EDITOR’ S NOTE A exceptionally large number of excellent commentary proposals inspired a special research topic for further discussion of this target article’s subject matter, edited by Axel Cleeremans and Shimon Edelman in Frontiers in Theoretical and Philo- sophical Psychology. This discussion has a preface by Cleeremans and Edelman and 25 commentaries and includes a sep- arate rejoinder from Andy Clark. See: http://www.frontiersin.org/Theoretical_and_Philosophical_Psychology/researchtopics/Forethought_as_an_evolutionary/1031 Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science Andy Clark School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, EH8 9AD Scotland, United Kingdom [email protected] http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/full-academic/andy-clark.html Abstract: Brains, it has recently been argued, are essentially prediction machines. They are bundles of cells that support perception and action by constantly attempting to match incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or predictions. This is achieved using a hierarchical generative model that aims to minimize prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing. Such accounts offer a unifying model of perception and action, illuminate the functional role of attention, and may neatly capture the special contribution of cortical processing to adaptive success. This target article critically examines this “hierarchical prediction machine” approach, concluding that it offers the best clue yet to the shape of a unified science of mind and action. Sections 1 and 2 lay out the key elements and implications of the approach. Section 3 explores a variety of pitfalls and challenges, spanning the evidential, the methodological, and the more properly conceptual. The paper ends (sections 4 and 5) by asking how such approaches might impact our more general vision of mind, experience, and agency. Keywords: action; attention; Bayesian brain; expectation; generative model; hierarchy; perception; precision; predictive coding; prediction; prediction error; top-down processing 1. Introduction: Prediction machines 1.1. From Helmholtz to action-oriented predictive processing “The whole function of the brain is summed up in: error correction.” So wrote W. Ross Ashby, the British psychia- trist and cyberneticist, some half a century ago. 1 Compu- tational neuroscience has come a very long way since then. There is now increasing reason to believe that Ashby’s (admittedly somewhat vague) statement is correct, and that it captures something crucial about the way that spending metabolic money to build complex brains pays dividends in the search for adaptive success. In particular, one of the brain’s key tricks, it now seems, is to implement dumb processes that correct a certain kind of error: error in the multi-layered prediction of input. In mammalian brains, such errors look to be cor- rected within a cascade of cortical processing events in which higher-level systems attempt to predict the inputs to lower-level ones on the basis of their own emerging BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013), Page 1 of 73 doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000477 © Cambridge University Press 2013 0140-525X/13 $40.00 1