White Hat Hacker Anatomy of an Attack€¦ · White Hat Hacker . P WEALTH ADVISORY | OUTSOURCING | AUDIT, TAX, AND CONSULTING The Attacker •David Anderson –Farm kid turned hacker

Investment advisory services are offered through CliftonLarsonAllen Wealth Advisors, LLC, an SEC-registered investment advisor. | ©2017 CliftonLarsonAllen LLP

Anatomy of an Attack

Minnesota Medical Group Management Association March 2018

White Hat Hacker

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WEALTH ADVISORY | OUTSOURCING | AUDIT, TAX, AND CONSULTING

The Attacker

• David Anderson

– Farm kid turned hacker

– Offensive Security Certified Professional

– Oversee and participate in: ◊ Penetration Testing

◊ Social Engineering

◊ Vulnerability Assessments

– Yes, I am older than 18

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Outline

• Anatomy of an Attack

– Reconnaissance

– Remote Access

– Privileges, Pivoting, and Accessing Data

• Key Takeaways

– Mitigate these risks

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Target

• Who am I after?

– Healthcare System

• Who to I target initially?

– Their billing company

• Why?

– Let’s find out

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Reconnaissance

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Reconnaissance

• Technical

– Port and Service enumeration

– Shodan

– Web Applications

• Non-Technical (OSINT)

– Social Media

– Employees / Customers / Business Partners

– Public Resources (Court Records)

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Service Enumeration

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Shodan

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Reconnaissance

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• Why are we doing this?

– Find interesting/potential targets

– Does the company have a VPN system?

– Does the company have “juicy” websites? ◊ Outlook Web App / Web-based Email

◊ Sites that allow access to medical records

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Reconnaissance

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Reconnaissance

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LinkedIn

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LinkedIn

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Court Records

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Remote Access

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Delivery

• Social Engineering

– Phishing / Email spoofing

– Call spoofing

– In Person

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Phishing Website

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Phishing Website

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Phishing Website

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Poor Email Filtering

Connected to mail.XXXXXXX.com (38.9.X.X).

MAIL FROM: <[email protected]>

250 OK

RCPT TO: <[email protected]>

250 Accepted

DATA

354 Enter message, ending with "." on a line by itself

FROM: <[email protected]>

TO: <[email protected]>

Subject: Free Tesla Car

SMTP Envelope

SMTP Message

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Delivery

• On the Phone

– It is easy to spoof caller ID

• [AUDIO]

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Delivery

• In Person

– RFID clone

– Media drops

– Tailgating

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Not this tailgating…

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Delivery

• In Person

– RFID clone

– Media drops

– Tailgating

• [VIDEO]

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Success!

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Remote access to billing company!

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Privileges, Pivoting, and Accessing Data

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Internal Network Recon

• Where am I?

• Who am I?

• What privileges do I have?

• Do I have local admin rights?

• Who is on the network?

• Who are the administrators?

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One Big Happy Family

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BloodHound

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Internal Network Recon

• Default/easily guessable passwords – Winter2018

• Misconfiguration – Open file shares (no restrictions)

• Missing patches – WANNACRY

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Capture the Flag

• Gain Admin Creds

• Asset Identification

• Asset Acquisition

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Exfiltration

• Collect Data

• Package it up – Compress

– Encrypt

• Send it out

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How to Protect Yourself

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Key Takeaways

• Understand what you publish online in the public

• Two-Factor Authentication – VPN, webmail, etc.

– Protect all external authentication that employees/vendors use

• Configure spam filter to block spoofing

• Understand remote connections to vendors – Restrict and monitor this access

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Key Takeaways

• Don’t give standard users administrative privileges to workstations/servers

• Restrict egress traffic – Don’t allow users to use file sharing services

• Monitor your systems – Everything supports logging, make sure you configure it

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CLAconnect.com

Thank you!

David Anderson 612-397-3132

david.anderson @CLAconnect.com

White Hat Hacker Anatomy of an Attack€¦ · White Hat Hacker . P WEALTH ADVISORY | OUTSOURCING | AUDIT, TAX, AND CONSULTING The Attacker •David Anderson –Farm kid turned hacker

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