WHOLE MIND

WHOLE MIND INTRODUCTION Welcome friends. Our pastor has asked me to teach a series of tutorials that will challenge and satisfy parishioners interested in deepening their knowledge of the Catholic Faith. For this reason, the series is called "Whole Mind" as in Mark 29:30, "And thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind, and with thy whole strength."; or as in Ecclesiasticus 16:24 "Listen to me, my son, and learn knowledge, and give your whole mind to my words." For self-evident reasons, we shall open each tutorial with a prayer to the Holy Spirit. Prayer To The Holy Spirit Come Holy Spirit, fill the hearts of thy faithful and enkindle in them the fire of thy love. Send forth thy spirit and they shall be created and thou shalt renew the face of the earth. Let us pray. O God, who didst instruct the hearts of thy faithful by the light of the Holy Spirit, grant us, in that same Spirit, to be truly wise and ever to rejoice in His consolation; through the same Christ Our Lord, Amen. Some practical considerations. All participants are encouraged to familiarize themselves with the texts, the better to understand what is taught and to contribute where possible. Please note that session preps may exceed the amount of work that can be covered in a single tutorial; in these cases, the topic will be continued in the subsequent tutorial or tutorials as time and the depth of our inquiry permit. We are more interested in being thorough than in covering large quantities of material. We shall read the texts together with frequent pauses for my comments or your questions. To avoid crosstalk and confusion, the online sessions will be moderated. David B. Rioux, Ph.D.

Whole Mind Tutorial Series Three No Greater Love Excerpted from the Treatise on Charity by Thomas Aquinas, taken from the Summa Theologiae, Second of the Second Part, (Questions 23-30) and translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, Notre Dame University. QUESTION 23 Charity in its own right We next have to consider charity: first, charity itself (questions 23-44) and, second, the gift of wisdom, which corresponds to charity (questions 45-46). Concerning the first topic we have to consider five things: first, charity itself (question 23-24); second, the object of charity (questions 25-26); third, the acts of charity (questions 27-33); fourth, the vices opposed to charity (questions 34-43); and, fifth, the precepts that pertain to charity (question 44). Concerning the first topic, there are two things to consider: first, charity itself in its own right (question 23) and, second, charity in relation to its subject (question 24). On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is charity friendship? (2) Is charity something created that exists in the soul? (3) Is charity a virtue? (4) Is charity a specific virtue? (5) Is charity a single virtue? (6) Is charity the greatest of the virtues? (7) Can any genuine virtue exist without charity? (8) Is charity the form of the virtues? ## Article 1 Is charity friendship It seems that charity is not friendship (caritas non sit amicitia): Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in Ethics 8, nothing is as proper to friendship as sharing one's life with one's friend (convivere amico). But charity belongs to a

man with respect to God and the angels, whose lives, as Daniel 2:11 says, are not with men. Therefore, charity is not friendship. Objection 2: As Ethics 8 says, friendship does not exist without reciprocity (non est sine reamatione). But charity is had even with respect to one’s enemies—this according to Matthew 5:44 (“Love your enemies”). Therefore, charity is not friendship. Objection 3: According to the Philosopher in Ethics 8, there are three species of friendship: friendship of pleasure (amicitia delectabilis), friendship of utility (amicitia utilis), and friendship of virtue (amicitia honesti). But charity is neither friendship of utility nor friendship of pleasure; for in Epistola ad Paulinum, which is placed at the beginning of his Bible, Jerome says, “A true relationship (vera necessitudo), joined by the glue of Christ, is where men are drawn together not by the usefulness of familial matters, or by mere bodily presence, or by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God and the study of the divine Scriptures.” Again, charity is likewise not a friendship of virtue, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas a friendship of virtue, as Ethics 8 says, exists only with the virtuous. Therefore, charity is not friendship. But contrary to this: John 15:15, “I no longer call you servants, but my friends.” But this was said to them only by reason of charity. Therefore, charity is friendship. I respond: According to the Philosopher in Ethics 8, not every sort of love has the character of friendship; rather, friendship is a love that exists with benevolence (cum benevolentia) more specifically, when we love someone in such a way as to will the good for him. By contrast, if we do not will the good for what we love, but instead will for ourselves the very good that belongs to them, then this is a love of concupiscence and not a love of friendship. For it is ridiculous to claim that someone has friendship with wine or friendship with a horse. However, benevolence is not sufficient for the character of friendship; instead, a certain mutual loving is required, since a friend is a friend to his friend. Now this sort of mutual benevolence is founded upon something shared in common (fundatur super aliqua communicatione). Therefore, since man shares something in common with God insofar as God communicates His own beatitude to us, it must be the case that some sort of friendship is founded upon this sharing. 1 Corinthians 1:9 says of this sharing, “... the faithful God, by whom you have

been called into the fellowship of His Son.” But the sort of love built on this sharing is charity. Hence, it is clear that charity is a certain sort of friendship of man with God. Part 2-2, Question 23 150 Reply to objection 1: There are two kinds of human life: One is the exterior life, in accord with our sentient and corporeal nature, and as regards this kind of life, there is no sharing or commonality between us and God or the angels. The other kind of human life is man's spiritual life in accord with his mind. And as regards this kind of life, we have a shared life both with God and with the angels-imperfectly in our present state, which is why Philippians 3:20 says, “Our true life is in heaven.” But this shared life will be perfected in heaven, when God’s servants will serve Him and see His face, as Revelations 22:3-4 says. And so charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven. Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which friendship is extended to someone: In one way, with respect to his very self, and in this sense there is never friendship except with respect to a friend. In a second way, it is extended to someone with respect to another person; for instance, if someone has a friendship with a man, then by reason of that friendship he loves all those who belong to that man, whether his children or his servants or those who are related to him in any way whatsoever. And the love for a friend can be such that, because of one's friend, those who belong to him are loved even if they offend us or hate us. And it is in this way that the love of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, with whom the love of friendship is had principally. Reply to objection 3: A friendship of virtue is had only with respect to one who is virtuous as with respect to the principal person, but for his sake those who belong to him are loved even if they are not themselves virtuous. And in this sense charity, which is friendship of virtue to the highest degree, extends to sinners, whom we love out of charity for God's sake. ## Article 2 Is charity something created that exists in the soul It seems that charity is not something created that exists in the soul (non sit aliquid

creatum in anima): Objection 1: In De Trinitate 8 Augustine says, “If someone loves his neighbor, it follows that he loves Love itself.” But God is Love. Therefore, it follows that he principally loves God. And in De Trinitate 15 he says, “It was said, 'God is charity', just as it was said, 'God is Spirit'.” Therefore, charity is God Himself and is not something created that exists in the soul. Objection 2: God is spiritually the life of the soul in the same way that the soul is the life of the body—this according to Deuteronomy 30:20 ('He is your life'). But the soul vivifies the body through itself. Therefore, God vivifies the soul through Himself. But He vivifies the soul through charity—this according to 1 John 3:14 ('We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love our brethren'). Therefore, God is charity itself. Objection 3: Nothing created has infinite power, but instead every creature is emptiness (vanitas). But charity is not emptiness; instead, it is opposed to emptiness and has infinite power, since it leads a man's soul to an infinite good. Therefore, charity is not something created that exists in the soul. But contrary to this: In De Doctrina Christiana Augustine says, 'By charity I mean the mind’s movement toward enjoying God for His own sake.' But a movement of the mind is something created that exists in the soul. Therefore, charity is likewise something created that exists in the soul. I respond: The Master examines this question thoroughly in Sentences 1, dist. 17, and he claims that charity is not something created that exists in the soul, but is instead the Holy Spirit inhabiting the mind. Now he does not mean that this movement of love by which we love God is the Holy Spirit Himself; Part 2-2, Question 23 151 instead, he means that this movement of love is from the Holy Spirit but not by the mediation of any habit in the way in which other virtuous acts are from the Holy Spirit by the mediation of the habits of the other virtues, e.g., by the mediation of the habit of hope or of faith or of some other virtue. And he makes this claim because of the excellence of charity. However, if one considers the matter correctly, this view redounds to the detriment

of charity. For it is not the case that the movement of charity proceeds from the Holy Spirit, who is moving the human mind, in such a way that the human mind is only moved and is in no sense a principle of this movement, in the way that a body is moved by an exterior mover. For as was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 6, a. 1), this is contrary to the character of the voluntary, the principle of which has to exist in the thing itself. Hence, it would follow that the act of loving (diligere) is not voluntary. This implies a contradiction, since love (amor) by its nature implies that it is a voluntary act (actus voluntatis). Similarly, one cannot claim that the Holy Spirit moves the will to an act of loving in the way that an instrument is moved, since even though an instrument is a principle of an act, it is nonetheless not within its power to act or not to act. For the character of the voluntary would likewise be removed in such a case and the character of merit would be excluded—and yet it was established above (ST 1-2, q. 114, a. 4) that the love of charity is the root of meriting. Instead, the will has to be moved by the Holy Spirit toward an act of loving in such a way that it itself also effects the act. But no act is perfectly produced by an active power unless the act is connatural to the power through some form that is a principle of the act. Hence, God, who moves all things toward their fitting ends, endows individual things with forms through which they are inclined toward the ends instituted for them by God, and it is in this way that 'He disposes all things sweetly,' as Wisdom 8:1 puts it. But it is clear that an act of charity exceeds the nature of the power of willing. Therefore, if no form were added to the natural power by which one is inclined toward an act of elective love, then the act would thereby be less perfect than natural acts and the acts of the other virtues; nor would it be easy and delightful. But this is clearly false, since no virtue has as great an inclination toward its act as charity does; nor does any virtue act with as much delight. Hence, for an act of charity, it is absolutely necessary for there to exist in us some habitual form which (a) is added to our natural power, which (b) inclines that power toward the act of charity, and which (c) makes it operate promptly and with delight. Reply to objection 1: God's essence is itself charity, just as it is likewise wisdom and goodness. Hence, just as we are called good by the goodness which is God and wise by the wisdom which is God, because the goodness by which we are formally

good is a certain participation in God's goodness, and the wisdom by which we are formally wise is a certain participation in God's wisdom, so, too, the charity by which we formally love our neighbor is a certain participation in God's charity. For this mode of speaking was common among the Platonists, whose teachings Augustine was imbued with—though some who did not realize this have taken his words as an occasion for going wrong. Reply to objection 2: It is as an efficient cause (effective) that God is the life both of the soul through charity and of the body through the soul, but it is as a formal cause (formaliter) that charity is the life of the soul, just as the soul is likewise formally the life of the body. Hence, one can thereby conclude that just as the soul is immediately united to the body, so charity is immediately united to the soul. Reply to objection 3: Charity operates as a formal cause (operatur formaliter). However, the efficacy of a form is in accord with the power of the agent that induces the form. And so the fact that charity is not emptiness, but instead brings about an infinite effect when it conjoins the soul to God by justifying the soul, demonstrates the infinity of God's power, which is the source of charity. Part 2-2, Question 23 152 ## Article 3 Is charity a virtue It seems that charity is not a virtue: Objection 1: Charity is a certain sort of friendship. But friendship is not posited as a virtue by the philosophers, as is clear from the Ethics; nor is it numbered among either the moral virtues or the intellectual virtues. Therefore, charity is not a virtue, either. Objection 2: As De Caelo 1 says, 'A virtue is the ultimate limit (ultimum) of a power.” But charity is not an ultimate limit; instead, it is joy and peace that are the ultimate limit. Therefore, it seems that it is not charity that is a virtue, but joy and peace. Objection 3: Every virtue is a certain habit that is an accident (est quidam habitus accidentalis). But charity is not a habit that is an accident. For charity is more

noble than the soul itself, and no accident is more noble than its subject. Therefore, charity is not a virtue. But contrary to this: In De Moribus Ecclesiae Augustine says, 'Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are absolutely upright, joins us to God, and by which we love Him.' I respond: Human acts have goodness insofar as they are regulated by an appropriate rule and measure, and so human virtue, which is a principle of all good human acts, consists in attaining to the rule of human acts. Now, as was explained above (q. 17, a. 1), there are two such rules, viz., (a) human reason and (b) God Himself. Hence, just as a moral virtue is defined as being in accord with right reason—this is clear from Ethics 2—so, too, attaining to God constitutes the nature of a virtue, as was likewise explained above in the case of faith and hope (q. 4, a. 5 and q. 17, a. 1). Hence, since, as is clear from the passage cited from Augustine, charity attains to God by joining us to God, it follows that charity is a virtue. Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher does not deny in Ethics 8 that friendship is a virtue; instead, he says that it is 'either a virtue or accompanied by virtue” (virtus vel cum virtute). One could claim that friendship is a moral virtue having to do with operations that concern others (operationes quae sunt ad alium), though in a way that differs from justice. For justice has to do with operations that concern others under the concept legal debt, whereas friendship—as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 8— has to do with operations that concern others under the concept amicable and moral debt or, better, under the concept gratuitous favor. On the other hand, one could claim that friendship is not in its own right a virtue distinct from the others. For it has the nature of something praiseworthy and upright only from its object, viz., insofar as it is based upon the uprightness of the virtues. This is clear from the fact that not every type of friendship has the nature of something praiseworthy and upright, as is clear in the case of friendship of pleasure and friendship of utility. Hence, virtuous friendship is more like something that follows upon the virtues rather than being itself a virtue. However, it is not like this with charity, which is founded mainly upon God's goodness and not upon human virtue. Reply to objection 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love someone and to rejoice over him, since, as was explained above when we were discussing the passions (ST 1-2, q. 25, a. 2), joy follows upon love. And so love is posited as the virtue rather

than joy, which is an effect of love. Now ‘ultimate limit', as posited in the definition of a virtue, means not that which is last in the order of effects, but rather that which is last in the order of exceeding, in the way that a hundred pounds exceeds sixty pounds. Reply to objection 3: With respect to its esse, every accident is inferior to a substance, since a substance is a being in its own right (ens per se), whereas an accident is a being-in-another (ens in alio). On the other hand, with respect to the nature of its species, an accident that is caused by the principles of its subject has, to be sure, less dignity than its subject, in the way that an effect has less dignity than its cause. Part 2-2, Question 23 153 However, an accident that is caused by participation in some higher nature has more dignity than its subject insofar as it is a likeness (similitudo) of that higher nature, in the way that light (lux) is more dignified than a diaphanous body. And it is in this latter way that charity has more dignity than the soul, insofar as charity is a certain sort of participation in the Holy Spirit. ## Article 4 Is charity a specific virtue It seems that charity is not a specific virtue (virtus specialis): Objection 1: Jerome says, 'Let me briefly summarize the whole definition of virtue: Virtue is charity, by which one loves God and neighbor.' And in De Moribus Ecclesiae Augustine says, 'Virtue is an ordering of love (ordo amoris).' But no specific virtue is posited in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore, charity is not a specific virtue. Objection 2: Something that extends to the works of all the virtues cannot itself be a specific virtue. But charity extends to the works of all the virtues—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:4 ('Charity is patient, is kind, etc.”). Likewise, it extends to all human works—this according to 1 Corinthians 16:14 ('Let all your works be done in charity'). Objection 3: The commandments of the Law correspond to the acts of the virtues.

But in De Perfectione Iustitiae Humanae Augustine says, 'The general command is: ‘You must love' (diliges), and the general prohibition is, 'Do not covet' (ne concupisces).” Therefore, charity is a general virtue. But contrary to this: Nothing general is enumerated with what is specific. But charity is enumerated with specific virtues, viz., with faith and hope—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:13 ('Now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three.' Therefore, charity is a specific virtue. I respond: As is clear from what was said above (ST 1-2, q. 18, a. 2 and q. 54, a. 2), acts and habits are specified by their objects, and so where there is a specific sort of good, there is a specific sort of love. But the divine good, insofar as it is the object of beatitude, is a specific sort of good. And so the love of charity, which is the love of this good, is a specific sort of love. Hence, charity is likewise a specific virtue. Reply to objection 1: Charity is posited in the definition of all virtue not because it is by its essence every virtue, but rather because, as will be explained below (a. 7), all the virtues in some sense depend on it. In the same way, as is clear from Ethics 2 and 6, prudence is posited in the definition of the moral virtues because the moral virtues depend on prudence. Reply to objection 2: A virtue or art (ars) that the ultimate end belongs to rules over the virtues or arts that other secondary ends belong to—in the way that, as is explained in Ethics 1, the military art rules over the equestrian art. And so, since charity has as its object the ultimate end of human life, viz., eternal beatitude, it extends to the acts of all of human life in the manner of a command and not in the sense that it directly elicits all the acts of the virtues. Reply to objection 3: The commandment that has to do with loving is said to be a general command because all the other commandments are traced back to loving as an end—this according to 1 Timothy 1:5 ('The end of the commandment is love'). Part 2-2, Question 23 154 ## Article 5 Is charity a single virtue

It seems that charity is not a single virtue: Objection 1: Habits are distinguished by their objects. But there are two objects of charity, God and neighbor, which are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore, charity is not a single virtue. Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 17, a. 6 and ST 1-2, q. 54, a. 2), diverse conceptions of an object make for diverse habits, even if the object is one and the same thing in reality. But there many conceptions of loving God, since we are debtors to His love for each one of His perceived favors. Therefore, charity is not a single virtue. Objection 3: Friendship toward one's neighbor is included under charity. But in Ethics 8 the Philosopher posits diverse species of friendship. Therefore, charity is not a single virtue, but is instead multiplied into diverse species. But contrary to this: Just as God is the object of faith, so too He is the object of charity. But faith is a single virtue because of the oneness of divine truth—this according to Ephesians 4:5 ('... one faith...'). Therefore, charity is likewise a single virtue because of the oneness of God's goodness. I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), charity is a sort of friendship of man with God. Now, in one way, the diverse species of friendship are taken from the diversity of the ends, and in this sense there are three species of friendship, viz., (a) friendship of utility, (b) friendship of pleasure, and (c) friendship of virtue (amicitia honesti). In a second way, the diverse species of friendship are taken from the diversity of the sorts of commonality upon which the friendships are based. For instance, the species of friendship that belongs to relatives is different from the species of friendship that belongs to fellow citizens or fellow travelers, since the one is founded upon a natural communion, whereas the others are founded upon a civil communion or upon the common life of a journey. This is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 8. However, charity cannot be divided into many virtues in either of these ways. For there is a single end of charity, viz., God's goodness. There is likewise a single communion of eternal beatitude, upon which this friendship is founded. Hence, what follows is that charity is a single virtue absolutely speaking and is not

distinguished into more than one species. Reply to objection 1: This argument proceeds on the assumption that God and neighbor are objects of charity in equivalent ways (ex aequo). But this is not true. Rather, God is the principal object of charity, whereas one's neighbor is loved out of charity for the sake of God. Reply to objection 2: God is loved out of charity because of Himself (propter seipsum). Hence, there is only a single reason for loving that is principally attended to by charity, viz., God's goodness, which is His substance—this according to Psalm 105:1 ('Give glory to the Lord, for He is good'). Now the other reasons that induce one toward love, or that make for an obligation to love, are secondary and consequent upon this first reason. Reply to objection 3: Human friendship—which is the sort of friendship the Philosopher is talking about—has diverse ends and diverse types of association. As has been explained, there is no room for this sort of diversity in the case of charity. And so the arguments are not parallel. Part 2-2, Question 23 155 ## Article 6 Is charity the most excellent virtue It seems that charity is not the most excellent virtue: Objection 1: A higher virtue belongs to a higher power, just as a higher operation does. But the intellect is higher than the will and directs it. Therefore, faith, which exists in the intellect, is more excellent than charity, which exists in the will. Objection 2: That through which a thing operates seems to be lower than that thing itself, in the way that a minister through whom a lord operates is lower than the lord. But as Galatians 5:6 says, 'Faith works through love.' Therefore, faith is more excellent than charity. Objection 3: What comes about through an addition to another thing seems to be more perfect than that other thing. But hope seems to come about through an addition to charity, since the object of charity is the good, whereas the object of

hope is the arduous good. Therefore, hope is more perfect than charity. But contrary to this: 1 Corinthians 13:13 says, 'The greatest of these is charity.' I respond: Since in human acts the good arises from the fact that the acts are regulated by an appropriate rule, human virtue, which is a principle of good acts, must consist in attaining to the rule for human acts. But as was explained above (a. 3), there are two rules for human acts, viz., human reason and God. However, the primary rule is God—even human reason has to be regulated by this rule. And so the theological virtues, which consist in attaining to that primary rule by virtue of the fact that their object is God, are more excellent than the moral or intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining to human reason. Because of this, it must be the case that, among the theological virtues, the one that attains to God to a greater degree is the greater. Now that which is such-and-such in its own right (per se) is always greater than that which is such-and-such through something else (per aliud). But faith and hope attain to God insofar as the cognition of the true or the acquisition of the good come to us from Him, whereas charity attains to God Himself insofar as He exists in Himself and not insofar as something comes to us from Him. And so charity is more excellent than faith and hope—and, as a result, it is more excellent than all the other virtues. In the same way, prudence, which attains to reason in its own right, is more excellent than the other moral virtues, which attain to reason insofar as a mean is set by reason in human operations or passions. Reply to objection 1: The intellect's operation is brought to completion insofar as what is understood exists in the one who has the act of understanding, and so the nobility of an intellectual operation arises from the measure of the thing as understood (attenditur secundum mensuram intellectus). By contrast, the operation of the will—or of any appetitive power—is perfected in the inclination of that which has the appetite toward the real entity which is the terminus of the appetite (perficitur in inclinatione appetentis ad rem sicut ad terminus). Therefore, the dignity of an appetitive operation arises from the real entity that is the object of its operation. Now things that are lower than the soul exist in the soul in a way that is more noble than the way in which they exist in themselves; for, as the Liber de Causis explains, one thing exists in another in the manner of the thing in which it exists. By contrast, things that are higher than the soul exist in themselves in a way that is more noble than the way in which they exist in the soul. Therefore, the cognition of things that are lower than us is more noble than the love of them. That is why the Philosopher places the intellectual virtues above the moral virtues. By

contrast, the love of things above us—and especially the love of God—is preferable to the cognition of those things. And that is why charity is more excellent than faith. Reply to objection 2: Faith does not operate through love as through an instrument, in the way that a master acts through his servant. Rather, faith operates through love as through its proper form. And so the argument does not go through. Reply to objection 3: The very same good is the object of both charity and hope. But charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies a certain distance from it. And this is why charity does not relate to that good as an arduous good, in the way that hope relates to it. Part 2-2, Question 23 156 For what is already united does not have the nature of the arduous. And from this it is clear charity is more perfect than hope. ## Article 7 Can any genuine virtue exist without charity It seems that genuine virtue can exist without charity: Objection 1: It is proper to a virtue to produce a good act. But those who do not have charity perform certain good acts, e.g., when they clothe the naked, feed the hungry, and do other similar things. Therefore, some genuine virtue can exist without charity. Objection 2: Charity cannot exist without faith, since it proceeds from 'unfeigned faith,' as the Apostle puts it in 1 Timothy 1:5. But genuine chastity can exist in non-believers when they control their sensual desires, and genuine justice can exist in them when they adjudicate correctly. Therefore, genuine virtue can exist without charity. Objection 3: As is clear from Ethics 6, scientific knowledge and art are virtues. But virtues of this sort are found in men who are sinners and do not have charity. Therefore, genuine virtue can exist without charity.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 13:3 the Apostle says, 'If I should distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, but not have charity, it profits me nothing.' But genuine virtue profits one greatly—this according to Wisdom 8:7 ('She teaches temperance and justice, prudence and virtue, which are such that men do not have anything more profitable in life'). Therefore, genuine virtue cannot exist without charity. I respond: As has been explained (ST 1-2, q. 55, a. 4), virtue is ordered toward the good. But the good is mainly the end, since the means to the end are called good only in relation to the end. Therefore, just as there are two sorts of end, one ultimate and the other proximate, so, too, there are two sorts of good, one ultimate and the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and principal end for man is the enjoyment of God—this according to Psalm 72:28 ('It is good for me to adhere to God'). It is toward this end that a man is ordered by charity. On the other hand, there are two possible kinds of secondary and, as it were, particular ends for man, (a) one of which is genuinely good because in its own right it can be ordered toward the principal good, i.e., toward the ultimate end, and (b) the other of which is an apparent and not genuine good, since it leads one away from the final good. So, then, it is clear that a genuine virtue, absolutely speaking, is one that orders a man toward his principal good. In the same way, in Physics 7 the Philosopher says, 'A virtue is a disposition of what is perfect toward what is best.' And so no genuine virtue can exist without charity. However, if one takes ‘virtue' as it is used in relation to a particular end, then some virtue can be said to exist without charity, insofar as it is ordered toward a particular good. Still, if that particular good is an apparent good and not a genuine good, then the sort of virtue which is ordered toward that good will not be genuine virtue, but will instead be a false likeness of a virtue—in the same way that, as Augustine explains in Contra Julianum, 'In the avarcious it is not the genuine virtue of prudence by which they think up different ways to make a profit, and it is not the genuine virtue of justice by which, because of their fear of punishment, they judge the property of others not to be worth bothering about, and it is not the genuine virtue of

temperance by which they restrain their appetite for luxurious things because they are too expensive, and it is not the genuine virtue of fortitude by which, as Horace puts it, ‘'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'.' Part 2-2, Question 23 157 On the other hand, if the particular good in question is a genuine good, e.g., the preservation of the city or something of that sort, then there will be, to be sure, a genuine virtue, but it will be an incomplete virtue (virtus imperfecta) unless it is referred back to the final and complete good. And this is the sense in which there cannot be any genuine virtue, absolutely speaking, without charity. Reply to objection 1: There are two possible sorts of act that belong to someone who lacks charity: One sort accords with his lack of charity in the sense that he does something ordered toward that which makes for a lack of charity. This sort of act is always bad; as Augustine explains in Contra Julianum 4, an act that belongs to a non-believer insofar as he is a non-believer is always a sin, even if he clothes the naked, or does anything else of this sort, while ordering it toward the end of his unbelief. But, as was explained above (q. 10, a. 4 and ST 1-2, q. 85, a.2), there can be a second sort of act that (a) belongs to someone who lacks charity not insofar as he lacks charity, but insofar as he possesses some other gift from God—whether faith or hope or even some natural good—and that (b) is not completely corrupted by sin. And in this sense, in the absence of charity there can be an act which is good by its nature—and yet not perfectly good, since it lacks the appropriate ordering toward the ultimate end. Reply to objection 2: Since the end in practical matters is like the principle in speculative matters, it follows that just as there cannot be genuine scientific knowledge absolutely speaking unless there is a correct estimation of first and indemonstrable principles, so, too, there cannot be genuine justice or genuine chastity absolutely speaking unless there is a proper ordering toward the end, which comes through charity—even if one is correctly situated with respect to everything else. Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 56, a. 3) scientific knowledge and art imply by their very nature an ordering toward some particular good and not toward the ultimate end of human life. In this they are unlike the

moral virtues, which make a man good absolutely speaking. ## Article 8 Is charity the form of the virtues It seems that charity is not the form of the virtues: Objection 1: The form of a real entity is either an exemplary form or an essential form. But charity is not the exemplary form of the other virtues, since in that case the other virtues would have to belong to the same species that charity belongs to. Likewise, it is not the essential form of the other virtues, either, since in that case it would not be distinct from them. Therefore, there is no sense in which charity is the form of the virtues. Objection 2: Charity is related to the other virtues as their root and foundation—this according to Ephesians 3:17 ('... rooted and grounded in love ...'). But a root or foundation does not have the nature of a form. Rather, it has the nature of matter, which is the first part in an act of generating. Therefore, charity is not the form of the virtues. Objection 3: As is clear from Physics 2, the form and the end and the efficient cause do not coincide in something numerically the same. But charity is called the end and the mother of the virtues. Therefore, it should not be called the form of the virtues. But contrary to this: Ambrose claims that charity is the form of the virtues. I respond: In moral matters the form of an act is taken mainly from the end. The reason for this is that the principle of moral acts is the will, whose object and, as it were, form is the end. Now the form of an act always follows upon the form of the agent. Hence, it has to be the case that, in moral matters, whatever gives the act its ordering toward the end also gives it its form. Part 2-2, Question 23 158 But it is clear from what has been said (a. 7) that it is through charity that the acts of all the virtues are ordered toward the ultimate end. Accordingly, charity itself gives the form to the acts of all the other virtues. And it is said to be the form of the

virtues to the extent that they themselves are called virtues in relation to their informed acts. Reply to objection 1: Charity is said to be the form of the other virtues neither as their exemplar nor as their essence, but rather as an efficient cause, i.e., insofar as imposes its form on all of them in the way explained above. Reply to objection 2: Charity is compared to a foundation and root insofar as all the other virtues are sustained and nurtured by it—and not in the sense in which a foundation and root has the nature of a material cause. Reply to objection 3: Charity is called the end of the other virtues because all the other virtues order one toward its end. And by reason of the fact that the mother is the one who conceives within herself from another, charity is called the mother of all virtues. For from the desire for the end it conceives the acts of the other virtues by commanding them. ### QUESTION 24 The Subject of Charity We next have to consider charity in relation to its subject. On this topic there are twelve questions: (1) Is charity in the will as in a subject? (2) Is charity caused in a man by his previous acts or by God's infusing it? (3) Is charity infused in proportion to the capacity of a man's natural gifts (secundum capacitatem naturalium)? (4) Does charity increase in the one who has it? (5) Does charity increase by addition? (6) Is charity increased by every act [of charity]? (7) Does charity increase ad infinitum? (8) Can charity in this life be perfect? (9) What are the different stages of charity? (10) Can charity decrease? (11) Can charity once had be lost? (12) Is charity lost through a single act of mortal sin? ## Article 1 Is the will the subject of charity It seems that the will is not the subject of charity:

Objection 1: Charity is a certain type of love. But according to the Philosopher, love (amor) is in the concupiscible appetite. Therefore, charity is likewise in the concupiscible appetite and not in the will. Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 6), charity is the most important of the virtues. But reason is the subject of virtues. Therefore, it seems that charity is in reason and not in the will. Objection 3: Charity extends to all human acts—this according to 1 Corinthians 16:14 ('Let all your deeds be done in charity'). Therefore, it seems that charity resides especially in free choice as in a subject, and not in the will. But contrary to this: The object of charity is the good, which is likewise the object of the will. Therefore, charity exists in the will as in a subject. I respond: Since, as was established in the First Part (ST 1, q. 80, a. 2), there are two appetites, viz., the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite, which is called the will, the good is the object of both of them, but in different ways. For the object of the sentient appetite is the good as apprehended through the senses, whereas the object of the intellective appetite, or will, is the good under the common concept good, insofar as it can be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not a good that can be sensed, but is instead the divine good, which only the intellect has cognition of. And so the subject of charity is the intellective appetite, i.e., the will, and not the sentient appetite. Reply to objection 1: As was shown in the First Part (ST 1, q. 81, a. 2), the concupiscible appetite is part of the sentient appetite, but not part of the intellective appetite. Hence, the love that exists in the concupiscible appetite is love of a good that can be sensed. However, the concupiscible appetite does not extend to the divine good, which is intelligible; only the will does. And so the concupiscible appetite cannot be the subject of charity. Reply to objection 2: According to the Philosopher in De Anima 3, the will exists in reason. And so by the fact that charity is in the will, charity is not alien to reason. Still, reason is not the rule of charity in the way that it is of the other virtues; instead, charity is regulated by God's wisdom and exceeds the rule of human reason—this according to Ephesians 3:19 ('... the charity of Christ, which surpasses scientific knowledge'). Hence, charity is not in reason as in its subject, in

the way that prudence is; nor is it in reason as in that which regulates it, in the way that justice and temperance are. Instead, it is ‘in reason' only because of the will's affinity to reason. Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 83, a. 4), free choice is not a power different from the will. And yet charity does not exist in the will under the concept free choice. For [the power of] free choice, the act of which is to choose, is directed towards the means to an end, whereas the will (voluntas), as is explained in Ethics 3, is directed toward the end itself. Hence, charity, whose object is the ultimate end, should be said to exist in the will rather than in free choice. Part 2-2, Question 24 160 ## Article 2 Is charity caused in us by being infused It seems that charity is not caused in us by being infused (non causetur in nobis ex infusione): Objection 1: What is common to all creatures exists naturally in men. But as Dionysius says in De Divinis Nominibus 4, 'What is lovable and delectable (diligibile et amabile) to all things is the divine good,' which is the object of charity. Therefore, charity exists in us naturally and not by being infused. Objection 2: A thing can be loved more easily to the extent that it is more lovable. But God is maximally lovable, since He is the greatest good. Therefore, it is easier to love Him than to love other things. But we do not need an infused habit in order to love other things. Therefore, neither do we need an infused habit in order to love God. Objection 3: In 1 Timothy 1:5 the Apostle says, 'The end of the commandment is charity from a good heart and a pure conscience and an unfeigned faith.' But these three things belong to human acts. Therefore, charity is caused in us by our previous acts and not by being infused. But contrary to this: In Romans 5:5 the Apostle says, 'Charity is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.'

I respond: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1) charity is a certain sort of friendship of man with God, founded on God's sharing eternal beatitude (fundata super communicationem beatitudinis aeternae). However, according to Romans 6:23 ('The grace of God is eternal life'), this sharing has to do not with natural goods, but with the gifts of grace (dona gratuita). Hence, charity itself likewise exceeds the capacity of nature (facultatem naturae excedit). Now what exceeds the capacity of nature cannot be natural and cannot be acquired by means of natural powers. For a natural effect does not transcend its cause. Hence, charity cannot exist naturally in us and is not acquired by our natural powers. Instead, it is acquired by an infusion of the Holy Spirit (per infusionem Sancti Spiritus), who is the love of the Father and the Son; and, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 2), created charity is itself our participation in that love (et cuius participatio in nobis est ipsa caritas creata). Reply to objection 1: Dionysius is talking about the sort of love of God that is based upon the sharing of natural goods, and so this sort of love exists naturally in us. By contrast, charity is based on a supernatural sharing. Hence, the arguments are not parallel. Reply to objection 2: Just as God is in Himself maximally knowable and yet not maximally knowable to us—and this because of the weakness of our cognition, which depends on things that can be sensed—so, too, God is maximally lovable in His own right insofar as He is the object of beatitude, but He is not in this way maximally lovable to us—and this because of our affective inclination toward visible goods. Hence, it is necessary for charity to be infused into our hearts in order for us to love God to the highest degree. Reply to objection 3: When charity is said to proceed in us 'from a good heart and a pure conscience and an unfeigned faith,' this should be taken to refer to the act of charity, which is aroused by these things when they precede it. An alternative reply is that this assertion is made because acts of the sort in question dispose a man to receive the infusion of charity. Again, one should say about this (a) what Augustine says, viz., that 'fear leads to charity,' and (b) what is said in a Gloss on Matthew 1:2, viz., that 'faith generates hope, and hope generates charity.' Part 2-2, Question 24 161 ##

Article 3 Is charity infused in proportion to the quantity of one's natural powers It seems that charity is infused in proportion to the quantity of one's natural powers (secundum quantitatem naturalium): Objection 1: Matthew 25:15 says, 'He gave to each one in proportion to his virtue.' But there is no virtue or power that precedes charity besides natural virtue or power (virtus naturalis), since, as has been explained (q. 23, a. 7), without charity there is no virtue. Therefore, charity is infused in a man by God in proportion to his natural power. Objection 2: Among all the things that are ordered to one another, the second is proportioned to the first; for instance, we see that (a) in material things the form is proportioned to the matter and that (b) among the gifts of grace, glory is proportioned to [habitual] grace. But since charity is the perfection of nature, it is related to one's natural capacity in the way that a second thing is related to a first thing. Therefore, it seems that charity is infused in proportion to the capacity of one's natural powers. Objection 3: Men and angels participate in charity in the same way, since in both there is a similar sort of beatitude—this according to Matthew 22:30 and Luke 20:36. But, as the Master explains in Sentences 3, dist. 2, in the case of the angels charity and the other gifts of grace are given in proportion to the capacity of their natural powers. Therefore, the same thing seems likewise to hold true in the case of men. But contrary to this: John 3:8 says, 'The Spirit breathes where He will.' And 1 Corinthians 12:11 says, 'All these things are done by one and the same Spirit, apportioning to each as He will.' Therefore, charity is given not in proportion to the capacity of one's natural powers, but rather according to the will of the Spirit who distributes His gifts. I respond: The quantity of any given thing depends on the thing's proper cause, since a more universal cause produces a greater effect. Now since, as has been explained (a. 2), charity exceeds any proportion to human nature, it does not depend on any natural power but only on the grace of the Holy Spirit who infuses it. And so the quantity of charity does not depend on the nature's condition or on the capacity of its natural power; instead, it depends only on the will of the Holy

Spirit distributing His gifts as He will. This is why, in Ephesians 4:7, the Apostle says, 'Every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ.' Reply to objection 1: The power in accord with which God gives His gifts to everyone is the antecedent disposition or preparation, i.e., the effort (conatus) of the one who is receiving the grace. But the Holy Spirit likewise initiates (praevenit) this disposition or effort as well, moving the man's mind either more or less according to His will. Hence, in Colossians 1:12 the Apostle also says, 'He has made us worthy to participate in the lot of the saints in light.' Reply to objection 2: A form does not exceed the measure of its matter; instead, they are of the same kind. Similarly, grace and glory are of the same kind (ad idem genus referuntur), since [habitual] grace is nothing other than a beginning of glory in us. By contrast, grace and nature are not of the same kind. Therefore, the two cases are not parallel. Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 61, a. 6), an angel has an intellectual nature, and it belongs to him by his status (secundum suam conditionem) to enter fully into whatever he enters into. And so among the higher angels there was both a stronger striving (conatus) for the good in those who persevered and also a stronger striving for evil in those who fell. By contrast, a man is a rational nature, and it belongs to a rational nature to be at some times in potentiality and at some times in act. And so a man does not have to enter fully into whatever he enters into. Instead, someone who has greater natural powers can make less of an effort (minor conatus), and vice versa. And so the two cases are not parallel. Part 2-2, Question 24 162 ## Article 4 Can charity increase It seems that charity cannot increase: Objection 1: The only thing that increases is a thing with quantity (nisi quantum). But there are two sorts of quantity, viz., (a) dimensive quantity and (b) quantity of power (quantitas virtualis). The first does not belong to charity, since charity is a

spiritual perfection. And the quantity of a power has to do with [the number of] its objects. But charity does not grow in this regard, since even the least charity loves all the things that are to be loved out of charity. Therefore, charity does not increase. Objection 2: What is already at the limit (in termino) does not receive an increase. But charity is at the limit, since it is the greatest of the virtues and the highest sort of love of the highest good. Therefore, charity cannot increase. Objection 3: Increase is a certain sort of change (quidam motus). Therefore, that which increases is changed. Therefore, what is increased in essence (essentialiter) changes in essence. But a thing is not changed in essence unless it is either corrupted or generated. Therefore, charity cannot increase in essence, unless perhaps it were being generated or corrupted—which is absurd. But contrary to this: In Super Ioannem Augustine says, 'Charity deserves (meretur) to increase, so that, having increased, it might likewise deserve to be perfected.' I respond: The charity of this life (caritas viae) can increase. For we are called ‘wayfarers' (viatores) by reason of the fact that we are travelling toward God, who is the ultimate end of our beatitude. But in this life, the more progress we make, the closer we come to God, who is approached not by bodily steps but by the affections of the mind. But it is charity that effects this approach, since it is through charity that the mind is united to God. And so the charity of this life is by nature such that it can increase; for if it could not increase, then our progress in this life would cease. This is why the Apostle calls charity a 'way,' when in 1 Corinthians 12:31 he says, 'I now point out to you a still more excellent way.' Reply to objection 1: Only quantity of power—and not dimensive quantity—belongs to charity. However, this sort of quantity has to do not only with the number of objects, viz., in the sense that more objects or fewer objects are loved, but also with the intensity of the act, in the sense that something is loved more or loved less. And it is in this latter sense that the quantity of charity increases. Reply to objection 2: Charity is at the summit with respect to its object, viz., insofar as its object is the highest good; and it is from this that it follows that charity is more excellent than the other virtues. But it is not the case that every instance of charity is at the summit as regards the intensity of its act. Reply to objection 3: Some have claimed that charity increases only with respect to

its rootedness in its subject, or with respect to its fervor, and not with respect to its essence. However, these people did not understand what they were saying (propriam vocem ignoraverunt). For since charity is an accident, its being is to-be-in-another (eius esse est inesse). Hence, for it to increase with respect to its essence is nothing other than for it to exist in its subject to a greater degree, i.e., to be more deeply rooted in its subject. Again, charity is by its essence (essentialiter) a virtue that is ordered toward its act, and so its increasing with respect to its essence is the same as its having efficacy in producing an act of more fervent love. Therefore, charity increases in its essence not in the sense that it begins to exist or ceases to exist in its subject—as the objection imagines—but rather in the sense that it begins to exist in its subject to a greater degree. Part 2-2, Question 24 163 ## Article 5 Does charity increase by addition It seems that charity increases by addition: Objection 1: An increase with respect to quantity of power is just like an increase with respect to corporeal quantity. But an increase with respect to corporeal quantity is effected by addition; for in On Generation and Corruption 1 the Philosopher says, 'Increase is an addition to a preexistent magnitude.' Therefore, an increase of charity, which is an increase with respect to a quantity of power, will likewise be by addition. Objection 2: According to 1 John 2:10 ('He who loves his brother abides in the light'), charity in the soul is a sort of spiritual light. But light grows in the air by addition; for instance, light grows in a house when another candle is lit. Therefore, charity grows in the soul by addition. Objection 3: According to 2 Corinthians 9:10 ('He will increase the growth of the fruits of your justice'), it belongs to God to make charity increase. But by infusing charity in the first place, God makes something in the soul that was previously not there. Therefore, by increasing charity God likewise makes something in the soul that was previously not there. Therefore, charity increases by addition. But contrary to this: Charity is a simple form. But as is proved in Physics 4, when

what is simple is added to what is simple, it does not make something bigger. Therefore charity does not increase by addition. I respond: Every addition is an addition of something to something. Hence, in the case of every addition, one has to presuppose, prior to the addition, at least the distinction between the things, the one of which is added to the other. Therefore, if charity is added to charity, one must presuppose that the added charity is distinct from the charity to which it is added—not, to be sure, that it is distinct with respect to its esse, but at least that it is understood as distinct (secundum intellectum). By way of example, God could likewise increase a corporeal quantity by adding some magnitude that was created at that moment, not having previously existed, and yet even though it did not previously exist in reality, it would still in itself be such that one could understand its distinctness from the quantity to which it is added. Therefore, if charity is added to charity, one must presuppose—at least with respect to understanding—the distinctness of the one charity from the other. Now in the case of forms there are two sorts of distinction, the one with respect to species and the other with respect to number. Among habits the distinction with respect to species has to do with a diversity in the objects, whereas the distinction with respect to number has to do with a diversity in the subjects. Thus, a habit can grow by addition when it is extended to objects which it previously did not extend to, and it is in this sense that the scientific knowledge of geometry increases in someone who begins to know de novo geometrical matters that he previously did not know. However, this cannot be said about charity, since even the most minimal instance of charity (minima caritas) extends to everything that should be loved out of charity. Therefore, in the case of an increase in charity, the addition cannot be understood as presupposing a distinction in species between the added charity and the charity to which it is added. What remains, then, is that if an addition is made of charity to charity, then it is made on the presupposition that there is a distinction with respect to number—i.e., with respect to a diversity of subjects, in the way that whiteness increases when one white thing is added to another, even though it is not the case that by this increase something becomes more white. But neither can this be said in the case under discussion. For the subject of charity is a rational mind, and so the sort of increase of charity described above could be

effected only if by means of it one rational mind were added to another—which is impossible. Again, even if this sort of increase were Part 2-2, Question 24 164 possible, it would effect a greater thing that loves and not a thing that loves to a greater degree. Therefore, it follows that there is no way in which charity can increase by the addition of one charity to another, as some have claimed. So, then, charity increases only by its subject's participating in charity to greater and greater degrees (magis et magis participat caritatem), i.e., only insofar as its subject is more easily led to acts of charity (magis reducitur in actum illius) and is more subordinated to charity. For this is the mode of increase that is proper to any form that is intensified, since being a form of this sort consists wholly in inhering in what is susceptible to it. And so since the magnitude of a thing follows upon its esse, for the form to be greater is for it to exist to a greater degree in what is susceptible to it (formam esse maiorem hoc est eam magis inesse susceptibili), and not for another form to arrive. For the latter would occur if the form had a certain quantity in its own right (ex seipsa) and not in relation to its subject. So, then, charity increases by being intensified in its subject—and this is for it to increase with respect to its essence—and not by one charity being added to another. Reply to objection 1: A corporeal quantity has (a) something insofar as it is a quantity and (b) something insofar as it is an accidental form: Insofar as it is a quantity, it is distinct with respect to its location or distinct in its number. And so it is in this sense that an increase in quantity is thought of as being by addition, as is clear in the case of animals. On the other hand, insofar as a quantity is an accidental form, it can be distinct only with respect to its subject. And it is in this sense that it has increase properly speaking (habet proprium augmentum) by way of its intensification within its subject (per modum intensionis eius subiecto), in the same way that other accidental forms do. This is clear in case of things that become rarified, as the Philosopher shows in Physics 4. Similarly, scientific knowledge (scientia), insofar as it is a habit, has quantity on the part of its objects; and in this sense it grows through addition insofar as someone comes to know more things. Likewise, insofar as it is an accidental form, it also has quantity by the fact that it exists in a subject; in this sense it grows in someone who now knows

the same knowable things with more certitude (certius) than he had before. Charity likewise has two sorts of quantity. But, as has been explained, it does not increase in the quantity that is taken from the objects. Hence, it follows that charity increases only through intensification. Reply to objection 2: The addition of light to light can be understood to occur in the air because of the diversity of the light-sources that are causing the light. But this sort of distinction has no place in the case under discussion, since there is just one light-source that causes the light of charity. Reply to objection 3: The infusion of charity implies a change with respect to having charity and not having charity, and so it must be the case that something arrives that had previously not existed in the subject. By contrast, an increase of charity implies a change with respect to having less and having more. And so it does not have to be the case that something now exists that previously had not been infused; rather, it has to be the case that what had previously existed in the subject to a lesser degree now exists to a greater degree. And this is what God effects by increasing charity, viz., that it now exists [in the subject] to a greater degree, and that the likeness of the Holy Spirit is participated in more fully in the soul. Part 2-2, Question 24 165 ## Article 6 Does charity increase with every act of charity It seems that charity increases with every act of charity: Objection 1: What is capable of a greater effect is capable of a lesser effect. But every act of charity merits eternal life, which is greater than a simple increase of charity, since eternal life includes the perfection of charity. Therefore, a fortiori, every act of charity increases charity. Objection 2: Just as a habit among the acquired virtues is generated by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by acts of charity. But every virtuous act contributes to the generation of a virtue. Therefore, every act of charity likewise contributes to an increase of charity. Objection 3: Gregory says, 'On the way to God, to stand still is [to] go backwards.'

But no one goes backwards when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore, anyone who is moved by an act of charity makes progress on the way to God. Therefore, charity increases with every act of charity. But contrary to this: An effect does not exceed the power of its cause. But sometimes an act of charity is done with lukewarmness (tepor) or lack of intensity (remissio). Therefore, it does not lead to a more excellent charity, but instead disposes one toward a lesser charity. I respond: A spiritual increase of charity is in some way similar to a corporeal increase. However, corporeal increase in animals and plants is not a continuous movement in the sense that if something increases to such-and-such an extent in such-and-such a temporal interval, then something is added proportionally in each part of that temporal interval, as happens in local motion. Instead, for a time nature operates to dispose the plant or animal for the increase and does not increase anything in actuality, and afterwards it produces the effect that it had disposed the subject for by increasing the plant or animal. So, too, not every act of charity increases charity in actuality, but every act of charity does dispose one for an increase of charity, insofar as by one act of charity a man is rendered more prompt to act out of charity once again. And as this facility increases, the man breaks out into a more fervent act of love by which he strives to make progress in charity; and it is at that point that charity increases in actuality. Reply to objection 1: Every act of charity merits eternal life—to be procured not immediately, but in its own proper time. Similarly, every act of charity merits an increase of charity, but charity does [not] increase immediately, but increases when one strives for such an increase. Reply to objection 2: Even in the case of the generation of an acquired virtue, not every act brings the generation of the virtue to completion; instead, every act contributes to the generation by disposing one for it; and it is the last act, which is more perfect and acts in the power of all the previous acts, that brings the generation to actuality—just as in the case of the many drops of water that hollow out a stone. Reply to objection 3: One is making progress on the way to God not only when his charity is actually increasing, but also as long as he is disposed for an increase. ##

Article 7 Does charity increase ad infinitum It seems that charity does not increase ad infinitum: Objection 1: As Metaphysics 2 explains, every movement is toward some terminus and end. But an increase of charity is a sort of movement. Therefore, it tends toward some end and terminus. Therefore, it is not the case that charity increases ad infinitum. Objection 2: No form exceeds the capacity of its subject. But the capacity of a rational creature, which is the subject of charity, is finite. Therefore, charity cannot increase ad infinitum. Part 2-2, Question 24 166 Objection 3: Every finite thing is such that through continuous increase it can attain the quantity of another finite thing, no matter how big the latter is—unless, perchance, what accrues to it through the increase is ever-diminishing (id quod accrescit per augmentum semper sit minus et minus). For as the Philosopher explains in Physics 3, if we add to one line what is taken from a second line that is being divided ad infinitum, and if these additions are made ad infinitum, we will never reach any determinate quantity which is composed of the two lines, i.e., the line that is being divided and the line to which what is subtracted from the divided line is being added. However, this does not occur in the case under discussion, since a second increase in charity does not have to be less than the previous increase; rather, it is more probable that it is equal to the previous increase or greater than it. Therefore, since charity in heaven is a limit, if charity in this life could increase ad infinitum, it would follow that the charity in this life could be made equal to the charity in heaven—which is absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that charity in this life can increase ad infinitum But contrary to this: In Philippians 3:12 the Apostle says, 'Not that I have already attained it or already become perfect, but I pursue it in the hope that I might possess it.' A Gloss on this passage says, 'None of the faithful, even if [he] has made much progress, says, 'That is enough for me.' For anyone who says this has left the road before reaching the end.' Therefore, in this life charity can always increase more and more.

I respond: There are three ways in which a terminus can be fixed for the increase of a form: In one way, on the basis of the nature of the form itself, which has a fixed measure that is such that, once it is reached, the increase cannot go any further in the form, and if it does go further, then one arrives at a different form. This is clear in the case of grayness, the limits of which one crosses by means of continuous alteration, arriving at either whiteness or blackness. In the second way, on the part of the agent, whose power does not extend to increasing the form any further within the subject. In the third way, on the part of the subject, which is not capable of any greater perfection. Now in none of these ways is a limit imposed on the increase of charity in this life: Charity does not itself have a limit of increase according to the proper nature of its species, since it is a sort of participation in unlimited charity, i.e., in the Holy Spirit (participatio quaedam infinitae caritatis, quae est Spiritus Sanctus). Similarly, the cause that effects an increase in charity has unlimited power (est infinitae virtutis), viz., God. Again, a limit to such an increase cannot be fixed even on the part of the subject, since it is always the case that when charity grows, the capacity for further increase grows. Hence, it follows that no limit to an increase of charity can be fixed in this life. Reply to objection 1: An increase in charity is ordered toward some limit, but that limit exists in the future life and not in this life. Reply to objection 2: The capacity of a spiritual creature increases through charity, since the heart is enlarged through charity—this according to 2 Corinthians 6:11 ('Our heart is enlarged'). And so further capacity still remains for a greater increase. Reply to objection 3: This objection goes through for those things that have quantity of the same type, but not for things which have a diverse sort of quantity. For instance, no matter how much a line increases, it does not attain the quantity of a surface. But the quantity of charity in this life, which follows upon the cognition of faith, is not of the same type as the quantity of the charity in heaven, which follows upon clear vision. And so the argument is invalid. Part 2-2, Question 24 167

## Article 8 Can charity be perfect in this life It seems that charity cannot be perfect in this life: Objection 1: This sort of perfection would have existed especially in the apostles. But it did not exist in them; for in Philippians 3:12 the Apostle says, 'Not that I have already attained it or already become perfect ...' Therefore, charity cannot be perfect in this life. Objection 2: In 83 Qu[a]estiones Augustine says, 'The nourishment of charity equals the diminishment of disordered desire (diminutio cupiditatis); the perfection of charity equals the absence of disordered desire.' But the latter cannot occur in this life, in which we are unable to live without sin—this according to 1 John 1:8 ('If we say that we have so sin, we are deceiving ourselves'). Now every sin proceeds from some sort of disordered desire. Therefore, charity cannot be perfect in this life. Objection 3: What is already perfect cannot grow any further. But as has been explained (a. 7), in this life charity can always increase. Therefore, charity cannot be perfect in this life. But contrary to this: In Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis [In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos] Augustine says, 'When charity has been strengthened, it is perfected; and when it has arrived at perfection, it says, ‘I want to be dissolved and to be with Christ'.' But this is possible in this life; for instance, it occurred in the case of Paul. Therefore, charity can be perfect in this life. I respond: There are two ways in which to understand the perfection of charity: (a) on the part of what is lovable and (b) on the part of the one who does the loving. On the part of what is lovable, charity is perfect insofar as a thing is loved to the extent that it is lovable. But God is as lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite. Therefore, He is infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him to an infinite degree, since every created power is finite. Hence, the charity of a creature cannot be perfect in this sense; instead, only the charity by which God loves Himself can be perfect in this sense.

By contrast, on the part of the one doing the loving, charity is called perfect when someone loves with all his capacity (quando aliquis secundum totum suum posse diligit). There are three ways in which this can happen: (a) In one way, a man's whole heart is borne toward God in actuality. And this is the perfection of charity in heaven, which is not possible in this life. For in this life it is impossible, because of the infirmity of life, to always be thinking in actuality about God or to be always moved in actuality by love for Him. (b) In a second way, a man directs his efforts to leaving time for God and divine things, setting aside other things except insofar as the necessity of the present life requires them. And this is the perfection of charity that is possible in this life, even though it is not common to everyone who has charity. (c) In a third way, a man puts his whole heart in God habitually, so that he does not think about or will anything that is contrary to divine love. And this is the perfection common to everyone who has charity. Reply to objection 1: The Apostle is denying that he has the perfection of heaven. Hence, a Gloss on that passage says, 'He was a perfect wayfarer, but had not yet arrived at the perfection aimed at by the journey itself.' Reply to objection 2: He says this because of venial sins. Venial sins are contrary to the act of charity, but not to the habit of charity, and so they are incompatible with the perfection of heaven, but not with the perfection of this life. Reply to objection 3: The perfection of this life is not perfection absolutely speaking. And so it is always such that it may increase. Part 2-2, Question 24 168 ## Article 9 Is it appropriate to distinguish three stages of charity, viz., beginning charity, proficient charity, and perfect charity It seems that it is inappropriate to distinguish three stages of charity, viz., beginning charity, proficient charity, and perfect charity:

Objection 1: Between beginning charity and its ultimate perfection there are many stages in the middle. Therefore, one should not posit just one middle stage. Objection 2: As soon as charity begins to exist, it likewise begins to progress. Therefore, proficient charity should not be distinguished from beginning charity. Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 7), no matter how perfect the charity one has in this world, his charity can increase. But for charity to increase is for it to become proficient. Therefore, perfect charity should not be distinguished from proficient charity. Therefore, the three stages in question are not appropriately assigned. But contrary to this: In Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis [In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos] Augustine says, 'After charity has been born, it is nurtured, and this belongs to the beginners; when it has been nurtured, it becomes stronger, and this belongs to the proficient; when it has been strengthened, it is perfected, and this belongs to the perfect.' Therefore, there are three stages of charity. I respond: The spiritual increase of charity can be thought of as somewhat similar to a man's corporeal growth. Even though the latter can be divided into many parts, it nonetheless has some determinate divisions according to the determinate actions or pursuits which a man attains to through growth. For instance, a man's age is called infancy before he has the use of reason; after that, the man's second stage is distinguished when he begins to speak and to use reason; again, his third stage is the stage of puberty, when he begins to be able to generate, and so on up to the point where he reaches perfection. So, too, diverse stages of charity are distinguished by the diverse endeavors to which a man is led by an increase of charity. For at first the principal endeavor that falls to a man is to withdraw from sin and to resist those desires of his that move him in a direction contrary to charity. And this belongs to beginners, in whom charity must be nourished or kept warm in order not to be corrupted. A second endeavor follows, viz., that the man principally intends that he should make progress in the good. And this endeavor belongs to the proficient, who principally intend that charity should be strengthened in them by increasing. And the third endeavor is that a man should principally intend to adhere to God and enjoy Him. And this belongs to the perfect, who 'want to be dissolved and to be with Christ.' In the same way, we see in the case of a corporeal movement that first there is a withdrawal from the terminus [a quo], and, second, there is a drawing near to the

other terminus, and, third, there is rest in that terminus. Reply to objection 1: Every determinate distinction that can be made within the increase of charity is included under the three stages that have been explained. In the same way, as the Philosopher explains in On the Heavens 1, every division of continuous things is included under the triad of beginning, middle, and end. Reply to objection 2: For those in whom charity is beginning, even if they are making progress, the main immediate concern is to resist sins, by whose attacks they are disquieted. But afterwards, sensing that these attacks have lessened and that they are now more secure, as it were, they undertake to become proficient (ad profectum intendunt)—'on the one hand doing the work, and on the other holding a sword,' as Esdras 2 [Nehemiah] 4:17 says of those who were building Jerusalem. Reply to objection 3: The perfect are also making progress (proficiunt) in charity, but this is not their principal concern; instead, they turn their efforts especially toward adhering to God. And even though the beginners and proficients likewise seek this, they nonetheless experience concern for other things; Part 2-2, Question 24 169 the beginners are concerned about avoiding sins, and the proficient are concerned about making progress in the virtues. ## Article 10 Can charity decrease It seems that charity can decrease (possit diminui): Objection 1: Contraries are apt to be effected with respect to the same thing. But decrease and increase are contraries. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 4), charity increases, it seems that it can likewise decrease. Objection 2: In Confessiones 10, in speaking to God, Augustine says, 'He loves You less who loves something else along with You.' And in 83 Quaestiones he says, 'What nourishes charity decreases disordered desire (cupiditas),' and from this it seems that, conversely, an increase of disordered desire decreases charity. But disordered desire, by which something other than God is loved, can grow in a man.

Therefore, charity can decrease. Objection 3: In Super Genesim ad Litteram 8 Augustine says, 'It is not the case that God makes a man just by justifying him in such a way that if he turns away from God, what God did remains in the now absent man.' From this one can gather that in conserving charity in a man, God operates in the same way that He operates when He first infuses charity into him. But in the first infusion of charity, God infuses less charity in a man who has prepared himself less for it. Therefore, in the conservation of charity He conserves less charity in a man who has prepared himself less for it. Therefore, charity can decrease. But contrary to this: In Scripture, charity is compared to fire—this according to Canticle 8:6 ('Its torches (i.e., charity's torches) are fire and flames'). But as long as fire remains, it is always ascending. Therefore, as long as charity remains, it is able to ascend but not able to descend, i.e., to decrease. I respond: The quantity that charity has in relation to its proper object cannot decrease—in the same way that, as was explained above (a. 4), it cannot increase, either. However, since charity increases in the quantity that it has in relation to its subject, here we have to consider whether it can decrease in this respect. Now if it decreases, then it must decrease either (a) through some act or (b) merely through the cessation of its own act. Now as was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 53, a. 3), virtues that are acquired by acts decrease—and are sometimes even corrupted—through the cessation of their act. Hence, in Ethics 8 the Philosopher says of friendship that lack of communication (inappellatio), i.e., not calling on or talking with one's friend, dissolves many friendships. And the reason for this is that the conservation of a thing depends on its cause, and the cause of an acquired virtue is the human act; hence, when the human acts cease, an acquired virtue diminishes and in the end is totally corrupted. However, this sort of thing has no place in the case of charity, since, as was explained above (a. 2), charity is caused solely by God and not by human acts. Hence, it follows that even if its act ceases, it is neither decreased nor corrupted by this if there is no sin involved in the cessation. Therefore, it follows that a decrease of charity can be caused only by God or by some sin. But no defect is caused in us by God except by way of punishment, in accord with which He takes grace away as a punishment for sin.

Hence, it is appropriate for Him to decrease grace only by way of punishment. Hence, it follows that if charity decreases, the cause of its decrease is sin, either as an efficient cause or as a meritorious cause. However, mortal sin does not decrease charity in either of these ways; instead, it totally corrupts it—both (a) as an efficient cause, since, as will be explained below (a. 12), every mortal sin is contrary to charity, and also (b) as a meritorious cause, since if someone does something contrary to charity by committing a moral sin, then he deserves to have God take charity away from him. Part 2-2, Question 24 170 Similarly, neither can charity decrease through venial sin, either as an efficient cause or as a meritorious cause. Not as an efficient cause, because venial sin does not touch charity itself. For charity has to do with the ultimate end, whereas venial sin is a sort of disorder with respect to the means to the end. But love for the end does not decrease by one's doing something disordered with respect to the means to the end—just as it sometimes happens that sick people who mightily love health are disordered when it comes to observing their diet, and just as, in the case of speculative matters, false opinions concerning matters that are inferred from the principles do not decrease the certitude of the principles. Similarly, venial sin likewise does not merit a decrease of charity. For when someone is delinquent in a lesser matter, he does not deserve to suffer a greater loss, and God does not turn away from a man to a greater degree than that to which the man turns away from Him. Hence, someone who is disordered with respect to the means to the end does not deserve to suffer a loss of charity, through which he is ordered toward the ultimate end. Hence, the result is that charity can in no way decrease, speaking directly. However, a disposition toward the corruption of charity, which is effected either by venial sins or by ceasing to exercise the works of charity, can indirectly be called a decrease of charity. Reply to objection 1: Contraries have to do with same thing when the subject is related in equal ways to both contraries. But charity is not related in the same way to increase and decrease, since, as has been explained, it is able to have a cause that increases it, but it is unable to have a cause that decreases it. Hence, the objection does not go through.

Reply to objection 2: There are two types of disordered desire (cupiditas): (a) By the first of them the end is set up in creatures. And this type of disordered desire totally kills charity, since, as Augustine says in Confessiones 10, it is poisonous. And this makes it the case that God is loved less—that is, that He is loved less than He ought to be loved by charity—by a total destruction of charity and not just by a decrease of charity. And this is how one ought to understand the claim that 'He loves You less who loves something else along with You.' This occurs only in the case of mortal sin and not in the case of venial sin, since what is loved in venial sin is loved for the sake of God in habit, even if not in act. (b) The second type is the disordered desire that belongs to venial sin, and this type of disordered desire is always decreased by charity, but, as has already been explained, it cannot decrease charity. Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 113, a. 3), a movement of free choice is required in the infusion of charity. And so whatever decreases the intensity of free choice operates dispositively in such a way that less charity is to be infused. By contrast, a movement of free choice is not required for the conservation of charity; otherwise, charity would not remain in those who are sleeping. Hence, charity does not decrease because of any obstacle having to do with the intensity of a movement of free choice. ## Article 11 Can charity once had be lost It seems that charity once had cannot be lost: Objection 1: If charity is lost, it is lost only because of sin. But he who has charity cannot sin; for 1 John 3:9 says, 'He who is born of God does not commit sin, since His seed abides in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.' But only the children of God have charity, since, as Augustine says in De Trinitate 15, charity is what distinguishes 'the children of the Kingdom from the children of perdition.' Part 2-2, Question 24 171 Therefore, one who has charity cannot lose it. Objection 2: In De Trinitate 8 Augustine says, 'If love is not true, it should not be

called love.' But as he himself says in Epistola ad Julianum Comitem, 'Love that can be deserted was never true love.' Therefore, neither was it charity. Therefore, if charity is once had, then it is never lost. Objection 3: In a homily on Pentecost, Gregory says, 'The love of God does great things if it exists; if it ceases to operate, it is not charity.' But no one loses charity by doing great things. Therefore, if charity is present, it cannot be lost. Objection 4: Free choice is inclined toward a sin only through some motive for sinning. But charity excludes every motive for sinning—love of self, disordered desire, and anything else of this sort. Therefore, charity cannot be lost. But contrary to this: Apocalypse 2:4 says, 'I have a few things against you, that you have abandoned your first charity.' I respond: As is clear from what was said above (a. 2), through charity the Holy Spirit dwells in us. Therefore, there are three ways in which we can think about charity. In the first way, on the part of the Holy Spirit moving the soul to love God. On this score charity has impeccability by the power of the Holy Spirit, who unfailingly does whatever He wills. Hence, it is impossible for these two things to be true simultaneously: (a) that the Holy Spirit moves someone to an act of charity and (b) that this individual loses charity by sinning. For the gift of perseverance is counted among those benefits of God by which, as Augustine puts it in De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, 'whoever is liberated is liberated with most certainty.' In the second way charity can [be] thought of in its proper nature, and in this sense charity is just that which belongs to the nature of charity. Hence, charity cannot sin in any way—just as heat cannot effect cooling, and just as injustice cannot effect anything good, as Augustine points out in De Sermone Domini in Monte. In the third way, charity can be thought of on the part of the subject, which is variable in keeping with its freedom of choice. Now the relation of charity to its subject can be thought of both (a) in the general way in which a form is related to its matter and (b) in the specific way in which a habit is related to its power. Now a form is by its nature such that it exists in the subject in a 'lose-able' way when it does not fulfill the whole potentiality of its matter. This is clear in the case of the forms of things that are generable and corruptible; for the matter of such

things receives one form in such a way that the potentiality for another form remains in it, as if the whole potentiality of the matter were not fulfilled by the one form. And so the one form can be lost through the reception of the other form. By contrast, the form of a celestial body, which fulfills that whole potentiality of the matter in the sense that there does not remain in it the potential for another form, exists in its subject in such a way that it cannot be lost. So, then, the charity of heaven, which fulfills the whole potentiality of a rational mind, viz., insofar as all its actual movements are carried toward God, is had in such a way that it cannot be lost. By contrast, the charity of this life does not fulfill the potentiality of its subject in this way, since its subject is not always being carried toward God in actuality. Hence, when it is not being carried toward God in actuality, something can occur through which charity is lost. On the other hand, it is proper to a habit that it should incline the power to do what is appropriate to the habit insofar as (a) it makes what is appropriate to the habit seem good and (b) it makes what is incompatible with the habit seem bad. For just as the sense of taste judges flavors according to its own disposition, so too a man's mind judges something to be done according to his own habitual disposition. Hence, in Ethics 3 the Philosopher says, 'As each one is, so will such-and-such an end seem to him.' Therefore, charity is had in such a way that it cannot be lost when what is appropriate for charity cannot but seem good, and this is in heaven, where God is seen through His essence, which is the very essence of goodness. And this is why charity cannot be lost in heaven. But charity can be lost in this life, wherein one does not see God's very essence, which is the essence of goodness. Part 2-2, Question 24 172 Reply to objection 1: This passage is talking about the power of the Holy Spirit, who, by His conservation of charity, renders immune from sin those whom He moves as He will. Reply to objection 2: Charity that can be deserted by the very nature of charity is not true charity. For this would occur if someone had in his love something which he loved for a time and afterwards ceased to love—something that would not belong to genuine love. On the other hand, if charity is lost because of the mutability of the subject and contrary to the intention of charity, which is included within the act of charity, then this would not be opposed to the genuineness of the charity.

Reply to objection 3: The love of God always does great things in its intention, which belongs to the nature of charity. However, because of the condition of the subject, charity does not always accomplish great things in actuality[.] Reply to objection 4: By the nature of its act, charity excludes every motive for sinning. But sometimes it happens that charity is not doing anything in actuality. And at such a time it is possible for some motive for sinning to intervene, and if this motive is consented to, then charity is lost. ## Article 12 Is charity lost through a single act of mortal sin It seems not to be the case that charity is lost through a single act of mortal sin: Objection 1: In Periarchon Origen says, 'When self-satisfaction seduces a man away from those things that have put him at the highest and most perfect stage, I do not think that he will become empty or fall away suddenly; rather, he has to fall little by little and gradually.' But a man falls by losing charity. Therefore, it is not the case charity is lost just through a single act of mortal sin. Objection 2: In Sermo de Passione, Pope Leo, addressing Peter, says, 'The Lord saw that in you faith had not been conquered and love had not been turned away, but that constancy had been shaken. Tears abounded where affection never failed, and the fount of charity washed away the words that stemmed from fear.' Bernard took this to mean that 'charity had been lulled to sleep in Peter but not extinguished.' But in denying Christ, Peter sinned mortally. Therefore, it is not the case that charity is lost through a single act of mortal sin. Objection 3: Charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. But the habit of an acquired virtue is not destroyed by a single contrary act of sin. Therefore, a fortiori, charity is not destroyed by a single contrary act of mortal sin. Objection 4: Charity involves love of God and neighbor. But someone who commits a mortal sin retains, it seems, his love of God and neighbor, since, as was explained above (a. 10), a disordered affection for the means to an end does not destroy one's love for the end. Therefore, charity with respect to God can remain even when a mortal sin is committed because of a disordered affection for some

temporal good. Objection 5: The object of a theological virtue is the ultimate end. But it is not the case that the other theological virtues, viz., faith and hope, are excluded through a single act of mortal sin; to the contrary, they remain as unformed. Therefore, charity, too, can remain as unformed even when a mortal sin has been perpetrated. But contrary to this: Through mortal sin a man comes to be deserving of eternal death—this according to Romans 6:23 ('The wages of sin is death'). But everyone who has charity merits eternal life. For John 14:21 says, 'He who loves me is loved by my Father, and I love him, and I will manifest myself to him' -and eternal life consists in this manifestation, according to John 17:3 ('This is eternal life, that they know You, the true God, and the one whom you have sent, Jesus Christ'). Part 2-2, Question 24 173 But no one can be simultaneously worthy of eternal life and deserving of eternal death. Therefore, it is impossible for someone to have charity along with a mortal sin. Therefore, charity is destroyed through a single act of mortal sin. I respond: the one contrary is destroyed when the other contrary supervenes. But every act of mortal sin is contrary to charity according to the proper nature of charity, which consists in God's being loved above all things and in a man's totally subjecting himself to God by referring all things to Him. Therefore, it is of the nature of charity that a man loves God in such a way that he wills to subject himself to Him in all things and to follow the rule of His precepts in all things. For whatever is contrary to His precepts is clearly contrary to charity and, hence, can in its own right exclude charity. To be sure, if charity were an acquired habit that depended on its subject's own power, then it would not be immediately destroyed by a single contrary act. For an act is directly contrary to an act and not to a habit, whereas the conservation of a habit in a subject does not require a continuous act (non requirit continuitatem actus); and so an acquired habit is not directly excluded by a supervening contrary act. However, since charity is an infused habit, it depends on the action of God infusing it, and, as has been explained (a. 10), in infusing and conserving charity God behaves like the sun illuminating the air.

And so, just as light would immediately cease to exist in the air if some obstacle were posed to the sun's illumination of the air, so too charity immediately ceases to exist in the soul if some obstacle is posed to charity's being infused into the soul by God. But it is clear that through every mortal sin, which is contrary to God's precepts, an obstacle is posed to the aforementioned infusion, since by the very fact that a man, in choosing the sin, prefers it to friendship with God, which requires that we follow God's will, it follows that the habit of charity is immediately lost through a single act of mortal sin. Hence, in Super Genesim ad Litteram 8 Augustine says, 'A man is illuminated when God is present, but when God is absent, he is continually in the dark; for one recedes from Him not by spatial distances but by turning away [from] his will.' Reply to objection 1: In one way, what Origen says can be taken to mean that a man who is in a perfect state does not suddenly fall into an act of mortal sin but is instead disposed for this by some sort of antecedent negligence. This is why venial sins are called a disposition for mortal sin, as was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 88, a. 3). Nonetheless, it is still through a single act of mortal sin, if he commits it, that he falls and loses charity. However, given that Origen himself adds, 'If a brief lapse occurs and he quickly recovers, then he does not seem to fall completely,' an alternative reply is that Origen means that someone 'becomes empty and falls' when he falls in such a way as to sin out of malice. This does not happen all at once in a man who was perfect to begin with. Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which charity is lost: (a) in one way, directly, through actual contempt, and Peter did not lose charity in this way. (b) in a second way, indirectly, when an act contrary to charity is committed because of the passion of desire or of fear. And it is in this way, acting contrary to charity, that Peter lost charity. But he regained it quickly. Reply to objection 3: [There is no reply here to objection 3; see the body of the article.] Reply to objection 4: Not every disordered affection that has to do with the means to the end, i.e., with created goods, constitutes a mortal sin. This occurs only when the affection is such that it is incompatible with God's will; and, as has been explained, this is directly contrary to charity. Reply to objection 5: Charity implies a certain union with God, but faith and hope do not. Now as was explained above (q. 20, a. 3 and ST 1-2, q. 72, a. 5), sin

consists in a turning away from God. And this is why every mortal sin is contrary to charity. However, not every mortal sin is contrary to faith or to hope; Part 2-2, Question 24 174 only certain determinate sins are, viz., those by which the habit of faith or the habit of hope is destroyed—in just the way that the habit of charity is destroyed by every mortal sin. Hence, it is clear that charity cannot remain in an unformed state, since, as has been explained, it itself is the ultimate form of the virtues because it relates to God as the ultimate end (in ratione finis ultimi). ### QUESTION 25 The Object of Charity We next have to consider the object of charity. On this topic there are two things that have to be considered: first, the things that are to be loved out of charity (question 25) and, second, the ordering of the things to be loved (question 26). On the first topic there are twelve questions: (1) Is God alone to be loved out of charity, or one's neighbor as well? (2) Is charity to be loved out of charity? (3) Are non-rational creatures to be loved out of charity? (4) Can one love himself out of charity? (5) Can one love his own body out of charity? (6) Are sinners to be loved out of charity? (7) Do sinners love themselves? (8) Are one's enemies to be loved out of charity? (9) Should enemies be shown signs of friendship? (10) Are the angels to be loved out of charity? (11) Are the demons to be loved out of charity? (12) How should one enumerate the things to be loved out of charity? ## Article 1 Does the love of charity stop with God, or does it extend to our neighbor It seems that the love of charity stops with God and does not extend to our neighbor:

Objection 1: Just as we must love God, so too we must fear Him—this according to Deuteronomy 10:12 ('And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you except that you fear Him and love Him?'). But the fear by which a man is feared and which is called human fear is different from the fear by which God is feared and which, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 2), is called either servile fear or filial fear. Therefore, the love that belongs to charity, by which God is loved, is likewise different from the love by which our neighbor is loved. Objection 2: In Ethics 8 the Philosopher says that to be loved is to be honored. But the honor that is owed to God, which is the honor of latria, is different from the honor that is owed to a creature, which is the honor of dulia. Therefore, the love by which God is loved is likewise different from the love by which our neighbor is loved. Objection 3: As is said in a Gloss on Matthew 1:2, hope generates charity. But hope is had in God in such a way that those hoping in men are reprehended—this according to Jeremiah 17:5 ('Cursed be the man who places his trust in man'). Therefore, charity is owed to God in such a way that it does not extend to our neighbor. But contrary to this: 1 John 4:21 says, 'This commandment we have from God, that he who loves God should also love his brother.' I respond: As was explained above (q. 17, a. 6; q. 19, a. 3; ST 1-2, q. 54, a. 3), habits are diversified only by that which changes the species of the act, since all the acts of a single species belong to the same habit. But given that the species of an act is taken from its object in accord with the object's formal character (secundum formalem rationem ipsius), an act that is directed toward an object's [formal] character and an act that is directed toward the object under such a character (sub tali ratione) must be the same in species—in the way that an act of seeing by which light is seen is the same in species as an act of seeing by which a color is seen in accord with the character [of] light (secundum luminis rationem). Now the [formal] character that belongs to loving one's neighbor is God, since we ought to love in our neighbor the fact that he exists in God. Hence, it is clear that an act by which God is loved (diligitur) is the same in species as an act by which our neighbor is loved. And it is because of this that the habit of charity extends not only to love (dilectio) of God, but also to love of neighbor. Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which our neighbor can be feared, just

as there are likewise two ways in which our neighbor can be loved. In one way, it is because of what is proper to himself—as, for instance, when someone fears a tyrant because of his cruelty, or when he loves (amat) someone out of a desire to acquire something from him. Part 2-2, Question 25 176 And this sort of human fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same holds in the case of love. In the second way, a man is feared and loved because of what there is of God existing in him—as when a secular power (a) is feared because of the divine ministry which he has of punishing evildoers and (b) is loved for the sake of justice. And this sort of fear of a man is not distinct from the fear of God, and neither is this sort of love (amor) distinct from the love of God. Reply to objection 2: Love (amor) has to do with the good in general (respicit bonum in communi), whereas honor has to do with the proper good of the one who is honored, since it is bestowed on someone as a testimony to his own proper virtue. And so love is not diversified in species by the different quantities of goodness had by diverse things, as long as those things are all referred back to a unified general good, whereas honor is diversified according to the proper goods of individuals. Hence, we love all our neighbors by the same love of charity, insofar as they are referred back to one common good, i.e., God, whereas we bestow different honors on different individuals in accord with the proper virtue of each one. And, similarly, we show to God the singular honor of latria, because of His singular virtue. Reply to objection 3: The ones being blamed are those who hope in man as the principal source of salvation, not those who hope in man as helping them ministerially under God. Similarly, if someone loved (diligere) his neighbor as the principal end, this would be reprehensible, but not if someone loved his neighbor for the sake of God—which belongs to charity. ## Article 2 Is charity to be loved out of charity It seems not to be the case that charity is to be loved out of charity:

Objection 1: As is clear from Matthew 22:37-39, what is to be loved out of charity is inferred from the two precepts of charity. But charity is not contained under either of these precepts, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore, it is not the case that charity is to be loved out of charity. Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity is based upon a sharing in beatitude. But charity cannot participate in beatitude. Therefore, it is not the case that charity is to be loved out of charity. Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity is a sort of friendship. But no one can have a friendship with charity or with any accident, since things of this sort cannot reciprocate love—which, as is explained in Ethics 8, is part of the nature of friendship. Therefore, it is not the case that charity is to be loved out of charity. But contrary to this: In De Trinitate 8 Augustine says, 'He who loves his neighbor must, as a consequence, likewise love love itself (etiam ipsam dilectionem diligat).' But one's neighbor is loved out of charity. Therefore, as a consequence, charity is likewise loved out of charity. I respond: Charity is a certain sort of love (amor). But by the nature of the power of which it is an act, love is such that it can be reflected back upon itself. For since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever is contained under the notion good can fall under an act of willing; and since an act of willing is itself something good (ipsum velle est quoddam bonum), one can will to will—just as, likewise, the intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands, since this, too, is something true. However, it is also the case that, by reason of its own species, love is such that it is reflected back upon itself, since it is a spontaneous movement on the part of the lover toward what is loved. Hence, by the very fact that someone loves, he loves that he loves. Part 2-2, Question 25 177 Still, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity (caritas) is not simple love (amor) but instead has the character of friendship (amicitia). Now there are two ways in which something is loved by friendship: In one way, something is loved as

the friend with whom we have the friendship and for whom we will good things. In the second way, something is loved as a good that we will for our friend. And it is in this way, and not in the first way, that charity is loved out of charity. For charity is a good that we wish for everyone whom we love out of charity. And the same line of reasoning holds for beatitude and for the other virtues. Reply to objection 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we have friendship. But our love for them includes loving charity, because we love our neighbor and God insofar as we love it for ourselves and our neighbor to love God, i.e., to have charity. Reply to objection 2: Charity is the very sharing of the spiritual life through which one arrives at beatitude. And so it is desired as a good for everyone whom we love out of charity. Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through insofar as what is loved through friendship are those with whom we have friendship. ## Article 3 Are even non-rational creatures to be loved out of charity It seems that even non-rational creatures (creaturae irrationales) are to be loved out of charity: Objection 1: It is through charity that we are especially conformed to God. But God loves non-rational creatures out of charity; for as Wisdom 11:25 says, He loves 'all things that exist,' and whatever He loves, He loves by His very self, and He is charity. Objection 2: Charity is mainly directed toward God and extends to other things insofar as they pertain to God. But just as the rational creature pertains to God insofar as he has the likeness of an image (similitudo imaginis), so too the non-rational creature has the likeness of a trace (similitudo vestigii) (cf. ST 1, q. 93). Therefore, charity extends even to non-rational creatures. Objection 3: Just as God is the object of charity, so He is also the object of faith. But faith extends to non-rational creatures insofar as we believe that heaven and

earth are created by God, and that the fish and the birds are produced from the waters, and that plants and walking animals are produced from the earth. Therefore, charity likewise extends to non-rational creatures. But contrary to this: The love of charity (dilectio caritatis) extends only to God and our neighbor. But by the name ‘neighbor' one cannot mean a non-rational creature, since non-rational animals do not share in the life of reason with man (non communicant cum homine in vita rationali). Therefore, charity does not extend to non-rational creatures. I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), charity is a certain sort of friendship, and what is loved through friendship is, in the first sense, the friend with whom the friendship is had and, in the second sense, the goods that are wished for one's friend. Thus, no non-rational creature can be loved in the first sense out of charity—and this for three reasons. Two of these reasons have to do with friendship in general, which cannot be had with non-rational creatures: First, because friendship is had with someone for whom we will the good. But I cannot properly will the good for a non-rational creature, because only a rational creature, who is in charge of using the good that he has through free choice, and not a non-rational creature, properly possesses his own good (est eius proprie habere bonum). Part 2-2, Question 25 178 That is why, in Physics 2, the Philosopher says, 'It is only by a similitude that we say that something happens well or badly for entities of this sort.' Second, because every friendship is based upon some sharing of life; for, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 8, nothing is so proper to friendship as sharing one another's lives. But non-rational creatures cannot share in human life, which has to do with reason (quae est secundum rationem). Hence, no friendship can be had with non-rational creatures—except, perhaps, metaphorically (nisi forte secundum metaphoram). The third [main] reason is proper to charity. For charity is based upon the sharing of eternal beatitude, which a non-rational creature is not capable of. Hence, the friendship of charity cannot be had with a non-rational creature.

Still, non-rational creatures can be loved out of charity as goods which we will for others, viz., insofar as out of charity we will them to be conserved for the honor of God and for their usefulness to men. And this is likewise the sense in which God loves them out of charity. Reply to objection 1: The response to the first objection is clear from this. Reply to objection 2: The similitude of a vestige does not cause the capacity for eternal life in the way that the similitude of an image does. Hence, the arguments are not parallel. Reply to objection 3: Faith can extend to all things that are in any way true. But the friendship of charity extends only to those things that are apt to have eternal life. And so the arguments are not parallel. ## Article 4 Does a man love himself out of charity It seems that a man does not love himself out of charity: Objection 1: In a certain homily Gregory says, 'Charity cannot be had between fewer than two individuals.' Therefore, no one has charity with respect to himself. Objection 2: As is clear from Ethics 8, friendship by its nature implies reciprocal love and equality, which are not possible for a man with respect to himself. But as has been explained, charity is a certain sort of friendship. Therefore, it cannot be the case that someone has charity with respect to himself. Objection 3: What belongs to charity cannot be blameworthy, since, as 1 Corinthians 13:4 says, charity does not do wrong. But to love oneself is blameworthy, since 2 Timothy 3:1-2 says, 'In the last days dangerous times will come, and men will be lovers of self.' Therefore, a man cannot love himself out of charity. But contrary to this: Leviticus 19:18 says, 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.' But we love our friend out of charity. Therefore, we should also love ourselves out of charity.

I respond: Since, as has been explained (q. 23, a. 1), charity is a certain sort of friendship, there are two possible ways in which we can talk about charity: (a) in one way, under the common notion of friendship. And on this score we should say that, properly speaking, what is had with respect to oneself is not friendship, but something greater than friendship. For friendship implies a certain type of union—for instance, Dionysius says, 'Love is a unitive virtue'—whereas what each individual has with respect to himself is unity, which is stronger than union. Hence, just as unity is a principle of union, so the love by which one loves himself is the form and root of friendship, since we have friendship with respect to others by the fact that we relate to them as we relate to ourselves. For Ethics 9 says, 'The friendly regard (amicabilia) directed toward the other comes from the friendly regard that is directed toward oneself.' In the same way, with respect to principles one does not have knowledge (scientia) but instead has something greater, viz., understanding (intellectus). Part 2-2, Question 25 179 (b) In a second way, we can speak of charity as regards its proper notion, viz., insofar as it is the friendship of a man mainly with respect to God and, consequently, with respect to the things that belong to God. Among those things is included the man himself who has charity. And so among the other things that he loves out of charity as belonging to God, he loves even himself out of charity. Reply to objection 1: Gregory is talking about charity under the common notion of friendship. Reply to objection 2: On this same interpretation, the second argument goes through. Reply to objection 3: Those who love themselves are blamed insofar as they love themselves with respect to their sentient nature, which they conform to. But this is not to love oneself truly with respect to one's rational nature, i.e., in such a way that one loves those goods that contribute to the perfection of reason. And it is in this latter sense that loving oneself belongs mainly to charity. ## Article 5 Should a man love his own body out of charity

It seems that a man should not love his own body out of charity: Objection 1: We do not love what we do not will to share a common life with. But men who have charity flee from association with the body—this according to Romans 7:24 ('Who will free me from the body of this death?') and according to Philippians 1:23 ('... having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ'). Therefore, our body is not to be loved out of charity. Objection 2: The friendship of charity is based upon a sharing in the enjoyment of God. But our body cannot participate in this enjoyment. Therefore, our body is not to be loved out of charity. Objection 3: Since charity is a certain sort of friendship, it is directed toward those who can reciprocate our love. But our body cannot love us out of charity. Therefore, it is not to be loved out of charity. But contrary to this: In De Doctrina Christiana 1 Augustine claims that four things are to be loved out of charity, and included among them is one's own body. I respond: There are two ways in which our body can be thought of: (a) with respect to its nature and (b) with respect to the corruption of sin and punishment. Now the nature of our body comes not from any created evil principle, as the Manicheans imagine, but from God. Hence, [we] can use it in the service of God—this according to Romans 6:13 ('Present your members to God as instruments of justice'). And so out of the love of charity, by which we love God, we should likewise love our own body. On the other hand, we should not love the infection of sin and the corruption of punishment in our body, but should instead strive for their removal. Reply to objection 1: The Apostle did not flee from association with the body as regards the body's nature; in fact, in this regard he did not want to be deprived of it—this according to 2 Corinthians 5:4 ('We wish not to be unclothed, but to be overclothed'). But he did wish to lack the infection of excessive desire (volebat carere infectione concupiscentiae), which remains in the body, and its corruption, which prevents the soul from being able to see God. This is why he explicitly says '... from the body of this death.' Reply to objection 2: Even though our body cannot enjoy God by knowing and

loving Him, nonetheless, through the works that we do with our body we can attain the perfect enjoyment of God. Hence, a certain sort of beatitude redounds upon the body from the soul's enjoyment, viz., 'the strength (vigor) of health and incorruption,' as Augustine puts it in his letter to Dioscorus. And so since the body in some sense participates in beatitude, it can be loved with the love of charity. Part 2-2, Question 25 180 Reply to objection 3: Reciprocal love has a place in the friendship that is with respect to another, but not in the friendship that one has with respect to himself, as regards either the soul or the body. ## Article 6 Are sinners to be loved out of charity It seems that sinners are not to be loved out of charity: Objection 1: Psalm 118:113 says, 'I have hated the wicked.' But David had charity. Therefore, sinners are more to be hated out of charity than loved out of charity. Objection 2: As Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost, 'The proof of love is in the exhibiting of the deed.' But the just do not exhibit deeds of love to sinners, but instead they seem to exhibit deeds of hatred—this according to Psalm 100:8 ('In the morning I put to death all the sinners of the land'). And in Exodus 22:18 the Lord commanded, 'Do not allow the evildoers to live.' Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity. Objection 3: It belongs to friendship that we will and desire good things for our friends. But out of charity the saints desire evil things for sinners—this according to Psalm 9:18 ('Let the wicked be turned to Hell'). Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity. Objection 4: It is proper to friends to rejoice over the same things and to will the same things. But charity does not make one will what sinners will; nor does it make one rejoice over what sinners rejoice over. Rather, it brings about just the opposite of this. Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity. Objection 5: As Ethics 8 says, it is proper to friends to share their lives. But one

should not share his life with sinners—this according to 2 Corinthians 6:17 ('Withdraw from their presence'). Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity. But contrary to this: In De Doctrina Christiana 1 Augustine says, 'When it is said, ‘Love your neighbor', it is clear that every man is to be counted as a neighbor.' But sinners do not cease to be men, since sin does not destroy their nature. Therefore, sinners are to be loved out of charity. I respond: There are two things to think about in the case of sinners, viz., (a) their nature and (b) their sin. As regards their nature, which they have from God, they are capable of beatitude and, as was explained above (q. 23, aa. 1 and 5), charity is based upon the sharing of beatitude. And so, as regards their nature, they are to be loved out of charity. By contrast, their sin is opposed to God and is an obstacle to beatitude. Hence, with respect to their [their] sin, by which they are opposed to God, every sinner is to be hated—even, as Luke 14:26 has it, one's father and mother and relatives. For in the case of sinners we ought to hate the fact that they are sinners and love the fact that they are men capable of beatitude. And this is what it is to truly love them out of charity because of God. Reply to objection 1: The prophet hated the wicked insofar as they are wicked, hating their iniquity, i.e., their evil. And this is the perfect hatred of which he says, 'I have hated them with a perfect hatred.' Now hating someone's evil is of a piece with loving his good. Hence, this perfect hatred likewise belongs to charity. Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says in Ethics 9, the benefits of friendship are not to be withheld from friends who are sinners as long as there is hope of their being cured; instead, they are to be assisted in recovering their virtue more than in recovering their money if they have lost it, inasmuch as virtue is more closely related to friendship than money is. However, when they fall into very great wickedness and become incurable, then the familiarity of Part 2-2, Question 25 181 friendship should not be accorded them. And that is why sinners of this sort, from whom harm to others is more to be expected than a mending of their ways, are ordered to be put to death according to both divine law and human law. Yet a judge

does this not out of hatred of them, but out of the love of charity by which the public good is preferred to an individual person's life. Still, death imposed by a judge benefits the sinner—whether he is converted, in which case his sin is expiated, or not converted, in which case his sinning is terminated, since through his death the power to sin further is removed from him. Reply to objection 3: There are three possible ways to understand imprecations of this sort that are found in Sacred Scripture: (a) as predictions rather than desires, so that the meaning is, 'Let the sinners depart for Hell,' i.e., they will depart for Hell. (b) as desires, but in such a way that the desire of the one who wishes it is referred back not to the punishment of the men, but to the justice of the punisher—this according to Psalm 57:11 ('The just man will rejoice when he sees the vindication'). For as Wisdom 1:13 says, God Himself, who does the punishing, likewise 'does not rejoice in the destruction of the wicked,' but rejoices instead in His justice, since 'the Lord is just and has loved justice' (Psalm 10:8). (c) as desires that are referred back to the removal of the sin and not to the punishment itself—viz., so that the desire is that the sins should be destroyed and the men remain. Reply to objection 4: We love sinners out of charity not in order that we might will what they themselves will or in order that we might rejoice over what they themselves rejoice over, but in order that we might bring it about that they will what we will and rejoice over what we rejoice over. Hence, Jeremiah 15:19 says, 'They will be turned to you (convertentur ad te), and you will not be turned to them.' Reply to objection 5: Living together with sinners is indeed to be avoided by the weak because of the danger that threatens them of being subverted by the sinners. However, for the perfect, whose corruption is not a matter of concern, it is praiseworthy to have commerce with sinners, so that they might convert them. For as Matthew 9:11-13 relates, our Lord ate and drank with sinners in this way. Still, the company of sinners is to be avoided by everyone as far as association in their sin is concerned. And this is why 2 Corinthians 6:17 says, 'Withdraw from their midst and do not touch the unclean,' viz., by consenting to their sin. ## Article 7 Do sinners love themselves It seems that sinners love themselves:

Objection 1: The source (principium) of sin is found especially in sinners. But love of self is the source of sin; for in De Civitate Dei 14 Augustine says, 'It builds up the city of Babylon.' Therefore, sinners especially love themselves. Objection 2: Sin does not destroy one's nature. But it belongs to each thing by its nature to love itself; hence, even non-rational creatures naturally seek their own good, viz., the conservation of their being and other such things. Therefore, sinners love themselves. Objection 3: As Dionysius says in De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, the good is lovable to all things. But many sinners think of themselves as good. Therefore, many sinners love themselves. But contrary to this: Psalm 10:6 says, 'Whoever loves iniquity hates his own soul.' I respond: In one sense, loving oneself is common to everyone; in a second sense, it is proper to those who are good; and in a third sense, it is proper to those who are bad. For it is common to everyone that he loves what he takes himself to be. However, there are two ways in which a man is said to be something: Part 2-2, Question 25 182 In one way, according to his substance and nature. And on this score all men take it to be a general good that they are what they are, viz., composites of soul and body. And on this score all men, both good and bad, also love themselves insofar as they love the conservation of themselves. In the second way, a man is said to be something in accord with what is preeminent in him (secundum principalitatem), in the way that the ruler of a city is said to be the city, so that what the ruler does, the city is said to do. Now in this sense not everyone thinks himself to be what he in fact is. For the principal thing in a man is his rational mind, whereas what is secondary in him is his sentient and corporeal nature. As is clear from 2 Corinthians 4:16, the Apostle calls the first of these the ‘interior man' and the second the ‘exterior man'. Now good men think that what is preeminent in them is the rational nature or interior man, and hence they think themselves to be what they in fact are. By contrast, bad men think that what is predominant in them is the sentient and corporeal nature, viz., the exterior man.

Hence, not having a correct understanding of themselves, they do not truly love themselves, but instead love what they take themselves to be. Good men, on the other hand, having a correct understanding of themselves, truly love themselves. The Philosopher proves this in Ethics 9 by reference to five things that are proper to friendship. For, first of all, each friend wills that his friend exist and live; second, he wills goods for him; third, he does good things to him; fourth, he finds it pleasant to live with him; fifth, he is in agreement with him, taking pleasure in the same things and being pained by the same things. Accordingly, good men love themselves with respect to the interior man, since they will the interior man to be preserved in his integrity; and it is pleasant for them to enter into their own heart, since they find there good thoughts in the present, the memory of good things in the past, and the hope of future goods—and pleasure is caused by all of these. Similarly, good men do not suffer dissension of the will within themselves, since their whole soul tends in a single direction (tendit in unum). By contrast, bad men do not will that the integrity of the interior man should be preserved. Nor do they desire the spiritual goods of the interior man or act for this end. Nor is it pleasant for them to live with themselves by entering into their own heart, since they find there bad things—present, past, and future—which they abhor. Nor, because of their tormenting conscience, do they agree with themselves —this according to Psalm 49:21 ('I will reprove you and stand firm against your face'). And by these same things it can be proved that bad men love themselves with respect to the corruption of the exterior man. But this is not the way in which good men love themselves. Reply to objection 1: As is explained in the same place, the love of self which is the source of sin is the sort of love which is proper to bad men and which ends up in contempt for God. For bad men desire exterior goods in such a way that they disdain spiritual goods. Reply to objection 2: Even if natural love is not totally removed from bad men, it is nonetheless perverted in them in the way already explained. Reply to objection 3: Insofar as bad men take themselves to be good, they have some participation in love of self. Still, this is only apparent love of self and not

genuine love of self. Still, even this sort of love is not possible in those who are extremely bad. ## Article 8 Is it necessary for one's enemies to be loved out of charity It seems not to be necessary for one's enemies to be loved out of charity: Objection 1: In Enchiridion 73 Augustine says, 'So great a degree of goodness,' viz., to love one's enemies, 'does not belong to such a great multitude as we believe are heard when, in prayer, they say, ‘Forgive us our trespasses'.' Part 2-2, Question 25 183 But no one's sin is forgiven without charity, since, as Proverbs 10:12 says, 'Charity covers all sins.' Therefore, it is not necessary for one's enemies to be loved out of charity. Objection 2: Charity does not destroy one's nature. But every entity, even non-rational ones, naturally hate their contrary, in the way that the sheep hates the wolf and that water hates fire. Therefore, charity does not bring it about that one's enemies are loved. Objection 3: Charity does not do wrong. But it seems perverse that one should love his enemies, just as it seems perverse that one should hate his friends. Hence, in 2 Kings 19:6 Joab reproaches David saying, 'You love those who hate you and hate those who love you.' Therefore, charity does not bring it about that one's enemies are loved. But contrary to this: In Matthew 5:44 our Lord says, 'Love your enemies.' I respond: There are three possible ways to think of love of one's enemies: First, that one's enemies are loved insofar as they are enemies. This is perverse and contrary to charity, since it is to love what is bad in the other person. In the second way, love of one's enemies can be understood as directed toward the nature, but in general. And love of one's enemies in this sense necessarily belongs to charity (est de necessitate caritatis), so that, namely, one who loves God and

neighbor does not exclude his enemies from the general love of one's neighbor (ab illa generalitate dilectionis proximi). In the third way, love of one's enemies can be thought of specifically (in speciali), in the sense that one is moved by a movement of love specifically toward an enemy (in speciali ... ad inimicum). And this does not belong to charity with absolute necessity (non est de necessitate caritatis absolute), since to be moved with a movement of love specifically toward any given me[a]n individually likewise does not belong to charity with necessity; for this would be impossible. Yet it does indeed belong to charity with necessity as regards one's being mentally prepared (secundum praeparationem animi)—so that, namely, a man has a mind ready to love a particular enemy if the necessity arises. However, it belongs to the perfection of charity that a man should, in addition, actually accomplish loving his enemy for the sake of God outside of a time of necessity. For since one's neighbor is loved out of charity for the sake of God, to the extent that someone loves God more, he will also show more love to his neighbor without any enmity hindering him—just as, if someone loves a man more, he will love that man's children even if they are unfriendly to him. And this is what Augustine is talking about. Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is thus clear. Reply to objection 2: Each entity naturally hates what is contrary to itself insofar as it is contrary, and enemies are contrary to us insofar as they are enemies. Hence, we ought to hate this in them, since it ought to displease us that they are our enemies. But they are not contrary to us insofar as they are men and capable of beatitude. And on this score we ought to love them. Reply to objection 3: It is blameworthy to love our enemies insofar as they are enemies. And, as has been explained, charity does not do this. ## Article 9 Does it necessarily belong to charity that a man should show the signs or effects of love to his enemy It seems that it necessarily belongs to charity that a man should show the signs or effects of love to his enemy:

Objection 1: 1 John 3:18 says, 'Let us love not in word or in speech, but in deed and in truth.' But one loves in deed by showing to the one loved the signs and effects of love. Therefore, it necessarily belongs to charity that one show signs and effects of this sort to one's enemies. Part 2-2, Question 25 184 Objection 2: In Matthew 5:44 says 'Love your enemies' along with 'Do good to those who hate you.' But loving one's enemies necessarily belongs to charity. Therefore, so does doing good to one's enemies. Objection 3: By charity one loves not only God, but also his neighbor. But in a homily for Pentecost Gregory says, 'The love of God cannot be idle, since it does great things if it exists. If it ceases to operate, it is not love.' Therefore, charity that is had with respect to one's neighbor cannot exist without the effects of its operation. But it necessarily belongs to charity that every neighbor is loved, even one's enemy. Therefore, it necessarily belongs to charity that we should extend the signs and effects of love to our enemies. But contrary to this: A Gloss on Matthew 5:44 ('Do good to those who hate you') says, 'To do good to one's enemies is the summit of charity. But what belongs to the perfection of charity does not belong to it with necessity. Therefore, showing the signs and effects of love to one's enemies does not belong to charity with necessity. I respond: The effects and signs of charity proceed from an interior act of love (ex interiori dilectione) and are proportioned to it. And as was explained above (a. 8), an interior act of love for one's enemy in general falls under the necessity of a precept absolutely speaking, whereas an interior act of love specifically for one's enemy falls under the necessity of a precept not absolutely speaking, but rather as regards one's being mentally prepared for it. The same thing, then, should be said about showing an effect or sign of love exteriorly. For there are certain works and signs of love (beneficia et signa dilectionis) which are shown to our neighbors in general—for instance, when one prays for all the faithful or for the whole people, or when one bestows a favor on the whole community. And it falls under the necessity of precept to show such acts or signs of love to one's enemies, since if they were not shown to one's enemies, this would

smack of the ill-will of vindictiveness—contrary to what is said in Leviticus 19:18 ('Do not seek revenge; and do not hold in memory the injuries wrought by your fellow citizens'). By contrast, there are other works or signs of love that one shows to particular persons. And showing such acts or signs of love to one's enemies is not necessary for salvation except with respect to being mentally prepared to come to their assistance in time of necessity—this according to Proverbs 25:21 ('If your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is thirsty, give him drink') But for someone to show good works of this sort to his enemies outside of a time of necessity belongs to the perfection of charity, through which one is not only wary of being conquered by evil, which belongs to necessity, but also wills to conquer evil with good, which belongs to perfection—that is, as long as he is not only wary of being dragged down into hatred because of the injury inflicted on him, but also intends by his own good works to draw his enemy toward loving him. Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from this. ## Article 10 Do we have to love the angels out of charity It seems that we do not have to love the angels out of charity: Objection 1: In De Doctrina Christiana 1, Augustine says, 'The love of charity is twofold, viz., love of God and love of neighbor.' But love of the angels is not contained under love of God, since the angels are created substances. Nor does love of the angels seem to be contained under love of neighbor, since they do not share the same species with us. Therefore, it is not the case that the angels are to be loved out of charity. Part 2-2, Question 25 185 Objection 2: Brute animals have more in common with us than do the angels, since we and the brute animals are in the same proximate genus. But as was explained above (a. 3), we do not have charity with respect to the brute animals. Therefore, neither do we have charity with respect to the angels.

Objection 3: As Ethics 8 explains, nothing is more proper to friends than to share their lives (convivere). But angels do not share their lives with us, and we cannot even see them. Therefore, we are unable to have the friendship of charity with respect to them. But contrary to this: In De Doctrina Christiana 1 Augustine says, 'Now if anyone to whom we are bound to offer a favor of mercy or who is bound to offer a favor of mercy to us is correctly called our neighbor, then it is clear that the holy angels, from whom we receive many favors of mercy, are also included under the precept by which we are commanded to love our neighbor. I respond: As was explained above (q. 23. a. 1), the friendship of charity is based upon the sharing of eternal beatitude, participation in which men share with the angels. For Matthew 22:30 says, 'In the resurrection men will be like the angels in heaven.' And so it is clear that the friendship of charity extends to the angels as well. Reply to objection 1: Someone is called a ‘neighbor' not only because of sharing a species but also because of sharing in the blessings that pertain to eternal beatitude. For it is upon this sort of sharing that the friendship of charity is based. Reply to objection 2: Brute animals agree with us in a proximate genus by reason of their sentient nature. But we participate in eternal beatitude not by reason of our sentient nature, but by reason of our rational mind, which we share in common with the angels. Reply to objection 3: Angels do not share their life with us by exterior intercourse, which belongs to us in accord with our sentient nature. However, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), we share our life with the angels by our minds—imperfectly, to be sure, in this life, but perfectly in heaven. ## Article 11 Do we have to love the demons out of charity It seems that we have to love the demons out of charity: Objection 1: The angels are neighbors to us insofar as we share our lives with them in our rational mind. But the demons also share their lives with us in this way,

since, as is explained in De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, their natural gifts remain undiminished—viz., their being (esse), their life (vivere), and their understanding (intelligire). Therefore, we have to love the demons out of charity. Objection 2: The demons differ from the blessed angels by the difference sin, in the same way that men who are sinners differ from just men. But just men love men who are sinners out of charity. Therefore, they likewise have to love the demons out of charity. Objection 3: As is clear from the passage from Augustine adduced above (a. 9), those by whom we are given favors ought to be loved by us out of charity as neighbors. But as Augustine points out in De Civitate Dei 11, the demons are useful to us in many ways, since 'by tempting us they fashion crowns for us.' Therefore, the demons are to be loved out of charity. But contrary to this: Isaiah 28:18 says, 'Your covenant with death shall be abolished, and your pact with hell shall not stand.' But the perfection of a covenant and a pact comes through charity. Therefore, it is not the case that we have to have charity with respect to the demons, who are the inhabitants of Hell and the overseers of death. I respond: As was explained above (a. 6), in the case of sinners we have to love their nature out of charity and hate their sin out of charity. Now the name ‘demon' signifies a nature deformed by sin. And so the demons are not to be loved out of charity. Part 2-2, Question 25 186 However, if this meaning is not given to the name, and the question is instead referred to those spirits who are called demons, whether they are to be loved out of charity, then one should reply, in accord with what was said above (a. 2), that there are two ways in which something is loved out of charity: In one way, as someone with whom friendship is had. And on this score we cannot have the friendship of charity with those spirits. For it belongs to the nature of friendship that we will the good for our friends. But we cannot will out of charity the good of eternal life, which charity has to do with, for those spirits who have been damned for eternity by God. For this would be incompatible with charity for God, through which we give our approval to His justice. In the second way, something is loved as that which we will to endure as the

other's good. As was explained above (a. 3), this is the way in which we love non-rational animals out of charity insofar as we will them to endure for the glory of God and for their usefulness to men. And it is in this way, too, that we can love the demons out of charity, viz., insofar as we will those spirits to be conserved with their natural gifts for the glory of God. Reply to objection 1: It is not impossible for the mind of the angels to have eternal beatitude, in the way that this is impossible for the mind of the demons. And so the friendship of charity, which is based upon the sharing of eternal life rather than upon the sharing of a nature, is had with the angels but not with the demons. Reply to objection 2: Men who are sinners in this life have the possibility of attaining eternal beatitude. This possibility is not had by those men who are damned in Hell; on this score, the line of reasoning is the same for these men as it is for the demons. Reply to objection 3: The usefulness that accrues to us from the demons derives not from their own intention but from the ordering of divine providence. And so we are not induced by this usefulness to have friendship with them; instead, we are induced to be friends of God, who turns their perverse intention to our advantage. ## Article 12 Are the things to be loved by us out of charity correctly enumerated as these four: God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves It seems that the things to be loved by us out of charity are not correctly enumerated as these four: God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves: Objection 1: As Augustine says in Super Ioannem, 'Anyone who does not love God does not love himself, either.' Therefore, the love of oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore, it is not the case that the love of oneself is one thing and the love of God another thing. Objection 2: A part ought not to be divided over against its whole. But our body is a certain part of ourselves. Therefore, our body ought not to be divided, as another lovable thing, from ourselves. Objection 3: Just as we have a body, so, too, does our neighbor. Therefore, just as

the love by which one loves his neighbor is distinct from the love by which he loves himself, so, too, the love by which one loves his neighbor's body is distinct from the love by which he loves his own body. Therefore, the four things to be loved out of charity are not appropriately distinguished. But contrary to this: In De Doctrina Christiana Augustine says, 'There are four things to be loved: one which is above us,' viz., God; 'another which we ourselves are; a third which is next to us,' viz., our neighbor; 'and a fourth which is below us,' viz., our own body. I respond: As has been explained (q. 23, a. 1), the friendship of charity is based upon the sharing of beatitude. Part 2-2, Question 25 187 In this sharing, there is one thing that is thought of as the source who pours forth beatitude, viz., God; there is a second thing that directly participates in beatitude, viz., the man or the angel; and there is a third thing into which beatitude streams through a certain sort of overflow, viz., the human body. That which pours fourth beatitude is for that reason lovable, since He is the cause of beatitude. That which participates in beatitude can be lovable for two reasons, either because he is identical with ourselves or because he is joined to us in participating in beatitude—and on this score there are two things lovable out of charity, viz., insofar as a man loves both himself and his neighbor. Reply to objection 1: The different relations of the lover to different lovable things makes for the diverse character of lovability. Accordingly, since the relation that a man who loves has to God is different from the relation that he has to himself, two lovable things are posited; for the love of the one is a cause of the love of the other. This is why when the one is removed, the other is removed. Reply to objection 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind, which can be capable of beatitude, whereas the body does not directly attain to beatitude, but instead attains to it only through a sort of overflow. And so in accord with his rational mind, which is the principal thing in man, a man loves himself out of charity in a way different from the way in which he loves his own body.

Reply to objection 3: A man loves his neighbor both with respect to his soul and with respect to his body by reason of a certain fellowship in beatitude. And so in the case of one's neighbor the love has a single character. Hence, our neighbor's body is not posited as a special lovable thing. ### QUESTION 26 The Order of Charity We next have to consider the order of charity. And on this topic there are thirteen questions: (1) Is there an order of charity? (2) Should a man love God more than his neighbor? (3) Should a man love God more than himself? (4) Should a man love himself more than his neighbor? (5) Should a man love his neighbor more than his own body? (6) Should a man love one neighbor more than another? (7) Should a man love a better neighbor more than someone connected with himself? (8) Should a man love someone connected with him as a blood relative more than someone connected with him by other close ties? (9) Should a man love his children more than his parents out of charity? (10) Should a man love his mother more than his father? (11) Should a man love his wife more than his father or mother? (12) Should a man love his benefactor more than his beneficiary? (13) Does the order of charity remain in heaven? ## Article 1 Is there an order of charity It seems that there is not an order of charity: Objection 1: Charity is a certain virtue. But in the case of the other virtues there is no assigned order. Therefore, neither is there any assigned order in the case of charity. Objection 2: Just as the object of faith is the first truth, so the object of charity is the highest good. But no order is posited in the case of faith; rather all things are believed equally. Therefore, neither should any order be posited in the case of charity.

Objection 3: Charity exists in the will. But it is reason that orders, and not the will. Therefore, no order should be attributed to charity. But contrary to this: Canticle of Canticles 2 says, 'He brought me into the wine cellar; he gave order to the charity within me.' I respond: As the Philosopher explains in Metaphysics 5, 'before' (prius) and 'after' (posterius) are said in relation to some principle. But an ordering includes within itself some sort of 'before' and 'after'. Hence, wherever there is a principle, there must also be an ordering. Now it was explained above (q. 23, a. 1 and q. 25, a. 12) that the love of charity tends toward God as the principle of beatitude and that the friendship of charity is based upon the sharing of beatitude. And so among the things that are loved out of charity there has to be an ordering according to their relation to the first principle of this love, i.e., God. Reply to objection 1: Charity tends toward the ultimate end under the character ultimate end and, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 6), this feature does not belong to any other virtue. But as was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 1) the end has the nature of a principle among things that are desirable and doable. And so charity especially implies a relation to the first principle. And so in the case of charity the ordering is thought about most of all in relation to the first principle. Reply to objection 2: Faith belongs to a cognitive power whose operation exists insofar as the things known exist in the knower (res cognitae sunt in cognoscente). By contrast, charity exists in an appetitive power whose operation consists in the soul's tending toward the things themselves. Now an ordering is more chiefly found in the things themselves, and it flows from them to our cognition. And this is why an ordering is more appropriate for charity than for faith. Still, there is an ordering in the case of faith as well, insofar as faith is principally about God, whereas it is secondarily about the other things that are referred back to God. Reply to objection 3: An order belongs to reason insofar as it is reason that does the ordering, but it belongs to the appetitive power insofar as it is the appetitive power that is ordered. And it is in this latter way that an order is posited in the case of charity.

Part 2-2, Question 26 189 ## Article 2 Is God to be loved more than one's neighbor It seems that God is not to be loved more than one's neighbor: Objection 1: 1 John 4:20 says, 'If one does not love his brother, whom he sees, then how can he love God, whom he does not see?' From this it seems that what is more visible is more lovable, since, as Ethics 9 says, seeing is the beginning of love (principium amoris). But God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore, He is also less lovable by charity. Objection 2: Similarity is a cause of love—this according to Ecclesiasticus 13:19 ('Every animal loves its like'). But the similarity of a man to his neighbor is greater than his similarity to God. Therefore, a man loves his neighbor out of charity more than God. Objection 3: As is clear from Augustine in De Doctrina Christiana 1, what one loves in his neighbor is God. But God does not exist more in Himself than in one's neighbor. Therefore, it is not the case that God ought to be loved more than one's neighbor. But contrary to this: What is to be loved more is such that certain things are to be hated because of it. But neighbors are to be hated because of God, viz., if they lead one away from God—this according to Luke 14:26 ('If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, then he cannot be my disciple'). Therefore, God is to be loved out of charity more than one's neighbor. I respond: A friendship has to do mainly with that thing wherein is principally found the good which is such that the friendship is based on the sharing of it. For instance, political friendship has to do mainly with the city's ruler, on whom the entire common good of the city depends; hence, it is likewise the case that trust and obedience are especially owed to him by the citizens. Now the friendship of charity is based upon the sharing of beatitude, which

consists essentially in God as the first principle from whom it flows into everyone who is capable of beatitude. And so it is God who is mainly and especially to be loved out of charity, whereas our neighbor is to be loved as one who participates along with us in beatitude from God. Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which something is a cause of love. In one way, as a reason for loving (ratio diligendi). And this is the way in which the good is a cause of love, since each thing is loved insofar as it has the character of goodness (rationem boni). In a second way, because it is a sort of path to acquiring an act of loving. And this is the way in which vision is a cause of love—not, to be sure, in such a way that something is lovable by reason of the fact that it is visible, but because it is through vision that we are led toward love. Therefore, it does not have to be the case that what is more visible is more lovable; instead, what is more visible occurs first for us to love. And this is the way the apostle argues. For since our neighbor is more visible to us, he appears first for us to love; as Gregory puts it in a certain homily, 'From the things that the mind knows it learns to love what is unknown.' Hence, if one does not love his neighbor, it can be argued that he will not love God, either—not because his neighbor is more lovable, but because he appeared first to be loved. However, God is more lovable because of His greater goodness. Reply to objection 2: The similarity that we have to God is prior to and a cause of the similarity that we have to our neighbor. For we are made similar to our neighbor because it is from God that we participate in that which our neighbor likewise has from Him. And so by reason of similarity we ought to love God more than our neighbor. Reply to objection 3: If we think of God's substance, then He is equal in everything in which He exists, since He is not diminished by the fact that He exists in a thing. Part 2-2, Question 26 190 But it is still not the case that our neighbor has God's goodness to the same degree (equaliter) that God has it. For God has goodness by His essence (essentialiter), whereas our neighbor has it by participation (participative). ## Article 3 Should a man love God out of charity more than himself

It seems not to be the case that a man should love God out of charity more than himself: Objection 1: In Ethics 9 the Philosopher says, 'The friendly regard (amicabilia) directed toward the other comes from the friendly regard that is directed toward oneself.' But a cause is more powerful than its effect. Therefore, the friendship of a man with himself is greater than his friendship with anyone else. Therefore, he should love himself more than God. Objection 2: Each thing is loved to the extent that it is one's own good. But the reason for loving is loved more than that which is loved for that reason—in the same way that principles, which are the reason for knowing, are themselves better known. Therefore, a man loves himself more than any other loved good. Therefore, it is not the case that he loves God more than himself. Objection 3: One enjoys God to the extent that he loves Him. But one loves himself to the extent that he loves enjoying God, since this is the highest good that anyone can will for himself. Therefore, it is not the case that one ought to love God out of charity more than himself. But contrary to this: In De Doctrina Christiana 1 Augustine says, 'If you ought to love even yourself not for your own sake but for the sake of Him in whom is found the most appropriate end of your love, then let no other man be irritated if you love him, too, for the sake of God.' But that for the sake of which a thing is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such (propter quod unumquodque, illud magis). Therefore, a man should love God more than himself. I respond: We are able to receive a twofold good from God, viz., (a) the good of nature and (b) the good of grace. Natural love is based upon the sharing (communicatio) of natural goods with us that is brought about by God. By this natural love it is not only man in the integrity of his nature that loves God above all things and more than himself, but every creature in its own way, i.e., by intellectual love or rational love or animal love or at least by natural love, as with rocks and other things that lack cognition. For every part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own proper particular good. This is evident from what it does (ex opere). For each part has its main inclination toward common action for the advantage of the whole. This is likewise apparent in the case of the political virtues, in accord with which citizens,

for the sake of the common good, sometimes sustain losses both to their own property and to their own persons. Hence, this is true a fortiori in the case of the friendship of charity, which is based upon a sharing in the gifts of grace. And so out of charity a man ought to love God, who is the common good of all things, more than himself, since beatitude exists in God as the common and originating principle of everyone who is able to participate in beatitude. Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is talking about friendly regard for another in whom the good that is the object of friendship is found in some particular mode, but not about friendly regard for another in whom this good is found with the character of the whole. Reply to objection 2: Each part loves the good of the whole insofar as it is appropriate for itself—not in such a way that it refers the good of the whole back to itself, but rather in such a way that it refers himself back to the good of the whole. Reply to objection 3: The fact that someone wills to enjoy God pertains to the love by which God is loved with the love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae). Part 2-2, Question 26 191 But we love God with the love of friendship (amor amicitiae) more than with the love of concupiscence, since the good of God is greater in itself than what we are able to participate in by enjoying Him. And so, absolutely speaking, a man loves God out of charity more than himself. ## Article 4 Should a man love himself out of charity more than his neighbor It seems not to be the case that a man should love himself out of charity more than his neighbor: Objection 1: As was explained above (a. 2), the main object of charity is God. But sometimes a man has a neighbor who is more closely joined to God than he

himself is. Therefore, one ought to love such a neighbor more than himself. Objection 2: The more we love someone, the more we avoid what is detrimental to him. But out of charity a man suffers what is detrimental to himself for the good of his neighbor (pro proximo)—this according to Proverbs 12:26 ('A man who disregards harm to himself for the sake of his friend is just'). Objection 3: 1 Corinthians 13:5 says that charity 'does not seek what belongs to it.' But we especially love someone whose good we seek to the highest degree. Therefore, it is not the case that out of charity a man loves himself more than his neighbor. But contrary to this: Leviticus 19:18 and Matthew 22:39 say, 'Love your neighbor as yourself.' From this it seems that a man's love for himself is, as it were, the exemplar of the love which he has for another. But the exemplar is better than what it is an exemplar of. Therefore, a man ought to love himself out of charity more than his neighbor. I respond: There are two things in a man, viz., (a) his spiritual nature and (b) his corporeal nature. As was explained above (q. 25, a. 7), a man is said to love himself by the fact that he loves himself in accord with his spiritual nature. And on this score, after God, a man should love himself more than anyone else. This is clear from the very nature of loving. For as was explained above (a. 2), God is loved as the source of the good that the love of charity is based upon. And a man loves himself out of charity by reason of the fact that he participates in that good, whereas his neighbor is loved by reason of their fellowship in that good. Now the fellowship is a reason for loving as regards a certain sort of union in relation to God. Hence, just as unity is [more] strong[er] than union, so, too, a man's own participation in the divine good is a stronger reason for him to love than is another's being associated with him in this participation. And so a man ought to love himself out of charity more than his neighbor. An indication of this is that a man should not [to] undertake sinful evil that is contrary to his own participation in beatitude in order to free his neighbor from sin. Reply to objection 1: The love of charity has quantity not only on the part of its

object, which is God, but also on the part of the one who loves, i.e., the man himself who has charity—just as the quantity of any action depends in some way on the subject itself. And so even if a better neighbor is closer to God, nonetheless, since he is not as close to the one who has charity as the latter is to himself, it does not follow that anyone ought to love his neighbor more than himself. Reply to objection 2: A man ought to suffer bodily detriment for the sake of his friend, and in this very way he is loving himself with respect to his spiritual mind. For this pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of the mind. By contrast, as has already been explained, in spiritual matters it is not the case that a man should suffer what is detrimental, viz., by sinning, in order that he might free his neighbor from sin. Reply to objection 3: In Regula Augustine says, 'When it is said, ‘Charity does not seek what belongs to it,' this should be understood to mean that charity places what is held in common ahead of what is private.' Part 2-2, Question 26 192 But it is always the case that the common good is more lovable to each individual than his own private good—in the same way that, as has been explained (a. 3), the good of the whole is more lovable to each part than the partial good that belongs to it itself. ## Article 5 Should a man love his neighbor more than his own body It seems not to be the case that a man should love his neighbor more than his own body: Objection 1: Our neighbor's body is understood in our notion of our neighbor. Therefore, if a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body, then it follows that he should love his neighbor's body more than his own body. Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 4), a man loves his own soul more than his neighbor. But our own body is closer to our soul than our neighbor is. Therefore, we ought to love our own body more than our neighbor.

Objection 3: Everyone exposes what he loves less to risk before he exposes what he loves more to risk. But not every man is obligated to expose his own body to risk for his neighbor's safety; rather, that is something that perfect individuals do—this according to John 15:13 ('Greater charity no one has than to lay down his life (anima) for his friends'). Therefore, a man is not obligated to love his neighbor more out of charity than his own body. But contrary to this: In De Doctrina Christiana 1 Augustine says, 'We ought to love our neighbor more than our own body.' I respond: As has been explained (aa. 2 and 4), what is to be loved more out of charity is that which has more of the character of what is lovable out of charity. Now fellowship in full participation in beatitude, which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a stronger reason for loving than is participation in beatitude by way of overflow, which is the reason for loving our own body. And so, out of charity, we ought to love our neighbor, as regards the salvation of his soul, more than our own body. Reply to objection 1: According to the Philosopher in Ethics 9, each thing seems to be what is preeminent in it (praecipuum in ipso). When it is claimed that our neighbor is to be loved more than our own body, this is understood to have to do with his soul, which is the more important part of him. Reply to objection 2: It is with respect to the constitution of our nature that our body is closer to our own soul than our neighbor is. But with respect to participation in beatitude, the fellowship of our neighbor's soul with our soul is even greater than the fellowship of our own body with our soul. Reply to objection 3: Taking care of his own body is of concern to every man, but taking care of his neighbor's safety is not of concern to every man, except perhaps in an emergency. And so there is no necessity of charity that a man expose his own body to risk for his neighbor's safety, except in cases in which he is obligated to provide for his neighbor's safety. Rather, it pertains to the perfection of charity that someone should of his own accord offer himself for this. ## Article 6 Should one neighbor be loved more than another

It seems not to be the case that one neighbor should be loved more than another: Objection 1: In De Doctrina Christiana 1 Augustine says, 'All men are equally to be loved. But since you are unable to do good to all of them, you have to take into account especially those who, given the circumstances of time and place and other such things, are more closely connected with you, as it were, by happenstance.' Therefore, it is not the case that one neighbor is to be loved more than another. Part 2-2, Question 26 193 Objection 2: Where the reason for loving different individuals is one and the same, then the love should not be unequal. But as is clear from Augustine in De Doctrina Christiana 1, there is a single reason for loving all our neighbors, viz., God. Therefore, we ought to love all our neighbors equally. Objection 3: As is clear from the Philosopher in Rhetoric 2, to love is to will the good for someone. But we will an equal good for all our neighbors, viz., eternal life. Therefore, we should love all our neighbors equally. But contrary to this: Someone should be loved more to the extent that one who acts contrary to loving him sins more grievously. But one who acts contrary to the love of certain neighbors sins more grievously than one who acts contrary to the love of other neighbors. Hence, Leviticus 20:9 commands, 'Let whoever curses his father or mother die the death'—which is not commanded in the case of those who curse other men. Therefore, some of our neighbors are such that we ought to love them more than others. I respond: On this matter there are two opinions. Some have asserted that all neighbors are to be loved equally out of charity as regards affection, but not as regards exterior effects. They say that the ordering of love must be understood as having to do with exterior good works, which we ought to confer more on those who are close to us than on strangers, but not as having to do with interior affection, which we should confer equally on all, even our enemies. However, this claim is unreasonable. For the affections that belong to charity, which is an inclination of grace, are no less ordered than those that belong to natural appetite, which is an inclination of nature, since both inclinations proceed from God's wisdom. Now we see in the case of natural things that a natural

inclination is proportioned to an act or movement that befits the nature of the thing; for instance, earth has a greater inclination of gravity than water has, since it belongs to earth to exist below water. Therefore, it must be the case that the inclination of grace, i.e., the affection of charity, is likewise proportioned to what is to be done externally—so that, namely, we have a more intense affection of charity toward those to whom it is more fitting for us to be beneficent. And so one should reply that even with respect to affection it is necessary to love one of our neighbors more than another. And the reason is that since the principle of love is (a) God along with (b) the one who is himself doing the loving (ipse diligens), it must be the case that the affection of love (dilectionis affectus) is greater in proportion to a greater proximity to one or the other of these principles. For as was explained above (a. 1), in everything in which a principle is found, the ordering has to do with the relation to that principle. Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which love can be unequal. In one way, on the part of the good that we wish for our friend. And in this regard, we love every man equally out of charity, since we wish for all of them the same generic good, viz., eternal beatitude. In the second way, love is called greater because of a more intense act of loving. And in this regard, it is not necessary to love all men equally. An alternative reply is that there are two ways in which love can be had unequally with respect to certain individuals. In one way, from the fact that some individuals are loved and others are not loved. And it is necessary to preserve this sort of inequality as regards good deeds (in beneficentia), because we cannot do good to everyone. However, this sort of inequality of love should not be had as regards good will (in benevolentia). The other sort of inequality of love stems from the fact that some are loved more than others. Therefore, Augustine intends to exclude the first sort of inequality and not this second sort, as is clear from what he says about good deeds (de beneficentia). Part 2-2, Question 26 194 Reply to objection 2: Not all neighbors are equally related to God; instead, some are closer to Him because of their greater goodness. These are more to be loved out of charity than others who are less close to Him. Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through in the case of quantity of love on the part of the good that we wish for our friends.

## Article 7 Should we love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us It seems that we should love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us: Objection 1: It seems that what should not be hated for any reason is to be loved more than what is such that there is some reason why it should be hated—just as what is more white is less mixed with black. But there are reasons why persons connected with us should be hated—this according to Luke 14:26 ('If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother ...')—whereas there is no reason why good men should be hated. Therefore, it seems that those who are better are to be loved more than those who are more closely connected with us. Objection 2: It is by charity that a man is especially conformed to God. But God loves more what is better. Therefore, through charity a man should likewise love one who is better more than one who is more connected with him. Objection 3: As regards any friendship, what is to be loved more is what the friendship is based upon. For by natural friendship we love more those who are more closely connected with us by nature—for instance, our parents or children. But the friendship of charity is based upon a sharing of beatitude, to which being better is more relevant than being more closely connected with us. Therefore, out of charity we should love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us. But contrary to this: 1 Timothy 5:8 says, 'If any man does not take care of his own, and especially of those who belong to his own household, then he has denied the faith and is worse than a non-believer.' But the interior affection of charity should correspond to its exterior effect. Therefore, charity should be had more with respect to those who are closer to us than to those who are better. I respond: Every act must be proportioned both to its object and to its agent. But from its object it has its species, whereas from the power of its agent it has the mode of its intensity. For instance, a movement has its species from its terminus ad quem, whereas it has its intensity from (a) the disposition of the thing that is moved (ex dispositione mobilis) and (b) the power of the thing that effects the

movement (ex virtute moventis). So, then, an act of loving (dilectio) has its species from its object, whereas it has its intensity from the one who has the act of loving (ex parte ipsius diligentis). Now the object of charity's act of loving is God, whereas it is the man who has the act of loving. Therefore, as far as its species is concerned, the diversity of the act of loving that belongs to charity should, in the case of neighbors to be loved, be thought of as corresponding to their relation to God—so that, namely, out of charity we will a greater good for a neighbor who is closer to God. For even though the good that charity wills for everyone, viz., eternal beatitude, is a single good in its own right (unum secundum se), it nonetheless has different degrees corresponding to the different [individual] participations in beatitude. And it belongs to charity to will that God's justice be preserved, according to which those who are better participate more perfectly in beatitude. This has to do with the species of the act of loving, because the different species of the act of loving correspond to the different goods that we wish for those whom we love. Part 2-2, Question 26 195 By contrast, the intensity of the act of loving should be thought of as having to do with the relation to the man who is doing the loving. Accordingly, the man loves those who are closer to him with a more intense affection with respect to the good concerning which he loves them than he loves better men with respect to a greater good. There are also other differences here that have to be taken into consideration. For instance, some neighbors are closer to us by natural origin, which they cannot withdraw from, since they are what they are because of their natural origin. By contrast, as was explained above (q. 24, aa. 4 and 10-11), the goodness of virtue, by which some draw near to God, can come and go, increase and decrease. And so out of charity I can will that this man, who is connected with me, should be better than some other man and so be able to attain a higher degree of beatitude. And there are yet other ways in which we can out of charity love more intensely those who are more closely connected with us, since we love them in many ways. For with those who are not connected with us we have only the friendship of charity, whereas with those who are connected with us we [have] other types of friendship corresponding to the sort of connection they have with us. But since the

good upon which any other sort of upright friendship is based is ordered toward the good that charity is based upon as its end, it follows that charity regulates (imperet) the act of any other friendship, in the way that a craft that has to do with the end regulates a craft that has to do with the means to that end. And so charity can regulate our loving someone because he is a relative or because he is connected with us or because he is our fellow citizen or because of any other licit bond of this sort that can be ordered toward the end of charity. And so out of charity, eliciting and regulating in many ways, we love those who are connected with us more. Reply to objection 1: In the case of those close to us we are not commanded to hate that they are close to us; rather, we are commanded to hate only that they keep us from God. And in doing so they are not our relatives, but our enemies—this according to Micah 7:6 ('A man's enemies are those of his own household'). Reply to objection 2: Charity brings it about that a man is conformed to God according to a certain proportion, viz., in such a way that the man is related to what is his own in the way that God is related to what is His own. For as was established above (ST 1-2, q. 19, a. 10), as long as this is done with a goodness of will, we are able out of charity to will certain things, because they are fitting for us, which God nonetheless does not will, because it is not fitting for Him to will them. Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, charity elicits an act of loving not only in accord with the notion of the object but also in accord with the notion of the one doing the loving. Because of the latter, it happens that what is more closely connected with us is loved more. ## Article 8 Should we especially love those who are connected with us by carnal origin It seems not to be the case that we should especially love those who are connected with us by carnal origin: Objection 1: Proverbs 18:24 says, 'A man amiable in society will be more a friend than a brother is.' And Maximus Valerius says, 'The bond of friendship is very strong and in no way weaker than ties of blood. This is likewise more certain and tested: The lottery of birth yielded a fortuitous result, whereas it was by solid

judgment that each individual's uncoerced will contracted the bond of friendship.' Therefore, it is not the case that those who are connected with us by blood are to be loved more than others. Part 2-2, Question 26 196 Objection 2: In De Officiis 1 Ambrose says, 'I love you whom I have begotten in the Gospel no less than if I had begotten you in marriage. For nature is no more vigorous in loving than grace is. We should love more firmly those whom we think will be with us forever than those who will be with us just in this world.' Therefore, it is not the case that our blood relatives are to be loved more than those with whom we are connected in other ways. Objection 3: As Gregory says in a homily, 'The proof of love is in the exhibiting of the deed.' But there are some individuals on whom we ought to confer the works of love more than on even our own relatives, in the way that in the military one's commander is more to be obeyed than one's father. Therefore, it is not the case that those who are connected with us by blood are to be loved in a more special way. But contrary to this: As is clear from Exodus 20:12, honoring one's parents is specifically commanded in the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, those who are joined to us by carnal origin are to be loved by us in a more special way. I respond: As has been explained (a. 7), those who are more closely connected with us are to be loved more out of charity, both because they are loved more intensely and also because they are loved for more reasons. Now the intensity of an act of loving stems from the connection of what is loved with the lover. And so the love for different individuals is to be measured by the different types of connection—so that, namely, an individual is loved more in what pertains to the connection in accord with which he is loved. And, further, one act of loving is to be compared to another by comparing the one connection with the other. So, then, one should reply that the friendship among blood relatives is based upon the connection of natural origin, whereas the friendship among fellow citizens is based upon civic sharing, and the friendship among fellow soldiers is based upon

sharing in battle. And so in matters that pertain to nature we ought to love our blood relatives more, whereas in matters that pertain to civic life we ought to love our fellow citizens more, and in matters of battle we should love our fellow soldiers more. This is why in Ethics 9 the Philosopher says, 'What is proper and fitting should be rendered to each individual. And this is what people seem to do. For instance, they invite their relatives to weddings, and it will seem especially necessary to honor their parents and provide them with support.' And something similar holds for the other cases. But if we are comparing one sort of connection with another, it is clear that the connection of natural origin is prior and more fixed, since it has to do with what belongs to the substance, whereas other connections supervene on it and can be removed. And so the friendship among blood relatives is more stable. But other friendships can be stronger as regards what is proper to each friendship. Reply to objection 1: Since one's friendship with associates is contracted by one's own choice, it follows that in those things that fall under our choice, for instance, matters of action, this sort of love takes precedence over our love of our blood relatives, with the result that we agree more with these friends in matters of action. However, our friendship with relatives is more stable, because it is more natural, and it prevails in matters that have to do with nature. Hence, we are more bound to our blood relatives in providing for necessities. Reply to objection 2: Ambrose is talking about love as regards good deeds that have to do with the sharing of grace, viz., instruction in morals. For in this matter a man ought to help to a greater degree his spiritual children, whom he has given birth to spiritually, than his corporeal children, whom he ought to provide for more in matters of corporeal support. Reply to objection 3: The fact that in matters of battle a soldier obeys his commander more than his father proves not that his father is loved less absolutely speaking, but only that he is loved less in a certain respect, i.e., with respect to the love based upon sharing in battle. Part 2-2, Question 26 197 ## Article 9 Should a man love his children more out of charity than his parents

It seems that a man should love his children (filium) out of charity more than his parents (pater): Objection 1: We ought to love more those whom we are more obligated to do good to. But we are more obligated to do good to our children (filiis) than to our parents (parentibus). Therefore, children are to be loved more than parents. Objection 2: Grace perfects nature. But as the Philosopher says in Ethics 8, parents naturally love their children more than they are loved by their children. Therefore, we ought to love our children more than our parents. Objection 3: Through charity a man's affections are conformed to God. But God loves his children more than He is loved by them. Therefore, we should likewise love our children more than our parents. But contrary to this: Ambrose says, 'God is to be loved first; second, one's parents; next, one's children; after that, the members of one's household.' I respond: As was explained above (aa. 4 and 7), there are two ways to think about the degrees of love: In one way, on the part of the object. And on this score, what is to be loved more is that which has a greater sort of good and is more similar to God. And in this sense one's parents are to be loved more than one's children, since, we love our parents under the concept principle, which has the character of a more eminent good and is more similar to God. In the second way, the degrees of love are calculated on the part of the one doing the loving. And in this sense what is loved more is what is more closely connected. On this score, as the Philosopher explains in Ethics 8, one's child is to be loved more than one's father. First, because parents love their children as something of their own, whereas a father is not something of his child. Second, because parents know with more certainty that some individuals are their children than vice versa. Third, because a child is closer to his parent, since he is a part, than a father to his children, to whom he has the relation [of a] principle. Fourth, because parents have loved for a longer time, since a parent begins to love his child immediately, whereas the child begins to love his parents as time goes non. But love is stronger to the extent that it has lasted longer—this according to Ecclesiasticus 9:14 ('Do not forsake an old friend, for the new one will not be like to him'). Reply to objection 1: Honor and the submission of reverence are owed to the

principle, whereas to the effect it is correspondingly fitting to receive the principle's influence and its provision. Because of this, what children owe more to their parents is honor, whereas what parents owe more to their children is concern about providing for them. Reply to objection 2: Parents naturally love their children more by reason of the children's connection with them. But by reason of a more eminent good children naturally love their parents more. Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says in De Doctrina Christiana 1, 'God loves us to our advantage and for His own honor.' And so because parents are related to us by the relation principle [of], in the way that God is, it properly belongs to parents that honor be shown to them by their children, whereas what belongs to the children to their advantage is to be provided for by their parents—even though in a case of necessity children are obligated, from the benefits they have received, to provide especially for their parents. Part 2-2, Question 26 198 ## Article 10 Should a man love his mother more than his father It seems that a man should love his mother more than his father: Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in De Generatione Animalium 1, [']the female provides the body in generation.' But as was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 90, a. 2 and q. 118, a. 2), a man has his soul not from his father, but from God through creation. Therefore, a man has more from his mother than from his father. Therefore, he ought to love his mother more than his father. Objection 2: A man ought to love more the one who loves him more. But a mother loves her children more than a father does; for in Ethics 9 the Philosopher says, 'Mothers have greater love for their children. For generation is more laborious for the mothers, and mothers know more surely than fathers do that the children are theirs.' Therefore, the mother is to be loved more than the father. Objection 3: More affection of love is owed to the one who has worked harder for us—this according to Romans 16:6 ('Greet Mary, who has labored much among

you'). But the mother labors more in generation and education than the father does; hence, Ecclesiasticus 7:29 says, 'Do not forget the groaning of your mother.' Therefore, a man should love his mother more than his father. But contrary to this: In Super Ezechiel Jerome says, 'After God, the Father of all, one's father is to be loved.' And it is afterwards that he adds the mother. I respond: What is said in these comparisons is to be understood ‘in its own right' (per se), so that the question is understood to be whether one's father insofar as he is a father is to be loved more than one's mother insofar as she is a mother. For as the Philosopher points out in Ethics 8, in all cases of this sort there is such a range of goodness and badness that the friendship might be lessened or destroyed. This is why, as Ambrose puts it, 'Good servants are to be preferred to bad children.' However, speaking per se, the father is to be loved more than the mother. For the father and mother are loved as certain principles of natural origin. But the father is a principle in a more excellent way, since the father is a principle in the mode of an agent, whereas the mother is a principle in the mode of a patient and of matter. And so, speaking per se, the father is to be loved more. Reply to objection 1: In human generation the mother supplies the body's unformed matter, whereas the matter is formed through the formative power that exists in the father's semen. And even though this sort of power cannot create a rational soul, it nonetheless disposes the bodily matter to receive this type of form. Reply to objection 2 [and objection 3]: This argument pertains to the other reason for love, since the species of friendship by which we love someone who loves us is different from the species of friendship by which we love someone who has generated us. But here we are speaking of the friendship which is owed to the father and the mother in accord with the notion of generation. ## Article 11 Should a husband love his wife more than his father and mother It seems that a husband should love his wife more than his father and mother: Objection 1: No one puts a thing aside except for something that is loved more. But Genesis 2:24 says, 'A man leaves his father and mother because of his wife.'

Therefore, a husband should love his wife more than his father or mother. Objection 2: In Ephesians 5:28 and 33, the Apostle says that husbands should love their wives as themselves. But a man should love himself more than his parents. Therefore, a husband should likewise love his wife more than his parents. Part 2-2, Question 26 199 Objection 3: Where there are multiple reasons for love, there ought to be a greater love. But there are multiple reasons for love in the case of the friendship which is had with one's wife; for as the Philosopher says in Ethics 8, 'In the case of this friendship, it seems to be useful, and pleasant, and for the sake of virtue, as long as the spouses are virtuous.' Therefore, there should be more love for one's wife than for one's parents. But contrary to this: As Ephesians 5:28-29 says, 'A husband ought to love his wife as his own flesh.' But as was explained above (a. 5), a man ought to love his own body less than his neighbor. But among our neighbors it is our parents that we ought to love more, Therefore, we should love our parents more than our spouse. I respond: The degree of love can have to do with both (a) the character of the good and (b) the connection with the one who is doing the loving. Therefore, in accord with the character of the good, i.e., the object of the act of loving, parents are to be loved more than spouses, since they are loved under the notion of a principle and of a more eminent good. However, in accord with the notion of connection, one's wife is to be loved more, since a wife is joined to the man and they exist as one flesh—this according to Matthew 19:6 ('And they are no longer two, but one flesh'). And so one's wife is loved more intensely, while more reverence is to be shown to the parents. Reply to objection 1: One's father and mother are not deserted in all respects because of his wife, since in certain respects a man ought to assist his parents more than his wife. Rather, having left his parents, a man adheres to his wife with respect to the union of carnal intercourse and the union of living together. Reply to objection 2: The Apostle's words should be taken to mean not that a man should love his wife as much as he loves himself; instead, it should be taken to mean that the love which he has for himself is the reason for loving that he has

with respect to the wife who is joined to him. Reply to objection 3: Multiple reasons are likewise found in the friendship with one's parents, and in some respects they take precedence over the reasons for loving which are had with respect to one's spouse -this has to do with the character of the good, even though the latter reasons take precedence with respect to the character of the connection. Reply to the argument for the contrary: This passage is not to be understood in such a way that the phrase 'as he loves his own body' implies equality of love; rather, it implies the reason for loving. For a husband loves his wife principally by reason of their carnal union. ## Article 12 Should a man love his benefactor more than his beneficiary It seems that a man should love his benefactor more than his beneficiary: Objection 1: As Augustine says in De Catechizandis Rudibus, 'There is no greater incentive for someone to love you than for you to love him first; for he must have a hard mind indeed who, even if he does not will to offer love, wills not to return love.' Objection 2: Someone is more to be loved to the extent that a man sins more gravely if he ceases to love him or if he acts contrary to love. But one who does not love his benefactor or acts against him sins more gravely than if he ceases to love someone whom he has benefited up to now. Therefore, benefactors are to be loved more than beneficiaries. Objection 3: As Jerome says, among all the things to be loved, God is especially to be loved and, after Him, one's father. But these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore, a benefactor is to be loved [] to most of all (maxime). Part 2-2, Question 26 200 But contrary to this: In Ethics 9 the Philosopher says, 'Benefactors seem to love those whom they benefit more, rather than vice versa.'

I respond: As was explained above (aa.7, 9 and 11), there are two ways in which something is loved: in one way because it has the character of a more excellent good; in the second way, by reason of a closer connection. Therefore, in the first way a benefactor is to be loved more. For since he is a principle of good in the one to whom he does good, he has the character of a more excellent good—just as was explained above in the case of a parent. However, in the second way we love more those to whom we do good. The Philosopher proves this in Ethics 9 by means of four arguments. First, because someone to whom good is done is, as it were, a sort of handiwork of the benefactor, and thus it is customary to say of someone that he will have been ‘made' by his benefactor. But it is natural for everyone to love his own handiwork, just as we see that poets love their poems. And the reason why is that each thing loves its own being and its own life, and this is especially clear in its action. Second, because each individual naturally loves that in which he sees his own good. To be sure, it is true both that the benefactor has some good in the one whom he benefits and also vice versa, but the benefactor sees in the one he benefits his own upright good, whereas the one who benefits sees in the benefactor his own useful good. But an upright good is considered more pleasant than a useful good, both because an upright good is longer-lasting—for usefulness quickly passes and the pleasure of the memory is not like the pleasure of something present—and also because we recall our own upright goods with more pleasure than the useful goods that have come to us from others. Third, because it pertains to a lover to act, since he wills and does good for the one he loves, whereas it pertains to the one loved to receive. And so to love belongs to him who is more excellent. Fourth, because it is more difficult to bestow benefits than to receive them. But we love more those things which we work hard at, whereas we easily look down upon what comes easily to us. Reply to objection 1: There is in the benefactor something such that the one who receives the benefit is incited to love him. But the benefactor loves the one he benefits not because he is, as it were, incited by him, but because he is moved by himself. But what is from oneself (ex se) is better than what is through another (per aliud).

Reply to objection 2: The benficiary's love for his benefactor is more of an obligation, and so its contrary has the character of a greater sin. By contrast, the benefactor's love for his beneficiary is more spontaneous, and so it has greater promptitude. Reply to objection 3: God likewise loves us more than we love Him, and parents love their children more than they are loved by them. And yet it does not have to be the case that we love every one of those we benefit more than we love any of our benefactors. For we prefer the benefactors from whom [we] receive the greatest benefits—viz., God and our parents—to those individuals on whom we have bestowed lesser benefits. ## Article 13 Does the order of charity remain in heaven It seems that the order of charity does not remain in heaven: Objection 1: In De Vera Religione Augustine says, 'Perfect charity is that we love greater goods more and lesser goods less.' But in heaven there will be perfect charity. Therefore, someone will love one who is better more than himself or more than those connected with him. Part 2-2, Question 26 201 Objection 2: Someone to whom we will a greater good is loved more. But everyone who is in heaven wills a greater good to one who has more good. Otherwise, his will would not be conformed to God's will in everything. But the one who is better has more good. Therefore, in heaven everyone will love the better individual more. And so he will [love] the other more than himself, and he will love someone unconnected with him more than one who is close to him. Objection 3: God will be the whole reason for loving in heaven, since at that point there will be a fulfillment of what is said in 1 Corinthians 15:28 ('God will be all things in all things'). Therefore, one who is closer to God will be loved more. And so one will love someone who is better more than himself, and he will [love] someone unconnected with him better than someone connected with him.

But contrary to this: Nature is not destroyed by grace, but is perfected by grace. But the order of charity posited above proceeds from nature itself. And all things naturally love themselves more than other things. Therefore, this particular ordering of charity (iste ordo caritatis) will remain in heaven. I respond: The order of charity has to remain in heaven to the extent that God must be loved above all things. This will absolutely be the case when a man perfectly enjoys Him. But as regards the ordering of oneself to others, it seems that a distinction must be made. For as was explained above, $$the degree of love can be distinguished either (a) according to the difference among the goods that one wishes for the other or (b) according to the intensity of the love. In the first mode, one will love those who are better more than himself and those who are less good less than himself. For each one of the blessed shall will each individual to have what is due to him according to God's justice—and this because of the perfect conformity of his human will to God's will. Nor will there then be time for making progress through merit for a greater reward—as occurs now, when a man can desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man. Instead, at that time the will of each individual will rest within what has been determined by God. However, in the second mode one will love himself more than his neighbor, even a better neighbor. For as was explained above (a. 7), the intensity of an act of loving stems from the [H](p)art of the subject who loves. And the gift of grace is conferred on each individual by God (a) primarily in order that he might order his own mind toward God, and this belongs to love of oneself, and (b) secondarily in order that he might will the order of other things toward God or even bring this about in his own way. On the other hand, as regards the ordering of one's neighbors to one another absolutely speaking, the better someone is, the more he will love him, in accord with the love of charity. For the whole of the beatified life consists in ordering the mind toward God. Hence, the whole order of love among the beatified will be observed in relation to God—so that, namely, one who is closer to God will be loved more and held by everyone to be more closely connected (propinquior) with himself. $$For at that time the provision will cease that is necessary in the present life, by which everyone, for whatever sort of necessity, provides more for those

connected with him than for strangers. It is by reason of this provision that in this life a man, by the very inclination of charity, loves more someone who is connected with him and on whom he must bestow the effect of charity. Still, in heaven it will happen that someone will love for many reasons those who are connected with him, since the upright causes of love will not cease in the mind of someone who is beatified. $$However, the reason for loving that is taken from closeness to God will be incomparably preferred to all these reasons. Reply to objection 1: This argument should be conceded as regards those who are connected with oneself. But as regards himself, someone has to love himself more than others—more so to the extent that his charity is more perfect—since the perfection of charity orders a man perfectly to God and, as has been explained, this is relevant to his love of himself. Reply to objection 2: This argument is about the ordering of love according to the level of the good that someone wills for the beloved. Part 2-2, Question 26 202 Reply to objection 3: God will be the total reason for loving for each individual, because God is the total good for a man. For if we granted, per impossibile, that God were not a man's good, then the man would have no reason to love. And so in the ordering of love it must be the case that after God, a man loves himself the most. ### [ QUESTION 27 ] The Principal Act of Charity, i.e., the Act of Loving We next have to consider the act of charity and, first of all, the principal act of charity, which is the act of loving (dilectio) (question 27), and, second, the other acts or effects that follow upon the act of loving (questions 28-33). On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Which is more proper to charity, to be loved or to love (amari vel amare)? (2) Is the act of loving (amare) the same thing as the act of willing the good (benevolentia)? (3) Is God to be loved because of Himself (propter seipsum)? (4) Can God be loved directly (immediate) in this life? (5) Can God be wholly

(totaliter) loved? (6) Does the love of God have a mode or fixed quantity (habet modum)? (7) Which is better, to love a friend or to love an enemy? (8) Which is better, to love God or to love one's neighbor? ## Article 1 Which is more proper to charity, loving or being loved It seems that it is more proper to charity to be loved rather than to love: Objection 1: Charity is found to be better in better individuals. But better individuals ought to be loved. Therefore, it is more proper to charity to be loved. Objection 2: What is found to be the case in most instances seems to be more fitting for the nature and, as a result, better. But as the Philosopher says in Ethics 8, 'Many wish to be loved more than to love, and for this reason the lovers of flattery are many.' Therefore, it is better to be loved than to love and, as a result, this is more fitting for charity. Objection 3: That for the sake of which each thing is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such. But it is for the sake of being loved that men love; for in De Catechizandis Rudibus Augustine says, 'There is no greater incentive for someone to love you than for you to love him first.' Therefore, charity consists in being loved more than in loving. But contrary to this: In Ethics 8 the Philosopher says, 'Friendship lies more in loving than being loved.' But charity is a certain sort of friendship. Therefore, charity consists more in loving than in being loved. I respond: Loving is appropriate to charity insofar as it is charity. For since charity is a virtue, it has by its essence an inclination to its proper act. However, to be loved is not an act of charity belonging to the one who is loved; instead, the act of charity belongs to one who does the loving, whereas being loved belongs to the one who is loved in accord with the common character of the good, viz., insofar as another is moved toward his good through an act of charity. Hence, it is clear that loving belongs to charity more than being loved does, since what belongs to each thing is what belongs to it in its own right (per se) and in its substance rather than what belongs to it through another (per aliud).

There are two indications of the claim that loving belongs to charity more than being loved does. First, friends are praised more for loving than for being loved—at the very least, they are blamed if they are loved and do not love. Second, mothers, who love the most, seek more to love than to be loved; for as the Philosopher says in the same book, 'Some mothers entrust their children to a nanny—they do love them, to be sure, but they do not seek to be loved in return if it does not happen.' Reply to objection 1: By the very fact that they are better, better individuals are more lovable. But by the very fact that charity is more perfect in them, they are more loving, yet correspondingly loved. For a better individual does not love what is below him less than it is lovable, but someone who is less good does not attain to loving a better individual to the extent that he is lovable. Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says in the same place, 'Men want to be loved insofar as they want to be honored.' For just as honor is bestowed on someone as a sort of testimony to the goodness that exists in the one who is honored, so by the fact that someone is loved some good is shown to exist in him, since only what is good is lovable. Part 2-2, Question 27 204 So, then, men seek to be loved and to be honored for the sake of something else, viz., for the manifestation of the good that exists in the one who is loved. But those who have charity seek to love in their own right, since this is the very good of charity, just as every act of a virtue is the good of that virtue. Hence, it belongs more to charity to want to love than to want to be loved. Reply to objection 3: Some love for the sake of being loved, not in such a way that being loved is the aim of their loving, but because being loved is a sort of path that induces a man to love. ## Article 2 Is loving, insofar as it is the act of charity, nothing other than willing the good It seems that loving (amare), insofar as it is the act of charity, is nothing other than willing the good (benevolentia):

Objection 1: In Rhetoric 2 the Philosopher says, 'To love is to will good things for someone.' But this is to will the good (benevolentia). Therefore, the act of charity is nothing other than willing the good. Objection 2: An act belongs to what its habit belongs to. But as was explained above (q. 24, a. 1), the habit of charity exists in the power of the will. Therefore, the act of charity is likewise an act of the will. But it tends toward nothing other than the good, which is to will the good. Therefore, the act of charity is nothing other than willing the good. Objection 3: $$In Ethics 9 the Philosopher posits five things that belong to friendship: the first is that a man wills the good for his friend; the second is that he wills him to exist and to live (velit ei esse et vivere); the third is that he shares his life with him; the fourth is that [(t)he] chooses the same things; the fifth is that they grieve together and rejoice together. But the first two pertain to willing the good (benevolentia). Therefore, the first act of charity is willing the good. But contrary to this: In the same book the Philosopher says, 'Willing the good is neither friendship nor loving (amatio); instead, it is a source (principium) of friendship.' But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity is friendship. Therefore, willing the good (benevolentia) is not the same thing as loving (dilectio). I respond: $$Willing the good (benevolentia) is properly said to be an act of the will by which we will the good for another. Now this act of the will differs from an act of loving (differt a actuali amore) both (a) when the latter exists in the sentient appetite and also (b) when it exists in the intellective appetite, i.e., the will. For the love that exists in the sentient appetite is a passion. Now every passion inclines one with a sort of impetus toward its object. However, the passion of love is such that it does not arise suddenly, but instead arises through a constant inspection of the thing that is loved. And this is why, in Ethics 9, the Philosopher, in showing the difference between willing the good and the love that is a passion, says that willing the good does not involve reaching out and desiring, i.e., it does not have any impetus of inclination; instead, a man wills the good for another solely by a judgment of reason. Similarly, this type of love arises from familiarity, whereas willing the good sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us at a boxing match when we will victory for one of the boxers.

On the other hand, the love that exists in the intellective appetite likewise differs from willing the good. For this sort of love implies a certain union of affection on the part of the lover with the one who is loved, viz., insofar as the lover thinks of the one who is loved as being in some sense one with himself or as belonging to himself, and so he is moved toward him. By contrast, willing the good is a simple act of the will by which we will the good for someone even without presupposing the sort of union of affection just mentioned. Part 2-2, Question 27 205 So, then, willing the good (benevolentia) is included in the act of loving (dilectio) insofar as it is an act of charity, but the act of loving (dilectio sive amor) adds the affection of union. And this is the reason why the Philosopher says that willing the good is a source of friendship. Reply to objection 1: In this place the Philosopher defines love not by giving its entire nature (totam rationem ipsius), but by giving something that belongs to its nature and in which the act of loving is especially clear. Reply to objection 2: The act of loving (dilectio) is an act of the will that tends toward the good but is accompanied by a union with the one who is loved—something that is not implied by willing the good. Reply to objection 3: What the Philosopher says in this place is relevant to friendship to the extent that it arises from the love that someone has for himself, as he says in the same place—so that, namely, one does all these things to his friend as to himself. This pertains to the affective union mentioned above. ## Article 3 Is God loved out of charity because of Himself or because of something else It seems that God is loved out of charity not because of Himself but because of something else: Objection 1: In a homily Gregory says, 'From the things that the mind knows it learns to love what is unknown.' But he is calling intelligible and divine things ‘unknown' and things that can be sensed ‘known'. Therefore, God is to be loved because of other things.

Objection 2: Love follows upon cognition. But God is known through another—this according to Romans 1:20 ('The invisible things of God are clearly seen, having been understood through the things that have been made'). Therefore, He is likewise to be loved because of another and not because of Himself. Objection 3: As a Gloss on Matthew 1:2 says, 'Hope generates charity.' Fear likewise leads to charity, as Augustine says in Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis Tractatus. But hope looks for something to be acquired from God, whereas fear withdraws from something that can be inflicted by God. Therefore, it seems that God is to be loved because of some hoped for good or because of some evil to be feared. Therefore, He is not to be loved because of Himself. But contrary to this: In De Doctrina Christiana 1 Augustine says, 'To enjoy is to adhere to someone by love because of himself.' But as he says in the same book, God is to be enjoyed. Therefore, God is to be loved because of Himself. I respond: The preposition ‘because of' or ‘for the sake of' (propter) implies a relation to a cause. Now there are four genera of causes, viz., final, formal, efficient, and material; in addition, a material disposition, which is not a cause absolutely speaking, but rather a cause in a certain respect (secundum quid), is traced back to the material cause. And it is with respect to these four genera of causes that something is said to be loved because of one thing or another: (a) with respect to the genus final cause, in the way that we love medicine because of health; (b) with respect to the genus formal cause, in the way that we love a man because of his virtue—since, namely, by his virtue he is formally good and hence lovable; (c) with respect to the genus efficient cause, in the way that we love certain individuals because they are the children of this father; (d) with respect to a disposition that is traced back to the genus material cause, as when we are said to love someone because of something that has disposed us toward loving him -for instance, because of certain benefits that have been received- even if, after we have already begun to love him, we come to love our friend not because of those benefits, but because of his virtue. Part 2-2, Question 27 206 Hence, in the first three ways we love God for Himself and not because of anything else. For He is not ordered toward anything else as His end; instead, He Himself is the ultimate end of all things. Nor is He informed by anything else in

order to be good; instead, His substance is goodness itself, according to which all things are good as likenesses (exemplariter). Nor, again, does His goodness exist in Him from another; instead, it is from Him that goodness exists in all other things. However, in the fourth way He can be loved because of something else—namely, since we are disposed by certain other things to progress in our love of God—for instance, by the benefits that we receive from Him or, again, by the rewards that are hoped for or by the punishments that we intend to avoid through Him. Reply to objection 1: From the things that the mind knows it learns to love what is unknown, not because the things known are the reason for loving the unknown things in the manner of a formal cause or final cause or efficient cause, but because through the things that are known a man is disposed to love what is unknown. Reply to objection 2: The cognition of God is, to be sure, acquired from other things, but afterwards, once God is known, He is known not through other things but through Himself—this according to John 4:42 ('We now believe not because of what you told us: for we have seen for ourselves, and we know that this is truly the savior of the world'). Reply to objection 3: As is clear from what was said above (q. 17, a. 8 and q. 19, a. 7), hope and fear lead to charity in the manner of dispositions. ## Article 4 Can God be loved directly in this life It seems that God cannot be loved directly (immediate) in this life: Objection 1: As Augustine says in De Trinitate 10, 'What is unknown cannot be loved.' But we do not have a direct cognition of God in this life, since 'we see now through a mirror, darkly,' as 1 Corinthians 13:12 says. Therefore, neither can we love Him directly. Objection 2: One who is incapable of what is lesser is incapable of what is greater. But it is greater to love God than to know Him, since, as 1 Corinthians 6:17 puts it, one who adheres to God through love becomes 'one spirit with Him.' But a man cannot have a direct cognition of God. Therefore, a fortiori, he cannot love Him directly.

Objection 3: A man is cut off from God through sin—this according to Isaiah 59:2 ('Your sins have caused a division between you and your God'). But sin exists in the will more than in the intellect. Therefore, a man is less able to love God directly than to know Him directly. But contrary to this: As is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:9ff, since the cognition of God is mediated, it is called 'dark' and it 'passes away' in heaven. But, as 1 Corinthians 13:8 says, 'Charity does not pass away.' Therefore, charity in this life (caritas viae) adheres directly to God. I respond: As was explained above (q. 26, a. 1), the act of a cognitive power is perfected by the fact that the thing known exists in the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power is perfected by the fact that the appetite is inclined toward the thing itself. And so the movement of an appetitive power is toward the things in accord with the condition of the things themselves, whereas the act of a cognitive power is in accord with the mode of the one having the cognition. Now the very order of things is in its own right such that God is knowable and lovable because of Himself (propter seipsum), insofar as He is by His essence (essentialiter) truth itself and goodness itself, through which other things are both known and loved. Part 2-2, Question 27 207 But as regards us, since our cognition arises from sensation, the things that are first knowable are those that are closer to the senses, and the ultimate terminus of cognition lies in what is maximally removed from the senses. Accordingly, one should reply that (a) the act of love (dilectio), which is the act of an appetitive power, even in this life tends first toward God and then flows from Him to other things, and that, accordingly, (b) the act of charity loves God directly and loves other things through God (mediante Deo). By contrast, it is the opposite with cognition—viz., we know God through other things as a cause is known through its effects, or else in the mode of preeminence or of negation (vel per modum eminentiae aut negationis), as is clear from Dionysius in De Divinis Nominibus.

Reply to objection 1: Even though what is unknown cannot be loved, nonetheless, it is not necessary for the order of cognition to be the same as the order of love. For love is the terminus of cognition. And so where cognition ceases, viz., in the thing itself that is known through another, love is able to begin immediately. Reply to objection 2: Since the love of God is something greater than the cognition of God, especially in the state of the present life (maxime secundum statum viae), it presupposes the cognition of God. And since cognition does not come to rest in created things but tends through them toward something else, love begins with this cognition and through it flows to other things—in the manner of a circle—as long as (a) the cognition, beginning from creatures, tends toward God and (b) the love, beginning from God as the ultimate end, flows toward creatures. Reply to objection 3: The aversion from God that comes through sin is removed by charity and not by cognition alone. And so it is charity that, by loving, joins the soul directly to God by a bond of spiritual union. ## Article 5 Can God be wholly loved It seems that God cannot be wholly (totaliter) loved: Objection 1: Love follows upon cognition. But God cannot be wholly known by us, since this would be to comprehend Him. Therefore, He cannot be wholly loved by us. Objection 2: As is clear from Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, love is a sort of union. But a man's heart cannot be wholly united with God, since, as 1 John 3:20 says, 'God is greater than our heart. Therefore, God cannot be wholly loved. Objection 3: God wholly loves Himself. Therefore, if He is wholly loved by someone else, then someone else loves God as much as He loves Himself. But this is absurd. Therefore, God cannot be wholly loved by any creature. But contrary to this: Deuteronomy 6:5 says, 'You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart.' I respond: Since love is thought of as lying between the lover and what is loved,

when one asks whether God can be wholly loved, there are three ways in which the question can be taken: (a) In one way, insofar as the mode of totality is referred back to the entity that is loved. And in this sense God is to be wholly loved, since a man ought to love the whole that belongs to God. (b) In the second way, the question can be understood so that the totality is referred back to the one doing the loving. And in this sense, too, God ought to be wholly loved, since a man ought to love God with his whole strength (ex toto posse), and he ought to order whatever he has toward the love of God—this according to Deuteronomy 6:5 ('You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart'). Part 2-2, Question 27 208 (c) In the third way, the question can be understood in accord with a comparison of the one loving to the thing loved, so that it means: Is the mode of the one who is loving equal to the mode of the thing loved? And this is impossible. For since each thing is lovable to the extent that it is good, God, whose goodness is infinite, is infinitely lovable, whereas no creature can love God to an infinite degree. For every power that belongs to a creature—whether that power is natural or infused—is finite. Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3 and to the argument for the contrary: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said. For the first three objections go through for the third way, and the argument for the contrary goes through for the second way. ## Article 6 Is there some mode or determinate quantity of the love of God that should be had It seems that there is some mode or determinate quantity (modus) of the love of God that should be had: Objection 1: As is clear from Augustine in De Natura Boni, the nature of the good (ratio boni) consists in 'mode, species, and order' (in modo, specie et ordine). But the love of God is the best thing in a man -this according to Colossians 3:14 ('Above all things have charity'). Therefore, the love of God should have a mode or determinate quantity.

Objection 2: In De Moribus Ecclesiae Augustine says, 'Tell me, I ask you, what is the mode of loving? For I fear being either more inflamed or less inflamed with desire and love for my Lord than I ought to be.' But it would be useless for anyone to seek a mode unless there were some mode of the love of God. Therefore, there is a mode or determinate quantity of the love of God. Objection 3: In Super Genesim ad Litteram 4 Augustine says, 'Mode (modus) is what its own proper measure (propria mensura) fixes for each thing.' But the measure of the human will, as well as of exterior action, is reason. Therefore, just as there has to be a quantity fixed by reason in the case of the exterior effect of charity—this according to Romans 12:1 ('... your reasonable service ...')—so, too, the interior act of loving God must itself have a determinate quantity. But contrary to this: In De Diligendo Deum Bernard says, 'The cause of loving God is God; the mode or determinate quantity is to love without mode or determinate quantity.' I respond: As is clear from [the] passage just cited from Augustine, ‘mode' (modus) implies a certain determination of measure. Now this determination is found both (a) in the measure and (b) in the thing measured, though in different ways. In the measure it is found in its essence (essentialiter), since a measure is in its own right (secundum seipsam) such that it determines and moderates other things, whereas in the things that are measured the measure is found in relation to another (secundum aliud)—that is, insofar as those things attain to the measure. And so within the measure nothing can be taken as unmodified (immodificatum), whereas the thing that is measured is such that unless it attains to the measure, it is unmodified—regardless of whether it falls short of the measure or exceeds the measure. Now in all desirable and doable things the measure is the end, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in Physics 2, we must take from the end the proper conception of what we desire and what we do. And so the end has a mode or quantity in its own right (secundum seipsam), whereas the means to the end have their mode or quantity from being proportioned to the end. And so, as the Philosopher says in Politics 1, 'In every art the desire for the end is without a limit or terminus, whereas there is a limit to the desire for the means to the end.' For instance, a physician does not impose any limit on health, but effects it as completely as he can. By contrast, he does impose a limit on the medicine. For he

does not give as much medicine as he can, but instead doles out the medicine in proportion to health; if the medicine were to exceed that proportion or fall short of it, then it would be immoderate. Part 2-2, Question 27 209 Now the end of all human action and affection is the love of God, through which, as was explained above (q. 17, a. 6 and q. 23, a. 6), we especially attain to the ultimate end. And so with the love of God there cannot be a mode (modus) in the way that a mode exists in a thing that is measured, where it is possible for there to be too much or too little (plus et minus). Rather, with the love of God the mode is found as it exists in a measure, in which there cannot be excess; instead, the greater the degree to which the rule (regula) is attained, the better it is. And so the more God is loved, the better the love is. Reply to objection 1: What is per se is better than what is through another (per aliud). And so the goodness of a measure that has a mode or quantity per se is better than the goodness of the thing measured, which has a mode or quantity through another. And so charity, which has a mode or quantity in the way that a measure does, is likewise preeminent over the other virtues, which have a mode or fixed quantity in the way that things that are measured do. Reply to objection 2: In the same place Augustine adds that the mode or quantity of loving God is that He be loved with one's whole heart, i.e., that He be loved as much as He can be. And this has to do with the mode or quantity that is appropriate for a measure. Reply to objection 3: An affection whose object is subject to the judgment of reason is to be measured by reason. But the object of the love of God -that is, God—exceeds the judgment of reason. And it[ is not measured by reason, but instead exceeds reason. Nor is there a parallel between the interior act of charity and its exterior acts. For the interior act of charity has the character of an end, since a man's ultimate good consists in his soul's adhering to God—this according to Psalm 72:28 ('It is good for me to adhere to God'). By contrast, the exterior acts are, as it were, ordered toward the end, and so they are to be measured both by charity and by reason. ## Article 7

Is it more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend It seems that it is more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend: Objection 1: Matthew 5:46 says, 'If you love those who love you, what reward will you have?' Therefore, to love one's friend does not merit a reward. But as is shown in the same place, to love one's enemy does merit a reward. Therefore, it is more meritorious to love one's enemies than to love one's friends. Objection 2: The greater the charity something proceeds from, the more meritorious it is. But as Augustine says in Enchiridion, to love one's enemy belongs to 'the perfect children of God,' whereas to love one's friend belongs also to imperfect charity. Therefore, to love one's enemy is of greater merit than to love one's friend. Objection 3: Where there is a greater effort for the good, there seems to be greater merit, since, as 1 Corinthians 3:8 says, 'Each one will receive his own reward according to his labor.' But a man needs a greater effort for loving his enemy than for loving his friend, since it is more difficult. Therefore, it seems that to love one's enemy is more meritorious than to love one's friend. But contrary to this: What is better is more meritorious. But it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love someone who is better. But one's friend, who loves, is better than one's enemy, who hates. Therefore, to love one's friend is more meritorious than to love one's enemy. I respond: As was explained above (q. 25, a. 1), the reason for loving one's neighbor out of charity is God. Therefore, when it is asked which is better, or more meritorious, to love one's friend or to love one's enemy, there are two ways in which these acts of love can be compared: (a) on the part of the neighbor who is loved and (b) on the part of the reason for which he is loved. Part 2-2, Question 27 210 In the first way, the love of one's friend surpasses the love of one's enemy. For a friend is both better and more closely connected; hence, he is a more fitting ‘matter' for love and, because of this, the act of loving that passes into this matter is better. Hence, its opposite is, accordingly, worse; for it is worse to hate one's friend than to hate one's enemy.

In the second way, however, the love of one's enemy is preeminent, and this for two reasons. First, there can be some reason other than God for the love of one's friend, but God is the only reason for love of one's enemy. Second, assuming that both are loved because of God, the love of God is proven stronger when a man's mind extends to more remote things—more specifically, right up to the love of one's enemy—just as the power of a fire is shown to be stronger by the fact that it diffuses its heat to more remote places. Again, the love of God is shown to be stronger to the extent that we accomplish more difficult tasks because of it, just as, once again, the power of a fire is stronger to the extent that it is able to ignite matter that is less combustible. But just as the same fire acts more strongly on nearby things than on remote things, so, too, charity loves more fervently those who are connected with one more than those who are remote. And on this score, the love of one's friends, considered in its own right, is more fervent and better than the love of one's enemies. Reply to objection 1: Our Lord should be understood to be speaking per se. For the love of one's friends has no reward in God's eyes when they are loved solely because they are one's friends, and this seems to happen when one's friends are loved in such a way that one's enemies are not loved. However, the love of one's friends is meritorious if they are loved because of God and not just because they are one's friends. Reply to objection 2 and objection 3 and the argument for the contrary: The reply to these objections is clear from what has been said. For the next two arguments go through on the part of the reason for loving, whereas the last argument goes through on the part of those who are loved. ## Article 8 Is it more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God It seems that it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God: Objection 1: What the Apostle prefers (magis elegit) seems to be more meritorious. But the Apostle prefers love of neighbor over love of God—this according to Romans 9:3 ('I wished myself to be cursed by Christ for the sake of my brothers'). Therefore, it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 7), it seems less meritorious in some sense to love one's friend. But God is especially one's friend, who 'loved us first,' as 1 John 4:10 says. Therefore, it seems less meritorious to love Him. Objection 3: What is more difficult seems to be more virtuous and more meritorious, since, as Ethics 2 says, 'Virtue has to do with what is difficult and good.' But it is easier to love God than to love one's neighbor, both because (a) all things love God naturally and also because (b) in God there is nothing that is not to be loved—something that is not the case with one's neighbor. Therefore, it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God. But contrary to this: That because of which each thing is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such. But the love of one's neighbor is meritorious only because one's neighbor is loved because of God. Therefore, the love of God is more meritorious than the love of one's neighbor. I respond: This comparison can be understood in two ways: In one way, insofar as the two sorts of love are considered separately. And in that case there is no doubt that the love of God is more meritorious. Part 2-2, Question 27 211 For a reward is due for it because of itself, since the ultimate reward is to enjoy God, toward whom the movement of the love of God tends. Hence, in John 14:21 a reward is promised to one who loves God: 'If anyone loves me, he will be loved by my Father, and I will manifest myself to him.' Second, the comparison can be considered insofar as ‘love of God' is taken to mean that God alone is being loved, whereas ‘love of neighbor' is taken to mean that one's neighbor is loved because of God. And in this sense the love of one's neighbor includes the love of God, whereas the love of God does not include the love of one's neighbor. Hence, there will be a comparison of the perfect love of God, which also extends to one's neighbor, with a love of God that is insufficient and imperfect by reason of the fact that 'this commandment we have from God: that he who loves God should also love his brother' (1 John 4:21). And in this sense the love of one's neighbor is preeminent. Reply to objection 1: According to one explanation in a Gloss, the Apostle did not wish this—namely, that he should be separated from Christ for the sake of his

brothers—when he was in the state of grace, but instead he had wished it when he was in the state of unbelief. Hence, he is not to be imitated on this point. A possible alternative reply, following Chrysostom in De Compunctione, is that this passage does not show that the Apostle loved his neighbor more than God, but instead shows that he loved God more than himself. For he willed to be deprived of the enjoyment of God for a time (which pertains to his love of himself) in order that God's honor might be procured among his neighbors (which pertains to the love of God). Reply to objection 2: The love of one's friend is sometimes less meritorious because the friend is loved because of himself, and so the love falls short of the genuine reason for the friendship of charity, which is God. And so the fact that God is loved because of Himself does not diminish the merit; instead, it constitutes the whole character of merit. Reply to objection 3: It is the good of virtue, rather than its difficulty, that contributes more to the character of merit. Hence, it does not have to be the case that whatever is more difficult is more meritorious; rather, what is more meritorious is what is more difficult in such a way that it is also better. ### QUESTION 28 Joy We next have to consider the effects that follow upon the principal act of charity, which is the act of loving: first of all, the interior effects (questions 28-30) and, second, the exterior effects (questions 31-33). On the first topic there are three effects to be considered: joy (gaudium) (question 28), peace (pax) (question 29), and mercy (misericordia) (question 30). On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is joy an effect of charity? (2) Is joy of this sort compatible with sadness? (3) Can this sort of joy be full (plenum)? (4) Is this sort of joy a virtue? ##

Article 1 Is joy an effect of charity within us It seems that joy (gaudium) is not an effect of charity within us: Objection 1: Sadness (tristitia), rather than joy, follows from the absence of what is loved. But God, whom we love through charity, is absent to us as long as we live in this life, since, as 2 Corinthians 5:6 says, 'As long as we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord.' Therefore, within us charity causes sadness rather than joy. Objection 2: Through charity we especially merit beatitude. But among the things through which it is claimed that we merit beatitude is sorrow (luctus)—this according to Matthew 5:5 ('Blessed are they who mourn, for they shall be comforted'). Therefore, sadness, rather than joy, is an effect of charity. Objection 3: As is clear from what was said above (q. 17, a. 6), charity is a virtue distinct from hope. But joy is caused by hope—this according to Romans 12:2 ('... rejoicing in hope'). Therefore, joy is not caused by charity. But contrary to this: As Romans 5:5 says, 'The charity of God is diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us.' But joy is caused within us by the Holy Spirit—this according to Romans 14:17 ('The kingdom of God is not food and drink, but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit'). Therefore, charity is a cause of joy. I respond: As was explained above when we were discussing the passions (ST 1-2, q. 25, a. 3), joy (gaudium) and sadness (tristitia) arise from love (amor), but in different ways. For joy is caused by love either (a) because of the presence of the thing that is loved or also (b) because in the very thing that is loved, that thing's own proper good exists and is conserved. Accordingly, the latter pertains to the love of benevolence (ad amorem benevolentiae), through which someone rejoices over his friend's prospering, even if his friend is absent. By contrast, sadness is caused by love either (a) because of the absence of what is loved or (b) because someone for whom we will the good is deprived of his own good or oppressed by some evil.

Now charity is the love of God, whose good is unchangeable, since He is His own goodness. And by the fact that He is loved He exists in the one who loves Him through His most noble effect—this according to 1 John 4:16 ('He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him'). And so spiritual joy, which is had from God, is caused by charity. Reply to objection 1: As long as we are in the body, we are said to be 'absent from the Lord' in comparison with that presence by which He is present to some through the ‘vision of sight'. This is why the Apostle adds in the same place, 'We walk by faith and not by sight.' However, He is also present to those who love Him in this life through the indwelling of grace (per gratiae inhabitationem). Reply to objection 2: The sorrow that merits beatitude is over things that are contrary to beatitude. Hence, the fact that such sorrow is caused by charity has the same explanation as the fact that spiritual joy over God is caused by charity, since rejoicing over a good has the same explanation as being saddened by things that are incompatible with that good. Part 2-2, Question 28 213 Reply to objection 3: There are two ways in which there can be spiritual joy over God: (a) insofar as we rejoice over the divine good considered in its own right and (b) insofar as we rejoice over the divine good as participated in by us. Now the first sort of joy is better, and it is this that principally proceeds from charity. But the second sort of joy proceeds also from hope, through which we look forward to the enjoyment of the divine good—though the enjoyment itself, whether perfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of our charity. ## Article 2 Does the spiritual joy that is caused by charity receive an admixture of sadness It seems that the spiritual joy that is caused by charity receives an admixture of sadness: Objection 1: It belongs to charity to rejoice together over the goods of one's neighbor—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:6 ('Charity does not rejoice over wickedness, but rejoices together over the truth'). But such joy receives an

admixture of sadness—this according to Romans 12:15 ('Rejoice with those who rejoice; weep with those who weep'). Therefore spiritual joy takes on an admixture of sadness. Objection 2: As Gregory says, 'Penitence is to weep over evils that have previously been done and not to commit again acts that have to be wept over.' But true penitence does not exist without charity. Therefore, the joy that belongs to charity has an admixture of sorrow. Objection 3: Because of charity it happens that one desires to be with Christ—this according to Philippians 1:23 ('... having the desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ'). But a certain sadness follows upon this desire—this according to Psalm 119:5 ('Woe is me that my sojourn here has been prolonged'). Therefore, the joy that belongs to charity receives an admixture of sadness. But contrary to this: The joy that belongs to charity is joy over God's wisdom. But joy of this sort does not have any sadness mixed in—this according to Wisdom 8:16 ('Her conversation has no bitterness'). Therefore, the joy that belongs to charity does not receive an admixture of sadness. I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), there are two sorts of joy over God that are caused by charity. One is the principal joy, which is proper to charity and by which we rejoice over the divine good considered in its own right. And this sort of joy that belongs to charity does not suffer from any admixture of sadness, just as the good over which there is joy cannot have any admixture of evil, either. And this is why the Apostle says in Philippians 4:4, 'Rejoice in the Lord always.' On the other hand, the second sort of joy that belongs to charity is that by which one rejoices over the divine good insofar as it is participated in by us. However, this participation can be impeded by something contrary to it. And so on this score the joy that belongs to charity can have an admixture of sadness, viz., insofar as someone is saddened by what works against participation in the divine good either in us or in our neighbors, whom we love as ourselves. Reply to objection 1: The tears of our neighbors are only over some evil. But every evil implies a defect in one's participation in the highest good. And so charity makes one sad for his neighbor to the extent that participation in the divine good is impeded in him.

Reply to objection 2: As Isaiah 59:2 says, sin causes a division between us and God. And this is a reason for sorrowing over our own past sins as well as over the past sins of others, insofar as we are impeded by those sins from participating in the divine good. Reply to objection 3: Even though we in some way participate in the divine good through cognition and love even in the dwelling of our present unhappiness, the unhappiness of this life nonetheless keeps us from a perfect participation in the divine good of the sort that will exist in heaven. Part 2-2, Question 28 214 And so this sadness by which one mourns the delay of glory likewise has to do with an impediment to his participation in the divine good. ## Article 3 Is the spiritual joy that is caused by charity able to be made full in us It seems that the spiritual joy that is caused by charity is not able to be made full in us (non possit in nobis impleri): Objection 1: God's joy is made more full in us to the extent that we have more joy over Him. But we can never rejoice over God to the extent that He is worthy of being rejoiced over. For it is always the case that His goodness, which is infinite, exceeds a creature's joy, which is finite. Therefore, joy over God can never be full in a creature. Objection 2: What is made full cannot be made greater. But even the joy of the blessed in heaven can be greater, since the joy that belongs to one of the blessed is greater than the joy that belongs to another. Therefore, joy over God cannot be made full in a creature. Objection 3: Comprehension seems to be nothing other than a fullness of cognition. But just as a creature's cognitive power is finite, so, too, is a creature's appetitive power. Therefore, since God cannot be comprehended by any creature, it seems that a creature's joy over God cannot be made full.

But contrary to this: In John 15:11 our Lord said to His disciples, '... that my joy may be in you, and your joy may be made full.' I respond: Fullness of joy (plenitudo gaudii) can be understood in two ways. In one way, on the part of the thing over which there is rejoicing, so that, namely, there is as much rejoicing over it as it is worthy of being rejoiced over. And in this sense only God's joy over Himself is full, since (a) God's joy is infinite and (b) His infinite goodness is wholly worthy of this (hoc est condignum infinitae bonitati Dei). By contrast, the joy of any creature has to be finite. In the second way, fullness of joy can be thought of on the part of the one who is rejoicing. Now as was explained above when we were talking about the passions (ST 1-2, q. 25, aa. 1-2), joy is related to desire in the way that rest is related to movement. But there is full rest when nothing remains of the movement. Hence, there is full joy when nothing any longer remains to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the movement of desire does not come to a rest within us, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 24, aa. 4 and 7), it still remains that we might get closer to God through grace. Now when perfect beatitude will have been reached, then nothing will remain to be desired, since then there will be full enjoyment of God and in this enjoyment a man will obtain whatever he has desired in other goods—this according to Psalm 102:5 ('... who satisfies your desire with good things'). And so desire will come to a rest—not only the desire by which we desire God, but there will likewise be rest with respect to all desires. Hence, the joy of the blessed in heaven is perfectly full—and, indeed, more than full, since they will obtain more than they have been content to desire (plus obtinebunt quam desiderare suffecerint). For as 1 Corinthians 2:9 says, '... nor has it entered into the heart of man what God has prepared for those who love Him.' And this is why Luke 6:38 says, 'Good measure ... and overflowing they shall give into your bosom.' However, since no creature is capable of a joy over God that is wholly worthy of Him, it follows that the sort of joy that is altogether full joy is not ‘grasped' by a man; rather, the man ‘enters into' it—this according to Matthew 25:21 ('Enter into the joy of your lord'). Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for fullness of joy on the part of the thing that is rejoiced over. Reply to objection 2: When beatitude has been arrived at, each one will attain the limit fixed for him by divine predestination, and there will remain nothing further that is tended toward—even though in that end state one will attain a greater

closeness to God and another will be less close to Him. Part 2-2, Question 28 215 And so the joy of each one will be full on the part of the one who is rejoicing, since the desire of each one will be put fully to rest, and yet the joy of one individual will be greater than the joy of another because of a fuller participation in God's beatitude. Reply to objection 3: Comprehension implies a fullness of cognition on the part of the thing known, so that, namely, it is known to the extent that it can be know[n]. However, cognition also has a fullness on the part of the knower, just as has been explained for the case of joy. Hence, in Colossians 1:9 the Apostle says, '... that you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom, and spiritual understanding.' ## Article 4 Is joy a virtue It seems that joy is a virtue: Objection 1: A vice is contrary to a virtue. But as is clear in the case of acedia (acedia) and envy (invidia), sadness is posited as a vice. Therefore, joy ought likewise to be posited as a virtue. Objection 2: Just as love (amor) and hope (spes) are certain passions whose object is the good, so too with joy. But love and hope are posited as virtues. Therefore, joy should be posited as a virtue, too. Objection 3: Precepts of the Law are handed down concerning acts of the virtues. But it is commanded that we rejoice over God[—] this according to Philippians 4:4 ('Rejoice in the Lord always'). Therefore, joy is a virtue. But contrary to this: As is clear from what was said above (ST 1-2, qq. 57, 60 and 62), joy is not enumerated either among the theological virtues or among the moral virtues or among the intellectual virtues. I respond: As was established above (ST 1-2, q. 55, aa. 2 and 4), a virtue is a

certain sort of operative habit and so by its proper nature has an inclination toward some act. Now it is possible for many ordered acts of the same character to arise from a single habit, with one of the acts following upon another. And since the later acts proceed from the habit of the virtue only through a prior act, it happens that the virtue is defined or named only from the prior act, even though the other acts also follow from it. Now it is clear from what was said above about the passions (ST 1-2, q. 25, aa. 1-3) that love (amor) is the first affection of an appetitive power and that desire and joy follow upon it. And so it is the same habit of virtue that inclines one (a) to love and (b) to desire the good that is loved and (c) to rejoice over it. But since love (dilectio) is the first among these acts, it happens that the virtue is named (denominatur) not from joy or desire, but instead from love; and the virtue is called charity. So, then, joy is not a virtue distinct from charity, but is a certain act or effect of charity. And because of this, it is numbered among the fruits [of the Holy Spirit], as is clear from Galatians 5:22. Reply to objection 1: The sadness that is a vice is caused by a disordered love of oneself, which, as was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 77, a. 4), is not a specific vice but instead a sort of general root of the vices. And so one has to posit particular sorts of sadness as specific vices, since they flow from a general vice and not from any specific vice. By contrast, the love of God is a specific virtue, viz., charity, and, as has been explained, it is to charity that joy is traced back as an act proper to it. Reply to objection 2: Hope follows from love in the same way that joy does, but hope adds a certain specific character on the part of the object, viz., that the object is both difficult to obtain and possible to obtain. By contrast, joy does not add, over and beyond love, any special character on the part of the object that could give rise to a special virtue. Part 2-2, Question 28 216 Reply to objection 3: A precept of the Law is handed down about joy insofar as joy is an act of charity, though it is not the first act of charity. ###

QUESTION 29 Peace We next have to consider peace. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is peace (pax) the same as concord (concordia)? (2) Do all things seek peace? (3) Is peace an effect of charity? (4) Is peace a virtue? ## Article 1 Is peace the same as concord It seems that peace (pax) is the same as concord (concordia): Objection 1: In De Civitate Dei 19 Augustine says, 'Peace among men is ordered concord.' But we are speaking here of nothing other than peace among men. Therefore, peace is the same as concord. Objection 2: Concord is a certain union of wills. But the essence of peace (ratio pacis) consists in such a union; for in De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 11 Dionysius says, 'Peace is what unifies all and is an operative consensus.' Therefore, peace is the same as concord. Objection 3: Things that have the same opposite are the same as one another. But the same thing, viz., dissension (dissensio), is opposed both to concord and to peace; hence, 1 Corinthians 14:33 says, 'He is not a God of dissension, but a God of peace.' Therefore, peace is the same as concord. But contrary to this: There can be concord among wicked men with respect to something evil. But as Isaiah 48:22 says, 'There is no peace for the wicked.' Therefore, peace is not the same as concord. I respond: Peace includes concord and adds something else to it. Hence, if the name ‘peace' is being taken properly, then wherever there is peace, there is concord, but it is not the case that wherever there is concord, there is peace. For concord, taken properly, is had in relation to someone else (ad alterum)—more specifically, it is had insofar as the acts of will of different hearts come together at

the same time in a single consensus (inquantum diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt). In addition, it happens that the heart of an individual man tends toward diverse things, and this in two ways. One corresponds to diverse appetitive powers, in the way that the sentient appetite very often tends toward what is contrary to the intellective appetite—this according to Galatians 5:17 ('The flesh lusts against the spirit'). In a second way, insofar as one and [the] same appetitive power tends toward diverse desirable things which cannot be attained simultaneously. Hence, there has to be conflict among the appetitive movements. Now the union of such movements is of the essence of peace (de ratione pacis); for even if a man possesses something that he wants, he does not have a peaceful heart (pacatum cor) as long as there is still something that he wants and cannot have at the same time. By contrast, this sort of union of movements is not of the essence of concord. Hence, concord implies a union of desires among different individuals (unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium), whereas, over and beyond this union, peace implies a union of desires within a single individual. Reply to objection 1: Augustine is here talking about the peace that exists between one man and another. And he says that this peace is concord—not just any sort of concord, but concord that is ordered by the fact that the one man agrees with the other on something that is fitting for both. For if one man agrees with another not by a spontaneous willing but by being, as it were, coerced by the fear of some imminent evil, than such a concord is not genuine peace, since the order within the two who are agreeing is not preserved, but is instead disrupted by whatever inflicts the fear. And this is why Augustine, before this, had said that peace is a tranquility of order, and this sort of tranquility consists in all the appetitive movements within an individual man being at rest together. Reply to objection 2: If one man consents to the same thing as another man, his agreement is not altogether unified unless all of his own appetitive movements likewise agree with one another. Part 2-2, Question 29 218 Reply to objection 3: There are two sorts of dissension, viz., (a) dissension between a man and himself and (b) dissension between one man and another. It is only the second sort of dissension that is opposed to concord.

## Article 2 Do all things seek peace It seems that not all things seek (appetant) peace: Objection 1: According to Dionysius, peace is a 'consensus that makes for unity' (unitiva consensus). But in things that lack cognition there cannot be a unified consensus. Therefore, things of this sort cannot seek peace. Objection 2: An appetitive power does not tend toward contraries at the same time. But there are many who desire war and dissension. Therefore, not everyone desires peace. Objection 3: Only what is good is desirable. But a certain sort of peace seems to be bad; otherwise, our Lord would not say in Matthew 10:34, 'I have not come to bring peace.' Therefore, not all things seek peace. Objection 4: What all things seek seems to be the highest good, which is the ultimate end. But peace is not this sort of thing, since it is had even in the present life; otherwise, in Mark 9:49 it would have been useless for our Lord to command, 'Have peace among you.' Therefore, not all things seek peace. But contrary to this: In De Civitate Dei 19 Augustine says that all things seek peace. And Dionysius says the same thing in De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 11. I respond: From the very fact that a man desires something, it follows that he desires the attainment of what he desires and, as a result, he desires the removal of anything that can impede that attainment. Now the attainment of a desired good can be impeded by a contrary desire either on the man's own part or on the part of others and, as was explained above (a. 1), both of these obstacles are removed by peace. And so it must be the case that anything that has an appetitive power seeks peace, viz., insofar as everything that has an appetitive power seeks to arrive with tranquility and without impediment at that which it seeks—and this is what peace, which Augustine defines as 'a tranquility of order,' consists in. Reply to objection 1: Peace implies not only a unification of the intellectual (or rational) appetite or a unification of the animal appetite, both of which have to do with a consensus, but also a unification of natural appetite. This is why Dionysius

says that peace 'effects both consensus and connaturality,' so that ‘consensus' implies a unification of appetitive powers that proceed from cognition, and ‘connaturality' implies a unification of natural appetitive powers. Reply to objection 2: Those who seek war and dissension desire only a peace which they do not think that they have. For as has been explained, it is not peace if someone agrees with another against something that he wills to a greater degree. And so by making war, men seek to shatter this latter sort of concord as something lacking in peace, in order that they might arrive at a peace in which nothing is contrary to their will. And for this reason, all those who make war seek to arrive through war at a more perfect peace than they previously had. Reply to objection 3: Since peace consists in the quieting and unification of the appetitive power, it follows that just as a desire can be either for the good absolutely speaking or for a merely apparent good, so too peace can be both genuine and apparent. There cannot be a genuine peace unless what is desired is a genuine good (nisi circa appetitum veri boni), since every evil, even if it appears good in some respect and hence partly quiets the appetite, nonetheless has many defects because of which the appetitive power remains restless and perturbed.. Part 2-2, Question 29 219 Hence, a true peace can exist only in good individuals and among good individuals. By contrast, the peace that belongs to bad individuals is an apparent peace and not a genuine peace. Hence, Wisdom 14:22 says, 'Those living in a great war of ignorance took so many evils, and such great evils, to be peace.' Reply to objection 4: Since genuine peace exists only with respect to the good, it follows that just as a true good is had in two ways, viz., perfectly and imperfectly, so there are two sorts of genuine peace. One is perfect peace, which consists in the perfect enjoyment of the highest good and through which all desires are unified by coming to rest in a single good. And that is the ultimate end of a rational creature—this according to Psalm147:3 ('He has made peace within your borders'). The other is imperfect peace, which is had in this world. For even though the principal movement of the soul comes to rest in God, there are nonetheless conflicts, both interior and exterior, which disturb this peace. ##

Article 3 Is peace a proper effect of charity It seems that peace is not a proper effect of charity: Objection 1: Charity is not had without habitual grace (sine gratia gratum faciente). But peace is had by some individuals who do not have habitual grace; for instance, the gentiles sometimes have peace. Therefore, peace is not an effect of charity. Objection 2: Something whose contrary can exist with charity is not an effect of charity. But dissension, which is contrary to peace, can exist with charity. For we see that even the sacred doctors, e.g., Jerome and Augustine, disagree in some of their opinions, and it is written in Acts 15:37 that even Paul and Barnabas disagreed. Therefore, it seems that peace is not an effect of charity. Objection 3: It is not the case that the same thing is the proper effect of diverse things. But peace is an effect of justice—this according to Isaiah 32:17 ('The work of justice is peace'). Therefore, it is not an effect of charity. But contrary to this: Psalm 118:165 says, 'Much peace have they who love your Law.' I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), there are two unifications that are of the essence of peace. One of them has to do with the ordering of one's own appetitive powers into a unity, while the other has to do with unifying one's own appetite with the appetite of another. And charity effects both of these unifications. It effects the first unification insofar as God is loved with our whole heart—so that, namely, we refer all things to God and so all our desires are brought together into a unity. Charity effects the second unification insofar as we love our neighbor as ourselves, and from this it happens that a man wills to fulfill the will of his neighbor as he wills to fulfill his own will. And it is because of this that sameness of choices is posited as one of the signs of friendship, as is clear from Ethics 9; and in his book De Amicitia Tully says, 'It belongs to friends to like and dislike the same things.'

Reply to objection 1: No one falls away from habitual grace except because of sin, by which it happens that a man is turned away from his due end and sets up his end in something unfitting. And on this score his appetitive power adheres principally to an apparent final good instead of to the true final good. And this is why there can only be apparent peace, and not true peace, in the absence of habituating grace. Part 2-2, Question 29 220 Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says in Ethics 9, it is not agreement on opinions that pertains to friendship, but rather agreement on the goods that contribute to life—particularly the big goods, since to disagree on some small matters seems, as it were, not to amount to dissension. And because of this, nothing prevents individuals who have charity from disagreeing in their opinions. Nor is this incompatible with peace, since these opinions belong to the intellect, which precedes the appetitive power that is unified by peace. Similarly, when there is agreement on important goods, disagreement in small matters is not contrary to charity. For such disagreement proceeds from a diversity of opinions, where one of the individuals thinks the matter over which there is disagreement is relevant to the good on which they agree, and the other individual thinks that it is not relevant. Accordingly, such disagreement over trifles and over opinions is, to be sure, incompatible with perfect peace, in which the truth will be known fully and every desire will be fulfilled, but it is not incompatible with imperfect peace of the sort that is had in this life. Reply to objection 3: Peace is indirectly the work of justice, viz., insofar as justice removes obstacles to peace. But peace is directly the work of charity, since charity by its proper nature is a cause of peace. For as Dionysius says in De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, love is a 'unifying force' and peace is the unification of the appetitive inclinations. ## Article 4 Is peace a virtue It seems that peace is a virtue: Objection 1: Precepts are handed down only with respect to acts of the virtues. But as is clear from Mark 9:49 ('Have peace among you'), precepts are handed down about having peace. Therefore, peace is a virtue.

Objection 2: We merit only by acts of the virtues. But it is meritorious to make peace—this according to Matthew 5:9 ('Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God'). Therefore, peace is a virtue. Objection 3: Vices are opposed to virtues. But dissension, which is opposed to peace, is numbered among the vices, as is clear from Galatians 5:20. Therefore, peace is not a virtue. But contrary to this: A virtue is not itself the ultimate end but is instead a path to the ultimate end. But peace is in some sense the ultimate end, as Augustine explains in De Civitate Dei 19. Therefore, peace is not a virtue. I respond: As was explained above (q. 28, a. 4), when all the acts follow upon one another, proceeding from the agent according to the same reason, then all acts of this sort proceed from a single virtue or power (ab una virtute procedunt); nor do the individual acts have individual virtues from which they proceed. This is clear in the case of corporeal entities. For instance, when fire, by giving heat, liquefies and rarefies, there does not exist in the fire one liquefying power and another rarefying power; instead, the fire effects all these acts through its single heating power. Therefore, since, as has been shown (a. 3), peace is caused by charity in accord with the very nature of the love of God and neighbor, it follows that, just as in the case of joy, there is not a virtue other than charity of which peace is a proper act. Reply to objection 1: The reason that a precept is handed down for having peace is that it is an act of charity. And because of this it is also a meritorious act. And this is why it is posited among the beatitudes, which, as was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 69, a. 3), are acts of perfect virtue. Likewise, it is posited among the fruits [of the Holy Spirit] insofar as it is a sort of final good having spiritual sweetness. Part 2-2, Question 29 221 Reply to objection 2: The reply to the second objection is clear from what was just said. Reply to objection 3: Many vices are opposed to a single virtue in accord with the virtue's diverse acts. And, on this score, opposed to charity is not just (a) hate, by reason of the act of loving, but also (b) acedia and envy, by reason of joy, and (c) dissension, by reason of peace.

### QUESTION 30 Mercy We next have to consider mercy or pity (misericordia). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the cause of mercy or pity something bad that belongs to the one on whom we have mercy or pity[?] (2) Over what sorts of things does one have mercy or pity (quorum sit misereri)? (3) Is mercy a virtue[?] (4) Is mercy the greatest of the virtues? ## Article 1 Is something bad properly speaking the motive for mercy It seems that something bad is not properly speaking the motive for mercy or pity (misericordia): Objection 1: As was shown above (q. 19, a.1 and q. 48, a.6), sin is a greater evil than punishment. But sin evokes indignation rather than mercy or pity. Therefore, it is not what is bad that evokes mercy or pity. Objection 2: What is cruel or detestable (crudelia seu dira) seems to have a certain excess of evil. But in Rhetoric 2 the Philosopher says that what is detestable is different from what is pitiable and expels pity. Therefore, what is bad is not as such a motive for mercy or pity. Objection 3: Indications of bad things are not themselves genuinely bad. But as is evident from Rhetoric 2, indications of bad things evoke pity. Therefore, it is not what is bad that properly speaking evokes mercy or pity. But contrary to this: In De Fide Orthodoxa 2 Damascene says that mercy or pity is a species of sadness. But the motive for sadness is something bad. Therefore, the motive for mercy or pity is something bad. I respond: As Augustine says in De Civitate Dei 9, 'Mercy or pity (misericordia) is

compassion in our heart for another's unhappiness (alienae miseriae in nostro corde compassio), by which we are compelled to help if we are able to.' For it is called ‘misericordia' from the fact that one has a saddened heart (miserum cor) over the unhappiness of another (super miseria alterius). But misery or unhappiness (miseria) is opposed to happiness (felicitas), and it is of the nature of beatitude or happiness (de ratione beatitudinis sive felicitatis) that one gets what he wants. For as Augustine says in De Trinitate 13, 'The one who is happy (beatus) has all that he wants and wants nothing bad.' And so, contrariwise, it belongs to misery or unhappiness that a man undergoes something that he does not want to undergo. Now there are three ways in which someone wants something: In one way, he wants it by a natural desire, in the way that all men want to exist and to live. In a second way, he wants something by choice stemming from premeditation. In a third way, a man wants something not in its own right but in its cause; for instance, when someone wants to eat what is harmful to him, we say that he in some sense wants to be sick. So, then, the motive for mercy or pity, insofar as it pertains to unhappiness, is in the first instance what is contrary to the natural desire of the one who is doing the willing, viz., corruptive and sorrowful evils whose contraries men desire naturally. Hence, in Rhetoric 2 the Philosopher says, 'Pity is a certain sadness over an apparent corruptive or sorrowful evil.' Second, bad things of this sort are more effective in evoking pity when they are contrary to choices one has willed. Hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that bad things make for unhappiness 'when their cause is fortune, as when something bad occurs where something good was being hoped for.' Third, bad things cause still more unhappiness when they are contrary to whatever someone wills (contra totam voluntatem), e.g., when a particular individual has always pursued good things, and bad things keep happening to him. And so in the same book the Philosopher says, 'The greatest degree of pity is over evils that someone suffers undeservedly.' Part 2-2, Question 30 223 Reply to objection 1: It is part of the nature of sin that it is voluntary, and on this score it has the character of something to be punished rather than the character of something miserable. But since sin can in some sense itself be a punishment, viz., insofar as it has something joined to it that is contrary to the sinner's will, it can on this score have the character of something miserable. Accordingly, we pity sinners and have compassion for them; as Gregory says in a homily, 'Genuine justice has compassion for sinners and not disdain.' And Matthew 9:36 says, 'Jesus, seeing the

crowds, had compassion on them, because they were troubled and lying about, like sheep without a shepherd.' Reply to objection 2: Sin [ce] mercy or pity is compassion over another's unhappiness, it is properly directed toward another and not toward oneself, except by a sort of similitude—just like justice, insofar as the diverse parts are thought of within a man, as Ethics 5 points out. Accordingly, Ecclesiasticus 30:24 says, 'Have pity on your own soul, pleasing God.' Therefore, just as it is pain or sorrow (dolor)—and not pity or mercy—that is properly speaking directed toward oneself, as when we suffer something detestable within ourselves, so, too, if certain persons are so closely connected to us that they are, as it were, part of ourselves, e.g., children or parents, then we feel pain at their evils and not pity, just as we do in the case of our own wounds. And this is the sense in which the Philosopher says that what is detestable drives out pity. Reply to objection 3: Just as pleasure follows upon the expectation of good things and the memory of good things, so, too, sadness follows upon the expectation of bad things and the memory of bad things—though not as vehemently as from sensing them in the present. And so insofar as indications of bad things represent unhappy bad things as present to us, they move us to have pity. ## Article 2 Is some defect on the part of the one who has mercy a reason for his having mercy It seems that a defect (defectus) on the part of the one who has mercy or pity is not a reason for having mercy or pity: Objection 1: It is proper to God to have mercy; hence, Psalm 144:9 says, 'His tender mercies are over all His works.' But there are no defects in God. Therefore, a defect cannot be a reason for having mercy. Objection 2: If some defect is a reason for having pity, then those who have the biggest defects should especially have pity. But this is false; for in Rhetoric 2 the Philosopher says, 'Those who have been totally ruined have no pity.' Therefore, it is not the case that a defect on the part of the one who has pity is a reason for having pity. Objection 3: Sustaining some sort of abuse involves a defect. But in the same place

the Philosopher says that those who have an abusive disposition do not have pity. Therefore, a defect on the part of the one who has pity is not a reason for having pity. But contrary to this: Mercy is a certain sort of sadness. But a defect is a reason for sadness; this is why, as was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 47, a. 3), the sick are easily saddened. Therefore, a reason for having mercy is a defect on the part of the one who has mercy. I respond: Since, as was explained above (a. 1), mercy or pity is compassion over another's unhappiness, it follows that someone has mercy or pity because it happens that he is sorry about another's unhappiness. Now since sadness or sorrow is directed toward something bad that belongs to oneself, it follows that someone is sorry about, or is saddened by, another's unhappiness to the extent that he perceives the other's unhappiness as his own. Now there are two ways in which this can happen. Part 2-2, Question 30 224 In one way, because of a union of affection, which is effected by love (amor). For since the lover thinks of his friend as himself, he thinks of the evil that belongs to his friend as his own evil, and so he is sorry about his friend's evil as about his own. This is why, in Ethics 9, the Philosopher posits among the signs of friendship that one suffers along with one's friend. And in Romans 12:15 the Apostle says, 'Rejoice with those who rejoice, weep with those who weep.' In the second way, it happens because of a real union, as when something bad that belongs to certain individuals is close enough that it passes from them to us. And so the Philosopher says in Rhetoric 2 that men have pity on those who are connected with them and are similar to them, since they are thereby made to think that they themselves are likewise able to undergo similar bad things. And this is why the old and the wise, who realize that they are able to come unexpectedly upon evils, along with the weak and the fearful, are more merciful. By contrast, others, who think themselves happy and powerful enough that they think that they are unable to be afflicted by anything bad, are not so merciful. So, then, defects are always the reason for having pity or mercy, either insofar as one thinks of another's defect as his own because of a union of love, or because of the possibility of undergoing similar evils.

Reply to objection 1: God is merciful only because of love, insofar as He loves us as something of His own. Reply to objection 2: Those who are already immersed in the worst evils do not fear that they will suffer anything worse, and so they do not have pity or mercy. Similarly, neither do those who are extremely fearful, since they are so intent on their own suffering that they do not pay attention to the unhappiness of others. Reply to objection 3: Those who have an abusive disposition—whether because they have suffered abuse or because they want to afflict abuse on others—are moved to anger and audacity, which are passions of virility that lift a man's mind to deal with what is difficult. Hence, these passions draw a man's mind away from the thought that something will be suffered in the future. Hence, as long as such individuals are in this disposition, they have no mercy—this according to Proverbs 27:4 ('Anger has no mercy, nor fury when it erupts'). For a similar reason, the proud, who look down upon others and think them bad, do not show mercy. This is why Gregory says that false justice, i.e., the false justice of the proud, harbors disdain and not compassion. ## Article 3 Is mercy a virtue It seems that mercy is not a virtue: Objection 1: As is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics, the main thing in a virtue is choice. But as is explained in the same book, an act of choosing is an inclination toward what has already been deliberated about (appetitus praeconsiliati). Therefore, what impedes deliberation cannot be called a virtue. But mercy or pity impedes deliberation—this according to Sallust ('All men who take counsel need to be free from anger and pity, since the mind does not easily see the truth when these things stand in the way'). Therefore, mercy is not a virtue. Objection 2: Nothing contrary to a virtue is praiseworthy. But as the Philosopher says in Rhetoric 2, nemesis is contrary to mercy. But as Ethics 2 says, nemesis is a praiseworthy virtue. Therefore, mercy is not a virtue.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 28, a. 4 and q. 29, a. 4), since joy and peace follow upon charity, they are not special virtues,. But mercy likewise follows upon charity, since it is out of charity that we 'weep with those who weep,' in the same way that we 'rejoice with those who rejoice.' Therefore, mercy is not a special virtue. Part 2-2, Question 30 225 Objection 4: Since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is not an intellectual virtue. Neither is it a theological virtue, since it does not have God as its object. Similarly, it is not a moral virtue, either. For it does not have to do with operations, since this pertains to justice; nor does it have to do with the passions, since it is not traced back to any of the twelve 'means' that the Philosopher posits in Ethics 2. Therefore, mercy is not a virtue. But contrary to this: In De Civitate Dei 9 Augustine says, 'In praising Caesar, Cicero spoke much better and more humanely and more in keeping with pious sensibilities when he said, ‘None of your virtues is more admirable or gracious than your mercy'.' Therefore, mercy is a virtue. I respond: Mercy implies sorrow over the unhappiness of another. Now this sorrow can, in one sense, denominate a movement of the sentient appetite. And on this score mercy or pity is a passion and not a virtue. However, in a second sense it can denominate a movement of the intellective appetite, insofar as an individual is displeased by what is bad for someone else. Now this movement can be regulated by reason and, in accord with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of the lower appetite can be regulated. Hence, in De Civitate Dei 9 Augustine says, 'This movement of the soul'—viz., mercy—'serves reason when mercy is offered in such a way that justice is preserved, whether one is giving to the needy or forgiving the penitent.' And because, as was shown above (ST 1-2, q. 56, a. 4 and q. 59, a. 4 and q. 60, a. 5 and q. 66, a. 4), the nature of a human virtue consists in the mind's movements being regulated by reason, it follows that mercy is a virtue. Reply to objection 1: This passage from Sallust is taken to be about mercy insofar as it is a passion unregulated by reason. For as an unregulated passion it impedes reason's deliberation when it makes for a departure from justice.

Reply to objection 2: Here the Philosopher is speaking of mercy and nemesis insofar as both of them are passions. And, to be sure, they have a contrariety as to the estimation they have of the bad things that happen to others. The one who experiences mercy is sorry about those bad things to the extent that he thinks that an individual is suffering them undeservedly, whereas the one who experiences nemesis (a) rejoices over them to the extent that he thinks that the individuals are suffering them deservedly and (b) is saddened if things go well for the undeserving. And as is said in the same place, 'Both of the passions are praiseworthy and derive from the same moral disposition.' However, as will be explained below (q. 36, a. 3), it is envy that is properly opposed to mercy. Reply to objection 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the character of the good which is the object of charity, and so they do not require virtues other than charity. By contrast, mercy has to do with a special reason, viz., the unhappiness of the individual to whom mercy is shown. Reply to objection 4: Insofar as it is a virtue, mercy is a moral virtue that has to do with the passions, and it is traced back to the mean that is called nemesis, since it proceeds from the same moral disposition, as Rhetoric 2 explains. To be sure, the Philosopher does posit these means as passions and not as virtues, since they are praiseworthy even insofar as they are passions. However, nothing prevents them from arising from an elective habit. And in this respect they assume the character of a virtue. ## Article 4 Is mercy the greatest of the virtues It seems that mercy is the greatest of the virtues: Part 2-2, Question 30 226 Objection 1: Divine worship seems especially relevant to virtue. But mercy is placed higher than divine worship—this according to Hosea 6:6 and Matthew 12:7 ('I desire mercy, and not sacrifice'). Therefore, mercy is the greatest of the virtues. Objection 2: In his Gloss on 1 Timothy 4:8 ('Godliness (pietas) is profitable to all things'), Ambrose says, 'The whole summit of the Christian way of life lies in mercy and piety.' But the Christian way of life includes every virtue. Therefore, the

summit of the whole of virtue consists in mercy. Objection 3: A virtue is something that makes the one having it good. Therefore, a virtue is better to the extent that it makes a man more similar to God, since a man is better by being more similar to God. But it is mercy that especially does this, since in Psalm 144:9 it is said of God that 'His tender mercies are over all His works.' Hence, in Luke 6:36 our Lord says, 'Be merciful, even as your Father is merciful.' Therefore, mercy is the greatest of the virtues. But contrary to this: In Colossians 3:12, after the Apostle had said, 'Put on, as the beloved of God, the bowels of mercy ...,' he later added, '... above all, have charity.' Therefore, mercy is not the greatest of the virtues. I respond: There are two ways in which a virtue can be the greatest virtue: (a) in its own right (secundum se) and (b) in relation to the one who has it. In its own right mercy is the greatest. For it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others and, what's more, to alleviate the needs of others—and this belongs especially to someone who is higher (est superioris). That is why being merciful is posited as proper to God, and it is in this that His omnipotence is especially manifested. However, as regards the one who has the virtue, mercy is not the greatest unless the one who has it is the greatest and has no one above him, but instead has everyone below him. For one who has someone above him is such that it is greater and better for him to be connected to someone above him than to supply what is needed to someone below him. And so, as regards a man, who has God above him, charity, through which he is united to God, is better than mercy, through which he supplies what is needed by his neighbors (per quam defectus proximorum supplet). Still, among all the virtues that pertain to one's neighbor, mercy is the best, just as its act likewise belongs to one who is better. For to supply what is needed by another belongs, as such, to someone who is higher and better. Reply to objection 1: It is not because of God that we worship Him with exterior sacrifices and gifts; it is because of ourselves and because of our neighbors. For He does not need our sacrifices, but instead He wants them to be offered for the sake of our devotion and for the sake of the advantage of our neighbors. And so mercy, by which the needs of others are supplied, is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, because it works more closely to the advantage of our neighbors—this according to

Hebrews 13:16 ('Do not forget to do good and to share; for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained'). Reply to objection 2: The summit of the Christian religion consists in mercy as regards its exterior works. However, the interior affection of charity, by which we are joined to God, is greater than both love and mercy with respect to our neighbors. Reply to objection 3: It is through charity that we are assimilated to God as united to Him through affection. And so charity is greater than mercy, through which we are assimilated to God as regards a similarity in operation. ###