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TheBattleof73Easting:AStudyinLeadership,CompetenceandMobile
ArmoredFirepowerinAction.PresentationtotheFirstInfantry
DivisionMuseumatCantigny,
5September2012
DouglasMacgregor,PhD
Colonel(ret)U.S.Army
+1703
975
6954
WarriorsRage:TheGreatTankBattleof73EastingNavalInstitutePress,2009
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Pin(theIraqiRepublicanGuard)withtheir
backsagainstthesea,then,goinandwipe
themoutOncetheyregonebepreparedtocontinuetheattacktoBaghdad.
GeneralNorman
Schwarzkopf,
November1990.
AttackIraqipoliticalmilitaryleadership
andcommand
and
control;
gain
and
maintainairsuperiority;severIraqisupply
lines,destroychemical,biologicaland
nuclearcapability;destroyRepublicanGuardforcesintheKuwaitiTheater;liberate
Kuwait.
U.S.CentralCommandOperations
Order91001,17January1991
TheMission:FindandDestroythe
RepublicanGuard!
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ThirdU.S.
Army
Personnel
Command
estimates
VIICorpswilltake20,000casualtiesinthefirstfive
daysoffightingtheIraqiArmy.
RichardSwain,LuckyWar.ThirdArmyinDesertStorm,page205
TheWhiteHousehadbeenaccustomedoverthe
yearstothemilitarycominginwithverylargeforce
requirementsforcontingencyplans.Thiswas
clearlypartlyoutofcaution,buttherewasalsothe
perceptionat
times
it
was
to
dissuade
the
Presidentfromaction.
RobertM.Gates,DeputyNationalSecurity
Advisor,1990,TheGeneralsWar,page154.
IfSaddam
withdraws
with
most
of
his
forces
intact,wehaventreallywon.
BrentScowcroft,NationalSecurityAdvisor,
1991fromAWorldTransformed,page473.
Expectationsin19901991:
ConventionalWisdom
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GettingReadyfortheFight:
LessonsinLeadership
Gettherightpeopleintotherightleadership
positionsandtherestwilltakecareofitself.(Natural
bornleaders!)
Cavalryunitsorarmoredreconnaissanceoutfitsare
likedeep
sea
sharks
that
have
to
swim
to
eat
and
live.Aslongasanarmoredcavalryunitisinmotion,it
findsanddevoursitsenemy.Oncelaunchedinto
action,itmustnotstop!
Inthe
fast
paced
action
of
mobile,
armored
combat,
disciplinemustbeaformofhabit(BattleDrill). Armoredwarfareishairtriggerfast,lethal,and
unforgiving.Themarginbetweenvictorand
vanquishedcan
be
afraction
of
asecond.
Waitingforordersisdeadly.
Relentlesspreparationforoffensiveoperations
suppressesthesoldiersnaturalinclinationstofear
andhomesickness.
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PLHARPS
PLBECKS
PLDIXIE
OBJ
GATES
OBJ
MAYOBJ
MERREL
OBJ
FEUCHT
Limit
of
Advance
on
24
Feb.
1991at 1700hours
LimitofAdvanceon24Feb.1991
at1000
hours
LimitofAdvanceon23Feb.1991
at1500hours
RedfoxForward
Reconnaissance
Element
CougarBattlegroup(Main
Body)
TheAdvanceintoIraq23
24February1991:
Note:Distancefrom
SaudiBorder
to
edge
ofRepublicanGuard
SecurityZonewas
roughlyequaltothe
distancefrom
Washington,DCto
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvaniaor
123
miles.
RepublicanGuardCorps
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GhostTroop
EagleTroop
FoxTroop
HawkCompany
II
XX
I
TheBattle:26February1991:
Directionof
Movementtoward 73
Easting
TenKilometer
Zoneofattack.
BoxFormation
wasten
kilometers
deep.
Fragmentaryorder(FRAGO)0522hourstotheregiment:2ndACR[ArmoredCavalryRegiment]
attacksEasttofixTawalkana MechanizedDivision;onorder,1ID[1st InfantryDivision]passesthrough2ndACRtocontinuetheattackEastacknowledge,over!
Versus
CougarBattle
Group
Combat
Power
Soldiers 1,100
M1A1AbramsTanks 42
ArmoredFightingVehicles(Bradley) 41
155mmSelfPropelledHowitzers 8
4.2MortarsmountedinM113s 6
M113A2 12
RepublicanGuard
Brigade
Combat
Power
Soldiers 2,100to2,300(estimated)
T72Tanks 70(tanksfromretreatingunitsmixed
induringfighting)
ArmoredFightingVehicles(alltypes) 80+
ArtillerySystems(alltypes) 20+
Trucks 4050
Versus
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Eagle
Troop
1607hrs
E2
MINES
MINES
3rd AD
2nd Cavalry
3T72
13BMP
29T72
2T55
11BMP
3MTLB
1SA13
1T72
1
BMP
3AD
XX
2ACR
17 T72
18 BMP
00
05
1059 68 73EASTING
2/2
II3/2
EagleTroop
consolidatesalong
73Easting 1643hrs.
Ghost
3
rd
Platoon
ScoutsMove
forward1615hrs.
2nd PlatoonTanks
attackat1630.
EagleTroop
Punchestothe73Easting 1618hrs.
Situationbetween
1600and1700hours
3T72s
Ghost
Troop
1600hrs
EagleTroop
1630hrs
Eagle
Troop
1645hrs
Ghost
Troop
1610hrs
XX
Cougar3
Cougar3
051618hrsCougar
attacksEasttoward
70Easting
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GhostTroop
EagleTroop
FoxTroop
ll
HawkCompany
2ndSquadron
3rdSquadronIronTroop
FortyminutesafterEagleTroop
attacks,IronTroopattacksto73Easting, thenfallsbackbehind70
Easting,LimitofAdvance.
Note:CaissonBatterysGun
Platoonswerepositioned
immediatelybehindGhost
andEagleTroops.
ActualCougar
Deploymentalong
the73Eastingfrom1643
to
0600
hrs
2ndCavalrys
LimitofAdvance
1700hrs 26Febto
0600hrs 27Feb
alongthe
70
Easting
HeavyBlackLine
MarksCougar
Squadrons
PositionsAlongthe
73Eastingafter1700hours26
February
3rdArmoredDivisionZone
ofAttack
N
E
73Easting
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28February1991
Thegate'sclosedWhatisn'tescapingisheavytanks,whatisn't
escapingisartillerypiecesI'mtalkingaboutthegatethatclosedonthe
warmachinethatisoutthere.
GeneralNormanSchwarzkopf,CDR,U.S.Central
Command,28February1991
27March1991
Inaddition,thegeneral(Schwarzkopf)saidintheinterview,majorRepublicanGuardunitshad"buggedout"beforethemainattackbyAmericanforces andcrossedtheEuphratesRiver Whentheshootingstopped,
the
general
said,
he
was
"suckered"
by
Iraqi
military
commanderswhoaskedforandreceivedpermissiontoflyhelicopters
overIraq.
PatrickE.Tyler,AftertheWar;SchwarzkopfSays TruceEnabled
IraqistoEscape,TheNewYorkTimes, 27March1991.7October1994
80,000IraqitroopsincludingtwoveteranRepublicanGuarddivisionsmoveSouthtowardKuwaitiBorder.MadeleineK.AlbrighttellstheUN
SecurityCouncilIraqmightsoonhavesome60,000troopsand1,000
tankspoisedtoattackKuwait.U.S.respondsputting36,000troopson
planesandsettinganother160,000inmotion.
TheOutcome:
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Thedistantrearofanarmyengagedinbattleisnotthebestplacefromwhich
tojudgecorrectlywhatisgoingoninfront.
GeneralU.S.Grant,1863
Thereisonlyonetacticalprinciplewhichisnotsubjecttochange.Itistouse
themeansathandtoinflictthemaximumamountofwound,death,and
destructionontheenemyintheminimumamountoftime."
GeneralGeorgeS.PattonJr.,1942
Lessonsfromthe73Easting
Observed,butnotlearned:
"ThecasualtiesarethelowestinanyArmyvehicles,despitehowoftentheAbrams
(Tank)istargeted about70%ofthemorethan1,100tanksusedinIraqhavebeen
struckbyenemyfire,mostlywithminordamage.
SteveKomarow,USAToday,30March2005,page3.TheAmericanpeopledontfullyrealizewhatsgoingon,saidthe27yearoldStaffSergeantfromBuffalo,NewYork.Theyjustknowbackhomewhatthehigherups
heretellthem.Butthehigherupsdontgoanywhere,andactuallytheyonlygoto
thesafeplaces,placeswithalittlebitofgunfire.JoshuaPartlow,IDontThinkThisPlaceisWorthAnotherSoldiersLife,
TheWashingtonPost, 27October2007,pageA10.