Water, Cooperation and Peacebuilding: Exploring (Internal) Transboundary Water Governance In Kosovo After 1999

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Water, Cooperation and Peacebuilding: Exploring (Internal) Transboundary Water Governance

In Kosovo After 1999

Florian Krampe

[email protected]

Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University

Paper prepared for presentation at ISA Annual Convention “Global IR and Regional Worlds - A New Agenda for International Studies” February 18th-21st, 2015, New

Orleans, Louisiana.

9 February 2015

Do not cite or quote without permission!

Abstract

Following the Yugoslavian secessionist wars of 1992, the number of transboundary river basins doubled in the region. Kosovo, in particular, poses an intriguing challenge to water governance in the post-war Balkans. In this paper I investigate how the international community governed Kosovo’s water resources after the UN assumed trusteeship of Kosovo in 1999. In particular, this study focuses on Ibar basin, i.e. particularly the Gazivoda reservoir, located on the border of Serbia and northern Kosovo, and also the Iber-Lepenc Canal, which brings water from the Serb-dominated areas in the North to the Albanian-dominated central Kosovo. A dynamic puzzle arises around the governance of water resources in Kosovo’s “no war, no peace” situation. The challenge of water governance exists not only between contested national boundaries, but also between ethnic divisions within Kosovo. Did the handling of water issues through UNMIK contribute to peacebuilding in Kosovo’s sensitive and complex post-conflict context? The study reveals that while there are instances of interstate cooperation appearing, the water issue is much more complicated when considering the internal ethnic divisions on the local level.

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Introduction Following the Yugoslavian secessionist wars of the 1990s, the number of

transboundary river basins on the western Balkan peninsular doubled. Rivers have

shaped the regions characteristic landscape have and always played an important role

in the regions history. As such it is no surprise that particular bridges have been a

recurring symbol of the wars on the Balkans, with the bridge in Visegrad, Bosnia,

build by the Ottomans, to the symbolic destruction of the bridge in Mostar, Bosnia.

Till today the bridge connecting the northern Serb part of Mitrovica in Kosovo to the

Albanian south is a symbol of continuous scuffle between the parties since 1999.

Kosovo, in particular, poses an intriguing challenge to water governance in the post-

war Balkans. Kosovo presents a dynamic puzzle around cooperation of water

resources in its on-going “no war, no peace” situation. The challenge of water

governance exists not only between contested national boundaries, but also between

ethnic divisions within Kosovo. According to the water conflict chronology compiled

by the Pacific Institute water had been used twice as a political tool during the

Kosovo conflict between 1998 and 1999: firstly by contaminating wells and secondly

by shutting down water supply to Pristina short before the end of the conflict

{PacificInstitute:tw}. However, the post-conflict phase has despite continuous high

rising tensions and outbursts of organized violence not seen any significant events

that would relate violence and water.

In this paper I investigate whether the water governance that UNMIK implemented

has contributed to peacebuilding after the UN assumed trusteeship of the region in

1999. The focus is on the Ibar basin and with that the Gazivoda reservoir, located on

the border of Serbia and northern Kosovo, and among others the Iber-Lepenc Canal,

which brings water from the Serb-dominated areas in the North to the Albanian-

dominated central Kosovo.

Water, Cooperation and Peacebuilding Environmental change exacerbates the human costs of war. For almost three decades

scholars in social science have studied the relationship between environmental change

and war, with the debate skewing towards climate change and war in the last ten

years. While there is still insufficient theoretical understanding of this relationship

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(Adger, Barnett, & Dabelko, 2013; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Salehyan, 2008; Theisen,

Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013), there is agreement that environmental changes, and

climate change in particular, are indirectly influencing war and conflict (German

Advisory Council on Global Change, 2007).

There is a long on-going scholarship on environmental cooperation, i.e. cooperation

over management of scarce renewable resources, that emerged simultaneously with

the environmental conflict debate (Conca, 2002; Mason, 2004; Swain, 2011; Swatuk,

2002). Conca argues that ‘Rather than asking whether environmental degradation can

trigger broader forms of intergroup conflict, we ask whether environmental

cooperation can trigger broader forms of peace’ (Conca, 2002, p. 9). Earlier studies

had already problematized the important, yet narrow focus on environmental change

and conflict, and emphasized that ‘human survival has always depended more on the

ability to handle challenges and find solutions rather than on fighting wars, defeating

peoples and conquering territory’ (Wallensteen & Swain, 1997b, p. 702). Yet,

Environmental Peacemaking by Ken Conca and Geoffrey Dabelko is the first to

conceptual and empirically study that not just conceptualizes, but also approaches the

relations of environmental cooperation and conflict resolution empirically.

The case studies in the book address the issue from a regional perspective and try to

establish whether environmental cooperation can ‘be an effective general catalyst for

reducing tensions, broadening cooperation, fostering demilitarization, and promoting

peace’ (Conca, 2002, p. 9). The authors ‘cannot conclude that environmental

cooperation causes peace’ (Conca & Dabelko, 2002a, p. 230), however, the

contributions illustrate that environmental politics is high level politics on a regional

level. While this on the one hand might make cooperation more difficult, Conca and

Dabelko argue that under special circumstances it may in fact serve as an entry point

for cooperation as for instance the chapter on the Indus cooperation between India and

Pakistan shows (Conca & Dabelko, 2002a). As such, the literature on environmental

cooperation serves as an optimistic alternative to the dominant environmental conflict

literature. The cooperation argument is drawing particular strength from multiple

positive experiences around water governance, as scholars have established in the last

two decades that water wars between states are highly unlikely (Swatuk, 2015;

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Wallensteen & Swain, 1997a; Weinthal, Troell, & Nakayama, 2013; Yoffe & Wolf,

1999; Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008).

The literature on water cooperation in particular is focused on everyday interstate

security relations and the potential of cooperation and thus an issue of conflict

prevention. However, scholars also explore water cooperation broadly in the frame of

peacemaking, i.e. suggested in the Conca and Dabelko study as a conflict resolution

mechanism that would enable trust building between adversaries during ongoing

tensions and conflicts. Lately more emphasize has placed on the possibilities that are

laying with water as a tool for peacebuilding.1

Taking up the latter, researchers and policymakers believe that ‘environmental

peacebuilding’, i.e. the consideration of environmental issues in post-conflict policies,

can contribute to building peace (Conca & Dabelko, 2002b; Machlis, Hanson, Špirić,

& McKendry, 2011). The issue gained increased prominence with UNEP and UNPC

recognizing the ‘interplay between conflict, environment and natural resources’

(United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, 2008, p. 9) attempt to translate this

emphasize into policy to ‘capitalize on the potential for environmental cooperation to

contribute to peacebuilding’ (Matthew, Brown, & Jensen, 2009, p. 5). This has been

an important step to thinking about environmental issues and peacebuilding efforts.

More recent studies have started to establish deeper understanding of the ways natural

resources can contribute to different pillars of peacebuilding - from economic

recovery and livelihoods, through improved governance, and opportunities for

cooperation and reconciliation (Conca & Wallace, 2009). Overcoming natural

resources as trigger of conflicts, scholars emphasize the possibility of good natural

resources governance as bearing the potential for a swift economic recovery and thus

a strengthening of peace processes (Jensen & Lonergan, 2012; Lujala & Rustad,

2012). Jensen and Lonergan, argue that ‘integrating natural resource management and

                                                                                                               1 It is a disconcerting weakness of the majority of studies that try relating environmental governance and cooperation to peace that these studies suffer from a strong consideration of peace and conflict theories in their work. The close connection between the conflict and environmental change debate has helped in recent decades to mediate strong early findings regarding the relationship of the early Toronto school era by qualifying the environmental security argument with the broader armed conflict argument. While it has still not produced any conclusive arguments, the quality of the works conducted has increased tremendously. A similar exchange between the peace, i.e. conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature with the environmental cooperation/peacebuilding literature is strongly desirable to increase the quality of the debate.

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environmental sustainability into peacebuilding’ is the way to avert uncontrolled

exploitation in the aftermath of conflict (Jensen & Lonergan, 2012, p. 9). Similarly,

Unruh and Williams argue that issues of land reforms have recurrently destabilized

post-conflict societies. Future successes and failures of land reforms depend thus on

‘aligning land and property interventions’ in peacebuilding efforts (Unruh &

Williams, 2013, p. 16).

A major study on Water and Post-conflict Peacebuilding by Weinthal, Troell and

Nakayama concludes: While there are multiple pathways by which water can be harnessed to address humanitarian crises, promote economic recovery, and foster regional cooperation, it is equally true that there is no overarching template that can be applied to all countries emerging from conflict. Rather, attention should be paid to the specific context in which these interventions are taking place with an emphasis on fostering a nuanced, coordinated, participatory, flexible, and conflict-sensitive approach to managing water and its natural variability. Such an adaptive approach will be especially important as water governance institutions respond to unprecedented changes in the global climate. (Weinthal et al., 2013)

Based on the literature on water cooperation in particular, there is little reason to

expect that water issues would have caused any serious contention between the

conflicting parties in Kosovo. However, as some scholars argue it is essential to

identify the ‘specific shape and content of these conditions’ between, but also within

states and different actors, to elaborate more critically on the relationship and expose

power asymmetries that actually might motivate the cooperation over water (Swatuk,

2015). This study investigates whether the water governance that UNMIK facilitated

in Kosovo after 1999 has contributed to peacebuilding. For that it is important to look

beyond the absence of conflict, but also beyond the presence of cooperation to expose

and qualify the power structures that play a role.

The case study shows that water governance around Kosovo’s energy and water

supply sectors has not experienced or caused violence in the post-conflict period.2 On

the contrary, while the main discourse between Kosovo and Serbia remains focused

on the incompatibility of governance and territorial affiliation until today, there are

signs of cooperation on the interstate level between Serbia and Kosovo over issues

                                                                                                               2 Despite minor acts of sabotage and attemps to utilize/polarise over the water issue, there is however no violence associated with water issues in Kosovo.

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related to water. Yet there are also signs that cooperation especially with UN

authorities has been opposed and rejected when considering the intrastate level.

In the first part of this study a the Kosovo conflict and subsequent peacebuilding

effort is outlined without specific focus on water, before in part two the specific water

resource management and reconstruction in Kosovo is described. The study

continuous with two specific case studies to explore the governance dynamics of

water in the energy sector, and secondly to study the governance dynamics arising

from water supply to Serb dominated areas. The study concludes that UNMIK failed

to build on the potential of conflict resolution presented by the water sector, by

instead searching practical fixes that calm interethnic tensions, but do not resolve the

underlying problem.

Kosovo conflict and peacebuilding background Although the region of Kosovo has been traditionally one of the economically less

developed areas in the Balkans, it has a symbolic significance for both Albanian and

Serbian populace. The roots of the Serbian Christian Orthodox Church have their

origin in the province. Furthermore the Battle of Kosovo between Christian armies of

the Balkans led by Serbian aristocracy and the Ottoman Empire in 1389 has a

prominent place in the Serbian national narrative (Bakic-Hayden, 2004). After World

War II Kosovo, although formally a part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, was one

of two autonomous provinces within the Yugoslavian Federation. After political

tensions in the 1960s Kosovo gained extended autonomy and became an in practice

equal member of the Federation, until Slobodan Milošević limited Kosovo’s

autonomy again in 1989 (O'Neill, 2002). Ibrahim Rugova, one of the 1989 founders

of the Lidhjes Demokratike të Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo, LDK), was

elected president of the self-declared Republic of Kosovo in 1992 and proclaimed a

peaceful separation from Serbia. The Albanian paramilitary forces UCK started first

violent attacks on Croatian Serb refugee camps and police forces in 1996 (O'Neill,

2002). In 1998 the conflict escalated into a war between the police forces of Serbia

and the UCK (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, n.d.).

After international meditation attempts had failed, the Račak massacre in January

1999 eventually activated a strong international response that led to the Rambouillet

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Accords. The accords called for restoration of a broad autonomy of Kosovo,

deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces, their right to trespass Serbian territory,

use resources without due compensations, and freedom from prosecution for the

crimes committed on the territory of Serbia during their deployment (Magnusson,

1999). Only after NATO’s military intervention between March 24 and June 10, 1999

Serbia conceded to the terms of the Rambouillet Accords. KFOR troops were

deployed in the province with the backing of UN resolution 1244.

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo In addition to establishing KFOR, resolution 1244 placed Kosovo under UN control

in form of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

UNMIK mission was to establish basic civilian administrative functions; promote the

establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; facilitate a

political process to determine Kosovo's future status; coordinate humanitarian and

disaster relief of all international agencies; support the reconstruction of key

infrastructure; maintain civil law and order; promote human rights; and assure the

safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in

Kosovo (United Nations Security Council, 1999). Responsibility to achieving these

aims was divided among four pillars that were run by different international actors.

Pillar one focused on Humanitarian Assistance and was led by the Office of the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Pillar two organized the

Civil Administration of Kosovo for which the United Nations took responsibility;

whereas the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) took

charge of pillar three Democratization and Institution Building. The responsibility for

reconstruction of among others the water utility sector was taken up by pillar IV

under leadership of the European Union to focus on Reconstruction and Economic

Development (United Nations, n.d.).

After occasional violent clashes and UNMIK as well as international mediation

efforts unable to find a mutually acceptable solution between Serbia and Kosovo,

Kosovo declared independence in through a vote of the Assembly of Kosovo on 17

February 2008, ending factually, yet not legally, UNMIK’s mission.

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In February 2008 the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was

launched to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area,

specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas. An agreement about the final

status of Kosovo between Serbia and Kosovo is still outstanding.

Water resources management in Kosovo Kosovo is sharing boundaries with the former Yugoslav republics Montenegro, Serbia

and Macedonia, as well as with Albania in the west. Kosovo is sharing transboundary

rivers with each of the above-mentioned states, but it only receives water from Serbia

through the rivers Ibar in the north-west and Jablanica in the east. Kosovo’s

mountainous topography has divided its water resources into four larger river basins.

The Ibar basin in the north-central Kosovo and the Drin basin in the west are

dominating in size. The two remaining basins are the small Lepenec basin in the south

and in the southeast the Binacka basin.

The Ibar basin is playing a central role in the water supply of Kosovo’s bigger cities

and industry. The key reservoirs supplying drinking water to Pristina and Mitrovica

lay within the basin. But also the cooling systems of the only major power plants, the

lignite powered plants Kosovo A and B near Pristina, receive water from the basin,

partly through additional diverting of water resources from further north of the basin

during water scarce months.

At the same time Ibar river is of central political importance as it forms the border

between the Serb dominated north and Albanian dominated south within Kosovo -

most visible in the divided city of Mitrovica. But in addition to this internal division,

the Ibar basin adds a transboundary dimension between the key belligerents Serbia

and Kosovo. Ibar river enters Kosovo from Serbia and returns back to Serbia as part

of the larger Danube drainage basin.

Given this significance of the Ibar basin for Kosovo, the two case studies presented

here will for the most focus on the dynamics within the basin. The following sections

will briefly reflect the water sector reconstruction in Kosovo after the UN assumed

trusteeship of Kosovo in 1999. Subsequently, in two brief case studies the dynamics

around the internal and external transboundary water governance in the energy sector

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and the water supply sector are outlined, before the paper offers some preliminary

conclusions.

Water sector reconstruction through UNMIK At the end of the conflict in 1999 the water supply infrastructure of Kosovo was

poorly maintained. GTZ reports ‘high level of leakage in the network, and weak

management of the water companies’ as particular challenge in this situation,

meaning that roughly 50% of the population in Kosovo had direct access to water

(AGEG Consultants, 2009). Responsibility for the reconstruction of the water utility

sector in Kosovo was part of UNMIK’s pillar IV under leadership of the European

Union. The complex setup of UNMIK with different partially competing agencies in

charge caused several tensions between the different entities and financing

specifically of the utility sector was rather unclear in the beginning.

After initial set-up of UNMIK offices external water sector consultants were brought

in on funding of their home countries. The focus was to assess through a fact finding

mission what the immediate needs to make the water sector function again, as well as

identifying of stakeholders and develop and modernize the water sector in the coming

years. However, it would take until 2004 that some consolidation of the water sector

reform set in.

By 2000 the chaos of the early post-conflict period dominated and pillar four worked

to re-establish some basic administrative structures. In August the “Administrative

Department of Public Utilities” was established under trusteeship of UNMIK pillar

four to oversee the management and ‘regulation of matters relating to public utilities in Kosovo that shall include natural gas supply, transmission and use for public utilities purposes, electric light, heat, power, water supply and waste water and solid waste collection and treatment, as may be provided by public, private and other enterprises and institutions providing such services.’ (UNMIK, 2000b)

With these administrative changes introduced in 2000 came significant

transformations to the local utility sector and first signs of problems emerged by the

end of the year. UNMIK and the Department of Public Utility liberalized the utility

sector and facilitated the registration of Public Utility Service Providers in Kosovo

while simultaneously introducing supervisory boards to supervise the service

providers’ programs and activities (UNMIK, 2000b). As part of the reform subsidies

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have been awarded to the service providers, which caused a shift with companies now

lobbying for funding rather than collecting money form customers. In addition, the

reforms caused conflicts between the new central authorities and the municipalities

over competences.3

Only by 2001 did the emergency projects for the water sector repairs take off.

However, the problem of payment for services remained a key problem for UNMIK

over the years and was particularly difficult in the Serb dominated areas in the north

and the enclaves, which did not recognize the new authorities and continued to

receive funding from Belgrade. Recognizing these difficulties UNMIK and the World

Bank decided a shift away from the traditional reconstruction approach towards a

management contract, as they identified the management problems of the water sector

as more severe than the technical and financial problems (Marin, Mugabi, & Marino,

2010).

The EU led pillar four of UNMIK embarked from early on a strategy of economic

liberalization in Kosovo to boost economic development. The decision to award a

management contract in the water sector to outside companies was intended to

facilitate the still outstanding repair of the existing water infrastructure. But moreover

to implement a new framework of water governance in the country, focusing

particularly on the improvement of the operational performance in the water sector

and thus reduce investment losses (Marin et al., 2010). The contract was awarded in

2001 after international biding to the German utility provider Gelsenwasser.

The approach of economic liberalization of the former socialist state structures was

since 2002 formally facilitated through the newly established Kosovo Trust Agency

(KTA). In the water sector this meant a revolution by integrated the over 35 municipal

water companies into just seven regional water companies (AGEG Consultants,

2009).4 The northern region of Kosovo did not participate in the restructuring of the

water companies into this new regional framework. Especially those authorities in

Mitrovica were strongly opposed to any cooperation with UNMIK, but overall the

                                                                                                               3 Author interview 4 Author interview

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northern water authorities remained to be funded by Belgrade.5 Also among the other

municipal water companies the reform wasn't fully embraced: ‘some former

municipal utilities were reluctant to join the regional companies, mainly because the

consolidation process was felt as a top-down process’ (AGEG Consultants, 2009).

Gelsenwasser took responsibility of the Hidrodrini Radiniqi (HSR) company, which

was one of the new established seven regional operators. The operator is located in

the Drini basin in the western region of Kosovo around Gjakove and Rehovec (Marin

et al., 2010). The area is dominantly Albanian, but included several smaller Serb

enclaves, such as Velika Hoča and Hoca i Madhe.6

The water sector reconstruction of Kosovo focused on two key elements. That was

firstly, the emergency repair of household water supply and the restructuring of the

water utility sector. Secondly, UNMIK’s pillar four tasked with the reconstruction of

the economy had to solve the energy challenges that resulted out of the new

secessionist situation. In the following the water sector reconstruction efforts by

UNMIK will be discussed in relation to the development of the energy sector and then

to the water supply sector to illustrate the difficulties and different priorities and

trade-offs that were part of the processes. In the latter I will elaborate on the dynamics

around the enclaves and paying particular tribute to the processes surrounding

Mitrovica.

Energy Sector Case Study Kosovo’s faces a critical energy shortage that has not been fully resolved since

UNMIK took control of the utility sectors at the end of the conflict in 1999. The EU

pillar of UNMIK controlled Kosovo’s electricity company KEK. As KEK had

difficulty in keeping the plants running Kosovo depended heavily on imports form

Serbia and Bulgaria.

In recent years Kosovo has progressed in its policies related to renewable energy

resources and established targets to diversify the energy production: ‘The

Government has set as a target for Kosovo to reach a renewable share of 7% by

2016.’ (Ministry of Energy and Mining, 2009, p. 76). A 2012 assessment found that

                                                                                                               5 Author interview 6 Author interview

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Kosovo would be able to provide over 30% of its energy needs through renewable

energy sources and that such a policy would even increase employment while costing

less than the coal based power plants (Kammen, Mozafari, & Prull, 2012). This has

been further confirmed by a study on Wind Energy in Kosovo (Bajrami, 2013). That

means the focus on security and economic development would not be contradicted by

the promotion of renewable energy policies in peacebuilding strategies for Kosovo

and might have been applied earlier. Electricity production on Gazivoda lake with an

installed capacity of 35MW contributed 114GWh in 2010. The remaining small

hydropower plants generate less than half of that of the Gazivoda dam. Other

hydropower stations that have been restored since the end of the conflict produced

2.2% of Kosovo’s net power generation in 2010 (Kammen et al., 2012). However,

Kosovo depends since the end of the conflict strongly on its lignite resources and

requires water among others from the Serb dominated areas in the north for the

cooling of the power plants.

The main domestic and independent sources of power remains the power plants

Kosovo A and B. Both are lignite fire power plants and have a capacity to produce

800MWh and 2 times 290MWh respectively (World Bank, 2008, pp. 100-104). The

power plants and the disposal sites are located in the municipality of Obilic some

three kilometers from the capitol city of Pristina. Kosovo A has five units that were

built in two phases (from 1962 to 1964 and from 1970 to 1975). Kosovo B has two

units built between 1983 and 1984. It is important to note that the two power plants

differ in terms of environmental impact due given their differences in age and

technology. Namely, the Western-designed Kosovo B is 15 years old and is

considered cleaner than the older, Russian-designed, Kosovo A, which has one or two

units (out of five) operating intermittently and at reduced capacity (REC Field office

in KosovoSIDA, 2000).

In the initial phase after UNMIK assumed trusteeship of Kosovo the priority was to

get the two power plants up and running again after they were damaged through the

conflict and poor maintenance in the past (UNMIK, 2000a). This step was essential as

these two power plants are responsible for 98% of Kosovo’s domestic energy

generation (Kammen et al., 2012). Previous studies have argued that ‘one of the key

problems for sustainable peacebuilding is the lack of economic alternatives in

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Kosovo. This leads international and local actors into the dilemma of abandoning

environmental issues and preferring options like opencast lignite mines and thermal

power plants’ (Kostić, Krampe, & Swain, 2012).

The priority of UNMIK was economic reconstruction and development for which the

energy generated in the two power plants was essential. However continuously until

2001 Kosovo’s two power plants could not produce much energy and had to undergo

frequent and significant repairs.

While the problem with getting the power plants back to run at least close to their

capacity was a continuous challenge for UNMIK, the power generation through

lignite-propelled thermal power plants has a number of environmental and political

shortcomings that ought to be taken into consideration. Uncontrolled gas emissions

from power plants consist of high level of carbon dioxide and dust (Krasniqi, 2009).

Lignite is transported by open belt conveyer from the mines to the separation plant

and then is distributed by internal belt conveyer systems, which produces a substantial

amount of dust affecting populated areas in the vicinity of the mine. According to the

World Bank assessment a substantial amount of bottom ash and fly ash are produced

during the combustion process. Bottom ash and fly ash from Kosovo A (unit 1 and 2)

is transported to the disposal sites as slurry without re-circulation of the water. Thus,

this type of treatment leads to water pollution. Fly ash from other unites is dry-

transported by air to a temporary storage at the plants where it is mixed with water

and transported by belt conveyers to the disposal site close to the power plants.

Kosovo A has five stacks 100 meter high, while Kosovo B has only one stack 182

meters high. Electrostatic precipitators in all units provide dust capture. There is

neither desulphurization nor denitrification in Kosovo A or Kosovo B. The power

plants are not provided with wastewater treatment plants. The water necessary to the

plant to prepare process water is taken from the Llapi River flowing nearby the power

plant; when the river flow rate is too low water is taken from the Iber-Lepenc channel.

The solid residuals from water treatment are disposed together with the ashes. A 2014

assessment of Kosovo’s waterway pollution concludes: ‘The most polluted river in Kosovo is Sitnica, which confluences with Ibër/Ibar River in Mitrovica. The urban wastewaters of most urban centers in central and northern Kosovo are discharged to Sitnica and Ibër/Ibar respectively. In addition, water is polluted by numerous industrial sources, particularly by discharges from two Power Plants (Kosovo A and B),

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Ferronikeli/Feronikel, acidic mine drainage waters and industrial wastes from Trepca complex.’ (Azizi, 2014)

The highly polluted water that is reaching Ibar river through its tributary Sitnica is

leaving Kosovo to enter central Serbia. Even though Serbia has complained about

pollution of Ibar river in Kosovo, there have not been any major disputes around the

issue or severe accusations of purposefully polluting the water resources. That does

however not mean that multiple actors haven’t tried to utilize the issue to discredit

UNMIK’s policies. However, fact is that UNMIK and Serbia have cooperated through

UNEP on investigating pollution of the river in 2003 during a phenol spill in Sitnica

that had affected the Ibar river system (UNEP, 2003).

However some tensions as well as threats and fear emerged before Kosovo decleard

independence in 2008. These tensions concern the use of water as a cooling medium

for the turbines in Kosovo’s power-plants. As World Bank has noted, there is the

potential for conflicting demands from various water users, i.e. one needs to asses the

growing needs for fresh water vis-a-vis the industrial needs. This is an issue of

urgency as water stress already occurs, as there are frequent shortages in summer in

the portable water supply to Pristina and other municipalities supplied by the Pristina

Water Supply Company (World Bank, 2008, p. 220). In addition, some 30% of water

to Oblic and Pristina is supplied from the artificial lake of Gazivoda, which is placed

in the Serb-controlled Northern Kosovo. The Gazivoda’s water is used both for

drinking and as a coolant in the Kosovo B power-station. During the proclamation of

Kosovo's independence the Albanian politicians called upon NATO to assume the

control over Gazivoda as Serb authorities in N. Kosovo threatened to cut of water

supply in response to the Kosovo Albanian proclamation of independence (de

Quetteville, 2007). According to the UNMIK officials, the Gazivoda complex is

critically important for Kosovo, but the people running the installation are all Serbs

from the local area. Yet, without Gazivoda it is questionable whether Kosovo could

survive - not just for drinking water, but also for electricity. Yet, all suggestions to put

KFOR troops around Gazivoda were strongly rejected by Russia at the time (de

Quetteville, 2007). While no acts of sabotage or other attempts to cut off the supply of

water happened in 2008, also possibly because of strong interdependence between the

north and south regarding the water supply, the political issue and threat remains.

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In 2009 the Kosovo Serb authorities in Northern Kosovo refuse to recognize the

authorities of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo and continue to operate

according to the laws of Republic of Serbia. In that vein, they do not recognize the

Kosovo Energy Company (KEK) and refuse to pay electricity bills to it. In an attempt

to rebuff the challenge from the Serb provinces, the KEK decided to cut off all

electricity to northern Kosovo on 17 October 2009. This was done despite the calls

from the UNMIK to restrain themselves from irresponsible behavior (Beta B92 News,

2009). In a response, the authorities of the Republic of Serbia connected northern

Kosovo to its grid in central Serbia. Also, the Kosovo Serbs continue to relay heavily

on the electricity supply from the hydro power plant on Gazivoda. Also, it has been

reported that from November 2009 all citizens of northern Kosovo will be paying

electricity bills to Elektroprivreada Srbije (EPS) (Beta B92 News, 2009). According

to the Kosovo Serb representatives, the issue of the power supply to the north of

Kosovo has been politicized, and that KEK had given an ultimatum to Kosovo Serbs

in an attempt to integrate the north into the Kosovo institutions (Beta B92 News,

2009). The Brussels agreement that was reached between Serbia and Kosovo in April

2013 with help of the EU was hoped to resolve the issues. The agreement regulates an

autonomous status of Kosovo Serbs, particularly northern municipalities, within

Kosovo, while guaranteeing integration of Northern Kosovo in the security, political,

economic and legal structures of the state of Kosovo (Vogel, 2013). However, until

now no final agreement has been reached.

Water Supply Sector Case study The water supply network of Kosovo has been divided through the internal divisions

between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. In addition, the network suffered under poor

performance and maintenance. In this section the focus will be firstly on

Gelsenwasser that took responsible management of Hidrodrini Radiniqi (HSR), which

was one of the new established seven regional operators. The operator is located in

the Drini basin in the western region of Kosovo around Gjakove and Rehovec (Marin

et al., 2010). The area is dominantly Albanian, but included several smaller Serb

enclaves, such as Velika Hoča and Hoca i Madhe.7 Secondly the focus will be on

                                                                                                               7 Author interview

Page 16 of 23  

Mitrovica that has been divided ethnically, but the divide has also complicated the

water supply of the city significantly.

Water Supply in Enclaves – the case of Hidrodrini Radoniqi (HSR) With Gelsenwasser taking responsibility of one of the new regional water companies

in the western part of Kosovo Hidrodrini Radiniqi (HSR) company significant

improvements have been reported in the operations of the water network as well as

financially (Marin et al., 2010).

Gelsenwasser could count on cooperation with the local Albanian population and

structures. However, the problem of Serb enclaves in the region was particularly

delicate. Some enclaves such as Brezovica in the far South had their own water

supply plant, other enclaves like Velika Hoca and Hoca i Madhe that are located in

the Gjakova region required water supply from Albanian controlled water plants.

Both of these villages received water from the Radoniqi Lake, Kosovo’s second

largest lake, where the water was treated I the local water treatment facilities and then

distributed among others to the enclaves. To address the issue that the enclaves

rejected to pay for the water supply they received Gelsenwasser attempted making the

water bills in several languages to signal their willingness depoliticize the issue.

However, without success as fee collectors were frequently chased away.8

In contrast to the attempts by Gelsenwasser the issue of utilities supply, among others

water supply has been instrumentalized and serves as a tool to subjectively frame the

situation of the enclaves and portray them as victims: Nowadays there are about 700 Serbs living in Velika Hoca in extreme difficult conditions, badly suffering from the tragic misfortune, out of basic human rights, experiencing the constant torture, retribution and violence, but irregular electricity and water supply, facing the constant fear for pure life, completely isolated in the hostile surroundings of the armed Albanian population.9

 Yet enclaves were willingly rejecting cooperation with UNMIK and other authorities.

As such the enclaves were not part of the revised regional water management

structures. Serb companies did not want to regionalize and did not get further

investments after the reform. The non-cooperative attitude among the enclaves water

companies was further supported by Belgrade, as until lately they could get income as

                                                                                                               8 Author interview 9 http://www.panacomp.net/serbia?mesto=kosovo_velika%20hoca

Page 17 of 23  

public servant from Belgrade. The lack of investment from either side is leaving the

local water supply structures largely outdated.10

The situation regarding the enclaves became further difficult for Gelsenwasser and

UNMIK to handle as pressure form the Albanian side rose and it became more and

more difficult to mediate Albanian attitudes towards the enclave. Water supply pipes

that lead to the enclaves have occasionally been sabotaged. While it remains unclear

by whom it required allegedly inside technical knowledge of the functioning of the

water supply network to do damage. The fact that in Gjakova several employees of

the water company had a background in the UCK made the issue of water supply to

the enclaves more and more difficult.11

While the public private partnership between Hidrodrini Radiniqi and Gelsenwasser

had several advantages it appears that both actors were left alone by UNMIK in their

attempts to deal with the situation of water supply to the enclaves. UNMIK did not

seem to have a clear idea of how to address and eventually solve the issue. At this

point it is unclear if there were coordinated attempts to approach the communities

overt the issue of water supply and attempt to facilitate trust building around a rather

technical issue. Nonetheless, despite more significant tensions between the conflictive

communities and water actors there was no sever act of aggression in response to the

water supply, aside from the sabotage of water pipes.

Water Supply in northern Kosovo – The case of Mitrovica Some of the dynamics arising in Mitrovica are comparable to those in the enclaves

even though we have more insight into the involvement of UNMIK in this case.

The problematic situation for Mitrovica arises out of the fact that the water supply for

the city is coming from the Gazivoda reserve at the Serb border and dominated by a

Serb majority population. The water supply from the lake was prior to the conflict

managed by the cities water company, however with the end of the conflict the water

company split up, one controlling the water supply for the southern, Albanian

dominated part of the city and one managing the resources in the Serbian dominated

north of the city. However, the water treatment plant that prepares the lake water to be                                                                                                                10 Author interview 11 Author interview

Page 18 of 23  

supplied to the households is located in the southern part of the city and controlled by

the Albanian water company. However, the southern water company continued to

supply the north with water even though it did not receive utility payments from the

north for providing the service. The northern company received continuous payments

from Belgrade and limited their work to maintaining the water supply network.

In the eyes of UNMIK the northern company should be integrated into the new

regional structure of water companies and hoped thus to be able to solve the potential

conflict between north and south, as well as improving the operational performance of

the highly overstaffed northern company. The EU pillar representatives of UNMIK

went with 20.000 Deutsche Mark in cash to pay salaries and try to integrate the Serb

company through registering it in Pristina. That way the company would be able to

receive subsidies if it cannot live on its own. However, the attempt failed, as Serbs

felt bribed into Albanian structure. Occasionally Kosovo Serb water authorities

showed up at the monthly meetings that UNMIK organized in the utility sector, yet

those from Mitrovica were not keen on cooperation. Cooperation between UNMIK

and some villages in the north like Leposaviq was easier mostly because of more

moderate utility directors. Nevertheless, these northern companies were under

pressure from local politics limiting possibilities of cooperation.12

UNMIK’s work with the southern water company in Mitrovica was comparatively

easy as UNMIK was still received as the liberator, but also due to subsidies that the

EU pillar paid. Compared to the rather conflictive attitude in the enclaves, the

Albanian company in Mitrovica did not threaten to shut down water supply to the

north. However, this might be more due to the fact that UNMIK offered to

compensate the southern water company for the financial losses received through

water supply to the north, to calm the situation between the two groups. Then again,

the area did not suffer under any severe water shortage during this period, which

might hypothetically have increased tensions.13

Even though given this complex setup with water resources and supply chains

controlled by different parties, actors involved in UNMIK’s water management at the                                                                                                                12 Author interview 13 Author interview

Page 19 of 23  

time claim that there weren’t any conflicts or unprofessional behavior or even threats,

at least until 2007 as discussed before. It is likely that the interdependence that

resulted out of the complex setup mediated attitudes on either sides, or at least it was

clear that any actions would not come without direct repercussions for the respective

own population. UNMIK’s role in this might be more ambiguous. UNMIK was

highly aware of the incompatibilities between north and south, also in regard to the

water issues. However, there seems not to have been a coherent strategy to deal with

the issue. Then again the overall political tensions that existed and continue to

complicate the situation between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo might not have

served as a good foundation to utilize the water sector for conflict resolution and

mediation attempts. Instead UNMIK appears to have gone for a non-confrontational

approach trying to compensate the problems resulting around the incompatibility,

rather than trying to actually resolve them.

Conclusion To draw some preliminary analytical conclusions form the initial case studies. It is

intriguing, yet not surprising that no conflict on water issues has been detected in

Kosovo, considering the theoretical assumptions on water cooperation.

The case studies of the energy and water supply sector highlight that cooperation over

water resources is possible, despite unresolved conflicts. In fact Serbia and Kosovo

cooperated through existing institutional frameworks on the interstate level over

issues related to water. However, this cooperation cannot necessarily be associated to

the role of UNMIK, but might be a consequence of the institutional and bureaucratic

capacity of Serbia. So far it is uncertain if UN administration of Kosovo actually

facilitated this cooperation. Essentially, the cooperation did not resolve any of the

higher-ranking issues between Serbia and Kosovo, it is interesting to observe that in

the recent Brussels agreements Serbia and Kosovo have come to mutual agreements

for instance in the energy sector. However, the agreement as such remains not

implemented as the crucial issue of Kosovo’s political and territorial status remains

disputed.

At the same time to look at the subnational level offers essential insight in a more

complex story about water issues in a post-conflict context. Cooperation was minimal

Page 20 of 23  

between UNMIK and Serb enclaves and the northern region, particularly Mitrovica.

More often in fact it was openly rejected and opposed. From a peacebuilding

perspective it is not surprising that the governance initiatives through UNMIK have

received mixed response among the local population – including Albanians. This

response is a common consequence of peacebuilding missions and well studied and

understood (Björkdahl & Höglund, 2013; cf. MacGinty, 2010). As such, non-

cooperation and resistance can be expected considering the overall liberal

peacebuilding framework that has been applied to Kosovo.

However, while non-cooperation and resistance can be easily explained, it is

interesting to notice that also on an intrastate dimension the water issues have, despite

tensions, not caused major outburst of violence. This can this time be partially

associated to the way that UNMIK, as the key actor in the peacebuilding process, has

acted in response to these situations. It is due to the financial and personal

intervention of UNMIK that the tensions around the water issues did not increase into

violent outburst. However, the fact that UNMIK failed to actually resolve the

conflictive issue and instead opted for mending it through paying the bill for the Serb

water supply gives rise to an alternative explanation. It is highly likely that the high

interdependence, especially of the water network around Mitrovica, has prevented

either side from acting beyond verbal threats. As either side’s action with regard to

the water supply would equally affect their own group, the interdependence might

successfully deter any significant utilization of water as a political tool in the post-

conflict situation.

To draw a preliminary conclusion to the question whether the water governance that

UNMIK implemented has contributed to peacebuilding, it appears as if UNMIK,

despite good efforts to reconstruct and develop the water sector, has failed in

developing a comprehensive strategy that would have realized the full potential of

conflict resolution through interethnic cooperation and trust building. Then again, it is

hard to assess whether the highly polarized situation in Kosovo would have allowed

for participatory conflict resolution approaches.

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