Whitehead_Haas_Anthropology of WarCap7.pdf

8/11/2019 Whitehead_Haas_Anthropology of WarCap7.pdf

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makc this assessment little reliancecan be placedon possible expJanations of war or even of specific \vars inthe Carib area.

A third consequencc of reevaluation will be to alJo\\' formorecomprehensive explanationsof Carib warfare. ConAictin Amazoniaand the Guianas is unlikelv to

causes.the identificationof what

alld the studyof thehas historically arisen.

purposesof lhis pap cr are accordingly l\Vofold: first, to provide adetailed and accurate descriptionof Carib militar)' tacticsandweaponry,as well as tIJe socialand ideoJogical context inwhich they\Vere deployed;and second, to analyzethe effectsof European intrusionOIl these same aspectsof Carib socicty.

Tile Caribs arc today represented byremnant communities living inVenezuela, Guyana Karrzya), Surinam, and French Guiana Galib),aIld have long played a central role inthe historyof colonialism in thisregion of the Caribbean and South America. Despite sorne regionaldialect differences thesc groups areas linguisticallyhomogeneous todayas they \Vere in the sixteenth celltury (Hoff1968. Thev have alsodisplayed exceptionaJ tenacityand longevity

is e Vidcnt from the earliest

or spirits-from-the-sea)andother Amerindian groups. For example,both thenorthern and western neighborsof the

a s1I11Ilar taleof the originsof Caribs.To wit, tbey say thatthe Carib arose fromthe rottillg bodyof a snake (the anaconda),which had been killcd bythem following its seductionof tbeir wives.The Achagua,another neighboring grollp, said simply thatthe Caribs,, ere chaviarz or sonsof the tigers tecth .1

SlIch Amerindian legellds, first lIoted bythe earl)' missionaries JosGurnilla alldWilliam Brett in theeightecnth and ninetecnth centuries,

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Carib warfare, ca.

catingofsuch a stcreotype, in terms

Carib settlementsand socially andisolating Carib tradcrs. was well lInderstood bythe

heginning of thcir occupation of the New World. twas also assidllollsly employed bythcm throughout the pacificationoftheOrinoco basin Whitehead 1988 . Howcver, inthe colonial experience of thc Englishand Dutch, while losingnonc of the more luridattributes inmany descriptions we haveof them, the Caribs emergeasinvaluablc military alliesand trading partners.This fact particlllarlydisturbedthe Spanish visionof conquest on the Ornoco. n 1638 theCorporationof SalltoTom, Spanish capitalof Guayana, left the Kingin no doubt as to consequenccsof thisOne grieves for somany women and children who arehandsof such inhuman savages, eatersofhumanour Bol Catholc Faith from whom God was

the coreofn April

< he Caribsand Dulch. 01115)

al

followingthe Berbice slave rcbelliol1,the Directorwrotethe following tothe Directorsof the Dutch

India Company (DWIC);God be praised, arebeginning oncc more lo takc a lolerably

turo Ihere [Berbic:e], lo whic:hend our Caribs, both from Iheserivers [Essequibo Del1lcrara] and even Barim a, have Joyallydone their best

are yet doingit, constantly roving abollt belweenthe two Colonics .havngbeen so successfuJ in all their expedilio11Sas lo have losl11 11C of theirown people. PRO-CO. 116, 34)

The Spanishopinion of the Carib \vasnot without S0111efor they\Vere, on occasion, ruthless warriorsand slavers. However,thehistorical conkxt and motivationof these activiticsiscannot be understood initself forced linesof Carib

arca. Fur


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thermore, this central role, over a periodof nearly three centuriesinduced the Caribs to approximate moreand more c10sely the verystereotype that European fears and insecurities had so gratuitouslyassigned to them. Even the Prefectofthe Capuchin Mission, Fr. Benitode la Garriaga, felt obligated to acknowledge the effectsof this process:"this trade in PoytosZhasso complctcly altered the Caribs that now their

occupationis constantly going to and from war, scIling and killingthe Indians " (AGl. C.258-9/6/1758).The Director-General inEssequibo also noted a pattern, and remarked to theDWIC in 1746thatthe trade inpaitos had now become the activity "from which alone thatnation derives its livelihood"(PRO-CO 116,39).

This paper then traces the courseof the relations between Carib andEuropean to show how Carib warfareoreku: literally "wounding"),wasrecruited to and changed by European colonial priorities.To fulIyexplicate this process the nature of Caribcombat and warfare at earHestcontad wiU be examined first, followed by a considerationof thechanges that encompassed the Snake Warriorsas they became inextric

enmeshed in the Europeaneconomie order.

CARIB CO M BAT

Traditional Carib weapomof war wcrethe poisoned arrow and the club.According toeyC .vtnesstestimony such weapolls were highly effective.For example, theDutehman, A. Cabeliau, reported the following in1597 concerning the Carib useof the bow akapra) and cnvcnomedarrows purewa);

if anyoneis hit by them,so that blood flows, hemust perfarce die withintwenty-four hours: his Resh droppin g from his bones: so thatthe Spanish greatlyfear that nationand their arrows (Jonge 1862:15

Carib technique in using such arrowswas dcscribed thus:They shoot all theirarrOW$ into the air with such accuraey that, thoughnot

taking direct aim at a body, they knowthat they willhit it of those that arewounded bythem, few recover. (Van Berkel 1695:32)

Antidotesto arrow-poison were known to the Amerindians,but werekept a c10se secret from thc Europeans to maintainthat strategicadvantage which Cabeliall noted.Thus when the small grandsonof awar cbief inadvertently showed the traveller JeanMocquct the plantfrom which the antidotewas derived,

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Carib warfare, ca. 1500-1820

. ' ' 1 would have pluckedup someof this Rootbut this little boy would notsufferit. And besides the lndians whoweTe with him , seem cd to be very angry

had showedme ihis Plant, which they prised alId esteemed aboye all(1696: 57)

The Europeans wcre equalIy impressed with the efficacyof the Caribwar club aputu). The following judgement, brutaIly simple inits

explanation,was made by the mercenary soldier Jobn Gabriel Stedman,who personally led Amer indian levies against the black rebe slavesofSurinam: One blow from this club, whichis frequently fixed witb asharp stone, scatters the brains"(1796:1:396). Finished clubs were richlycarved with varous symbolic devices, including imagesof WOJl1ell,the number of "kills" achieved (see Whitehead1986).

In the high savanna country thereis evidence that tbe spearamara)or sword macana) and shicld maluana), favored weaponsof theLokono and Yao, were adopted. In1607 Robert Harcourt sentmusketeers tothe aid ofthe Yao chief, Ragapo, in the Sierra Lombarda,BraziL The following is Harcourt's reportof their adion, that KingJames 1 "might note thc fadionsamong the lndian uations, thediscipline and order they hold in warre.", in the Front he [Ragapo] frst plaeedour foure Englishmen, by two in arank, next to thern two lndians armed with wooden Swordsand 'rargets[shields]; then two Arehers; and afterthem two men with sharpened staves,irrstead ofPikes; and in likemanner arderedand ranked all his company , Beingthus prepared heemarched against the Caribs who (neere at hand) werecomming in the same order towards him;but when they approached, and(unexpected) perceivedour Englishmen amongst the Yaios, theyweTe arnazedand made a sudden stand. (Harcourt 1613)

Harcourt adds that, the Caribs "presently agreed to peace by reasonofour mens presence [whicbJ in time wilImuch avail llS, being well

observed and rightly applied, aeeording to occasion" (1613: 22-3).More usually the forest and river were the scenesof Carib combat,and tbe war canoekanawa) the base from which such attacks wcrelallnched. This vessel rnight holdup to 50 warriors, who paddledcraft, being rangedon twelve benches, two abreast, alongeach side.Thesides themse ves were protected by a raised wooden rail,running rightround the craft, from which shields might behung as a furtherprotection against enemy arrows.Gumilla (BM.V.XX-13, 24/10/1733)and Pelleprat(1965: 164-95)add that tbe skulls and smoked limbscourageous cnemiesitoto) might also festoon the kanawa.

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Judging from sources su ehas thcse, it seerns thatambush, raid, andset-piece baule were all partofthe Carib warrior's repertoire. [n defense

his villagehe rnight besummoned to arms at amoment s notice bythe blowingof a concho For aplanned raid, the organizing warchiefwould send knotted-cordsoul lo allied villages to indicatewhen the raidwould takc place.Then he would havethe women prepare a great feastat whichhe would present his reasons for proposingthe attack.

Once assembled, the war chiefs,who formed a distinct group, woulddiscuss strategy and tacticsas wellas who was best fitted to ead the raid.This would not necessarily havebeen the one who proposed it.Meamvhilc the assembled warriors drank, danced,and actedout mockbattlesas the women haranguedthem to be cruel to their enemiesandavenge the

A special formof manioc-beerpaiwarri), containingthe brain, liverand heart of a tiger, an anaconda and vanquished enemies,wasconsumed at thcse ceremonies.These organs werethought to promote,respectively,cunning, courage and energy during thecoming fight.Their armsand clubs would also be smeared with a salvemade from theworms collected fromthe buried teethand clawsof the tiger echoesofthe Achagua taleof their origins quoted aboye.

dances Ihat were performed, perhaps rehearsalsof the coordinated movementsof Carib battle-formation, were designed toawakenthe Snake-Spiritand Tiger-Spirit. A SnakeDance aroused

warriorsthe spiritof Anaconda kiliu), silentand invisible, capableof strangling and swallowing eventhe Tiger. lts force was felt to beanindispensableelement in the psychologicalarmour of the warriors.Appropriately so, whenone recalls that, according to boththe Salivaand Warao, itwas the wombof ther nation.

The Tiger dance was ntended to awakeKakus-yumu, the Tiger

Spirit himself, who,011 taking possessionof the warrior, enabledhim toas the tiger kills. However,he only relinquished possessionofwarrior's spirit on tastingthe bloodand flesh of a deadcnemy that thewarrior had killed. Pcnardand Penard (1907:1:66-7) quote a Caribwarrior's explanatonof his dance:

1growl. 1hiss, 1swing the club ust likehe does when he erushes his preyone blo\','of bis terrible claws. And when1have killed mv encmv1must alsodrink his blood and taste hisf1esh that the spirit that impesme to' do this deed

be assuaged. . . Vv hen the Tigeris in the man, the man beeornes like theTigeL

1

Carh warfare ca. 1500-1820

t is in this context tltat reportsof Carib cannibalism should beintcrpretcd - a lIIeansby whch thc warrior cotlld distance himselffrolll

trauma of killing. An ideologicaltheme whose importanceisattested toby the fact that it still persisted c\'cn in the period whcn Car ibs\\ere being paidby the Dutch to hunt down runaway-sla\'es. [n1768 the Dire ctor-Generalof Essequibo ",rote tothc DWIC:

came down riveryestercldv e\'ening with histhe eanoes arrivcd\Ve thought there\Vere SOIllC negroes inmel1l Deeausc someof thc Caribs had eomplctcly covered thcir hedds amI faces with their

Icloaks], TbisCllSt0l1l was quiteUnkllOWll to me. When they came011 shorcI asked Tampoko what it meantand he told me tllat these werelllel1that had kilIed Ilegrocs; thisis their eustom amI they mustgo Iike this fora

PRO-Ca 116, 36)

size of thesc Carib raiding parties..vas highly variable, anddependcnt onthc purposcsfor which it\Vas formcd. Even thc earliestreports, howcver, indicatc that a forceof 300-400 warriors, comprising a

of arolllld 20 vessels,was typical. Based011 an estimate"average" size ataround 400 persons, this suggests a lcvclof polticalandmilitary aUiance whieh incorporated four or five viUnges.Contcmpor-ary estimatesof the scopeof the allthorityand influenceof a local warchief are also at leastof this order (Whitchead 1988).

Nonetheless, Icadership didnot derive from the prestigeof the warchicfs alone. Leaders also exercised sharnanistic authorityas exemplified by piaii in Carib societies.1 he roleof piaii is difficult to discern inearly times, though it probably declined furtheras the wholc frameworkof the aborginal warfare eollapsed, following theEuropean invasion.Nonethcless the piaii\Vere ccrtaillly originally consulted on questionstactics and strategy,as \Vcll as the general propitiollsnessof thc particularenterprise in hand.Mocquet was told that Camaria, "Kingof the

Caribs" in eastern Guayana, praetiscd divinationof his enemies'movemcnts.Whcn Camaria, who . . had but Orle eye, and wasmighty Craftyand Treacherous ",

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aballdoncd on the basis of unfavorable omcns, cvendstallcc of the enemy village, it is probable that the advicc of thewas takcn throughout an expedition. Thus Biet 0664:mentions that j Ist prior to an attaek,

From the manner in which the1'divine whetber or not

were heavly dependentcontrol

not bc taken to implywas "weak," but that accessiOll to the rank of war

direction of the piaii, candidates submtto variolls ordeals, prmarily a long period of fasting on

water aeeompanied by the pcriodic drinking of largcquantities of tobacco-juice. t was also cxpccted that such candidates

would have killed many encmics. On his own dcath the bones ofthe war chief were prescrvcd and rubbed with rcd-dye anatto) and

might be hung in thc trophy-hall of the warriors, which once dominatedthe center of the larger Carib scttlemcnts.

As has been indicatcd, the war chief was responsble for supplyingbasic foodstuffs for thc raidng party. In tlle first inst ance this ne ed wasmet by advancc preparation of large quantities of cooked manioc, bothby his O\vn wivcs and by the other women of the village. Smoked meatmight also bc carriee or fish caught en route.chiefs poltical infl uenee might ensure hospitality amongthat lay on the way to enemy settlements. Thistense at the best of times but must have becomein the eighteenth century, as thc orbit ofpreviously allied villagcs:

Carib raiding-partics, with easilyinhcrent limit to the scope and

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Carib warfare ca.

open to make peace.on lVlarcllRiver in Brazil, stopped at a Yao village on the Oyapock,

a large Aricoure war-party, from

en route to attack Carib scttlements at Cayenne. The Yao intervened, asthey were "cornmon friends of the two." T'hey secured a peace bctweenthe Caribs and the Aricoures, but only "on condition tbat the Aricouresshould ask for

Their cerenlOny was as follows; thc Caribs obligcJ thcIll to wait on thc seashorcwith thcir arms and as thc Caribs fitted thc arrow to thc bow, rcady to et Ay, theArieoures took water and poured it on their hcaJs. This donc, the Caribs,throwing clown their arms, rushcd into thc canocs of thc othcrs and embracedthem. 011 the occasiol1 of this pcacc thc Ya os clltcrtaillcd thcm togcthcr foreight days, pea ce having llc"cr bccn known bctWCCll them beforc. (BL-Sloane:179b

Barrre, some 130 years later, rcported aone of the opposing war-chiefs wouldband of warriors declaring

sides would throw down their arms, rush to embrace ea ch other andretire to one or another village for a feast (1743: 174-5).

an attack was prcssed horne, the general aim was toyoung wornen and boys and to kili enemy warriors, taking

of their bodies for the ritual purpose of expunging theTiger-Sprit. In the case of sct-piece con frontations , as in the uplandsavannas and the llanos, the combatants would first face each other at adistance and dance. They then relea sed pois oned arrows, and followedup with individual combat with clubs. The Orinoco Caribs are said tobave preferred this kind of attack, as opposed to the night-time


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rites.purposcsmentionsthe Bariml/Waini mouths appear to havepurposes - Brett (1868: 424-40) and 1m Thum 1these practices may have persisted in just a fe ,' sites over manygenerations, since it was reported in 1597 to tlle King of Spain that tlleOrinoeo Clribs and their Kalinago allies from Dominica and Grenada\Vere already accustomcd tn go to the mouth of the Barima,

where they are 011 terms of peaee and friclldship with other Caribs, andwhere thev go to divide thcir spoil and offer saerifiecs, and cat those Indians that

(BM-V P. IV,15)

villagcs,incorporated asfresh bout of celebration. The practice ofbringingin the village was in contrast to that of

eaptives were tortured to death by both women and men in thesettl ement itself (see Van Berkcl 1695). This also seems to have been thecase among the neighboring Tupi of Brazil (sec Knivet 1625, Lerius1625, Staden 15 Forsyth 1983). The Caribs, however, firmlysegregated the killing of enemies from village life, although the human-

took, slIch as bone Autes, belts or hair, and driedand displayed in the village. By the

l l l

brought ne\\' and tactics,11'Iilitary units in Carib warfare. Such innovations directly threatenedthe survival of traditional patterns of leadership. As described aboye,these required at least an inter-village level of consensus if an effectivemilitar)' force \Vas to be recruited. The central factors in the new patternof war \Vere a wder access to fire arms and a more permanent state ofmilitancv among the Carib warriors as reasons for raiding increased.

in turn may be traced to thc chronic instability of Dutchslave poplllations coupled with a limited

servants

Carib war{are, ca. 1500 1820

Moreover, in the eighteenth century the determined efforts of theon the Orinoco to find a final solution to the Carib problem

most isolated and pacific Carib villages to evolve sornechanging conditions in the Orinoco area. Chief

evangelized the denselydepleted populations, traditional Iines ofweakened. The opportunities offeredturn, encouraged some Caribs to become more and morehunting slaves, both black runaways and red domestics. In 1767Director-General of Essequibo informed the DWIC that:

1 have had a great deal of troublc with t he Caribs beca use they spoke to meand it is only with a lot of cffort and promises of doublc payment

got thelll to agree to cateh the rtJ\laways and bring thcm back alive,II , 8/3/1 771)

seulements in EssequiboDemerara make it clear that auite small oarties of Caribs could beextremely effectivethe interior, to take and sell captives ratherbe easily acheved by relatively smallequipped with firearms. Brdt comments:

If a party ean muster cight or ten stand of fire-arms, it will fight its way tbroughall the mountain tribcs, though at open war with thcm, alld by the rapidity ofthcir marches, and nightly entcrprises [ambushes], they cOllceal the wcakncss

their numbers, and earry terror bcfore them. (1868: 145)

changed conditions of warfare, sorneArawak Lokono) and Akawaio, evolved

laying of posoned traps\Vere techniques that had, insome cases,

However, as was suggestedCarib and Arawak was an example of Europea nof overwhelming Amerindian numbers. t

strategy to attempt to exacerbate and exploit any existing tensionsthey found amongst the Amerindian population. The conflictvendetta s between Carib and Arawak emerged largely due to the variOllSalliances that different villages or networks of villages had with the

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European powers. This conclusionis further eonfirmedby evidencemueh of the early Amerindian resistanee tothe Spanish was

without regard to tribal differenees (Whi tehe ad 1986).As Ralegh'sdscussion (1596)ofhis attempts to raise a general Amerindian rebeIJionagainst the Spanish inGuayana shows, traditionsof raiding betweengroups implied a mutuality betweenthem. This mutuality could,different circumstances, involve military cooperation,as occurred, forexample, in 1618when Arawak,Carib and Warao united to atlack theSpanish capitalof SantoTom (BM-V.P. VIII, 16). Nor shoul d it beforgotten tha t it wasthe usual fateof any femaleand ehild captives to be

integrated intoCarib society. Only under European inAuenee,which encouragedthe saleof such captives,was the stability implied bysuch local and habitual conAicts upset.

t was therefore the historie roleof the Europeans to shatterrelationships, producing a steady hemorrhageof eaptives from the cycleof exchanges that had defined the aboriginal Amerindian polity.n theCarib idiom, it was as if Kaikusi-yumu, the Tiger Spirit, had beenreleased from his magic constraints, tobecome a constant force in the

conseiousnessof the Carib warrior.

TH E E U R O P E A N I N TRU S I O N

Perhaps the s ingle most striking faetof Carib history between 15001820 is that, despite a continual presence at the marginsof theirterritories, itwas not llntil the1770s thatthe Spanish c an be sad to haveeffectively pacified the Caribsof the Orinoeo basin. The reason for

was not justthe tenacityof Carib resistance to encroachmentsontheir political sovereigntybut also their pivotal role in the colonialconAietofthe Dlltchand Spanish in this region.This is made c1ear by a

letterof April 6th, 1766, fromthe Director-Generalof Esseqllibo to theDirectorsof the DWIC:I cOlltinue to have good look-out kept011 aH the mo\'crncnts of the Spaniards

In such matterswe can fu]]y relyupon the assstanccof thc Caribs.Thedeep-rooted hatred and enmityof that nation towards the Spaniardsis so greatthat thereis littlc probabilityof a reconciliation between them, and although

nation has lost manyof its old charactcristics, tbis still contirlUes to be oneof its innatc peculiaritics.PRO-CO 1

Accordingly, althollgh it was the Spanishwho were responsible fordefinitvely breakingCarib poweron the Orinoco, the nAuenceof

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Carib war{are, ca. 1 820

Dlltch on Carb society, throllghout thesevcnkenth and eighteenthcenturieswas just as significant.Though the Spanish had definedloscaribes as theparamount cnemy as earlyas 1503 (Whitehead 1984:it was only in the contextof DlItch colonial ambitions that the Caribswere able to mOllnt widespread resistance to their presenceon theOrinoco. Nor was this just because bothDutch and Caribs hadcoinciding interests in expeIlingthe Spanish. t was alsodue to

economic benefits involved in the trade in forest produets thatdevelopedva the varolls DlItch outposts situated alongthe Wild Coastin the early seventeenth

By the beginningof the eighteenth century, however, DlItch econpriorities had radicaIly changed.The emphasis wason plantation

produets, primarily sugar, from which derived the ncreasingdemandfor black slaves and Amerindian servants.As a result Dlltch colonialpolicy was re-oriented to achieving a dtellte withthe SpanishofOrinoco.They had to HICe ~ : .,pita]imd labor intensive plantationswere far more vulnerable to attackand disruptionthan the relativelyanonymous trading posts had been.As we sh;ll :;( C, t i ~ change in

economieand political priorities drasticaJIy affectedCarib groups, evenbeyondthe immediate orbitof the Dutch colonies.Nonetheless, Carib leaders made impressive achievements in

assembling and mai ntaining widespread allianees,not onlyof far-AungCarib groups,but also of such non-Caribsas the Saliva, Warao,Arawak. Sllch aIlianees were ultimate ly rooted inthe virtual monopolyof Dutch trade goods thatthe Caribs possessed. However, they couldalso be aetivated for wider political ends, asis c1early shown inthe waythe Caribs resisted Spanish poweron the Orinoeo for over two centuries.Even in the eighteent h century the Spanis h were still faeed with chronicand widespread rebellion. In1750 the Prefectof Capuehin Missions onthe Orinoco reported to theCommandant of Guayana concerning thefailure to oacifv Amerilldians:

. . . and not only the Caribsof thc forestsbut evcn thoscof tbe missionsparticipate in thcse wars, withou tour bcing ablc to control thclIl in allyway andwhcncver we makc an effortlo do so, thcy imrnediatcly desertliS in grcatnumbers. (BL-V.P.XXV,l)

By the 1770s,as the fuJI impactof European diseases was feJt, theCaribs appear to have acceptedmuch of the mission regime.This was atenous conversion, however.When these mssions eollapseddue to

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the depredationsof the Venez uela nWar of Independenceat the turnofeighteenth century, they were instantlyand almost universallv

deserted. This suggeststhat at least sorneof the old patternsof Caribvillage leadership still smvived, notwithstanding the vast population

of these mission villages,and all the concomitant consequencesendurance of the underlying kin network.

therefore, a useful distinction lobe drawn between theperiodup to the eighteenthcentmy and thereafter. It is also necessary

main featmesof the growthof Carib power inGuayana in theseventeenlh century should be outli ned beforeils defeatand relrenchment in the eighteenth cenlury can be properly examined.

' f H E RISE AND FALL O F ' f I l E CARIBHE E M O N Y IN G U AYA N A

As outlined aboye, Ihekey featureof Carib combat and warfare wasitsinherenily limited nature, until the beginningof sustained intercoursewith the Europeans.'fhere were restraintsof ideology,as expressed in

that human violenceand aggression areof external origin (Le,from Kakus-yumu Ihe Tiger Spirit)and potental enemies andcaptves are partof Ihe worldof affines [see note2]. These in turn werecoupled with consfraintsof opportunity, imposed hy logistiealcon-siderationsand a social context in which infiniteaccumulation of thespoilsof war (women and/or labor powerof the poilo had no practicalrationale. Such factors combined to make aboriginal warfareanendemic and persistent, yet socially-eontrolled event.One has only tothinkof the highly ritualized confrontations thal are reported from theearly seventcenth century to realizethat there was a large mcasureofagreement between opposing forcesas to what behavior was appropriate

to such occasions.5

' fhe introductionby Ellropeansof distinctly different ideologyof war, exemplified inthe famous formulations ofHobhes, inevitably disrupted Amerindian assumptions

practicesas to the permitted scopeand purposesof armed eonfliet.' fherise of Carib power inthe sixteentband seventeenth eenturiesis to be

related to thcir obviollS abilitv to adaDt to these

Sueh an alteration in the ellstomand practice of 'Nadare wasexpcrienced directlyby Carib warrors throllgh theiremployment as alocal militia by tbe Dlltch. Indirectly, it was experienced through the

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Carb warfare, ca. R2

new poutIeaJ andeconomic ambitions engenderedby their caseofaccess to European goods, derivecl from theirmany trade partnerships

the DlIteh. In eonsequenee, they had the rationale lo expandtheseope aIld frequencyof their raiding expeditions, which inturn signaledan irreparable fracture inthe pre-existing eonsensusas to tbe rules andproeeduresof warfare.

steady streamof \ ,lar captves drainedout of tbe cireuit ofArnerindian societics, into the handsof the Europeans, greatlyunbalancedthe traditional relationships between groups. Beeausethis loss of eaptives fromthe Amerindians polity, any rough paritybetween tradtional enemies was unlikely, even inthe longer term.Furthermore, a practical monopoly011 the distribution of European

could result in a rapid increase in the eeonomcand politiealstatusof any of the groupsso privilcged. Broadly, thisis what happenedto the Carib in the seventeenth century,as it happened tothe(Ara\vak) and Kalinago in the sixteentb century.

seventeenth eentury, Carib grollps wcre not atthe forcfrontof contad with the Europeans,and variolls Carib grollpS experieneontact at different times throllghoutthe seventeenth century.However, to paraphrase Cookand Borab (1963:4) it took placeuniformly with a steadily increasing violenceof effeet. Most obviously

. violcnceof effect was metedout by firearmsand artillery,psyehological impactof such weapons being wellrnissionary succinctlyput it to Humboldt: Thev do lIotof the Cospel whcre thev have notfirst18 219 .

sueb advantagesthe Spanish strategy on tllein the faeeof extensiveCarib bostility. Tbe

dcseriptionof a mission stockade tbat the Spanish Govenor eonsidered

to be partieularly well-designed showsthe pattern.Close to the Padre's house thcreis a large tower inwhieh

swivel gulIS. The saiJ to\\ er, houseand c:hurch areby a hedgeof stakes. a sllffiecllt wall to keep off the Caribs. ullless

thc\' come ac:c:ompaniedby the Dllteh, againstwhom the swivelgUllS arellseful if there is anyone in the villagewho can manage them and theirnoisc too frightens off the Caribs,so that they donot \'enture to come nearthe village or the stockaJewhieh proteets the tower wherethe women andchilJren and Indians are, if the enerny are in superior forceor give noopportunity thern to l1\ount addense with their arrows. (BL-V.P.XXVII,2, 151l2 l


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gellerally in this arca. However, the close proximity of thcDutch trading colonies of Pomeroon alld Essequibo, as weIl as attemptsto directl)' colonize the Barima, between 1670 and 1730, undoubtcdlyunderwrote the social wealth of Carib groups in this arca. The clearest

that s uch new-follnel opportllniti es were bei ng flllly exploitedCarib lcaders is given by tlle large raids against the Jesuits Icd

Taricura anel his fatber Aragllacare from the I680s to the 1730s.cOlltcmporary reeords make clear, thcse raiels were promptcdadvlllccS the missionaries had made in disrupting regional Carib tradingrclationships (BL-V.P. 8, 13/XXXI-3,

Although bis father dramatically terrninated tbe esuit prcsenee onthe Orinoco, Taricura in fad failed to dislodge the missionaries. Tbis

the cxtent to which tllc Spanish had Iearned from theirexpcrience of the 1680s and, indirectJy, the limits of Carih militarypower. Tarieura, despite having bllilt cOllSidcrablc web of aIliances,was not actllalIy in a position to mil itarily dOlllinate tIJe Spanish on theOrinoco indeh.nitcly, in the eontext of the wicler Amerindianagainst the missionaries, the sources of his power among the Orinoco

Arnerindians sprang from his trading relations with the Dutch, particuillicit trading of guns. t was this trade in firearms, however,to Caribs on the fringes of the Dlltch colonies, that the DWIC

severely curtaiIed in the cighteenth centmy under the pressureSpansh threats of retaliation as weIl as the fear of overweeningpower itself. With just these kinds of considerations at the front of hisminel, the Director-General of Essequibo wrotc to the DWIC in 1770(the last free Caribs 011 the Orinoco having sent a c1cputation to him toask for support against the Spanish raids being made against their

h.rearms.tbat he had been unable to accede in urgent Carib reqllests

Within the Dutch colonies themselves the situation differedsomewhat, sinee Carib warriors \,>'ere used as bllsh-police againstblack slaves. However this uscfulness of the Caribs to the authorities didnot survive llnder the British administration which supplanted theDlltch in 1803. Whcn the Carib chief, Mahanarva, entered the capitalin 1810, sceking to continlle the trade that had been established by the

refusal of the Cm'enor to accept a fine slave, dashedand declared, for the fllture, that his

1825:same period joined

Carib wa rfa re ca. 1500 1820

with Patriot forces of Simn Bolvar to h.ght the Spanish Crown. Theyformed a special grollp who opcrated in support of the cavalry on thceastern llanos, whcre a number of eritical victories \Vere won by the

'Sotillo's Men', as they were proud to be called, or 'Sotillo's Bloodhounds'as their enemies called them. Each was eqllipped with his bow and aarro\Vs - suspended aver his back as wdl as shollldering:Jclothing a narrow strip of cloth and the lap. 1876: 154)

These new developments in the relationship betweell tIJe Caribs anclthe authorities in Venezuela and British Guiana only tencl to underlinethe contrast with earlier times when the Snakc Warriors \Vere able to

didate their own terms to the Europcans. In the \Vorcls ofMajorScott, the absence of Carib support for nascent colonies "

mouldering away to nothing (BL-Sloane 3662). Buthaving acceptcd and servecl the ways of the whitc-11lell they were nolonger in a position to resist thern.

In some respects the legacy of thi5 c10se Carih involvement inaffairs lived 011, despite the fact that many groups withdrew

into the interior of the old Dutch territories. Accorcling to thc CovenorofEssequibo, thc Carihs withdrew " beeause they got no encouragement, reeeived no presents, and obtained no sign of tliat estecmfriendship on which they prided themsclves in being hcld by tIte Duteh(Covenor Essequibo to British Colonial Ofh.ce PRO CO 111l4-20 1

already bcen mentioned the missioll scttlemcnts in Venezueladeserted. In the context of massive poplllation loss, howevcr,

of the Venezuela War of llldepenclenccCarib groups were Idt with a situation in

aggresslOl1 were stilI socially gencrated. However,,vas no a means of expression, otlier tllan withn the

eirele of neighhors ami kin. Quite simply, the collapse of a panAmerindian tropical forest society meant tbat tlle 1110st basie Caribabout raiding and the taking of capti\'es were no longer

missionary, Zander, records thc followingfrom the :\broni. in the earh' cighteenth

century:

ho\V mamo nations there \\'ere in Orinoco. He took all:Jndful of salld and asked me r 1 could COlll1t the grains, \\hel1 1 that 1could not he replied that, "So many are the natiollS in Orinoco."19l2: 1

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NEIL WHITEHEAD

By the end of the eighteenth century the Caribs had themselvesexperienced a90 percent population loss, and the "nations inOrinocohad all but disappeared,as a resultof epidemie disease.As a consequenee of this sudden isolation and the decline in traditional patternsleadership, Amerindia n societies experienced

;piritual movements

the latterhalf of the nineteenth century. Brett encounteredone suchassassinon the Demerara in thc1840s:Two Indianspassed us in a very lght canoe. Onewas unadorned; but the manwho stceredwore a handsome tiara offeathers, and had hisskin coveredall over

wildly through cireles of the same paint; and bothwere

with brightred spots, lke those of the jaguar,save in colour. Hiseyes

paddling withall their Tllight against the stream.(1868:

to thc eodeof the Kanaima specifiedthat thewas first to be immobilized and onlythen to be killed, ideallyby

grasping the throatand forcing the fangsof a vcnomous snake throughhis distended tongue. Signifieantly, in the eontcxtof what has been saidin the preceding sectionabout Carib rituals of cannibalism, thepraetitionerof Kanama eould only be releascd from the Tiger-Spiritwhieh possessedhim if the liver and bloodof the deadman were tasted.Failure to observe thisinjunction, just as a failure tovictim involved dire consequcnces.The Kanaima

be condemned to wanderas

An Indian, reduced almostto a skeleton,and in a dreadful state of exhaustion,was picked upin the forest by some Arawaks [Lokono] and broughtto thePomeroon Mission.He had lost a portion ofhis scalp and had hislower lp torn

down at each comer Those woundswere in a most loathsome condition.The Aeawaiosat the missiolltook eare of himat frst, but afterwardsfrom his refusing certaillkindsoffood and other signs, thathe was a devotec andvietim ofan unappeascd Kallairna, and we had somc diffeultyin getting

tIJev fea red lest thev should

vengeance cults,or Kanama.latter, dedieatcd toK a k u s ~ y u m uthe Tiger-Spirit, emerged in

bim nursed till hisstrcllvthhad retmIled.as

the Venezuelan territorics where the Caribs hadnot alreadybccomc incorporated into the lowest ranksof the ncw nation-state, itwas said: Though prctty wcll brokcn, they [Caribs] retain featuresoftheir former character, ha\'ng rcsistcd the forccdIcvies [Venezuela n

166

Carb warfare ca. 1500-1820

among themselves and others"Spanish" or "English" Caribs (see also Whitchead

Caribmade the following statement in1897, the yearof

Whenwe were eapturedby the Spanish [Venczuclans]it was done witIJ theassistancc of tbe Spallish Caribs. Wewere broughtto Carapo andwe were tiedwith our thumbs togcther untilwe becamc submissiveto them. (BGS-BC2291

Yet even ncremere 1 an ofCarib hegemony, sim;e,at the very last, they were needed to down their own.As the Prefectof the Capuchins correctly divined,

this is a unique nation, whiehis pcrmanently inclomitable, andfor whoseconvcrsionit will be necessaryto apply, both spiritually and temporally, tbemaximum force. (AGI-SD592, 23/1211755

C O N C L U S I O N

emerge in the analysisof Carib warfare over the yearsa general significance for any attempt to reach

an anthropologicalunderstandingof warfare. Among the more importantof thcseis a strong contrast between the basic historical trajectoriesof Amerindian and European warfare with consequent differences inwhat might be termed their "war-cultures." Paradoxically it has beenthe Hobbesian notionof warwhere . , . cveryman is theenemy to everyman (1651 :xiii) that has often beenthought to correct_

case of the Caribs, however, suchan

ofthe Europeans.The limited aimsofAmerindian raidingseems to have been more c10sely associated with theand relative underdevelopmelltof their military technologywas asapparent to the Europcans in the sixteenth centuryas it is to l S today.Subsequently, the social consenslls which lInderlay sllch traditionalconAictsas thatof the Karinya and Saliva or Achagua, the Kalinagothe Lokono,or the Tupi and Tapuya (Lvi-Strallss 1943. Bale 1was disrupted by the sudden

strategicsand wcaponry,inAuenccand the cver prescnt

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