Wayans Ruling

8/10/2019 Wayans Ruling

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~~

S u p e r i o r

Court

o f

C a l i f o r n i a

County

o f

Los

Angeles

S h e r r i

R.

a r t e r

Exe

M i r e

Q

i c e r / C l e r k

By----

Deputy

~,. Y (Janno

SUPERIOR

COURT

OF

THE STATE

OF

CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF

LOS

ANGELES

DANIEL,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ICM, etc.,

et al.,

Defendants

Case No.:

BC555610

RULING

RE

SUBMITTED

MATTER

Hearing

date:

1

2/

1

1/14

Counsel

for

defendant/moving

party

Marlon

Wayans:

William

Briggs;

Celeste

Brecht

(Venable)

Counsel for

plaintiff/opposing

party:

Adam

Reimer;

Tessa

King;

Alisa

Khousadian

Reimer,

etc.)

Defendant

Wayans

special

motion

to

strike

complaint

(CCP

~

425.16),

filed

11/5/14;

hearing

date 12

/

1

1/14.

Defendant

Wayans

seeks

an order

striking

the

eight

causes

of

action (1S t

and

4 t h

through 10t h

)

alleged

against

him.

73

ONGKEKO,

P R E S I D I N G

RULING RE SUBMITTED

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Having

read and considered

the moving

and

opposing

papers,

heard

argument,

and having taken the

matter

under

submission,

the

court

now

rules as follows:

Evidentiary

rulings:

Plaintiff's objections to

defendant's

evidence:

#14,

25.

Overrule all

others.

Defendant's

objections to

plaintiff's

evidence:

Sustained

as

to

Sustained.

Defendant

Wayans' motion

to strike

is

GRANTED

as

to

each

challenged

cause

of

action

against

Wayans,

namely,

the

l

st

and

4t n

through

10t hcauses of action.

There

being

no

other

surviving

causes

of action

against Wayans,

the

complaint

against

Wayans

is

(DISMISSED.

DISCUSSION

Timeliness

Plaintiff's

amended objection

(filed 12/

2/

14)

is

based

on

a

hearing scheduled

beyond

the

30

-day

period

under

CCP

425.16(f).

This

objection is

overruled.

Motion

date

availability

in

Dept.

73

is

given by

court staff

as soon

as

practicable.

Given

the

court's

caseload

and heavily

congested

motion

calendar,

despite

daily

law

a n d

motion settings,

the

very

slight

delay

here

of

six

days

is

not

an issue

for

the court and

certainly

not a

sufficient

ground

to

deny

a

hearing on

the motion.

2

73

ONGKEKO

P R E S I D I N G

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Continuance

request

By

his

ex

parte

application

filed

on

11/21/14,

plaintiff

sought

a

order

continuing

the motion

and

authorizing

limited

discovery

to

conduct three depositions,

including

inquiries

into

the

standard

union voucher defendant

submitted (Ex.

A

to

Alvarez'

declaration

and

Wayans'

alleged

nondisclosure

agreement.

The

court

denied

th

requests without

prejudice. Given

the

rulings

below,

there

is

no

good cause to reconsider

the ruling

denying

these

requests.

The

voucher

applies

in

Wayans'

favor

given

his

various

roles

in

the

production

of the

film

and any

nondisclosure

agreement

he

might

have would not change the

result

as

against

this

plaintiff.

(Merits

CCP ~

425.16

`requires

that

a

court

engage

in

a

two-step

process

when

determining

whether

a

defendant's

anti-SLAPP

motion

should

b

granted.' (Citation

omitted.)

`First

the

court

decides

whether

the defendant has made

a

threshold showing that the challenged

cause of

action

is one arising

from

protected

activity.

[Citation.]

A

defendant

meets

this

burden

by

demonstrating

that

the act

underlying

the

plaintiff's

cause

[of

actions

fits

one

of

the

categories

spelled out

in

section

425.16,

subdivision

(e)

[citation] '

[Citation.

[ y [ ]

If

the

defendant

makes

this

showing, the court proceeds

to

the

second

step

of

the

anti-SLAPP

analysis.

[Citation.]

In

the

second

step,

the

court

decides

whether

the

plaintiff

has

demonstrated a

reasonable

probability

of

prevailing

at

trial

on

the

merits of

its

challenged

causes

of

73

ONGKEKO

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action.

[Citations.]

[~]

Conversely,

if the

defendant

does

not

meet

its

burden

on

the

first

step, the

court

should

deny

the

motion

and

need not

address the

second

step.

[Citation.]

(Citation

omitted.)

Hunter

v.

CBS

Broadcasting (2013)

221

Cal.App.4t

1510,

1519

(italics

added).

~~Only a

cause

of

action

that

satisfies

both

prongs of

the

anti-SLAPP statutei.e.,

that

arises

from

protected

speech or

petitioning

and lacks

even

minimal

meritis

a

SLAPP,

subject

to

being

stricken

under the

statute.

Navellier v.

Sletten

(2002) 29

Cal.4th

82,

89

(Italics

omitted).

//

//

3

ONGKEKO

PRESIDING

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First

Prong

Protected

Activity

Defendant

Marlon

Wayans' motion

to

strike

contends,

at

6:26-

7:1,

that plaintiff's claims

against

him

are

based

on

activity

that

qualifies

for

protection

under

the

anti-SLAPP

statute's

public

forum

-public

interest

statement,

i.e.,

any

written

or

oral

statement or writing made

in a

place

open

to

the

public

or a

public

forum

in connection

with an

issue

of

public

interest.

(CCP 425.16(e)(3)

).

In

his reply

(filed

1

2/

4

/14),

Wayans

relies

on

(e)(4)

as

well,

i.e.,

any

other

conduct

in

furtherance

of

the

exercise of the constitutional

right of

petition

or

the

constitutional

right of

free

speech in

connection

with

a

public

issue or

an

issue of

public

interest.

The

motion contends

that

the

protected

conduct

involves

Wayans' Internet

(via

Twitter)

post

to

social

networking

sites

humorously

comparing Daniel

to

the

popular

cartoon

character

Cleveland Brown. (7:1-2, footnote omitted.) However, plaintiff

further

contends

that

other

acts

and

conduct

(e.g.,

racial

harassment

in

the

FEHA

1

St

ause of

action)

are

involved.

Although defendant

acknowledges

that

plaintiff

describes

other

conduct

by

Wayans that

may

not be

protected,

defendant

relies

on

the

protections extended

to

such

conduct

if

the

gravamen

or

principal thrust of

the claim

is

protected

activity

(7:26

-

28,

fn.1, citations omitted).

5

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ONGKEKO

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73

ONGKEKO,

PRESIDING

Having

considered the

admissible

evidence

from

both

sides,

including the

transcripts

and

the

viewing

of

actual

film

footage,

the

court finds

that

the

entirety

of

the

claimed

conduct

meets

th.

first

prong of

the

anti-SLAPP

analysis,

fulfilling

defendant

Wayans'

burden

to show

all

of

his

statements

and

conduct

are

protected activity

under

paragraphs 3

and

4

of

subdivision

(e)

of

the

anti-SLAPP

statute.

In determining

the

applicability of

CCP

425.16

to

the

myriad .

of factual

situations

presented in

anti-SLAPP

cases,

courts

shoul

look

at

the principal

thrust or

gravamen

of a

plaintiff's

claims.

Dyer v.

Childress (2007)

147

Cal.App.4t

1273,

1279.

Notwithstanding his 43

-page

complaint

and

declarations

in

opposition,

plaintiff's

claims

ignore

the

holdings

in

recent

case

which

make it clear

that

even

where

FEHA

violations

are

alleged,

so

long

as the protected

activity

was

not

incidental

to

the

FEH

claims, the discrimination claims which constitute the

very

conduct

on which

such

claims

are

based,

are

still

subject

to

anti-SLAPP

protections.

Hunter,

supra,

at

1522-1525,

citing

Tuszynska

v.

Cunningham

(2011)

199

Cal.App.4t

257.

Just

as

in

Hunter, where all of

the

allegations

underlying

Hunter's

discrimination

claims

relate to

the

allegedly

unlawful

manner

in

which CBS selected its

weather

anchors

(Hunter,

supra,

at

1521),

'here,

all

of

plaintiff's

claims

relate

to

conduct

and

decisions

made

in

connection with

his

one

-day

participation

in

the

filming

of the movie,

ultimately

distilled to

his

five

seconds

of

film

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3

ONGKEKO

PRESIDING

time.

Wayans' actions

and

conduct,

particularly

the

decision

to

compare

plaintiff

to,

and

eventually

name

him

as,

the

Cleveland

cartoon

character,

were

not

simply

incidental

to

plaintiff's

claims, but

comprise

the

very

conduct

upon

which

plaintiff's

claims are

based.

Hunter,

supra, at

1525.

Wayans has

shown

that

plaintiff's

role

was

limited

as

an

extra

to

one day's work

as

a

non

-speaking

furniture

mover

in

an

rated comedy that lived up (or

down)

to

its

rating,

complete

with.

trashy,

raunchy,

racist,

and

offensive

humor.

Wayans,

who

has

a

body

of work that

deals with

racial

humor,

among

others,

has

also

shown

that the comedy

depended on

the

artists'

creativity

based

o

improvisation that

is

encouraged and

occurs

spontaneously

on

the

set.

The creative process

was ongoing

and

continued

even

when

the

cameras were not

rolling.

The

evolution

of

the

scene

involving

plaintiff as

shown

in

the

outtakes

and

final

version

is

a

prime

example of the improvisational ad lib process. The Cleveland

(character

was born precisely

from

that

process,

using

a

name

and

(character

at first

unbeknownst to

plaintiff

until

Wayans

called

(him

by

that

name

sometime that

day

before

the

cameras

began

to

roll.

The

name was not

chosen

accidentally,

but

was

based

on

Wayans'

noticing

plaintiff's

physical

similarities

with

the

cartoon

character.

It

is

undisputed

that

plaintiff

was

called

by

the names

of

Cleveland and

Cleveland

Brown

both

on

and

off

camera.

It is undisputed that plaintiff

willingly

answered

to

Cleveland

and

Cleveland

Brown and took

direction

from

those

in

a

position

to

7

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3

ONGKEKO,

R E S I I N G

(give

directions (including

Wayans)

while

so

addressed.

It is

undisputed

that

plaintiff's

brief

role

and

purpose

in

the

film

wa

limited

to his

character,

which

developed

eventually

as

the

comical Cleveland Brown

character.

The

Cleveland

Brown

character

like

plaintiff, obviously

black,

heavy

(plaintiff's

role

cast

him

as

a

heavy-set

furniture

mover

strong

enough

to

move

and

lift

the

safe

that flattened

the

dog),

with

curly

Afro

hair

(hence,

the

perm

and Jheri curl jokes), were

all

incorporated

humorously

into

the

filming of the scene

involving

Wayans,

his

dog,

and

plaintiff

Indeed,

plaintiff

fulfilled

his

role

as

an

extra.

The

transcript

and

film

clips

show

that

plaintiff's

concerns

regarding

Wayans'

statements and conduct were part of

the

improvisational

humor

tha

was

important

to the

creative

process

and

should

have

come

as

no

surprise to

plaintiff

as a

participant in

that

process.

Apart

from

the photograph consent

issue

(discussed

below

in

connection

with

the

5

th

and

6

t h causes

of

action),

Wayans'

single

Twitter

post

~of

plaintiff's photo alongside the Cleveland Brown cartoon

(character

with a caption using

racially

based

humor

with

social

media

links to

the

film

itself

( ahhmovie2 )

and

even

a

separate

reference

to

Wayans'

own

website

whatthefunny

(CCP

425.17(d)(2j)

falls well

within

the

ambit

of

the

humor

emanating

from

plaintiff's

role in the

film

and

its

promotion.

Despite the

above

circumstances,

plaintiff

claims

the

case

is

about a

FEHA violation

premised upon

Wayans'

race

harassment,

including posting a picture of

Daniel

that

refers

to

him

as

a

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3

ONGKEKO

R E S I D I N G

`nigga.'

(Open. 4:19-21).

Although

not

mentioned

in

his

complaint,

it

cannot be

disputed

that

Wayans,

like

plaintiff,

is

African

-American.

Plaintiff's

declaration

also

refers to

Wayans'

calling him a

black

fat ass,

nigga

at

least

three

to

four

times,

and referring to his hair

as

an

Afro,

all

the

while

evoking

laughter from

other

individuals.

(Daniels

decl.

9 [ g I 7

9,

0, 1, 2)

Even

construing

plaintiff's

evidence

liberally,

it is

inescapable that

the

principal

thrust

or

gravamen

of

his

claims

fall

within activity

protected by

Wayans'

rights

of

free

speech

in the context

of

the

production

of

this

type

of

film.

It

is

undisputed that the

statements and

actions

were

made

in

furtherance

of

the constitutional

right of

free

speech

under

(e)(4).

Just

as

the

creation

of

a

television

show

is

an

exercise

of

free

speech

and

where the

defendants'

acts

helped

to

advance

or

assist in the

creation,

casting,

and

broadcasting

(Tamkin v.

CBS

(2011) 193

Ca1.App.4th

33, 143),

the

creation

of

the

Cleveland character through plaintiff, and all positive or

negative

statements

and

conduct

that

may

arguably

come

with

it,

was part

of the

improvisational

humor,

both

on

and

off

camera

that

advanced

or

assisted

the

exercise of

free

speech.

Cf.

Hunter,

supra,

at

1521, citing

Tamkin,

supra,

at

143.

Thus,

plaintiff's

complaints

about

conduct occurring

during

breaks

and

throughout

the

filming day implicate

Wayans'

free

speech

rights

under

(e)(4)

which

qualify

as a

form

of

protected

activity

as

the

statute

should

be

broadly

construed.

CCP

425.16(a)

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Wayans'

posting

of the photo occurred via

social

media

over

the

Internet,

a

public

forum under

(e)(3).

The

remaining issue

concerns

the

public

issue

or

public

interest

requirement,

as

they appear

in

(e)(3)

and

(4).

Section

425.16

does

not define

`public

interest'

or

`public

issue.'

Those

terms

are

inherently amorphous and thus

do not

lend

themselves to

a

precise,

all

-encompassing

definition.

Cross v.

Cooper

(2011)

197

Cal.

App.

4th

357, 371. In the

court's

view

these

are

easily

met

by

Wayans'

linking plaintiff's

specific

role

in

the

film

to

the

Cleveland

Brown character (an

existing

cartoon

character

in

whom

there

was

already

an

existing

public

interest-

e.g.,

I

hope

the

Cleveland

Brown

show gets

another

season )

and

to

the

public's

interest

in

Wayans' work, the movie sequel,

and

issues

relating

to

race,

stereotypes,

and

the

like. That

plaintiff,

as

an

extra,

became

the focus

of

certain

statements

and

conduct

is

unfortunate,

but well within the protections intended by the anti-SLAPP

statute.

Defendant

Wayans

has

met his burden

under

the

protected

activity

prong

of the

anti-SLAPP

statute.

Second

Prong

Probability of

Success

on

the

Merits

Once

a

defendant has

established

that the

anti-SLAPP

statute

applies,

the

burden

shifts to the

plaintiff

to

demonstrate a

probability

of

success on the

merits. CCP ~

425.16(b);

Equilon

10

73

ONGKEKO

P R S I I N G

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Enterprises

LLC

v.

Consumer

Cause,

Inc.

(2002)

29

Cal.4th

53,

67.

[T]he

plaintiff

must demonstrate

that

the

complaint

is

both

legally

sufficient and

supported

by

a

sufficient

prima

facie

showing

of facts

to

sustain

a

favorable

judgment if

the

evidence

submitted by

the

plaintiff is

credited.

Matson

v.

Dvorak

(1995)

40

Cal.App.4th

539,

548

(internal

quotations

omitted).

The

evidentiary

showing by the

plaintiff

must

be

made

by

competent

and

admissible

evidence.

Morrow

v.

Los

Angeles

Unified

School

District

(2007) 149

Ca1.App.4th

1424,

1444.

We

decide

the

second

step

of

the

anti-SLAPP

analysis

on

consideration of

`the

pleadings

and

supporting and

opposing

affidavits

stating

the

facts

upon

,which

the

liability

or

defense

is

based.' (

425.16,

subd.

(b)).

,Looking

at

those

affidavits,

`[w]e do not

weigh

credibility,

nor

do

we

evaluate the

weight of the

evidence.

Instead,

we

accept

as

true

all

evidence

favorable to the

plaintiff

and

assess

the

defendant's

evidence

only

to

determine if

it

defeats

the

plaintiff's submission

as a

matter of law.' [Citation.]

[~]

That

is

the

setting

in

which

we determine

whether

plaintiff

has

met

the

required

showing,

a showing

that is

`not

high.'

[Citation.]

Grewal

v.

Jammu (2011) 191

Cal.App.4th

977,

989.

1

ause

of

action-

Race/national

origin

harassment

in

employment.

(Govt.

Code

12940, et

sea):

Plaintiff

has not

shown that

the

various

statements

and

actions

attributed

to Wayans

unreasonably

interfered with

his

work

performance by

creating

an intimidating,

hostile,

or

offensive

11

3

ONGKEKO,

PRESIDING

RULING RE SUBMITTED

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21

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24

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26

27

28

work

environment.

Thompson

v.

City

of

Monrovia

(2010)

186

Cal.App.4

t h

860,

876. The

alleged

harassment

was

not

sufficiently

severe or

pervasive

to alter

the

conditions

of

[plaintiff's]

employment and

create

an

abusive

working

environment.

Kelly-Zurian v.

Wohl

Shoe

Co.

(1994)

22

Cal.App,4

397,

409.

Plaintiff has not

shown

a

probability

of

success

on

this

cause

of

action.

t

cause

of action

-Unruh Act

violation

(Civil

Code

51,

et

seq.):

Plaintiff

alleges the

same

conduct

relied

on

in

the

1

t

cause

of

action. (~78)

He

alleges

defendants

denied

;

discriminated,

and/o

made a

distinction that

denied

full

and

equal

accommodations,

advantages, facilities, privileges,

and/or

services

to

Plaintiff.

(~75)

The

Unruh Act applies where

businesses

exclude

individuals,

and

where treatment is unequal,

based upon

race,

color,

and

ancestry,

among other

protected

classifications.

Cohn

v.

Corinthian Colleges,

Inc. (2008)

169 Cal.App.4th

523,

527.)

The

Unruh Act does not

apply

to

employment.

Rojo

v.

Kliger

(1990)

52

Cal. 3d

65. The cases

cited

by

Plaintiff

are

inapposite.

Plaintiff

would not

succeed on

these

allegations.

The

allegations

concern, not the denial, but the

rendition

of

services

in

connection

with

his

employment

(arguably

the

entire

employment

period

of

one

day)

which

themselves are

alleged

to

constitute

the

tortious acts. The

Unruh Act

should

not

be

turned

on

its

head

in

this

manner.

Even

assuming

the

statute

does

apply,

in

arguing

that he

can

demonstrate

a

likelihood

of

success

on

this

cause

of

12

EPT.

3

AFAEL

ONGKEKO

PRESIDING

RULING

RE

SUBMITTED

MATTER


13/17


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2

4

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21

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23

24

25

26

27

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appropriating plaintiff's name,

voice,

likeness,

et.

cetera;

and

(4)

resulting

injury. Kirby v.

Sega of

America,

Inc.

(2006)

144

Cal.

App.

4th 47, 55.

Here,

Plaintiff

maintains he

never

gave

permission

for

his

photograph to

be

taken or

used on

the

Internet.

(Daniel

decl.

~~14-24, Ex. A.) The parties

dispute

the

scope

of

the

application of a waiver

signed

by

plaintiff.

The

Standard

Union

Voucher that plaintiff

signed

provides,

in

relevant

part:

By

signing

this voucher;

I

acknowledge

and

agree

to

the

following:

(2) That

I

hereby

grant to

the

Production

Company

of

The

Production,

its

successors,

assignees,

licensees

or

any

othe

person

or

company

who

might gain

title

or

rights

to

the

production, the right to photograph me and record

my

voice t

use,

alter, dub,

and or

otherwise

change

such

photographs

an

recordings,

in

any

manner

whatsoever

and

for

any

reason

in

connection

with

Production,

such

right

to

be

worldwide

and

in

perpetuity.

(Alvarez Decl.

Ex.

A.)

Despite plaintiff's

argument

to

the

contrary,

the

above

language

is

broad

enough

to

include the

right

of

defendant

Wayans,

a

co-

producer,

to

photograph

plaintiff,

and

certainly

broad

enough

to

include the

use of plaintiff's

photograph

in

the

tweet,

which,

per

14

DEPT.

3

RAFAEL

ONGKEKO

UDGE

P R S I I N G

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the

Voucher

was

in

connection with

the

film

notwithstanding

an

additional

link

to

Wayans'

separate

website.

Defendant's

transformative

use

defense

is

a

secondary

ground

preventing

plaintiff

from

prevailing, as argued in

the moving

papers.

7t

cause

of

action-

invasion of

privacy of

false

light:

Plaintiff

alleges

the

character

of

Cleveland

Brown is

known

primarily

for being

~~slow and

having

physical

and

emotional

problems

and

that by

drawing

comparisons

between

plaintiff

and

that

fictional character,

the

comparison

drew

inferences

that

plaintiff

possessed

the

same

traits as

Cleveland

Brown

thereby

showing

plaintiff

in a false light.

(Complaint

~~136-37.)

To

prove

a

claim

for

false

light,

one

must

demonstrate

(1)

false;

(2

unprivileged; (3)

publication

by

writing,

printing,

or

other

fixe

representation;

(4) exposes a person to

hatred,

contempt,

ridicule,

or

obloquy,

or

which

causes

person

to

be

shunned

or avoided, or which has

a

tendency to injure person

in

his

occupation;

and (5)

malice

as to

public

figures.

Briscoe

v.

Reader's

Digest

Association,

Inc.

(1971)

4

Ca1.3d

529,.543,

overruled

on

other grounds by Gates v.

Discovery

Communications,

Inc.

(2004)

34

Cal.4th 679, 697.

Plaintiff

argues

the

character

of

Cleveland

Brown is associated with

negative

stereotypes of

African

Americans,

exposing

him

to

such

assumptions

based

on

the

physical

comparison.

(Daniel Decl:

9124.

Plaintiff

provides

that

he

has

received questions about whether

he

is the

person

in

the

photograph

on

the

twitter post.

(Daniel

Decl.

9[27.

Plaintiff

has

15

D E P T

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RAFAEL ONGKEKO,

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P R E S I D I N G

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failed

to

indicate that

he has

suffered any

suffered

any

public

ridicule

or

lost

work.

However,

defendant's

argument

that

the

tweet

did

not

contain any statements

of

facts

has

merit.

Plaintiff's

claim

relies

on

inferences

he

assumes

one

would

make

based

on

the

juxtaposition

of

photographs.

Plaintiff

has

not

shown a

probability

of

prevailing on

this

cause of

action.

St

cause

of action

for

breach

of

quasi

contract;

9t

cause

of

action

for

unjust

enrichment:

Plaintiff

alleges defendant obtained

a

benefit

from

plaintiff

by

fraud,

duress,

conversion,

or

similar

conduct

when

plaintiff's

photo

was

taken and

used

for

unjust gain

on

the

Internet.

(Complaint

~~154-156,

171-172.)

Here,

it is

unclear

how

the

alleged quasi

contract

arose or what

benefit

was

allegedly

derived

by

defendant. Lance

Camper

Mfg.

Corp. v.

Republic

Indem.

Co.

of

Am.

(1996)

44 Cal.

App.

4th

194, 203

( [A]n

action

based

on

an

implied-in-fact or quasi-contract cannot lie where there exists

between the

parties a valid express

contract

covering

the

same

subject

matter. ); Falkowski

v.

Imation

Corp.

(2005)

132

Cal.

App.

4th 499, 518 ( implied

contract

cannot

override

the

terms

of

an

express

agreement.... );

Gorlach

v.

Sports

Club

Co.

(2012)

209

Cal.App.4th 1497, 1507

(implied

-in-fact

contract

may

be

inferred

from

the conduct, situation or

parties

relationship,

provided

that

there

is an

intent

to

promise);

Davis

v.

Consolidated

Freightways

(1994)

29

Cal.App.4th

354,

366

(existence of

implied

-in

-fact

contracts

normally

is determined by

triers of

fact,

except

where

73

ONGKEKO

PRESIDING

RULING RE

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EPT.

3

the

facts

are

undisputed,

and

support only

one

conclusion,

in

which

case

summary judgment may

be

entered).)

The

same

is

the

case

regarding

unjust

enrichment

as

it

is

unclear

what

benefit

defendant is

alleged to have received.

Peterson

v.

Cellco

Partnership (2008)

164

Cal.App.4th

1583,

1593.)

Alvarez'

declaration establishes that plaintiff

was

paid

for

his

services.

(Alvarez

Decl.

y [ 4

Ex.

A.)

In

any

event,

the

terms

of

the

vouche

in (1)

provide

that

his

wages will

be

payment

in

full

for

all

services

rendered by me.

Plaintiff

has

not

demonstrated

a

probability

of success

on

the

merits on

these

causes

of

action.

t

cause

of

action for IIED:

Because no

cause

of

action

survives

against

Wayans,

particularly

his

FEHA

claim,

this

claim

fails

as well.

Defendant Wayans' motion

is

granted in

its

entirety.

IIT IS

SO

ORDERED.

DATED: December 31,

2014

~''

~AFAEL

A.

ONGKEKO

J

~E OF

THE

SUPERIOR

COURT

17

RULING RE

SUBMITTED

MATTER

Wayans Ruling

Documents