Sustainability 2010, 2, 3710-3734; doi:10.3390/su2123710 sustainability ISSN 2071-1050 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability Review Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis Andrea Kollmann 1 and Friedrich Schneider 2, * 1 Energy Institute, Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Altenberger Straße 69, 4040 Linz, Austria; E-Mail: [email protected]2 Institute of Economics, Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Altenberger Straße 69, 4040 Linz, Austria * Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: [email protected]; Tel.: +43-732-2468-8210; Fax: +43-732-2468-8209. Received: 4 October 2010; in revised form: 15 November 2010 / Accepted: 22 November 2010 / Published: 30 November 2010 Abstract: There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not as yet been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation over the past decade, the Public Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy, instead of command-and-control measures, are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insight into how to overcome them. Keywords: public choice and environmental policies; sustainability; voters; government; interest groups; tradable permits; green taxes [D23, D62, D72, D73, H23, Q57, Q58] 1. Introduction “A survey of 40 leading US economists in 1998 found that that there is little agreement among them as to which of thirteen national tax and regulatory reforms are desirable public policies, with the exception that all support a proposed 25¢ per gallon fuel tax increase.” [1] OPEN ACCESS
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“A survey of 40 leading US economists in 1998 found that that there is little agreement among them
as to which of thirteen national tax and regulatory reforms are desirable public policies, with the
exception that all support a proposed 25¢ per gallon fuel tax increase.” [1]
OPEN ACCESS
Sustainability 2010, 2
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At least since the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC was released in 2007, the need for
ambitious global action to combat climate change is more pressing than it ever was. Nevertheless, the
UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, held in December 2009, failed to reach its main
objective: a legally binding agreement on an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol that would enable a
second commitment period to follow the end of the first commitment period in 2012. The so called
Copenhagen Accord of 18 December 2009 was neither adopted nor endorsed by the Conference of the
Parties, which simply took note of it. Hence uncertainty about the future of the global climate regime
as designed by the Kyoto-Protocol is growing. The greenhouse gas reduction targets laid down in the
Kyoto-Protocol are only binding until 2012 and the prospects of setting legally binding targets beyond
that date are hard to assess.
As an important player in the Kyoto process, the E.U. decided to base its climate policy on using
market-based instruments in environmental policy. Especially the adoption of Directive 2003/87/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003, establishing a scheme for greenhouse
gas emission allowance trading (EU-ETS) within the Community and amending Council Directive
96/61 EC, has affirmed this major shift in the way environmental policy is implemented and publicly
perceived. Due to its amendment by Directive 2008/101/EC, the E.U. emission trading system
(EU-ETS) was even extended by including aviation activities. The latest amendment by Directive
2009/29/EC finally set the course for the time beyond the current Kyoto period, originally based on the
assumption that a global and comprehensive post-2012 agreement would be concluded in due time.
But also other instruments, like the car scrapping premium introduced during the recent economic
recession in various countries or the discussion about introducing a CO2 tax in some major European
countries, have created more public—and especially political—awareness of the importance of
choosing adequate instruments for environmental policy (see [2] for an overview of environmental
governance in the European Union).
One of the main reasons for this wider acceptance is certainly climate change, and particularly the
formal statement of [3] that “most of the observed increases in globally averaged temperatures since
the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas
concentrations”, clarifying that human greenhouse gas emissions are (almost certainly) responsible for
climate change. In consequence, the Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen (COP-15) agreed to
stabilize global warming at an additional two degrees (despite the absence of binding commitments)
and the European Union decided to adapt its CO2 emissions to reach the two degree target.
Furthermore, in 2008, the E.U. climate and energy package was presented, specifying: (1) A reduction
in E.U. greenhouse gas emissions of at least 20% below 1990 levels, (2) a 20% share of E.U. energy
consumption to come from renewable resources; and 3) a 20% reduction in primary energy use to be
achieved by improving energy efficiency (known as 20-20-20 targets, see [4] for details).
Global agreements like the Kyoto protocol and multi-national agreements like the EU-ETS show a
basic willingness on the part of governments all over the world to commit themselves to
environmentally friendly policies. But this willingness is seemingly not combined with the use of
effective and efficient instruments, even though the importance of incorporating environmental goals
in the policy of industrialized countries is undisputed in comparison to other purely economic goals
like full employment (for a discussion and literature about the effectiveness of European
environmental policy see [5]). This can especially be stated for the Kyoto agreement and for the
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EU-ETS, neither of which turned out to be successful due to their design (Compare also [6], who are
critical of the European emission trading directive: They argue that it is unspecific in many respects
and leaves many decisions defining the rules of the game to the individual member state, especially the
limited scope of trading regarding geography, polluting sectors and activities reduces the quality of the
system).. They rather seem to be motivated by individual choices that differ between countries and are
subject to and defined by intra-country strategies (see [7]). Out of the EU-27 countries that ratified the
Kyoto protocol, only 16 countries have reduced their CO2 emissions, none of them substantially [8].
Whether any country has actually decreased CO2 emissions due to its facilities being part of the
EU-ETS is still subject to discussion [9]. The alleged inefficiency of the overall system has eventually
led to its redesign; the result will be implemented in the next trading period 2013 to 2020.
Furthermore, whether the instruments now in use were introduced for reasons of environmental
protection
or as a way to raise additional governmental revenues is also disputable (see e.g., [10] for a
discussion of the effectiveness of CO2 taxation in the OECD (Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development)).
The aim of our paper is to apply the Public Choice approach in order to discuss why the use of
market-based instruments in environmental policy is still limited and why those instruments that are
already in place do not bring about the desired environmental results. Earlier papers tackled a similar
issue, such as [11,12] and [13]. In all these papers the basic Public Choice model is presented and not
the more recent empirical and theoretical developments from 2003 on. In our paper we focus on the
latest developments and show that in spite of some environmental policy measures (like the EU-ETS)
little has been achieved.
In accordance with Public Choice theory we do not treat the state as a uniform body but discuss the
characteristics and main interests in environmental policy of the five groups of economic
agents—voters, politicians, administrators, producers and interest groups—plus their interactions.
We assume utility-maximizing or selfish behavior for all five groups involved, but also discuss
literature findings on allowing for altruistic, pro-social and pro-environmental attitudes when assessing
economic agents’ behavior.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the characteristics of market-based and
command-and-control instruments and takes a closer look at the EU-ETS and environmental taxes. In
Section 3 we discuss the Public Choice approach to environmental policy and analyze the motives of
voters, politicians, producers, interest groups and public administrators. Section 4 winds up
our discussion.
2. Choosing an Instrument: Market-Based versus Command-and-Control
Basically, three types of market-based instruments are considered in the literature: charges and
taxes, subsidies, and tradable permits. In [14] deposit-refund systems are listed as a fourth instrument,
while [15] ranks deposit-refund systems among pollution charges and lists market friction reductions
(market creation, liability rules, information programs) as a fourth type of instrument instead.
For the scope of this paper, we consider market-based instruments that encourage behavior through
price signals rather than through explicit directives. They correct prices in distorted markets, existing
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as well as evolving ones, and internalize environmental externalities at the lowest overall cost to
society. Incentives are formulated in such a way that the greatest reductions can be realized by those
economic agents with the lowest costs [15,16].
In contrast to market-based instruments are command-and-control instruments that “dictate” a
certain behavior for all economic agents or for a group of agents defined by specific characteristics.
The prescribed behavior is mandatory and deviations are subject to punishment.
Command-and-control mechanisms are criticized for being inflexible as they set uniform standards
for economic agents, regardless of the individual costs involved [15]. [17] give a set of reasons for the
continued use of command-and-control instruments. They argue that command-and-control
instruments are already familiar and that there is a comfort factor involved in knowing that every
facility is controlled. Furthermore, they point at the cultural dimension of respecting and obeying the
law, which is more apparent under a regulatory regime.
If market-based instruments are superior to command-and-control mechanism from a theoretical
point of view, the question of why there is an undersupply of them arises. [12] discuss three general
arguments against the wider use of market-based instruments:
Firstly, they argue that there are objections to the basic concept of the neoclassical model as well as
the theory of homo economicus. Secondly, they point to arguments that market-based instruments
might crowd out environmental ethics, which are essential in other policy areas. This argument has
been analyzed in a relatively new cross-disciplinary field of economic research that combines insights
from economics and psychology. [18] argue that an environmental policy via command-and-control
measures undermines environmental morale because, under a regulatory regime, individuals’
self-determination is reduced and replaced by prescriptions. Environmental morale and motivation are
important: they increase the demand for a clean environment or environmentally friendly private goods
and products, which according to [18] is manifested in hedonic market studies on the housing and
labor markets.
Environmental morale can also help to overcome the free-rider problem in public good provision.
While this reduces any intrinsic environmental behavior, it also leaves consumers informed about the
right way to behave. Whether regulations lead to the crowding out of environmental morale depends
on their design: few, easy to understand, regulations are to be favored so that consumers are not overly
governed and violations are effectively punished. They reason that “a large number of complex,
abstract and opaque regulations, on the other hand, are unlikely to improve the environment as
environmental morale will be strongly crowded out while threatened punishments are easier to
evade”. [18] furthermore find that tradable permits crowd-out environmental morale. In the case of
taxes, differentiations are made: with low taxes, consumers do not feel overly controlled, whereas the
crowding-out effect is either small or could eventually become a crowding-in effect. With intermediate
or high taxes on the other hand, crowding-out will occur.
Of the various market-based instruments, we focus our discussion on environmental taxes and
permit trade systems, as those two instruments are at the center of European environmental policy. In
theory, permit trading systems and emission taxes are equally efficient, if the tax rate is set at a level
that equals the price of the permit. But current developments show that in practice different problems
arise in the political discussion: Why is the EU-ETS not as efficient as it could be? Why are
environmental taxes difficult to impose and inefficiently designed when imposed? And finally, why
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are command-and-control measures still promoted even though their efficiency is—at least from a
theoretical point of view—inferior to market-based instruments?
In Section 3 we will look into these questions from the point of view of the most important players
in developed countries: voters, politicians, producers, interest groups and bureaucracies. Before, we
highlight the main characteristics of the EU-ETS and environmental taxes that are of importance for
our further analysis.
2.1. Permits
Taking into account the important status that the EU-ETS has reached in the meantime, and the
political and economic efforts that have been put into the development and ongoing improvement of
this instrument, its nature is worth examining. The basic concept of the EU-ETS is a cap-and-trade
system. The regulator sets an emission cap, where the level of the cap depends on how ambitious the
reduction target is. Finally, the participators in the emission trading market—the facilities—receive
individual allocations of emission allowances. Practically, two questions arise from this emission
trading design that have fundamental influence on the overall system’s efficiency: what is the cap and
how are the emission allowances allocated? For the purpose of our analysis the second question is of
special importance. Basically, two types of allocation methods are possible: Permits can either be
given out at no cost and allocated according to past emission levels (grandfathering) or they can be
auctioned off. Within the EU-ETS the grandfathering option was chosen, at least for the first
(2005–2007) and the second (2008–2012) trading periods, even though auctioning permits off is
considered the superior allocation method, for which [19] provide four reasons: Firstly, auctions are
more cost-effective given transaction costs. Secondly, the revenue raised in an auction can be used to
reduce other market distortions, because tradable permits can create market entry barriers which can be
offset if the government recycles the auction revenue by reducing preexisting distortionary taxes. The
third argument in favor of auctioning is that greater incentives for firms to develop substitutes for
CO2-intensive technologies are created. Finally, the (probably) substantial revenue that could be raised
by an auctioning procedure may provide greater incentives to administrative agencies to monitor
compliance. [20] also argue that the elimination of lobbying influence should be considered as a
further benefit of auctioning.
Grandfathering of permits in the EU-ETS has led to perverse economic results: due to extensive
lobbying activities more permits than needed were allocated in the first trading period, which led to a
vast decline in the permits price [21]. Furthermore, large emitters charged their customers for the
permits and thus received high windfall profits [21,22].
It is beyond the scope of our paper to go into detail on any other aspects of the EU-ETS, but we
refer the reader to work done by [23,24] and [19]. For the sake of our discussion, the most important
aspect of the current design of the EU-ETS is that the permit allocation method is not as efficient as it
could be, even though the superiority of auctioning over grandfathering was known ex-ante.
2.2. Environmental Taxes
The other main market-based instruments currently in use in Europe, and the widening of which is
intensively discussed in the European Union, are environmental taxes.
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Environmental taxation is not a new idea. As early as 1972 the OECD issued “Guiding Principles
concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies“ in which the Polluter-Pays
principle was presented and the idea of internalizing external effects of pollution in market prizes
was recommended.
Environmental taxes are discussed as being a policy with which a double dividend could be
realized. The double dividend hypothesis states that when taxes which cause distortions in one
economic sector are reduced and, simultaneously, taxes to reduce distortions in another sector are
introduced, overall efficiency would rise and unemployment would be reduced. If there is a double
dividend and the implementation of incentive-oriented environmental tax policies is not accompanied
by tax increases but by a shift in the tax burden, there is no longer a trade-off between fighting
unemployment and environmental policy. There is an ever growing body of literature about the double
dividend hypothesis: see e.g., [25] for a recent overview. [26] conducted a meta-analysis of 61 studies
and found that an environmental tax reform is more efficient on the environmental side than on the
economic side, but their results do not reject the double dividend hypothesis. [27] find in their meta-
regression analysis encompassing 41 studies that employment effects are negatively affected by the
stringency of environmental regulation. We reproduce their findings in a highly abbreviated way in
Table 1 which shows the ambiguity of outcomes in the literature.
Table 1. Results of studies about the double dividend hypothesis (Source: [27],
abbreviated by authors).
Study Region Emissions change
Employment effect
(% vs. BAU) (% vs. BAU)
Köppl et al. (1995) Austria –7 0,4
Capros et al. (1998) European Union –18 0,4
Bayar (1998) European Union –16 1,3
Ellingsen et al. (2000) European Union –14 1
Bosello and Carraro (2001) European Union –14 1,3
Hayden (1999) European Union –11,5 0,1
Barker and Rosendahl (2000) European Union –11,5 1,1
Barker (1998) European Union –10 1,2
Welsch (1996) European Union –6,5 1,7
Capros et al. (1996) European Union –5 0,2
Bossier and Brechet (1995) European Union –4,4 0,6
Koschel (2001) European Union 5 0,6
Welsch (1998) European Union 8,5 5,4
Buttermann and Hillebrand (1996) Germany –17,1 –0,7
DIW (1994) Germany –17,1 1,1
Meyer et al. (1997) Germany –17 3,3
Meyer (2001) Germany –16,9 1,6
Schmidt and Koschel (1999) Germany –15,5 0,6
Conrad and Löschel (2002) Germany –13,7 0,4
Schön et al. (1995) Germany –5 0
Braun and Kitterer (2000) Germany –3 1,7
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Table 1. Cont.
Study Region Emissions change
Employment effect
(% vs. BAU) (% vs. BAU)
Stephan et al. (2003) Germany –2 –0,6
Meyer zu Himmern (1997) Switzerland –15,4 0,1
Mauch et al. (1996) Switzerland –6,1 0,3
In the introduction we also raised the question of what motives could trigger the introduction of
environmental taxes in the European Union. Currently discussed, and strongly supported by the French
government, is the introduction of a CO2 tax to be levied at the European Union’s borders to reduce
trade distortions and to safeguard the competitiveness of European industry relative to large Asian
producers, especially China. The introduction of an environmental tax is mainly discussed in terms of
industries’ competitiveness, not in terms of environmental issues. Evidence for the view that
environmental taxes are introduced for budgetary and not for environmental reasons can be found
in [28]. They tested their model of the political economy of policy-making using data for the OECD,
and found that environmental taxes are set mainly with the aims of industry competitiveness and
increasing revenue, and therefore lack environmental effectiveness. Table 1 shows that for most
studies we clearly see a reduction of emissions up to –17% versus the business-as-usual scenario,
whereas the employment effect is very modest. Hence the second dividend is empirically quite weak.
2.3. Permits, Taxes and Command-and-Control Measures
From Sections 2.1. and 2.2., we conclude that there is an ambiguity between (a) knowing about the
superiority of market-based instruments, taxes and permit trading systems, in terms of efficiency, and
(b) the competing interests of all economic agents involved. Before turning to those competing
interests, we discuss the instruments’ characteristics from a global point of view to find answers to the
three questions we asked above.
Firstly, we have to ask why command-and-control measures are still favored in environmental
policy. [12] identify two reasons: the high economic efficiency of market-based instruments, and
distributional concerns.
The first argument of high economic efficiency is based on the situation of a single firm faced with
the introduction of market-based instruments: while the economic efficiency of these instruments for
the whole economy can be reasonably assumed, it is debatable whether the single firm can realize
minimum costs. [29] argue, for example, that if a tax design involves no refunding scheme, all
polluters will favor a command-and-control regime over taxes. But, assuming there is a refund system
and emission levels are heterogeneous among polluters, then refunding depends on the individual
polluting level of each facility. Uniform refunding would therefore lead to redistribution from large to
small polluters. In consequence, smaller polluters may prefer taxes, while larger producers may still
prefer command-and-control measures. The theory of lobbying behavior (see Section 3.3) points out
that smaller well organized interest groups are relatively more successful in lobbying than lobbyists
representing larger interest groups. In a world with a few large emission polluters and a large
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number of small polluters, there will be a marked tendency for the policy outcome to be a
command-and-control mechanism, even if taxes or other market-based instruments would both be
more efficient and/or effective [10].
Furthermore, within a command-and-control regime there is leeway for negotiations between the
regulating authority and the individual firm [30]. Assuming asymmetric information between the
authority and the firm, the firm certainly has superior bargaining power. In one-on-one talks the firm
can also exercise pressure by threatening to shed employees or to relocate. Another argument is the
federal structure of many European countries in which legislative power is split between regional
governments and central government. Regulating power at least partially lies with the federal states
and their authorities, while the central government exercises tax jurisdiction. In such a case the
familiarity between a firm and the relevant regional government is certainly greater than the familiarity
between the firm and central government, which will also increase individual firms’ bargaining power.
Overall, [12] conclude that regulation will be less strict with a command-and-control regime than with
market-based instruments.
The second argument of [12] is that distributional consequences arise under either a command-and-control
regime or market-based instruments. We assume a firm has identical characteristics under a
command-and-control mechanism and in a situation in which market-based instruments are used.
Under a regulatory regime, pollution for the firm is free. With market-based instruments pollution
comes with a cost when taxes are imposed and when permits are auctioned off, but is also free of costs
when permits are allocated by grandfathering. Regulation would be preferred to market-based
instruments, and grandfathered permits would be preferred to other market-based instruments or
permit allocation methods, because both exhibit an additional charge in comparison to taxes and
auctioned permits. Grandfathering additionally creates entry barriers to markets, which is another
benefit for existing firms [31].
[32] furthermore argues “that imposing an emission standard will restrict output, which in turn will
raise the price of the commodity under consideration, thereby increasing the profits of existing firms.”
Contrastingly, an emission tax would raise additional budget for the government, which is why firms
generally prefer an emission standard to an emission tax. [30] point out that one reason why “the use
of taxes to discourage polluting activities and the introduction of systems of tradable emission
allowances are now more than just ideas appearing in textbooks on the subject” is that the
shortcomings of command-and-control mechanisms have become more apparent over time. For
example the tightening of control of polluting activities gets more expensive over time, which makes
it more worthwhile to look for alternatives (see also [33] for a discussion of the costs of
command-and-control measures in the US).
At the beginning of Section 2 we posed three questions. The first one addressed the notion that
existing permit trade systems are not as efficient as they could be, because grandfathering the permits
instead of auctioning them off is only the second-best solution. We saw from the general point of view
that we took throughout this section that interest groups seem to have an intrinsic motivation to support
grandfathering, an argument that we will look at in more detail in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. The second
question, “Why are environmental taxes difficult to impose and inefficiently designed when imposed?”
can be answered either in terms of politicians’ with competing interests who want to increase
governmental revenue or with a more specific resistance towards taxes. We will discuss these aspects
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in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. The final question, why command-and-control measures are still promoted,
will also be tackled in the following section.
3. The Public Choice Approach to Environmental Policy
We now turn to the economic agents and discuss—according to Public Choice theory—the motives
or interests in environmental policy of voters, politicians, public administrators, producers and interest
groups. Figure 1 shows the interdependence of all of these parties and that in any policy process the
outcome of negotiations is one of all parties’ competing interests. In environmental policy, being a
policy that ought to preserve the common public good “the environment”, these interactions are of
great importance, as our analysis will show.
Figure 1. The interaction of economic agents from a public choice perspective.
The main focus of the following Public Choice analysis is discussing the different incentives of all
actors in general and on command-and-control versus market-based instruments. But not only is the
choice of the instrument of great importance for successful environmental policy, also the general
positions of the actors matter.
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In relation to climate change mitigation, [34] discusses seven different intellectual positions of
opponents of a stronger environmental policy: Firstly, he argues, that there is a group of people who
generally sees no need for any emission reduction policy and, secondly, some believe that any action
comes to late anyway. Both arguments can—in his opinion—be overcome by establishing the
credibility of the science (see also Section 3.1 about trust and credibility issues). Thirdly, there is
concern, that emission reductions and economic growth are incompatible. The next two positions (four
and five) he describes, are the targets of the costs of emission reductions: on the one hand, some argue
that emission reductions are too costly and on the other hand they have to be borne ‘up-front’
(see Section 3.1 for a discussion of price-elasticity and social discount rates). Furthermore
(position six), emission reduction targets are considered unrealistic and cannot be achieved due to a
lack of political will. Lastly (position seven), there is no first mover advantage involved with imposing
environmental policy. With these fundamental arguments in mind, we will now turn to analyzing the
individual position of the actors involved.
3.1. The Voters
Citizens’/voters’ sensitivity towards environmental issues has continuously increased throughout
recent decades. One indicator for this is that voters attach more and more importance to the use of
renewable energy sources. [35] show that in Germany, within the period 1984 to 2003, the public
attitude towards energy sources has shifted notably from nuclear power to renewable energy sources
(wind, solar). While in 1984 only 17% of respondents expected wind energy to significantly contribute
to Germany’s energy supply, in the following three decades the figure increased, to 42% in 2003.
Public opinion analysis, undertaken by the European Commission, shows that 50% of European
Citizens consider climate change a serious problem (see Table 2). In yet another survey for the
European Commission, 97% of respondents considered environmental protection very or fairly
important [36].
Table 2. Results of Eurobarometer survey, January/February 2009 (Source: [37]).
In your opinion, which of the following do you consider to be the most serious problem currently facing the world as a whole? Firstly? Any others?—% EU
Rank Problems 2008 2009 %-change
1 Poverty, lack of food and drinking water
67% 66% –1%
2 A major global economic downturn
24% 52% 117%
3 Climate change 62% 50% –19%
4 International terrorism 53% 42% –21%
5 Armed conflicts 38% 39% 3%
But when asked about the overall most important issues for Europe at the moment, those surveyed
put unemployment, the economic situation and crime at the top of the list, while environmental and
energy issues did not even enter the top 10 (see Table 3); they ranked 12th and 13th.
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Table 3. Results of Eurobarometer survey, October/November 2009 (Source: [38]).
What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?
Rank Issues Answers in %*
1 Unemployment 51%
2 Economic Situation 40%
3 Crime 19%
4 Rising prices/inflation 19%
5 Healthcare system 14%
6 Immigration 9%
7 Pensions 9%
8 Taxation 8%
9 The educational system 7%
10 Housing 5%
11 Terrorism 4%
12 The environment 4%
13 Energy 3%
14 Defense/foreign affairs 2%
* multiple answers possible.
The European Commission’s statistics raise the question of where this two-facedness among voters
comes from and whether the under-provision of market-based instruments in developed democracies is
after all still due to a lack of concern among voters, due to their competing interests or other factors. The
literature proposes a number of explanations for the voters’ behavior, which we will discuss below.
The comparatively new happiness research literature provides evidence that environmental
pollution negatively affects individual well-being [39,40]), which supports the view that the general
public has an intrinsic motivation to act in an environmentally friendly way. [41] analyze the
relationship between citizens’ satisfaction with the quality and performance of the economic and
political system they live in and environmental quality. They find that “[…] both a focus on
environmental policy and higher environmental quality (in terms of lower emissions, in particular, of
CO2, and less traffic) increase satisfaction with democracy in statistically and economically important
ways.” But they also report that a rise in public environmental expenditure tends to decrease average
satisfaction, which they interpret as a confirmation for the public good characteristics of environmental
policy and environmental quality. Furthermore, [42] show empirically that the public’s willingness to
pay to prevent small negative impacts on the ecosystem is insignificantly different from zero but
significantly positive with larger impacts.
A lack of information about market-based instruments in environmental policy, especially energy
taxes, is found in several studies (for France see [43], for Ireland see [44]; for Germany see [45]). One
line of arguments in the discussion about why market-based instruments are not satisfactorily
incorporated in environmental policies is that this lack of information on the voters’ side is too costly
to be overcome. Understanding the complexity of environmental issues requires higher education,
interest and time to learn, therefore acquiring information is subject to high opportunity costs. But [46]
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report that participants in a Danish focus group argued that “they could not accept something they did
not understand”.
However, [47] argue that information about “the need for, or characteristics of, controversial
developments has not notably delivered acquiescence on the part of local communities. On the
contrary, it can fuel distrust […]”. If only information can raise acceptance for new instruments but
information also triggers distrust in specific projects, the key target issue according to several studies is
seeking trust, as voters may simply not trust their governments. Studies for a number of European
countries show that voters especially either do not trust their governments to use the extra taxes
responsibly or see no reason for any additional tax.
In a study in Ireland, [44] report that voters are on the one hand suspicious and distrustful of their
government when it comes to tax policy and on the other hand already feel overtaxed. [43] report that
the participants in their French focus groups suggested “that politicians always thwart the allocation of
taxes”. Even stronger is a study result from Denmark in which focus group participants suppose that
environmental taxes are just another way for obtaining public revenues and that their environmental
effects were only fake [46]. A similar response is reported by [17] for the United Kingdom.
Another aspect of this trust issue is that voters believe they alone have to bear the costs. This line of
argument does have substance. Especially if price elasticity is low, the tax burden can be transferred
from producers to consumers (which—in most cases—would offend the polluter-pays principle). But
if price elasticities are high, the tax burden will be borne by producers as well as workers. [48] reports
own-price elasticities of Swedish households of –1.80 for an electricity tax, of –1.83 for a district
heating tax and of –1.58 for an oil tax. [49] report price elasticities for gasoline demand in the range of
–0.6 and –1.0. For Spain, [50] estimated the price elasticities of transport fuels at –0.32 to –0.75.
Finally, [51] also find mean short-run and long-run price elasticities of −0.34 and −0.84, respectively,
for demand for gasoline in a meta-study of 43 studies. Price elasticities for gasoline demand, for which
a large body of literature is available, tend to undermine the fear that environmental taxes may at least
partly be borne by voters alone (see Table 4).
Table 4. Price-elasticities.
Source Electricity tax District heating Oil tax Gasoline/transport fuels
[48] –1.8 –1.83 –1.58
[49] –0.6 to –1.0
[50] –0.32 to –0.75
[51] –0.34 to –0.84
Source: see reference list.
When it comes to compliancy with a specific tax regime, [52] point out that a rational voter would
try to evade taxpaying as being caught is unlikely and fines tend to be small in comparison to what can
be gained from tax evasion. The fact that taxes are paid nevertheless can be explained by tradition and
especially with trust. [52] show for Switzerland, that the more far-reaching political participation rights
are, the higher tax morale is.
Another aspect brought out in this discussion is that voters are more likely to accept a policy they
are familiar with, as is the case with regulation, in contrast to market-based instruments. [17] point out
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that “familiarity breeds affection: those being controlled regard it as ‘tolerable’ while an alternative
approach might not be seen as such”. A position also supported by [53], who find that people generally
dislike the word “tax” and are more willing to accept a policy that even though actually being a tax is
labeled differently. That terminology itself may have a considerable influence on acceptance is also
shown in [44] who propose to re-label taxes as charges, since “tax” is considered a “bad” word.
[12] argue that voting out of self-interest is possibly a major obstacle to any kind of environmental
policy. An interesting data set that allows the analysis of individual characteristics of voting behavior
was gathered in Switzerland in the year 2000, when Swiss citizens voted on three proposals for taxes
on fossil energy. [54] analyzed the data and found that political affinity and education played a role in
voter behavior. Both citizens with an affinity to green and left-of-center parties and citizens with
higher education had higher rates of participation in the vote and also of approval of the tax proposals,
whereas income—ceteris paribus—did not significantly influence voting behavior.
In another analysis of the votes on the three Swiss proposals, [55] found that socially accepted
norms and ideology do play a role in the referendum outcome and that price and/or income effects are
not the only factors taken into account by voters.
From the values of social discount rates given in the literature, it appears that voters care more
about the here and now than about the future: In an overview of relevant papers, [56] reports values
varying between 3 and 6%, where any social discount rate above 0% implies that a higher weight
(importance) is given to earlier generations than to generations in the distant future [57]. [42] calculate
a public discount rate of nearly 1%. Even though there is an ongoing dispute in the literature about the
use, morality and size of social discount rates, especially in view of the costs of fighting climate
change [58], there is a widespread tendency to assume that voters at least to some extent, attach more
value to the present than to some unknown future. Most interestingly, [41] find that parents worry
significantly more about CO2 emissions than citizens without children, which is another argument in
favor of a non-zero inter-temporal discount rate.
Summing up our discussion, we find three main issues that may explain why voters do not
explicitly vote for the environment: firstly, the provision of the public good ‘environment’ allows
free-rider behavior, secondly, the time delay between costs and benefits of environmental policies
(especially CO2 emission reduction) is difficult to explain and non-zero social discount rates diminish
the future’s importance and finally, other more urgent issues, like unemployment or security, are of
higher priority than less tangible environmental issues.
3.2. The Politicians
We now turn to analyzing the behavior of politicians and their position concerning the introduction
of market-based instruments. The main questions that need to be discussed are whether politicians are
intrinsically motivated to engage in environmental policy, and whether they favor market-based
instruments or command-and-control mechanisms.
The standard political economy approach assumes self-interested behavior of utility-maximizing
politicians, where utility is gained by being re-elected [59] and by reaching certain ideological policy
goals. If re-election is the maximizing condition, a politician will promote a certain policy only if the
median voter demands it and is willing to pay for it (see [60] for a formal discussion of the median
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voter model and [61] for an empirical discussion of how the national median voter’s willingness to pay
determined the outcome of the Kyoto negotiations). [62] argues that politicians are intrinsically
motivated to implement instruments that are in line with their political ideology and increase their
power or their personal income. Whether or not they can follow their own inclinations or have to
comply with the median voter’s demands depends on how stringent the re-election constraint is. Then
again, [63] argue that the re-election constraint may be valid only for major political topics like overall
government spending or income distribution, it may be less important for secondary issues like
environmental policy: a view that is also supported by [64].
The question whether or not the re-election criterion is an important factor in a politician’s decision
to engage in environmental policy can also be discussed in connection with the partisan hypothesis, to
the effect that the re-election constraint is stringent only in election times, but does not influence the
politician’s decisions throughout his term (see [65] and [64] for a review of empirical studies of
partisan cycles and [60] for a formal approach to the partisan model).
According to [66] the governing party that aims to stay in power will seek to please the median
voter only if its self-perceived re-election chances are low. If its self-perceived re-election probability
is high, it will undertake policies in line with its ideology. As we stated above, politicians want to be
re-elected, to have power and to receive benefits. What does that mean for a politician’s intrinsic
motivation to pursue environmental policies? Firstly, as our discussion in Section 3.1. showed, voters
value the environment but do not have complete information about environmental issues, their
importance and the toolkit of instruments that can be used. They also fear being overly burdened
financially. Furthermore, following the argumentation of [63] environmental issues may be of only
secondary interest to the median voter, but if secondary issues do not influence the median voter’s
election decision, there may be voters who attach extraordinarily high importance to such issues. A
politician may therefore be inclined to pursue this secondary policy in order to receive additional
votes. Furthermore [63], who empirically analyzed U.S governors’ public spending and environmental
policies, found that “in states with a large group of green voters […] governors advance less
environmentally friendly policies once they face a binding term limit.” They also “[…] observe the
opposite pattern in states with a small environmental constituency, where governors advance much
greener policies once they can no longer be re-elected.” They interpreted their results as support for
their theory that politicians reverse policies they have pursued only to attract additional voters, and
conclude that secondary policy issues like environmental policies are strongly influenced by elections.
[62] also points out that politicians are not completely tied to the median voter’s demands, because
rational voters acquire political information only up to the point where the marginal cost of acquiring
additional information equals the marginal benefits. As the single voter’s influence on an election
outcome is marginal, this benefit from acquiring information is marginal, too. In consequence, with
uninformed voters, politicians can pursue their own goals. This lack of information on the voters’
side offers scope for interest groups to influence politicians according to their own motives
(see Section 3.3.).
We find that politicians may be intrinsically motivated to implement environmental policies
especially to improve their chances of re-election. From this, the second question arises: If politicians
pursue environmental policies, do they favor market-based instruments or command-and-control
measures? There are three arguments in favor of market-based instruments. Firstly, we can reasonably
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assume that politicians are better informed about market-based instruments and their comparative
efficiency advantages over command-and-control measures.
Secondly, market based instruments like taxes increase—compared to command-and-control
measures like standards—the government’s revenue, which provides leeway for reducing other taxes
or for financing other projects that may be of primary interest to the median voter and thus increase the
chances of re-election.
Thirdly, environmental taxes or permit systems may be easier to explain to the public than other
taxes because they can be labeled as punishment for polluters [12]. And finally, as [67] point out,
politicians may favor market-based instruments, as they have some control over defining winners and
losers from a specific policy.
We now turn to arguments in favor of command-and-control measures:
Firstly, a utility-maximizing politician is also likely to pursue a policy that leads to immediate and
noticeable utility gains for the median voter, while its costs are as invisible as possible. In contrast to
market-based instruments, command-and-control mechanisms have the advantage of less visible
costs [30,62], and can probably be supplied at a lower cost [31].
Secondly, as discussed above, politicians will favor policies that improve their re-election
prospects, so they will try to please either voters or interest groups. Both of these (see Sections 3.1.
and 3.3.) may favor command-and-control measures. Voters are more familiar with these instruments
and interest groups have more leeway to pursue their own interest under a command-and-control
regime [68].
Thirdly, as [31] and [30] argue, command-and-control measures may serve as market-entry barriers
to new firms—standards for new products tend to be more stringent than for existing ones—and are
therefore favored by existing firms and by politicians who want to protect these firms.
In conclusion, after arguing that a self-interested politician may not be intrinsically motivated to
promote market-based instruments over command-and-control measures, but reacts to the other agents’
interests, the question arises whether such a policy—if put in place—will be carried out efficiently.
From our discussion so far, it follows that the design of a specific policy is strongly influenced by
interest groups whose motivations we will discuss in the following.
3.3. The Affected Producers and Interest Groups
To assess the influence of interest groups on the outcome of negotiations about the introduction of
market-based instruments in environmental policy, two aspects of lobbying power need to be
considered: firstly, the lobbyists’ strategy can aim at preventing an instrument’s use, and secondly, if
prevention is impossible, they can alter a policy’s design according to their individual preferences. [69]
goes on to distinguish between four categories of lobbyists which differ according to the services
they offer:
- service functions, i.e., the provision of specific (and often exclusive) services for their members
- lobbying functions, i.e., attempts to influence decision-making processes from outside
- decision-making functions, i.e., attempts to influence decisions from within
- implementation functions, i.e., participation in policy implementation
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The importance of organized interest groups derives from the need of detailed expert knowledge for
reaching educated decisions in environmental policy. At the moment, more than 2,700 organizations
and individuals are accredited as lobbyists at the European Parliament (accrediting is voluntary not
mandatory); 53% of them are «in-house» lobbyists and trade associations active in lobbying. [70]
defines a lobbyist as an “organization or individual that seeks to influence policy, but does not seek to
be elected” and points out “that lobbying is a familiar if not always welcome reality in western politics,
and that most political scientists and policy-makers recognize that public and private interests have a
legitimate and important role to play in the policy process”. That about 15,000 Commission and
European Parliamentary officials face 20,000 lobbyists in Brussels, which may serve as an indicator
showing that lobbying activities have to be considered a major influence on any political activity.
We argue that producers prefer command-and-control measures over market-based instruments in
environmental policy (see Sections 2.1. and 2.2.), which may go far to explain their restricted use. We
furthermore argue that green interest groups also favor command-and-control measures and have a
weaker position in the policy making process. In the following we analyze whether, from these
propositions, the restricted use of market-based instruments can be explained.
We assume that the lobbyists’ information is equally reliable; then the question arises which
characteristics of a group will make them more successful in pursuing their individual goals. Firstly,
producers’ lobbyists will have more financial backing than environmental advocacy groups. Most
interestingly, the so called Green-10, composed of the ten major environmental advocacy groups
(BirdLife International, Climate Action Network Europe, CEE Bankwatch Network, European
Environmental Bureau, European Federation of Transport and Environment, Health and Environment
Alliance, Friends of the Earth Europe, Greenpeace Europe, International Friends of Nature, and WWF
European Policy Office), receive substantial funding from the European Commission (excluding
Greenpeace whose policy is not to accept financial support from governments, the EU or industry).
The importance of any interest group’s budget is shown by [71]. He calculates within a regression
model encompassing data from 800 interest groups, that the probability to have weekly contact with
the European Commission is 50 % higher if an interest group has a budget of 7.5 million euro
compared to an interest group without a budget.
Secondly, with environmental issues, especially pollution control and alternative technologies, there
is a strong information asymmetry between producers’ lobbyists and environmental lobbyists.
Thirdly, [30] reckon that environmental interest groups object to market-based instruments in
environmental policy on philosophical grounds. In their line of thinking, permits and environmental
taxes are interpreted as “rights to pollute” and are therefore immoral. [31] adds that environmental
interest groups furthermore argue that the possible damages from pollution are difficult or impossible
to quantify and monetize, which prevents the calculation of an accurate tax rate.
Fourthly, as [72] famously described in his “Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence”, group size matters: the smaller the group the more effectively it can lobby, which
is why business lobbying tends to be more effective than lobbying for consumers [73,74]). Public
interest groups (like environmental groups) are also relatively weak due to group size.
The relative strength of an interest group furthermore depends on a number of factors, such as
policy makers’ preferences and the cost/benefit ratio of the proposed regulation [75]. [20] illustrate this
in the context of the EU-ETS: The EU-ETS sectors which were represented by more powerful interest
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groups realized two positive outcomes: firstly, they got a preferential allocation of allowances in
comparison to other EU-ETS sectors, and secondly, they succeeded in lowering the overall abatement
burden within the EU-ETS, whereby abatement burden was imposed on non EU-ETS sectors and
overall economic efficiency was reduced. Concerning the position of green interest groups, [32] argues
that they prefer grandfathering of permits to auctioning and to emission taxes. He formulates a
two-stage model where, in the first stage, the type of policy is determined and in the second stage the
emission cap is set and shows that grandfathering increases the environmental policy groups political
influence and minimizes the emission cap [30].
In yet another example, [76] study the effects of a revenue-neutral tax reform which links ecological
taxes with reductions in labor costs. Using the German Ecological Tax Reform database, they find
substantial effects of lobbying, especially for sectors with a highly inelastic energy use. From an
efficiency point of view, the highest taxes should be imposed on these sectors; as this is known ex-
ante, these sectors also have the highest incentive to lobby for substantially reduced taxes, which may
well result in practice. Furthermore they show that interest groups’ effectiveness also depends on
market concentration and energy demand elasticities.
In an attempt to show how this resistance to environmental taxes could be overcome, [77] compares
different refunding mechanisms (income-tax cuts, extra public spending and tax-burden compensation
to polluters) and shows that by “lobbying for a refunding rule that pleases voters, the interest group can
reduce the ‘‘price’’ of buying a reduction in the green tax. In cases where the tax revenue can be used
to compensate the interest group’s members, this benefit must be sufficiently large to outweigh the
value of the foregone tax burden compensation. In cases where the tax revenue cannot be refunded to
polluters, the interest group has no direct stake in the refunding rule and will, therefore, support the
rule that voters prefer.” And [10] argue that “in heterogeneous sectors the tax revenue is difficult to
refund in a politically acceptable way. Energy-intensive firms will lose from taxation even with a full
refund, and are able to protest quickly and with success.”
We see that lobbyists of industrial and business interest groups are relatively better equipped to
influence policy making from an early stage on. The specific information and expertise of lobbyists is
a crucial factor in policy-making which strengthens the relationship between administrators and
lobbyists. On the other hand environmental lobbyists, suffer from group size and fewer financial
resources which in reality can even result in a situation in which the lobbyists are paid by the very
organization they lobby. [78] furthermore shows that lobbying behavior in the European Union
significantly differs between traditional and green interest groups. Traditional interest groups lobby
bureaucrats (in the European context, the European Commission) while green interest groups lobby the
European Parliament. From this we derive that traditional interest groups are more involved in early
stages of policy making than green interest groups and may therefore better influence the evolution of
a policy. Taking the EU-ETS as an example, [79] analyzed whether the final design of the EU-ETS
can be explained by potential industry winners or losers involved in the early stages of the policy
making process. Their answer is ambiguous because on the one hand industries’ main objective to
install a voluntary system was not realized, but on the other hand, lobbying leads to a policy design
that benefited industry more than any other policy design that could have been realized.
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3.4. The Public Bureaucracy
We now turn to analyzing the role of the administrative level of the political system. Administrators
necessarily play an important role in the preparation and early implementation of environmental policy
measures. According to Niskanen’s famous model of bureaucracy [80], the leader of any public
administration unit seeks to maximize his unit’s budget, increase the number of his employees, and
hence increase his power and importance (see [81] who provide empirical support for this notion). In
contrast to politicians administrators are also not bound by re-election constraints. If this holds true for
authority whether or not it is engaged in environmental policy, the result of budget-maximizing is that
environmental administrations are intrinsically motivated to implement environmental policy measures
which require the most administrative controls as well as exhibiting the highest costs [59]. We can also
assume that most members of “green” public authorities identify themselves with the goals of their
authority and are highly motivated. But being motivated need not necessarily lead to favoring
cost-efficient policy making. Especially with environmental policy that is largely tied to incentives that
need to be given to the regulated party, the inefficiency aspect of command-and-control mechanisms
also comes from the simple fact that administrators are not there to formulate or provide incentives or
to encourage and reward the regulated ones, not to speak of any innovation beyond compliance with
given requirements, as [33] point out.
When it comes to assessing whether public authorities are in favor of command-and-control
instruments over market-based instruments or vice versa, given budget-maximizing behavior, several
factors need to be considered: Firstly, command-and-control mechanisms exhibit high costs, since
monitoring them is labor-intensive; secondly, with command-and-control mechanisms the authority
has an information advantage that mainly derives from expert knowledge within the authority
compared to the government; thirdly, the authority simply knows what to do, which may not be the
case with a new instrument; and fourthly, public authority is needed for command-and-control
mechanisms, but may be superfluous if, say, a command-and-control mechanism is replaced by an
environmental tax, or this may at least require a great degree of flexibility within the authority [11,82].
Instead of continuously monitoring a large number of facilities, the use of taxes or tradable permits
reduces the information needs of the public authority or makes the information completely superfluous
in cases where the relevant powers are taken away from the authority completely. Obviously, as
information acquisition is resource-consuming, this is not necessarily in the interest of the authority [31].
Studies about the administrative costs of market-based and command-and-control instruments are
scarce. [83] estimates the start-up costs of the EU-ETS for Germany at about 7.5 million euro and the
recurrent costs at about 7 million euro p.a. In Germany nearly 1,900 emitters take part in the EU-ETS.
For Austria’s 200 emitters, the Austrian Federal Audit Commission calculated the costs of the EU-ETS
for the public administration at 2 million € in 2007. Comparing these figures, especially when they are
prepared by public officials, is difficult if not impossible (see e.g., [84] for an analysis of transaction
cost measurement systems). To the authors’ knowledge there is no literature comparing the transaction
costs of different environmental policy instruments.
In light of Section 3.3., we conclude that the affected producers and the public authorities are the
two groups with the strongest reasons to favor command-and-control policies. Also, both parties have
the political power and resources to influence the design of environmental policy.
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4. Concluding Remarks
In recent years the use of market-based instruments in environmental policy has steadily increased;
most notably the EU-ETS brought a major shift in the way environmental policy is implemented and
perceived. Yet still, the efficiency of the instruments in use is questionable, as their design seems to be
strongly influenced by the economic agents’ different interests. We used Public Choice theory to
differentiate between five economic agents, voters, politicians, producers, interest groups and
administrators, and considered the intrinsic motivation of each group in turn to find answers to the
question we posed in the title of our paper, “Why does environmental policy in representative
democracies tend to be inadequate?” Summarizing our public choice analysis, we draw the
following conclusions:
(1) While, in the past, command-and-control instruments successfully reduced tangible
environmental pollution (mostly in local areas) and improved the overall environmental quality in
Western democracies, the more threatening, but much less tangible global pollution arising from
CO2 emissions, obviously cannot be controlled with command-and-control measures. Furthermore,
economic theory shows the superiority of market-based instruments over command-and-control
measures in terms of efficiency. Still, experience so far with market-based instruments is sobering,
as regards both their frequency of use and their design and effects. The EU-ETS suffers from
conceptual weaknesses, as not only was grandfathering chosen as the allocation method instead of
auctions, but it also seems to have led to an over-allocation of tradable permits and to windfall
profits. The environmental taxes imposed in several European countries on fossil energy and CO2
emissions are used more to finance public spending and less as instruments in fighting climate
change or reducing environmental pollution.
(2) On the other hand, both political rhetoric and public discussion point strongly to the need to
fight climate change, and to the economic superiority of tradable permit systems or taxes over
command-and-control instruments. And the general public, the voters, attach great importance to
environmental quality—an empirical fact repeatedly verified in the studies we reviewed. The
growing body of literature about what influences happiness also shows the high positive correlation
between individual happiness and environmental quality. In addition, the more tangible
willingness-to-pay studies confirm these findings and show that parents have a higher willingness to
pay for CO2 emission reductions, which may be an argument in favor of a non-zero social discount
rate. The value that voters place on the environment surely is high, but we also mentioned that in
terms of everyday life, in which one’s job, income and security situation have more weight than less
tangible aspects, like CO2 emissions, people’s environmental morale or intrinsic motivation may
not be high enough for them to actively vote for the environment. Furthermore, the costs of fighting
climate change are imposed on today’s voters immediately, while it is future generations that will
benefit from this effort. While, as described above, altruistic behavior can surely be ascribed to part
of society, it may be less prevalent for environmental policy measures in society as a whole.
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(3) With a look at the affected producers and interest groups, we conclude that, all in all, traditional
(industrial) interest groups have every advantage over green interest groups: their group’s size is in
their favor and their financial backing is considerable. Both aspects work against the green interest
groups, who suffer from the simple fact that they represent the general public, so group size is an
issue and financing themselves is much more difficult (not least due to free-rider behavior).
(4) Considering the public administration, we conclude that administrators exhibit
budget-maximizing behavior which makes command-and-control measures more attractive to
them, because monitoring these is resource-intensive. Furthermore, they are in favor of
command-and-control instruments over market-based instruments for several other reasons:
command-and-control mechanisms exhibit high costs, there they have an information advantage
because they profit from expert knowledge within the authority compared to the government; the
authority simply knows what to do, which may not be the case with a new instrument; and the
public authority is needed for command-and-control mechanisms, but may be much less needed if a
command-and-control mechanism is replaced by market-based instruments such as an
environmental tax. We conclude that the regulated industries and public authorities are the two
groups who have the strongest reasons to favor command-and-control policies. Also, both parties
have the political power and resources to influence the design of environmental policy, which we
consider the main answer to the question posed in the title of our paper.
What can we derive from our analysis? Firstly, to increase the importance and influence of
voters/taxpayers one could push the idea of giving voters more rights, such as the introduction of a
referendum or the right to an initiative. Voters could then express their preferences on single issues
(like environmental ones) and force the government to undertake certain ecological measures. It is
important that power to set the agenda is then shifted from the government or bureaucracy to the
voters, too. As we see in Switzerland, the institution of the referendum or direct democracy has
worked quite effectively. Secondly, as we show in our discussion of voters’ motives and interests, a
persisting information asymmetry remains a major obstacle in environmental policy. Ongoing efforts
made especially on the European level, such as ‘green labels’ for food and non-food products, may
help voters to internalize environmental behavior and thus increase the pressure on producers.
References and Notes
1. Wachs, M. A Dozen Reasons for Raising Gasoline Taxes; Research Report UCB-ITS-RR-2003-1;
Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California (Berkeley): Berkeley, CA, USA,
2003.
2. Unalan, D.; Cowell, R.J. Europeanization, strategic environmental assessment and the impacts on