WHEN CHANGE BECOMES EXCESSIVE

WHEN CHANGE BECOMESEXCESSIVE

Joyce Falkenberg, Inger G. Stensaker, Christine

B. Meyer and Anne Cathrin Haueng

ABSTRACT

“Change or perish” has become a corporate mantra (Abrahamson, 2000).What happens when change becomes excessive? We define excessive changeas when organizations pursue several seemingly unrelated and perhapsconflicting changes simultaneously, or when organizations introduce newchanges before previous changes have been completed. When change isperceived as excessive, organizational members react in various ways. Inthis paper we draw on existing literature in strategy and management totheoretically develop the phenomenon of excessive change, ways of copingwith excessive change, and organizational consequences of excessive change.Implications include how excessive change can be managed as well assuggestions for future research.

There is too much started that is not implemented.

Before we get the structure in place from one organizational development process, managementcomes with new ideas on how we should work.

Strategic change is one of the most frequently researched topics in the field ofstrategy. Change is perceived as not only necessary for survival but is often equatedwith progression (Gagliardi, 1999). In addition to the empirical articles which havefocused on antecedents and outcomes of change and change processes, the field is

Research in Organizational Change and DevelopmentResearch in Organizational Change and Development, Volume 15, 31–62© 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd.ISSN: 0897-3016/doi:10.1016/S0897-3016(04)15002-7

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abundant with “cook books” to inform organizations about how to change. Withall this emphasis on change, it is not surprising that in some organizations changemay become excessive.

In an empirical study, we found evidence of excessive change. Drawing on ourdata we defined the phenomenon and uncovered coping mechanisms individualsused as well as the individual and organizational consequences of excessive change(Stensaker et al., 2002). In this paper we theoretically develop our definition ofexcessive change and discuss different coping mechanisms and consequences inrelation to existing research within strategy and management.

Excessive change has shown strong face validity. In this paper we address theissue of whether the term is just another example of the “king’s new clothes.”That is, are we only adding yet another label to describe strategic change, whena label from the existing classifications could be used? To answer this charge,we attempt to classify excessive change based on the existing categories (such asdegree of change, or urgency). This paper shows that while the categories wereuseful in suggesting possible characteristics, excessive change appears to cut acrosscategories, and not be limited to a single classification of change.

When change becomes excessive individuals react and respond. Resistance tochange was an expected reaction. In addition to the negative response of resistance,we found a series of other responses, including those having positive effects.Comparing our findings to some recent research suggesting that individuals donot resist change per se, we find support for those who suggest discontinuing theuse of the term resistance to change and recommend focusing on the consequencesof change (Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Piderit, 2000). As an alternative to theresistance to change literature, we build on the work that has been done onburnout, change fatigue and cynicism. We use this literature to help us betterunderstand coping mechanisms and to suggest potential movement in thesemechanisms.

Excessive change was found to have consequences for organizations as wellas for individuals. Managers were rotated from one position to another; middlemanagers were unable to function effectively, and organizational structuresbecame inefficient. Literature on the role of middle management; the paradoxesfacing managers who lead change, and managing under conditions of chaos andcomplexity were used to explain these consequences. Again the literature in thefield, specifically the work on the role of middle management and the patterns ofchange, was useful in helping to explain these consequences.

Building on existing literature in the areas of strategy and management allows usto draw implications for managing excessive change. Additionally, it has allowedus to suggest several areas for future research which will further our understandingof excessive change.

When Change Becomes Excessive 33

This paper adds to the growing body of research on strategy process.We have taken seriously the demands of strategy process research made byChakravarthy and White (2002) for a longitudinal in-depth investigation thatfollows strategic changes throughout the organization. The major contributionsinclude the recognition that change is perceived in different ways within anorganization. This can have serious consequences for the outcome of the changeinitiative, for organizational members, for organizational performance, as well asfor future change initiatives.

The paper is organized as follows: before theoretically developing our empiricalfindings, we outline the methods used for uncovering excessive change. Wethen present our definition of excessive change and discuss this in the contextof strategic change. Our findings include reactions and responses to excessivechange. These are discussed in light of the literature in order to develop a morecomplete understanding of the consequences of excessive change. In conclusion,we direct attention to managerial implications and suggest areas for future researchon excessive change.

DISCOVERING AND UNCOVERINGEXCESSIVE CHANGE

In this section we present the cases and methods used in discovering and uncoveringexcessive change. We begin with the context and describe the three cases. We thendiscuss the research design and finally, discuss the sources of data that were used.

Perceptions of excessive change were unexpectedly discovered in our analysesof three cases, Teleco, Oilco 1, and Oilco 2. Although the information onthese three cases were originally gathered to investigate strategic implementationissues, the methodology allowed for the development of the definition and foruncovering consequences of excessive change. The three cases were used toelaborate preliminary findings on defining the construct and to investigate theconsequences of excessive change.

The Teleco case was designed to study the implementation of acquisitions inthe IT-sector made by the largest and dominating national telecom-company. Thefocus of the other two cases examined the implementation of major organizationalchanges facilitated by IT change taking place in two major divisions in Oilco.Oilco referred to this change as the largest ever undertaken by the company.

Teleco: The study of Teleco was undertaken in a period when the organizationwas going through substantial changes and struggling to adapt to a rapidlychanging environment. Teleco had been the monopoly firm in the highly regulatedtelecom-sector. Deregulation required the firm to adjust to the intense rivalry.

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Because of the blurring boundaries between the telecom and IT-sectors, theincreased competition arose not only from traditional telecom companies, butalso from a range of IT-companies investing heavily in the telecom sector.Furthermore, the leading actors in the market were constantly changing, makingthe competitive arena complex and unpredictable. Teleco chose to adapt to thesechanging conditions by diversifying into the IT-sector. They acquired a number ofcompanies that were market leaders. Moreover, the company went through severalreorganizations of their existing businesses as they tried to balance the need foradaptations to a changing market with the need to realize synergies across businessentities.

Oilco: The study of Oilco was undertaken to investigate the corporatewide implementation of organizational changes facilitated by the integrated IT-system, SAP (SAP stands for Systems, Applications and Products). During theimplementation process, the top management of the company was changed anda plan to change governance structure and to privatize was set in motion. Oilcobelieved that the implementation of SAP and subsequent organizational changeswere necessary to maintain competitiveness in the future. They were facing morecost-efficient competitors and reduced oil reserves. Their changes were proactiveand involved no immediate time pressure. Two divisions were investigated for thisstudy. In addition to the corporate change program mentioned above, both divisionshad additional change programs that were being implemented. The changes inOilco 1 and Oilco 2 were similar except for timing. Oilco 1 was the first divisionto implement change after the pilot program; Oilco 2 was in the middle of the“roll-out” period.

We can compare the context of the cases in terms of the environment facing theorganizations and their responses. Teleco faced a highly uncertain and complexenvironment due to changing industry boundaries and new players. Additionally,they were part of changing the environment in their acquisition of four companiesin the IT sector. Oilco’s environment was changing from being highly predictableto one of increasing uncertainty and turbulence that was reflected in a decreasein munificence. The competitive arena was no longer stable. In his study of theoil industry, Grant (2003) found that oil companies “had experienced a radicaltransformation of their industry environment from one of stability and continuityto one of uncertainty and turbulence. After several decades of stability and growthwhen they had been masters of their destiny, their competitive environmentwas thrown into turmoil by the oil shocks of 1973–1974 and 1979–1980, thenationalization of the reserves, and the growth of competition” (Grant, 2003; Grant& Cibin, 1996).

The change undertaken by Teleco can be viewed as a change in corporate levelstrategy, as they chose to diversify into a new industry. The changes at Oilco were

When Change Becomes Excessive 35

decided at corporate level but primarily made at the business level, with focus onincreasing effectiveness.

Both Teleco and Oilco were concerned with organizational issues. The focus atTeleco was in terms of organizing to take advantage of the synergies provided bythe acquisitions. The emphasis at Oilco was on implementing new organizationalstructures and work processes necessary for implementation success of the newIT system.

Regardless of these differences, perceptions of excessive change were foundin all three cases. Both organizations experienced that many changes were set inmotion simultaneously. These changes were interrupted as other change programswere initiated. Finding the same phenomena (excessive change) in different casesundertaken by different researchers convinced us that excessive change was aphenomenon in need of further exploration.

We then undertook a more systematic investigation of the phenomenon todeliberately explore the concept of excessive change. The purpose was to furtherelaborate our preliminary conceptions of excessive change, as well as to investigatethe consequences at the organizational level.

Choice of Research Design

The three cases were designed to investigate the strategic and organizational changein a natural context and over time. For these reasons, we chose a qualitative casestudy design. In analyzing the data we started inductively and developed categoriesfrom informants rather than specifying them in advance of the research.

Our inductive approach can be characterized as an emerging design where thequestions and categories were redefined as the study proceeded. The selection ofthe first two cases was opportunistic in the context of this paper, and it involvedfollowing new leads and taking advantage of the unexpected (Miles & Huberman,1994, p. 28). In case three, we used theoretical sampling and searched for anadditional case where we could examine the concept of excessive change.

We used a grounded theory approach to study how individuals interacted, tookactions or responded to a phenomenon (Creswell, 1998). Moreover, this approachallowed for in-depth exploration of issues that were complex and could be sensitive(Sykes, 1990), and understanding social processes in their organizational andenvironmental contexts (Hartley, 1994).Interviews.In line with the explorative character of the study, the goal of

the interviews was to explore the change process from the perspective of theinterviewee, and to understand why s/he came to have this particular perspective.In the interviews, we followed the recommendation made by King (1994) to have

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“a low degree of structure imposed on the interviewer, a preponderance of openquestions, a focus on specific situations and action sequences in the world of theinterviewee rather than abstractions and general opinions” (King, 1994, p. 15).Hence, the collection of primary data in these studies consisted of unstructuredand semi-structured interviews.

We used four criteria for sampling informants. (1) We drew informants frompopulations representing multiple organizational levels, including members ofthe board of directors, top managers, middle managers, union representativesand other employees. Thus our data meets the challenge presented by Bartunek(1993) who pointed out that virtually all discussions of change take the changeagents’ perspective. (2) We used multiple informants within each sub-group toincrease validity. (3) We selected key informants, and used the participants asobservers and interpreters of the change process (Van de Ven & Huber, 1990). Weused our contacts within the companies to help us select the key informants. Inaddition, we used snowball sampling, asking for names of possible intervieweesfrom the informants. (4) We selected some informants who had not participated informulating the change programs/projects, but who were largely affected by thechanges. Again, these participants were used as observers and interpreters of thechange process. The majority of the interviews were tape-recorded. This enabledus to fully concentrate on asking questions and responding to the interviewees’answers.

The number of interviews varied among the three cases. In Teleco, nineteeninterviews were held at an earlier phase and again at a later period. Ten interviewswere held in Oilco 1 while thirty-seven interviews were held in Oilco 2.Documents.A substantial amount of documents were analyzed for each case.

The documents were used as background information and as input to the interviewguide. The documents were also useful in counteracting the biases of the interviews.For Teleco, the documents included strategy and marketing plans, project reportsfor the change programs, internal newsletters, copies of speeches and resultsfrom climate surveys. In Oilco, the strategy and implementation plans as wellas divisional development plans were perused. In addition, the evaluations used tomap the present and future situation (“as-is/to-be” evaluations) at the divisionallevels were made available.Observation.Observation and participation in meetings and seminars were

important in helping the research team to understand the setting. The researchteam members were both observers and participants. In Teleco, one member ofthe research team participated in the seminar that mapped the present situation. InOilco 1, two members of the research team participated in weekly meetings withthe committee working on improvements. Confusion and frustrations arising as aresult of the organizational changes often came to the surface in these meetings.

When Change Becomes Excessive 37

Observation also provided the opportunity to crosscheck statements made in theinterviews.

Data Analysis

The advantage of using a grounded theory approach is that the process of analysisis systematic and follows a standard format. Using open coding we formed initialcategories of information about excessive change. The open coding was data drivenwithout reference to existing literature. Three members of the research team codedempirical data into two broad categories: descriptions of too much change andstatements revealing consequences of too much change. All four researchers thenworked together in further categorizations of the definition and consequences ofexcessive change. This process allowed for crosschecking to ensure intercoderreliability.

Following the open coding, we used axial coding to explore the links between thecentral phenomenon of excessive change and its consequences. To aid us with openand axial coding we used the computer program NUD*IST. Finally, we appliedselective coding; writing a story that integrated the categories in the axial codingmodel. In this procedure we consulted our data and drew on existing literature.

WHAT IS EXCESSIVE CHANGE?

We defined excessive change using the subjective perceptions of individuals. Inthis section, we discuss this construct, first comparing our definition of changewith the way the term has been used in the literature. We then focus on the issueof “the king’s new clothes” and discuss how excessive change differs from thoseclassifications of strategic change commonly used.

Defining Excessive Change

Excessive change has been defined (Stensaker et al., 2002, p. 302) as:

(1) The organization pursues several, seemingly unrelated and sometimesconflicting changes simultaneously.

(2) The organization introduces new changes before the previous change has beencompleted and evaluated, without allowing time for a period of “business asusual” or for reaping the benefits of the previous change.

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Fig. 1. Defining Excessive Change.

These situations are illustrated as in Fig. 1.We can compare our definition of excessive change with the dictionary definition

and also the way the term was used in the literature. The dictionary definesexcessive as exceeding what is normal, proper or reasonable. Change is themovement away from a present state toward a future state. An objective definitionof excessive change would then be: A movement that exceeds that which is normal,proper or reasonable, away from the present state toward a future state. The majordifference between this and our findings is that our definition is based on individualperceptions of what exceeds that which is normal.

Within the strategy literature the term excessive change was introduced in Zajacet al.’s (2000) article on the dynamics of strategic fit. Changes in the environmentoften require organizations to change or adapt. Strategic fit has been used todescribe both the relationship of the organization with the environment and theinternal fit between strategy and structure (Miller, 1992; Siggelkow, 2001). Zajacet al. (2000) use the term excessive to describe the situations when the organizationchanges although the environment and organizational contingencies do not suggestthe need to change and when the organization changes for change’s sake. In bothof these cases, excessive change results from formulating strategic changes when

When Change Becomes Excessive 39

they are not needed. The implication is that it is possible to objectively determinewhether or not strategic change has become excessive, for example, by comparinginformation on the environment with changes made in the organization.

The third situation that resulted in excessive change focuses on internalstrategic fit in terms of the match between the strategy and the dimensions ofimplementation, for example, structure, systems, etc. Zajac et al. (2000) state thatchange becomes excessive when the organization rightly changes one element butfails to change other organizational dimensions accordingly. We question whetherthis is excessive change or the opposite, not enough change. In the view taken byZajac et al. (2000) change becomes excessive because the organization is unableor unwilling to implement it. Alternatively, it can be viewed as incomplete changein that the organization is unwilling or unable to make the necessary structuralchanges to implement the strategic change.

Zajac et al.’s (2000) work is important for increasing our understanding ofstrategic fit but differs in several ways to our definition. First, their definitionof excessive change focuses on the organization as the level of analysis while ourdefinition focuses on the individual level of analysis. Second, change becomesexcessive because it does not get implemented. We find that this may be aconsequence of excessive change, but we define excessive change independentlyof whether or not it is implemented. A third difference concerns whether or notit is possible to objectively determine excessive change. Zajac et al.’s (2000)conceptualization of excessive change assumes that it is possible to objectivelyevaluate whether the adaptation of the organization to the environment is necessaryor excessive. We question this assumption of objectivity. We have experienced, forexample, that researchers investigating change may assume that a given change hasless strategic importance than the insiders (the organization) who have formulatedand implemented the change. In the determination of excessive change, theassumption of objective determination was further challenged given the differencesamong the perceptions of organizational members as to the degree to which changewas excessive.

Differences in Perceptions of Excessive Change

Defining excessive change as we did allowed us to gain new insight into ourunderstanding of the construct. Specifically, we learned that not everyone inthe organization experienced change as excessive. Whether or not change hadbecome excessive depended on the position of the individual in the organization.We found no evidence of perception of excessive change among the top-levelmanagers. However, individuals in middle management positions and in lower

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organizational positions often experienced strategic change as excessive. Weexplore these differences drawing on the literature to help explain these findings.

Top managers described strategic changes in the organization differently thanmiddle managers or lower level employees. The simultaneous pursuit of differentstrategies was described as being excessive by middle managers and lower-level employees. Top managers described these same changes as a single majorchange process having different components, rather than several different changestrategies. Top managers saw the changes in a holistic manner, a major change toachieve an overall goal.

Middle managers and lower level employees also defined as excessive thosechanges that were introduced before previous changes had been implemented.Middle managers and other employees experienced one change project takingover the next, without ever finishing and evaluating previous change projects. Topmanagers disagreed that the different changes actually overlapped and argued thatprevious changes had been completed and evaluated (Fig. 2).

These differences in perception can be understood if we draw on the literatureon strategy formulation and implementation. Although we recognize that it is notalways possible to separate the strategic management process into formulationand implementation, we find general agreement that top management’s focus is on

Fig. 2. Differences in Perceptions of Excessive Change.

When Change Becomes Excessive 41

formulation and not on implementation, while middle management is responsiblefor implementing the strategy. The need for communication, information, andbuilding support all imply that strategy is formulated at the top level and thereforeneeds to be “sold” to the organization. It is the middle managers who areresponsible for communicating the strategy to others in the organization as part ofimplementing the strategy.

What implications does this have for the differences in perceptions at differentlevels in the organization that we found in our study? Because top-levelmanagement formulate the change, they have both more information and a moreholistic perspective on strategic change. Their focus is often on the overall goal,and the activities that are needed to achieve that goal. Thus they are better ableto see the links connecting different elements within a change project or indeedconnecting different change projects. They are exposed to the changes earlier,which give them a relatively longer time to adjust to the changes than the rest ofthe organization. Because of the separation of formulation and implementation,top managers “let go” of the changes earlier as they push the changes downwardin the organization. The following statement by one of the top managers emphasizesthis: “It takes a long time for things to mature. What we [the top managers] haveused years to absorb and understand, we expect others to understand in a coupleof months. It’s not that simple” (Oilco 2).

Change is likely to become excessive at middle and lower organizational levels,as this is the level at which implementation actually occurs. In addition to theirday-to-day work activities, these employees have to deal with implementing thechange. In an attempt to achieve a goal, additional changes may be required.Pettigrew (1998, p. 280) suggests that although change programs often appearedto be focused, one-issue interventions, they also have an indefinite character. Theseambiguities breed uncertainties and complexities.

Additionally change processes, although sometimes completed, are seldomevaluated. Early promising results, “early wins,” receive a great deal of attention,but complete evaluations as to the degree of success of a change in terms of time orbenefits are seldom undertaken. Top management is often anxious to announce thata change has been successful when middle managers start to report early results,but they still have the remaining implementation ahead of them. Thus, the topmanager team seems to be operating within a different time frame compared withthe rest of the organization.

Pettigrew (1998) recognizes that formulators and implementers of change maybe facing competing versions of reality. For those who formulate, it is excitingto focus on a problem of substance and exhilarating to complete a difficult taskand move the organization on to the next step in its development. “Progress andprogression are the elixir for those who lead major change episodes. For those who

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are the recipients, much of the change appears as initiativistic, unfocused meddling– churning not changing” (Pettigrew, 1998, p. 272).

Excessive Change: The King’s New Clothes?

In the previous section we defined and discussed excessive change. In this sectionwe compare and contrast the construct of excessive change to the classificationsoften used in the strategic change literature.

Strategic changes are often categorized using terms such as revolution vs.evolution or radical vs. incremental change (Greiner, 1972; Miller & Friesen,1982; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). These categories are descriptive of thedegree of change and give a useful means of differentiating major changes fromless major changes. However, the classification appears to place change along asingle continuum and does not account for other potentially relevant characteristics(Gallivan et al., 1994).

Dutton and Duncan (1987) developed a more complete typology using urgencyand feasibility. The urgency of an issue is dependent on the perceived cost of nottaking action with respect to that issue. Feasibility results from knowing what to do(high understanding) and having the means to be able to do this (issue capability).Thus their final categorization of change was built on three determinants: urgency,and feasibility that included understanding and capability.

More recently, researchers have used other descriptors of strategic change.Examples of these include first order change that occurs within the system itselfand second order change in which the system itself changes (Denis et al., 2001;Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998).

These categories and descriptors are helpful in classifying different types ofchange. Are they useful for classifying excessive change as well? We test this outusing a simple typology based on two continua: degree of change and urgency,and focusing on the two extreme cells, turnaround change which is high on bothdegree and urgency and incremental change which is low on both characteristics.Revolutionary, turnaround or second order change is characterized as having a highdegree of both change and urgency. Does excessive change fit here? Many wouldsuggest that major revolutionary changes in which many things are changed atthe same time would be excessive. However, individuals may feel that it is properor reasonable for an organization to undergo a change that is urgent and major.If an organization is facing a crisis, individuals may perceive the many changeinitiatives not as excessive but rather as necessary. On the other hand, incrementalchange, which for many observers would appear to be the opposite of excessive,may be perceived as excessive. Incremental changes may result in one change not

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being completed before another change process is started. Pettigrew (1998) states:“Many change processes deliver variations which are seen by some as small scaleand incremental, yet for others they represent bruising encounters with the devil”(1998, p. 272). We therefore suggest that it is not useful to try to place excessivechange within the context of the normal categories of types of change, rather itappears to be a separate construct which may have characteristics of either or bothturnaround and incremental changes.

We have drawn on the existing literature in strategic change to find definitionsor operationalizations of excessive change as well as to investigate whether theexisting categories of change are useful for our understanding of excessive change.We conclude that excessive change focuses on a unique phenomenon.

REACTIONS AND RESPONSES TOEXCESSIVE CHANGE

In this section we focus on the ways that individuals react and respond to excessivechange. Reactions to excessive change are reported and then discussed in relation toresistance to change. More surprising than employees’ reactions were the ways inwhich they made responses to change when they felt these changes were excessive.We describe these coping mechanisms and classify them on two categories: passiveor active responses and whether or not the responses make the change attempt likelyor unlikely.

Reacting to Excessive Change

Individuals reacted to excessive change with frustration and anger. Someindividuals expressed that they experienced stress and physical and psychologicalproblems. These reactions could affect the health of the recipients of excessivechange. Other reactions were related to the job situation such as job dissatisfactionand lack of motivation. Employees also expressed feelings of uncertainty resultingfrom the change: uncertainty about their job, and about their competence andadequacy.

Do these reactions suggest that employees resist change? In general, researchersinvestigating resistance to change draw on Levin’s (1951) definition of resistance asa restraining force moving in the direction of maintaining the status quo. As a result,much of the resistance to change literature focuses on negative reactions to change.Recently, however, several review articles on resistance to change have proposedthat this dichotomized response is an oversimplification (Dent & Goldberg, 1999;Piderit, 2002).

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Dent and Goldberg (1999) suggest that people do not resist change per se,rather they resist the loss of status, loss of pay, or loss of comfort. They resistthe unknown, they resist being dictated to, or they resist management ideas thatdo not seem feasible from their standpoint. Dent and Goldberg’s (1999) worksupports Piderit’s (2000) tripartite structure model of attitudes toward change.Piderit uncovered three different emphases in conceptualizations of resistance:a cognitive state, an emotional state, and a behavioral or intentional state. Thecognitive dimension of an attitude refers to an individual’s beliefs about the attitudeobject. The emotional dimension of an attitude refers to an individual’s feelings inresponse to the attitude object. The intentional dimension is a plan or resolutionto take some action.

Our findings support the work done by Piderit and Dent and Goldberg. We agreewith Dent and Goldberg that the term resistance to change may be misleading.Instead we found, like Dent and Goldberg, that individuals do not resist the changebut resist the consequences of that change. In addition we found that individualshave a behavioral or intentional response to change, as indicated by Piderit. Inthe following section we focus on how individuals manage under conditions ofexcessive change.

Responding to Excessive Change

Individuals responded to excessive change in many different ways. We haveclassified these along two dimensions. One dimension was the degree to whichthe individuals were active or passive in responding to the change. The otherdimension focused on the likelihood that the responses would result in the changeor not.

These dimensions were determined based on our data; however, these dimen-sions have been used in categorizing change at the organizational level. Barker andBarr (2002) found a difference in the level of response depending on whetherthe stimuli were interpreted as causing some impact on the organization on not(active/passive). Lant et al. (1992) found likelihood of strategic change dependedon external attributions (change improbable/improbable).

We categorized the responses and placed them along the two continua mappingout the different ways individuals coped with excessive change. See Fig. 3A.

We start our discussion on the change probable side, and begin with active/change probable.Active Coping Mechanisms/Change Probable: Regardless of the well-accepted

axiom of resistance to change, we found that a number of employees worked tosupport the change. For some employees the response was an active, take-charge,

When Change Becomes Excessive 45

Fig. 3. (A) Coping Mechanisms. (B) Movement Among Coping Mechanisms.

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take-over attitude. When faced with many different change programs, or initiativesfor new changes, they attempted taking controlof the situation.

We have more or less found the way ourselves (Teleco).

. . . we called a meeting with our superiors (Teleco).

Lower level employees became impatient waiting for management to take charge ofthe implementation. They themselves took charge and figured out how the changescould be implemented. A situation of self-organization (Lichtenstein, 2000; Stacey,2000) could occur if many individuals attempted this.Passive/Change probable: Other employees loyally followed orders without

taking initiative on their own. Characteristic of this group was that their loyalty tothe organization and to the change resulted in massive overtime as they attemptedto carry out the work associated with the change in addition to their regular work.

People worked more and more as time went by. I could no longer abide by the labor laws(Teleco).

Passive/Change Improbable: We placed three responses in the cellpassive/change improbable, BOHICA, cynicism and paralysis. BOHICA (BendOver Here It Comes Again) was the most common way to cope with perceptionsof excessive change. Our data clearly show that many coped with excessive changeby waiting it out, waiting until the forces of change had blown over. Those whodescribed BOHICA as a way of dealing with excessive change had been exposedto a number of change initiatives, which indicates that this strategy was based onlearning by experience.

There seems to be a tendency for people to wait for the change to blow over, thinking that itwill soon pass (Teleco).

Cynicismresults from a loss of faith in the leaders of change and a response toa history of change attempts that are not entirely or clearly successful. Employeeswho are cynical respond in a scornful way.

We continue our work just as we used to and make fun of it (the change program).

Viewed from the perspective of the organization, BOHICA and cynicism arenot entirely negative. Although the changes have only a small chance of beingimplemented, since employees are somewhat indifferent to the changes, employeesare able to focus their attention on the daily, operationally oriented tasks.

The third response classified in the category of passive coping mecha-nism/change improbable is paralysis. This is a more serious condition thanBOHICA and cynicism in that the employees become paralyzed and cannotperform even their daily tasks. People were not unwilling, but unable, to carry

When Change Becomes Excessive 47

through the changes, nor could they carry out the simple, routine tasks that theyhad always managed previously.

It gets messy, frustrating and there is too much to cope with. In the end your body doesn’tfunction . . . and you just float along . . . (Teleco).

Active/Change Improbable: Some middle managers and employees coped withexcessive change more actively. We placed two coping mechanisms in thiscategory: exit and sabotage. Exit was the active coping mechanism used by thosewho terminated their employment, who quit. The result of exit is that the changesare not likely to be implemented. Turnover has been found to be higher among thebest workers. Those who are best in one organization are most attractive to otherorganizations as well, and are often among the first to leave.

In this process a number of highly qualified employees leave and find work elsewhere. Often itis the best people who choose to leave (Teleco).

Sabotageof the change initiative describes active resistance. Descriptions ofsabotage include blaming the change initiative for everything that went wrong,playing down the importance of the change initiative, or punishing people whotried to implement the changes.

Local groups sent in loads of negative and trivial input. It was all about painting a black pictureof the process and making everything look negative (Oilco).

There have been incidents of disloyalty. People sit there in the team meetings and both indirectlyand directly support statements [against the changes] which they know are not true (Oilco).

Movement Among Coping Mechanisms

The frequency with which the different coping mechanisms occurred was not equal.We found an overrepresentation of BOHICA tendencies. This may be a result of thetiming of the data collection (mid-stream in the change process). If we had collecteddata at a later point in the process, we may have found different reactions. However,the high frequency of BOHICA may also be a result of movement among the copingmechanisms as a person experiences that change more and more change. We drawon the literature to suggest paths of movements among coping mechanisms. Theseexpected paths are indicated in Fig. 3B.

Loyalty, a positive response that is expected to result in implementation of thechange projects, can, alternatively, lead to burnout or change fatigue. Shirom (1989)defines burnout as a chronic condition of physical and emotional reduction thatis a result of extensive demands in work. Pettigrew (1998) uses the term change

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fatigue to describe change programs that appear to be all input and process withoutachieving the change.

Our work load has increased as a result of these (changes). It gets harder to stay motivated(Oilco 2).

We suggest that burnout or change fatigue can lead to BOHICA that can then resultin cynicism or it can lead to paralysis. In either case, the responses move along thecontinuum from change likely to change unlikely.

In proposing this movement toward BOHICA, we draw on Molinsky (1999).Molinsky found that overzealous change leaders often diffuse and dilute theprocess. By flooding the organization with multiple projects, managers confuseworkers and stretch resources too thin. This leads to change as rhetoric rather thanchange as reality. He poses this as a paradox in which the commitment needed tolead the change keeps the change from happening (Molinsky, 1999). This paradoxwas found to be especially important in organizations that had not delivered ontheir promises in the past regarding major changes. We suggest that the responseon the part of the individuals who are to make that change is BOHICA.

We draw on the work of Reichers et al. (1997) to propose a reinforcing movementbetween BOHICA and cynicism. Reichers et al. (1997) found that, if cynics refuseto support change, then cynicism about organizational change could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Their lack of support may bring about failure or very limitedsuccess. This failure reinforces cynical beliefs that further inhibit the willingnessto try again, a BOHICA response.

In addition to loyalty leading to BOHICA, we also expect that burnout caused byloyalty may lead to paralysis. Professional efficacy is a feeling of being competent,successful and able to reach goals in work (Reichers et al., 1997). When one’sresources are inadequate to meet the work demands, individuals no longer feelthey have sufficient emotional resources to handle the stressors confronting them(Lee & Ashforth, 1996). This can result in paralysis.

These propositions are tentative, but they can contribute to explaining the over-representation of BOHICA. In addition, we acknowledge the dynamics involvedin coping with excessive change.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONSEQUENCES

Excessive change has organizational level consequences in addition toconsequences at the individual level. We first report on the structural consequences,categorized under the labels: Rotating Responsibility, Non-functioning MiddleManagement, and Structural Instabilities. We then discuss the consequences ofexcessive change on organizational performance.

When Change Becomes Excessive 49

Rotating Responsibility

Management rotation was a common feature in all three cases. Managers werecontinually shifted and sometimes eliminated. They were frequently moved fromone part of the organization to other parts, sometimes even back to a positionwhere they had been previously. This led to a perceived lack of continuity andlack of responsibility in the change process. The continuous shifting around alsoresulted in managers’ not being able to keep track or manage the different changeinitiatives.

Molinsky (1999) suggests that change leaders in organizations are often in awin-lose situation. Early wins result in career movement for the leaders withthe result that advancement is made before change projects are completed. Thusrotation may prevent managers from having to take long-term responsibility forany potential failure. Losing, for example, non-success of a change project, couldresult in involuntary turnover.

While many managers were moved around, some managers were eliminated.Turnover was both involuntary and voluntary. When managers’ positions wereshuffled and lay-offs were expected, key people sometimes chose to leave. Thebest managers, those who were attractive on the job market, left first. Thus,excessive change resulted in losing good managers in addition to the rotatingof poor managers. Drawing on our data, we found evidence of excessive changeallowing poor managers an opportunity to hide in the chaos. Over time, this resultedin sustaining poor management.

We’ve had three managers since the reorganization in 1996 (Oilco 1).

We call it musical chairs. We change places and some have to leave (Oilco 2).

In the past six months we have had six managers, one manager twice (Teleco).

It’s easy to play hide and seek . . . They [poor managers] can surf on the waves. Nobody has thetime to follow them up (Teleco).

There is little continuity at the level that is supposed to implement the strategy. When youdelegate the strategic responsibility to the level with the least continuity, well, then no oneremembers the strategy (Teleco).

Non-Functioning Middle Management

Employees often had to deal with middle managers who were incapable ofmanaging the change process. Evidence of the lack of leadership at the locallevel included employees’ perceptions of inconsistencies in communication andin the way they were treated in the change process. Employees became uncertain

50 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

about who their leader was at any given time. The relationship between employeesand managers naturally became more loosely coupled. In general, employees whowere part of the change process did not perceive that their needs were being met.They felt they were left on their own to figure out how to carry out the change.They chose to turn to colleagues and previous leaders for advice rather than thenew manager.

I must admit this has been a hard time. The manager hasn’t had time to take care of his owngroup of employees (Teleco).

The managers hardly know what we are doing (Oilco 1).

The CEO said one thing, and his subordinate said another. They were inconsistent and we reallybegan to wonder what was going on (Teleco).

I could have just as well needed a secretary [instead of a manager]. If I need help I make aphone call or ask a colleague (Oilco 2).

Our findings are supported by Molinsky (1999). He found that managers, whowere involved in many change efforts in addition to the normal operations oftheir divisions, had only minimal effectiveness in any single change initiative. Thesimultaneous focus on many change programs resulted in a shortage of time tooversee and manage any single process.

Structural Instabilities

Excessive change also resulted in structural and organizational instabilities. Theseinstabilities included the lack of overall structure and lack of continuity in thechange process. Employees who perceived change to be excessive described theorganization as being in a state of chaos, having a high degree of turbulence.The organization was characterized as being in a transition mode where existingroutines were not maintained, and new routines were not yet put into place. Thelines of responsibilities were unclear and there was a lack of long-term continuity.

This condition as described by the employees can be related to the discussionsabout being on the “edge of chaos” (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998). Connor (1998),Sanders (1998), and Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) propose the need to promotechange relentlessly to the edge of chaos with crisis where managers are stretchedand stressed. Stacey et al. (2000) question this notion of managers being able topush the organization deliberately to the edge of chaos as well as the moral of doingso. In their terms, being on the edge of chaos implies that “certain parameters fallwithin a critical range – for example critical rates of information flow, degrees ofconnectivity and diversity between agents” (p. 146).

When Change Becomes Excessive 51

The name of the game is the more change the better. Everything gets very turbulent (Oilco 2).

Everything has happened at once. We have not had time to sit down and draw the map. We havehad to go out and work in the terrain without any guidelines. I feel we have had an inhumantask to cope with (Teleco).

Lists have gone missing and not even been handed to the pay office. There is such a lack ofroutines and when this starts to show up on peoples’ paychecks, they really get upset (Teleco).

There is a troll in Oilco that has been set free (Oilco 1).

Consequences Related to Performance

Other consequences of excessive change at the organizational level are related toperformance. Here we found both implementation failure and loss of effectiveness.

Implementation failure refers to the failure of actually changing the organization.We found instances in which the change was on paper only; it had never been putinto practice. Employees referred to this when they said the company was excellentat planning, but failed to carry through the changes. They also stated that thingshad not changed in reality and probably would not change for a long time.

We are masters at running without jumping here. There is too much we want to start that cannotbe implemented. When we started, we experienced processes that were carried out to a largeextent and then suddenly abandoned (Oilco 2).

First there is unrest, and then we fall back into old working habits (Oilco 2).

You cannot turn 20.000 heads and hearts upside down in five minutes. Most people will workalong the same paths as before – for a long, long time (Teleco).

My feeling is that hardly anything is expected to last for long. We are sort of doing everythingon a half-a-year basis (Teleco).

Loss of effectiveness was the result of the organization’s attention being focused onthe change rather than on their customers, markets, and operational tasks. Incomederiving activities were not given resources needed to carry out these activities.We also found that the organization was often forced to prioritize change projectsat the expense of other more market-oriented projects. In some cases customerrelations suffered both because of the chaos in the organization, and also becausecustomers were neglected when employees focused too much on changes in theorganization. Forcing the organization to prioritize change projects affected otherprimary tasks as well, such as safety dimensions. Excessive change can also resultin lost effectiveness because of a loss of capabilities. The organization risks losingwell-functioning routines and other good dimensions because too much focus isput on continuous (and excessive) changes.

52 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

Our customers are very upset for the simple reason that they do not know where to call. Theycannot tell the difference between our numerous entities. They expect us to connect them to theright people (Teleco).

I understand that the customer thinks this is a mess, in fact that is my own experience [whentrying to get hold of someone in this organization] (Teleco).

By changing work routines you reduce effectiveness . . . temporarily. However, when thingschange frequently, then it [reduced effectiveness] is no longer temporary (Oilco 2).

First we get frustrated, then indifferent, and we neglect a whole lot of matters. The consequenceis that things start to go wrong and accidents are bound to happen (Oilco 2).

These organizational level consequences can be viewed in light of the literatureon middle management. Floyd and Wooldridge (2000) found that in turbulentenvironments, strategic effectiveness depends on middle managers who effectivelymonitor, interpret and communicate changing conditions. This role is weakenedwith rotating managers who continually face new work situations.

Pettigrew (1998) offers a different perspective. He emphasizes the importantrole of followers and suggests that leading change is not just about individualleadership, but is also about followership. Leaders and managers need reciprocaland reinforcing pressure from followers. This reciprocal role is reduced whenemployees no longer follow their managers or the managers are not there to lead.

The performance consequences are supported by Miller (1992) who found thatorganizations could either be highly efficient (high congruence among the elementsof implementation) or highly effective, that is, have a close match to the prevailingenvironment. Although tight fit makes it difficult for an organization to be able torespond to changes in the environment, continual creation of new change programsmay prevent an organization from becoming efficient.

Linkages Between Individual and Organizational Consequences

In addition to the direct linkages uncovered between excessive change andconsequences at both the individual and organizational level, we found somesuggestion of relationships between the individual and organizational levelsleading to performance consequences.

It is all a big mess . . . In the end your body does not cope anymore and you set yourself aside,floating along. But who is taking responsibility? (Teleco).

The structure at the middle management level has been stable, but with totally differentmanagers all along. This has not been a good combination . . . There is little continuity atthe level which is supposed to implement the strategy . . . When you delegate the strategic

When Change Becomes Excessive 53

responsibility to the level where the continuity is least, well then nobody remembers the strategy(Teleco).

In the first quote there are indications of structural instability, paralysis and non-functioning middle managers. The second quote suggests a relationship betweenrotating responsibility influences implementation failure. Thus our data suggeststhat if structural instabilities become linked with perceptions of excessive change,then a number of different reactions, mostly negative, are likely. We illustrate thesepossible linkages in Fig. 4.

The causality is not clear-cut and results are highly tentative. The outcomesmay be linked together in positive feedback loops (Stacey, 2000) suggesting thatcausality is circular.

MANAGING EXCESSIVE CHANGE

As discussed above, excessive change has individual and organizationalconsequences. In this section we draw on our findings and other relevant researchto discuss how excessive change can be managed and eliminated. We use Porrasand Robertson’s (1987) framework of implementation and organize our discussionbased on their steps of diagnosis, planning, intervention and evaluation.

Fig. 4. Potential Linkages among Organizational and Individual Consequences.

54 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

Diagnosis

Managers in many organizations believe that large-scale or whole system changesare necessary to maintain effectiveness in today’s environment (Weber & Manning,1998). However, a fundamental question in managing excessive change is whetheror not the change is necessary. Both our definition of excessive change, based onperceptions, and Zajac et al.’s (2000) objective definition recognize that excessivechange can arise when the organization changes for change’s sake, or advocateschange even though the environment and organizational contingencies do notsuggest the need to change.

A direct implication of this for the diagnosis stage is that excessive change canbe managed by a careful analysis of the environment and limiting the changes tothose which are found to be necessary in order to react to environmental changesor make pro-active changes to pre-empt environmental change.

Planning

The next step focuses on the importance of planning in implementing change.Discourse is one aspect of the planning stage that has particular importancein managing excessive change. Change can be made part of the organizationalconversation and the conversations can be an instrument for organizational change.(Ford, 1999).

Drawing on the results of our study, we suggest that discourse is particularlyimportant for developing an understanding for a major, holistic change rather thana number of independent, simultaneous changes. Armenakis, Harris and Field(1999) suggest that “programs of the month,” often perceived as excessive, canbe turned into long term changes for the organization through use of conversationtools. They found that persuasive communication; managing internal and externalinformation and diffusion practices were useful tools. These same conversationtools can be used to develop perceptions of holistic change for those involved inall phases of the change process.

Intervention

We suggest that those responsible for managing excessive change can benefit fromthe intervention tactics used for continual improvements (CI). Reporting on thefindings of a major study of CI, Lillrank, Shani, Kolodny, Stymne, Figurera andLui (1998) identified design requirements useful for the successful implementation

When Change Becomes Excessive 55

of continuous improvement. We discuss three of these requirements that haveparticular relevance for managing excessive change: involvement, empowerment,and development of skills.Involvement: Involvement of middle management may be a necessary,

although insufficient, condition for managing perceptions of excessive change.The involvement of middle managers has traditionally been focused onimplementation; however, middle managers have much to offer in the processof formulation. They are closest to the daily operations as well as to the customersand are therefore in a unique position to visualize, as well as implement change(Huy, 2001; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). Involvement at the formulation level canresult in more efficient implementation. Floyd and Wooldridge (2000) found thatwhen middle managers were involved in setting goals and generating alternatives,there was a greater performance effect than when they were only involved inimplementation.

Involvement in and of itself may not reduce the perceptions of excessive change.However, involvement is relevant in reducing excessive change when it allowsfor increased understanding and commitment to the strategy. Involvement oforganizational members at all levels allows them to develop an understanding ofthe changes, triggering sensemaking and sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).Allowing individuals time to absorb change, supporting employees and facilitatingtheir understanding of how changes are linked to other organizational processes,and ensuring two-way communication becomes important from a sensemakingperspective.Empowerment: Empowered individuals see themselves as proactive starters who

act under their own volition and are able to make independent decisions (Spreitzer,1997). Kirkman and Rosen (1997) propose that teams as well as individuals canfeel empowered. This can be done in ways similar to empowering individuals:“delegate responsibilities to the team, solicit and utilize team input when makingdecisions, relinquish control of work to the team, let the team set its own goals,encourage the team to assess its own problems and general solutions, verballypersuade them to expect a lot from themselves and display trust and confidencein the team” (Kirkman & Rosen, 1997, p. 142). Many of the changes that leadto excessive change are organization wide, resulting in the need to carry out thechanges by working in teams or groups.

Empowerment has, as summarized by Spreitzer (1997), many positive outcomes.However, in situations of excessive change, empowerment can be a double-edgedsword. Individual or teams may become empowered at a time that they are alreadyexperiencing excessive change, or the empowerment may lead to feelings ofexcessive change as they receive added responsibilities. Thus empowerment canlead to either loyalty or taking control, or, oppositely, paralysis or BOHICA.

56 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

The dilemma becomes how much support a leader should give in the processof empowering individuals or teams. If the purpose is that people should takeresponsibility and become empowered, the leader must determine how muchadvice and support can be given so that the individuals or teams take on the addedresponsibilities without this leading to perceptions of excessive change.Skill development: What skills are necessary to carry out the change? Our

findings indicate that individuals become frustrated when they do not have the skillsneeded. This becomes exaggerated when cross-functional teams are involved, asis often the case in large-scale organizational changes. Mohrman and Mohrman(1997) suggest that organizations need to learn how to develop a flexible, team-based organization. Teams need to be trained, not only for technical competencies,but also in interpersonal competencies and in conflict resolution (Lam, Bischoff,Higgins & Persing, 1999).

Developing the necessary skills can therefore contribute to reduction ofperceptions of excessive change. However, in determining what skills are necessaryand from whom, management must be cognizant that there may be a period oftrial and error, or learning by doing as implementation of the change takes place(Stensaker, Falkenberg & Grønhaug, 2003).

Evaluation

The evaluation stage for managing excessive change sets focus on two issues:completion of the change and developing capacity for change.Completing the process: Our findings indicate that while management perceived

the change to have been completed, this perception was not shared by others in theorganization who were involved in the implementation of the change. This resultedin perceptions of excessive change when additional changes were proposed bymanagement. We suggest that management make evaluations and results explicitand present this information throughout the firm. Individuals can gain a sense ofcompletion and accomplishment. Making the completion of the change visible(Wanous & Reitchers, 2001) can be a way to manage excessive change.

Upon completion of one change, Abrahamson (2000) suggests that organizationsneed to enjoy a period of “business as usual” in order to reap the benefits of thatchange. This logic follows the punctuated equilibrium model of change (Tushman& Romanelli, 1985). Periods of stability give time for organizational structuresand systems to reinforce the basic strategies. These stable periods are punctuatedby short bursts of fundamental change in strategy. The employees we investigatedexpect and prefer change processes where the beginning, purpose and end of changecan be clearly defined (Lewin, 1951).

When Change Becomes Excessive 57

Developing capacity for change: What do organizational members learn aboutchanging when they perceive change as excessive? Our findings indicate thatBOHICA was a typical response; this implies that organizational members maylearn to disregard change. In managing excessive change, it may be necessaryto develop a capacity for change. Although we cannot draw conclusions basedon our limited study, further investigation will help us better understand whatcreates a capacity for change. If the organization manages to influence the levelat which employees perceive strategic changes as excessive, and thus reduce thenumber of people who experience excessive change, then the consequences wouldbe minimized as well.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of this paper was to theoretically develop the phenomenon of excessivechange. The definition of excessive change emerged empirically from perceptionsof those involved in the change processes. We argued that it is necessary to definethe term using perceptions given that organizational members at different levelsof the organization experience excessive change differently. To explain why thesame set of changes could be viewed as being excessive by middle and lower-level employees, but not for the top management team we drew on the work doneon the role of middle management. We also argued that excessive change is aunique construct in that it cannot be described using the classifications often usedto categorize strategic change.

Individual and organizational level consequences of excessive change werepresented. The coping mechanisms that describe different ways of dealing withexcessive change suggest that we need to extend our understanding of reactionsbeyond “resistance to change.” Our findings of the reactions and responses toexcessive change suggest a need to focus on both active and passive responsesaffecting change in positive or negative ways. Focusing on the reactions andresponse has clear implications for managers who may find that potentially positiveintentions may trigger negative responses to change.

Extending Our Knowledge of Excessive Change

We recognize the limitations of the present study both in terms of the contextand construct development. Regarding context, can our findings be generalizedto other types of change? That is, is excessive change found when the changesare not strategic? Concerning construct development, can excessive change bedistinguished theoretically from strategic change in general?

58 JOYCE FALKENBERG ET AL.

While the cases used in our investigation varied in terms of types of changes,all three cases investigated could be described as being strategic changes inrelatively large monopolistic-type organizations. However, in presenting our workto different types of audiences, there has been general acknowledgement that ourfindings are relevant for the way that change is experienced in many organizations.Individuals have shared their stories, relating to us that both perceptions ofexcessive change as well as the consequences we uncovered in our study werealso found in their organizations. The changes they described ranged frommajor strategic changes similar to our context, to relatively minor changes. Theimpression we have based on these stories is that organizations and individuals areconstantly dealing with change. Perceptions of excessive change appear to resultregardless of whether the changes are strategic, similar to those described in ourstudy, organizational such as changes in reward systems, reorganization, etc., orrelate to the individual, such as relocation from one city to another or one officeto another. While there remains a need for further empirical research in differentcontexts, it may be useful for organizations to recognize that change may result inperceptions of excessive change and that excessive change can have consequencesfor both the individual and organization.

The other limitation relates to the issue of separating the consequences ofexcessive change from consequences of change in general. As we discussed, somereactions to excessive change were similar to those discussed by Dent and Goldberg(1999) and Piderit (2002). Also, the consequences we uncovered may have beena result of change in general. Further research will be required to disentangle theunique consequences of excessive change. While this research is important in termsof theoretically developing excessive change as a construct, our findings can haverelevance for managers by contributing to their understanding of the consequencesof change.

New Directions

Although there are numerous ways to extend the knowledge of excessive change,we focus on the three issues which have been discussed above, but which requirefurther investigation: movement among coping mechanisms, linkages betweenindividual and organizational level consequences and developing a capacity tochange.Patterns in coping mechanisms: We uncovered seven different coping

mechanisms in our data, and placed these in a matrix. The theory used to explainthese coping mechanisms also suggests that there might be a pattern of movementamong the mechanisms. Extending the framework developed by Reichers et al.

When Change Becomes Excessive 59

(1997) to excessive change, we could suggest that burnout (resulting from loyalty)may lead to paralysis, and BOHICA may lead to cynicism. Mapping these patternsof coping mechanisms would be an important extension of knowledge on excessivechange. Greater knowledge about how people move between different copingmechanisms over time may also be helpful for managers in trying to promotemore positive ways of reacting to change.

Linkages between individual and organizational level consequences: While ourdata allowed us to suggest that there might be linkages between individual andorganizational level consequences, it did not allow us to draw firm conclusions.This remains an area for further investigation. Among the interesting relationshipswould be uncovering organizational consequences which trigger and reinforcesome of the individual reactions which might reinforce perceptions of a non-functioning management.Capacity for change: While our study did not allow for investigation of capacity

for change, we recognize this as an important area for future research. Pettigrewand Whipp (1993) operationalized the concept at the macro level as the capacity ofthe firm to comprehend the competitive forces in play and how they change overtime and the ability of a business to mobilize and manage resources to respond.We believe that it is important to investigate what capacity to change means at theindividual level as well. Some researchers (Pettigrew, 1998; Reichers et al., 1997)suggest that capacity to change is increased when change programs have beensuccessfully implemented. We found indications that continuous change leads,not to capacity for change, but to BOHICA. These ambiguous findings suggestthat understanding capacity for change is an important extension of the work onexcessive change.

Regardless of the limitations and need for future research discussed above,we conclude that excessive change is pervasive. The implications of this forpractitioners are recognized by Pettigrew (1998) “In today’s business world thepressures for change are such that there is no longer the luxury of handling changessequentially” (p. 287). It also has implications for researchers who can no longerportray change as a discrete event. “Organizations are a cacophony of complemen-tary and competing change attempts . . .” (Dutton et al., 2001, p. 716). We feel thatby defining and recognizing the consequences of excessive change we have takenan important first important step toward understanding excessive change.

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