1 Why did Mexico become a violent country? The role of illegal American firearms and other alternative hypotheses Following a pattern observed in developed countries, Mexico experienced a substantial drop in crime and violence throughout the second half of the XXth century. However, after the 2004- 2007 period, the observed decline ceased and homicides began to increase, whilst other crimes such as violent robberies, extortions and kidnappings appeared for the first time in previously- considered non-violent regions. By comparing the explanatory power of several hypotheses used to date, this paper suggests that more illegal firearms being trafficked from the U.S. after the Assault Weapon Ban (AWB) expired in 2004 is the best predictor for homicide rise in Mexico after then. Keywords Mexico, U.S, Assault Weapons Ban, homicide, violence, crime, guns, firearms, trafficking
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Why did Mexico become a violent country? The role of illegal American firearms and other alternative hypotheses Following a pattern observed in developed countries, Mexico experienced a substantial drop in crime and violence throughout the second half of the XXth century. However, after the 2004-2007 period, the observed decline ceased and homicides began to increase, whilst other crimes such as violent robberies, extortions and kidnappings appeared for the first time in previously-considered non-violent regions. By comparing the explanatory power of several hypotheses used to date, this paper suggests that more illegal firearms being trafficked from the U.S. after the Assault Weapon Ban (AWB) expired in 2004 is the best predictor for homicide rise in Mexico after then. Keywords
AWB Assault Weapons Ban (U.S.) Ley de Prohibición Federal de Armas de Asalto
CONAPO National Council of Population (Mexico) Consejo Nacional de Población ICESI Citizens' Institute for Security Studies (Mexico)
Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad IFAI Institute of Access to Information and Data Protection (Mexico)
Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información Pública y Protección de Datos INEGI National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Mexico) Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía SNSP National Public Security System (Mexico)
Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública SEDENA Secretariat of National Defense (Mexico)
Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional – Mexican Army
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Introduction Following a pattern observed in other countries around the world (Farrell, Tseloni, Mailley and Tilley,
2011), Mexico experienced a substantial drop in crime and violence over the last decades of the
twentieth century. This trend is clear in the case of homicides for which the rate per 100,000 inhabitants
fell from around 40-50 homicides in the mid-1950s to 17.9 in 1997, and around 11.5 by mid-2000s
(SESNSP, 2014; CONAPO, 2014). By 2004, the incidence of crime in Mexico was at the lowest level
recorded.
Nevertheless, after 2004, violence generated by criminal organisations began to increase. This occurred
particularly in Mexico’s northern states (which border the U.S.) where authorities started to be
challenged, policeman and Mayors were killed for the first time, and society witnessed a dramatic
expansion of violent crimes such as kidnapping, robberies and extortion (Ríos, 2011 and SNSP 2013).
Alongside these sudden changes in crime, increases in other forms of violence such as confrontations
in public spaces in which innocent victims were injured, the rising prevalence of powerful guns in
criminal hands, and an increase in the fear of crime -as measured by victimization surveys- generated
the perception that Mexico was becoming a ‘failed state’ (ENSI2010; ENVIPE, 2012; USJFCOM;
2008).
These changes naturally raise many questions. A first one is about explaining the ‘big picture’. In other
words, how criminological theories might enlighten why a country that was experiencing a decline in
crime (with the size and population of Mexico) suddenly changed trajectory to witness a clear increase
in violence. A second one is about the ‘tactic behind the violence’. This is relevant given that Mexico
has had one of the strictest gun policies in the world. Certainly, an analysis about the illegal gun supply
is lacking and its inclusion would help to comprehend if criminal opportunity actually changed and how
this fact could have triggered violence in the country.
Overall, the aim of this study is to explore some of the most widespread hypotheses used when trying
to explain the spike in violence in Mexico during the last decade. The main argument presented here is
that homicide increase cannot be empirically elucidated by using the traditional ‘criminological
explanations’. By contrast, it proposes an additional hypothesis: due to the timing of these criminal
changes in Mexico and the geography involved, one possible explanation may be found in modifications
to gun legislation in the U.S. This research particularly explores how the expiration of the U.S. Assault
Weapon Ban (AWB) in 2004 might explain the rise of homicide in Mexico after then.
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The study is organised as follows. Section 1 outlines a general background -the rationale behind the
paper- suggesting how gun prevalence in the U.S. is linked with illegal guns in Mexico (gun seizures is
considered a proxy) on one hand, and its possible impact: homicides in Mexico, on the other. Section 2
presents the statistical analysis: a fixed effect panel data model linking homicides with gun seizures in
Mexico, controlling by other explanations for violence. Section 3 explores two additional robustness
techniques: a first one to reconfirm the temporal role of AWB expiration in homicides increase, and
some exploratory ideas for a possible instrumental variable. Finally, Section 4 presents some general
findings and further implications.
1. Background
Graph 1: An input-ouput-outcome model
Source: Author’s elaboration, 2014
1.1 Input: More guns (prevalence) in the U.S. On September 13, 1994, U.S. President William Clinton signed into law the Public Safety and
Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, commonly known as the Federal Assault Weapons Ban
(AWB). This federal law included a ten-year prohibition on the manufacture and import of specific
semi-automatic firearms for civilian use that were defined therein as "assault weapons" (GPO, 1994).
From an analytical perspective, this policy of restricting military-style guns had two main objectives.
On one hand, it aimed to reduce the social costs -morbidity and mortality- associated with the public
shootings, accidents and murders occurring all over the U.S. On the other, it also intended to contribute
1. More available guns in the U.S. as possible input
2. More seized firearms in Mexico as possible output
3. More homicides in Mexico as possible outcome
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in stopping the violent crimes experienced in cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Detroit, Baltimore,
D.C., Boston and others (Presidential Libraries, 1994).
Although there is no absolute consensus regarding if this ten-year ban was actually successful or not in
achieving these goals, most of the studies suggest some positive externalities. By restricting high calibre
and large amounts of guns to unreliable users (such as gangs and straw purchasers), this policy could
have contributed to re-empower police forces, on one hand, and to reduce social harm previously caused
by high gun prevalence, on the other (Roth and Koper, 1999).
In any case, ten years later in 2004, the AWB expiration removed the restrictions to private contractors
for manufacturing, importing and selling for civilian use most of the semi-automatic weapons that were
prohibited ten years ago. In addition to a quantitative raise in prevalence, guns also increased its
destructive power (lethality). In fact, ATF (2013) data shows that more 9mm pistols and rifles started
to be produced at higher rates after 2004, coincidentally the preferred weapons by criminal organisations
operating in Mexico (Goodmand and Marizco, 2010).
Graph 2: Gun prevalence in the U.S.
Source: Perez Esparza and Weigend, 2014
0
2,000,000
4,000,000
6,000,000
8,000,000
10,000,000
12,000,000
14,000,000
16,000,000
Implementationof the AWB
Removal fo the AWB
Obama'sadministration
Mass shootings in Aurora and
Newtown
Net number of firearms =(manufactured + imported firearms) - exported firearms
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1.2 Output: More illegal guns (confiscations) in Mexico
Mexico has had a highly restrictive gun policy for almost 100 years. One of the clearest keys for
understanding this regulation is the 1972 Federal Law of Firearms and Explosives, which basically
reconfirmed two historical bases. On one hand, it fortified the legal and administrative system to control
the proliferation of guns in the country while heavily limiting and restricting the access for civilians,
(and even to the civil police forces). On the other, it granted exclusivity and the constitutional mandate
to the federal government to strictly enforce this policy throughout the Mexican Army (SEDENA).
As a result of these foundations, manufacturing for civilian use has been almost inexistent in Mexico.
Production for government agencies has been rare and, when it has occurred, it has been carried out
monopolistically by the Army, for the Army itself. The rationale behind was to restrict the supply to
civilians under the ‘least-guns-as possible’ paradigm.
In terms of civil possession, for instance, Mexican citizens who want to acquire a gun have to register
to be granted with a license, only possible after completing an intense legal and medical background
check also carried out by the Mexican Army (Vega, 2011). Even when passing these exams, private
handgun ownership has been restricted to ‘justified causes’ (such as hunting) and to low caliber weapons
(.38 or below). In any case, law does not allow citizens to carry guns in public places, either openly or
concealed (UNODC, 2013). By 2013, there were only 3,140 private users with a legal valid license in
all Mexico (Aviles, 2013), a fact that may indicate the low gun-demand from most Mexican citizens1.
Then, where are the firearms coming from? The idea of American guns illegally being trafficked to
Mexico is not new. Analysts have studied, for instance, how firearms producers in the U.S. participated
and enriched during the 1910 Mexican Revolution. More recently, by 1994 when AWB was aiming to
reduce prevalence in the U.S., American guns were already associated with the Zapatista uprising
(UNODC, 2013) and with Mexican Presidential Candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio murder committed
with a .38 revolver acquired in San Francisco, California (Brito, 2011). Still, all these cases were more
or less isolated until some years ago when the amount and lethality of guns being trafficked increased,
starting to concern some NGOs2. In any case, data suggests that:
1 If legal demand has been relatively low and stable, it is possible to assume then that there has been a growing demand for illegal guns. Besides the expansion in demand probably associated with the ‘Merida Initiative arms race’ and other changes in criminal equilibriums, it is likely to infer that some citizens could have acquired guns for self-defence purposes, as perceived in the ‘Michoacán Autodefensas’ case
(Martinez and Mayorga, 2014). 2 The Washington’s Office on Latin America (WOLA), the Brady Campaign against Gun Violence, and the Violence Policy Center have raised this point in the U.S. In Mexico, [Des]arma México is the leading organization. The 2014 #No+Armas #No+Guns report elaborated by the Mexican organizations Instituto para la Seguridad y Democracia (INSYDE) and Movimiento por la Paz in partnership with the Americans Global Exchange and Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) is the best example of binational cooperation in this security issue.
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The U.S. is the largest exporter of weapons to developing countries (Grimmet and Kerr, 2012).
There have been some cases of American actors supplying guns and getting involved with
international conflicts, as demonstrated in the Iran-Contra affair (Brown, 2013).
The U.S. has been recognized as the largest source of guns being trafficked to Mexico. A study
from United Nations has estimated that 20,000 American firearms are illegally introduced every
year to Mexico, accounting for $20 million per year and no less than 10% of all the global
illegal market (UNODC, 2013). Further studies have concluded an amount ten times larger:
212,887 firearms trafficked annually, representing nearly 2.2% of all U.S. domestic arms sales
(McDougal, Shirk, Muggah, R. and Patterson, 2014).
The U.S. has been proved to be the largest supplier for criminal organizations operating in
Mexico. From all the firearms that Mexican authorities confiscated to criminal organizations
and were later sent to the ATF, between 70% and 90% of them were positively traced back to
gun-shops operating in the U.S. (U.S. ATF-b, 2012; GAO, 2010).
This data, however, should be understood in a broader picture of cases occurring alongside the border.
Situations that are not only associated with organized criminals, but also with American authorities
failing to follow Mexican and international law. In 2011, one New Mexico’s Mayor and his County
Police chief were both busted in a scheme to supply guns to criminals in Mexico (Caulfield, 2011). In
2014, U.S. Marine Sgt. Andrew Tahmooressi was arrested after accidentally crossing the Mexican
border with guns in his truck (Daily Mail, 2014). Later, a Californian Senator was accused of trafficking
firearms in exchange for substantial campaign contributions (Bernstein, 2014).
In any case, perhaps the most dramatic case of trafficking with officials involved became public in early
2011. Back then, the World Net Daily, Fox News and The Washington Times were the first mass media
enterprises in reporting that, as a result of the “Fast and Furious Operation” 3, the U.S. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) motivate gun sellers to retail about 2,000 weapons
to “straw” buyers, often young kids lured by a reported $100 per transaction. According to further
inquiries, the official idea was to implement an undercover operation for detecting this illegal network.
Nevertheless, Mexican authorities have suggested that they were never informed, ATF lost track of an
estimated 1,700 of all guns and none of the high-level smugglers had been arrested (Reasoned Politics,
2012; De Luca, 2012).
3 The first "gun walking" investigation by ATF was Operation Wide Receiver (2006-2007). Fast and Furious (2009-2011) was the second one under Project Gunrunner which started in 2005.
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Not surprisingly, some of these American firearms were later recovered from 170 crime scenes all over
Mexico (Serrano, 2011). Some of them were actually linked to the homicide of the U.S. Border Patrol
Agent Brian Terry in December 2010 and to the one of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Agent Jaime Zapata in 2011 (Univision, 2012). Although ATF was accused of targeting whistleblowers
for avoiding revealing information of these operations (Lott, 2011), one fact became clear: Americans
firearms smuggled by ATF killed not only Mexicans but also American agents.
Firearms’ trafficking from the U.S. to Mexico has been politically recognized on both sides of the
border. From the Mexican side, former President Felipe Calderón presented this concern to the U.S.
Congress during 2010 (Sheridan, 2010) and even lead a protest in Ciudad Juárez, near the border with
El Paso Texas, where he witnessed the destruction of thousands of American firearms seized (Martinez-
Cabrera, 2012). Following his position, Alejandro Poiré, Former Secretary of Interior, stated that
Mexico was doing its job undertaking a historic confiscation of drugs going north, and it was now time
for the U.S. to make a historic confiscation of illegal firearms going south (CNN, 2011).
Recently, during his 2013’s speech at the National Anthropology Museum in Mexico City, U.S.
President Barack Obama recognized that American firearms have had a negative effect on the recent
spike in violence experienced in Mexico. This goes along with some hypotheses suggested by the
Mexican authorities. The idea of this paper is to provide further evidence to assess these arguments.
In spite of this growing evidence from academics, historians and international organizations, there have
been other rival hypotheses stating that firearms used in crime in Mexico could have a different origin
instead of the U.S. Some American analyst have speculated that firearms have come from Russia, China
and other Eastern European nations and that they may be entering from the southerner border that
Mexico has with Guatemala and Belize (Cook, Cukier and Krauze, 2009).
Evidence, however, is not strong in this sense. For instance, the amount of seizures in the northern
bordering with the U.S. has no comparison with the confiscations occurring in the south. During the
Calderón administration, the federal government seized almost 150,000 firearms (CNN, 2011). From
all of them, only 1% were seized in southern state of Chiapas (UNODC, 2013).
An alternative hypothesis has suggested that most firearms used by criminals have been stolen or came
from corrupt Mexican Army or police officers. Nevertheless, this idea also lacks of evidence. In fact,
national and international data suggests that no more than 1.74% of all firearms seized could be linked
with this phenomenon (UNODC, 2013). Evidence, therefore, is strong enough to support that most of
guns have illegally trafficked to Mexico from the U.S.
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How many illegal guns are in Mexico? Although data on illegal ownership is naturally inexistent, one
Mexican Congressman recently stated that Mexico became now the 5th country with more trafficked
guns in its territory, whilst some years ago it was in the 22ndplace. This report also suggests that from
all illegal guns existing in Mexico, 35% are possessed by citizens looking for self-defence and 65% are
owned by organized criminal groups (Arvizu, 2014). Only 14% of all guns being trafficked to Mexico
are confiscated (Robledo and Rios Piter, 2015).
Graph 3: All gun seizures in Mexico
Source: Mexican Federal Government. State of the Union report, 2012
Graph 3 shows how confiscation of illegal firearms dropped between 1995 and 2004, following the
years in which AWB was operating. Similarly, once the AWB expired, the number of confiscated
firearms reported by the Federal Government in Mexico started to increase4. Even accepting that
confiscation does not necessarily mean illegal prevalence and that other factors might also explain the
sudden escalation of seizures, some similarities between these trends draws particular attention that
requires further research.
4 A sample of American guns seized in Mexico revealed that: a) in 21% of the cases guns were bought in the U.S. between 1 and 3 months before, b) in 12% of them between 4 and 6 months, c) in 22% between 7 and 12 months and d) in 18% between 13 and 18 months (#No+Armas #No+Guns, 2014).
Previous two sections have pointed out how a higher prevalence of guns in the U.S. seems to follow a
similar temporal pattern of higher rates of gun confiscation in Mexico. Whilst trying to link both to a
possible outcome, Graph 4 shows the general trend of homicides in Mexico. It is remarkable how the
year 2004 seems to have stopped the previous declining trend, on one hand, and how it follows a similar
“u” form as the previous two graphs, on the other.
Graph 4: Total homicide in Mexico
Source: INEGI, 2012
Victimisation surveys could shed some additional light that more illegal guns have been actually used
to commit crimes in general, and homicides, more specifically. Data from available exercises5 reveal
that, after 2004, gun-use for criminal purposes has increased substantially as shown in Graphs 5, 6 and
7.
5 The ICESI (Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad) carried out the ENSI (Encuesta Nacional sobre Inseguridad) from 2002 to 2010. Later, the INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía) became the responsible of this task with the ENVIPE (Encuesta Nacional sobre Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad).
Section 1 provides several arguments to support that after AWB expired in 2004: a) gun prevalence in
the U.S. augmented, b) gun seizures in Mexico enlarged, and c) homicides and firearms use in crime in
Mexico also increased. Furthermore, the three follow more or less a similar “u” pattern.
If a simple correlation is used to assess an association between these three variables for the 1999-2011
period (3 variables, 13 years of observation), the input-output-outcome argument expressed above can
be ratified as follows:
Graph 8: Evidence for an input-ouput-outcome model
Source: Author’s elaboration, 2014
1. More available guns in the U.S. as possible input
2. More seized firearms in Mexico as possible output
3. More homicides in Mexico as possible outcome
Input-Output (93%)
Output-Outcome (95%)
Input-Outcome (87%)
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2. Method: Illegal guns as determinant of homicides
Leaving this exploratory correlation (and the U.S.-Mexico input-output-outcome model) behind,
Section 2 particularly focuses on testing the specific explanatory power of the X variable gun seizures
in Mexico (as a proxy of all illegal guns in the country)6 when it comes to enlighten the Y variable
homicides in Mexico. In other words, a model that uses only national data from Mexico for the 1999-
2011 period. For this purpose, Table 1 shows a simple regression of homicides and firearms seized.
Following this logic, Table 2 presents a fixed effect panel data model considering the 32 Mexican states
as units of analysis7. Both exercises show a positive and significant role of firearms in homicides.
Table 1: Homicides explained by firearms seizures (regression)
Table 2: Homicides explained by firearms seizures (panel A)
6 Given that the State of the Union report does not include disaggregation of gun seizures per state, this Model A alternatively uses a sample elaborated by the Mexican Army through the Transparency Report initiative (IFAI-Infomex). Overall, this random sample is strong whilst representing 65% of all the cases suggested by the State of the Union report. 7 For both cases, the independent variable, Homicide Y(h), was built using information from INEGI. The dependent one Guns X1(g) was constructed using information provided by the Mexican Army through the Transparency Report initiative (IFAI-Infomex). Both variables were considered and both transferred into a Log function to reduce excessive dispersion.
(1982); Thomberry & Farnworth (1982) and Tittle (1983) are examples of this trend.
The prominence of this variable became so strong that Schafer (1969) noted that hardly any research
studying the causes of criminality omitted poverty or economic conditions (e.g. GDP-Gross domestic
product) as elements of their analysis. In any case, after all these years, systematic reviews have not
find a clear or coherent conclusion (Hsieh & Pugh, 1993). For explaining the recent rise of violence,
poverty in Mexico should have grown substantially since 2004-2006. Evidence challenges this
perspective: Mexico is richer now than it was before. Therefore, this variable cannot explain the recent
rise in violence.
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b) Hypothesis: Inequality is associated with higher homicide.
Marx (1849) may be the first one to have explored the relationship between inequality and the rise in
violence. In his classical example, social tensions arise when a ‘palace is built next to a relatively smaller
house’. By contrast, peace is stable in a society -no matter if houses are large or small-, as long as the
neighbouring ones are likewise in size.
During the 1930s, Merton (1938) predicted a future rise in crime in the U.S. once the ‘American dream’
proved to increase inequality and social dissatisfaction. Later, Blau & Blau (1982) found an empirical
strong association between inequality and homicide rates in large metropolitan areas. Others, however,
have suggested mixed results as a more accurate association (Land, McCall, & Cohen, 1990). In any
case, although there is always a problem of how to measure inequality [e.g. segregation across vs.
within: Kang, 2014], based on the U.S. and international data, empirical studies generally find that
inequality and some crimes are positively linked (Kelly 2000; Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza 2002;
Soares 2004).
Following these arguments, inequality in Mexico should have increased over the analysed period.
Nevertheless, using Gini index8, evidence suggests that this variable appears unlikely to explain the
recent variation in homicides.
II. Social factors
c) Hypothesis: Inter-state migration is associated with higher homicide.
Globalisation observed during recent decades has created a highly inter-connected globe. ‘World
becoming flat’ (Friedman, 2007), has also induced deep social transformations inside Mexico:
urbanisation and the pursuit of efficiency associated with free trade agreements.
Nonetheless, it has also generated ‘unintended consequences’. One of them is the increasing facility in
which people can move from one place to the other, seeking for better opportunities. Naturally, the
problem here is not the movement of people itself, but how emigration reduces social auditing,
undermine the ability and willingness of communities to exercise informal control over their members,
and leaves areas without surveillance (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Kornhauser, 1978; Sanchez, 2006).
8 Gini index is a measure of statistical dispersion created by Corrado Gini (1912) to represent the income distribution of a given place or society. A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality while a coefficient of one (or 100%) expresses maximal inequality.
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Emigration, at the end, creates more unguarded places, less informal surveillance and less defensive
spaces: risk-factors that have been associated by the environmental criminology with more crime9.
Contrarily, places receiving Mexicans from other states also generates challenges. For instance
‘immigrant communities’ enhance secondary group relationships (e.g. neighbours, co-workers and
strangers) instead of primary group ones (e.g. family). The issue here is how anonymity and distance
among new neighbours also enlarge opportunities for crime (Wirth, 1938).
For the context of Mexico, migration could be also associated with violence10. Theoretically, more
emigrants due to rising violence would create a perverse cycle in which emigration itself allows more
criminal operations, and more crime pushes more emigrants (Schultz, 1971; Morrison, 1993; Morrison
& Pérez Lafaurie, 1995). Evidence from Mexico, however, reveals that emigration from one state to
another has declined over time, being this effect strongest in the Centre region and marginally positive
only in the case of the Northwest one.
d) Hypothesis: International migration is associated with higher homicide
Following Newman’s ‘natural surveillance’ and ‘defensible space’ arguments (1972 & 1975) presented
in previous hypothesis, it would be expected that places with rising inter-national emigration are
associated with increasing homicides.
Data from Mexico suggests that Inter-national emigration has diminished steadily since 2000. From
525,000 Mexicans that were leaving their country each year to live in the U.S, at the present there are
less than 100,000. In fact, if only net migration is considered, emigrant figures have fallen to zero: the
lowest level recorded in history (MPP, 2009; Sheridan, 2011; Passel, Cohn and González-Barrera,
2012). Given that this phenomenon is quite recent and most reports from elsewhere have been unable
to conclude association (Apodaca, 1998; Schmeidl, 1997; Elias and Massey, 2010) this reports
considers the case of international remittances as the better proxy of international migration.
9 Newman (1972 & 1975) argues that an area is safer when people feel a sense of ownership, territoriality and responsibility for that piece of a community. Under this logic ‘defensible space’ is an environment whose physical characteristics -building layout and site plan- function to allow inhabitants themselves to become key agents in ensuring their security. ‘Natural surveillance’ is the link between an area's physical
characteristics and the residents' ability to see what is happening. 10 Rios (2012) has suggested that the number of unoccupied dwellings in Mexican northern cities is strongly associated with the rates of organised crime homicides. In some cases, this forced emigration impacted smaller, rural towns to the point of creating de facto ghost towns.
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e) Hypothesis: Unemployment is associated with higher homicide
Criminological literature has also suggested that there is a concurrence between crime and labor market
trends. Freeman (1983), for example, has advocated that more people taking active part in the economy
would predict less delinquency.
Despite the intuitive appeal of this argument, empirical research has been unable to consistently
document a strong association between them (Raphael and Winter‐Ebmer, 2001). On one hand, Levitt
(2004) and Farrell, Tseloni, Mailley & Tilley (2011) have agreed that economy is not a major
determinant of crime. On the other, Cook & Zarkin (1985) and Chiricos (1987) have concluded that
recessions (and growing unemployment) has some degree of association with crime: higher for property
crime motivated by economic gain and weaker in homicide. Evidence from Mexico suggests that,
although not as dramatic as in other countries, unemployment has actually increased after the
international 2008-2009 crisis.
III. Violence factors
f) Hypothesis: Unreported crime is associated with higher homicide
Unrecorded crime (or dark figure) has several consequences in terms of encouraging more delinquency,
and eventually, more homicides. For instance, it contributes to the misallocation of police resources, it
limits the deterrent capability of the criminal justice system, it renders victims ineligible for
public/private benefits and it weakens police’s reputation in society (Skogan, 1977). For these reasons,
if a region is experiencing a growth in under-reporting, this may be an indication of a reduced legitimacy
in the security sector bureaucracy and a dangerous ‘social capital’ weakening between government and
citizens.
According to this logic, theory wold predict a positive association between under-reporting and
homicide in Mexico after 2006-2007, when this crime increased. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that
an increase in under-reported crimes occurred in 2002 and after that, it remained basically stable. From
this perspective, the statistical association with homicide seems unlikely.
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g) Hypothesis: Institutional inefficiency in reported crimes is associated with higher homicide
For the purpose of explaining many human activities -even crime-, rational choice theory has integrated
economic models into criminal decision-making. The idea is simple but powerful: people will commit
crime only if it is rational to do so (Becker, 1968). Hence, if a person has decided to become a criminal,
this choice is based on the idea that expected benefits (the utility or gains of the crime) exceeds the
expected costs (the probability of being caught and punished).
Considering this theoretical assumption, some empirical studies have tested the deterrent or
incapacitation effects of the efficiency in the security-justice system in terms of murder. In Colombia,
one study found that impunity (low cost of crime) was significantly associated with homicides
(Montenegro & Posada, 1994). In the U.S. researchers have used Becker’s approach to conclude that
incarceration rates significantly reduced crime (Levitt & Miles, 2006). Other studies have found similar
Total pistols seized in Mexico 1999-2011 per region
Source: Elaborated by the author using IFAI Transparency Report (b)
Total revolvers seized in Mexico 1999-2011 per region
Source: Elaborated by the author using IFAI Transparency Report (b)
38
Total shotguns seized in Mexico 1999-2011 per region
Source: Elaborated by the author using IFAI Transparency Report (b)
Total rifles seized in Mexico 1999-2011 per region
Source: Elaborated by the author using IFAI Transparency Report (b)
39
Total other firearms seized in Mexico 1999-2011 per region
Source: Elaborated by the author using IFAI Transparency Report (b)
40
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