American Public University System Charles Town, West Virginia A Research Project Proposal Submitted By Geoffrey M. Fisher 4080844 HIST500 C001 Sum 13
American Public University System
Charles Town, West Virginia
A Research Project Proposal
Submitted By
Geoffrey M. Fisher
4080844
HIST500 C001 Sum 13
Submitted to the Department of History and Military
Studies
Sunday, December 22, 2013
I.
Tentative Title
I propose to title the research paper "What Caused the
Decline of the Mughal Empire During the Reign of
Aurangzeb (1658-1707)?"
II.
Research Problem
Since the mid-1970s, there have been many historians
who have provided specialized works on the Mughal Empire.
Athar M. Ali,1 Karen Leonard,2 M. N. Pearson,3 and John F.
1 M. Athar Ali, "The Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case," Modern Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (1975) http://www.jstor.org/stable/311728 (accessed December 3, 2013).
2 Karen Leonard, "The 'Great Firm' Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire," Comparative Studies in Society and History 21, no. 2 (April 1979) http://www.jstor.org/stable/178414 (accessed December 3, 2013).
3 M.N. Pearson, “Shivaji and the Decline of the Mughal Empire,” The Association of Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (February, 1977) http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053980 (accessed October 14, 2013).
1
Richards4 are just some of the historians who have sought to
answer what led to the decline of the Mughal Empire during
the reign of Aurangzeb. All four historians have posited
theories that are as varied as there are possibilities about
its demise. These theories discuss economic failings, the
beginnings of international trade, European financial
institution, populations decreases in the empire, stagnation
in military technology, the slow transition from an agrarian
rural to an urbanized society, the rebellious Marathas, and
not fully subduing newly acquired lands in the South.
All of these accounts provided credible theories on the
empire's downfall. However, all of the authors refuse to
look at the end of the empire from a holistic point of view.
I intend to hypothesize that it was not just one or two of
these theories, but a combination of all of them that lead
to the decline of the Mughal Empire under Aurangzeb. The
evidence that I intend to prove my hypothesis are two
sources. First is Richards' book, The Mughal Empire: The New
Cambridge History of India, which has been well received by 4 John F. Richards, The Mughal Empire, vol. 5 of The New Cambridge
History of India. (Cambridge: University Press, 1996).
2
Western and Eastern historians because it fills a void in
the historiography of the empire. The second source that I
intend to use is Ali's essay "The Passing of Empire: The
Mughal Case." Both sources discuss similar causes that led
to the end of the Mughal Empire, such as economic failings
and stagnation in military technology. However, their
analysis leads them to different conclusions. For instance,
Richards states it that it was "Aurangzeb's rigid and
imperceptive policies, especially in the Deccan, failed to
respond to the growing crisis."5 While I think there is
some truth to Richards' narrow conclusion, I refuse to fully
believe that it was Aurangzeb's sole responsibility that led
to the end of the empire. Ali's conclusion takes a more
holistic stance by writing "the failure of the Mughal Empire
would seem to derive essentially from a cultural failure,
shared with the entire Islamic world."6 Ali's summation
seems to hold that it was a combination of multiple factors
that led to the end of the empire. Still, Ali's holistic
perspective needs some critiquing because he does not 5 Richards, The Mughal Empire, 290.6 Ali, "The Passing of Empire," 390.
3
mention the impact of European banking firms on the empire's
health.
There are many research implications for further study.
For instance, there has been a discussion on whether or not
the Mughal Empire had a centralized government. There are
three sources that I may wish to integrate into this further
research. First, there is M. Athar Ali's "The Mughal Polity
—A Critique of Revisionist Approaches."7 Ali tracks the
historiography about the Mughal Empire being a centralized
society. This may prove helpful for further research since
it would tell me what other historians thought about the
Mughal government being centralized or decentralized. In
the end, he comes to the conclusion that it was not a
centralized society. Second, there is Chetan Singh's
"Centre and Periphery in the Mughal State: The case of the
Seventeenth-Century Panjab."8 Singh offers an interesting
7 M. Athar Ali. "The Mughal Polity—A Critique of Revisionist Approaches." Modern Asian Studies 27, no. 4 (October, 1993): 699-710. http://www.jstor.org/stable/312827(accessed December 8, 2013).
8 Chetan Singh, "Centre and Periphery in the Mughal State: The Case of seventeenth-Century Panjab," Modern Asian Studies 22, no. 2(1988) http://www.jstor.org/stable/312624 (accessed December 3,2013).
4
starting point by connecting the decentralization of the
empire to the decline of the Mughal. He writes, "[i]f the
origins of the ultimate fragmentation of the Mughal Empire
are to be, in a way, traced back to the seventeenth century,
certain doubts begin to arise about the degree to which the
Mughal state was centralized."9 My third source would be
Richards' The Mughal Empire. I think it would benefit my
research and my proposed hypothesis immensely if I can parse
out more related concepts about whether or not the Mughal
Empire was centralized or decentralized and causes of the
decline to the point where I can compare and contrast my
sources' analysis and conclusions.
III.
Definition of Terms
Aligarh- a modern city in Northern India. Location of the Aligarh
Muslim University.
Agra- one of the four cities designated as a royal capital in the
Mughal Empire.
Akbar- was one of Aurangzeb's sons (1681, went into exile in
9 Ibid., 302.
5
Persia). Sought to unseat his father by setting up an alliance with
Shambhaji, the successor of Shivaji.
Aurangzeb- a ruler of the Mughal empire (1658-1707). Expanded the
frontiers of the empire through wars against the Marathas in the
Deccan and the kingdom of Golconda or Golkonda.
Deccan- a definition used to describe the region south of the Hind.
The city of Hyderabad was located in this region of India.
Diwan-i-khalisa- officer who oversaw all properties and income
producing entities managed by the emperor.
Farman- an official documented proclamation sent out by the emperor.
Faujdars- military officer designated army and administrative duties
in a certain area.
Fitna- meaning "temptation" in Arabic. It is a term used in times
of hardship in Muslim society.
Golconda or Golkonda- a city in the south central part of the Mughal
Empire. It was besieged and overtaken by Aurangzeb in September
1687.
Hindustan- the home base of Muslim governmental and martial strength
in North India. It was comprised of four cities: Lahore, Delhi,
Agra, and Jaunpur.
Jagirs- a financial right given by the emperor to gather property
6
taxes from a community or region.
Jamaʻ- all of the profits that were ordered.
Khalisa- territories or extra properties that produced an income for
the emperor and the governmental coffers.
Mansab- prestigious title indicated rank in a numerical format.
Mansabdar- an officer with a particular rank given by the emperor.
Marathas- a group of people found on India's west coast. They were
the main military opponents against Aurangzeb and the Mughal empire.
Padshah- the Persian word for emperor.
Paibaqi- unassigned domain managed briefly by the diwan-i khalisa.
Raiyat- Mughal word for peasants.
Shivaji- was the Maratha leader (1627-1680) and an enemy of the
Mughal Empire.
Shambhaji- was the son and successor of Shivaji (d. 1689). Had a
shaky alliance with, Akbar.
Suwar- the required figure of cavalrymen every officer had to
assemble before a campaign was to commence.
Watan- familial region of a Maratha leader or fighter. Usually held
within the family.
Zabt- a system of property appraisal and collection of taxes that
7
was used by the Mughals.
Zamindari- property-owners or people who held the land also ruled
the peasants.
IV.
Background
The Mughal Empire was one of three Islamic empires that
saw its ascent in the early modern period. The other two
were the Ottomans, who spanned three continents: Western
Asia, Eastern Europe, and Northern Africa, and the
Safavids in Iran. At its height, the Mughals ruled as
far west as Kabul, as far as east Dacca, Bengal, as far
north as Srinagar in the Himalaya Mountains, and as far
south as the Kaveri River. Population totals are hard to
pin down, which means I will be forced to approximate as
my best guess. For example, 150 million people10 seems to
be the starting point. In addition to the initial
calculation, Douglas E. Streusand, the author of Islamic
Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, writes that
10 Richards, The Mughal Empire, 190; Ali, "The Passing of Empire," 387.
8
city populations are harder to calculate, "the
populations of Agra and Delhi exceeded 5000,000 in the
seventeenth century, with Agra perhaps reaching 800,000
in Aurangzeb's time."11 There were some 115 million
people living within Mughal control.12
My research will posit four possible causes to the end
of the Mughal Empire. First, how did Aurangzeb's
conquest of the Golconda adversely influence the
stability of the Mughal? Second, how did the
deterioration of the Silk Road and its trade affect the
Mughal Empire? Third, how did the lack of technology
hasten the demise of the empire? Fourth, what were the
cultural trends Aurangzeb established that helped to
destabilize the empire? These four possible causes will
provide new research to the historiography to the fall of
the Mughal Empire.
The Conquest of the Golconda Kingdom
11 Douglas E. Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 2011), 272.
12 Ibid.
9
The Mughal's objective for the conquest of the Golconda
Kingdom was simple. When Shambhaji left and raided one
of the cities in the Burhanpur region, Aurangzeb could
not just stand on the sidelines and watch this because it
may have threatened trade that was being transported
between Eurasia.13 From early in the year of 1685 to
September 1687, Aurangzeb's forces were repeatedly
stymied at various locations throughout the Deccan.
First, there was Bijapur. Second, was the immense fort
of Hyderabad. The latter would fall to an ignominious
end because of duplicity, and large amounts of booty were
taken by the Mughals.
In his analysis Richards offers trade and religious
causes for the Mughal conquest. Richards fails to
mention the governmental or military reasons for the
expedition into the Golconda. M. N. Pearson presents a
suggestion that belies Richards' thinking:
Our aim in this paper is to show that the move south was itself a symptom of a central weakness in the Mughal empire. Because of the centrality of military concerns in the upper levels of the
13 Richards, The Mughal Empire, 219.
10
state, there was no alternative but to respond aggressively to a military challenge. The move south was thus a final desperate attempt to crush a formidable enemy that had already inflicted humiliating defeats on the empire. The move was not expansionist, it was entirely defensive, a product of desperation, not of free of Mughal choice.14
Pearson's examination shows that there was an inherent
problem not just with the Mughal government, but its
policies towards the Deccan. Moreover, Pearson's
comments illuminate the presuppositions of the Mughal
government's centralization, a prominent theory held by
Richards. The heavy handed response may have been a part
of the plan from the commencement of the operation.
There is also the issue about the income producing
agrarian lands in the Deccan. In the final chapter of
his book, Richards gives a rundown of pervious
histiographic interpretations from historians. He
critiques a land revenue policy after the conquest of
Golconda by writing:
14 M. N. Pearson, “Shivaji and the Decline of the Mughal Empire,” The Association of Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (February, 1977): 233, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053980 (accessed October 14, 2013).
11
Examination of post-conquest imperial policies in Golconda suggests that policy choices had a bearing on the severity of the jagir crisis. Aurangzeb seems to have decided to retain many productive tracts in Golconda and also in Bijapur under direct crown control.15
The new taxation system wan an extreme change of
administration for the people living in the Golconda and
lands that they farmed. With this new duty system setup,
the taxes went straight to the emperor's palace by
passing regional officials.
Deterioration of the Silk Road and its Trade to the
Mughal Empire
Trade with other societies was a vital part of the
Mughal Empire and its economy. First, there was the Silk
Road. The significance of the Silk Road was that it
allowed people who were ethnically and geographically
different to communicate with each other in various ways.
The trading from the West to India with non-indigenous
goods was just one of them. Moreover, the Silk Road was
a vital component to the health and stability of the
15 Richards, The Mughal Empire, 292.
12
empire. When trading declined, the lack of trade
produced deleterious affects on the empire. Ali writes
in his article:
The Great Silk Road no longer carried the great caravans; and this must have distinctly impoverished central Asia (Uzbek Khanate). But inIndia and Iran, too, the costs of luxury articles rose-and, after all, for members of the ruling class it was these luxuries that life was about. The income previously obtained no longer sufficed.Here was a factor for an attempt at greater agrarian exploitation; and when that failed, or proved counter-productive, for reckless factional activities for individual gain, lead to interminable civil wars.16
Since there was no exporting or importing of goods with
the empire and no overland trade with the adjacent
civilizations around India, living and buying goods
within the empire was becoming harder during Aurangzeb's
reign.
Second, there were also the European banking firms and
their impact on the empire. European banking companies
like the English and Dutch East India Companies presented
significant stability challenges to the Mughal
16 Ali, "The Passing of Empire," 388.
13
government.17 Leonard provides another alternative to the
demise of the empire by writing, "[w]hen other powers
competed with the Mughal for the credit and other
services offered by Indian bankers, the imperial
bureaucracy was threatened."18
When studying the decline of the Mughal Empire, the
lack of military technology is a central part of the
story on how it hasten the demise of the empire. The
army was the number one benefactor of these technological
improvements. In particular, the construction of
artillery was considered the "heavy industry" in the
early modern world.19 From a comparative standpoint
Europe allocated people who possessed the requisite
technical and mathematical skills to produce guns in
large quantities, whereas contemporaries in India did not
allocate their resources for military technological
expansion. Ali takes this analysis a step farther by
writing:
17 Leonard, "The 'Great Firm' Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire," 152.18 Ibid., 153. 19 Ali, "The Passing of Empire," 390.
14
India saw no conscious attempt to design new artillery weapons: making of muskets and guns remained a mere craft, with no touch of science;and accordingly by 1700 these were almost completely out-dated. The Mughals continued to rely upon sword-wielding cavalry when its days were long over.20
Ali's supposition concludes that gunpowder weapons were
mainly ornamental objects, and it certainly points to a
systemic collapse within the empire. I think it is
interesting that Ali has come up with this conclusion
about the lack of military technology since the Mughal
Empire was a warlike civilization.
The adoption to gunpowder weaponry has proven very
difficult to ascertain because of the paucity of
documentation about production and distribution of
firearms.21 Richards provides some of the same analysis
that Ali had come up with about the Mughal's opinion
about firearms. He concludes that there was very little
support from the government and indigenously manufactured
guns were of shoddy quality.22 However, it was the date
20 Ibid.21 Richards, The Mughal Empire, 288.22 Ibid.
15
suggested by Richards that aligns with Ali's theory as
the dividing point between Mughal parity and inferiority.
Richards writes "[b]y the early years of the eighteenth
century Mughal India was not keeping pace with Europe in
field artillery."23
This is where I think Ali's and Richards' arguments
start to fall apart. Both of their arguments did not
fully articulate why the Mughals refused to acknowledge
the rising superiority of gunpowder technology. Why
would a warlike empire not get enthusiastic support from
one of its martial emperors on incorporating firearms in
its armies? To fully support my hypothesis I need to
know why the Mughals refused to use guns in their armies.
Jos Gommans' Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and High Roads to
Empire, 1500- 1700 is a great resource to begin this
research. He points out two key reasons for the lack of
gunpowder technology in Indian armies. The first one he
proffers points to a military doctrinal philosophy.
"Standardisation in weaponry, drill and uniform hardly
23 Ibid, 289.
16
appealed to the independent mindset of the Mughal horse
trooper."24 The second point he suggests is based off of
a native cultural practice that emphasized infantry.25
"Even before the onset of the infantry revolution, the
late-seventeenth-century process of zamindarisation of
the Mughal military tended to increase the importance of
locally peasant soldiers on foot as these were much
cheaper and more pliable than the fully equipped cavalry
units associated with the imperial tradition of the
Mughals."26
There are also cultural aspects during Aurangzeb's
reign that hastened the empire's demise. From my
research there are two ways to look at the decline of the
Mughal Empire. First, there is the big picture when
examining the decline of the empire. Ali is one such
historian that advocates for a big picture.
To me, then, the failure of the Mughal Empire would seem to derive essentially from a culturalfailure, shared with the entire Islamic world.
24 Jos L. Gommans, Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire, 1500-1700 (Routledge: New York, 2002), 204.
25 Ibid.26 Ibid.
17
It was this failure that titled the economic balance in favour of Europe, well before European armies reduced India and other part of Asia to colonial possessions, protectorates and spheres of influence. It was this cultural failure again that deprived the empire of the capacity to grapple with their agrarian crises.27
Ali's analysis shows that it was not just one emperor who
should be held responsible for the decline of the empire.
Instead, there was something systemically wrong with the
empire itself.
Richards' study does not acknowledge the big picture
when studying the decline of the Mughal Empire. Thus,
his suggestion evolves into an entirely different
conclusion. The decline of the empire stems from
Aurangzeb's occupation of Bijapur and Golconda. Richards
writes, "Aurangzeb's rigid and imperceptive policies,
especially in the Deccan, failed to respond the growing
crisis."28 From the takeover of these two regions to
1719, which was beyond Aurangzeb's death, the Mughals
27 Ali, " The Passing of Empire," 390.28 Richards, The Mughal Empire, 290.
18
experienced ever worsening situations on the battlefronts
and in the governmental sphere.29
V.
Research Methods
Many of my sources have similarities in the theories
they purport. The objective of my research method is to
delineate the similarities to the point where I can find
the comparisons and contrasts. Richards' The Mughal Empire
will serve as the basis for my research. Of all of my
sources, The Mughal Empire incorporates the most research
that is relevant to my intended topic. However, it has
its limitations. For example, military history is one of
them. To act as supplemental material to fill that part
of my research, I hope to incorporate Gommans' and
Streusand's, Mughal Warfare and Islamic Gunpowder Empires,
respectively.
In order to fully support my supposition I need to get
more concrete information on the Aligarh School of
Historiography that some of my sources adhere to. When I
29 Ibid.
19
have more of an understanding of Aligarh School of
Historiography, my attempt to collect the necessary data
through questionnaires will be more thoughtful and
succinct. If traveling is out of the question, then
utilizing email and skype may be sufficient enough to
meet my research needs. As a backup plan, I might have
to implement an observation method of collecting data.
However, this might be too difficult for me because of
the traveling costs.
In the outset of my paper, I would like to include a
map of the Mughal Empire that show geographical features,
such as rivers, deserts, and mountains, as well as
cities. Throughout my research, succeeding maps will
show the various strategic conquests Aurangzeb executed
and the lands he gained for the empire. Battlefield maps
will be very useful to show where the Mughal army and
their opponents positioned their artillery, cavalry, and
infantry forces in relation with one another. I want to
give the reader a bird's eye view in three perspectives.
First, I want a map that illustrates the entire empire
20
with man made characteristics, such as cities and roads.
This map would also contain geographical features, such
as deserts, mountain ranges, and bodies of water.
Second, I want a map that accurately shows the strategic
implications of wars and conquests. Third, I think it is
very important to show maps of key battles and sieges so
that the reader knows what tactics were employed during
the engagement.
VI.
Research Limitations
I have several concerns about my proposal's research
limitations. First, there is the difficulty in obtaining
the necessary sources to fully articulate my hypothesis.
Richards and a few of my other sources have mentioned
there is very little reputable secondary work on the
Mughal Empire. (In order to produce quality secondary
work a few requirements need to be met. Historians need
to find more primary sources and accurately analyze them.
Finding primary sources that are germane to my topic
could be very hard since many of the emperors, academics,
21
or aristocracy did not show much enthusiasm in printing.30
This is really fascinating because of the written
documentation that is needed so that a centralized
bureaucracy can function.31 These primary and secondary
sources need to be accessible to historians from other
disciplines, and social scientists. Finding the
requisite amount of relevant secondary sources on my
topic was one of the most difficult tasks I had to
overcome.) Second, I am concerned about the definitions.
While all my sources have been translated into English
from Hindi, I feel the important ideas that I deem
necessary to my hypothesis might be lost in translation.
More Westerners need to speak Hindi. Third, using and
collecting physical evidence would entail me traveling to
Duke University, where John F. Richards served as a
professor, and to Aligarh Muslim University, India.
Traveling to both of these locales is the best way to
ensure academic certainty. Fourth, statistics are very
important to the decline of the Mughal Empire. I would 30 Richards, The Mughal Empire, 290.31 Ibid.
22
like to look at the statistics, first hand, that Richards
used for the sources that I have. Fifth, I am not as
well versed in Indian geography as I am in Western
history. I have been finding it very hard to orient
myself geographically in the empire. If I am having a
hard time with the geography, then other non-specialists
and amateurs would too. That is why I would like to
incorporate a map of the entire empire, strategic maps
that show the conquests under Aurangzeb, and the
battlefield maps that demonstrate the tactics that were
employed. Of my four books, Gommans' Mughal Warfare: Indian
Frontiers and High Roads to Empire, 1500-1700 provides the most
specificity to maps. The maps supplied with his book
show the geographical features, the cities, roads, and
the farming land that show the most financial potential.
One characteristic that his book shows, which I did not
consider, were the centers of gravity of Mughal power,
such as Lahore, Delhi, Agra, and Kabul areas.
VIII.
Working Bibliography
23
I. Works Cited
Ali, M. Athar. "The Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case."Modern Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (1975): 385-396. http://www.jstor.org/stable/311728 (accessed December
3, 2013).
To help explain how the Mughal Empire declined, Ali looks at population increases in India and in Europe, theburgeoning of global trade through naval routes which hampered overland trade and markets, the lack of technological and scientific advancements carrying over to Mughal India, lackluster expansion of urbanization andlastly, why the Mughal military did not make an attempt to manufacture gunpowder weapons indigenously.
Gommans, Jos. Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire, 1500-1700. Routledge: New York, 2002.
Gommans’ main idea is that warfare was always a significant aspect of Indian culture before it was overtaken by colonial powers. The content he studies ranges from gunpowder weapons, the technological characteristics of warfare, and the military in a cultural framework.
Hardy, P. "Commentary and Critique." The Journal of Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (February 1976): 257-263. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053982 (accessed December 3, 2013).
Hardy critiques M.N. Pearson's and John F. Richards' theories about the fall of the Mughal Empire. Pearson and Richards are historians who follow the Aligarh Schoolof Historiography (See articles below.) He offers a general timeframe on the empire's demise. For example, he touts the fall of the Mughal Empire happened before the arrival of the East India Company.
24
Leonard, Karen. "The 'Great Firm' Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire." Comparative Studies in Society and History 21, no. 2 (April 1979): 151-167.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/178414 (accessed December 3, 2013).
In her article, Leonard looks at how European companieshastened the decline of the Mughal Empire. Leonard mentions there has not been a significant amount of studyin this area of Anglo-Indian history. She breaks her argument into sections. The first section dealt with the "Great Firms" and the Mughal Empire to 1750. The second section is about the "Great Firms" and The East India Company after 1750.
Pearson, M.N. “Shivaji and the Decline of the Mughal Empire.” The Association of Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (February, 1977): 221-235.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053980 (accessed October 14, 2013).
Pearson’s argument is about the empire’s demise around the military policy towards the Marathas on the southern end of the subcontinent. (Pearson’s article appeared before Naqvi’s article.) The content that he looks at iscomprised of several parts: first, the Mughal state and nobility; second, the Maratha Revolt; third, the sack of Surat; fourth, Mughal response; fifth, analysis of the Mughal response; sixth, the Maratha impact; and seventh, the response of the nobles.
Richards, John F. The Mughal Empire. Vol.5 of The New Cambridge History of India. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Richards’s main argument is that the Mughal Empire was highly centralized, which left room for competing powers.The content he examines ranges from political, military, social, economic, institutional, cultural, and religious aspects of the empire.
25
Singh, Chetan. "Centre and Periphery in the Mughal State: The Case of Seventeenth- Century Panjab." Modern Asian Studies 22. no. 2 (1988): 299-318.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/312624 (accessed December 3, 2013).
If historians really want to pinpoint the beginning of the end of the Mughal Empire, Singh believes that an argument about the supposed centralization of the government has to start in the seventeenth century. Singh looks at the structure of the regional bureaucracy of the Mughal Empire. It is really a bottom up study.
Struesand, Douglas E. Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals. Westview Press, 2010.
Struesand’s main argument is to discuss the Mughal Empire as an intricate society. The content he scrutinizes incorporates many interesting themes. They include philosophy, armed forces, and the financial system of the Mughal Empire’s ascent, growth, and eventual demise.
II. Works Consulted
Ali, M. Athar. "The Mughal Polity—A Critique of Revisionist Approaches." Modern Asian Studies 27, no. 4 (October, 1993): 699-710.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/312827 (accessed December 8, 2013).
Athar M. Ali's essay has a couple of parts. First, he revisits the historiographic arguments from various historians of how the Mughals taxed the empire. He expands upon his case by examining Western states and their laissez faire economy, and then compares the empire to a despotic Asian state labeled by historians who were heavily influenced by Marxist theory. His second argument is whether or not the Mughal bureaucracy was
26
really a modern, centralized empire on par with the modern European nation-state.
Brown, Katherine Butler. "Did Aurangzeb Ban Music? Questions for the Historiography of his Reign." Modern Asian Studies 41, no. 1 (Jan. 2007): 77- 120. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132345 (accessed December 21, 2013).
Historically, Aurangzeb is painted as an extreme, conservative Islamic despot overseeing an Asian empire that did not adhere to the same traditionalist view of Islam. According to Brown's analysis of the available primary sources that she looked at for her article, it appears that Aurangzeb was not the archetypical version of an Islamic despot. The records show he was a religiously pious man, but he did not impose his beliefs onto others.Hurewitz, J. C. "Military Politics in the Muslim Dynastic States, 1400-1750." Journal of the American Oriental Society 88, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar, 1968): 96-104.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/597901 (accessed November 11, 2013).
Hurewitz paints a picture of familial rivalry when it comes to succession of an emperor in the Mughal Empire. Family members would often enlist parts of the military to attain the emperorship. Aurangzeb was one such ambitious person who spread lies of the Emperor's death and eliminated his brothers. Aurangzeb's son, Akbar, would later challenge his own father's rule.
Lenman, Bruce. "The East India Company and the Emperor Aurangzeb." History Today 37, no. 2 (February 1987): 23-29. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed December 20, 2013).
Lenman's article recounts the first 150 years of the England's East India Company. The influence and
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superiority over the local and imperial Mughal governmentparallels the rise of one its most ardent supporters, SirJosiah Child. Child was not born into an auspicious family. Yet, he married well, which positioned him in future company appointments where he was handsomely benefited.
Naqvi, Hamida Khatoon. “Aurangzeb's Policies and the Decline of the Mughal Empire.” The Association for Asian Studies37, no 1 (November, 1977): 191-192.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053411 (accessed October 14, 2013).
Hamida Khatoon Naqvi’s article was in response to M.N. Pearson’s essay (see below.) Naqvi’s two part argument is about why the Mughal Empire declined. First, there isa civil-military dispute on how the politicians paid the military officers. Second, Aurangzeb failed to establishthe rising popularity of Marhatta (or Marathas) as a credible military threat to the empire.
Richards, John F. “The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in South Asia.” Cambridge University Press 24 no. 4 (October, 1990): 625-638.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/312726 (accessed October 14, 2013).
Richards’s main idea is the seventeenth century saw political strife, economic disruptions, and reductions inpopulation around the world. However, these maladies didnot plague India. Why? Richards tries to answer that question. The content that Richards looks at is the Indian economy and agriculture and how they relate to thepolitical and military potency. Pearson’s and Naqvi’s may serve as possible counterpoints to Richards.
Syros, Vasileios. "An Early Modern South Asian Thinker on the Rise and Decline of Empires: Shah Wali Allah of Delhi, the Mughals, and the Byzantines." Journal of World
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History 23, no. 4 (December, 2013): 793-840. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed December 20, 2013).
Syros implements Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi's hypothesis on why civilizations rise and fall. Dihlawi's supposition is based on several factors that lead to the decline of a civilization. His examples include civil servants who have motives that run contrary to the state,abnormal behavior like homosexuality, and various kinds of pests. III. Works to Be Consulted
Blake, Stephen P. "The Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals." The Journal of Asian Studies 39, no. 1 (Nov. 1979): 77-94. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053505 (accessed December 21, 2013).
Blake's article is a discussion about the structure of the Mughal Empire. For instance, a patrimonial government is not set up to have its people obedient to the state but to the ruler in office. In order for an emperor to maintain his rule over the empire he needed a strong, faithful armed powerbase. Blake writes that mostMughal emperors were on the move throughout the empire toenforce strict submission to the emperor. Aurangzeb was one of the most traveled emperors of the Mughal Empire inattempting to shore up the loyalty from his subordinates.
Blake, Stephen P. "The Urban Economy in Premodern MuslimIndia: Shahjahanabad, 1639-1739." Modern Asian Studies 21, no. 3 (1987): 447-471.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/312638 (accessed December 26, 2013).
Blake has written an updated version of Marxist theory on the Premodern Indian economy. The historiography of the Indian economy is very deficient, which makes it veryhard to make a definitive conclusion. The Marxist
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concepts he looks at are production, exchange, and utilization.
Habib, Irfan. "Usury in Medieval India." Comparative Studies in Society and History 6, no. 4 (Jul., 1964): 393-419 http://www.jstor.org/stable/177929 (accessed January 2,2014).
When reading Habib's article, it becomes apparent that usury was so commonplace that in 1684 Aurangzeb instituted a farman to release poverty stricken farmers from paying a tax. Usury was a widespread practice because it was supported by the empire. Habib looks at multiple ways usury was implemented throughout Mughal society.
Hasan, Farhat. "The Mughal Fiscal System in Surat and the English East India Company." Modern Asian Studies 27, no. 4 (October 1993): 711-718.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/312828 (accessed December 3, 2013).
Hasan is another disciple of the Aligarh School of Historiography. His argument is that the English East India Company did not pay the heavy taxes at ports like Bengal, but they were forced to pay the heavy taxes at the port of Surat. The difference in the taxation amounts between Bengal and Surat was that the English hadconspired with Mughal bureaucrats. This falls in line with M. Athar Ali's article that the English had a preferential trading policy with the Mughal Empire.
Leonard, Karen. "Banking Firms in Mughal India: A Reply." Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no. 2 (April 1981): 309-313.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/178738 (accessed December 26, 2013).
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Leonard's article is in response to Richards' essay about state finance and the premodern economy. She critiques the analysis that Richards concluded. Instead,she believes there is enough evidence to conclude the Mughal Empire accessed various financial services such astemporary credit and the transmission of money in the empire. From Leonard's perspective, banking institutionswere an integral part of the Mughal Empire and society.
Richards, John F. "Mughal State Finance and the Premodern World Economy." Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no. 2 (April, 1981): 285-308.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/178737 (accessed December 26, 2013).
Richards has written an article that critiques Karen Leonard's essay about the impact of banking firms in India. He believes the affects that banking firms had onthe Indian economy during the seventeenth century is too scant for historians to draw any definitive conclusions. Richards wants to see more questioning from historians about land generating revenue during the reign of Aurangzeb.
Richards, John F. "The Hyderabad Karnatik, 1687-1707." Modern Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (1975): 241-260. http://www.jstor.org/stable/311962 (accessed December
21, 2013).
Richards' article is a discussion about how Aurangzeb brought the newly conquered kingdom of Golconda into the Mughal sphere of influence. Within the district of Golconda there was Hyderabad. To ensure that his new possession was successfully brought into the empire, Aurangzeb organized it into one province with the intention of generating revenue that would be directly sent to the Emperor's palace. In the end, his plan for Golconda to become a revenue producing region did not happen as he had planned it.
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Richards, John F. "The Imperial Crisis in the Deccan." The Journal of Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (February 1976): 237-256.http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053981 (accessed November 24, 2013).
Richards presents a counterargument to the Aligarh School of Historiography, which has said the demise of the Mughal Empire's was due to economic strains. Instead, Richards promotes an argument that hypothesizes Aurangzeb failed to subdue his newly conquered southern possessions. If Aurangzeb accomplished pacifying his newpossessions, Richards believes that he would have enough resources to meet his upcoming expenditures.
Thompson, William R. “The Military Superiority Thesis and the Ascendancy of Western Eurasia in the World System.” Journal of World History 10, no. I (Spring 1999): 143-178.
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/225237397?accountid=82 89 (accessed September 8, 2013).
Thompson asks the question about how western Europeans established global empires when resources, like manpower,were lacking. He looks at five independent cases to answer his question. One of them is about the British and their involvement in India. Thompson comes to the conclusion the British were able to take over India not because of their supposed superiority in military technology, but rather naval superiority and getting assistance from local allies.
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