Warning Notice - Central Intelligence Agency · 1984. 8. 14. · Force Readiness Deployments 25 Training and Exercises 25 Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 25 Logistics

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SNIE 11-9-84

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD -THE UNITED STATES IN 1984

Information available as of 9 August 1984 wasused in the preparatioa of this Estimate, ap-proved by the National Foreign IntelligenceBoard on that date.

S,...szt-

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL.INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of theEstimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National SecurityAgency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of_Stote.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

CONTENTS

PageSCOPE NOTE 1

KEY JUDGMENTS 3

DISCUSSION 15

I. Current Soviet Policies Toward the United States 15:

A. The Content of the Current Line 15

B. Soviet Perceptions and Foreign Policy Calculations 17

C. Internal Factors 18

D. Possible Arguments Within the Kremlin for and AgainstNear-Term Policy Change 20

II. Soviet Policy Options in the Near Future 21

A. Continuation of the Dual-Track Policy 21

B. Deliberate Central Confrontation 23

Force Readiness Deployments 25Training and Exercises 25Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 25Logistics and Supply 25Defense Economies and Civil Defense. 26Vigilance and Security 26

C. Instigation or Exploitation of Limited Crises 27

Central America 27Pakistan 28Soviet Moves on the Persian Gulf 30Berlin 31

D. Shift Toward East-West Accommodation 32

III. Assessment and Outlook 33

Eu

SCOPE NOTE

This Special National Intelligence Estimate examines currentSoviet policy toward the United States and prospects for major changesduring the remainder of 1984. In part, it is a contribution to the ongoingeffort by the Intelligence Community to monitor the possibility that theSoviets may be preparing for some form of confrontation with theUnited States in the near term. This effort has assessed recent Sovietmilitary activities as largely the product of longstanding or evolvingplans, intended to increase Soviet strength for an intensified powerstruggle over the long term, rather than preparations for confrontationin the near term.

This SNIE's focus, however, is broader than that issue alone. Itattempts a comprehensive assessment of current Soviet policy towardthe United States and possibilities for sharp changes of course. Suchpossibilities include Soviet moves which instigate or exploit local crisissituations and also initiatives relating to arms control negotiations. Sovietviews about the current US administration make the possibility of majorSoviet initiatives to influence the November election, or to exploit thepolitical environment of the campaign period, a central concern of thisEstimate.

KEY JUDGMENTS

Current Soviet policy toward the United States expresses deephostility to US aims and interests. It is shaped primarily by the Sovietperception that the United States is acting to alter the overall militarypower relationship, seeking to strengthen US alliances, and conductingregional security policies—all for the purpose of containing and reduc-ing Soviet influence in world affairs. US policies threaten to undercutearlier Soviet expectations that the 1980s would be a period in whichthe USSR could, against the backdrop of its military power, expand itsinternational influence at low risk, and enjoy the economic anddiplomatic benefits of Western acceptance of its superpower status. USpolicies and pronouncements also contain a degree of challenge to themoral and political legitimacy claims of the Soviet regime which itsleaders find unusually disturbing. Soviet policy is motivated by thedesire to combat and, if possible, deflect US policies, and to create amore permissive environment in which Soviet relative military powerand world influence can continue to grow.

Current Soviet policy toward the United States makes - hostileinitiatives in crisis areas, such as Central America and Pakistan, adistinct near-term possibility. However, we do not see in currentSoviet political and military behavior preparation for a deliberatemajor confrontation with the United States in the near future.

The Soviets perceive that US policies directed against their objec-tives enjoy a considerable base of political support within the UnitedStates and in NATO. At the same time, they see weaknesses in that po-litical base which can be exploited to alter or discredit US policies,making it possible to blunt the challenge posed by the United States andperhaps to return to a condition of detente on terms consistent with So-viet international ambitions.

The policy implications of these perceptions for Moscow are fairlystraightforward, up to a point:

— First, Soviet leaders seem at present to believe that the likeli-hood that the United States will continue the policies of the pastseveral years into the rest of the decade is high enough torequire some political and military gearing up for a period oflasting and more intense struggle. How vigorous an effort thiswill require–in the future is uncertain to them, and possibly insome dispute.

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— Second, the Soviets believe they can influence the content,effectiveness, and durability of US policies they see directedagainst them. The rigidity and hostility of Soviet policy towardthe United States, on one hand, and attempts to take initiativeand show flexibility, on the other, are aimed at negating thosepolicies. Up to now, they have evidently calculated that rigidityand hostility are the most promising posture: But their recentperformance and the outlook for the future plausibly call thisinto question.

Moscow's policies toward the United States are focused on under-cutting the domestic and alliance bases of public support for US policiesand programs. Hostile propaganda, which blames the United States for .an increased danger of war and for di plomatic rigidity with regard toregional security and the major arms control issues, is used to put the USadministration on the defensive where possible and to excite oppositionto Washington's policies.

At the same time, a hostile stance toward the West is seen by Sovietleaders as convenient for exhorting greater discipline, sacrifice, andvigilance on the Soviet home front, where the Politburo is preoccupiedwith a range of complex problems. These problems include stagnatingeconomic performance and the resistance of the system to- reform, -flagging social morale and the dwindling' effectiveness of exhortationand disciplinary measures to boost worker performance, continuingisolated dissent, ethnic nationalism, -antisocial" attitudes among youth,and some doubts among the elite as to top-leadership effectiveness.Commanding a great deal of their attention, these problems create a set-ting in which a deliberately stimulated image of the USSR's beingembattled abroad is used by the Politburo to reinforce its political andideological control at home.

An alternative view is that, while the Soviet leaders recognize the -existence of a number of longstanding domestic protgems, they are notso preoccupied with addressing these issues that it prevents diem fromacting decisively and resolutely on foreign policies. Moreover, theholder of this view also believes that, while there may be somecriticisms among party functionaries, there is no evidence that thesecriticisms affect Soviet policies.'

Although there may be debates among Soviet leaders about tacticstoward the United States, we believe that current Soviet policy,combining a dominant hard line with steps and hints of progress, isbased on consensus in the Politburo. The uncertain political power of

' The holder of ihis view is the Director. Defense Intelitgenee Agency.

Top Soc oi

General Secretary Chernenko, his and other Politburo members' limitedforeign affairs expertise, and Cromyko's long experience as ForeignMinister have probabl y given the latter influence over Soviet foreignpolicy tactics he has not enjoyed under any previous General Secretary.We doubt, 'however, that he is unilaterally able to enforce his prefer-.ences over the objections of the rest of the Politburo, or that explicitcontention on foreign policy—as recently rumored with respect to theUSSR's space arms control initiative—led to his being temporarilyoverruled. The consensus-maintaining mores of the Politburo and theskills of its members in avoiding isolation make: such showdownsituations unlikely. Rumors of foreign policy conflict in the Politburoare probably exaggerations of more routine debate over tactics, andmay be deliberately spread to influence Western perceptions.

In the last few months, the Soviets have been amenable to progresson several US-Soviet bilateral issues and have made i prominentinitiative on antisatellite systems/space weapons negotiations. On bilat-eral issues, such as the hotline upgrade and the renewal of the technicaland economic cooperation accord, the Soviets appear motivated by adesire to preserve the basis for substantive dialogue on issues of directbenefit to them, despite their underlying hostility toward the present USadministration. The_space_weapons -initiative, on the other hand, wasintended primarily to stimulate concessions from the United States, orpolitical controversy about them, in an election period when the Sovietsjudge that the administration wants to display progress in US-Sovietrelations. Failing US concessions, the . Soviets -want, at-a-minimum, todeny the US administration any basis for claiming that it can manageconstructive US-Soviet relations while pursuing anti-Soviet military andforeign policy goals.

The USSR's as-yet inconclusive initiative on space weapons is an.example of the policy mix being pursued. Soviet behavior on this subjedis motivated by a prgfound concern that the United States *ill developstrategic defense capabilities—whether space-based or an ABM ver-sion—that would seriousl y undercut the credibility of Soviet strategyand by a .strong desire to achieve real constraints, by agreement orpolitical influence, on what the Soviets regard as threateninglong-termtechnology challenges by the United States in space weapons. Thisdesire will persist and shape future Soviet actions whether there arespace weapons talks in the near future or not. But short-term politicalconsiderations have clearly influenced the Soviets' tactics so far. Theyproposed specific talks in Vienna in September for a combination ofreasons: to put Washington on the defensive if it refused, to coax it intomajor concessions if it chose not to refuse, and to stimulate political

5T op S.,crot

interference from Congress and elsewhere with US ASAT and spaceweapons programs. The Soviets have expected all of these possibilities tobe greater in an election season, and have evidently been willing, for atime, to risk the US administration's claiming progress on arms controlfor its own political advantage. Throughout the diplomatic exchangesthat followed their proposal of 29 June, the Soviets combined adominant line of hostility and accusation that the United States blocksthe talks with repeated hints that compromise leading to Vienna ispossible.

The USSR is currently following a deliberate dual-track policytoward the United States. It involves, on one hand, hostile propagandaon all subjects, hostile acts such as harassment of US diplomats andtampering with access to Berlin, stubborn resistance to compromise oncentral arms control issues, and incremental increases in militarycapability dramatized by exercises and INF-related deployments. It hasalso allowed, on the other hand, forward movement on selected bilateralissues and contained hints of progress on arms control and wider US-So-viet issues if the United States make concessions. Sustained Sovietefforts to undermine US interests and policies, from Central America, toEurope, to the Middle East, are an integral part of this policy course.

. We expect this mixed Soviet policy to continue in the near future.It provides a basis for denying political benefits to the US administra-tion—which the Soviets expect, but are not sure, will be reelected—while exploring for concessions and a new tactical base for dealing withthe administration in a following term. This tactical posture-leaves open-the possibility of joining ASAT/space weapons talks in September if theUnited States appears ready to make inviting proposals, and also thepossibility of refusing such talks, or walking out on them, if theadministration looks politically vulnerable to such moves.

As of now, we believe the chances are well less than even that theSoviets will see it in their interest to start some form of ASAT/spaceweapons talks in September. They have probably not yet conclusivelydecided this, notwithstanding high-level assertions that talks are notexpected. In any case, they will handle the matter for the short-termpurpose of stimulating pressures for a US ASAT test moratorium and tocoax concessions on the agenda and substantive issues. Should such talksbegin, it is highly likely that the Soviets will hold over them the constantthreat of a walkout or suspension to keep up this pressure. If they seethe US administration as unbending on Soviet demands, divided within,and politically vulnerable.as the election approaches, there is a signifi-cant chance they would stage some sort of walkout for political effect. Itis somewhat more likely, however, that they would remain at the talks,

6

press for a scheduled adjournment or suspension before the elections,and maintain a drumfire of public and private accusations that theadministration is blocking progress on a vital arms issue that could openthe way to progress on the rest of the strategic arms control agenda. Thistactic would maintain pressure on Washin gton for concessions, keep theissue alive during the campaign, but not damage irretrievably theprospects for resuming the game should the administration be reelected.

Soviet desires to exacerbate the political vulnerabilities of theadministration or to exploit inhibitions on its behavior in the preelectionperiod could play a role in Soviet behavior toward potentially confron-tational situations that may arise in regions of tension, or could beinstigated by Soviet action. On the whole, Soviet behavior towaidregional crisis contingencies will be governed more by local opportuni-ties and risks than by the Soviet reading of the US political environ-ment As regards the latter, while the Soviets may see opportunities tohurt the US administration politically or to exploit election-yearinhibitions, they will also reflect on a spotty record of assessing these ef-fects, realizing that a Soviet challenge might strengthen the administra-tion's standing and generate support for a forceful response unwelcometo Moscow. The following examines possible contingencies we believemost worthy of attention, and we have reached judgments as to theirprobability:

— In Central America, an insurgent offensive of limited scope andmoderate effectiveness is likely to occur -in--E1 Salvador- -summer or the fall, and the Soviets expect it to undermineWashington's claim that its policies there are working- There isevidence that the Soviets are arranging the shipment of L-39trainer/combat aircraft to Nicaragua, possibly before Novem-ber. Although the United States has made clear that it will notaccept MICs or other combat jets in Nicaragua,, the Sovietswould count on the less capable L-39 to introduce ambiguitiesinto the situation and to complicate a US response. The Sovietswould be betting that the United States is unwilling militarily tochallenge the L-39 deployment before the election, and con-strained by its prior acceptance to tolerate the planes thereafter.The Soviets may intend to introduce more advanced fighteraircraft (such as MIC-21s) into Nicaragua at some point in thefuture. Their decision on MICs or other advanced aircraftwould depend principally on US reaction to deployment of theL-39s. The Soviets could also exploit the availability of Nicara-gua's large new militar y airbase for visits by Bear reconnais-

7Secret

sance and ASW aircraft, to shape the political environment forother deployment actions, and for military activity, such asmaritime monitoring at the a pproaches of the Panama Canal.An alternative view is that the estimate places too muchemphasis on the L-39 issue. If these aircraft are shipped toNicaragua, Moscow would perceive their introduction as onlyone of a number of increments in the Sandinista regime'smilitary capability—others would include the construction of alarge military airfield at Punta Huete and three Soviet-equipped communications intercept facilities. In evaluating theprobable US response to the MIGs, Moscow would consider USreaction to all of such increments, not to the L-39s alone. TheSoviet concern not to provoke the United States into military:action that has kept Moscow from delivering MIGs to Nicaraguafor over two years would continue in play.*

— The Soviets may take hostile action against Pakistan to end itssupport of the Afghan resistance, the tenacity of which appearsto have increased the Soviets frustration and perhaps led todoubts as to whether they ought to be satisfied with theirprotracted strategy for imposing control on Afghanistan. C

Thecannotnnot direct Indian actions againsrPakistaii . ut we_

believe that the likelihood of India's taking action over the next12 months for its own reasons has risen distinctly, and webelieve that the Soviets are in consultation with New Delhiabout the situation and strongly . motivated to exploit its . It issomewhat less likely that the Soviets will make direct butlimited attacks on Pakistan's border because this would presentthe best political circumstances for increased US supeort whilenot altering Zia's policies. Nevertheless, given Moscow's strongincentives to try to change Pakistan's policies toward the Afghanwar, recent signs of increased Soviet pressure on Islamabad, andMoscow's inability to command Indian action against Pakistan,the prospect of unilateral Soviet political and military pressureson Pakistan, such as limited air attacks and hot-pursuit raids onborder sites, cannot be ruled out. The Soviets may decide to

The holder of this view is the Director. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Department of State.

8

increase the frequency and scale of limited cross-border raids inan attempt to force President Zia to rein in the insurgents, butwe believe large-scale Soviet military actions against Pakistanremain unlikely.

— In the Persian Gulf region, escalation of the Iran-Iraq war andthe prospect of US intervention might induce the USSR pre-emptively to apply military pressure on Iran to end the conflictand to assert a Soviet role as a superpower in the Cuff region.Various developments in the Gulf are possible, but in the shortterm the most likely Soviet responses will be efforts to gainincreased political influence in Iran and other regional states,rather than confrontational military actions. An Iranian victoryover Iraq and Soviet reaction to it could lead to a Soviet invasionof Iran, and thereby to a direct military confrontation with theUnited States. But we believe this course of events is highlyunlikely in the time frame of this Estimate. There is noevidence to suggest that the Soviets are readying their militaryforces in the region to exert visible pressure or to take lopalaction, but they could be brought within weeks to sufficientreadiness to attack Iran or play a part in a Soviet pressurecampaign against Iran.

In Berlin, where the Soviets have been acting to remind theWest of its vulnerable access, the Soviets could escalate pressuresto stimulate fear and tension among the United States and its al-lies. Some increase in-Soviet actions - to test US and -alliedreactions cannot be ruled out in the short term. We believe anymajor escalation of pressure is very unlikely because the risk ofcounterproductive political effects in the West or a genuineconfrontation is higher than the Soviets wish to run now.

Taken together, these regional conflict situations, in which US andSoviet interests are opposed and the potential for local coriflict escala-tion is significant, generate possibilities for limited US-Soviet confronta-tion over coming months which we cannot rule out, although we judgethem unlikely. Circumstances could arise in which local events combinewith Soviet desire to gain local objectives and, secondarily, to embarrassthe United States, resulting in a degree of confrontation the USSR didnot originally seek. Domestic political conditions in the United Stateswill play some role in Soviet calculations. The Soviets would expect theelection period to impose inhibitions on US responses to their initiativesor other developments which would enhance their prospects of localsuccess. To a lesser extent, they may expect regional crises to put the USadministration on the defensive regarding its overall foreign policy. At

9

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the same time, uncertainties about US reactions to challenge and aboutthe political effects of Soviet challenges on US politics will continue tobe a restraining influence on Moscow's actions.

Recent Soviet military and political actions have created concernthat the Soviets may be preparing for a major military confrontationwith the United States. During the past six months or so the Soviets havepursued a vigorous program of large-scale military exercises, haveengaged in anomalous behavior with respect to troop rotation andwithdrawn military support for harvest activities, have demonstrativelydeployed weapon systems in response to NATO's INF deployments, andhave heightened internal vigilance and security activities. Amidstcontinuing propaganda and intermittent reportingC

)bout Soviet fears of impending war, there is concerti thatrecent Soviet military and defense-related activities might be read asrevealing (or attempting to cloud) definite Soviet preparations for anear-term confrontation with the United States that could sharplyheighten the risk of a general war. *

There is also concern about the possibility that the Soviet leader-ship might be of a mind to attempt a -now-or-never" effort todramatically shift the terms of the US-Soviet power struggle throughcentral confrontation, fearful that future Soviet domestic problems maymake it excessively difficult for the USSR to achieve its military and in-ternational goals in the future. It is feared that Soviet military activitiescould be in preparation for such a confrontation.

We strongly believe that Soviet actions are not inspired by, andSoviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict orconfrontation with the United States. Also, we do not believe that Sovietwar talk and other actions "mask" Soviet preparations for an imminentmove toward confrontation on the part of the USSR.

Supporting the conclusion, the • analysis underlying the presentEstimate has led us to judge, further:

— The Soviet leadership displays an expectation of intensifiedpower competition with the United States in the years ahead,along with some hope that US policies can be deflected by acombination of stubbornness and cajolery. It does not nowdisplay a view that dangerous confrontation may be required todefend its interests and advance its power.

— While pleased with the USSR's improved military situationachieved In - the past decade, the Soviet leadershi p is not soconfident in it that it would deliberately seek out a central testof US-Soviet strategic strength to - keep history on track.-

0Tve S,cro4

Tr

— Patterns of power and decisionmaking in the Soviet Politburo atpresent are very unlikely to generate initiatives that are politi-call y dangerous for its members, which a risky confrontationalstrategy would be.

— Examined comprehensively, Soviet military and defense-relatedactivities are in line with long-evolving plans and patterns,rather than with sharp acceleration of preparations for a majorwar. Noteworthy bY their absence are widespread logistics,supply; and defense-economic preparations obligated by Sovietwar doctrines and operational requirements. We have highconfidence in our ability to detect them if they were occurringon a wide scale.

To be sure, Soviet propaganda and other information activitieshave deliberately tried to create the image of a dangerous internationalenvironment, of Soviet fear of war, and of possible Soviet willingness tocontemplate dangerous actions. Some, although by no means all, recentSoviet military activity appears to have been directed in part atsupporting this campaign, especially large and visible Soviet militaryexercises. We believe that the apprehensive outlook the Soviets havetoward the long-term struggle with the United States has promptedthem to respond with a controlled display of military muscle.

pHowever, in thetotal context of Soviet foreign and doniestic developments, ,we judge itvery unlikely that the Soviets are now preparing for a majOr war or forconfrontation that could lead to a major war in the short run.

It is possible that, following the US elections and their reading ofthe overall political results, the Soviets could adjust their present foreignpolicy tactics to give more emphasis to steps of limited accommodation.Their aim would be to encourage US political trends that would deflector alter the defense and foreign policies of the United States which theSoviets see directed against them. They would seek a return in someform to the detente environment of the early •970s in which theyenjoyed many political and economic benefits of East-West amity but

II

—T-ep-Sec-c-94.

suffered few constraints on the expansion of their military power andinternational activities directed against the West, especially in the ThirdWorld. Although political circumstances in the West, both in the UnitedStates and in Europe, may encourage them to make more seriousattempts in this direction than in the past several years, the presentSoviet leaders appreciate that detente consistent with longstandingSoviet aims requires fundamental changes in US policies, namely asubstantial US retreat from efforts to contain Soviet power. They alsoappreciate that this is unlikely to be accomplished solely by diplomaticmaneuver on their part.

It is highly unlikely that the Soviets will fundamentally moderatetheir military and international aims and shift to a policy of genuine ..and far-reaching accommodation toward the United States in the periodof this Estimate. This could occur in the years ahead as a result of theUSSR's facing greater internal problems and external obstacles. For thepresent and the foreseeable future, Soviet leaders are likely to remainattached to expanding their military and international power. They willtry to manage the Soviet internal system to sustain these objectives.They would like to achieve a form of East-West detente that facilitatesthese objectives while limiting the costs and risks of pursuing them.They are not yet ready for a form of detente that forswears theexpansion of their power.

In brief summary, the near-term projections we have made are asfollows (percentages are merely for display of qualitative judgment;note that judgments of probable Soviet behavior in some cases arecontingent on prior developments having a lower probability):

— The USSR is likely to continue through the remainder of 1984the mixed policy toward the United States observed during thesummer months so far, with heavy emphasis on hostility and -rigidity, but with an undercurrent of hints about progress inbilateral relations and arms control (70 percent).

— It is now unlikely, but not ruled out, that the USSR will agree atthe last minute to commence space weapons talks in September(20 percent). The odds rise sharply if the United States agrees toan ASAT test moratorium (70 percent).

— Should space weapons talks begin in September, there is achance that the Soviets will contrive some sort of breakoff todamage the US administration politically (30 percent), but morelikely that they will simply accuse the United States of blockingsubstantive progress (70 percent).

12*Lt.. SCCCOI

— A moderately effective insurgent offensive is very likely, tooccur in El Salvador in late summer or the fall, and the Sovietswill welcome it for putting significant although not decisivepolitical pressure on Washington (90 percent).

— It is likely that the Soviets will introduce Le-39 jet aircraft intoNicaragua (70 percent). It is unlikely that more advanced fighters(such as MIG-21s) will be introduced before November (10percent). Should they successfully introduce L-39s, then the

• probability of their sending more advanced fighters rises. See thealternative view, held by the Director, Bureau of Intelligence andResearch, Department of State, as referenced in footnote 2. TheSoviets could also use the new large airfield soon to be completedfor visits by Bear reconnaissance and ASW aircraft.

— Should India evince interest in attacking Pakistanrthe Soviets praably would

be privately supportive, and proba ly would agree to provideintelligence and some logistic support (70 percent). The Soviets'main aim would be an end to Pakistan's support of the Afghanresistance.

— There is also a serious possibility that the Soviets will takeescalated unilateral military steps such as airstrikes and hot-pursuit actions to pressure Islamabad toward this end in themonths ahead (40 percent). A major Soviet attack on Pakistan,requiring new deployments and some weeks of preparation, isvery unlikely during the period of this Estimate (5 percent).

— Near-term Soviet behavior toward the more probable develop-ments in the Iran-Iraq war is likely to be continued effortstoward political openings in Tehran and among the Persian Gulfstates (80 percent). Only in the event of dramatic militarysuccess by Iran against Iraq (10 percent) or major US intervsn-.tion on Iranian soil are the Soviets likely to take direct militarymeasures toward intervontion (70 percent).

— The Soviets are unlikely to escalate substantially their presentvery low-key pressures on Berlin access (10 percent). They may,however, test Western reactions by small increases in the degreeand visibility of pressures they are now applying (30 percent).

— There is some likelihood that the Soviets will try, following theUS elections, a mix of tactics toward the United States that givegreater emphasis to flexibility on arms control and movementon bilateral issues, without giving up fundamental positions (30percent). Continuation of present policy mix well into 1985 ismore likely (70 percent).

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— It is highly improbable that the Soviets will shift to more far- .reaching accommodations toward the United States during theperiod of this Estimate (5 percent).

— It is highly unlikely that the USSR is now preparing for and willmove deliberately into a visible posture of direct, high-levelmilitary confrontation with the United States during the next sixmonths (5 percent). It cannot be ruled out, however, that theUSSR could move quickly into such a posture as a result of a lo-cal crisis escalation not now planned or sought by Moscow (10percent).

DISCUSSION

I. CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES TOWARD THEUNITED STATES

A. The Content of the Current Line

1. The Soviets are pursuing policies that expressdeep political hostility toward the United States. Soviettactics on arms control and bilateral issues have beenmore activist and have attempted to display moreflexibility since early summer than during the previ-ous six months or so. The dominant thrust of SovietPolicy, however, remains highly combative toward USinterests and stubbornly resistant to com promise on allmajor arms control and security issues. Soviet policycontinues to serve and be molded b y the Soviet desireto achieve and maintain overall military superiorityover the United States and its coalition partners. Itaims at preserving the USSR's gains and expanding itsinternational power against what the Soviets regard asserious challenges from the United States. -

2. The Soviets accuse the United States of pursuingthe most malign goals in world affairs, of seeking tooverturn the strategic -parity'. created in the 1970s, ofbeing totally insirscere about desiring arms control andimprovement In East-West relations, of increasing thedanger of nuclear war, and of seeking to destabilizethe Soviet internal system. The US administration isfrequently depicted to foreign and domestic audiencesas following in the footsteps of Nazism. On thediplomatic front, both in what they do and what theyrefuse to do, the Soviets are striving to undermine thedomestic and alliance support for the policies and thesurvival of the present US administration.

3. The hostility of Soviet policy today is new indegree, but not in content Soviet propaganda has beenblaming the United States for raising the danger ofnuclear war since a Central Committee resolution ofmid-1980 which followed NATO's dual-track decisionon INF and measures taken by the Carter administra-tion after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Theidentification of the United States with Nazism was acommon feature of Soviet propaganda until the early1970s. Although the Soviets charge the present USadministration with carrying US-Soviet relations to

their lowest point in several decades, the y also recog-nize that those relations have been declining since the

mid-1970s.

4. Soviet refusal to negotiate on START and !NF, acentral feature of Moscow's current policy, was trig-gered by the onset of NATO's INF deployments butcontinues to be motivated by the larger Soviet purposeof creating a worldwide , atmosphere of anxiety forwhich the United States is held to blame. Sovietwithdrawal from the Olympics was intended to signalthe extent of deterioration in US-Soviet relations andthereby to strike a blow that was expected to embar-rass Washington in a very political year. The Sovietinitiative on ASAT and space weapons talks has beenmanaged, so far, in order to saddle Washington withblame for rejecting an opportunity to discuss a majorarms issue.

5. On regional security issues throughout the world,the current Soviet line is that Washington is ultimatelyresponsible for all tensions, seeking to exploit them forits 'Imperial'. purposes, willing to risk major conflict,and thwarting all reasonable solutions. In many areasof the Third World, where the Soviets see themselveslocked in a historic struggle with the United States,they remain active in supplying arms, seeking toInfluence regional politics, and conducting local pene-tration activities to expand their power and to protectIt where it has been established. Although Moscowpublicly proclaims its desires for cooperation on re-glottal security issues' confidential diplomatic ex-changes with the United States and its allies reveallittle, if any, interest by Moscow in this direction.Although less shrill than their public propaganda, theirprivate messages are wholly of indictment and com-plaint

6. Current Soviet policy toward the United Stateshas a visible internal political purpose. The supposedlyincreased tensions—for which Washington is heldresponsible—are constant preambles to exhortations•by Soviet leaders to greater effort, discipline, andsacrifice by the Soviet population. They are cited indemands for greater internal vigilance and security.

15—T-sp-Sac.cas.

They preface repeated calls by Soviet military andpolitical leaders for measures to strengthen Sovietdefenses.

7. On close examination the overall image of hostil-ity and intransigence displayed by Soviet policy is,nevertheless, marked by elements that Qualify thedominant theme. Soviet pronouncements make clearwhat Moscow wants in US-Soviet :viaticum return tothe condition of detente as they saw it in the early1970s. In Soviet eyes, this is not a fundamentalcompromise of East-West antagonisms, but an envi-ronment in which Moscow is relatively free to expandits military power, to extend its influence in the ThirdWorld at low risk, to conduct political and ideologicalcampaigns against the West, and to enjo y the econom-ic and political benefits of "equality" as a superpowermember of the international community, while theUnited States is relatively constrained by agreementand political factors from contesting these Soviet poli-cies. What appears a good deal less certain to Sovietleaders is whether return to this kind of detente ispossible, and, if not, what pattern of US-Soviet rela-tions is feasible for them to pursue.

8. Soviet propaganda directed principally at inter-nal audiences injects the recurrent note that, after all,East-West tensions and the dangers of war have notgotten irretrievably out of hand, that US anti-Sovietpolicies are destined to be unsuccessful because thecorrelation of forces" and "objective factors" will

thwart them, and that "healthy forces" in the Westcan be counted on to ease tensions and revive detenteeventually.

9. Soviet official intransigence on START and INFis accompanied by occasional private feelers on how toget dialogue on these issues moving again, whileexploring for signs of US willingness to make conces-sions. Although the aim of putting the United States onthe political defensive has determined Soviet tactics onthe ASAT/space initiative, Moscow also has a genuinedesire to achieve—by some combination of politicalinfluences and agreement—real constraints on USspace weapons programs which could negate somecurrent Soviet advantages n these areas and couldeventually strain the USSR's strategic posture andoutpace its technological responsiveness. Meanwhile,the Soviets maintain some aspects of the arms controldialogue on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, onConference on Disarmament in Europe, and on chem-ical weapons. They have portrayed an eagerness tomove on the Com prehensive Test Ban.

10.The hostile atmosphere of the past six monthshas not prevented the Soviets from moving on avariety of selected bilateral issues, from which theycan obtain some benefit or which do not requirecompromising their strategic s-concerns These issuesare modest in themselves, but invested with a potentialPolitical impact somewhat contrary to the dominantthrust of Soviet policy. These include renewal of thetrade and economic cooperation agreement, hotlineupgrade, and progress on some consular issues andexchanges. During regular Ulla under the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement in late May, the Soviets showedexceptional hospitality to the American delegation (notatypical for military-to-military =Changes) and madea number of very forthcoming suggestions on shipvisits and air safety. In confidential ind high-leveldiplomatic interactions with the United States, whichhave been sustained fairly consistently throughout thelast several years, the Soviets have been sober andbusinesslike. Although substantivel y intransigent onmost central issues, especially arms control, theirdiplomatic communications have displayed neitherthe tone of alarm nor the belligerence generated intheir official propaganda.

II. During the last six months, certain nuances inSoviet public, diplomatic, and private communicationshave suggested some experimentation or searching, ifonly for tactical purposes, for openings to be moreflexible without jeopardy to basic positions:

— Around the turn of the yeas,cand some Soviet

leaders' statements t the Soviets didnot wish their recent walkout on START andINF to lock them into an immobile diplomaticposture.

— Chemenko's 2 March "election" speech referredto the possibility of a "breakthrough" in East-West relations, dependent on significant US con-cessions.

— Nongoverarnent delegations and diplomatic ob-servers in Moscow report a very frigid politicalatmosphere in March-May, and then a certainsoftening in the Soviet tone in late Ma y and June,during which progress on some bilateral issueswas made.

— The Soviet ASAT/space weapons demarche 01 29June, foreshadowed by a multitude of privateand official signals of Soviet preoccupation withthis topic, was dearly an initiative to get Sovietdiplomacy toward the United States out of its

16Top Socrgt

frozen state, although certainly motivated inlarge part by combative political attitudes to-ward the United States.

— Throughout this period, the Soviets have soughtthrough high-level contacts with US allies totransmit pressures for change in Washington'sPolicies and to undermine allied support forthem.

12.. In sum, especially since late s pring. the Sovietshave been moving on a dual track in which thedominant posture of hostility, suspicion, and refusal toentertain compromise on major arms control andsecurity issues has combined with real, but less visible,efforts to sustain a working relationshi p on a range ofbilateral matters.

13. Their major—and as yet inconclusive—initia-tive on ASAT/spaoe weapons, made on 29 June. is anexample of this policy. Soviet behavior on this subjectis motivated by a Profound concern that the UnitedStates will develop strategic defense capabilities—whether space-based or an ABM version—that wouldseriously undercut the credibility of Soviet strategyand by a strong desire to achieve real constraints onwhat the Soviets regard as threatening long-termtechnology challenges by the United States in spaceweapons, a desire which- will -Demist and influencefuture Soviet actions whether there are space weaponstalks in the near future or not But short-term politicalconsiderations have dearly influenced the Soviets'tactics so far. They proposed specific talk; hi Yiefigglitt --September for a combination of reasons: to put Wash-ington on the defensive if it refused, to coax it intomajor concessions if it chose not to refuse, and tostimulate political opposition from Congress and else-where to US ASAT and space weapons programs. TheSoviets have expected all of these possibilities to begreater in an election season, and, in order to testthem, apparently were willing for a time to risk the USadministration's claiming progress on arms control forits political advantage. Throughout the month ofdiplomatic exchanges that followed their proposal, theSoviets combined a dominant line of intransigence andaccusation that the United States blocks the talks withrepeated hints that compromise leading to Vienna ispossible.

B. Soviet Perceptions and .Foreign Policy Calculotions

14. The motivation for Soviet policy at present liesin the perception that the United States under its

current administration is a more consistently hostileopponent of the USSR's interests and aspirations thanit has faced in many years. At the core of thisPerception is the overall military power relationshipand the prospects for its being altered. By the late1970s the Soviets believed they had created a totalmilitary posture which was, although not a plateau onwhich they could rest their efforts, a much moresatisfactory basis for the defense of their securityinterests and the advancement of their power in thesurrounding world than had existed for decades. Theyexpected that. In the 1980s, this military frameworkwould help them gain many of the economic andpolitical benefits of detente and also expanded influ-ence at Western expense around their periphery andin the Third World, however reluctantly acquiesced inby the West.

15.Today they see the United States acting on abroad front to undercut these ex pectations, first byPursuing an array of military programs that mightshift the central strategic and regional power equationsagainst Soviet interests, and second b y pursuing for-eign policies that both den y the benefits of detente onthe terms the Soviets have sought and mobilize 1.3Sallies and regional security partners against the USSR.They see the Sino-US relationship, despite persistent

- frictions in it and Beijing's determination to follow acompletely independent course, as directed mainlyagainst Soviet interests.

16. Soviet leaders believe US policies are governed-by--deep anti-Soviet convictions in Washington. Intheir view, not only is the United States seeking tocontain Soviet power by its military and Politicalinitiatives, but aiming to use the larger power struggle,along with political and propaganda efforts, to chal-lenge the legitimacy and ultimately the stability ofSoviet control over its Third World clients, its EastEuropean dependencies, and even its -domestic order.Although they have long Oropagated the dogma thatthe ultimate threats to human welfare and securit y liein the "nature of imperialism"—above all US imperi-alism—Soviet leaders are greatly dismayed to hearfrom US leaders the contention that the dictatorial andacquisitive nature of the Soviet system itself is .thehistoric throat to peace and other human values.

17. In the Soviet view, American leaders cannot beother than essentially anti-Soviet. But since Stalin, theSoviets have increasingly believed that the UnitedStates would more often than not be governed by"realistic" political elements who would recognize theneed to accommodate not only to the existence of the

17T op Sc,.*-_".

Soviet system but to its expanding international influ-ence and military power as welt In this respect, thebroad challenge to the legitimacy of its power andiiioral claims heard from the United States recentlyhas been a disturbing jolt to the Kremlin. •

18. The Soviets perceive that current US policytoward the USSR enjoys a considerable base of supportat home and among key allies. As a consequence, theUS administration has been more successful than notin gaining approval for its military and foreign policyinitiatives, for its arms control stance, and for surviv-ing unsuccessful efforts, such as in Lebanon. On theother hand, the Soviets perceive and are intenselyinterested in the vulnerabilities of this Political base.They look to a whole range of -contradictions- in theeconomic development of the West generally, inrelations among US allies, and in US domestic politicsas sources of opposition to current US policies. Theyproclaim—as much out of hope as conviction—thatthese sources of opposition, along with the strength ofthe USSR, will prevent the United States from turningback the dock of history on the East-West powerstruggle. Above all, they look to the peace issue andpopular concern about nuclear arms as a countervail-ing force which they can stimulate and ex ploit ThePolicy implications of these perceptions for Moscoware fairly straightforward, up to a point:

First, Soviet leaders seem at present to believethat the likelihood that the United States willcontinue the policies of the past several years intothe rest of the.decade-is high enough to requiresome political and military gearing up for aperiod of lasting and more Intense strategicstruggle. How vigorous an effort this will requirein the future is uncertain to them, and possibly insome dispute.

— Second, they believe that they can influence thecontent, effectiveness, and durability of US poli-cies they see directed against them. The rigidityand hostility of Soviet policy toward the United

• States, on one hand, and attempts to take initia-tive and show flexibility, on the other, are aimedat deflecting and discrediting those US policies.Up to now, they have evidently calculated thatrigidity and hostility are the more promisingposture. But their recent performance and theoutlook for the future plausibly call this intoquestion.

19. Row the Soviets read the upcoming US presi-dential election is unavoidably an important factor inassessing their current foreign policy behavior. Soviet

concern about US domestic politics is not unique to thepresent situation. The Soviets always seek to base theirpolicies on long-term interests and calculation. Forthose policies to be successful, however, has obligedthem, especially since the late 1960s, to tailor theirtactics to a reading of the domestic political trends inthe West which they wish to exploit or temper. Thepolitical prospects of the present US administration aretherefore of keen interest to them.

•20. Many Soviet experts on the United States pro-

fess conviction that President Reagan will be reelect-ed Although Soviet propaganda has taken care not toapplaud his opponents, it is easy to see that Sovietleaders would like him to be defeated. But the morerelevant question is whether they thick they canusefully and safely influence or exploiethe US elec-tion.

21. Numerous sources report a Soviet determinationnot to do anything that might help President Reagan'sreelection. This Is a political stance resting on morethan just pique. The Soviets have calculated, thus far,that an improvement in the US-Soviet atmosphere andgenuine progress on arms control issues, while it mightyield specific benefits of interest to them and offersome opportunity to deflect the administration's poli-cies, would probably have the net effect of demon-strating that the United States can manage stable US-Soviet relations while also pressing military andforeign policies fundamentally directed against theUSSR. They have been very unwilling to concede this.They have not expected to affect the outcome of thepresidential race thereby, but have expected to keepthe administration on the defensive regarding US-Soviet relations through the campaign and Into thenext term, perhaps influencing the behavior of Con-gress and the administration's freedom of politicalaction. The Soviets clearly have operated on the beliefthat election pressures enhance the eagerness of Wash-ington to display some positive developments on armscontrol and, hence, the likelihood of some US conces-sions on ASAT/space weapons issues so long as theykeel) Prospects for negotiations barely alive. Moreover,they may calculate that an administration on thedefensive about US-Soviet relations and otherwiseseized with the pressures of an election campaign willbe more than normally inhibited in its responses toregional crisis developments in which the Soviets haveinterests or take initiatives.

C. Internal Factors

22. Soviet propaganda frequently accuses the Unit:ed States of seeking to destabilize the Soviet system by.

among other means, forcing the Soviet Union intoarms efforts which the system cannot sustain. Thefrequency with which the Soviets accuse the UnitedStates of this policy and the energy with which theydismiss its prospects for success suggest some anxiety inthe minds of Soviet leaders about the ability, of theSoviet system to deal with intensified and protractedstrategic struggle. •

23. The Soviet leadership continues to be facedwith a whole range of internal problems:

— The performance of the Soviet economy and thechallenge of finding any combination of politi-cally acceptable reforms that will materiallyimprove it.

—Declining social morale and dwindling effective-ness of exhortations and disciplinary measures inmotivating worker effort.

—Continuing manifestations of isolated politicaldissent, ethnic nationalism, and antisocial atti-tudes, especially among youth, which are worri-some despite massive and effective means ofcontrol in the hands of the regime.

— Doubts within the Soviet political elite as towhether the current senior Politburo memberscan effectively address Soviet foreign and domes-tic problems. An alternative view is that, whilethe Soviet leaders recognize the existence of anumber of longstanding domestic problems, theyare not so preoccupied with addressing theseissues that- it–Pi-events them from acting decisive-ly and resolutely on foreign policies. Moreover,the holder of this view also believes that, whilethere may be some criticisms among party func-tionaries, there is no evidence that these criti-cisms affect Soviet policies.'

24C ') wehave some evidence that Soviet military leaders ques-tion the ability of the work force to tolerate thesacrifices of intensified defense efforts. To the extentthese sentiments are known to, or present in, thePolitburo, they would cause considerable anxiety.

25. The internal problems of managing the countrydominate the agendas of the Soviet leadership in thebest of times. The array of problems facing them nowhas probably increased their preoccupation with inter-nal affairs. Recent Soviet policies toward the United

'The holder of this (,Jew is the Director. Defense IntelligenceAgency.

States and the outside world generally may to asignificant degree be affected by these internal preoc-cupations. Rigid policies and hostile, defensive rhetoricinward the outside world are a natural reflex of Sovietleaders when they sense that the system itself is underchallenge. These policies may endure even when theyare neither effective in advancing Soviet interestsabroad nor very helpful in easing the system's internaldifficulties. For exam ple, Soviet war-scare propagandamay have had counterproductive effects at home bystimulating the population's fears that the militarypower for which they pay so dearly does not reallyprotect them. This may have stimulated Intermittentassurances from various spokesmen that the dangers ofthe international environment should not be exagger-ated. Chernenko has reassured a worldng-class audi-ence that the demands of defense in a tense interna-tional period will not require overtime on militaryproduction. See the alternative view, held by theDirector, Defense Intelligence AgencY, as referencedin footnote 4.

26. Somewhat akin to their internal concerns, Sovietleaders face challenges to their interests in EasternEurope where social and economic problems aretaxing the effectiveness of Communist regimes andthose regimes are pressed to experiment with reformsand ties to the West which run counter to Sovietinterests in ideological orthodoxy and subservience toMoscow. In one degree or another, all the East Euro-pean members of the Warsaw Pact exce pt Czechoslo-vakia are pursuing.riornestic and foreign policy agen-das that pose challenges to Soviet interests and control,although the USSR maintains basic limits on EastEuropean deviation.

27. A balancing act is evident in current • Soviettactics toward Eastern Europe. Seeking a high degreeof visible solidarity on such issues as INF. the Olym-pics, and dealings with the West, the Soviets have hadto temper or delly sou;e'efforts to enhance economicintegration in CEMA.

28. The state of the top political leadership itself isa factor in the shaping of Soviet foreign policy.

;the presentPattern of Politburo decisionmaking its severalexperts, such as Ustinov on military matters, framingissues while final decisions are reached collectively.Collectivity is constantly touted in Politburo pro-nouncements. Limited foreign policy experience onthe part of Chernenko and other senior Politburomembers has apparently given Cromyko a leading-roleon foreign policy decisions which he did not enjoy

19Top Socc",

under previous General Secretaries. Recent rumorsabout dispute over the ASAT/space wea pons initiativebetween a majority of the Politburo, who allegedlyfavored it, and Cromyko, who opposed but was over-ruled, are probably overdrawn. We suspect someargument among Soviet leaders over tactics, but arewary of such reports because of the occasional Sovietinterest in depicting a "hawk-dove" dichotomy in theleadership to influence Western policy.

29. Given our uncertainties about the exact state ofplay in Soviet leadership politics, assessments about theinfluence of personalities and factions would at thispoint be little more than guesses. It is possible thatcomplaining about Cromyko's policy judgment on thepart of others eclipsed by his role, such as the interna-tional affairs specialists in the Central Committeeapparatus, could exert an influence on future Sovietoolicymaking.

30. Recent statements by Soviet military and politi-cal leaders and somewhat divergent pronouncementsas to how dangerous the international environmentreally is, against the backdrop of obvious economicproblems faced by the system, strongly indicate thatimportant resource allocation issues now intersectsharply with foreign policymaking. As it prepares forthe 27th CPSU Congress scheduled for 1986, rewritesthe party program, and builds the 1986-90 Five-YearPlan, the leadershi p is now addressing what the gener-al directions of foreign and domestic policy ought tobe over the rest of the decade and beyond. The keyissue is whether !A behavior ancl the challenges .itposes to Soviet strategic interests demand an increasein the Soviet military burden, and how the Sovietsystem can bear such an increase while managing itsother problems. In some fashion the leadership isprobably grappling with the Question whether near-term departures in policy might have a better chanceof advancing Soviet interests against the United Statesand of doing so at lower long-term cost to ttte systemthan the policies currently being pursued.

31. An alternative view is that the recent statementsby Soviet military and political leaders concerning thedangerous international environment have a domesticpropaganda function of rationalizing the demands forgreater productivity on the part of the labor force,continued consumer deprivation, and ideological vigi-lance in the society. In this view, these statementsagainst the backdrop of economic problems do notindicate that im portant resource allocation issues areimpacting on Soviet foreign policy making. Althoughthe USSR is faced with continuing economic problems,

this view holds that it is unlikely that the Sovietleadership will reduce military spending. On the basisof observed military activity—the number of weaponsystems in production, weapons develo pment, pro-grams, and trends in capital expansion in the defense.industries—this view expects Soviet military sPendingto grow.'

0. Possible Arguments Within the Kremlin forand Against Near-Term Policy Change

32. We have indirect evidence of Soviet leadershipdebate over future foreign policy direction, largely inthe form of varying lines on the danger of war and thebalance of positive versus negative features of theinternational scene. This evidence should not be takento indicate sharp, explicit controversy in the Politburo.The current thrust of Soviet policy is probably satisfac-tory to most members, in part because it- avoids theimmediate need for basic decisions. Moreover, theSoviet Politburo only rarely decides even major issuesby direct confrontation of opposing views, which canbe Politically dangerous for the losers. Normally.Policy disputes are resolved by bureaucratic process,subtle personnel moves, and esoteric communicationsthat signal which way the wind is blowing. Showdownsituations—such as Cromyko's allegedly being out-voted on the ASAT initiative—are avoided; when theyoccur they are about political power as well as policychoice. Thus, the Politburo projects to itself as well asthe surrounding elite an image of steady authority andstability vital to its hold on power.

33. These Politburo decisionmalcing mores tend toprotract and obscure consideration of basic policychange, but not prevent it entirely. An influentialSoviet argument for near-term change in the directionor basic tactics of Soviet policy would have to restheavily on the assessed benefits, costs, and uncertain-ties of proposed alternatives. A range- of possiblealternatives the Soviets miglit consider is examined inthe next section. Proponents of different policies,.however, would have to make a strong case or other-wise contrive a consensus that current Soviet policiestoward the United States are failing to achieve Sovietobjectives, and overcome a self-interested defense ofcurrent policies by its principal stewards.

34. A telling critique of current Soviet policiestoward the United States could be made, and probablyis being made in some quarters of the Soviet nationalsecurity establishment. What might it be?

'The holder of this view is the Director. Defense Intelligence' Agency.

20Sec(ot

— NATO's INF deployment was a major Sovietfailure unlikely to be reversed, even though itfaces further difficulties.

— Soviet policy—the walkout of START and INF,propaganda efforts, and diplomatic hostility to-ward the United States---has not put the UnitedStates clearly on the defensive. The US adminis-tration has managed to maintain Its original anti-Soviet policies and to limit the political effects ofSoviet hostility.

— If reelected, the Reagan administration will havea relatively free hand to pursue anti-Soviet Poli-cies in the future. Some new Soviet policy combi-nation has to be contrived to blunt those policiesby showing them ineffective or too dangerous.

35. Against such a critique, a Soviet defense ofcurrent policy would probably take the following line=

— There are fundamental forces of strain withinthe United States and its alliances that limit USpower and serve Soviet interests, such as fear ofwar, concein about defense spending, and dis-taste for tense relations with the USSR. Sovietpolicy is designed to exploit them, but must do sopatiently and persistently.

— Current Soviet policies exploit and increase thedifficulties faced by the United States withouteither undue concessions or undue risk, regard-less of US election results.

— Alternative policies face greater risks and uncer-tainties. Policies based on concessions run thehigh risk of failing to elicit countaroncessionsfrom Washington while legitimizing current USpolicies. Policies veering snore toward confronta-tional relations run the Political risk of broaden

-ing anti-Soviet sentiment in the United States,and could lead to real conflict.

— Relying on its strong suit of patience and stayingpower, Soviet policy will outlast the currentPhase of the US effort to block Soviet globalambitions and to win back past US losses.

— A proper evaluation of Soviet internal conditionslends support to current foreign policies. Al-though it will be difficult, the Soviet economycan sustain the likely intensification of the mili-tary competition. Major confrontations should beavoided because they will tax Soviet resourcesand stimulate US arms efforts which may other-wise subside.

Of the foregoing arguments, the defense of currentpolicy, in our judgment, has the upper hand in theKremlin today, although the critique is probablypersuasive enough to cause some consideration ofalternative policies.

IL SOVIET POLICY OPTIONSIN THE NEAR FUTURE

A. Continuation of the Dual-Track Policy

36. The USSR is currently following a deliberatedual-track policy toward the United States involving,on one hand, hostile propaganda on all subjects, hostileacts such as harassment of US diplomats and tamper-ing with access to Berlin, and stubborn resistance tocompromise on central arms control issues, combinedwith, on the other hand, forward movement on select-ed bilateral issues and hints of progrez on arms controland wider US-Soviet issues if the United States snakesconcessions. Sustained Soviet efforts to undermine USinterests and policies, from Central America, to Eu-rope, to the Middle East, are entirely consistent withthis course.

37. We believe that continuation of this policy isthe most likely Soviet behavior at least into early 1985.

38. In Soviet calculations, this mixed policy has anumber of benefits. It has the highest likelihood ofputting the United States in a defensive and reactivepolitical position, and applying pressureon .Washing

-ton to make concessions prior to the elections fordomestic political reasons. By holding out the possibili-ty of improvement in relations, it could inhibit USexploitation of Soviet political vulnerabilities, such asarising from the Sakharov case, or from taking newanti-Soviet initiatives of its own. This policy is alsocalculated to stimulate policy dispute within the USGovernment and the pdt blic arena that will help theSoviets to determine future diplomatic tactics andpropaganda lines.

39. The dual-track approach the Soviets are follow-ing allows them with some credibilit y to depict SovietPolicy as having the initiative, while leaving- theiroptions open as to which direction to take before andafter the US elections. It does not constrain theirability to respond to regional opportunities or pressuresfor action that could exacerbate US-Soviet tensions.

40. In the Soviet internal decision arena, the dual-track policy has the benefit of avoiding major pOlicyrevisions while giving increased license to various parts

21---Tep-bec-ret-

Ts,e

of the Soviet national security establishment to pursuetheir institutional agendas. There is a chance that thiscould produce actions by Soviet diplomats, propagan-dists, security organs, and even the military that arenot fully synchronized by central calculation_ Suchactions should not automatically be taken as a sign ofpolicy dispute or institutional conflict because theSoviets are balancing multiple objectives and becausethe appearance of dispute may be encouraged fortactical purposes.

41. Soviet behavior regarding ASAT/space weaponstalks will be central to their tactics. Over the course Ofthe next month, the Soviets will have to make adecision about priorities which they probably have notyet made: Do they prevent the onset of ASAT talks todeny the Reagan administration the political boonwhich the very existence of talks will represent? Or dothey use the talks for continuing influence over the USPrograms affected and as the starting point for newengagement of a US administration they expect to bereturned in November? They have a strong interest inkeeping the prospects of such talks barely alive as longas possible, while depicting the United States as reject-ing them, in order to maintain the political pressuresin Washington which could interfere with the fundingor testing of US systems while retaining an easy Sovietoption of backing away from talks. •

42. As of the moment the chances a ppear well lessthan even that the Soviets will decide to go to Viennain September. Their immediate tactical objectivesappear to be to deny the US administration thepolitical benefits of talks while casting it in a positionof blame for their absence. This explains the present,seemingly conclusive, deadlock Nevertheless, theystill have both a short-term interest in eliciting sub-stantive concessions on space weapons Issues and alonger term Interest In starting a political and negotiat-ing process that offers some prospect of constrainingUS programs in the future. If the United States iswilling to make concessions on any of the pdnts whichthe Soviets insist are blocking the talks, the Soviets mayyet be willing to go to Vienna to service these shortand long-term interests. They probably regard the USdesire to raise nuclear forces at such talks as relativelyunimportant, so long as they need not negotiate aboutthem. They also probably judge prior US commitmentto the goal of a total 'space weapons ban as unrealistic,although they would continue to insist on this as a goal.Their real bargaining target is a temporary ASAT-testing moratorium, which they believe could beParlayed into wider constraints on US space weaponsprograms. Even if talks do begin in September, the

Soviets will probably maintain a stubborn and accusa-tory posture in negotiations through the fall, insistingthat US behavior and positions indicate insincerity andjeopardize the continuation of talks.

43. The Soviets are unlikely during the next halfyear to agree to reopen the START and (NF negotia-tions in any forum, although their interest in findingsome way back to those talks will probably increaseafter the US elections. Over time, they may come tosee an arms control linkage of offensive strategicsystems with space-based defensive systems, whichthey now bitterly resist, as a means to exert politicalpressure on the entire range of US strategic programs.We also believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets will •agree to a summit with the United States before orimmediately after the US elections short of major USconcessions on arms issues. They would view eithermove as gratuitous legitimation of US policies theyseek to discredit After the November elections or atsuch point as the Soviets conclude their outcome iscertain. Moscow could begin to put more stress onPositive steps in the US-Soviet relationship in order toreshape the priorities of the administration in the nextterm away from the anti-Soviet directions Moscownow perceives.

44. There is a serious possibility that sometimebetween now and November, the USSR could revert toits completely negative tactics of the spring or deliber-ately contrive a sudden collapse of space negotiationsor other promising US-Soviet bilateral proceedings inthe hope of blaming the US administration for a -lostopportunity" prior to the elections. Opening this op

-tion was probably a factor In the Soviet proposal toinitiate formal talks.E

](The Soviets have recently stepped up overseasgrain purdiases this is probably a hedge against a poorharvest outlook.) Such Soviet moves, while currently intheir contingency planning, will certainly be decidedin the light of US domestic political reactions, as bestthey can read them. Their recent experience shouldtell them that they have consistently underestimatedthe ability of the US administration to fend off suchpolitical blows. Should visible controversy arise inWashington over possible concessions in space talks,however, the Soviets might believe they could usefacile diplomatic maneuvers to elicit concessions or toblame the administration for failure to make progress:If the Soviets were to consider cancellation of the grain

22L71-1

agreement, they would have to take into account suchfactors as their harvest outlook and, in general. Sovietreliability on long-term agreements.

B. Deliberate Central Confrontation

45. We believe it highly unlikely that the USSR ispreparing, in the near term, to instigate an acutecentral confrontation—on the order of the Cubanmissile crisis of 1962—carrying the risk of a.generalwar to achieve its political objectives.' But the im plica-tions of this possibility are so great as to require itsexamination. Concern that the Soviets might plan foran imminent confrontation arises from two kinds ofreasoning:

— Against the backdrop of sharpening difficultiesinside the Soviet system, and facing US actionsthat could reverse the "correlation of forces" inthe years ahead, It is feared, Soviet leaders mightcalculate that now is the time to call a majorshowdown in the US-Soviet strategic struggle.They might believe that their relative militarypower will never be greater, that as a conse-quence there is as high a prospect as they couldexpect that the United States would back downin a confrontation; and that such a result wouldvirtually neutralize the United States as a strate-gic opponent under any administration for yearsto come.

— During the past six months or so, the Soviets havePursued a vigorous program of large-scale mili-tary exercises, have engaged in anomalous behav-ior with respect to troop rotation, have withheldmilitary support from the harvest, have demon-stratively deployed weapon systems in responseto NATO's INF deployments, and have height-ened internal vigilance and security activitiesAmidst continuing propaganda and intermittentreporting 3 about

,Soviet fears of Impending war, there is concernthat recent Soviet military and defense-relatedactivities might be read as revealing (or possiblyconcealing) definite Soviet preparations for anear-term confrontation with the United Statesthat could sharply heighten the risk of a generalwar.

46. The concern here is less that the Soviets mightdeliberately provoke a general war than that theymight seek local objectives of such importance that alarger test of the US-Soviet power relationship ensues

• See additional view, as referenced in footnote 7. paragraph 53.

and the risk of escalation to a major conflict isdramatically increased. Were the Soviets to have suchobjectives immediately in mind, they would presum-ably be obliged to prepare for the most dangerouspossible Consequences of acting to achieve them. Sucha confrontation might occur as a result of deliberateSoviet closure of access to Berlin (to collapse NATO'sconfidence in itself and the United States), a majordirect attack on Pakistan (to terminate support to theAfghan resistance), a preemptive military move to-ward the Cull (to prevent the United States frominstalling forces and bases and to establish the USSR asthe preeminent superpower in the region), or theinsertion of nuclear weapons and other Soviet forcesinto Cuba (as a counter to INF or to deter US actionsagainst Soviet clients in Central Amerka).

47. The foregoing argumentation is presented toexplain consideration of this possibility. It cannot beruled out that the Soviet leaders have given somethought to the radical option of sa direct militaryconfrontation with the United States. Their own'prop-aganda and other means of signaling are Partiallyintended to plant the thought in Western minds thatthey are genuinely fearful of such a possibility now,and it is conceivable that they take this element oftheir own propaganda with some degree of seriousness.However, we believe it to be very unlikely that theSoviets are now planning to instigate a confrontationthat would carry an acute risk of general war, areplanning on a short-term basis some otheK action thatcould lead to such a confrontation, or genuinely fearthat they must prepare for and possibly preempt animpending US attack on them of some sort.

48. Our reasons for this judgment are as follows:

— First, we see no convincing evidence that theSoviet leadership is currently in the apocalypticframe of mind required to drive them into thesort of behavior speculated on above, and fairlyconvincing evidence to the contrary in the bal-ance of Soviet rhetoric about international anddomestic affairs. The Soviet leadership is defi-nitely worried about longer term trends in thecorrelation of forces- and their prospects in the

East-West power struggle. At the same time ittells all audiences that there are powerful forcesand trends at work in the international arena thatwill prevent the United States from forcing ashowdown situation and avert the necessit y ofthe USSR doing so. The Soviet leadership is' alsoworried about the capacity of the Soviet internal

23L..1, c.4

system to sustain the rigors of East-West compe-tition, not only in economic and technologyterms which clearly influence the military bal-ance, but also in propaganda and political terms.The authentic concern of Soviet leaders is proba-bly greater than that conveyed in public contain--nications. Yet we see little reason to believe thattheir worries about Soviet domestic problemsover the long run would motivate Soviet leadersto precipitate a massive confrontation to some-how "win the Cold War" before those problemsbecome more serious. Indeed, Soviet political andmilitary leaders at the top may out of self-interest be more optimistic about Soviet internalconditions than are lower level Soviet observerswho are the sources of much of our informationabout the problems of Soviet society. Moreover,the history of Russian wars suggests to Sovietleaders that, while international tension can forti-fy their domestic control, major wars can posegrave threats to internal stability.

— In short, the picture of the East-West powerstruggle and of the Soviet system which exists inthe minds of So.viet leaders today is not so gloomyabout long-term prospects nor optimistic aboutthe prospects for a grand test of strategic strengthin the short run as to inspire deliberate instiga-tion of acute confrontation. Moreover, althoughSoviet official propaganda continues to trumpetthe war-danger theme, its clear intent to blackenthe image of the United States and its coexistencewith the theme that peace will be assured by'Soviet strength and foreign policy dis play aSoviet leadership which is not genuinel y afraid ofimminent attack by the United States.

— Second, the current condition of the Soviet Polit-bttro as depicted by public evidence and consis-tent intelligence reporting argues strongly againstIts serious contemplation of deliberate centralconfrontation. Collective decisionmaking b y abody without a strong central figure who com-mands authority across the whole range of for-eign, military, and domestic policy is very un-conducive to bold initiatives on anythingcontroversial, which deliberate confrontationaloptions would certainly be As strong a leader asKhrushchev found himself hurt politically andultimately deposed in part because he laid him-self open to the charge of "adventurism" in theCuban missile crisis. None of the present tooSoviet leaders, neither the senior ones who seekto retain Dower as long as possible nor the

younger ones who want to inherit it, wishes toface this charge.

— Third, although Soviet leaders have more confi-dence in the adequacy of their overall militaryposture today than at any time since the begin-ning of the Cold War, they are not so confidentin it that they would deliberately put it to the testof a direct, central confrontation with the UnitedStates and possibly a general war. Moreover, onlyIn the case of Berlin, do the Soviets enjoy suchoverwhelming local power that they could confi-dently dictate the local military outcotr of acrisis, unless the United States escalated to gener-al war. And if NATO did not collapse politically,costs accruing from likely reactions throughoutthe Atlantic world would far outweigh the shortterm Soviet gains. In the case of direct Sovietmoves against Pakistan or the Gulf, the localpower balances are potentially favorable to theSoviet side if large-scale operations (and extensivePreparations for them, not yet seen) occurred,but still too problematical for easy calculation. Inthe case of direct confrontational initiatives in-volving Cuba, they are highly adverse for theSoviets. In considering directly confrontationaloptions, Soviet leaders would have to face thehigh probability of getting into serious militarytrouble or losing locally, and of having a moreunited and motivated set of adversaries over thelong run even were they to win their localobjective .

— Fourth, in surveying the range of military anddefense-related activities currently being con-ducted by the USSR, we conclude it is highlyunlikely that the Soviets are deliberately prepar-ing their forces for central confrontation or fortheaterwide military Eerations in the shortterm. These activities

t On the whole, they areconsistent with familiar patterns. All aimed atenhancing the military might of the Soviet Unionin some way, they distribute their payoffs atwidely different times from the near to thedistant future. They do not "cluster" to indicatetargeting of preparations for some period ofmaximum readiness in the neat- future. More-over, the Soviets are engaged in activities thatdetract to some degree from near-term forcereadiness; for example, modernization of theMoscow ABM system makes it currently less -combat capable than at any time since the early'1970s.

24Tvt,

Top 6— A

t

fin the totalPolitical context we are examining, we feel confidentthat• the Soviets are not now pre paring for majorconflict during the period of this Estimate.

53. There is an additional view specific to theobviously very confrontational Soviet Option to Piaci.SS-20s in Cuba. Although it is currently unlikely thatthe Soviets would place SS-20s in Cuba in the nearfuture, the possibility still exists and, because of thegreat danger which it poses, warrants continuingconsideration. There is still a rationale for such deploy-ments, although they are not likel y until after theelection. The Soviet leadership, while aware of thepotentially, great risks involvitd In deploying SS-20s toCuba, is also cognizant of, and might be tempted by,the significant political (and to a lesser extent military)gains that would be achieved if the United States wereforced to back down in a second Cuban missile crisis.Furthermore, given the significantly different US-Soviet military balance toda y compared with 1962,Soviet leaders might anticipate that another Cubanmissile crisis, in conjunction with renewed Sovietdeclarations about a desire to negotiate, would promptWest European leaders to presssure the United Statesto withdraw the Pershing II missiles and would splitUS opinion rather than generate a strong consensus infavor of US military action. -3

26

—T-op-Sca-c+-

54. It is possible that the Soviets could shift theircurrently more or less normal military preparednessactivities onto the track of rapid preparation for amajor confrontation in response to a local crisis devel-opment which might unexpectedly threaten to esca-late. These possibilities are considered below.

C. Instigation or Exploitation of limited Crises

55. Over the next six months the Soviets may find itin their interest to exploit or possibly even stimulatelimited crises, in most cases through their allies orsurrogates. We believe the Soviets are more likely toexploit or exacerbate a local crisis than they are tofoment one Sr novo; there are plenty of potentialcandidates already in existence. Candidate areas webelieve most worthy of attention are Central America,Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and Berlin. A Soviet desireto have impact on US domestic politics could be apartial, but probably not a dominant, motive for Sovietactions in a limited crisis. The Soviets might expectthat, facing a challenge in an area of military weaknessor political vulnerability, the United States could beshackled with damaging controversy, defeat, or blamefor precipitate action. The election prospects of theadministration or longer term political support for itspolicies could be hurt. More likely, the Soviets mightcalculate that an otherwise risky initiative on theirpart could prove less risky because election politicswould inhibit US responses and improve Soviet pros-pects for local success. However, they could not beconfident that US action in response to any Soviet orSoviet-supported threat would not have the oppositeresult of enhancing the administration's image in theeyes of US voters—as witnessed by the US interventionin Grenada. In any ease, Soviet actions will be primari-ly governed by the regional considerations that wouldeither constrain or advance Soviet objectives in addi-tion to short-term political effects in the United States.Moscow would weigh the likelihood of succeeding insuch a venture against the risks of escalation and lossOfSoviet control of events.

56. Soviet readiness to run some risk of a limitedconfrontation, short of actual hostilities, with theUnited States in a regionil crisis situation would notrequire a fundamental change of policy and attitudein Moscow from those prevailing now. Actions Moscowis now engaged in, particularly in respect to Central

This holder of this view is the Assisiant Chief of Staff forIntelligence. Deparimeni of (lie Army.

America and Pakistan, already im ply a degree ofwillingness to tolerate some risk of Confrontation withthe United States.

Central America

57. The Soviets see Central America as a promisingtheater of revolution for challenging and distractingUS power close to home. Soviet supply of encourage-ment, arms, and advice to the Sandinista regime inNicaragua and to the insurgents in El Salvador, bothdirectly and through their Cuban allies, serves long-term strategic aims. Less to test the United States andembarrass the administration than to advance thoselong-term aims, the Soviets could take near-terminitiatives that would present the United States withdifficult choices •

Confronted now with a militarily and politicallymore effective regime, the insurgents in El Salva-dor are trying to launch a late-summer offensive.Guerrilla objectives are to prove that Duarte doesnot effectively govern El Salvador, to expandtheir geographic areas of operation, and to attackeconomic targets in order to force Duarte tonegotiate.

3suggests that Castro sees anInsurgent offensive in El Salvador as potentiallyvery debilitating for the US administration, hurt-ing it badly if it acts or fails to respond. L

— In Nicaragua, several runways capable of han-dling high-performance fighters are being built.One of these is a major new airbase with runwayslong and thick enough to handle the heaviesttransports and reconnaissance strike aircraft inthe Soviet inventory. This base is likel y to beready for limited operations by October. TheSandinista regiml has been seeking first-line jetfighters from the Soviets, and soine pilots havebeen training in L-39s and MIG-21s. This andother evidence, such as the development of an airdefense radar networkC

"Isuggest that air defense capable fighterswill be delivered at some point. C

—Soviet delivery of arms and related supplies toCuba and Nicaragua has continued at a high ratesince 1981.

27T—v

58. It is very likely that an insurgent offensive willtake place in El Salvador. It is unlikely that Moscowexpects an offensive of such strength as to impactheavily on the US domestic scene, that is, to force adecision in Washington between losing El Salvador"or sending US troops. An early insurgent offensive,however, would be seen by Moscow as underminingadministration claims during the election that itsCentral American policies are proving effective. Al-though the Soviets have repeatedly cautioned theCubans and Nicaraguans—and most likely also theSalvadoran guerrillas—against provoking the UnitedStates, Moscow probably supports a Salvadoran guer-rilla fall offensive.

39. The Soviets may well intend to introduce ad-vanced fighters into Nicaragua at some point, notwith-standing the US position that this would not betolerated. They could time action toward this goal toexploit a perceived reluctance in Washington to takestrong counteractions on the eve of elections, and toimpose the political burdens on the administration thatwould stem from either action or inaction. To makeUS decisions more difficult, the Soviets are likely tomove in a series of graduated steps.

60. We believe that the Czech-built 1,39 subsoniclet trainer aircraft recentl y shipped from Libya toBulgaria are likely to be destined for Nicaragua andmay be the next step in the process of introducingadvanced fighters, possibly before November. Al-though far less capable as fighters than MIC-21-classaircraft, the L-39 is nevertheless capable of air-to-ground missions and would be a threat to slow flyingreconnaissance and insurgent supply aircraft. TheSoviets would probably judge that shipping L-39s toNicaragua has a fair likelihood of being accepted bythe United States, which would make it more difficultfor the United States to act later against the arrival ofmore advanced aircraft. US action against the 1..439swould be expected by the Soviets to generate majorcontroversy within the United States and among itsallies. Should the United States show itself willing totake direct action against such a move, the Sovietswould expect that action to be presaged by diplomaticand other warnings permitting them to modify theirplans and to foment political problems for Washingtonshort of actually shipping the planes. A Soviet decisionto send MICs into Nicaragua thus would dependheavily on the US reaction to the L-39s. An alternativeview is that the estimate places too much emphasis onthe L-39 issue. If these aircraft are shipped to Nicara-gua, Moscow would perceive their introduction as onlyone of a number of increments in the Sandinista

regime's military capability—others would include theconstruction of a large military airfield at Punta Hueteand three Soviet-equipped communications interceptfacilities. In evaluating the probable US response tothe MICs, Moscow would consider US reaction to all ofsuch increments, not to the L-39s alone. The Sovietconcern not to provoke the United States into militaryaction that has kept Moscow from delivering MICs toNicaragua for over two years would continue in play.'

61.The completion of the large airfield at PuntaHuete would give the Soviets additional options ofnear- and long-term concern to the United States. Forexample, Periodic visits by Soviet TU-95 Bear recon-naissance and ASW aircraft, even if irregular, could beused to monitor maritime activity in the Caribbeanand the Pacific, especially the approaches to thePanama Canal, and would be expected by the Sovietsto draw off thinly spread US resources in militarycontingency plans. In addition, such visits could beused by the Soviets to raise the profile of their militaryassociation with the Sandinistas at such time as theybelieve this useful..

62. Soviet military deliveries to the region indicatethat the Soviets and their clients expect developmentswhich may occasion US action against Nicaragua andeven Cuba_ Clearly the success of Soviet aims in theregion is likely to increase pressures for US action inthe years ahead, especially if the present US adminis-tration is returned in November. The Soviets may notexclude the possibility that, the United States willexperiment with negotiating approaches to influence'Nicaraguan and Cuban behavior. In either case, in-creased military strength of Soviet clients Will enhancetheir ability to continue serving Soviet long-term aimsIn political bargaining and in spreading leftist revolu-tions.

Pakistan

63. Over the next six to nine months there is anincreasing likelihood that the Soviets could take con-frontational initiatives against Pakistan, especially inconjunction with possible overt military moves byIndia against Pakistan's nuclear facilities. The possibil-ity of unilateral Soviet political and military actionagainst Pakistan, although less convenient for Moscowand, we believe, less likely, also cannot be ruled out.

• The holder of this oiew is the Director. Bureau of intelligence.and Research. Department of State.

28

65. The USSR cannot command Indian behaviortoward Pakistan. The Indians, moreover, have strongmotives to avoid being seen as any sort of surrogate forSoviet policies, along with other considerations inhibit-ing their actions against Pakistan now. But the Sovietshave powerful interests in exploiting any Indo-Paki-stani conflict for their own immediate purposes, andsome resources—including their treaty ties, militarycooperation, and intelligence connections—to encour-age and influence Indian behavior. Further, althoughMoscow and Delhi have different long-term conce p

-tions of Pakistan's future, they share a strong commoninterest in Zia's removal or, at least, a major change inhis policies, specifically, termination of Pakistan's SUP-port for the Afghan resistance, an end to Pakistan'snuclear program, and disru ption of the US-Pakistanimilitary assistance relationship.

66. Soviet motives for considering a confrontationalinitiative against Pakistan arise primarily from the warin Afghanistan. The Soviets aim to su ppress the insur-gency there and have a long-term strategy for doingso. But their campaign is not going well. Among itscosts have been frustration in the military command,sagging morale among Soviet troops, and some decreeof popular dissatisfaction about the war at home. Theirrecent major offensives have been aimed to get thecampaign on a winning track, but have not beenvisibly successful in this respect.

67. An element in any Soviet strategy to hastenvictory in Afghanistan is elimination of Pakistan'ssupport to the MuJahcdit n. The Soviets have applieddiplomatic pressure and three.% to this end in the past,so far unsuccessfully. On various occasions, we believethe Soviets have attempted to draw India into somekind of joint action to pressure or destabilize the Ziaregime. We have some re porting that the Soviets areconsidering stepped-up offensive actions from Afghan-istan which includes -hot pursuit' . at the Pakistanborder.

3Increased Soviet deploymentsof MIC-23s into Afghanistan enhance Soviet ability tostrike at targets near the border in Pakistan. Thissuggests that the Soviets are considering military

actions against Pakistan of greater scope and intensitythan the intermittent airstrikes at the border whichhave occurred in the past.

as befits theirtreaty68Celationship„ the Soviets and thaidians are inconsultation to some degree on their moves towardPakistanr

How far this consultation goes isunclear. If India is contemplating military actionagainst Pakistan, however, Delhi would certainl y seeka close reading of the views and desires of die SovietUnion, its principal arms supplier and the only signifi-cant counterweight to Pakistan's allies, the UnitedStates and China. The Indians would expect theSoviets to exploit an Indo-Pakistani conflict politicallyto facilitate a termination to Pakistan's su pport of theAfghan resistance. The Indians would, on balance,probably welcome this result. In addition to formalconsultations, the Soviets probably have many intelli-gence sources on Indian intentions and tactics, andchannels for influencing Indian calculations. In anycase, because the Soviets and the Indians share acommon interest in securing basic changes to Islam-abad's policies and possibly its government, somecooperation toward that end may now be in progress.Should India evince interest in attacking PakistanE

3:he Soviets would bePrivately supportive, and pro ably would agree toprovide intelligence and some logistic support.

69. For their part, the Soviets would see an Indo-Pakistani conflictC

as a major contribution toachieving their objectives vis-a-vis Pakistan, If it doesnot lead to greater US support for Pakistan. Some formof Indian attackg coincident with Soviet political andpossibly military pressure, could force Zia to come toterms with both India imar the USSR unless he receivedstrong US military support, including new militarydeliveries and possibly a direct US presence. But if theprecipitating occasion were an Indian response toPakistan's nuclear ambitions, the Soviets might calcu-late that the United States would find it politicallydifficult to provide adequate support to Pakistan. TheSoviets would expect that a crisis arising from thisequation could be a major political burden to the USadministration in the fall, es pecially if the Soviet handin it were obscured.

70. Soviet interest in an Endo-Pakistani confronta-tion would be inhibited by fear, shared by the Indians,that such action could lead to tighter US-Pakistani

29--Tee-Soc-Fet-

cooperation, more US arms, and possibly US militaryintervention. It could also lead to more active Chinesesupport for Pakistan, in cooperation with the UnitedStates. Because of the Afghan war, the Soviets havehad for several years an interest in acting againstPakistan. These inhibitions have helped deter suchaction up until now. They may be reduced, but noteliminated, by the prospect of parallel action withIndia and election-time inhibitions on US responses.

71. Should an Indian attack on Pakistan material-ize, the Soviets' preferred course of action would be toplay peacemaker in public, as they did at Tashkent in1965, while putting critical pressure on Zia In privateto meet Moscow's key demand—ending support forthe Afghan resistance—as the price of his survival andavoidance of defeat in an all-out war with India. If thisdid not prove effective, the Soviets might threatenlimited air attacks and other military measures inaddition to the pressures brought by Indian operations.Such Soviet pressure coincident with Indian militaryaction and reluctant US support, could force Zia intoaccommodation with both adversaries and posit!):topple his regime.

72. Moscow would probably regard escalated Sovietmilitary attacks—airstrikes and "hot pursuit" groundactions—on Pakistan by themselves as a less effectiveand riskier way to pressure Zia than some form ofparallel action in which India takes the more visiblerole. Limited cross-border actions by the Soviets alonehave a low probability of changing Zia's policies and ahigh probability of bringing in greater US support. Butthis may be the best the Soviets believe they can do ontheir own.

73. The Soviets lack the ground forces in Afghani-stan to mount a serious military threat of invasionagainst Pakistan. Especially if they expected to main-tain the present tenuous degree of control in Afghani-stan while conducting o perations against Pakistan. theIzoviets would have to introduce on the order of severalhundred thousand additional troops and their associat-ed support into the regions adjacent to Pakistan'snorthwestern border. This would require mobilizationwithin several military districts of the USSR and six toeight weeks of movement time, at a minimum. Thereis no evidence that this is occurring.

74. We believe that there is a serious possibilityover the next 12 months of Indian actions againstPakistan in which an Indian attack E

jcoincideswith Soviet political and, possibly, military pressure onIslamabad. Although it would seem less attractive

from Moscow's point of view for the Soviet Union totake limited military action against Pakistan in theabsence of prominent Indian initiatives, we do not ruleout this possibility either. The immediate Soviet aim inboth oases would be to end Pakistan's involvment inthe Afghan war. An ancillary but very importantobjective would be to discredit the role of the UnitedStates as an ally and security partner throughout theregion. We believe an all-out Soviet invasion of Paki-stan to be very unlikely in the period of this Estimate.

Soviet Moves on the Persian Gulf

75. The Iran-Iran war and longstanding Soviet am-bitions to have greater influence in the area mayoccasion new Soviet moves that threaten vital USInterests and carry sortie risk of confrontation. Sovietmilitary Power north of Iran gives the USSR latentpotential to exert more influence on the region shouldSoviet willingness to use it become more credible.Although the Soviets genuinely believe the UnitedStates is exploiting the war to establish a permanentmilitary presence in the region and deeply oppose this,they also appreciate the political controversy whichwould attend either direct US engagement in anescalation of the crisis or US reluctance to act if SaudiArabia or one of the Persian Gulf states were attackedby Iran.

76. Present Soviet policy rests on extensive militaryand political support for Iraq., while it seeks to exploitany opening in Tehran for ending the war andimproving Soviet-Iranian relations, and the Insecuritiesof the region, particularly those of the Gulf states, toestablish new Soviet diplomatic inroads. Soviet actionsare very much dependent on local developments andattitudes; OP the whole, Soviet Polley has been MAWSand exploratory, rather than daring. Yet the interest ofIran, Kuwait, and Jordan in keeping lines to Moscowopen—and recently increased Soviet responsiveness tothis interest—continue to give the Soviets politicalprospects in the region.

77. If the Iran-Iraq war grinds on along presentlyvisible lines, it will present the USSR with no dramaticnew pressures or opportunities for intrusion into theregion. In the near term, the most plausible departuresfrom current trends which could prompt changes inSoviet behavior are:

— Either in conjunction with, or as a substitute for,their long-awaited offensive against Iraq, theIranians escalate air attacks against the Gulfstates, and the United States responds by inject-ing forces into the region.

30S—fot

— The Iranian offensive aborts or is defeated andIran, perhaps under a new leadership constella-tion, decides to come to terms with Iraq and itsSoviet patron.

78. While fulminating at length against the pros-pect of US intervention, the Soviets have been veryretioent to indicate how they would respond to it.Low-level Soviet spokesmen have implied that theUSSR would invade Iran under the 1921 treaty if theUnited States puts force ashore in Iran, but would notreact militarily to lesser US moves. The Soviets wouldhope.for a political opening in Tehran attending anIranian military setback as opposed to US interventionfollowing an Iranian escalation. Both developmentscould occur. In eitheecase, the Soviets arc most likelyto try using the new circumstances to improve theirinfluence in Iran before they attempt to apply militaryPressure or take major military actions for which Iranis the Immediate target

79. In the less likely event that an Iranian offensiveappears successful and threatens to defeat Iraq, theSoviets could bring military pressure on Iran from th*.north to end the fighting. It is conceivable that theUSSR would express an interest in acting with theUnited States to contain the crisis, but much morelikely that the Soviets would seek to take the lead insome combination of di plomatic and military pressureon Iran—including a cutoff of Soviet and East Blocmunitions and supply shipments to Iran—that leavesthem with the image of the Gulf's new protector. AnIranian victory over Iraq arid Soviet reaction to itcould lead to a Soviet invasion of Iran, and thereby toa direct military confrontation with the United States,but we believe this course of events is very unlikely inthe time frame of this Estimate.

80. There is no evidence to suggest that the Sovietsare readying their military forces in the region to exertpressure or take local action; but the y could bebrought within weeks to sufficient readiness to playthe roles required by the developments discussedabove.'

81. The volatility of the region plus Soviet ambi-tions, involvement, and regional military power com-bine to give a fair probability to near-term Sovietactions exploiting or responding to the course of theGulf war. The exact circumstances would determinethe likelihood of some form of US-Soviet confronta-tion, which cannot be ruled out. None of these devel-opments is susceptible to prior orchestration or confi-

For greater detail. see NIE 11139-83. Soviet Forces and Capa-bilities in the Southern Theater of Military Operations.

dent management by the USSR, nor could they betimed by the Soviets for impact on US domesticdevelopments. One or another variation could occur atany time and stimulate the Soviets to take a moreforward political and military posture.

82. Elsewhere in the Middle East, the near-termpotential for an escalating crisis leading to possible US-Soviet confrontation is much less than in the Gulfregion. The USSR is, however, becoming more activediplomatically on Arab-Israeli conflict issues in waysthat could put pressure on US political interests. Therefurbishment of the USSR's Middle East peace pro-posals recently, the regional travels of Soviet diplo-mats, and developments in Soviet relations with Am-man, Cairo, and Beirut arise from a Soviet desire toappeal to the current frustration of moderate Arabstates with lack of movement on regional issues. TheSoviets clearly want some role compatible to that ofthe United States in regional peace diplomacy, and arewilling to try again at this longstanding goal at a timewhen the United States and Israel are preoccupiedwith Internal politics.

Berlin

83. Soviet military authorities have been toyingwith Allied air access to Berlin by unilaterally estab-lishing and adjusting air corridor altitude restrictions,ostensibly to assure safety in the presence of localmilitary operations. The Soviets have not accommo-dated to Allied protests, but insist that they have nodesire. to provoke, a contest over,,the -issue. Soviet.behavior on the air corridors, a few cases of traindelays and harassment, and protests about West Ger-man behavior in West Berlin suggest that the Sovietsare pursuing a low-key program of reminding theUnited States and its key allies of the vulnerability ofBerlu.. A related objective may be to signal that theSoviets could act quickly and unilaterally to disruptEast-West German relations, about which Moscow iscurrently somewhat nerveus. Major Soviet changes tothe Permanent Restricted Areas in East Germany,which restrict Allied freedom of movement and intel-ligence collection, may be part of the same pattern ofactivities, although they have a clear orierational ra-tionale.

84. Intensifying this campaign in a number of wayscould at any time be used by the Soviets to dramatizeBerlin's vulnerability. The presumed aims of suchactivity would be to show that the Soviets are willing,because of their distaste for US polic y and the supportit finds in NATO, to act against the most neuralgicsymbol of peace in Europe. They might hope thereby

31T. Sccrot

TI././ &SOWS 1.4.

to stimulate criticism of the United States, especiall y inWest Germany, and pressures for more accommodat-ing policies toward the USSR. They would, however,risk a serious negative response from the United Statesand Western Europe.

85. There is no evidence that the Soviets intend toescalate their pressures on Berlin in the near future.They could do so without warnin g. The way they havehandled the matter in the past six months indicatesthat they have not wished for a more dramaticaltercation. Presumably, they calculated that theycould achieve their local objectives without publiccontroversy over the issue.

86. We believe it unlikely that the Soviets willsignificantly escalate pressures on Berlin In the nearterm. The Soviets probably appreciate that they couldnot pick a poorer symbolic target than Berlin for short-term pressure tactics that become publicly visible.Although they might generate some frictions amongallied governments and between them and some sec-tors of public opinion in Europe, the early effect ofrelatively limited Soviet pressure would probably beincreased political support for NATO and the UnitedStates, and to enhance the credibility of anti-Sovietarguments. Yet Soviet uncertainty on this score andhopes for more positive political maths could inducethem to try very cautious increases in-their pressureson Berlin to test Western reactions.

87. Something on the scale of the Berlin Blockadecould be used by the Soviets to trigger an acute East-West crisis in Europe. The Soviets would expect thatthe risk of NATO taking direct military counteractionwould be minimal. But the Soviets probably would alsoexpect US action against other exposed Soviet strategicinterests, such as Cuba. And they would feel the need toready their entire defense posture against the Prospectthat the crisis escalated into a major war. The Sovietsmight calculate that over a period of months NATO'sresolve and integrity would crack from the tension. Butthis would not be certain enough to rationalize provok-ing a general crisis, nor would the value to the Soviets ofa change in Berlin's status. We see no evidence that theSoviets are contemplating a crisis of this sort overBerlin, and judge it highly improbable in the near term.It is less improbable, however, that the Soviets wouldtry to use the Berlin lever to exacerbate US-Europeanfrictions in the event of a major US-Soviet confrontationin the Third World.

D. Shift Toward East-West .Accommodation

88. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets will givemore emphasis to tactics aimed at improving the East-

West atmosphere before November. This is slightlymore likely in following months as the Soviets assessthe wider political consequences of the US electionsand other world developments which may occur. Thekey factor in the calculations of the Soviet leadershipwould be their assessment of their ability in the late1980s, through limited accommodation, to deflect orundermine political support for current US militaryprograms and foreign policies they regard as anti-Soviet. They would not see tactics of limited accom-modation—muting their hostile propaganda, allowingresumption of the major strategic arms talks, andmaking minor concessions on bilateral issues—as en-tailing fundamental concessions to the United States inarms control or major changes in their policies towardregional security issues. •

89. Present Soviet policy seeks, but does not confi-dently expect, the kind of detente which the Sovietsbelieve prevailed in the 1970s. That environmentpermitted what the Soviets found to be relativelyprofitable East-West relations while Soviet militarypower and influence in surrounding regions continuedto grow. But the Soviets realize this attractive environ-ment was not purely a function of Soviet policy choice.Various developments within the United States and itsalliances contributed considerably to weakening theAmerican challenge to Soviet power in that period.

90. At present and for the foreseeable future, theSoviet leadership is adamantly opposed to seekingmore amicable US-Soviet relations on terms which itbelieves the United Statesmaterial constraints on Soviet military power and theexpansion of Soviet international influence against theinterests of the United States and its allies. The Sovietsare doubtful now that they can encourage detenteconsistent with their power aspirations when the Unit-ed States is seeking to pose effective challenges toSoviet power and not seeming to retreat from its ownsuperpower role. In short, the pviets see the prospectsfor detente on terms they judge acceptable as dim inthe near future unless the United States can somehowbe brought by Soviet cajolery and domestic politicalpressures to acquiesce in Soviet terms. Their reading ofpolitical signals from the West could, however, per-suade them to try tactics of limited accommodation tosee if detente on their terms is still.possible.

91. It is highly unlikely over the next six months, orfor a considerable period beyond, that the USSR willshift toward a broad-based policy of genuine accom-modation with the United States. If, however, existingpressures in the Soviet international and domesticenvironment increase dramatically at some point in

32Tat.. Socret

Wt." arr., :14

the future, they might encourage Soviet leaders to trymore far-reaching accommodation in dealing with theUnited States. These pressures.could arise from wors-ening economic problems, greater difficulty in turningSoviet military power into political gain at low risk,great .tr fear that US defense efforts could shift theoverall strategic power balance against the USSR, anda perception that opposing US and Soviet objectivesharbor a higher risk of conflict than in the past.

92. A Soviet policy which sought a more authenticeasing of East-West conflicts would represent a far-reaching shift of Soviet leadership attitudes, which wejudge impossible in the time frame of this Estimate. Infact, it is almost certain to require a new Sovietleadership, one that comes to believe that policies ofconflict with the West do not work, are too dangerousto pursue so long as the United States remains commit-ted to the containment of Soviet power, and can besafely modified for a long period. Such a Sovietleadership might come into being following the demiseof the present senior members of the Politburo, and assuccessor generations of leaders inherit full responsibil-ity for the USSR's domestic evolution and internation-al power. A Soviet leadership consensus might conceiv-ably be formed on a policy that seeks to shift politicaland resource priority toward revitalizing the Sovieteconomy and improving social conditions while stabi-lizing for a protracted period the magnitude of mili-tary resource claims, retrenching Soviet efforts toexpand influence in third areas, and seeking mutualdetente with the United States and its allies.

93. The generations of leaders represented by suchfigures as Gorbachev, Romanov, Ogarkov, and Liga-chev appear now to differ from their elders only in thebelief that they can pursue traditional Soviet aimsmore skillfully and successfully at home and abroad.They will not come naturally to the judgment thattheir time at the helm should be devoted to "rebuild-ing socialism on one country," while ambitions toexpand Soviet power abroad should be deemphasizedfor a long period. At best this is a very distant andhighly uncertain prospect which could only emergegradually. It will not occur as the result of largelytactical adjustments we have recently seen.

II. ASSESSMENT AND OUTLOOK

94. The Soviet Union is currently applying towardthe United States a dual-track policy that emphasizesPolitical hostility and diplomatic rigidity, especially onmajor arms control and security issues, combined withan important, but subordinate, effort to move forwardon various bilateral issues and space weapons negotia-

tions. The avowed goal of this policy is to return to therelationship of detente of the early 1970s. The long-term goal of this policy is to pocket an y gains from USinterest in improved ties while limiting and neutraliz-ing US defense and foreign policies. The practical goalof this policy is, in the immediate future, to exploit thepolitical pressures of a US election season to encourageconcessions from Washington and to put the adminis-tration on the defensive about those aspects of itsPolicy the Soviets most dislike, especially its militaryprograms and far-reaching arms control proposals. TheSoviets probably believe that this combination oftactics will open new opportunities for influencingvarious US and European audiences, and will providea context for reassessing their tactics toward theUnited States after November.

95. Current Soviet policy involves, at most, minormodifications of their tactics of the past six months orso, and rests on premises of deep hostility toward USaims and interests. Soviet motives for slightly changedtactics arise from the judgment that their uniformnegativism has not worked with Western audiencesthey wished to influence, particularly within the USadministration and major allied governments.

96. At the same time the Soviets are looking aheadto a period of intensified political and strategic strug-gle against the United States likely to last through the1980s. Soviet elite and leadership pronouncementsplus the ongoing preparation of a new party program,Congress, and the Five-Year Plan, suggest that thePolitburo has not yet decided on all the policy andresource implications of this next phase. The currentstate of the Soviet leadership probably complicatesdecisive, lasting choices and encourages the retentionof established policies during the rest of this year. Thepressures for some basic decisions on foreign anddomestic policy will increase in 1985.,

97. We believe it highly unlikely that the currentSoviet leadership is now planning a deliberate majordeparture from the policies presently being pursuedtoward the United States, either in the direction ofaccommodation on arms and regional security issues,

•or toward direct military confrontation. Followin g theUS elections, and depending on how the Soviets readits results, there is some possibility that Moscow willactivate a variety of tactics aimed at limited accom-modation with the United States and constraining theanti-Soviet foreign and defense policies it now sees theUnited States pursuing.

98. The most likely of possible policy departures inthe near term are, we believe, a reversion to uniform

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negativism toward the United States until Novemberor a sudden Soviet withdrawal from any arms negotia-tion which may be ongoing in the fall for the purposeof sharpening domestic opposition to administrationforeign policy. We do not rule out that the SovietASAT/space weapons initiative has been contrivedfrom the start to set up this opportunity, but believethe Soviets are still playing this card opportunistically.

99. It is also possible that a continuing regionalconflict could develop in such a way as to afford theSoviet Union opportunities for new initiatives againstthe United States. We doubt that the Soviets will try tostimulate a regional conflict escalation expressly tohave impact on the US election because they woulddoubt their ability to predict its political results. But

they have regional aims and strategies to pursueagainst the United States in any ease, and these willdetermine their actions relative to local developments.

100. Overall, the local dynamics of the regionalconflict situations we have examined, combined withSoviet ambitions and opportunities for initiative, cre-ate the possibility of limited US-Soviet confrontationin the near term, which cannot be ruled out but whichwe judge unlikely. Although the Soviets are probablyready and may indeed be planning to take initiativesthat put Pressure on the United States, we do notbelieve the Soviets are now preparing themselves forthe prospect that their actions and US responses willcreate a central military confrontation in the next sixmonths.

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