We as Conceptual Entrepreneurs

Universitatea Bucureşti Facultatea de Filosofie

Lucrare de Disertaţie:

We as Conceptual Entrepreneurs The Interplay between Rules and Decisions

Coordonator ştiinţific: Prof. Univ. Dr. Mircea Dumitru

Absolvent: Trandafira Andrei

-2005-

Abstract

This work is about our distinctiveness as human beings. The answer is that we are conceptual entrepreneurs. That is, the realm that makes us different is the conceptual realm and the way we live within it is as entrepreneurs.

The aim is achieved by building upon insights of two different lines of thought (the first is mainly American Pragmatism, but the later Wittgenstein was on the same line in parallel, the second is Austrian Economics).

The first chapter deals with the first line of thought and is mainly an exposition of ideas of Robert Brandom. The chapter starts from the Kantian insight that we are normative creatures. Specifically, that judgments and actions are essentially normative. This positive insight is backed up by the negative point made by Frege, who showed what we lose if we overlook this normative dimension. Afterwards, it is enquired about how we can understand the normative. The first strategy is to reduce the normative to explicit rules and principles. This strategy was refuted by Wittgenstein who showed that we can enquire about every specific rule how it should be applied. Thus, we will need another rule and so on, having an infinite regress. The second strategy is to reduce rules to regularities of behavior. This strategy is flawed because it cannot secure a distinction between what ought to be done and what is in fact done. Every pattern of behavior can be made to accord with many rules, and thus we can not pick out a specific rule only by looking at behavior. The conclusion is that norms must be sought at the pragmatic level.

The second chapter deals with the second line of thought. It tries to show how we are able to learn from experience. It starts from humans viewed as Homo Economicus. This means that we are essentially optimizing creatures. But this strategy overlooks the first step, that of choosing a specific ends-mean framework. Thus, it is shown that the correct strategy is to view humans as Homo Agens. That is, to see them as possessing an ability (that of decision-making) which explains also the fact that we can change our ends-mean framework. This analysis of Human Action ultimately leads to the conclusion that we are entrepreneurs, making decision in a world endowed with uncertainty.

The third chapter combines these two lines of thought. It starts from the strategy to explain our ability to use concepts by grasping their essential properties. This strategy is showed to be flawed by confusing the descriptive and the normative functioning of language. By showing this it can be showed with clarity what is the relation between a concept and his applications. Afterwards it is shown how our decisions play an essential role in employing new concepts and changing old ones. These two points are combined, and the way we move through the world proves to be as conceptual entrepreneurs; as beings forced to take decisions in an uncertain world, where any decision could prove to be mistaken; and as beings capable to impose a structure upon the world by instituting rules (and specifically for us, concepts).

Acknowledgements: Besides the works of those from whom I have learned, I would like to thank Mircea Toboşaru, Marian Panait, Vlad Tarko, Andreea Eşanu, Andrei Buleandră and Teodor Gugiu for helpful comments, sugestions and discussions.

Contents:

I. Introduction pg.1

II. Chapter One - Grounding the normative at the pragmatic level pg.3

1. Introduction pg.3

2. Humans as normative creatures pg.6

3. How to understand the normative pg.9

4. Conclusion pg.12

III. Chapter Two – The entrepreneurial character of decision-making pg.13

1. Introduction pg.13

2. Homo Economicus pg.14

3. Homo Agens pg.18

4. We as entrepreneurs pg.22

5. Conclusion pg.27

IV. Chapter Three - The conceptual realm as interplay between rules and

decisions pg.28

1. Introduction pg.28

2. The Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian insight pg.31

3. The role of decisions in the conceptual realm pg.37

4. We as conceptual entrepreneurs pg.41

5. Conclusion pg.44

V. Conclusion pg.46

I. Introduction

What is our place in the world, as human beings? What differentiates us from

other creatures? What we have in common with them? On one hand, we deem ourselves

as intelligent creatures, different from every other; we have Reason. With such a general

claim every one would agree. But if we want to put the point more specifically, problems

arise. For example, we all agree that there are some entities that we call ‘concepts’. And

we are sure that they play an important role in our lives. Nevertheless we are puzzled by

them. With objects we do not have so many problems; they are concrete, they are in front

of us. But concepts are mysterious entities. Sometimes we put them in our heads, in our

minds. Sometimes we put them in a third world. Although we have a grip on them, at the

same time they have a grip on us. Do we create them or do we discover them?

The aim of this work is to offer a picture of what is specific to us, as human

beings. The picture will not be carried out in a great detail, but it will nevertheless be a

complete picture. This writer hopes that in the end the reader will remain with a clear

image. The picture is based upon insights of many great thinkers. Furthermore, many of

those insights were put together by some others. This work is based on raw materials

obtained from the works of Robert Brandom and Israel Kirzner. It is hoped that this work

keeps the spirit of their works intact (and with it the spirit of the other great thinkers

whose insights were kept clear by Brandom and Kirzner). The claim of this work is not

one of originality, in the sense of saying things that were never said or thought before. Its

claim is that it offers a clear picture of what is specific of human beings, by combining

two different lines of thought, namely that of American Pragmatism and that of Austrian

Economics (Robert Brandom being a great thinker of the first school, and Israel Kirzner

of the second). The two lines of thought are combined because this writer thinks that they

share the same fundamental spirit and insights, but that they develop them in different

ways and from different perspectives. Furthermore, by offering different perspectives

which start from the same fundamental points, if they are put together, then they might

give a more clear picture. This is not to say that by themselves they do not offer clear

pictures. They also offer much more detailed pictures than the one put forward in this

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work. But at the loss of detail and at the gain of perspective it is hoped that this picture

will be clear to unadvised eyes too.

This work is not an exegetic one or one that tries to make a critical comparison

between different lines of thought. Thus, it will not start from arguments that are

attributed to some thinker. Instead, it will start from insights that some thinkers had. But,

this writer is fully committed to every single insight put forward in this work. So, it is

also his duty to defend them if it is needed and the ones that had them for the first time

can only be of help by providing sound arguments to back up those insights. Furthermore,

it will not be an issue if someone contests that some specific thinker had some specific

insight. This is not a debate about what insights had a specific person or about who had a

specific insight. If this writer attributes an insight to a specific person, then this is made

only because he would like to thank that person in this way, not because he needs some

authority to back him up.

The first chapter presents a line of thought of Robert Brandom in which he builds

upon insights of Kant, Frege, Sellars and Wittgenstein. It is about we as normative

creatures and about where we should seek this normativity. The answer will be that we

should seek it at the pragmatic level.

The second chapter presents a line of thought of Israel Kirzner in which he builds

upon insights of Mises and Hayek. It is about us as decision-makers, specifically about

the entrepreneurial character of human decision-making. The point will be that the way in

which we can gain some knowledge in a mysterious world is by making decisions, even

if they could always prove to be mistaken.

Thus, the raw materials which we will use in the third and last chapter will be that

our ability to follow rules is rooted at the pragmatic level and that our decisions are taken

as entrepreneurs, in a world of uncertainty. In the third chapter we will show how these

two features of us combined give a picture of our specific way of being in the world. We

are concept mongers. This specific ability of ours will be shown to consist in forming a

conceptual web (a system of rules) by taking at every step entrepreneurial decisions about

how to modify it.

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I. Chapter One – Grounding the normative at the pragmatic level

1. Introduction

A friend of ours, which has a very nice house just outside the city, ordered the

most greenish hollandaise grass field to be installed in front of his veranda. After a week

of happy mornings with a cup of tee and the marvelous sight in front of him, one gloomy

morning he could not believe his eyes. In front of him laid what seemed to be a sea of

blood. While he was sleeping, all the grass turned red and, although he squeezed his eyes

hoping that all that is just an appearance, nothing changed. He had to confront the

cruelest of realities. Let us be assured, our friend’s eyes had nothing wrong, the grass did

really changed. At that moment, for him the range of possible explanations was immense,

for that reason him being completely puzzled, without any firm ground to put his feet on.

Of course, for us as perfectly informed observers the explanation is at hand, but this is not

really important now.

What matters is that, if our friend would have been a little pessimistic, he could

have thought, in the night, of all the different possible colors his dearly grass would have

in the morning. The world of possibilities is, indeed, a large one. Furthermore, is of prime

importance the reaction of our friend: ‘This shouldn’t have happened! This is not right!’.

But, we may say that in a sense it is right, in a sense reality is always right. So, what had

our friend in mind, what didn’t seem right to him? It could be that, for a second, he

thought that the laws of nature didn’t work anymore. But, on a second thought, he must

have realized that this is, at best, a very unrealistic possibility. Afterwards, he must have

thought that the world of nature is too complex, for him to grasp completely. That there

must be a chemical reaction or some strange insects or who knows what that explains it

all. Or, that the world of men is a mischievous one and, surely, one of his friends played

some dirty trick on him. These were the kinds of explanations that crossed his mind. But

why the new color didn’t seem right to him? What would have been his reaction if, in the

night before, a strange, nearly mad idea had crossed his mind; that of the excitement of a

very surprising thing happening, for example the grass turning red? For sure, in the

morning, the surprise would be as great as in the first case. But the words that would

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come out of his mouth would be very different: ‘Oh my dear! This is perfect, indeed!’.

Now, it seems that all that feeling of frustrating wrongness vanished in this new situation.

Now everything is correct according to our friend, even if a bit unexpected.

At this moment it should be noted that, making abstraction of our friend, the

reality is identical in the two cases above. The weather is the same; the grass has the same

reddish color. Everything is the same excepting the words our friend uttered and, maybe,

his state of mind. Of course, someone who is very fond of reductionism could say that in

our friend’s brain are happening very different things in the two cases, that the neuronal

processes present us enough of a difference. What could we say to him, besides that he is

trying to obscure the very point we are trying to make, that he looks in a wrong way? We

can add that it is nothing wrong in tracing the different neuronal processes, but if he has

this liberty, he should also let us have the liberty of tracing which differences we like.

That there is nothing wrong with this, will not be showed here thoroughly1. It will suffice

to say that we are on equal footing with the reductionist. That with the same legitimacy

with which he points toward what he considers being the relevant differences, we can

also do exactly the same thing. And that if he considers that this is not so, then this is a

point for him yet to make, not for us to defend.

So, what is different in the two cases? Let us suppose that our friend is fond of

drawing and that in the night before he made two drawings: one of a happy morning for

him and one of an unhappy one. Furthermore, let us suppose that in each case he made

the same drawings, two landscapes with him on the veranda, in one the grass being green,

in the other being red. The only difference is that in the first case the one with green grass

stands for the happy morning, and in the second the one with red grass stands for it. So,

by looking only to one of these pictures, or to both of them, we could not say which one

stands for the happy morning. Furthermore, it will not suffice to know that one of them

corresponds to reality. We really need to know what our friend’s idea of a happy morning

was if we want to know which drawing describes it correctly.

Being a rigorous person, our friend likes to plan in advance many things. He is

also a little childish so, before going to sleep, he likes to imagine how the next day should

be, for him to be happy. By doing this, he makes something like a plan, although it does

1 This point is developed by R.Brandom in his essay ‘Modality, Normativity and Intentionality’

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not require much action from him to make the plan work. Nevertheless, he makes a plan

because it involves two very distinct images of the future. In one of them, the happy one,

the reality sticks to the plan; it conforms to it. In the other, the unhappy one, reality

diverges from the plan; it does not conform to it.

To press the analogy further, any rule is a plan, because it involves two different

possible ways in which the events could develop. One in which the rule is followed

correctly, another in which the rule is followed incorrectly. In a similar way, intentions

could be successful by being followed by actions, or they could be not; concepts could be

applied correctly, or they could be not, opinions could state the facts correctly, or they

could not, and so on. We can ask many questions about what has been said here. Like,

what exactly is a rule, is there any difference between the laws of nature and those of

men, and if there is what is it, how could be a rule followed correctly, how could we

know that we followed a rule correctly and many others. But the important point here is

what the source of all these questions is. In the story above the emphasis was put,

although implicitly, on a distinctive feature of human beings, namely their normativity.

The point of this chapter will be to settle some important points about normativity, which

will be used as raw materials in the later chapters. The points that will be restated in this

chapter were offered by Robert Brandom in the first chapter of ‘Making it explicit’,

where he builds upon insights of great philosophers like Kant, Frege, Sellars or

Wittgenstein.

2. Humans as normative creatures

We, humans, have always regarded ourselves as special. And, maybe, we had

every right in doing so. After all, beginning with the discovery of fire, we have invented

inasmuch as we discovered many things. We have changed the world according to our

desires and ideals; we have tamed the beasts, but also the inanimate forces of nature. All

these, we have done with the power of our mind, our special ability, which permitted us

to rule the world and the other species. Of course, all these and many other differences

are said by us and from our point of view. Nevertheless, our distinctiveness is clear to the

vast majority of us: we are intelligent creatures, reasonable beings, we can make our own

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rules and we can follow them. We are free to choose our path, but we are responsible for

it, at the same time. So, what makes us special? The short answer is that we are normative

creatures. But what does this amount to? Although different stories on this subject could

be told, the one that will be restated here (in a very short and incomplete version) is that

of Robert Brandom. According to Brandom, Kant had a great insight on the point of

normativity:

[One] of Kant’s fundamental insights, into the normative character of the

significance of what is conceptually contentful… is that judgments and actions are above

all things that we are responsible for. Kant understands concepts as having the form of

rules, which is to say that they specify how something ought (according to the rule) to be

done. The understanding, the conceptual faculty, is the faculty of grasping rules, of

appreciating the distinction between correct and incorrect application they determine.

Judgings and doings are acts that have contents that one can take or make true and for

which the demand for reasons is in order. What is distinctive about them is the way they

are governed by rules. Being in an intentional state or performing an intentional action

has a normative significance. It counts as undertaking (acquiring) an obligation or

commitment; the content of the commitment is determined by the rules that are the

concepts in terms of which the act or state is articulated. Thus Kant picks us out as

distinctively normative or rule-governed creatures.2

A rule does not specify what the facts will be. It only specifies what the facts

ought to be, what would count as being in accord with that rule. If we would see a

signpost on which is written: ‘Don not step on the grass!’, then we would not know what

will in fact happen. Some people will step on the grass, some will not. But the rule that is

expressed by the words written on the sign will show us something. The rule will show us

who complied with it, and who did not. If we are to understand that rule, then we have to

discern what counts as correctly following that rule from what counts as incorrectly

following it. Similarly, for someone to count as possessing a concept, for example the

concept ‘square’, he must know how to apply that concept correctly. For example, if he

says about something that it is a rectangle with all sides equal, then he should agree to say

that it is a square. Or, if he says about something that it is a square, then he should agree

2 Articulating Reasons pg. 163

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to say that it is a geometrical figure. Also, we are responsible for our intentional states

and actions. Once certain concepts are in play and certain rules are being followed, they

have a grip on us. The fact that we followed a rule correctly does not depend on us

anymore. It is not up to our liberty anymore to decide if what we have done consists in a

correct or incorrect following of a rule.

The Kantian insight tries to settle a positive point. It tries to settle the important

role that normativity, in the form of rules, plays in the lives of human beings. This point

can be backed up by a negative one, by showing how things would be if we rule out the

normative ingredient. This point is carried out by Frege. In the words of Brandom:

‘Kant’s lesson is taken over as a central theme by Frege, whose campaign against

psychologism relies on respecting and enforcing the distinction between the normative

significance of applying concepts and the causal consequences of doing so. For Frege, it

is possible to investigate in a naturalistic way acts of judging or thinking (even thinking

conceived in a dualistic way), but such an investigation inevitably overlooks the

normative dimension that is essential to understanding the propositional contents that

are judged or thought’3

The consequence of overlooking the normative dimension is that everything that

is thought or judged is on equal footing. We can not have right or wrong inferences; we

can only have inferences that are actually made. By looking only to what actually

happens and to the causal links between facts we are in a position from which the line

between correct and incorrect can not be drawn. This is so, because in the natural order

everything happens according to some (natural) law, and so everything turns out to be

correct. If we are to make sense of the correct/incorrect distinction we need something

else, besides what happens, besides what is. We must make a place for what ought to be.

If I held true that ‘It is raining now’, then it does not help to look at what happens in my

brain to know if what I say is really true. Instead, I have to know what ought to be the

case for my statement to be true.

Frege made clear the distinction between causation and justification. To ask what

caused a certain event is to ask what made it actually happen. Causation runs through the

realm of actuality; with the help of it we can know why something did happen, is

3 Making It Explicit pg.11

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happening or will happen. Justification is about what ought to happen. In searching for a

justification, we enquire about what ought to happen. We may successfully causally

explain why an event took place, but this does not say if it should have happened. After

all, good things as well as bad things happen. But in the causal realm (which was in place

for a long time before our coming in the world) there is no place for good and bad, for

what ought to be and what ought to be not. Justification does just that, it makes room for

the distinction between what ought to be and what ought to be not. Something that ought

to be, nevertheless, may not actually obtain. Conversely, something that ought to be not

may actually obtain. The point is that causation and justification are different stories

(complementary, for sure) and failure of grasping this difference may lead to a hopeless

search in one realm for something that can be found only in the other.

At this point, it may be useful to ask how this confusion could happen. This kind

of enquire was done by the later Wittgenstein, who looked for the difference between the

causal ‘must’ and the logical (normative) ‘must’. Both of them are kinds of ‘must’

because both of them involve some necessary correlations, which do not leave room for

misfire. The causal ‘must’ does not leave room for misfire between the laws that govern

the functioning of the machine and how it does, in fact, function4. The logical ‘must’

also does not leave room for misfire, but between different things. As Brandom puts it:

‘The relation between the content of an intention and the performances that would

fulfill that intention does not leave any room for misfire, corresponding to the melting or

bending of the parts of a mechanism, for it is already a normative relation. The state is to

settle what ought to be done, what must be done if it is to be realized. What actually does

or would happen is another matter. The images of superrigidity – of being guided by rails

that one cannot fall away from – are what one gets if one assimilates normative

compulsion to causal compulsion, ignoring the Kantian distinction. That is, if the

normative ‘must’ were a kind of causal ‘must’, it would have to be a puzzling , superrigid

sort – but the point is not to start with this sort of naturalistic prejudice’5

4 Of course, every machine could break. But if we would be omniscient we would know that it was not the case of this kind of misfire, but some other laws were in place, that made the machine break. 5 Making It Explicit pg .14

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A rule cannot fail to settle what must be done if it is to be followed. Between

these two there is no room for misfire. But the relation between the content of a rule and

what actually happens is not predetermined in any way. One may succeed, as well as he

may fail, in following some rule. So, we have two kinds of ‘must’, because we have two

kinds of compulsion, between different things; but if we look in the logical ‘must’ for the

same type of compulsion that we have in the causal ‘must’, we will look in vain and we

will be puzzled for sure.

3. How to understand the normative

The previous section was meant to establish that the normative ingredient is a

very important one in us, of our intentional states. Now, the question that comes in place

is: How can we understand the normative? Brandom attributes to Kant the view that:

‘…norms just are rules of conduct. Normative assessments of performances are

understood as always having the form of assessments of the extent to which those

performances accord to some rule. Reference to proprieties of performance is taken as

indirect reference to rules, which determine what is proper by explicitly saying what is

proper. On this account, acts are liable as normative assessments insofar as they are

governed by propositionally explicit prescriptions, prohibitions and permissions. These

may be conceived as rules, or alternatively as principles, laws, commands, contracts, or

conventions. Each of these determines what one may or must do by saying what one may

or must do. For a performance to be correct is, on this model, for the rules to permit or

require it, for it to be in accord with principle, for the law to allow or demand it, for it to

be commanded or contracted’6

According to this view, whenever we asses the propriety of some conduct, we

make appeal to some explicit rules or principles which determine the correctness of that

conduct. The rules must be given somehow in advance, and we are to judge the propriety

of that conduct by looking at what is permitted by that rule. If we want to make an

assessment of correctness, then we have to make reference (at least implicitly) to a rule

that determines what is appropriately to do by saying what is appropriately to do. This

6 Making It Explicit, pg.19

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view is called by Brandom regulism and consists in conceiving the proprieties of practice

as being only expressions of more basic principles. The normativity is at home in

discursive principles that explicitly say what is correct, and only afterwards is it exhibited

in practice.

The critic of regulism was Wittgenstein. His argument drew on the observation

that a rule can be, itself, applied correctly or incorrectly. A rule specifies how something

ought to be done (e.g. how someone ought to cross the street); it must be applied to

particular cases (e.g. in which people are crossing the street) to see if in those cases it was

followed. If we ask if a rule has been applied correctly to a particular case, how shall we

settle the question? According to the regulist view we have to make appeal to some other

rule for deciding the correctness of our performance (i.e. that of applying the first rule).

So, for deciding if a rule was applied correctly, we must appeal to some other rule, and so

on ad infinitum. This regress argument shows that the process of interpretation7 must end

somehow, because it ends as a matter of fact. To stop the regress we need to question our

view that every assessment of correctness must be made by looking at some explicit rule.

This view does not propose an autonomous conception of norms. The final step, which

can stop the regress, is missing. Normativity cannot be ‘rules all the way down’ because

we cannot even start in this case. If we think that our first step consists in applying a rule,

then we will soon found out the trace of our earlier step, which consists in applying a rule

that allows us to know if we applied the first one correctly. Indeed, a rule specifies how

to do one thing correctly, but on the condition that the first step is already secured, that

we already can do something else correctly (applying the rule). So, what is the first step?

According to Brandom:

’The conclusion of the regress argument is that there is a need for a pragmatist

conception of norms – a notion of primitive correctness of performance implicit in

practice that precede and are presupposed by their explicit formulation in rules and

principles…The regress argument does not by itself provide such a conception of

proprieties of practice; it just shows that without one we cannot understand how rules

can codify the correctness that they do…What Wittgenstein shows is that the

intellectualist model will not do as an account of the nature of the normative as such. For

7 For Wittgenstein a rule for applying a rule is called an ‘interpretation’

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when applied to the norms governing the application of rules and principles, it generates

a regress, which can be halted only by acknowledging the existence of some more

primitive form of norm. The regress is Wittgenstein’s master argument for the

appropriateness of the pragmatist, rather than the regulist-intellectualist, order of

explanation. ’8

This is not to say that we cannot go on in enquiring about the correctness of the

application of every rule. The point is rather that every time we apply some rule, we

settled already in some other way what amounts to following correctly that rule; and that

this first step must be sought at the pragmatic level, where we can do something correctly

without first assessing that correctness by an appeal to some explicit rule. So, we need a

notion of norms that are implicit in practice, that are already in place, before our explicit

assessment by and of them. So, where should we seek the norms?

One strategy of response is ‘that to talk about implicit norms is just to talk about

regularities – that practices should be understood just as regularities of behavior’9. This

strategy tries to pick the rules by searching regularities of behavior. The regress argument

is avoided, since the norms need not be expressible by those in whose conduct they are

implicit. It is sufficient that we observe regularity in behavior and, thus, to see what rule

that conduct is conforming to. This strategy risks to reduce the ‘following of a rule’ to a

mere ‘to be in accord with a rule’, and this would come up to a reduction of the

normative to the causal. To avoid such a risk, this kind of strategy ‘must be able to fund a

distinction between what is in fact done and what ought to be done. It must make room

for permanent possibility of mistakes, for what is done or taken to be correct nonetheless

to turn out to be incorrect or inappropriate, according to some rule or practice.’10 For

this, it is needed a way of picking out a preferred pattern of regularities, which will

permit us to identify correct performances with regular ones.

The problem appears when we try to pick out the relevant regularity. Or, as

Brandom puts it: ‘The problem is that any particular set of performances exhibits many

regularities. These will agree on the performances that have been produced and differ in

their treatment of some possible performances that have not (yet) been produced. A

8 Making it explicit pg 21-22 9 Making it explicit pg 27 10 Making it explicit pg 27

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performance can be denominated ‘irregular’ only with respect to a specified regularity,

not tout court.’11

Put in other words, we now face the problem of selecting the relevant regularity

from many others. Only by doing this we can denominate some performance as

‘irregular’. But then, the problem arises again at the level of the selection of the relevant

regularity. Why some regularity is relevant, and not others? How can we decide which

regularity ought to be the relevant one? So, all this strategy does is to push the

normativity further away, but not to give an account for it.

What is the next move that we should make if we want to ground the normative?

‘If anything is to be made out of the Kantian insight that there is a fundamental

normative dimension to the application of concepts (and hence to the significance of

discursive or propositionally contentful intentional states and performances), an account

is needed of what it is for norms to be implicit in practices. Such practices must be

construed both as not having to involve explicit rules and as distinct from mere

regularities’12

The points are: first that our normativity reaches beyond our discursivity, and

second that we can not look for norms by looking only at mere regularities. Our norms

must be implicit in practice, in the first place, and they are in a strong sense ours, in that

they can not be grasped by looking from a completely external perspective, trying to

guess them somehow.

4. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to provide the first raw materials needed for the

construction pursued in the third chapter. It was meant to establish that we are normative

creatures; that the Kantian insight is one without we cannot make sense of our specificity

and that our normativity must be sought at the pragmatic level. For now, it will suffice

the negative thesis that normativity is not to be reduced to discursivity (norms are not

rules all the way down) and that normativity is not to be reduced to mere regularities.

11 Making it explicit pg.28 12 Making it explicit pg.29

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III. Chapter two – The entrepreneurial character of decision-making

1. Introduction

Ever since their coming into the world, humans strived to survive. Indeed, this is

not specific only to human beings, but to every living being. Nevertheless, why we did so

well in this respect is a question which regards only us.

Perhaps in the Stone Age13 humans did not have much knowledge, although they

could have made good use out of it. When some tribe found some new and unknown

fruit, they knew they could not afford to pass that opportunity away. They had to know if

that fruit was eatable, and so, eligible to become a new asset in their fight against

starvation. But they had no idea if that was so, that fruit being of unknown color and

form. They had only one chance: to risk, to try and see what will happen. One of them

was chosen and he ate the fruit. After that, the tribe acquired new knowledge, even if

sometimes this knowledge came at the cost of one human life.

Fortunately, the process of acquiring knowledge gives us important advantages. It

is a cumulative process and knowledge can be communicated. It is cumulative, because

we need not try two times the same poisonous fruit and we need not be in doubt twice

whether to eat a healthy fruit. Knowledge can be communicated, because one life is

enough for the other members of the tribe to know what to keep their hands off.

Of course, there are some inherent difficulties that come bundled with the process

of knowledge. Acquiring knowledge is not an easy task; it is a very hard and arduous

process. After all, it is not so easy going into the complete unknown and trying to shed

some light there. The world is immense and by acquiring knowledge we fathom only an

infamous part of it. So, the incompleteness of knowledge is something that we should get

used to it. The other problem is that knowledge is inherently uncertain, although to the

unadvised it may not look so. After all, not only in the Stone Age people died by eating

poisonous food, even today people die by eating poisonous mushrooms that look

identical with the eatable ones. Although for the advised the differences overwhelm the

13 This is not to talk about a different culture which is inferior to ours. We refer to that period as we refer to the child in comparison with the grown adult. It is meant as an earlier stage of a historical process, not as a different process.

13

apparent similarities between the so different (in terms of the consequences of eating

them) mushrooms, this certainty (of knowing for sure how to differentiate them) comes at

the cost of being fooled at least once by what we thought to be sure ground and proved to

be otherwise (not everyone must be fooled because, fortunately, knowledge can be

communicated).

This chapter will enquire about our doing so well in a world full of mystery and

surprise, about our abilities that permitted us such accomplishments. The line that will be

followed will be one of economic thought14. Precisely, what will be restated here, are

things said by I. Kirzner, who in turn developed and built on insights had by L. von Mises

and F. Hayek.

2. Homo Economicus

Survival is an important end, perhaps the most important one. Besides it we have

many other ends. But, we live in a world with limited resources. We can not accomplish

all our ends. Every moment we have to decide for what ends we should employ the

available means; and this is something every one of us must do. In the words of Kirzner:

‘The basis of the economic analysis of individual decision-making is found in its

economic aspect. Since the classic discussion by Lord Robbins (An Essay on the Nature

and Significance of Economic Science, 1932), the economic aspect of individual activity

has been understood in terms of the allocation of scarce means among competing ends.

Each individual is seen as confronted with an “economic problem” – the problem of

selecting those courses of action, with respect to given means, that will secure the

fulfillment of as many goals (in order of their significance) as possible. This problem is

sometimes expressed as that of securing efficiency, or as “maximizing” goal

satisfaction.’15

14 Why this is chosen should not come as a surprise. After all, the economist is the one which is oriented, at least implicitly, towards practices of maximization. He is the one which observes human practices in which we are all involved, more or less. And so, by starting from concrete situations, rather than by mere hypothesizing, he is in a better position to realize what abilities are those which permit us to be so successful. 15 Competition and entrepreneurship, pg.32

14

The situation seems clear: we can choose with ease examples which show that we

are confronted with the ‘economic problem’. If we are in a supermarket, we have to

decide how to spend our money. If we are careful enough, then we could calculate what

the optimal course of action is (which will best satisfy our goals). All would come up to a

computational problem, of distributing the scarce means (the sum of money allocated for

shopping) between competing ends (the products we want to buy). Suppose that we want

to buy apples and oranges and that we have the same preference for both of them. Then,

the best course of action is to buy equal quantities of both. This course of action can be

decided by mechanical computation, by calculating how much money to spend on apples

and how much on oranges. If apples are twice more expensive than oranges, then we

should divide our budget by three, and use two parts for buying apples and one for

buying oranges. In this way we will optimally achieve our ends, of buying apples and

oranges, for which we have an equal preference. In the same situation, if we would spend

all our money on apples, we would not optimally achieve our given ends. To be sure, this

kind of calculus is not always that simple, but with given means and ends there is some

course of action which is best.

We can observe this kind of behavior whenever a person has some ends which he

tries to achieve. This can be misleading and could lead us to think that maximization is an

essential characteristic of our actions. But, we must overlook an important step to get this

picture. In Kirzner’s words:

‘Being broader than the notion of economizing, the concept of human action does

not restrict analysis of the decision to the allocation problem posed by the juxtaposition

of scarce means and multiple ends. The decision, in the framework of the human-action

approach, is not arrived at merely by mechanical computation of the solution to the

maximization problem implicit in the configuration of the given ends and means. It

reflects not merely the manipulation of given means to correspond faithfully with the

hierarchy of given ends, but also the very perception of the ends-mean framework

within which allocation and economizing is to take place’16

Now, the point can be put clearly. The allocation problem is indeed one of

choosing the optimal course of action. But, the choosing must be made between courses

16 Competition and entrepreneurship pg.33

15

of action that are predefined by the ends-mean framework. Once we suppose that the

ends-mean framework is already in place, we can calculate what employment of means

would best achieve the ends. But, to put emphasis on the method of maximization is not

to look at the whole picture. The optimal course of action within a given ends-mean

framework is optimal in respect only to that given framework, and leaving unanswered

the question of the adequacy of the framework itself does not shed much light on our

problem. The problem is that:

‘A multitude of economizing individuals each choosing with respect to given ends

and means cannot, without the introduction of further exogenous elements, generate a

market process (which involves systematically changing series of means available to

market participants)’17

By focusing on maximization, we necessarily leave out of the picture the first

step, that of how a specific ends-mean framework comes into place. It is true that we can

pick out any action and that we can evaluate it by its economic aspect. For any particular

action, given the ends-mean framework, we can decide if it is optimal. But, by doing this,

we can not answer how our ends-mean framework changes. We are compelled to let the

coming into place of the framework beyond our understanding. The point can be put in a

different vocabulary (that of the first chapter). At any moment, a person has a set of given

rules to which he is committed to. That he tries to follow those rules follows analytically,

because to be committed to a rule means just to try your best in following that rule.

Likewise, to be committed to an ends-mean framework means just to do your best in

reaching the ends by the means.

But, what is expressed by the quest for optimality in respect to a given ends-mean

framework can be traced back to the earlier step. Why are we committed to some rules

and not to others, why are we committed to some ends-mean framework and not to

others? Why, for example, when we think of someone that committed suicide we do not

think in the first place of how successful he followed his rule, of how optimally did he

achieve his ends? Why this kind of ends-mean framework is not chosen by the vast

majority of us? The answer is that we raise the problem of optimality only after we

17 Competition and Entrepreneurship pg.33

16

accepted that a specific ends-mean framework is in place and that the problem

concerning the adequacy of the framework itself is dealt at an earlier step.

If we would be omniscient, then things would be very simple. Our plans would be

absolutely correct and all that we would have to do were to wait for them to unfold

completely. Being omniscient, we would choose the best course of action for the

achievement of all our ends. Furthermore, there would not be any end that would prove

incorrect, in the sense that we would come to see that we should have not even tried to

achieve it.

Unfortunately we are not omniscient. Our knowledge is incomplete and uncertain.

We should always keep these characteristics before our eyes, because they are always

with us. But there are ways to obscure them, to lose sight of them. One of them is to put

emphasis on the ‘economic problem’, on the maximization aspect of our actions (in a

given ends-mean framework). With the framework being already given, we are

confronted with a puzzle type problem. We just have to search for the correct (optimal)

solution, which is already predefined by the framework. Of course some of us are better

at solving puzzles; some of us will find the optimal courses of action and others will not.

It may seem that this search for the optimal courses of action is the most important one,

that by solving this kind of problem we solve all there is to solve. Being in this paradigm,

we might think that the knowledge problem is reduced to calculating what the optimal

course of action is.

Let us get some perspective. We live in a world full of mystery and uncertainty.

Somehow we have to overcome this problem. We have to move in a familiar setting, so

we have to make it familiar. By establishing an ends-mean framework we accomplish

exactly this. We provide ourselves a setting for our action to take place. The ends-means

framework provides us the possibility for rational action, in the sense of action directed

towards the maximization of our ends (provided by that very framework). But we can

concern ourselves with maximization (in a given ends-mean framework) only as long as

we perceive that framework as adequate. We can try to maximize as long as we leave the

problem of uncertainty behind, because as long as an ends-mean framework would be

endowed with full-blooded uncertainty there would be no such thing as the optimal

course of action. So, establishing an ends-mean framework is a necessary precondition

17

for the very possibility of maximization. Thus, we must seek to understand maximization

by finding its place in the scheme which starts with the establishment of the framework

itself. By separating these two aspects and by looking for essential characteristics only in

the first one, we give up perspective and we get only uncorrelated pieces.

3. Homo Agens

Mises had this specific insight, of bridging the two steps: that of the very

perception of the ends-mean framework and that of maximizing in respect with a given

framework. He says:

‘We call contentment or satisfaction that state of a human being which does not

and cannot result in any action. Acting man is eager to substitute a more satisfactory

state of affairs for a less satisfactory. His mind imagines conditions which suit him better,

and his action aims at bringing about this desired state. The incentive that impels a man

to act is always some uneasiness. A man perfectly content with the state of his affairs

would have no incentive to change things. He would have neither wishes nor desires; he

would be perfectly happy. He would not act; he would simply live free from care.

But to make a man act, uneasiness and the image of a more satisfactory state

alone are not sufficient. A third condition is required: the expectation that purposeful

behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness. In the

absence of this condition no action is feasible. Man must yield to the inevitable. He must

submit to destiny.

These are the general conditions of human action. Man is the being that lives

under these conditions. He is not only homo sapiens, but no less homo agens.’18

The Misesian insight was about what sets off human action in the first place. He

started by noticing when a human being would not act. If we would be perfectly content

with how things are, then we would not want to change anything. We would not act.

Action becomes feasible only when we are not perfectly content. We act so much only

because we are not perfectly content. So, the necessary precondition for us to act is some

uneasiness. Would this uneasiness be absent, then we would not want to change anything.

18 Human Action pg 14-15

18

This uneasiness need not be specified in any way19, for it to play its specific role,

namely driving us to act. At this first step it is sufficient that we are not perfectly content,

for us to want to make a change. Our desire to change things starts from a negative

insight. We are in some condition and we know that it is not good enough, that it is not

perfect. And we know this in the sense of feeling uneasy about it. If this feeling would be

totally absent, then we would be completely happy. Indeed, this amounts exactly to the

complete absence of action, to the complete absence of uneasiness. That some uneasiness

is what drives us to act need not be justified positively. This is not a point about our

mental states and about our neuronal connexions. It is not a point that could be decided

by analyzing our brain. This uneasiness is a condition of possibility for action. Actions

change the world. So, in order to act we need to want to change the world. And wanting

to change the world is possible only if we are not perfectly content; and not being

perfectly content means that we are somehow uneasy about our current state. For if this

would not be so, then we would not want to change anything; we would not act. As long

as we act, we do it because we have this uneasiness.

The understanding of this point might be obscured if we see it only from our point

of view, that of acting humans. By seeing things only from our perspective, we run the

risk of not being able to see the specific role of action in our lives. By not getting enough

perspective we may become too puzzled by what is omnipresent in us, by action. But, by

keeping in mind the fact that there are other ways for human beings to live we can also

understand our way better. That Nirvana is a state in which action disappears from the

picture and that its purpose is exactly the removal of uneasiness could show us

something. Precisely, it could show that very different strategies can be employed for

achieving the same goal. That these two cultures are so different and at the same time are

human cultures can be traced back to one common primary goal (the removal of

uneasiness) and two very different strategies (withdrawal from the world by non-acting

and involving in the world by acting). So, uneasiness is indeed the condition of

19 That this uneasiness exists is arrived at by a transcendental deduction. The fact that we act shows that there must be some uneasiness. But by this method we only reach this conclusion. If someone desires to be more specific about this uneasiness, then it is up to him. If he think that it can be proved that a specific uneasiness motivates every human being, then he is the one who has to make this point.

19

possibility for action, but action is just our (e.g. occidental) specific way with dealing

with the specific human problem (our uneasiness).

This unspecified uneasiness is the first condition of human action. The second one

is that of conceiving a more satisfactory state. This is a positive step. It consists in giving

a specific determination to that uneasiness. It consists in reducing the uneasiness to the

inexistence of the conceived state. This reduction is a methodological one. We need not

believe that once we accomplish the conceived state we will be perfectly content. It is

sufficient to believe that the accomplishment of that state is a small step towards the

removal of that uneasiness. Nevertheless, we must believe that that step is a good one;

that it will diminish our uneasiness once it is accomplished, or at least that it is possible to

diminish it in this way. This is the third condition: ‘the expectation that purposeful

behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness’20. Without

this our plans will remain idle. They would never be put to practice. We need to believe

that our plans could be carried out and that by being carried out they could make a

difference.

How this three condition link up together? How do they set off human action? To

answer these we should start with the second condition. This is the step where the ends-

mean framework comes into play. The ends-mean framework is sustained by the (at least

implicit) belief that it will help alleviate our uneasiness. The ends-mean framework is the

specific formal structure that our conceived states have. It bridges the gap between the

unspecified uneasiness and our concrete actions. We can act only in concrete and

determinate ways. So, if we are to have any hope of alleviating a complete indeterminate

uneasiness by acting in completely determinate ways, we have to bridge the gap

somehow. We need a way of discerning, of choosing between many possible actions.

And that unspecified uneasiness can not offer by itself criteria for choosing between

actions. In this case we would be at the mercy of pure luck. On the other hand, we learn

from experience that some actions are more apt at alleviating the uneasiness than others.

So, by acting without criteria we will not be better off either.

How does the establishment of an ends-mean framework help us? The ends-mean

framework is a formal structure which permits us to embed in it our past experience and

20 Human Action pg 14-15

20

also to take new guesses about what will alleviate our uneasiness. At the same time, it can

be evaluated with respect to our ultimate standard, the perceived level of uneasiness

itself. By establishing an ends-mean framework we temporarily suspend the

indeterminate character of our ultimate goal (the removal of uneasiness). This is so,

because our specific ends are seen as proxies for the ultimate goal. In this way, the

indetermination is pushed between the proxy and the ultimate goal and we can act in a

determinate environment. At this point, all we have to do is to get the best possible

combination of available means to achieve the given ends. And this amounts to solving

(by mechanical calculus) a maximization problem.

Only now, having in background this new image, we can see what the place of

maximization is. Maximizing amounts to reaching the proxy in the best possible way.

This is indeed something that some of was do better than others. But, which course of

action is better and which is the best can be decided precisely because the ends-mean

framework provides a positive criterion for this (specifically the accomplishment of the

end). But we should not forget some points. Firstly, by establishing a proxy we take only

a guess. Just by choosing a proxy we are not necessarily making a step towards

alleviating our uneasiness. This can not be foreseen with certainty. Every time we choose

a proxy we hope that we chose wisely. Furthermore, if we are rational, then our past

experience must support this hope. But, even so, we can not be sure of our choice of ends

until we accomplish them (that they are not feasible we can see before accomplishment

too). After reaching the proxy that we set we are again face to face with our ultimate

goal. The step that we made might have taken us closer or farther from our ultimate goal.

This is something we can only decide by perceiving our level of uneasiness. Now we

must start the process again and we must establish a new ends-framework, and with that a

new proxy. Designing the new framework, we can embed in it the past experience of

designing the old frameworks and of the points where they led us. And for sure, besides

adjusting what did not function as expected, we will introduce some completely new

elements in our framework.

In conclusion, every one of the three conditions is necessary. The first condition is

the one which provides the very possibility for human action. Furthermore, it serves us as

the ultimate standard for evaluating our actions. In absence of such a standard our actions

21

would be just uncorrelated pieces of behavior. This standard makes possible an entirely

human activity, that of Human Action21. Only against the background of this activity,

particular actions make sense. The second condition permits the existence of a structure

in which we can embed our past experience and our new guesses. This structure is the

stable ground we need to be more than drifters on the winds of chance. Nevertheless, this

structure is only formal. Now the third and final condition comes into play. It amounts to

our distinctive feature and power, that of deciding to face the world, to involve actively

into it. This decision precedes every act of ours. Without it we could not bring anything

into existence. That we are not conscious of its omnipresence means only that we got too

used with it. Our world, the World of Action starts only when we decide to start filling it

with actions. That this is possible only against a background of an ultimate goal which

will (probably) be always before us and that we tamed our power by imposing a specific

structure on it is something that we can only acknowledge for the time being.

4. We as Entrepreneurs

In this section we will apply what has been said in the previous section to the real

situations. We will see how humans move within the framework of Human Action. This

will help us understand with clarity how we manage to do so well in the world. To

recount with the help of Kirzner’s words:

‘Human action, in the sense developed by Mises, involves courses of action taken

by the human being “to remove uneasiness” and to make himself “better off”. The

decision, in the framework of the human-action approach…reflects not merely the

manipulation of given means to correspond faithfully with the hierarchy of given ends,

but also the very perception of the ends-mean framework within which allocation and

economizing is to take place…Mises’s homo agens is endowed not only with the

propensity to pursue goals efficiently, once ends and means are clearly identified, but

also with the drive and alertness needed to identify which ends to strive for and which

means are available. Now I choose to label that element of alertness to possibly newly

21 Human Action as an activity is more that the sum of all actions. It consists also in the pragmatic context that makes every action appropriate or not.

22

worthwhile goals and to possibly newly available resources the entrepreneurial element

in human decision-making. It is this entrepreneurial element that is responsible for our

understanding of human action as active, creative, and human rather than as passive,

automatic, and mechanical.’22

In a world of perfect knowledge the circumstances of a decision are known with

certainty. Here, the decision will always come up to selecting the optimal course of action

in respect to those circumstances. That course will be followed mechanical, at every step

in the process being perfectly clear what should be done. In such a world, where there is

no place for error, decisions will be indeed mechanical. But we live in a different world,

of incomplete knowledge and of uncertainty. It is incomplete because there are many

things we do not know yet and it is uncertain because every bit of knowledge can turn out

not to be so.

Let us take an example. Suppose that we have two markets A and B. In market A

the price for a certain product is 10 monetary units. In market B the price for the same

product is 5 monetary units. Initially the users (sellers and buyers) of the markets do not

know of the existence of the other market. In this case, if someone would have

knowledge of the existence of both markets he could grasp the opportunity for pure

profit. He could buy the product from market B with 5 monetary units and sell it in

market A for 8 monetary units. Thus, he will make a profit of 3 monetary units. It is

important to notice that this opportunity is already there, before our entrepreneur in fact

grasps it. The opportunity appears (in the sense of becoming visible for someone) when

something that is already in place is perceived by some alert individual. The opportunity

is already there because buyers from market A will readily offer to buy the product for 8

monetary units and sellers from market B will readily offer to sell the product for 6

monetary units. But neither one of them knows of the other. The one who discovers this

bit of knowledge grasps an opportunity for pure profit that was already there, but that

nobody has perceived yet.

For our entrepreneur to actually act for grasping the opportunity the three

Misesian conditions must be met. Firstly, he must be interested in finding opportunities.

Secondly, he must be capable of noticing opportunities. Thirdly, he must actually go on

22 Competition and Entrepreneurship pg.33-35

23

to grasp the perceived opportunities. Of course there is a difference between acting for

grasping a perceived opportunity and succeeding in grasping it. In the first place, the

perceived opportunity may not be a real opportunity (i.e. the real price from market B is

also 10, but our man was misinformed). In the second place, he must be able to develop

an adequate ends-mean framework which will lead him to grasp the opportunity (i.e. he

must find also the means to buy the product from market B, the means to reach market A

and so on). In the third place, although the perceived opportunity was real when it was

perceived, it must be so also when our entrepreneur’s actions get him to the point where

he can actually grasp the opportunity (i.e. when he reaches the market A he finds out that

other people where faster than he and that the price is now already 6). All this steps must

be carried out successfully for him to successfully grasp the opportunity. And the final

success depends in part on his abilities and in part on luck. For example it may be of no

use the fact that he manages to find the optimal course of action in respect to his ends-

mean framework or that, given his context, he chose the best framework. Even so, there

may be others who are in an objectively better position to grasp that opportunity (i.e.

another entrepreneur has already purchased the product from market B, when the first

entrepreneur perceives the opportunity). Thus, in many cases the entrepreneur’s abilities

can make the difference between success and failure. Nevertheless, the external factors

(luck, if we look from the point of view of the entrepreneur in case) can also make the

difference. This is so precisely because we live in a world of incomplete knowledge and

uncertainty. And our knowledge has an inherent guessing component in it. By extending

our knowledge and by developing our abilities we can become better guessers, but we

can never leave the possibility of surprise behind.

At this point, we should say a few words about two different knowledge

problems23. Both stem from the incompleteness of knowledge. The first problem appears

when we devise an over-optimistically plan (i.e. due to incomplete information we may

believe that we could sell a product at a very high price). In this case we presuppose that

some things are true when in fact they are not, that some things will obtain when in fact

they will not. This type of problem tends to be self-revealing. At some point, the plan will

be revealed as untenable. We will not reach the expected outcome, we will be

23 I.Kirzner ‘Knowledge problems and their solutions’

24

disappointed. In this way we will acquire new information which will help us in

redesigning our plans. When some plan will not get carried away successfully we will

know for sure that we have a problem and we can start finding solutions24.

The second problem appears when we devise an unduly pessimistic plan (i.e. due

to incomplete information we believe that we could sell only at very low prices). In this

case we do not presuppose that some things will obtain, when in fact they could have

obtained. This type of problem is not self-revealing. Our plans will get carried out

successfully. The problem is that they could have been carried out even more

successfully (in the sense that by devising a better plan we would have obtained more

profit). This kind of problem will not be necessarily revealed and corrected. What we

may fail to know today (when we are devising the plan), we may nevertheless continue to

fail to know tomorrow.

So, it is sufficient that we devise a plan for the first type of problem (if there is the

case that such a problem exists in that case) to reveal itself sooner or later. By devising a

plan we have done our part concerning the revealing of this type of problem. Now, it is

up to reality to refuse to comply to our over-optimistically plans and thus to reveal to us

that we have a problem. The second problem is not so easy to reveal. We may say that

reality is very happy that we demand to little of it and will not show anything to us in this

case. Put into other words, the bad plans will reveal themselves as bad by not being

successful, but every successful plan is not necessarily the best plan. We must actively

search for better plans. Overcoming the first problem helps us embed in our future plans

knowledge obtained from past experience (i.e. knowledge obtained by confronting the

expected results with the actual results and by adjusting our expectations to what

happened). Overcoming the second problem is a different process. Here we can not

compare the expected and actual results because they are identical. The only possible way

to overcome this problem is to introduce genuine new elements in our plans, to take blind

guesses about what the reality is and about what plans will be more successful. Once we

24 Of course if a plan does not get carried away successfully, then it does not necessarily mean that the plan was bad. It may also be the case that the problem is on our part, on our failure to carry it. But the point is that whenever a plan is devised over-optimistically, it will tend to lead to disappointments on our part (of course luck can play a part, but a plan that is carried away successfully, will be employed systematically in the future also; and if its success is due only to luck this will be clear when luck will not play a role anymore).

25

successfully overcome this problem, we can also embed new knowledge in our future

plans. But this knowledge is obtained not by analyzing past experience and by removing

the parts that made us expect too much25, but by introducing genuine new elements in our

plans, and by testing the new plans.

Someone need not be an entrepreneur to overcome the first problem (although he

must be an entrepreneur in order to devise the plan in the first place). He must only be

willing to remove parts from a plan that is already in place, until he successfully removes

the parts that led him to overly-optimistic expectations. But the overcoming of the second

problem calls for entrepreneurial decision-making, namely the decision to introduce

genuine new parts in the plan, parts that were not there before. And this type of decision

always involves a blind guessing on the part of the decision-maker. Introducing genuine

new elements always involves a blind guessing, which can be verified only afterwards,

by putting the new plan to work.

As long as we devise plans and as long as we modify our plans by introducing

genuine new elements into them we are entrepreneurs. Being entrepreneurs is our best

strategy of coping with a world full of uncertainty and of enlarging our knowledge about

it. Being entrepreneurs we have to take decisions, even if anyone of them could turn out

to be incorrect. But, with every new decision, with every new plan we take a new chance,

we make a new guess. As long as we are apt to carry the process further we can hope to

succeed in our guesses and to never repeat the mistakes.

25 In a case of a plan that did not carried out successfully we have of course the possibility of keeping the ends unchanged, and introducing new means in the plan, thus making it work. But this will amount to overcoming the second type of problem, not the first type. Nevertheless, we can separate the two problems if we proceed analytically. The first problem can be overcome by adjusting the ends so that the new plan will be carried out successfully. The adjustment of ends amounts to removing parts from them until the expectations become low enough for them not to be invalidated anymore. Afterwards, by introducing new means and by (re)introducing the old ends we can indeed devise a successful plan. But this amounts to changing a successful plan (the one that was reshaped by the adjustment of ends) with a new one, hoping that it will be more successful. That in changing the plan we do not introduce only genuine new parts, but we also reintroduce some other parts does not change the type of problem that we try to overcome. It is still the second type of problem that we are trying to overcome at this point. And this is so because we introduced genuine new elements into the plan. And ‘genuine’ means not absolutely new in respect to every plan that was ever devised, but with respect only to the first plan that faced the first type of problem. Introducing a genuine new part does not mean that that part is new as a part, irrelevant of the plans in which it figured, but only that is new in respect with a specific ends-mean framework (that by introducing that part in a specific framework we can not predict the outcome because the framework obtained is genuinely new and this is due to the introduction of that specific part).

26

5. Conclusion

This chapter was about how we manage to live in a world full of mystery, about

how we are able to learn to do better in this world. The answer was that we are

entrepreneurs; that we have to make many steps into the unknown to shed some light

there; that we are motivated in our journey by some undefined uneasiness; that we chose

as a safety device a specific formal structure – the ends-mean framework; that with the

help of it we can trace back our steps into unknown – that is our decisions; that with the

help of our safety device (the ends-mean framework) and of our guiding device (the felt

uneasiness) we can systematically learn to make wise steps; but that, nevertheless we can

not be certain of anyone of our steps, which are still steps into the unknown.

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III. Chapter Three – The conceptual realm as interplay between rules and

decisions

1. Introduction

What have all the games in common? Do they share a common essence in virtue

of which we name all of them ‘games’? Do they all have something in common? Till the

later Wittgenstein it was possible to give an affirmative answer to these questions and

then to go on in search of that common essence. But, Wittgenstein showed in a powerful

manner that this is not the case. There is no such thing as the common essence of all the

games, as the platonic idea of Game. There are only games and games.

If we want to describe a game so to grasp its quintessence how shall we proceed?

Let us imagine an essentialist who is trying to enlighten us and show us the way. He is

new in our community; he never played or heard of any games. He says that it will

suffice to observe a few games and then he will tell us what the essence that all games

share is. So we will take him to a particular game, a football match. After watching the

first half he could say that football is a game because it is played between two sides and

the point is to defeat the other side. But, immediately we can take him to watch a game

which does not conform to this definition. Of a game which is played by more than two

sides or of a game which point is not to be won. Of course, our essentialist friend would

insist that to discover the essence that all games share is a difficult process, one of trial

and error, that the first definition was just the first step. After every new example he

would refine his definition so to obtain a concept that could be correctly applied to every

case we present to him. Of course, we can not expect from him perfection, he can be

wrong; after all he is only human. He could say about something that it is a game only to

realize afterwards that he was mistaken. After watching him with his complicated, almost

scientific endeavor, we may be a bit confused because for ordinary people it seems very

easy to recognize if something is a game. Or, about an unclear case, they do not think too

much before deciding if that dubious activity is worthy to be called a ‘game’. Being late

for dinner because we kept bugging him with new cases which called over and over for a

refined definition, he may take a stand, although with a raised voice. He will say that the

28

process is now complete, that he gathered enough information, that the essence of the

game is now grasped. And that it is completely in vain to present him new cases because

things are as clear as the deepest azure summer sky. If the new case does not conform to

his definition, it is too bad for that case. It will never be worthy to be called a ‘game’, for

games are just the ones which conform to ours friend definition. Although we could ask

him why we needed to go from venue to venue in search of the essence that now he

proclaims with a raised voice, when he could have done that from the beginning, we need

not take this line of attack, because the odds are in our favor now.

In the journey we took together, we also have done some thinking. Being true

friends, for some time we imagined ourselves in a world where our friend is right. In this

way, we could see what would follow if we would think that there really is a common

essence of all games. In the first place, we would like to ask our friend some questions.

On the ontological side, we would like to ask if something can participate to only one

essence or to many and in the second case to how many. On the epistemological side, we

would like to ask how can we find to which essences does it participate or how can we

know that we found all of them. Thinking about these questions the first thing that comes

to mind is that by postulating all this essences we did not solve anything. At what does it

help to say that all games share a common essence? Why should we not restrict ourselves

to what we perceive, to particular games that have similarities and differences between

them? Why should we not start from here?

What Wittgenstein saw was that if we look to many games we will see that they

have family resemblances. There is not any property that belongs to all of them and in

virtue of which they are games. The second part is important. Because it can happen that

all the games played in a certain community consist in doing something with a ball. The

important point is that even in this case we can imagine the invention of a new activity

which does not consist in doing something with a ball and which, nevertheless, the

community decides to call it a game. At this moment, it should be said, though, that

although Wittgenstein is an enemy of naïve essentialism, he is not a friend of the

relativists either26. Put into better words: the insight that Wittgenstein had was not a

26 Wittgenstein has an argument against the possibility of private language. If we switch from a single person (which can not have a private language) to a single community, what has changed? If the argument

29

relativistic one. It was just an insight of someone who went farther than anyone before

into the depths of the dark waters of language. An insight of the flexibility of language, as

a tool which can be at the same time perfectly rigid and also which can be used to

account for the immense diversity that can be grasped through it.

At this point, let us remind an interesting moment in the journey we took with our

friend. In the final part of our journey, after watching many different games, we took him

by surprise and stumbled upon yet another football match. The last bit of enthusiasm our

friend had vanished when he saw that we took him to the same game! He asked us

angrily if we’re trying to make fun of him or what else could be the point of taking him to

a game which he already watched and thoroughly analyzed, extracting every bit of

essence out of him? With a candid voice we whispered to him: ‘But look! They have

different shirts! And also the grass is greener!’ We need not go deeper into the story,

because our point is made. Our friend, with all his serious look of a man who came to

discover some essences, got a little carried by the wind; he behaved like an ordinary man.

Because for ordinary men, not only to see all those different activities as being all games

is, in general, a simple task, but also the capacity to pass over the many irrelevant

differences is something fully within their reach.

It seems that we are continuously praising the ordinary man, with his ability of

discerning relevant from irrelevant differences and resemblances. It must be asked why

this is so? Why the application of a concept (in this case that of ‘game’) is usually an

ability fully within the reach of an ordinary man? To answer this question it is clear that

we can not make use of any complicated activities usually associated with philosophical

practice.

The answer to this question will complete the picture of what is distinctive of us,

humans. The raw materials developed in the first two chapters will be used in giving this

against private language is sound in the case of a single person, why would it not be sound in the case of a single community? If a person is helpless without external standards, why this would not be the same in the case of a community? After all, a community is just a sum of persons which interact. If the switch from one person to a community is enough for securing the possibility of language, then this is so because for each person become available external standards. A private language is impossible not because it is the language of a person, but because it is one of a single entity which can not have access to a different perspective. It would be very strange indeed if Wittgenstein would have agreed with the relativistic picture of seeing a community as a single person which, without external standards, nevertheless has a language (and a private language indeed).

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answer. We will show that the use of concepts is an ability that is indeed within the reach

of every human. This is so precisely because the use of concepts is nothing else than the

result of our abilities of following rules and of choosing what rules to follow.

2. The Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian insight

The insight that was already mentioned is that of the great flexibility of language

and at the same time of its rigidity. Let us recount the moment when we took our friend

to another football game and we justified our decision by pointing to outrageously

irrelevant differences. The point is that with the help of complicated theoretical

constructions we can make every difference look as a relevant one. But now we face a

dilemma. On one hand, if we would not have the possibility of selecting new differences

as being relevant, then we would be at a loss in explaining how our language evolves. On

the other hand, if we could not find a way for selecting some differences as relevant

rather than others, then we could not even start the whole process; we would be stuck

before the first step, being puzzled by the infinity of choices that we have in front of us.

So, the insight starts from the fact that we actually succeed in steering through the horns

of this dilemma. In what follows, we will show how we manage to accomplish this task.

Furthermore, we will show that by steering through this dilemma we also manage to sail

into our mysterious world.

Firstly, let us recall a classical distinction: that of token/type. The classroom

presentation of this distinction is along these lines: if we look at the word ‘apple’ we can

count the letters in two different ways. We can count five tokens and four types. In this

word, the type ‘p’ is instantiated two times; we have two tokens of ‘p’. So, the type is

what can be instantiated in every token that falls under it. Conversely, the tokens are the

instantiations of types. If in a sentence we have the word ‘the’ for three times, then we

have three tokens of that type. This distinction can be applied to every sort of entity we

wish. What is the utility of this distinction, we may wish to ask? Apart of being

something which can be observed by someone who is interested in the functioning of

language, does it do something in particular? As with any answer, we can choose the

level of complexity which suffices us. In the present context, a simple one should do. The

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role of this distinction is exactly to make possible the coexistence of rigidity and

diversity, because we have both of them at both levels, of types and tokens. On one hand,

every type is a type among many and the very possibility of recognizing something as a

type presupposes that it is perfectly distinct from all the others. A discussion of the

criteria that permits us to individuate these types is not relevant at this moment. Of

primary importance is that at the level of types every type can be differentiated from

every other. On the other hand, every token is a token among many identical others

which fall together under the same type. Again, the criteria for discerning the tokens that

fall under the same type are irrelevant. Here, of primary importance is that the tokens of

the same type are perfectly identical, all off them being imbued with the distinctiveness

of their type.

A classical strategy for trying to make account for the power of language could be

to see the categories of type and token as ontological distinct; to give ontological primacy

to the first one, to put the types in heaven and the tokens on earth. We are merely humans

and the World of Ideas is too far and too great for us to have an easy and direct access to

it. We should consider ourselves lucky if we can copy it, if we can instantiate through

earthly tokens the heavenly types. It doesn’t matter that for bridging the gap between

heaven and earth we need a magic wand, or better, that we should keep quiet on this

matter altogether.

Maybe it will be of some help to get back to the disagreement with our friend

concerning the relevance of the differences between the two football matches. Let us

remember that he was trying to discover the essence of the ‘game’. How did he know for

sure that the two football games are the same in that context? Maybe Sellars will be of

help:

‘The psychologistic blunder with respect to ‘means’ is related to another

fundamental error, that, namely, of confusing between (1) language as a descriptive

category for which symbols are empirical classes to which certain events belong (and

hence are symbol-events) by virtue of performing an empirical function, with (2)

language as an epistemological category for which the relation of type to token is not

that of empirical class to member…

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For the moment it will help clarify the epistemological distinction between

symbol-types and symbol-tokens, if we think of the former as norms or standards, and of

the latter as events which satisfy them. We can therefore, for the moment at least,

contrast the above two senses of ‘language’ as the descriptive and the normative

respectively. Making use of this distinction, we argue that ‘meaning’ or, better

‘designation’ is a term belonging to language about languages in the second sense. Its

primary employment is therefore in connection with linguistic expressions as norms.’27

Maybe an example should be given to clarify the distinction. Let us take the term

‘red’. The descriptive sense of language picks out all red objects as members of the

empirical class ‘red’. Every member of the class ‘red’ belongs in this class in virtue of

performing an empirical function (e.g. of emitting a certain length-wave radiation). In the

descriptive sense, the identification step already took place. For classifying an event as a

member of a certain class the identification of the relevant set of properties must be

already done. Afterwards a class groups together all the events which share some set of

properties. Using the language in the descriptive sense amounts to describing some event

as a member of a class (for which the symbol stands for). The epistemological sense of

language puts emphasis on a different point. ‘Red’ used in the epistemological sense

stands for the type ‘red’. The relation between type and token is different from the

relation between class and member. A type is a rule. By correctly applying a type (that is

by successfully following that rule) we obtain a token of that type. Thus, a token is what

is obtained by successfully following a rule. A type does not group together its tokens in

the sense a class group together its members. To obtain every token we must correctly

apply the type. In the type-token relation the emphasis is put on the normative aspect. We

must be able to follow the rule if we are to have any tokens of that rule. This ultimately

amounts to our practical ability of grasping the difference between correct and incorrect

applications of a rule. Thus, grasping the meaning of ‘red’ (that is using ‘red’ in the

epistemological sense) amounts to the practical ability of correctly applying the rule

expressed in the epistemological use of ‘red’

Our friend was looking for that essential property(es) which every game has and

in virtue of which every particular game is a member of the class of ‘games’. He used

27 W.Sellars ‘Realism and the New Way of Words’

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language in the descriptive manner. He presupposed that ‘games’ form a class and that

every particular game is a member of that class. One possibility would be that every

game shares a set of common properties and that that set defines the class of ‘games’. In

his search he was trying to discover the properties of this set. The simplest strategy of this

kind is to see the having of every property of the set as being a necessary condition for

belonging to the class of ‘games’. In this way, by looking at new instances of games we

can eliminate accidental properties (because we see that some properties are instantiated

only in some cases, not in all of them). At some point we would succeed in eliminating

every accidental property and thus, we would obtain the essential set of properties which

every game has; and in virtue of which it is a game.

An improved strategy is to talk about family resemblances. It amounts at saying

that the members of a class do not have to share exactly the same set of properties for

them to belong to that class; that the rule for belonging to a class need not be a

conjunctive one, that it may be a disjunctive one; that for a class to be well formed it is

sufficient a transitive relation between its members (i.e. a member of a class must share

the following set of properties abVbcVcdVde). Wittgenstein had a descriptive point when

he talked about family resemblances. He observed that many of our concepts function in

this loose way; that for something to be a member of a certain class it need not share a

common (conjunctive) set of properties with all the other members. It should be noted

though, that this is not a normative point; it does not amount to saying that all our

concepts should function in this way. It is just an observation of how our concepts in fact

function; that applications of the same concept, although they do not share a set of

common properties, nevertheless are applications of the same concept.

At this point we should answer two questions. First, why the use of concepts is

not governed by the same type of rules every time (some concepts are based on a

common set of properties, others are based on family resemblances etc.)? Second, what

kind of essentialism is rejected by observing that many concepts are based on family

resemblances?

In answering the first question we should remember that concepts are themselves

just rules. By employing a concept we follow a rule, for we can apply every concept

correctly or incorrectly. So, when we talk about rules that govern the use of concepts we

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talk about rules that govern the use of some type of rules. If concepts were some kind of

empirical objects, then it would make sense to search for the class to which they

belonged. But they are not objects. Furthermore, we have seen already (in chapter one)

that the essential normative ingredient of rules must be sought at the pragmatic level. So,

when we ask what we should do according to some explicit rule we should seek the

answer at the pragmatic level. The common normative ingredient found in every rule is

not some ultimate explicit meta-rule. This kind of regress, as we have already seen, can

not be stopped. What is common to all concepts, as rules, is the normative ingredient. Of

course, as a special type of rules, concepts must have something in common that

differentiates them from other types of rules. Thus, the quest for finding the special

ingredient that makes them concepts, not just rules, is legitimate. But, searching for it in

the genetic of concepts might not be the best strategy. It would amount at trying to find a

specific normative ingredient in a descriptive land. Let us suppose that all our concepts

would be based on a common set of properties that would be found out in every

application of that respective concept. What would be relevant on the normative level in

this case? Precisely, that concepts could be applied (correctly or incorrectly); that we

would have criteria for applying them (looking for the particular instances that present

the common set of properties). But, at this point, nothing could stop us in finding

different criteria that would do the same job. Maybe we could think that the first criterion

is too rigid; that we could make good use of a weaker type of similarity. By letting a

concept be based on family resemblances we enrich our conceptual reservoir. We obtain

new concepts that nevertheless are concepts because they are formed with the help of

precise criteria; and they are precise precisely because we can grasp the difference

between correct and incorrect applications. Also, it should be said that we can not choose

a priori between criteria; that they are good as long as they can be applied; and that this

ultimately amounts to possessing the practical ability to do so.

What was the mistake of our essentialist friend? The sound insight he had was

that concepts really work. The mistake was to explain this success by the use of the

specific criterion. Thus, he had to embark on an impossible quest: that of explaining the

successful employment of concepts by the use of a specific criterion that did work. It

amounted to confusing something sufficient for being also necessary. What Wittgenstein

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noticed was that it is not necessary to use an essentialist criterion for a concept to be

employed successfully. And he saw this by observing that in practice many of our

concepts are not based on essentialist criteria. Concepts do their job so well not because

we found the single criterion which makes this possible, but because we succeeded in

finding criteria that work; and for a criterion to work we must posses the practical ability

of applying it correctly. Wittgenstein managed to see through the irrelevant details. He

saw that for a concept to function it is needed a criterion that makes possible this

functioning; and that a specific criterion is ultimately just our succeeding in putting the

normative at work. In contrast, our essentialist friend mistook a specific criterion for what

makes any criteria to work: our practical ability of discerning between correct and

incorrect applications of it.

Now, we can answer how our friend knew that the two football games were two

tokens of the same type. Let us remember what he was trying to do. He was searching for

the essence of ‘game’. He thought that this essence consists in some essential properties

that are to be found in every game. Of course, he knew that there are many kinds of

games, for example football games. They have an essence of their own which is formed

by the core essence of ‘game’ plus a few other specific properties of the football game. In

his quest he tried to find the essence of ‘game’ by eliminating the accidental properties

specific to special kinds of games (which were essential for those special kinds of

games). We might call his strategy a bottom-up strategy because he started from specific

games and tried to isolate the essence of ‘game’. But his strategy was not bottom-up all

the way down. He started from specific types of games28. At some level he had to make

what we think that is the really important step. He made use of the practical ability of

applying concepts. Before starting to examine every kind of game, he already applied the

respective concept. He secured his ground by recognizing in a particular situation the

instantiation of a certain type. When we took him to the first football venue he used his

ability of applying concepts, specifically that of ‘football game’. Thus, afterwards he

could select the relevant properties that make something be a football game. But he could

28 For this point I have to thank to Mr. Marian Panait, who in a short discussion made it in a somehow different context.

36

have never made that step if he did not have the practical ability of recognizing29

something as a token of some type. The reason we took him to another football game was

exactly this. We tried to show him that he looks for something that is not the really

important point; that the important point is that we can apply concepts and that we do this

without the help of essences of the kind he was after. Furthermore, that his insight was

good but that he searched for it in the wrong way. Indeed every concept has an essence,

but this amounts to our practical ability of discerning correct from incorrect applications

of it. Also, even if we manage to explicitate this practical ability in terms of an ‘essential’

set of properties (which will define the class of ‘games’), we would analyze only a

corpse. And this will never explain how the living organism works.

3. The role of decisions in the conceptual realm

In this section we will explain what has been left unexplained in the previous

section; we will see how the living organism works; we will see how concepts function.

In doing this we will build upon the insight that applying concepts amounts to the

practical ability of discerning between correct and incorrect application of a rule.

Furthermore, we will see how decisions fit in the conceptual picture.

Let us take an example. Imagine a child who never got out of his home yet. All

the chairs in his home have four legs; no other object in his home has four legs. His

parents teach him the concept ‘chair’ extensionally by telling him which objects are

chairs and also by showing him what is their utility. Furthermore, trying to protect him

from sitting on unsuitable objects they tell him that only chairs can be sat upon. Let us

suppose that for our child ‘chair’ means from now on ‘an object which has exactly four

legs and which can be sat upon’. In his home environment this concept does its job

perfectly. By applying the concept ‘chair’ he succeeds in identifying an object which can

29 This use of ‘recognize’ although natural might be very misleading. This ability is not that of recognizing something that already is in front of us and independent of us; it is not about passively recognizing something; on the contrary it is about actively applying a concept, actively following a rule. This use of ‘recognize’ refers to something that could not be without our making it so. To recognize a token as belonging to a certain type, we must first be able to apply that type.

37

be sat upon every time he wants30. Suppose now that he gets into another environment. In

this new environment there are only three-legged chairs. When he wants to sit our child

starts looking for a chair. For this, he starts to apply his concept of ‘chair’. Now, he does

not have much success. In the beginning, he does not find anything wrong with his

concept. After all, in his home environment it did its job perfectly. But, after a while he

becomes a little tired. Furthermore, he notices that other people sit on the strange three-

legged objects. At this point our child will have some decisions to make. His concept of

‘chair’ that fared so well at home is not of any use in the new situation. So, what are his

choices? He could decide to keep his concept of ‘chair’ unchanged. In this case he could

also decide to form a new concept ‘schair’ which will have as its applications the strange

three-legged objects. Or he could decide that forming a new concept for coping with the

strange objects is not appropriate at all. He could also decide that the similarities between

the four legged-objects and the three-legged ones are much more important than the

differences between them. Thus, he could decide to modify his concept of ‘chair’ so that

the three-legged objects will become also chairs. Or he could decide that the similarities

are indeed much more important, but that the old concept was flawed in a serious way;

and that he should form an altogether new concept that will have as its applications the

four-legged and three-legged objects. Or he could decide that the number of legs is

indeed an irrelevant feature and that the new concept should not specify anything about

it. And so on. The number of decisions our child faces is great. And neither one of them

has already the label ‘correct’ put on it. What matters is that his decisions will shape his

world31.

30 Someone might say that if our child would have been smart enough, then he would have realized that the two features (that of having four legs and that of being sittable) are independent and thus, that there is no point in employing a concept that puts them together. First, we would like to say that we are not interested in what would happen only if someone is smart enough. Second and most important, he is wrong in thinking that our child could know that the two features are independent on a priori grounds. To take another example, imagine a primitive man who saw for the first time a fire, after lighting struck a tree. He also had the chance of using that fire. But how could he know that fire can be obtained by other means too? Our Universe could have been different so that fire could appear only by lighting. Our primitive man could just hope that fire could be replicated and with some luck he stumbled upon means for doing exactly this. In conclusion, to think that being smart enough could do the job of experience is wrong because it amounts to think that we can know a priori what can be known only a posteriori. 31 Let us suppose that we meet some alien creatures. They can not see (they have other senses), but they can classify objects with the help of a device. Now, suppose that we tell them about red apples, which we can only identify visually, and they tell us about some strange things which have a certain index according to their device. So, we tell them about some type of objects, and they tell us about a different one. Imagine

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A concept is a rule. We live in a mysterious world. Every day we face a number

of situations. If we would think that every situation is completely new, then we would

have no use for concepts. What use we would have for rules that are adequate for only

one case32? But, we do not think this way. Instead, we think that between different

situations we might find relevant similarities; that what was appropriate in one case will

be appropriate in a sufficient similar case. If similarities are also important, then we could

make good use of rules that grasp those similarities. By forming a new concept we decide

that some similarities are relevant. By successfully applying a concept we obtain cases

that are similar in respect to that concept. Thus, by forming a concept we can treat new

cases as old ones. This is useful because we can repeat the good steps and avoid the bad

ones we made until now.

Let us suppose that we have three situations a1, a2 and a3 and that we decide that

they are similar in a relevant way. Thus, we introduce a new concept A. From all our past

situations, the new concept A applies only to a1, a2, a3. Of course, we need the practical

ability of forming such a concept, which will discriminate the three situations from every

other existing situation. But, let us suppose that we accomplish this task. The point of

introducing the concept A would be to make use of the knowledge obtained in the three

cases in future situations (we want to be able recognize in the future chairs because we

know that we can sit on them). So, the point of introducing concept A is for applying it in

the future cases a4, a5 etc33. The future cases a4 and a5 will share the same similarities

now that we bring a few red apples to our friends, and they bring us a few objects with the respective index. With great surprise we see that they brought red apples, and they realize that we brought objects with the same index as theirs. In this case, we may wonder if our rules for picking up the respective objects are still different rules or maybe there are only different forms of the same rule. But wondering would not solve anything. We have to decide that things stay in some way or another and afterwards new experience might or might not back up our decision (for example if the aliens put together by using their device yellow bananas too, we would be inclined to think that they use the same rules as us; but if they put in the same group ten yellow bananas and three green apples, we would for sure start to wonder about the kind of rules they are using). 32 We can imagine many scenarios very different from the one we usually use. For example, we can imagine that someone decides to form 1000 new concepts every day. Furthermore he decides that only this matters. So, even if he would recognize situations in which the application of an old concept would be appropriate, he would choose to form a new concept instead. We could not even say to him that he is not rational. He could be very rational in achieving his end; he could devise an adequate schedule which would permit him to form exactly 1000 new concepts every day. This kind of example shows that our decisions could lead us on very different paths. 33 Wittgenstein says: ‘But I don’t mean that what I do now (in grasping a sense) determines the future use causally and as a matter of experience, but that in a queer way, the use itself is already present’. The use is

39

that made us introduce concept A. Put differently, by introducing the concept A we select

some relevant features that make a1, a2 and a3 applications of that concept. Furthermore,

the concept A specifies what we ought to do in similar future cases like a4 and a5. Now,

let us suppose that we face a new situation. This is the moment for taking some decisions.

We have to decide for example if we met the case a434 or if we have to deal with a

different case b. If we decide that indeed we face the case a4, then we know what we

ought to do; and if we think that the application of the concept A is appropriate35 in this

situation and then, if we manage to apply it correctly, then we will apply concept A. But

this is a decision for us to make; and we have many other options like the child in our

example had. Even if we have a strong disposition to apply the concept A in the new

situation, this is not enough. We also have to think that our disposition is reliable36. Our

dispositions have their place among the factors we have to take into consideration before

making a decision.

At this moment, it should be said once more what we mean by ‘decision’. In the

normal use ‘decision’ refers only to situations where the alternatives are more or less in

equilibrium. Only in these cases the decision comes fully in the spot light; only in these

cases we become fully aware that we must make a decision; that we are at a crossroad

and we have to decide which way we should go. In such cases we might start to whisper:

‘I have to decide what to do!’. But we should not be fooled to think that decisions come

to play only in such difficult cases. A decision comes to play every time we could have

done otherwise. That we know our way and we do not stop at every crossroad does not

mean that there are not any crossroads there. already present in the sense that all possible cases of application are in the same relation with the respective concept. And this is the same for the past cases as well as for possible future cases like a4, a5. The problem that we will face, though, is to decide when it is appropriate to use that concept; when it is the case that a4. This could amount to deciding if it is appropriate to use concept A or if it is appropriate to see a certain case as a4. 34 When we introduced concept A, the case a4 did not stood for a real case, but for a future possible one. It meant only that it is the next case of application of concept A. Whether or when will happen to be the case that a4 was not specified. 35 Let us take the case of an object. For something to be recognized as an object, first we need to apply the concept ‘object’. If we apply it correctly, then we can go on and apply further concepts that will specify the type of object. But an object can be specified in multiple ways at the same time. An object might be specified as a chair, or as made of wood etc. if the concept A is ‘chair’, then we could meet case a4 in a situation when we are looking for a wooden object not for a chair. In this case, although we will recognize the case as being a4, we will not actually apply the concept A. 36 If someone takes a drug which distorts the visual perception then he would be justified in resisting to commit himself to the existence of the strange beings he sees, although he sees them very clearly.

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Thus, in the conceptual realm we see at work the interplay between rules and

decisions. At a first sight we could have any rule we want; we could form every concept

we like. But, if we look carefully we will see that this is not so. A rule comes to life only

if we succeed in applying it; and this is not only up to us. It is up to us, because it requires

that we have the practical ability of grasping the difference between correct and incorrect

application of it, and thus being able to apply it. But we should keep in mind that without

this ability we do not have a rule yet. We might have the plan to make a rule, but this is

only the first step37. It is not only up to us because once we make a rule we can not

choose anymore what is correct and what is not correct according to that rule. By making

a rule we make ourselves responsible for how we apply it. Also we have to decide what

rules to follow. Here it is totally up to us what we decide. We could follow many rules,

but is up to us to decide what rules we want to follow. Afterwards, we become

responsible for our decisions, because they are of our making.

4. We as conceptual entrepreneurs

Now, the time to complete the picture has come. We saw in the first chapter that

we are normative creatures and that our normativity is rooted at the pragmatic level. We

saw in the second chapter that we live in a mysterious world and thus we are always more

or less entrepreneurs. Until now, in this chapter we saw how rules as well as decisions are

to be found at every point in the conceptual realm. In this section we will se the complete

picture. We will see how the two features combine to make us the creatures that we are,

namely conceptual entrepreneurs.

Normativity is not exhausted by explicit rules and principles. It is not exhausted

even at the level of norms that are implicit in practice either. This is clear if we try to

bridge the explanatory gap between what ought to be and what is. More specific, how can

we explain that we manage to do what we think we ought to do? How my thinking that I

ought to raise my hand materializes in the fact that I actually raise it? After all, this is

37 A full-blooded rule must already contain its proper use in it. As an analytically device we can separate form from content, and if we like we may even use ‘rule’ to stand only for the formal part. But this is another usage of the word. When we talk about rules that really work, that can be used, we have together form and content. And the content is acquired only by successfully putting the rule at work.

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what normativity is all about. By talking of normativity we point to the accomplishment

of this miracle. How is it possible that something that is only envisaged by us (in one way

or another) actually happens in some occasions? The only answer we could give starts

with us as being normative creatures. That is, precisely that somehow the gap can be

bridged; that it is bridged sometimes. What we can understand is our specific form of

normativity. We can start from the most specific, from normativity explicit in rules and

principles. That we can trace this further down and indeed that we must is no big surprise.

After all, the discursive practice is just a practice among others. So, when we realize that

the discursive practice shares some kind of meaningfulness with the other practices, we

realize that normativity must be traced back to the pragmatic level. That is, to the level of

practice. After this step we can not trace back normativity anymore. And this does not

mean that it starts from here. It means only that we have to stop here. Normativity is

something that we start with, not the other way around. Furthermore, talking about forms

of life in the sense of Wittgenstein amounts to our acknowledging that normativity is not

specific only to us.

Now we can go back to a pre-conceptual era. In other words, to a time when we

had some practices, but we did not have the discursive one. At that time we were still

normative creatures. After we would get burned for the first time, we would never touch

fire again. And this would happen because we would still be entrepreneurs. We would

still have to face a mysterious world; and we would still be able to learn from experience,

from our earlier steps. We would not repeat the wrong steps and we would repeat the

correct ones. But in that pre-conceptual era our entrepreneurial ability would be very

limited. We would use our past experience in facing the new situations. But we would not

have the means of selecting some specific experience as being similar with the new one.

We could not escape our dispositions, because we would not have other ways for making

use of our past experience. Our dispositions will be exactly the voice of our past

experience. And after we would get burnt almost every time when we did not follow our

dispositions, we would realize that following them is the best option for the moment.

What accomplishes the conceptual when is introduced in a world of sheer

experience? A concept, which is a rule, introduces a line of order into the world of

experience. It selects a number of cases and puts them under him. Thus, we can group

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similar experiences in a systematic way. A concept stands for the relevant similarities

which are picked by applying that concept. It is important that a single entity can fall

under many concepts. Something may be at the same time an object, a chair, a piece of

wood etc. The conceptual structure forms a web with the help of which we can grasp a

particular experience in many ways. It becomes interrelated with many others, by means

of different similarities, introduced by different concepts. Now, when we face a new

experience we do not do it against the background of a vast ocean of indiscriminate past

experience. The new point we are facing can be caught up in our conceptual web. By

incorporating it in this web it will have a clear place. We will be able to trace back our

past experience through different paths, choosing how exactly to throw the web on our

new experience. After successfully catching it in the web, by putting it under a concept,

we can make use of relevant past experience. All this past experience will be already

embedded in our conceptual web, at different points. And every concept, by being caught

up in the web, will be connected with others by different paths. Now, when we have to

take a new decision we can take alternative paths which lead in different directions. And

we can always put an experience under more and more concepts and we can revise the

old ones. How good is anyone’s web and how well we manage to place new experiences

in it depends on our practical ability of doing this. And every individual develops his

ability by practicing it more and more, by learning from successes as well as from

failures. Where we will incorporate a new experience into the conceptual web is up to us

to decide. It is also up to our deciding how we modify the web. But once we deem for the

moment the web as adequate and we decide to put the new experience in some place, we

can only follow predefined paths38, although we may choose which ones. That we can

follow only predefined paths should not be taken as a sign of our lack of freedom. We

should not forget the situation we were in the pre-conceptual era. That we decide to

follow the conceptual paths (which are of our making) is because we constantly see this

as the best option available. We are always free to dissolve any concept before making

use of it and we could do this with every concept. That we do not do this shows that we

decide that giving up some liberty (in the sense of not dissolving any concept for

38 Put in the words of Wittgenstein, this is the way in which the grammatical structure defines our world.

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example) will pay off in the long run because we will be free to move farther, faster and

safer in our mysterious world.

Furthermore, by entering the conceptual realm we acquire a laboratory. Before,

we were directly facing the world. Our steps were always for real. We faced every new

situation backed up by previous experience but we could not do any trying. Then, after

every decision the real step must have been made. But now we can throw the conceptual

web many times before deciding that we threw it well. Only after this we will go on to

act. Also, by using counter-factuals we can walk on our conceptual paths as many times

as we like, thus knowing them better. Thus, when the real steps must be made we will

walk on much more familiar paths and we will know better where they lead.

In conclusion, we are conceptual entrepreneurs because we face every decision in

the conceptual realm as entrepreneurs. That is, without knowing anything for sure;

without knowing for sure what will be the effects of our decisions and actions; without

knowing in advance that we will make wise steps. The conceptual realm is very much

decided by us. With the help of it we can have clear paths on which to walk, not just

wilderness. In deciding to make a step we can also plan a sequence of further steps. We

do not have to make any step backed up only by an unstructured past experience and

afterwards start the whole process again. We will still face the world as entrepreneurs, but

we have very good tools for doing this.

5. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to show the way in which we use concepts. We

started from the insight that concept use is an ability which is fully within the grasp of

every human. We used the raw materials from the previous chapters, namely that we are

normative creatures and that our normativity is rooted at the pragmatic level, and that we

are entrepreneurial decision-makers who operate in a mysterious world. These two points

shed some light on how we use concepts. We saw that the use of concepts amounts to

having a practical ability and that concepts are in the first place rules. By forgetting these

two things we might try in vain to discover in every concept an essential set of properties.

We saw that this amounts to seeing the concepts as dead entities, which would not

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change. But a concept is a living entity, because we endow it we life. A concept is indeed

rigid (in the sense that it cuts precisely between correct and incorrect applications of it)

but we can always modify it, thus altering the specific way in which it cuts through

correct and incorrect applications, through reality. Any new experience, any new case

calls for us to make a new decision. Thus it calls for a reconsideration of the conceptual

web. What we decide is up to us at every point, and there are no predefined correct

decisions (at least from our point of view). How our decisions fared we can evaluate only

afterwards.

Thus, we are conceptual entrepreneurs. At every point in our life we have the

power to make decisions. By the practical ability of making and following rules we can

make concepts. And they form a web, with which we try to grasp the world. In devising

our conceptual web we are entrepreneurs, we do not know in advance if a specific

decision to form or modify a concept will turn out to be correct. We can only hope to

learn from our experience and it seems that we can just do that.

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V. Conclusions

The aim of this work was to show what is specific to us, as humans. The answer

was that we can move through a special realm, the conceptual one. This realm is formed

by the interplay of rules and decisions. These are two normative features but they put

emphasis on a different aspect. The two lines of thought that were followed here share the

same fundamental insight, of us as normative beings. They are complementary because

they put the emphasis differently. By focusing on rules, the first line focuses on how we

are free and able to impose a structure to the world; and afterwards on how our own rules

impose constrains on us. By focusing on decisions, the second line focuses on how we

are free to take any decision we like in dealing with the world; and afterwards on how the

world can always show that we chose unwisely. Thus, both lines of thought see us as

caught between freedom and compulsion, but they put emphasis on different freedoms

and compulsions. Combined they can give a complete picture. On the one hand, we can

invent tools (rules) but afterwards we can do only specific things with them. On the other

hand, we are free to make any step (decision) we want into the world, but only some of

them will prove to be correct and we can hope to discover which ones.

Thus, we are conceptual entrepreneurs. We are free to make rules and we are free

to take decisions. But, at the same time we are constrained by our rules and we face the

consequences of our decisions. In this process we can hope that we will improve our

conceptual web and thus, that we will grasp our world better.

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