1 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author When Autocracies play Democracy – Clan (and) Politics in the Philippines Paper prepared for the 6 th ECPR General Conference at the University of Iceland; August 25-27 2011 Section 84: Democracy, History, Universality: Beyond the Decline of the West Panel 226: The Future of (Liberal) Democracy: An Asian Perspective Presenter and Author: Hannah Neumann (FU Berlin) Contact: [email protected]Abstract: Democracy seems to be lively and stable in the Philippines, if compared to its neighbors. National elections take place every five years, the changes in presidency were peaceful, there have only been few cases of election fraud and election related violence, press laws are liberal as is the constitution and many women are to be found in powerful positions. Compared to Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia or Vietnam, the country has become one of the role models within ASEAN. But digging beyond the surface and looking at daily social practices, this democracy can easily be deconstructed as an agglomerate of autocracies interacting within (and sometimes beyond) a democratic constitution. The century-old concept of the clan as immediate political unit has survived Colonialism, Democratisation, Martial Law, Peoples Power and revolutionary movements. It translated to nowadays politics, law making, economy and security structures. Across all political parties, within all religious groupings and on all islands, the clan provides the central element of social categorisation and organisation. What looks like a democracy to the outside, are numerous elaborate bargaining processes and shifting alliances between local clans and their representatives on national level.
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1 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
When Autocracies play Democracy – Clan (and) Politics in the Philippines
Paper prepared for the 6th ECPR General Conference at the University of Iceland; August 25-27 2011
Section 84: Democracy, History, Universality: Beyond the Decline of the West Panel 226: The Future of (Liberal) Democracy: An Asian Perspective
Presenter and Author: Hannah Neumann (FU Berlin) Contact: [email protected]
Abstract: Democracy seems to be lively and stable in the Philippines, if compared to its neighbors. National elections take place every five years, the changes in presidency were peaceful, there have only been few cases of election fraud and election related violence, press laws are liberal as is the constitution and many women are to be found in powerful positions. Compared to Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia or Vietnam, the country has become one of the role models within ASEAN. But digging beyond the surface and looking at daily social practices, this democracy can easily be deconstructed as an agglomerate of autocracies interacting within (and sometimes beyond) a democratic constitution. The century-old concept of the clan as immediate political unit has survived Colonialism, Democratisation, Martial Law, Peoples Power and revolutionary movements. It translated to nowadays politics, law making, economy and security structures. Across all political parties, within all religious groupings and on all islands, the clan provides the central element of social categorisation and organisation. What looks like a democracy to the outside, are numerous elaborate bargaining processes and shifting alliances between local clans and their representatives on national level.
2 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
Law or revolutionary unrest
When Autocracies play Democracy – Clan (and) Politics in the Philippines
“Sure enough, we now have free elections, free speech, free assembly. But these are the empty shells of democratic institutions, because the real essence of democracy does not exist here. True to her oligarchic class … she turned EDSA1 into a restoration of the old oligarchy.” (Sionil 2004, 50)
Since the end of Marcos dictatorship, Filipino democracy seems to be lively and
stable – at first glance. Regular elections are conducted every five years, the change in
presidency at minimum every ten years has been peaceful, only a few accounts of
election fraud and election related violence have called international attention, the
press laws and the overall constitution are liberal and many women are to be found in
powerful positions. Popular Policy Indices, such as the Bertelsmann Transformation
Index or the Freedom House Index acknowledge these developments and rank the
Philippines in the top bracket of South-East Asian Countries.2 Compared to Burma,
Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia or Vietnam, the country has once more become one of
the role models within ASEAN. But this appearance is deceiving and the Philippines
are an illustrative case for how much more important it is to look at actual social
practices rather than at institutional organs and constitutional provisions.
Autocratically ruled clans have widely managed to transfer their hierarchical system
based on unconditional loyalty in exchange for security and resources to today’s
democracy. What seems liberal to the outside is an elaborate system of bargaining and
shifting alliances between autocratically ruled elite families at the inside. Neither
Colonialism, nor the Commonwealth3, World War Two, final Independence, Martial 4 5 brought an end to such rule. Rather a closer look at
1 EDSA refers to the People Power Revolution which led to a non-violent and of Marcos dictatorship in 1986) 2 For such a comparison, see the Bertelsmann data: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/457.0.html>
and the Freedom House data, where the Philippines have been rated as “Free” from 1996 to 2005, during the “all-
out wars”, online: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/FIW_All Scores_Countries.xls>. 3 The Commonwealth period in the Philippines lasted from 1935 to 1946, where the country was a commonwealth
of the United States. 4 The Philippines were under Martial Law from 1972 to 1981 under the rule of Ferdinand Marcos. 5 The most prominent and wide-spread revolutionary movements, active today are the MILF in Muslim Mindanao
(a Muslim group fighting for self-determination) and the NPA (a communist group fighting for regime change).
3 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
those historical periods shows elite rule gaining an increased momentum. Autocratic
clan structures have survived democracy and regular elections. A small group of
powerful families continues to rule the masses. Loyalty to ones clan serves as the
common denominator unifying all Filipinos, regardless of regional, ethnic, religious
or linguistic origin. Personalized rule and control persists and the social order is best
described as a coexistence of concurring clans. Each historical period introduced new
ways and means to safeguard resources and legitimise such elite rule. The paper seeks
to explore this ambivalent relationship between changing systems and stable
structures and thus provides an historical explanation for the persistence of clan rule.
It is based on historical and analytical literature of which most is cited in the
following paper, complemented by the authors own experiences while living and
researching in Manila, Cebu, Davao, Butuan, Cotabato and Pikit.6 The focus of the
following paper is on Mindanao, but many of the findings are transferable to other
regions of the Philippines, and as some might realize, to a number of other post-
colonial states.
Early Settlements – where clan equaled community The clan runs through Filipino history like a scarlet threat, like the only scarlet threat
it seems. Clan and residential community had been congruent during early settlement
periods. Members of a clan and their offspring settled close to each other (Zialcita
1998). Ownership of the surrounding lands was community based, with the head of
the clan as custodian of the land (Filipinas Foundation 1975, 58). Land belonged to
the kin group which started using it and members of the family received rights to use
parcels of the land; but not to own it (Abreu 2005; Arumpac 1998). Strangers were
temporarily allocated plots. The mechanisms underlying distribution of land as well
as political power were based on clan custom, as well as Adat Law, the Mindanaon
customary law. Both sets of rules were neither formalized nor universal, but provided
general guidelines for social interaction surprisingly consistent across Mindanao
(CPRM 2004, 51). Power, for example has widely rested on a mix of genealogy, age
and social hierarchy.
6 The author was exchanged student at Ateneo de Manila University in 2004 and 2005. She was further intern with
the German Development Service in Cebu in 2005 and documenting on various projects of World Vision in
Mindanao. She later on returned for research in 2006 and 2009 and remained in close contact with many of her
informants until now.
4 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
to rely on the loyalty of the da
Islamisation – the origin of datuship and personal loyalty The arrival of Islam, mostly through trade, starting in the 15th century changed little
(Abubakar 1983, 7). Most communities converted to Islam and Islam slowly melted
into local custom, but without fundamentally challenging any of the underlying
mechanisms. The family remained the main organizing principle, with the head now
called datu7. All persons in a district considered themselves allied to a datu –
organizing them into innumerable petty states, basically reflecting the indigenous
structure of settlements. The datu was a combination of political leader, landlord,
judge and religious functionary. His power was not measured in terms of land or
wealth, but by the number of followers, meaning people upon whose loyalty he could
count. Power rested on the person’s ability to sustain his constituents and on his
personal charisma (Lebar 1972, 23; Jocano 1983, 3). In return for their loyalty, the
datu had to provide aid in emergency and advocacy in disputes with other clans or
chiefs (Dolan 1991). The number of followers thus became a selection criterion
besides genealogy. This was necessary, as in the Philippines status can be inherited
from both – paternal as well as maternal lines, generating a number of potential datus
(Damaso 1983, 81).8
The local datu again, was embedded into a bigger hierarchy through alliances with
other datus and subordinated to the sultan. Those Sultanates united the scattered and
autonomous communities into a political community, called bangsa (nation) (Jocano
1983, 4). Despite the introduction of the sultanates, power and authorities rested on
the local datus and was and distributed upwards based on a precarious system of
alliances (Kiefer 1967, 23). Although the sultan occupied the highest social, political
and religious status in society (Jocano 1983, 3), he depended on personal loyalties and
his own finesse in building and securing alliances (Kiefer 1967: 24}. The sultan had
tus to secure his power. If he would lose the loyalty of
7 Historians dispute the usage and origin of the term ‘datu’ as it may have existed already before the introduction
of Islam and is also used among the non-Islamized communities in Mindanao (Damaso 1983). In either case, the
English equivalent used most often is that of ‘ruler or descendant of rulers’ which gives the term a combined
sociological and genealogical significance (Beckett 1977, 50). 8 The number of followers could be increased following different mechanism. Whereas distributing resources
downwards surely was one, others more normative have been mentioned in literature: (1) Bansawan — belonging
to the royal core lineage, or a pidtaylan (2) Ilmawan — knowledgeable in adat and Shariah to be a fitting vice-
regent of Allah (3) Rupawan — personable, with good features (nonawan) and charisma (4) Hartawan — affluent
to lend prestige and dignity to the exercise of the office.
5 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
one datu, he would at the same time loose the loyalty of all his followers (Kreuzer
2011, 8). Securing the loyalty of the datu, thus was his main objective.
The judicial system provided means to stabilize this system of loyalties and ensure the
dependency of the individual on the clan. The codes only made gross distinctions
between ranks (Islamic law distinguishes only between free persons and slaves). In
practice, however, these rules were applied with great attention to rank differences
(Bentley 1992, 103). Islamic law was understood and applied through the rank
sensitive lens of customary law which specified, with striking finesse, the behavior
expected of persons of different ranks. Especially the traditional bang-on (or
maratabat) system of raising one’s life and dignity was one of the social pressures
imposed through the elders to maintain adherence to the informal body of laws.
maratabat, a term usually translated as ‘rank honor’ also carried the connotations of
self-esteem and self-respect. The idea was that each Filipino Muslim, as well as his
clan, possessed maratabat in proportion to his or her rank in the traditional hierarchy,9
which combines genealogical elements with actual lifetime achievements. Such
dignity and prestige are seen as exclusive – meaning one person can only gain if
another looses (Bentley 1985) – until today leading to bloody feuds and long-lasting
violence if an offence on maratabat is not resolved. The logic was and is: If honor is
not restored in a non-violent mechanism of conflict resolution, it needs to be restored
by violent means.10 And such a restoration is only possible through the help of the
clan and the approval of its datu. Naturally, those clans with most followers were in a
better position than those less powerful. Thus, often inferior clans refrained from
taking such action and members of the more powerful lineages got away with their
offences – cementing genealogical hierarchies between the clans.11
9 The maratabat system is best described for the Maranao (Bentley 1985), but compatible, though less elaborately
described systems exist for the other ethnic groups in Mindanao. 10 For many, justice is a matter of honor and restoring ones maratabat it the only way to reach justice. Thus
described for the Tausug: “They do not teach their children to fight. They teach them not to fight. Violence itself,
however it is expressed, is considered morally wrong by the Tausug. To be shamed with-out taking revenge is,
however, as great a wrong.” (Kiefer 1972, 5) 11 This was not only true in the case of clan feud, but according to some accounts even for judicial processes
following customary rule. Here, the number of witnesses was reported to be the key criterion for the decision of
the datu. Those clans with more followers and resources to secure witnesses thus were in better position (Kreuzer
2011, 11)
6 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
patronage system, based on t
Colonialism – strengthening patronage Spanish colonialism from 1521 to 1898 had little impact on Mindanao and its power
structures. Aside a few minor wars, Mindanao was widely left on its own. The only
legacy left by the Spanish was the introduction of private land ownership as a central
pillar to their concept of feudalism (Zialcita 1998, 54). In the Northern islands the
effects of this system were felt soon and increased the power of clans. The promotion
of an agrarian, hacienda based society and economy and absentee landlordism
resulted in the concentration of land in the hands of a few, mostly the old elites who
collaborated with the Spaniards. In Mindanao, land continued to be allocated by the
datu and handled as if it were owned by the clan, but this changed towards the end of
American colonialism.
American colonialism started under a more powerful approach, providing a mix of
military force and incentives. The initial policy of the US towards the rulers of
Mindanao was, to rule the different clans and regions by “accommodating” their
leaders (Tan 1983, 124). The idea was to look for “important families through whom
they could control a people they did not understand” (Beckett 2009, 291). Although
Provincial offices were subject to election according to the constitution, this never
was implemented in Mindanao (Beckett 2009, 280–88). In the Bates Treaty between
the Sultan of Sulu and the United States in 1899, the colonialists even promised not to
interfere in Sulu religion, law and commerce in exchange for the sultan’s
acknowledgement of United States sovereignty (The Bates Treaty of 1899 1899).12
Sultans and datus were paid a monthly salary for their administrative support, as long
as they ensured an end to piracy raids and accepted the US flag to be used. The US
representatives widely cooperated with the old datus loyal towards the United States
and provided them with incentives such as pilgrimages to Mecca, a share in revenue
or scholarships for their children(Beckett 2009, 291). The loyalty paid off.
Pilgrimages were increasing prestige, revenue could be distributed downwards to
increase loyalty and the number of followers and scholarships increased the chances
of their offspring in competing against alternative rulers. The American system
provided the datus with extended the means to build up and secure a clan based
he pre-existing family system as a means to distribute
12 Elsewhere in Mindanao, the United States entered into similar, though less formal agreements with local power
holders (Holbrook 2009, 12)
7 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
equalled political posts, equa
wealth and power downwards. And the same pattern was valid for Filipino-American
relations in the northern islands.13 Earlier practices of decision-making remained
largely intact and clan politics was strengthened during early American colonization.
The situation started to shift after the Public Land Act of 1903 and the abrogation of
the Bates Treaty in 1904. Both challenged the power of Mindanaon sultans and datus.
The Public Land Act (nos. 718, 926 and 496) introduced the homestead system and
allowed individuals to acquire lots – in the same time declaring null and void all lands
rights granted by datus, sultans or traditional chiefs without authority of the State.
This measure, of which Muslims and Indigenous were widely ignorant, legally
ensured the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few big landlords
(Gomez and Mercado 2001). Naturally the most educated Christian settlers, coming
from the Northern islands and educated Moro elites benefited most. Whereas some of
the incoming Christian settlers could improve their position, land reform cemented
established power structures among the Muslim Mindanoans, but as they had to
compete with the settlers, decreased their overall power.
Those who opposed US American domination and the concept of private land
ownership, or just had no knowledge of the system, failed to title their land. Many
small farmland owners saw their land occupied by these corporations and became
farm workers instead (Ocampo 2011). Christian lowland Filipinos were more adept at
using the modern law for their end and applied for individual titles to various tracts of
“state” land and, after becoming the legal owners of these tracts, enforced eviction of
the original inhabitants (Kreuzer 2006, 41). The same did many Muslim elites apply
for land titles in the names of their clan members and later on rent it out to them. Land
reform, in the whole of the Philippines strengthened elite rule, and until today no
solution to this problem has been found. Cooperation once more paid off. Those who
owned farmland, were able to increase their production of rice, corn, coconuts and
cattle and some of the earlier subsistence farmers turned into big landlords. Business
was made mostly by those owning huge areas of land – predominantly the Christian
and in some cases the Muslim elites – linking land ownership to commercial
ownership and through a huge number of dependants and tenants, to political
patronage. Land ownership equalled richness, equalled a high number of dependants,
lled funds, equalled patronage and strengthening of
13 This is described along the example of Sergio Osmena and the Osmena family in (Cullinane 1989).
8 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
meant not having any rights at
patronage network. The landlord as “custodian”, distributing lands among his
dependants in return for loyalty and in many cases tenure, has become the modern
datu; translating the century old concept to Colonialism, throughout the
Commonwealth period, and as further remarks will show, to today’s Filipino
democracy.
The abrogation of the Bates Treaty, putting an end to legal pluralism had comparable
strengthening effects on clan rule. The Bates Treaty was unilaterally abrogated in
1904 and replaced legal pluralism in favor for “integration”, or put bluntly,
assimilation (Holbrook 2009, 12). The resulting Moro14-American war from 1902 to
1913 led to a defeat of the sultans and their final subordination to American power,
which did by no means decrease their power on regional and local level. In 1914 US
administration imposed a uniform law that disregarded Muslim and customary law
(McKenna 1998, 91). Local law was only allowed, as long as it was in accordance
with the laws of the United States of America, a restriction widely ignored on the
ground. Most issues, even those dealing with murder and homicide, were dealt along
customary law and processes. Those permit even the most serious offenses to be
settled by the payments of fines or debt servitude (Scott 1984, 133). The public is not
seen as an aggrieved party. An act is not right or wrong in itself. Offences committed
to outsiders of the kin group usually do not affect the relation between kin-members
and can be negotiated with the aggrieved party (Zialcita 1998, 46). Not punishment,
but compensation and restoration of the loss in resources, prestige or power are the
main motives of the victim. Cases are dealt with based on negotiations between
victim and offender, both represented by elders of their clan. Local datus are
facilitating such negotiations, but compensations have to be debated by the parties in
conflict. Their hierarchical relation to each other, not some formal law serves as
benchmark (Kreuzer 2011, 11).15 Being a member of an inferior clan meant having
less loss in prestige to be compensated for. Not being member of a clan meant not
having any advocacy in these disputes. In a system based on amicable settlement, this
all.
14 The term Moro is a political label for all Muslim Mindanaons. It serves to unify the different ethnic groups of
Muslim belief and to distinguish them from the Christian settlers living in Mindanao. Introduced as a pejorative
term by the Spanish, it now serves as unifying term, used by the Moro revolutionary movements. 15 A number of explanations and legal matters concerning the Muslim Legal System in the Philippines can be
found on this website: http://www.muslimmindanao.ph/sharia_system.html
9 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
common interest unifying the
Colonialism might have challenged the authority of the sultans by introducing a
higher level authority on national level and integrating them into national level
politics, but it changed little of the power structures on the ground. Even more so, by
allocating funds and incentives to the former sultans and datus, colonial powers
strengthened their kinship networks. From the beginning of the Commonwealth,
democratic institutions were manipulated not to uplift the ‘humble commoner’ but to
serve the Filipino directing class and American policy (Cullinane 1989, 105). Land
reform cemented elite leadership as it allocated land to those already in power, widely
denying access to the common Mindanaon and Filipino in general. Justice reform
installed a system widely unacceptable to Muslim Mindanaons, thus increasing the
power of informal and customary structures, once more safe-guarding hierarchies
within and between the clans.
Independence – increasing funds, competition and violence There are a number of post-colonial countries in which the fight for independence
provided some unifying elements between its citizens. This was not the case in the
Philippines. For one, there was no revolutionary upraise against the American, but a
rather slow transition of power to the Commonwealth government and later on the
independent Philippines. The little revolution against the Spanish was an elite project,
taking place nearly exclusively in Manila and led to the 1898 Declaration of
Philippine Independence from Spain and continues to be celebrated today. But as that
struggle was a predominantly Christian and Tagalog16 one, the nation-building project
was patterned along this Christian, Tagalog image (Coronel-Ferrer 2005, 7),
culminating in the American-derived values of democracy and individual freedom
(Bankoff and Weekley 2002, 95), coupled with the Spanish legacy of Christianity.
Christianity became the corner-stone of the nation, symbolically excluding religious
minorities (approximately 15 per cent of Filipinos). What remained as smallest
common denominator between all religious, ethnic and linguistic groups of the
Philippines, and thus as only base for national level interaction was there adherence to
the clan.
Safe-guarding clan rule and increasing the outlook of the personal clan was the
Filipinos, thus it comes as no surprise that clan identity
16 Tagalog, the ethnic group living in the region in and around Manila, led the national resistance. Their
vernacular was later on made the national language (Tagalog), although most Filipinos speak Visayan.
10 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
ranks much higher than any other loyalty. Asking Filipino Muslims about their
identity, a clear and surprisingly consistent hierarchy appears:17 The most important
level of identification is that of clan affiliation or kinship ties. Second is ethnic group
(being a Maguindanaoan, a Maranao or a Tausug), third is religious identity (being a
Muslim), fourth, closely interwoven with third, is being a Moro, based on political
activity as a Muslim, and in fifth place finally comes being a Filipino (Guilal 1998,
161). The same hierarchy is valid for Christian Filipinos. They are foremost members
of a family and clan. Asked the question “Who are you?” the answer most often is “I
am the son/daughter of...”, followed by an indication to the village / area they live in,
their ethnic group and only lastly their religion18.
Thus, the clan continued to exist as primary organizing principle after independence,
throughout the years of Marcos dictatorship, until today. Democracy, the way it is
practiced in the Philippines, served to strengthen the power of the clans rather than to
diversify power and increase participation. This can be demonstrated along three
sectors key to a state: Security, Land Ownership/Economy and Political Power, all
three closely related to each other in the Philippines to ensure the perpetuity of clan
leadership. Electoral democracy opened state resources for privatization by
established and emerging families, which knitted themselves, during the middle
decades of the twentieth century, into a national oligarchy. The state remained weak,
making it difficult, obviously impossible, to formulate and implement policies
independently of the powerful vested interest groups, especially the powerful
families, clans, and kinship networks (Rivera 1994, 32).
As no real political parties existed at the end of the Commonwealth, voting became a
mere objectification of clan loyalty, especially on the local and regional levels. Being
voted into office served as a further base of legitimacy for continuing elite dominance
and the resources allocated to those in office as additional means to secure the loyalty
of followers. The Philippines as a whole became a distinctly American patterned of
17 The following data is based on research by Wahab Ibrahim Guilal in 1998 entitled “Perceptions on Democracy
and Citizenship in Muslim Mindanao”, based on key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and a review
of literature. 18 This is based on my own experience in the Philippines and confirmed by a presentation of Carolyn Anonuevo,
as quoted in (Grabowski 2006, 67).
11 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
subordination to a national le
decentralized democracy19 in which regular and competitive elections are of high
importance. Until today, local agencies of the state are subordinate to elected
municipal mayors and provincial governors, a hierarchy, which guarantees that the
accumulation and mobilization of local personal followers remains a key source of
political power, just as it had been in pre-colonial and throughout colonial times
(Hedman and Sidel 2000, 170). Political office assumed greater importance as the
rewards and powers of these formal political positions increased – mayors had funds
to spend, jobs to allocate, police to command and the courtship of big politicians at
election time (Beckett 2009, 292) The strong reliance on local power holders largely
translated to the electoral system. What had been the datu was the mayor, what had
been the sultan was the governor. Political parties were loose and unstable coalitions
of local power holders with their followers, based on family or other loyalties rather
than on shared ideology or class consciousness (Beckett 2009, 288). Just as with the
rural Christian Filipino, the concept of democracy and citizenship enshrined in most
Muslims is reduced to mere participation in elections (Guilal 1998, 171); although
actual choosing of candidates is usually done in a collective manner where command
votes are a widely accepted phenomenon (Kreuzer 2005, 20, 31).
Electoral democracy had increased the competition between the clans, but not
challenged the logic of clan rule per se. Ruling a certain area or community has
become equal to securing political and economical resources. Especially the so-called
pork-barrel funds (Priority Development Assistance Funds) are widely used as a
means to reward followers for their loyalty: By the president to reward the
parliamentarian for voting him or her into office, and by the parliamentarian to
reword his followers for voting him or her into office. 1,2 Million Euros are allocated
to each parliamentarian which he can distribute rather freely on projects of his choice.
In a region with 70% living below the poverty line, this is an immense amount.
The system of electoral democracy has imposed a new structure on the traditional and
Islamic region of Mindanao, but old elites could to a large extent use these new
structures for their own means (Kreuzer 2011, 14). What was new, was the definite
vel. Those datus who finally succeeded, had learned to
19 It is decentralized in so far as the district/ municipality has a strong basis, but on the other hand, it is directly
dependent on the national government. What is lacking in the case of the Philippines is an intermediate/ regional
level of political organization.
12 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
play the game of democracy. They entered in a “wheeling-and-dealing” (Coronel-
Ferrer 2005, 11–12) of funds and resources against loyalty, meaning votes, across all
levels. Datus secured the votes of their followers to either the governor or the
president, and in return could basically rule their regions ad libitum (Kreuzer 2011).20
“Implication in kidnappings, coups, fraud, venality, and murder do a (...) datu’s
reputation no harm, so long as he gets away with it“ (Bentley 2009, 277).
But this situation is not unique to Mindanao. The whole of Filipino politics is
characteristically described as “kinship politics of an oligarchic nature” (Kreuzer
2006: 31), a “collection of clan alliances” (Abinales 2002, 613), or “an anarchy of
families” (McCoy 2009). Political families randomly try to convert the state and its
institutions into “hangers-on of the family” (Kreuzer 2006, 55). The pervasiveness of
family rule all over the country is increasing its persistence. Political families prefer
other families or family-like organizations as political opponents since they, too, have
a vital interest in stabilizing the order in which families have a key political position
(Kreuzer 2006, 55). Coalitions are unstable, formed between different elite families,
oriented along the need for the smallest-needed majority and usually “bought
together” by particular deals (Kreuzer 2008b, 49). Even the metaphors used in
political communication reflect this notion of family ruling. An often used metaphor
for the Philippine nation-state and its local units is that of a family. All Filipinos are
then supposed to be brothers and sisters and the executive being the father (Zialcita
1998). Marcos was playing on this metaphor with him, being the father and his wife
being the mother of the nation. Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos did not continue using
these metaphors, but today’s president Benigno Aquino, who likes to be called by his
nickname NoyNoy is again introducing a notion of informality and closeness. On
local level, such terms as Ama (father), Ina (mother) or Atte (bigger sister) continue
to be used widely.
20 The most prominent example of such an alliance is that between the Ampatuan clan and Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, the former president of the Philippines. Andal Ampatuan, the clan leader secured the vote of all twelve
senatorial posts in his region to go to Arroyo supporters in 2007, and 100% of the votes during presidential
election in 2004 to Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. In turn, he had never been charged for any of the many irregularities
under his rule, such as a killed rival candidate for regional elections, executed prisoners, and suppressed human
rights activists (Kreuzer 2011, 16–17). Only the Maguindanao massacre in 2009, killing 57 people gained
international attention; but so far neither he nor any member of his clan has served a sentence.
13 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
But not only had the clan as political entity with its head counting on utmost loyalty
translated to electoral democracy. The same did the private armies of former datus
and sultans, today under the disguise of fully legal paramilitary forces or state forces
protecting important politicians. Elite politicians are buying protection of the Filipino
Army and the National Police. Legal para-military organizations serve as private
army. Political killings are common and some datus command private armies of as
much as 3000-5000 armed men (Kreuzer 2011). Both, police and military, as well as
para-military forces serve as the armed faction of elite politicians. Their loyalty
remains with the clan and they are perceived as representatives of the clan, not of the
state (Kreuzer 2011). Economic violence mingles with political violence, private
violence, ethnic violence, criminal activities and terrorism; constituting a highly
systemized and ironically pretty stable arrangement down to community level. To
start with exploring the systems of violence in brief, economic violence figures most
prominent when it comes to enforcing logging or mining concessions or to developing
farm land for plantation. Stavenhagen, the UN special rapporteur on the
implementation of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act precisely describes quite
common practices of development aggression: “dispossession, forced displacement,
physical abuse, torture (…) summary executions, destruction of houses, including the
bombing of an indigenous village, as well as the practice of hamleting21”
(Stavenhagen 2002, 43) in which even high-level politicians are involved.22
Such practices are often connected to political violence. High-level politicians are
closely connected to such corporations and thus targeted by political activists
opposing economic violence and challenging those behind it. Especially political
activists and parties from the left, as well as critical journalists see themselves faced
with numerous death threats. The number of extra-judicial killings has by no means
decreased since the return to democracy in 1986 (Kreuzer 2007). Rather, the number
of killed activists has become an impact indicator for the work of such groups23. Safe-
21 Hamleting is the forced re-organization of rural residents into special camps 22 The case of the press secretary of the president, Jesus Dureza, was a popular one at the time of field work in
2009. He had held a mountain resort without undergoing the proper legal process of land acquisition. 23 When I asked a human rights activist whether their human rights work had an impact on the regional and
national level, his short answer was revealing: “yes, our organization has lost 35 members due to extra-judicial
killings” This answer was given by Hilao Enriquez, from Karatapan during the Conference Human Rights in the
Philippines – Trends and Challenges under the Aquino Government, June 29 and 30 in Berlin.
14 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
president from signing it (Be
guarding political and economic interest against Communist or Moro claims for
change has become a daily routine for local politicians, even if this means to
challenge the authority of the Filipino government (Kreuzer 2008a).24 The border to
private violence is fluent. Political and economic interests are by no means separate of
private enrichment. This spills over to clan conflict on local level. Where resources
can only be secured by the family in political office, competition for such office is
high and means to secure it sometimes drastic. The latest incident of clan-related
violence, linked to political competition seemed to have opened a new dimension.
The so-called “Maguindanao Massacre” in which 57 men and women, approximately
half of them journalists, were killed and buried by a roadside in Mindanao on 23
November 2009 is part of a long-lasting feud between the Ampatuan and the
Mangudaddatu clan (Gutierrez 2009).25
The conflict between the Filipino Army and the MILF is part of this mix of violence
and is often used by the different clans as a means to either disguise or further their
personal agenda. It is hard to say, to what extent the escalation of private violence is a
reaction to the protractedness of ethnic conflict and to what extend the ethnic conflict
is used to disguise private violence on both sides. For sure, the latest outbreak of
supposedly ethnic violence between the government of the Philippines and the MILF
in 2008 can be seen as an indicator for mixing economic, private and ethnic issues.
The situation escalated after the MoA-AD (Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral
Domains) was not ratified by the national government, and the conflict is still ongoing
on at low intensity today. This memorandum was the result of a joint panel of
representatives of the MILF and the national government as well as academic experts.
It summarized all previous agreements between the two warring groups and should
have served as a roadmap to peace. Shortly before the designated signing date of the
document in Malaysia, two Christian governors from Mindanao appealed to the
Supreme Court to declare the whole process unconstitutional and discourage the
rnas 2008; Jurand 2008). The Supreme Court ruled in
24 One such case is the reaction of Governor Emanuel Pinol to the MoA-AD. He issued a statement replicated on
his website as well as numerous local newspapers where he announced to take up arms against the MILF in case
the government would be no longer willing or able to do so. 25 Esmael Mangudadatu was challenging Andal Ampatuan Jr., son of the Maguindanao governor Andal Ampatuan
Sr., as mayor of Buluan town. When Mangudadatus wife was on her way to filing a certificate for his candidacy,
she and her escort were kidnapped and brutally killed.
15 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
accordance with their appeal and criticized the MoA-AD as having departed too far
from the constitution (Bernas 2008).26 But this intervention was by no means free of
self-interest. One of the two governors who appealed to the Supreme Court, Emanuel
Pinol, owns vast tracts of land in Mindanao, which might have been redistributed if
the MoA had been implemented (Neumann 2010). When Pinol was trying to
safeguard his plantations by appealing as governor to the Supreme Court, this made
economic violence political. Because he was doing so to safe-guard his very own
benefit, it had a private connotation. When he called on all Christians in his province
to get prepared for self-defense it spilled over to a mix of privatized and ethnic
violence. And openly insulting a local military commander, who was pursuing a
strategy of de-escalation that he wouldn’t “have the guts” to fight the MILF, was
actively escalating the situation. Many in Mindanao have a very fine knowledge of
how to play this game. They are keeping violence at a certain level where it remains
generally acceptable but ensures for all those involved to secure further resources to
their clan. Peter Kreuzer, a sharp and prominent analyst of the situation in Mindanao,
goes as far as to see the continuing violence in Mindanao not as a failure of the
government in securing its monopoly of power, but as a necessary constituent of a
social and political order aiming towards stabilizing the authority of a few over the
many (Kreuzer 2007).
Violence is incorporating democracy. The daily practices of violence have little in
common with the formal character of the democracy written into the Filipino
constitution. But the structures of violence have been there before, they have always
had a stabilizing function and they seem to be surviving democracy. Formal
democracy is incorporated into violent structures in many aspects. Where the state is
still in control of the monopoly of power, it is just because those who have the
monopoly of power have become representatives of the state. If such monopolies are
challenged, as in the case of Pinol or Ampatuan, it is common to revert to, or at least
threaten to revert to, violence. Guns seem to be the only means to be respected:
"In areas like this (...) you have to be like a warlord to be respected. (...) It's a very feudal system. (...) you have to exact fear from your constituents. It gets you respect. Number two it's again economic power. (...) So it's guns, gold and goons. The three
26 Especially the powers envisioned for the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity go beyond those of local governments or
even the ARMM, making it, according to the Supreme Court, a quasi-autonomous state.
16 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
National Liberation Front (M
Gs." (leading representative of an international aid organization, working in Mindanao. Cited according to: (Kreuzer 2008b, 51)
And here we can close the circle to the clan. The clan remains the underlying
structure of this system and only as member of a clan, there is a chance to succeed in
it. Land is given to members of the clan, security is provided for members of the clan
and resources are allocated to members of the clan – in return for unconditional
loyalty. Political leaders have remained, what Gonzales calls “sultans of a violent
land”27:
Moro Revolution: challenging clan authority in Mindanao Translating the idea of family to democratic politics, or better, familialistic structures
incorporating democracy, lead to defunct structures. Loyalty without questioning, the
translation of inner-familial hierarchies to decision-making processes, the little
interest for a public good, the strong link between economic, political and military
branches and the exclusion of alternative ways of group alignment, such as ethnicity,
has led to a failure of democracy on the ground; in turn once more strengthening the
importance of the clan as organizing principle. Even ethnic protest, as powerful as it
might be voiced in Mindanao, has little impact on actual decisions and structures.
The clan system in Mindanao increased marginalization on the national level.
Oligarchic politics working through shifting alliances with the main power –
concentrated in the presidency in Manila – clustered power among elites outside of
the Moro ethnic communities. In the national parliament, Moros remained politically
marginalized. Muslim elites managed to gain resources for their region, but their
motivation was simply to strengthen their own paternalistic network. They worked
not to improve the fundamental interests of their ethnic and/or religious group, but
rather to distribute their financial means along paternalistic structures, strengthening
their own positions within this kinship network. (Kreuzer 2008b, 49). Ethnic protest
was without representation in the political sphere. When Marcos further eroded the
political power of Muslim representatives at the national level, it became evident to
many of the traditional as well as Islamic leaders that it would not be possible to
regain independence through political means or institutional mechanisms (Lingga
2007, 43). The Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (BMLO) soon became the Moro
NLF) and rapidly grew to tenth of thousands of
27 This is the title of his paper (Gonzales 2000)
17 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
Filipinos is defined by their o
members in the mid 1970s. This led to a split within the Moro societies. In the 1960s,
a young Moro elite, educated in Libya, Egypt and Saudi Arabia or at the University of
the Philippines in Manila, challenged the traditional authority of the datus. This new
elite used their Islamic teachings and the notion of equality inscribed in the Quran to
counter the hierarchical system of datuship and install a new system of leadership.
The upraise was personified by Nur Misuari, the leader of the MNLF, promoting
Islam as the base for political organisation instead of the clan (McKenna 1998, 133).
It was the first time, the traditional datuship had been challenged in an attempt to
unify all Muslims of Mindanaons as Moros and connect them to the bigger
community of believers in Islam, the ummah. Whereas the logic of the clans always
has been one of cooptation into the national system in return for funds to be handed
down the kinship network, Nur Misuaris network was based on a revolutionary spirit,
aiming towards radically changing the Muslim societies and liberating them from
Filipino domination. But by most, the clans continued to be seen as the bird in the
hand, securing economic safety based on kinship loyalty, whereas the revolutionary
movement symbolized the two in the bush. Both needed each other, to secure
resources. Until today, the revolutionary movement relies on the datus to secure the
constituents for whom it claims to speak. And the clans need the revolutionary
movements as they increase pressure on the government to allocate funds to the
Muslim regions, which are then handled through the clan structures.28 The old MNLF
cadres are now incorporated into the clan system. To what extend the MILF, their
successors, will be able to overcome clan rule remains to be seen. So far, clan rule has
proofed to be the strongest among all alternative organising principles.
The family, deeply enshrined in social practices Making a shift from political and public life, to private values and relationships
changes little. The family is “the strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest
loyalties and coloring all social activity with its own set of demands” (Grossholtz
1964, 86–87). It doesn’t matter whether it is about school funding, a new job, a
problem with the boss, a guy one admires or an offence one has committed – Filipinos
usually seek and get support from close family members rather than state agencies,
co-workers or advise centers (Zialcita 1998, 46). The moral universe of many
bligation to their kin, especially to their parents. Such
28 The most prominent example for this unsacred alliance is the ARMM
18 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
average citizens and the co
kin-bonds are based on and reinforced by highly reciprocal relationships. Among the
Filipinos in the northern islands, Utang na loob (an unpayable “debt of gratitude”)
defines the lasting moral obligation created when one accepts a voluntary gift or
service. Hiya refers to a complicated concept of shame, where an individual loses
his/her hiya, when he/she fails to repay his/her “debt of gratitude” and is then consid-
ered a shameless person (walang hiya). As a result, another major value is the avoid-
ance of conflict, or pakikisama (getting along). In Muslim Mindanao, authority and
cohesion manifested themselves, just as in general Filipino society, along a complex
system of personal, family, and clan loyalties (Guilal 1998, 164–65). The loob/ hiya
system finds its reflection in the indigenous bangon (or maratabat) system. Social
existence among Muslim, as well as Christian Filipinos, is much concerned with
intragroup (= intra-family) cohesion. Alternative support networks (such as unions,
peers, co-workers etc.) are rather weak (Abad 2005). Not only do the datus
subordinate their followers; they themselves willingly accept such subordination for
the good of their kin. The datu is seen as the father, who knows best what is good for
his children.
Conclusion In a weak nation state, such as the Filipino one, the clan provides the only means to
secure social and economic survival. The family has to allocate what the state fails to
provide for: capital, livelihood, education and formation and medicare. And it
provides stability, as it is based on proven and reciprocal loyalties – anxious to
transfer name, prestige and values to the following generations (McCoy 1994, 7). In
the Philippines, authority and voting behaviour are until today following a complex
system of personal, family and clan loyalties (Guilal 1998, 164–65) and the
decentralized political system encourages such. Partaking in politics in the Philippines
is understood as a necessity for any family or clan to reach its maximum profit and
increase the assets of its kin.29. These familial alliances form a crucial link between
untry’s elites. In societies where personal ties are
29 In a 2009 survey by Transparency International, Filipinos see their political parties and public officials as the
most corrupt aspects of society – scoring a 4 on a scale from 1 (not corrupt) to 5 (extremely corrupt) – and 77% of
the interviewed judge their government to be ineffective in fighting corruption. Online:
<http://www.transparency.org/content/download/43788/701097>. Adding the data of the Asian Barometer, the
picture becomes even more consistent. Here, only 10% of Filipinos are “consistent democrats”, the lowest rate in
Southeast Asia, pointing to a “very thin cultural legitimization for democracy” (Chu and Huang 2009, 13).
19 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
traditionally most important, citizens are often suspicious of politicians or officials
unknown to them personally. As a result, the system seems to lack order and is
instead characterized by “randomness and chaos, with the only operative force being
social ties underlying privilege” (Chikiamco 1998, 17) – privilege being constantly
reproduced through licit and illicit practices of familial relationships. This makes such
“cultural behaviour” of complex transactions of debt and obligation among extended
family or clan members a “rational economic strategy” (Bankoff and Weekley 2002,
77). The problem here is two-fold. (1) Such social patterns undermine any notion of
nationhood or political organization, as well as (2) democratic procedures, which go
beyond family ties and personal relationships. The slow pace of change (in anything
having to do with political processes) often bemoaned by international analysts,
enables elites to adapt to the necessary social change (Kreuzer 2006, 50).
Islamisation in Mindanao failed to change the traditional system of datuship based on
genealogy and prestige. Colonialism provided further incentives for clan leaders and
means to secure their dominance. These funds increased during democracy and
popular vote added an additional criterion of legitimacy. Moral integrity might have
declined, but political power of those in office increased. Especially in regions of war,
the usual civilian was occupied with surviving instead of challenging clan rule. Where
national systems of order weakened or broke down, clan loyalty was the only stable
structure they could count upon. The competitiveness of the American-patterned
democracy stabilized an exchange system of bottom-up, personalized loyalties against
top-down funds with a highly contagious outcome. The structures of Liberalism don’t
pay off, where the notion of a public good doesn’t exist. Democracy in the Philippines
has given those few in power additional means to secure their dominance, in
economics, politics and media. The results are ambivalent: Stability and predictability
despite a weak nation state, at the expense of participation and equality. A Christian
farmer, living in Maguindanao put it quite pointedly after Ampatuan Sr. was put into
jail:
“The Ampatuans have been good to us. They protected civilians. They never did anything to us. I think this thing about the massacre is just due to politics. When they were in power, we felt safe. Now we don’t know who to go to, for help".(local
20 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
farmer, interviewed by a BBC Correspondent, Assignment Reporting on Mindanao, aired on December 30, 2010)30
30 The download is still available under the following link:
21 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author
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