mobile
obstacle detachments as well asby infantry with automatic
rearms.[126] Independent
tank and self-propelled gun brigades and regimentswere tasked
with cooperating with the infantry duringcounterattacks.[126]
A Soviet machine gun in action during the Battle of Kursk.
Soviet preparations also included increased activity
ofpartisans, who attacked German communications andsupply
lines.[127] The attacks were mostly behind ArmyGroup North and Army
Group Centre.[28] In June 1943,partisans operating in the occupied
area behind ArmyGroup Centre destroyed 298 locomotives, 1,222
railwaywagons and 44 bridges, and in the Kursk sector there
were1,092 partisan attacks on railways.[113][128][129] These
at-tacks delayed the build-up of German supplies and equip-ment,
and required the diversion of German troops tosuppress the
partisans, delaying their training for theoensive.[28] Central
Partisan Headquarters coordinatedmany of these attacks. In June
Soviet Air Forces (VVS)ew over 800 sorties at night to resupply the
partisangroups operating behind Army Group Centre.[130] TheVVS also
provided communication and sometimes evendaylight air-support for
major partisan operations.[127]
Special training was provided to the Soviet infantry man-ning
the defences to help them overcome the tank pho-bia that had been
evident since the start of the Germaninvasion.[131][132] Soldiers
were packed into trenches andtanks were driven overhead until all
signs of fear weregone.[lower-alpha 17][132] This training exercise
was referredto by the soldiers as ironing.[118] In combat, the
sol-diers would spring up in the midst of the attacking in-fantry
to separate them from the spearheading armouredvehicles. The
separated armoured vehicles now vulner-able to infantry armed with
anti-tank ries, demolitioncharges and Molotov cocktails could then
be disabledor destroyed at point-blank range.[133] These types of
at-tacks were mostly eective against the massive Ferdinandtank
destroyers, which lacked machine guns as secondaryarmament.[133]
The soldiers were also promised nancialrewards for each tank
destroyed, with the Peoples Com-misariat of Defence providing 1,000
rubles for destroyedtanks.[134]
The Soviets employedmaskirovka (deception techniques)to mask
defensive positions and troop dispositions andto conceal the
movement of men and materiel.[135][136]
-
1.3 Contest for air superiority and air support of the ground
forces 7
These included camouaging gun emplacements, con-structing dummy
airelds and depots, generating falseradio-trac, and spreading
rumours among the So-viet frontline troops and the civilian
population in theGerman-held areas.[137] Movement of forces and
suppliesto and from the salient took place at night only.
Ammu-nition caches were carefully concealed to blend in withthe
landscape. Radio transmission was restricted and reswere forbidden.
Command posts were hidden and motortransport in and around them
forbidden.[138][139]
According to a Soviet General Sta report, 29 of the 35major
Luftwae raids on Soviet airelds in the Kursk sec-tor in June 1943
were against dummy airelds.[137] TheSoviet deception eorts were so
successful that Germanestimates issued in mid-June placed the total
Soviet ar-moured strength at 1,500 tanks.[140][141] The result
wasnot only a vast underestimation of Soviet strength, but
amisperception of Soviet strategic intentions.[138] Accord-ing to
historian Antony Beevor, in contrast, Soviet avi-ation apparently
succeeded in destroying more than 500Luftwae aircraft on the
ground.[142]
M3 Lee lend-lease tanks at Kursk. Unpopular with its crews,
theM3 was nicknamed a con for seven brothers.
The main tank of the Soviet tank arm was the T-34,considered the
best all-around tank design of the en-tire war, on which the Red
Army attempted to con-centrate production. The tank arm also
contained largenumbers of the T-70 light tank. For example, the
5thGuards Tank Army roughly contained 270 T-70s and500 T-34s. In
the salient itself the Soviets assembleda large number of
lend-lease tanks. These includedU.S.-manufactured M3 Lees and
British-built Churchills,Matildas and Valentines. However, the T-34
made upthe bulk of the Soviet armour.[143] Without includingthe
deeper reserves organised under the Steppe Front,the Soviets massed
about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks,20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792
aircraft to defend thesalient.[102][144] This amounted to 26
percent of the totalmanpower of the Red Army, 26 percent of its
mortarsand artillery, 35 percent of its aircraft and 46 percent
ofits tanks.[102]
1.3 Contest for air superiority and air sup-port of the ground
forces
Both the Luftwae and the VVS were air forces de-signed with the
primary mission of supporting their re-spective ground forces.
Though the VVS was always
much larger than the Luftwae, in the early stages of thewar with
the Soviet Union the Luftwae had achievedcomplete air superiority,
inicting huge losses upon theSoviet Air Force. The Luftwaes
extensive air supportto the German ground forces was checked only
when theadvance pushed beyond the range of their
forward-mostairelds.[145] However, by 1943 the Luftwaes strengthin
the east had started to weaken. Resupply by air of for-ward panzer
units had been a Luftwae role since thestart of the war, but the
demand placed upon the Luft-wae to resupply large isolated
formations during the se-vere winter of 194142 and then again over
Stalingradthe following winter cost the Luftwae a great deal
inequipment and pilots.[146] The Luftwae forces in the eastwere
further depleted with squadrons being shifted backto Germany to
defend against the increasing Allied bomb-ing campaign.[147] By the
end of June, only 38.7 percentof the Luftwaes total aircraft
remained in the east, withmost of them concentrated in the Kursk
area.[148]
Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 ground-attack aircraft
In 1943 the Luftwae could still achieve local air superi-ority
by concentrating its forces. The majority of Luft-wae aircraft left
available on the Eastern Front wereslated for Citadel.[142] The
changing strengths betweenthe two opponents prompted the Luftwae to
make op-erational changes for the battle. Previous oensive
cam-paigns had been initiated with Luftwae raids against op-posing
airelds to achieve air superiority. By this point inthe war Soviet
equipment reserves were extensive. TheLuftwae commanders realised
that whatever aircraftthey could destroy on the ground could be
replaced bythe Soviets within days, making such raids futile.
There-fore this mission was abandoned.[149] In addition, previ-ous
campaigns had made use of medium bombers y-ing well behind the
frontline to block the arrival of rein-forcements. This mission,
however, was rarely attemptedduring Citadel.[149] For Citadel, the
Luftwae connedits operations to the direct support of the forces on
theground.[150] In this mission the Luftwae continued tomake use of
the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers. Anew development to this
aircraft was the Bordkanone3,7 cm calibre cannon, one of which
could be slung un-
-
8 2 OPPOSING FORCES
der each wing of the Stuka in a gun pod. Half of theStuka groups
assigned to support Citadel were equippedwith these.[151] The air
groups were also buttressed by therecent arrival of the Henschel Hs
129, with its 30 mm MK103 cannon, and the ground attack (jabo)
version of theFocke-Wulf Fw 190.[152]
Luftwae ak units
The Luftwae command understood that their supportwould be
crucial for the success of Operation Citadel, butproblems with
supply shortfalls hampered their prepara-tions. Partisan activity,
particularly behind Army GroupCenter, slowed the rate of re-supply
and cut short theLuftwaes ability to build up essential stockpiles
ofpetrol, oil, lubricants, engines, munitions, and, unlikethe
Soviets, there were no reserves of aircraft that couldbe used to
replace damaged aircraft over the course ofthe operation.[153] Fuel
was the most signicant limitingfactor.[154] To help build up
supplies for the support ofCitadel, the Luftwae greatly curtailed
its operations dur-ing the last week of June.[152] Despite this
conservation ofresources, the Luftwae did not have the resources to
sus-tain an intensive air eort for more than a few days afterthe
operation began.[155]
In the months preceding the battle, Luftotte 6 support-ing Army
Group Center noted a marked increase in thestrength of the opposing
VVS formations. The Sovietforces encountered displayed better
training, and wereying improved equipment with greater
aggressiveness
and skill than the Luftwae had seen earlier.[156] The
in-troduction of the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5ghters gave
the Soviet pilots near parity with the Luft-wae in terms of
equipment. Furthermore, large num-bers of ground-attack aircraft,
such as the Ilyushin Il-2Shturmovik and the Pe-2, had become
available as well.The Soviet Air Force also elded large quantities
of air-craft supplied via lend-lease. Huge stockpiles of
suppliesand ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant the
So-viets would be able to conduct an extended campaignwithout
slackening in the intensity of their eort.[149]
2 Opposing forcesSee also: Battle of Kursk order of battle
2.1 Germans
For the operation, the Germans used four armies alongwith a
large proportion of their total tank strength on theEastern Front.
On 1 July, the 9th Army of Army GroupCentre based in the northern
side of the salient contained335,000 men (223,000 combat soldiers);
in the south,the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf,of Army
Group South, had 223,907 men (149,271 com-bat soldiers) and
100,000108,000 men (66,000 combatsoldiers) respectively. The 2nd
Army, that held the west-ern side of the salient contained an
estimated 110,000. Intotal, the German forces had a total strength
of 777,000779,000 men, and the three attacking armies
contained438,271 combat soldiers.[157][95] Army Group South
wasequipped with more armoured vehicles, infantry and ar-tillery
than the 9th Army of Army Group Center.[158][95]The 4th Panzer Army
and Army Detachment Kempfhad 1,377 tanks and assault guns, while
the 9th Armypossessed 988 tanks and assault guns.[157]
The two new Panther battalions the 51st and 52nd together
equipped with 200 Panthers, for whichthe oensive had been delayed,
were attached to theGrodeutschland Division in the XLVIII Panzer
Corps ofArmy Group South. With the 51st and 52nd Battalionsarriving
on 30 June and 1 July, the two units had little timeto perform
reconnaissance or to orient themselves to theterrain they found
themselves in. This was a breach of themethods of the panzerwae,
considered essential for thesuccessful use of armour.[159][160][49]
Though led by ex-perienced panzer commanders, many of the tank
crewswere new recruits and had little time to become familiarwith
their new tanks, let alone train together to function asa unit. The
two battalions came direct from the trainingground and lacked
combat experience.[161][162] In addi-tion, the requirement to
maintain radio silence until thestart of the attack meant that the
Panther units had littletraining in battalion-level radio
procedures.[161][159] Fur-
-
2.4 Preliminary actions 9
thermore, the new Panthers were still experiencing prob-lems
with their transmissions, and proved mechanicallyunreliable. By the
morning of 5 July, the units had lost16 Panthers due to mechanical
breakdown, leaving only184 available for the launching of the
oensive.[163]
2.2 Soviets
The Red Army used two Fronts for the defence of Kursk,and
created a third front behind the battle area whichwas held as a
reserve. The Central and Voronezh Frontselded 12 armies, with
711,575 men (510,983 combatsoldiers) and 625,591 men (446,236
combat soldiers) re-spectively. In reserve, the Steppe Front had an
additional573,195 men (449,133). Thus the total size of the
Sovietforce was 1,910,361 men, with 1,426,352 actual
combatsoldiers.
2.3 Comparison of strength
2.3.1 Operation Citadel
2.3.2 Soviet oensive phase
2.4 Preliminary actions
German penetration during the Battle of Kursk
Fighting started on the southern face of the salient on
theevening of 4 July 1943, when German infantry launchedattacks to
seize high ground for artillery observation postsprior to the main
assault.[170] During these attacks, a num-ber of Soviet command and
observation posts along therst main belt of defence were captured.
By 16:00, el-ements of the Panzergrenadier Division
Grodeutsch-land, 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions had seized the
vil-lage of Butovo and proceeded to capture Gertsovka be-fore
midnight.[171][172][170] At around 22:30, Vatutin or-dered 600
guns, mortars and Katyusha rocket launchers,of the Voronezh Front,
to bombard the forward Ger-man positions, particularly those of the
II SS PanzerCorps.[173][171][174]
To the north, at Central Front headquarters, reports ofthe
anticipated German oensive came in. At around02:00 5 July, Zhukov
ordered his preemptive artillerybombardment to begin. The hope was
to disrupt Germanforces concentrating for the attack, but the
outcome wasless than hoped for. The bombardment delayed the Ger-man
formations, but failed in the goal of disrupting theirschedule or
inicting substantial losses. The Germansbegan their own artillery
bombardment at about 05:00,which lasted 80 minutes in the northern
face and 50 min-utes in the southern face. After the barrage, the
groundforces attacked, aided by close air support provided bythe
Luftwae.[175][171][176][177]
German motorised troops prepare to move out.
In the early morning of 5 July, the Soviet Air Forcelaunched a
large raid against German airelds, hop-ing to destroy the Luftwae
on the ground. Thiseort failed, and the Soviets suered
considerablelosses.[lower-alpha 19][178][171] The Soviets lost 176
aircraftin 5 July, compared to the 26 aircraft lost by
theLuftwae.[179][178] The losses of the Soviet 16th AirArmy
operating in the northern face were lighter thanthose suered by the
2nd Air Army.[180] The Luftwaewas able to gain and maintained air
superiority over thesouthern face until 1011 July when it began
shifting inSoviets favor,[178][181] but the control of the skies
overthe northern face was evenly contested until the SovietAir
Force began to gain air superiority on 7 July, whichit maintained
for the rest of the operation.[182][183]
-
10 3 OPERATION ALONG THE NORTHERN FACE
3 Operation along the northernface
Models main attack was delivered by XLVII PanzerCorps, supported
by 45 Tigers of the attached 505thHeavy Tank Battalion.[184]
Covering their left ank wasXLI Panzer Corps, with an attached
regiment of 83Ferdinand tank destroyers. On the right ank,
XLVIPanzer Corps consisted at this time of four infantry di-visions
with just 9 tanks and 31 assault guns.[184] To theleft of XLI
Panzer Corps was XXIII Army Corps, whichconsisted of the reinforced
78th Assault Infantry Divi-sion and two regular infantry divisions.
While the corpscontained no tanks, it did have 62 assault
guns.[184] Op-posing the 9th Army was the Central Front, deployed
inthree heavily fortied defensive belts.[112]
Model chose to make his initial attacks using infantrydivisions
reinforced with assault guns and heavy tanks,and supported by
artillery and the Luftwae. In doingso he sought to maintain the
armoured strength of hispanzer divisions to be used for
exploitation once the So-viet defences were breached. Once a
breakthrough hadbeen achieved the panzer forces would move through
andadvance towards Kursk.[184] Jan Mschen, a major inModels sta,
later commented that Model expected abreakthrough on the second
day. If a breakthrough didoccur the briefest delay in bringing up
the panzer divi-sions would give the Soviets time to react. His
corps com-manders thought a breakthrough extremely
unlikely.[185]
Tiger I tanks spearhead the assault in the northern sector.
Following a preliminary bombardment and Sovietcounter
bombardments, the 9th Army opened its attackat 05:30 on 5 July.
[186] Nine infantry divisions and onepanzer division, with attached
assault guns, heavy tanks,and tank destroyers, pushed forward.[185]
Two companiesof Tiger tanks were attached to the 6th Infantry
Divi-sion, and were the largest single grouping of Tigers em-ployed
that day.[187] Opposing them were the 13th and70th Armies of the
Central Front.[185]
The 20th Panzer and 6th Infantry Divisions of the XLVIIPanzer
Corps, working in close cooperation, spearheadedthe advance of the
XLVII Panzer Corps. Behind them
the remaining two panzer divisions followed, ready toexploit any
breakthrough.[187] The heavily mined terrainand fortied positions
of the Soviet 15th Rie Divisionslowed the advance. By 08:00 safe
lanes had been clearedthrough the mineeld.[187] That morning
information ob-tained from prisoner interrogation identied a
weaknessat the boundary of the 15th and 81st Rie Divisionscaused by
the German preliminary bombardment.[188]The Tigers were redeployed
and struck towards this area.The Soviets countered with a force of
around 90 T-34s.In the resulting three-hour battle, the Soviets
lost 42 tankswhile the Germans lost two Tigers and a further vemore
immobilized with track damage.[188] While the So-viet
counter-attack was defeated and the rst defensivebelt breached, the
ghting had delayed the Germans longenough for the rest of 29th Rie
Corps of the 13th Army initially deployed behind the rst belt to
move for-ward and seal the breach.[189] Soviet mineelds were
cov-ered by artillery re, making eorts to clear paths throughthe
elds dicult and costly. Goliath and Borgward IVremote-controlled
engineer mine-clearing vehicles metwith limited success. Of the
653rd Heavy PanzerjgerBattalion's 45 Ferdinands sent into battle,
all but 12 ofthem were immobilized by mine damage before 17:00.Most
of these were later repaired and returned to ser-vice, but the
recovery of these very large vehicles weredicult.[190]
On the rst day, the XLVII Panzer Corps penetrated 6 mi(9.7 km)
into the Soviet defences before stalling,[191] andthe XLI Panzer
Corps reached the heavily fortied smalltown Ponyri, in the second
defensive belt, which con-trolled the roads and railways leading
south to Kursk.[192]In the rst day, the Germans penetrated 5 to 6
mi (8.0to 9.7 km) into the Soviet lines for the loss of 1,287
menkilled and missing and a further 5,921 wounded.[193][191]
Soviet KV-1 heavy tanks prepare to counter-attack.
Rokossovsky ordered the 17th Guards and 18th GuardsRie Corps
with the 2nd Tank Army and 19th Tank Corp,
-
11
backed up by close air support, to counterattack the Ger-man 9th
Army the following day on 6 July. However dueto poor coordination,
only the 16th Tank Corps of the 2ndTank Army commenced the
counterattack on the dawnof 6 July after the preparatory Soviet
artillery barrage.The 16th Tank Corps, elding about 200 tanks,
attackedthe the XLVII Panzer Corps and ran into the Tiger tanksof
the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion, which knocked out69 Soviet tanks
and forced the rest to withdraw to the17th Guards Rie Corps of the
13th Army.[194] Later thatmorning, the XLVII Panzer Corps responded
with its ownattack against the 17th Guards Rie Corps
entrenchedaround the village Olkhovatka in the second
defensivebelt. The attack commenced with an artillery barrage
andwas spearheaded by the 24 serviceable Tigers of the 505thHeavy
Tank Battalion,[195] but it failed to break the Sovietdefence at
Olkhovatka, and the German suered heavycasualties.[196][197]
Olkhovatka was on a high ground thatprovided a clear view of much
of the frontline.[198] At18:30, the 19th Tank Corps joined the 17th
GuardsRie Corps further bolstering Soviet
resistance.[196][197]Rokossovsky also decided to dig in most of his
remainingtanks to minimize their exposure.[199] Ponyri, defendedby
the Soviet 307th Rie Division of the 29th Rie Corps,was also
concertedly attacked on 6 July by the German292nd and 86th
Infantry, 78th Assault Infantry and 9thPanzer Divisions, but the
Germans were unable to dis-lodge the defenders from heavily fortied
village.[200]
Over the next three days from 7 to 10 July, Modelconcentrated
the eort of the 9th Army at Ponyriand Olkhovatka, which both sides
considered as vitalpositions.[201][202] In response, Rokossovsky
pulled forcesfrom other parts of the front to these sectors.[203]
[204][205]The Germans attacked Ponyri on 7 July, and captured
halfof the town after intense house-to-house ghting. A So-viet
counterattack the following morning forced the Ger-mans to
withdraw, and a series of counterattacks ensuedby both sides with
control of the town being exchangedseveral times over the next few
days. By 10 July, theGermans had secured most of the town, but
Soviet coun-terattacks continued.[206] The back and forth battles
forPonyri and the nearby Hill 253.5 were battles of attri-tion,
with heavy casualties on both sides. It became re-ferred to by the
troops as mini-Stalingrad.[192] The wardiary of the 9th Army
described the heavy ghting as anew type of mobile attrition
battle.[207] German attackson Olkhovatka and the nearby village of
Teploe failed topenetrate the Soviet defences; including a powerful
con-certed attack on 10 July by about 300 Germans tanks andassault
guns from the 2nd, 4th and 20th Panzer Divisions,supported by every
available Luftwae air power in thenorthern face.[208][209]
On 9 July a meeting between Kluge, Model, JoachimLemelsen and
Josef Harpe was held at the headquartersof the XLVII Panzer
Corps.[192] It had become clear tothe German commanders that the
9th Army lacked thestrength to obtain a breakthrough, and their
Soviet coun-
terparts have also realized this, but Kluge wished to main-tain
the pressure on the Soviets in order to aid the south-ern
oensive.[210]
While the operation on the northern side of the salient be-gan
with a 45-kilometre-wide (28 mi) attack front, by 6July it had been
reduced to 40-kilometre-wide (25 mi).The following day the attack
frontage dropped to 15-kilometre-wide (9.3 mi), and on both the 8
and 9 Julypenetrations of only 2-kilometre-wide (1.2 mi)
occurred.By 10 July, the Soviets had completely halted the
Germanadvance.[211]
On 12 July the Soviets launched Operation Kutuzov,
theircounter-oensive upon the Orel salient, which threat-ened the
ank and rear of Models 9th Army. The 12thPanzer Division, thus far
held in reserve and slated to becommitted to the northern side of
the Kursk salient,[212]along with the 36th Motorized Infantry, 18th
Panzer and20th Panzer Divisions were redeployed to face the
Sovietspearheads.[213]
4 Operation along the southernface
At around 04:00 on 5 July, the German attack com-menced with a
preliminary bombardment. Mansteinsmain attack was delivered by
Hoths 4th PanzerArmy, which was organized into densely
concentratedspearheads.[157] Opposing the 4th Panzer Army wasthe
Soviet 6th Guards Army, which was composed ofthe 22nd Guards Rie
Corps and 23rd Guards RieCorps.[159] The Soviets had constructed
three heavily for-tied defensive belts to slow and weaken the
attacking ar-moured forces.[112] Though they had been provided
su-perb intelligence, the Voronezh Front headquarters hadstill not
been able to pinpoint the exact location wherethe Germans would
place their oensive weight.[112]
Wespe self-propelled artillery battery in position to provide
resupport
-
12 4 OPERATION ALONG THE SOUTHERN FACE
4.1 XLVIII Panzer CorpsThe panzergrenadier division
Grodeutschland, com-manded by Walter Hrnlein, was the strongest
singledivision in the 4th Panzer Army. It was supportedon its anks
by the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions.[159]Grodeutschlands Panzer
IIIs and IVs had been supple-mented by a company of 15 Tigers,
which were used tospearhead the attack. At dawn on 5 July,
Grossdeutsch-land, backed by heavy artillery support, advanced on
athree-kilometre front upon the 67th Guards Rie Divi-sion of the
22nd Guards Rie Corps.[159] The Panzer-fsilier Regiment, advancing
on the left wing, stalled ina mineeld and subsequently 36 Panthers
were immobi-lized. The stranded regiment was subjected to a
barrageof Soviet anti-tank and artillery re, which inicted
nu-merous casualties. Engineers were moved up and clearedpaths
through the mineeld, but suered casualties in theprocess. The
combination of erce resistance, mineelds,thick mud and mechanical
breakdowns took its toll. Withpaths cleared, the regiment resumed
its advance towardsGertsovka. In the ensuing battle, heavy
casualties weresustained including the regimental commander
ColonelKassnitz. Due to the ghting, and the marshy terrainsouth of
the village, surrounding the Berezovyy stream,the regiment once
more bogged down.[214][215][160]
Panzer IIIs and IVs advance against the southern face of
thesalient.
The panzergrenadier regiment of Grodeutschland, ad-vancing on
the right wing, pushed through to the villageof Butovo.[216] The
tanks were deployed in a classic arrowformation to minimise the
eects of the Soviet Pakfrontdefence, with the Tigers leading and
the Panzer IIIs, IVsand assault guns fanning out to the anks and
rear. Theywere followed by infantry and combat engineers.[216]
At-tempts by the VVS to impede the advance were repulsedby the
Luftwae.[217]
The 3rd Panzer Division, advancing on the left ankof
Grodeutschland, made good progress and by theend of the day had
captured Gertsovka[72] and reachedMikhailovka.[218] The 167th
Infantry Division, on theright ank of the 11th Panzer Division,
also made su-cient progress, reaching Tirechnoe by the end of the
day.By the end of 5 July, a wedge had been created in the rst
belt of the Soviet defences.[219]
4.2 II SS Panzer Corps
The commander of a Tiger I attached to 2nd SS Panzer DivisionDas
Reich
To the east, during the night of 45 July, SS com-bat engineers
had inltrated no-mans land and clearedlanes through the Soviet
mineelds.[220] At dawn, 5 July,the three divisions of II SS Panzer
Corps SS Panz-ergrenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd
SSPanzergrenadier Division Das Reich and the 3rd SS
Panz-ergrenadier Division Totenkopf attacked the 6th GuardsArmys
52nd Guards Rie Division. The main assaultwas led by a spearhead of
42 Tigers, but in total 494tanks and assault guns attacked across a
twelve-kilometrefront.[220] Totenkopf, the strongest of the three
divi-sions, advanced towards Gremuchhi and screened theright ank.
The 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division ad-vanced on the left ank
towards Bykovka. The 2ndSS Panzer Division advanced between the two
forma-tions in the center.[220] Following closely behind the
tankswere the infantry and combat engineers, coming forwardto
demolish obstacles and clear trenches. In addition,the advance was
well supported by the Luftwae, whichgreatly aided in breaking
Soviet strong points and artillerypositions.[221]
By 09:00 hours, the II SS Panzer Corps had brokenthrough the
Soviet rst belt of defence along its entirefront.[222][223] While
probing positions between the rstand second Soviet defensive belts,
at 13:00, the 2nd SSPanzer Divisions vanguard came under re from
two T-34 tanks, which were quickly dispatched. Forty moreSoviet
tanks soon engaged the division. The 1st GuardsTank Army clashed
with the 2nd SS Panzer Division in afour-hour battle, resulting in
the Soviet tanks withdraw-ing. However, the battle had bought
enough time forunits of the 23rd Soviet Guards Rie Corps, lodged
inthe Soviet second belt, to prepare itself and be reinforcedwith
additional anti-tank guns.[224] By the early evening,2nd SS Panzer
Division had reached the mineelds thatmarked the outer perimeter of
the Soviet second belt ofdefence.[225] The 1st SS Division had
secured Bykovka by
-
4.3 Army Detachment Kempf 13
16:10. It then pushed forward towards the second belt ofdefence
at Yakovlevo, but its attempts to break throughwere rebued. By the
end of the day, the 1st SS Divisionhad sustained 97 dead, 522
wounded, and 17 missing andlost about 30 tanks.[225] Together with
the 2nd SS PanzerDivision, it had forced a wedge far into the
defences ofthe 6th Guards Army.
Two Tiger tanks of Totenkopf and a StuG assault gun
carryinginfantry
The 3rd SS Panzer Division was making slow progress.They had
managed to isolate the 155th Guards Regiment,of the 52nd Guards Rie
Division (of the 23rd GuardsRie Corps), from the rest of its parent
division, but itsattempts to sweep the regiment eastward into the
ankof the neighbouring 375th Rie Division (of the 23rdGuards Rie
Corps) had failed when the regiment wasreinforced by the 96th Tank
Brigade. Hausser, the com-mander of II SS Panzer Corps, requested
aid from the IIIPanzer Corps to his right, but the panzer corps had
nounits to spare. By the end of the day, the 3rd SS Divisionhad
made very limited progress due in part to a tributaryof the Donets
river. The lack of progress undermined theadvance made by its
sister divisions and exposed the rightank of the corps to Soviet
forces.[226] German crews,working in boiling tanks in sweltering
weather condi-tions, frequently suered from heat
exhaustion.[227]
The 6th Guards Army, which confronted the attack bythe XLVIII
Panzer Korps and II SS Panzer Korps, was re-inforced with tanks
from the 1st Tank Army, the 2ndGuards Tank Corps and the 5th Guards
Tank Corps. The51st and 90th Guards Rie divisions were moved up
tothe vicinity of Pokrovka (not Prokhorovka, 40 kilome-tres (25 mi)
to the north-east), in the path of the 1stSS Panzer Division.[219]
The 93rd Guards Rie Divisionwas deployed further back, along the
road leading fromPokrovka to Prokhorovka.[185]
4.3 Army Detachment KempfFacing Army DetachmentKempf, consisting
of III PanzerCorps and Corps Raus (commanded by Erhard Raus),were
the 7th Guards Army, dug in on the high ground onthe eastern bank
of the Northern Donets. The two Ger-man corps were tasked with
crossing the river, smashing
German soldiers move along an anti-tank ditch, while
pioneersprepare charges to breach it.
through the 7th Guards Army and cover the right ankof the 4th
Panzer Army.[228] The 503rd Heavy Tank Bat-talion equipped with 45
Tigers was also attached tothe III Panzer Corps, split up so that
one company of 15Tigers was attached to each of the three panzer
divisionsof the corps.[228] Although the river was bridged
duringthe night of 4 July, the crossing points were bombardedby
Soviet artillery.[228]
At the Milkhailovka bridgehead, just south of Belgorod,eight
infantry battalions of the 6th Panzer Division assem-bled to make a
crossing. They were subjected to heavyartillery re during the
Soviet defensive bombardment,but most of the infantry got across to
the eastern bank.An eort was made to cross a company of Tigers
fromthe 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion, but the bridge was bom-barded
and destroyed before the entire company could getacross. The
remainder of the 6th Panzer Division wasforced to cross further
south.[228] Clemens Graf Kage-neck, a battalion commander,
described it thus:
Suddenly, a red sunrise arose on the farside as hundreds of
Stalins organs hurled theirrockets exactly onto the crossing site.
Thebridge was totally demolished and the engi-neers, unfortunately,
suered heavy losses.Never have I hugged the dirt so tightly as
whenthese terrible shells sprayed their thin frag-ments just above
the ground.[228]
The diversion to the south pushed the 6th Panzer Divi-sion
behind schedule, and the problem was aggravatedwhen the new
crossing became clogged with trac. Fail-ing to nd another crossing,
the rest of the division re-mained on the western bank of the river
throughout theday.[228] Those units of the division that had
crossed theriver launched an attack led by Tigers on Stary
Gorod,which was repulsed due to poorly cleared mineelds andstrong
resistance.[229]
To the south of the 6th Panzer Division, the 19th PanzerDivision
crossed the river but was delayed by mines thatdamaged some of the
Tigers spearheading the advanceand division had moved forward 8
kilometres (5.0 mi)
-
14 4 OPERATION ALONG THE SOUTHERN FACE
Soviet PTRD anti-tank rie team, during the ghting
by the end of the day.[229] Luftwae He 111s bombedthe bridgehead
in error, wounding 6th Panzer Divisioncommander Walther von
Hnersdor and Hermann vonOppeln-Bronikowski of the 19th Panzer
Division.[230]Further south, infantry and tanks of 7th Panzer
Divisionmanaged to cross the bridges but these bridges were
notheavy enough to support the weight of the Tiger tanks at-tached
to the 7th Panzer Division. Eventually, engineersconstructed a
heavy bridge enabling the Tigers to cross,where they joined the
force on the far side.[231] Despite apoor start, the 7th Panzer
Division eventually broke intothe rst belt of the Soviet defence
and pushed on betweenRazumnoe and Krutoi Log, advancing about 10
kilome-tres (6.2 mi) during the day, the furthest advance by
ArmyDetachment Kempf of the day.[232]
The conditions during the battle were hot and humid. Here,
Al-fred Kurzmaul, of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion, drinks
wa-ter aboard a Tiger I during a lull in the ghting.
Operating to the south of 7th Panzer Division, were the106th
Infantry Division and the 320th Infantry Divisionof Corps Raus. The
two formations attacked across a32 kilometres (20 mi) front without
armour support andmade little progress. The advance began well,
with thecrossing of the river and a swift advance against the
72ndGuards Rie Division. The Soviet defenders were takenby surprise
with the speed of the advance.[232] Raus laterwrote:
The advancing infantry surprised them andhad no diculty
ferreting them out. But when
the infantry reached the two to ve-kilometredeep zone of the
battle positions prepared inthe preceding months, they had to make
ex-tensive use of hand grenades in order to mopup [a] maze of
densely dug-in trenches andbunkers, some of which were a dozen or
morefeet deep. At the same time, artillery and akred
counter-battery missions against the en-emy heavy weapons that had
resumed re fromrear positions. They also red on reserves
in-ltrating through the trench system, as well asagainst [Soviet]
medium artillery.[232]
After a erce battle, involving some hand-to-hand ght-ing, Corps
Raus took the village of Maslovo Pristani,penetrating the rst
Soviet belt of defence. A Sovietcounter-attack supported by about
40 tanks was beateno, with the assistance from artillery and ak
batteries.Having suered 2,000 casualties since the morning andstill
facing considerable resistance, the corps dug in forthe
night.[233]
The thrust of Army Detachment Kempf had been slowed,allowing the
Soviets time to prepare their second belt ofdefence to meet the
German attack on 6 July.[233] The7th Guards Army, which had
absorbed the attack of IIIPanzer Corps and Corps Raus, was
reinforced with tworie divisions from the reserve. The 15th Guards
RieDivision was moved up to the second belt of defence, inthe path
of the III Panzer Corps.[233]
4.4 Further German progress
Thunderclouds over the battleground. Intermittent heavy
rainscreated mud and marsh that made movement dicult.
By the evening of 6 July, the Voronezh Front had com-mitted all
of its reserves, except for three rie divisionsunder the 69th Army;
yet it could not decisively con-tain the 4th Panzer Army.[233][234]
The XLVIII PanzerCorps along the Oboyan axis, where the third
defensivebelt was mostly unoccupied, now had only the Soviet
sec-ond defensive belt blocking it from breakthrough intothe free
Soviet rear.[235][236] This forced the Stavka tocommit their
strategic reserves to reinforce the VoronezhFront: the 5th Guards
and 5th Guards Tank Armies, bothfrom the Steppe Front, as well as
the 2nd Tank Corps
-
4.5 Battle of Prokhorovka 15
from the Southwestern Front.[237][236] Ivan Konev ob-jected to
this premature piecemeal commitment of thestrategic reserve, but a
personal call from Stalin silencedhis complaints.[238] In addition,
on 7 July Zhukov orderedthe 17th Air Army the air eet serving the
Southwest-ern Front to support the 2nd Air Army in serving
theVoronezh Front.[236][239][240] On July 7, the 5th GuardsTank
Army began advancing to Prokhorovka. 5th GuardsTank Army commander,
Lieutenant General Pavel Rot-mistrov, described the journey:
By midday, the dust rose in thick clouds,settling in a solid
layer on roadside bushes,grain elds, tanks and trucks. The dark
reddisc of the sun was hardly visible. Tanks, self-propelled guns,
artillery tractors, armouredpersonnel carriers and trucks were
advancingin an unending ow. The faces of the soldierswere dark with
dust and exhaust fumes. It wasintolerably hot. Soldiers were
tortured by thirstand their shirts, wet with sweat, stuck to
theirbodies.[199]
The 10th Tank Corps, then still subordinate to the 5thGuards
Army, was rushed ahead of the rest of the army,arriving at
Prokhorovka on the night of 7 July, and 2ndTank Corps arrived at
Korocha, 25 miles (40 km) south-east of Prokhorovka, by morning of
8 July.[241] Vatutinordered a powerful counterattack by the 5th
Guards, 2ndGuards, 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, in all elding about593
tanks and self-propelled guns and supported by mostof the Fronts
available air power, which aimed to de-feat the II SS Panzer Corps
and therefore expose theright ank of XLVIII Panzer Corps.
Simultaneously, the6th Tank Corps was to attack the XLVIII Panzer
Corpsand prevent it from breaking through to the free Sovietrear.
Although intended to be concerted, the counterat-tack turned out to
be a series of piecemeal attacks dueto poor coordination.[242] The
10th Tank Corps attackbegan on the dawn of 8 July but ran straight
into the anti-tank re of the 2nd and 3rd SS Divisions, and it was
dev-astated. Later that morning, the 5th Guards Tank Corpsattack
was repelled by the 3rd SS Division. The 2nd TankCorp joined in the
afternoon and was also repelled.[242]The 2nd Guards Tank Corps,
masked by the forest aroundthe village Gostishchevo, 10 miles (16
km) north of Bel-gorod, with its presence unknown to the II SS
PanzerCorps, advanced towards the 167th Infantry Division.But it
was detected by German air reconnaissance justbefore the attack had
materialized, and was subsequentlydecimated by German ground-attack
aircraft armed withMK 103 anti-tank cannons and at least 50 tanks
weredestroyed.[243][244] This marked the rst time in
militaryhistory an attacking tank formation had been defeatedby air
power alone.[245][246] Although a asco, the Sovietcounterattack
succeeded in stalling the advance of the IISS Panzer Corps
throughout the day.[247][246]
By the end of 8 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had ad-
vanced about 29 kilometres (18 mi) since the start ofCitadel and
broken through the rst and second defen-sive
belts.[248][249][250][251] However, slow progress by theXLVIII
Panzer Corps caused Hoth to shift elements ofthe II SS-Panzer Corps
to the west to help the XLVIIIPanzer Corps regain its momentum. On
10 July the fulleort of the corps was shifted back to its own
forwardprogress. The direction of their advance now shifted
fromOboyan due north to the northeast, toward Prokhorovka.Hoth had
discussed this move with Manstein since earlyMay, and it was a part
of the 4th Panzer Armys plan sincethe outset of the
oensive.[252][253] By this time, however,the Soviets had shifted
reserve formations into its path.The defensive positions were
manned by the 2nd TankCorps, reinforced by the 9th Guards Airborne
Divisionand 301st Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, both from the33rd
Guards Rie Corps.[254][255]
Though the German advance in the south was slower thandesired,
it was much faster than the Soviets expected.On 9 July, the rst
German units reached the Psel River.The next day, the rst German
infantry crossed the river.Despite the deep defensive system and
mineelds, Ger-man tank losses were low.[256] At this point, Hoth
turnedthe II SS Panzer Corps from a northward heading di-rected
toward Oboyan to a northeast heading towardsProkhorovka.[257][258]
The main concern of Manstein andHausser was the inability of Army
Detachment Kempfto advance and protect the eastern ank of the II
SSPanzer Corps. On 11 July, Army Detachment Kempfnally achieved a
breakthrough. In a surprise night at-tack, the 6th Panzer Division
seized a bridge across theDonets.[259] Once across, Breith made
every eort topush troops and vehicles across the river for an
advanceon Prokhorovka from the south. A linkup with the II SSPanzer
Corps would result with the Soviet 69th Armybecoming encircled. It
appeared the hoped for break-through was at hand.[260]
4.5 Battle of Prokhorovka
Main article: Battle of ProkhorovkaHausser had expected to
continue his advance on
German Panzer IV and Sdkfz 251 halftrack
-
16 5 ALLIED INVASION OF SICILY AND TERMINATION OF OPERATION
CITADEL
Prokhorovka, and late on the evening of 11 July issuedorders for
a classic manoeuvre battle for the attack thenext day. The attack
would begin north of the Psel River,with the 3rd SS Panzer Division
driving northeast un-til reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka
road. Oncethere, they were to strike southeast to attack the
Sovietpositions at Prokhorovka from the rear. The 1st and 2ndSS
Panzer divisions were to wait until Totenkopfs at-tack had
destabilised the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka.Once the Soviet
position at Prokhorovka was under attackfrom the rear, the
Leibstandarte was to move forward, ad-vancing through the main
Soviet defences dug in on thewest slope before Prokhorovka. To the
Leibstandartesright, the 2nd SS was to advance eastward to the
highground south of Prokhorovka, then turn south to roll upthe
Soviet line and open a gap.[261] Unknown to Hausser,on the night of
11-12 July Rotmistrov had moved his5th Guards Tank Army to an
assembly area just behindProkhorovka in preparation for a massive
attack the fol-lowing day.[262][263] At 5:45 Leibstandarte
headquartersstarted receiving reports of the ominous sound of tank
en-gines as the Soviets moved into their assembly areas.[264]Soviet
artillery and Katyusha regiments were redeployedin preparation for
the counterattack.[265]
A Waen-SS Tiger I in action
At around 08:00, a Soviet artillery barrage began. At08:30,
Rotmistrov radioed his tankers: Steel, Steel,Steel!", the order to
commence the attack.[266][267][268]Down o the west slopes, before
Prokhorovka, came themassed armour of ve tank brigades from the two
So-viet tank corps. The 1st SS had just started to advance,when it
was taken largely by surprise.[269] As the Soviettanks aggressively
advanced down the corridor, they car-ried the infantrymen of the
9th Guards Airborne Divisioninto battle mounted on the tanks with
the paratroopersholding onto rails.[270] Amid the swirls of dust, a
highlyconfused tank battle began. To the north and east, the3rd SS
was engaged by the Soviet 33rd Guards RieCorps. Tasked with
destabilising the Soviet defences be-fore Prokhorovka, the unit rst
had to beat o a numberof attacks before they could go over onto the
oensive.Most of the divisions tank losses occurred late in the
af-ternoon as they advanced through mine elds against well-hidden
Soviet anti-tank guns. Although the 3rd SS suc-
ceeded in reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road,their hold
was tenuous and it cost the division half of itsarmour. The
majority of German tank losses suered atProkhorovka occurred here.
To the south, the Soviet 18thand 29th Tank Corps, of the 5th Guards
Tank Army, hadbeen thrown back by the 1st SS acting alone.
Meanwhile,the 2nd SS was holding a line to the south against the
2ndTank Corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.[271]
Exhausted German soldiers pause during the ghting.
By early afternoon, it was clear that Rotmistrovs attackhad
failed.[272] Luftwae local air superiority over thebattleeld also
contributed to the Soviet losses, partly dueto the VVS being
directed against the German units on theanks of II SS Panzer
Corps.[273] By the end of the day,the Soviets had fallen back to
their starting positions.[274]
The battle is considered a tactical defeat for the RedArmy due
to the heavy tank losses, but operationally wasa draw or a Soviet
victory.[253][275] Neither the 5th GuardsTank Army nor the II SS
Panzer Corps accomplishedtheir objectives. Though the Soviet
counterattack failedand they were thrown back onto the defensive,
they didenough to stop a German breakthrough.[276] Tank
lossesduring the battle have been a contentious subject. Soviettank
losses have been estimated from 200 to 822, but So-viet records
show about 300 complete losses and as manydamaged. The Soviets
claimed enormous German losses,stating they had destroyed at least
400 tanks, including100 Tiger tanks and inicting 3,500 deaths.[277]
Germanrecords indicate 3 to 5 of their own tanks destroyed,
andbetween 40 and 70 damaged. Their manpower losses areestimated at
500 killed.[278][253][279][280]
5 Allied invasion of Sicily and ter-mination of Operation
Citadel
On the evening of 12 July, Hitler summoned Klugeand Manstein to
his headquarters at Rastenburg in EastPrussia.[281] Two days prior,
the Western Allies hadinvaded Sicily. The threat of further Allied
landings inItaly or along southern France made Hitler believe it
wasessential to move forces from Kursk to Italy and to dis-continue
the oensive. Kluge welcomed the news, as
-
17
he was aware that the Soviets were initiating a massiveoensive
against his sector, but Manstein was less wel-coming. Mansteins
forces had just spent a week ghtingthrough a maze of defensive
works and he believed theywere on the verge of breaking through to
more open ter-rain, which would allow him to engage and destroy
theSoviet armoured reserves in a mobile battle. Mansteinstated, On
no account should we let go of the enemy untilthe mobile reserves
he [has] committed [are] completelybeaten.[282] Hitler agreed to
temporarily allow the con-tinuance of the oensive in the south part
of the salient,but the following day he ordered Mansteins reserve
theXXIV Panzer Corps to move south to support the 1stPanzer Army.
This removed the force Manstein believedwas needed to
succeed.[283]
On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line.The
following day, OKH ordered the II SS Panzer Corpsto be withdrawn
and transferred to Italy.[284][285] Thestrength of the Soviet
reserve formations had been greatlyunderestimated by German
intelligence, and the Sovietssoon went onto the oensive.[283]
5.1 Controversy
Following the war, a number of German generals werehighly
critical of Hitlers decision to call o the oper-ation at the height
of the tactical battle.[286] This criti-cism has been echoed by
ocers in the post-war GermanArmy,[287][288] and by a number of
historians.[289] Antic-ipating that the Western Allies would
conduct some formof operation in Western Europe, both Manstein and
Gud-erian had argued prior to the battle for forces to be
con-served and redeployed as a reserve. Once committed tothe
operation, it made little sense to pull them out at theclimax,
especially since they could not reach Italy in timeto impact events
there. Manstein argued pulling forcesout of Army Group South in the
midst of the battle, shift-ing away Luftwae support, and
transferring his reserveforce deprived his Army of its striking
power at what hebelieved was the decisive point of the battle.[290]
The ac-curacy of Mansteins assertion is debatable. The extent
ofSoviet reserves was far greater than he realised. These re-serves
were used to re-equip the mauled 5th Guards TankArmy, which
launched Operation Rumyantsev a coupleof weeks later. However,
rebuilding this formation didtake time. The essential thing was to
concentrate theavailable force for a decisive action; Hitlers
unwilling-ness to accept risk resulted in his commanders being
un-able to do so. Further, he restricted them from ghtingthe type
of mobile battle they wanted, despite Mansteinssuccess in this type
of action only a few months before atthe Third Battle of
Kharkov.[291][292] The result was a bat-tle of attrition they were
ill prepared for and which theyhad little chance of
winning.[293]
6 Soviet counteroensives
6.1 In the north: Operation KutuzovMain article: Operation
KutuzovSoviet oensive operations for the summer of 1943 were
Soviet soldiers in Orel pass by the Church of the Intercession,
5August 1943.
planned to begin after the strength of the German forceshad been
dissipated by their Kursk oensive. As the Ger-man momentum in the
north slowed, the Soviets launchedOperationKutusov on 12 July
against Army Group Centrein the Orel salient, directly north of the
Kursk salient. TheBryansk Front, under the command of Markian
Popov,attacked the eastern face of the Orel salient while
theWestern Front, commanded by Vasily Sokolovsky, at-tacked from
the north. The Western Fronts assault wasled by the 11th Guards
Army, under Lieutenant Gen-eral Hovhannes Bagramyan, and was
supported by the1st and 5th Tank Corps. The Soviet spearheads
sustainedheavy casualties, but pushed through and in some
areasachieved signicant penetrations. These thrusts endan-gered
German supply routes and threatened the 9th Armywith
encirclement.[294][295] With this threat, 9th Armywas compelled to
go over fully to the defensive.[296][213]
The thinly stretched 2nd Panzer Army stood in the wayof this
Soviet force. The German commanders had beenwary of such an attack
and forces were quickly withdrawnfrom the Kursk oensive to meet the
Soviet oensive.Operation Kutuzov reduced the Orel salient and
inictedsubstantial losses on the German military, paving the wayfor
the liberation of Smolensk.[297] Soviet losses wereheavy, but were
replaced.[298] The oensive allowed theSoviets to seize the
strategic initiative, which they re-tained for the remainder of the
war.
6.2 In the south: Operation PolkovodetsRumyantsev
Main article: Operation Polkovodets RumyantsevOperation
Polkovodets Rumyantsev was intended as the
main Soviet oensive for 1943. Its aim was to degrade
-
18 7 RESULTS
Soviet troops follow their T-34 tanks during a
counterattack.
the 4th Panzer Army and cut o the extended south-ern portion of
Army Group South.[299] After the heavylosses sustained by the
Voronezh Front, during Opera-tion Citadel, the Soviets needed time
to regroup and ret,delaying the start of the oensive until 3
August. Di-versionary attacks, launched two weeks earlier across
theDonets and Mius Rivers into the Donbass, drew the atten-tion of
German reserves and thinned the defending forcesthat would face the
main blow.[300] The oensive was ini-tiated by the Voronezh Front
and Steppe Fronts againstthe northern wing of Army Group South.
They drovethrough the German positions, making broad and
deeppenetrations. By 5 August, the Soviets had liberated
Bel-gorod.By 12 August, the outskirts of Kharkov had been
reached.The Soviet advance was nally halted by a counter-attackby
the 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions. In the ensuingtank battles,
the Soviet armies suered heavy losses inarmour.[301][302] After
this setback, the Soviets focusedon Kharkov. After heavy ghting the
city was liberatedon 23 August. This battle is referred to by the
Germansas the Fourth Battle of Kharkov, while the Soviets referto
it as the BelgorodKharkov oensive operation.[303]
7 ResultsThe campaign was a strategic Soviet success. For the
rsttime, a major German oensive had been stopped beforeachieving a
breakthrough. The Germans, despite usingmore technologically
advanced armour than in previousyears, were unable to break through
the in-depth Sovietdefences and were caught o guard by the
signicant op-erational reserves of the Red Army. This result
changedthe pattern of operations on the Eastern Front, with
theSoviet Union gaining the operational initiative. The So-viet
victory, however, was costly, with the Red Army los-ing
considerably more men and material than the GermanArmy. However,
the Soviet Unions larger industrial po-tential and pool of manpower
allowed them to absorb andreplenish these losses, with their
overall strategic strengthunaected. Guderian wrote:
With the failure of Zitadelle we have suf-
Prokhorovka Cathedral, on the former battleeld, commemo-rates
the Red Army losses and victory.
fered a decisive defeat. The armoured for-mations, reformed and
re-equipped with somuch eort, had lost heavily in both men
andequipment and would now be unemployablefor a long time to come.
It was problem-atical whether they could be rehabilitated intime to
defend the Eastern Front ... Needlessto say the [Soviets] exploited
their victory tothe full. There were to be no more periodsof quiet
on the Eastern Front. From now on,the enemy was in undisputed
possession of theinitiative.[304]
With victory, the initiative rmly passed to the RedArmy. For the
remainder of the war the Germans werelimited to reacting to Soviet
advances, and were neverable to regain the initiative or launch a
major oensiveon the Eastern Front.[305] The Western Allied landings
inItaly opened up a new front, further diverting German re-sources
and attention.[306]
Though the location, plan of attack, and timing were de-termined
by Hitler, he blamed the defeat on his GeneralSta. Unlike Stalin,
who gave his commanding gener-als the liberty to make important
command decisions,Hitlers interference in German military matters
progres-sively increased while his attention to the political
as-pects of the war decreased.[307] The opposite was truefor
Stalin; throughout the Kursk campaign, he trusted thejudgment of
his commanders, and as their decisions led
-
8.1 Soviet losses 19
to battleeld success it increased his trust in their
militaryjudgment. Stalin stepped back from operational plan-ning,
only rarely overruling military decisions, resultingin the Red Army
gaining more freedom of action duringthe course of the war.
8 Casualties and lossesThe casualties suered by the two
combatants are dif-cult to determine, due to several factors. In
regard tothe Germans, equipment losses were complicated by thefact
that they made determined eorts to recover and re-pair tanks. For
example, tanks disabled one day oftenappeared a day or two later
repaired.[308] German per-sonnel losses are clouded by the lack of
access to Ger-man unit records, which were seized at the end of
thewar. Many were transferred to the United States nationalarchives
and were not made available until 1978, whileothers were taken by
the Soviet Union, which declined toconrm their existence.[309]
8.1 Soviet losses
A German soldier inspects a knocked out T-34 during the Battleof
Kursk.
Russian military historian Grigoriy Krivosheyev, whobased his
gures on the Soviet archives, is consid-ered by historian David
Glantz as the most reliablesource for Soviet casualty gures.[310]
His gures are sup-ported by historian Karl-Heinz Frieser.[311]
Krivosheyevcalculated total Soviet losses during the German
of-fensive as 177,877 casualties.[310] The Central Frontsuered
15,336 irrecoverable casualties and 18,561medical casualties, for a
total of 33,897 casualties. TheVoronezh Front suered 27,542
irrecoverable casualtiesand 46,350 medical casualties, for a total
of 73,892. TheSteppe Front suered 27,452 irrecoverable casualties
and42,606 medical casualties, for a total of 70,085.[280]
During the two Soviet oensives, total casualtiesamounted to
685,456 men. During Operation Kutu-zov, Soviet losses amounted to
112,529 irrecoverablecasualties and 317,361 medical casualties, for
a total
loss of 429,890 men.[312] The Western Front reported25,585
irrecoverable casualties and 76,856 medical ca-sualties. The
Bryansk Front suered 39,173 irrecov-erable casualties and 123,234
medical casualties. TheCentral Front lost 47,771 irrecoverable
casualties and117,271 medical casualties.[312] Soviet losses during
Op-eration Polkovodets Rumyantsev totaled 255,566 men,with 71,611
listed as irrecoverable casualties and 183,955as medical
casualties. The Voronezh Front lost 48,339irrecoverable casualties
and 108,954 medical casualties,for a total of 157,293. The Steppe
Front lost 23,272 ir-recoverable casualties and 75,001 medical
casualties, fora total of 98,273.[313]
Memorial Teplovskys Hills in Ponyri region in honour of
thememory of the fallen on the northern face of the Battle of
Kursk
Soviet equipment losses during the German oensivecame to 1,614
tanks and self-propelled guns destroyedor damaged[18] of the 3,925
vehicles committed to thebattle. The Soviet losses were roughly
three times largerthan the German losses.[314][315] During
Operation Ku-tuzov, 2,349 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost
outof an initial strength of 2,308; a loss of over 100 per-cent.
During Polkovodets Rumyantsev 1,864 tanks andself-propelled guns
were lost out of the 2,439 employed.The loss ratio suered by the
Soviets was roughly 5:1 infavour of the German military.[316]
However, large Sovietreserves of equipment and their high rate of
tank produc-tion enabled the Soviet tank armies to soon replace
lostequipment and maintain their ghting strength.[314] TheRed Army
repaired many of its damaged tanks; many So-viet tanks were rebuilt
up to four times to keep them in theght. Soviet tank strength went
back up to 2,750 tanks by3 August due to the repair of damaged
vehicles.[317]
According to historian Christer Bergstrm, Soviet AirForces
losses during the German oensive amounted to677 aircraft on the
northern ank and 439 on the south-ern ank. Total casualties are
uncertain. Bergstrms re-search indicates total Soviet air losses
between 12 Julyand 18 August, during the German oensive and the
Op-eration Kutuzov counteroensive, were 1,104.[318]
-
20 8 CASUALTIES AND LOSSES
8.2 German losses
The grave of Heinz Khl (1915-43), a German soldier killed
atKursk
Karl-Heinz Frieser, who reviewed the German archiverecord,
calculated that during Operation Citadel 54,182casualties were
suered. Of these, 9,036 were killed,1,960 were reported missing and
43,159 were wounded.The 9th Army suered 23,345 casualties, while
ArmyGroup South suered 30,837 casualties.[9] Through-out the Soviet
oensives, 86,064 casualties were suf-fered. In facing Operation
Kutuzov, 14,215 men werekilled, 11,300 were reported missing
(presumed killedor captured) and 60,549 were wounded.[319]
DuringPolkovodets Rumyantsev, 25,068 casualties were in-curred,
including 8,933 killed and missing. Total casu-alties for the three
battles were about 170,000 men.During Operation Citadel, 252 to 323
tanks and assaultguns were destroyed. By 5 July, when the Battle of
Kurskstarted, there were only 184 operational Panthers. Withintwo
days, this had dropped to 40.[320] On 17 July 1943after Hitler had
ordered a stop to the German oensive,Guderian sent in the following
preliminary assessment ofthe Panthers:
Due to enemy action and mechanicalbreakdowns, the combat
strength sank rapidlyduring the rst few days. By the evening of
10
July there were only 10 operational Panthers inthe frontline. 25
Panthers had been lost as totalwriteos (23 were hit and burnt and
two hadcaught re during the approach march). 100Panthers were in
need of repair (56 were dam-aged by hits and mines and 44 by
mechani-cal breakdown). 60 percent of the mechanicalbreakdowns
could be easily repaired. Approx-imately 40 Panthers had already
been repairedand were on the way to the front. About 25still had
not been recovered by the repair ser-vice... On the evening of 11
July, 38 Pantherswere operational, 31 were total writeos and131
were in need of repair. A slow increase inthe combat strength is
observable. The largenumber of losses by hits (81 Panthers up to
10July) attests to the heavy ghting.[320]
By 16 July, Army Group South claimed 161 tanks and14 assault
guns lost. Up to 14 July, 9th Army reportedthey had lost as total
writeos 41 tanks and 17 assaultguns. These losses break down as 109
Panzer IVs, 42Panthers, 38 Panzer IIIs, 31 assault guns, 19
Elefants,10 Tigers and three ame tanks.[321] Before the
Germansended their oensive at Kursk, the Soviets began
theircounteroensive and succeeded in pushing the Germansback into a
steady retreat. Thus, a report on 11 August1943 showed that the
numbers of total writeos in Pan-thers swelled to 156, with only 9
operational. The Ger-man Army was forced into a ghting retreat and
increas-ingly lost tanks in combat as well as from abandoning
anddestroying damaged vehicles.[322] Across the entire East-ern
Front 50 Tiger tanks were lost during July and August,with some 240
damaged. Most of these occurred duringtheir oensive at Kursk.[323]
Some 600 tanks sustaineddamage in the period from 5 July to 18
July.[12]
The total number of German tanks and assault guns de-stroyed
during July and August along the entire East-ern Front amount to
1,331. Of these, Frieser estimatesthat 760 were destroyed during
the Battle of Kursk.[319]Beevor writes that the Red Army had lost
ve armouredvehicles for every German panzer destroyed.[10]
Frieser reports Luftwae losses at 524 planes, with 159lost
during the German oensive, 218 destroyed dur-ing Operation Kutuzov,
and a further 147 lost dur-ing Operation Polkovodets
Rumyantsev.[324] In review-ing the reports of the quartermaster of
the Luftwae,Bergstrm presents dierent gures. Between 5 and 31July,
Bergstrm reports 681 aircraft lost or damaged (335for Fliegerkorps
VIII and 346 for Luftotte 6) with a totalof 420 being written o
(192 from Fliegerkorps VIII and229 from Luftotte 6).[16]
-
21
9 Notes[1] After Kursk, Germany could not even pretend to hold
the
strategic initiative in the East. (Glantz & House 1995,
p.175).
[2] With the nal destruction of German forces at Kharkov,the
Battle of Kursk came to an end. Having won the strate-gic
initiative, the Red Army advanced along a 2,000 kilo-metres (1,200
mi) front. (Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 171).
[3] The breakdown as shown in Bergstrm (2007, pp. 127128) is as
follows: 1,030 aircraft of 2nd Air Armyand 611 of 17th Air Army on
the southern sector(Voronezh Front), and 1,151 on the northern
sector (Cen-tral Front).(Bergstrm 2007, p. 21).
[4] The breakdown as shown in Zetterling & Frankson (2000,p.
20) is as follows: 1,050 aircraft of 16th Air Army(Central Front),
881 of 2nd Air Army (Voronezh Front),735 of 17th Air Army (only as
a secondary support forVoronezh Front), 563 of the 5th Air Army
(Steppe Front)and 320 of Long Range Bomber Command.
[5] Operation Citadel refers to the German oensive from 4to 16
July, but Soviet losses are for the period of 523July.
[6] The breakdown as shown in Frieser (2007, p. 154) is
asfollows: 9,063 KIA, 43,159 WIA and 1,960 MIA.
[7] The whole Battle of Kursk refers to the period of the
Ger-man oensive (Operation Citadel) and the subsequent So-viet
counteroensives, from 4 July to 23 August.
[8] The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev (1997, pp. 132134) is
as follows: Kursk-defence: 177,847; Orel-counter:429,890;
Belgorod-counter: 255,566.
[9] The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev (1997, p. 262)is as
follows: Kursk-defence; 1,614. Orel-counter;
2,586.Belgorod-counter; 1,864.
[10] Some military historians consider Operation Citadel, orat
least the southern pincer, as envisioning a blitzkrieg at-tack or
state it was intended as such. Some of the his-torians taking this
view are: Lloyd Clark (Clark 2012, p.187), Roger Moorhouse
(Moorhouse 2011, p. 342), MaryKathryn Barbier (Barbier 2002, p.
10), David Glantz(Glantz 1986, p. 24; Glantz & House 2004, pp.
63, 78,149, 269, 272, 280), Jonathan House (Glantz & House2004,
pp. 63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280), Hedley Paul Will-mott (Willmott
1990, p. 300), and others. Also, NiklasZetterling and Anders
Frankson specically consideredonly the southern pincer as a
classical blitzkrieg attack(Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p.
137).
[11] Many of the German participants of Operation Citadelmake no
mention of blitzkrieg in their characterizationof the operation.
Several German ocers and comman-ders involved in the operation
wrote their account of thebattle after the war, and some of these
postwar accountswere collected by the U.S. Army. Some of these
o-cers are: Theodor Busse (Newton 2002, pp. 327), Er-hard Raus
(Newton 2002, pp. 2964), Friedrich Fan-gohr (Newton 2002, pp.
6596), Peter von der Groeben
(Newton 2002, pp. 97144), Friedrich Wilhelm vonMellenthin
(Mellenthin 1956, pp. 212234), Erich vonManstein (Manstein 1958,
pp. 443449), and others.Mellenthin stated: The German command was
commit-ting exactly the same error as in the previous year. Thenwe
attacked the city of Stalingrad, now we were to at-tack the
fortress of Kursk. In both cases the GermanArmy threw away all its
advantages in mobile tactics,and met the Russians (sic - Soviets)
on ground of theirown choosing. (Mellenthin 1956, p. 217) Some of
themilitary historians that make no mention of blitzkrieg intheir
characterization of the operation are: Mark Healy(Healy 2008),
George Nipe (Nipe 2010), Steven Newton(Newton 2002), D