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WANGCHUK 2015 Dorji Wangchuk, The Diachronic and Synchronic
Relationship between Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis
in Buddhism: With Special Reference to the Case of the Four
Applications of Mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag
pa) in Vajrayna. In Buddhist Meditative Praxis: Traditional
Teachings and Modern Applications, edited by K.L. Dhammajoti. Hong
Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2015,
pp. 177201.
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The Diachronic and Synchronic Relationship between
Philosophical
Theory and Spiritual Praxis in Buddhism: With Special Reference
to the Case of the Four Applications of Mindfulness
(smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag pa) in Vajrayna1
Dorji WAngchuK
0. Prologue1. Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis3. The
Issue of the TheoryPraxis Dichotomy in Buddhism4. The Diachronic
Relationship between Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis5.
Four Applications of Mindfulness in Vajrayna6. The Synchronic
Relationship between Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis.
Epilogue
0. Prologue
The general topic of the conference Buddhist Meditative Praxis:
Traditional Teaching and Modern Application lends itself well to
the following brief discussion of the problems posed by the
theorypraxis dichotomy in Buddhism, particularly as it relates to
the Four Applications of Mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar
gzhag pa; henceforth smtyupasthna) in Vajrayna or the Mantric form
of Mahyna Buddhism that has come down through the Ancient
(rNying-ma) School of Tibetan Buddhism. On the basis of a number of
primary (Tibetan) and secondary sources, I venture to discuss two
related issues in Buddhist Studies, namely, (a) the diachronic (or
historical) relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual
praxis, and (b) the synchronic (or doctrinal) relationship between
the two. My motivation for addressing these issues stems from the
conviction that any steps by way of innovation that Buddhist
theoreticians and practitioners might like to take ideally
presuppose a nuanced understanding of Buddhist intellectual
history, or at least a heightened awareness of how Buddhist
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theories and practices have evolved diachronically and
synchronically. In other words, innovational reinterpretation and
explication of traditional Buddhist teachingswhenever deemed
suitable for and relevant to modern explication and
applicationpresupposes a cognition and recognition of their
historical developmentthat is, expertise gained through an
investigation of Buddhist sources with the aid of
historical-philological tools and techniques. I believe that in
this way any potential contradiction or confrontation between
tradition and modernity can be precluded or resolved.
1. Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis
Let me begin by briefly explaining what I mean by the terms
philosophical theory and spiritual praxis.2 By philosophical theory
I mean any supposedly rational proposition or postulation regarding
the true existential mode (gnas tshul) of phenomena, the mode, that
is, that lies beyond their apparitional mode (snang tshul) and
which, therefore, one is normally not aware of; or regarding their
operational mode (i.e. modus operandi), namely, the fundamental
principles or mechanisms according to which phenomena are said to
originate or play out. The closest Sanskrit word for philosophical
theory that I can think of is di (lta ba) as used, for example, in
correct view (samyagdi: yang dag pai lta ba). Of the three kinds of
training (ik: bslab pa), philosophical theory can be said to be
associated with the higher insight or cognitive discernment
(adhipraj: lhag pai shes rab). Some examples of philosophical
theories in Buddhism would be those of dependent origination
(prattyasamutpda: rten cing brel bar byung ba) and emptiness (nyat:
stong pa nyid). The term spiritual praxis is employed here in the
sense of the observation of higher moral and ethical discipline
(adhila: lhag pai tshul khrims), and practices of higher
contemplation and deep meditation (adhicitta: lhag pai sems =
samdhi: ting nge dzin). Spiritual praxis according to any given
Buddhist system is thus the actual implementation or application of
a philosophical theory that is either tacitly presupposed or
explicitly proposed by that particular system, and as a rule having
or anticipating a desirable this-worldly and other-worldly, mundane
and super-mundane, destiny as its goal. It can be said to include
either pre-/post-meditative practices (cra/cary: spyod pa) or
contemplative (or meditative) practices (bhvan: sgom pa) or both.
What is known as
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the four infinitudes or unlimited ones (aprama: tshad med pa),
the contemplation of the impure (aubhabhvan: mi sdug pa sgom pa),
and the four applications of mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye
bar gzhag pa) may be mentioned here as examples of spiritual
praxis.
In the context of discussing philosophical theory and spiritual
praxis and their diachronic and synchronic relationships, it is
worth bearing in mind that we are dealing with various types of
Buddhist theories and practices, and naturally the kinds of
relationship we try to trace depend on the kinds of underlying
theory or praxis. With regard to a typology of philosophical
theories, we may recognize, as has been done,3 two types of
philosophical theory in Buddhism.
The first type represents those theories that have been
inherited from pre-/non-Buddhist Indian religious traditions, such
as the doctrine of transmigrational rebirth (sasra: khor ba), which
is to be found as early as the Brhmaas. The doctrine that the
earthly life and its constituents are essentially characterized by
suffering (dukha: sdug bsngal) is said to be already found in the
older Upaniads. Likewise the doctrine that craving or thirst (t:
sred pa) is the cause of rebirth, which implies suffering, is
foreshadowed by the Upaniadic doctrine according to which desire
decides ones destiny after death. The second type of philosophical
theory represents those that are exclusively Buddhist and which
have been freshly developed by Buddhism. Of the two types, the
former can thus be said to be common (i.e. shared) and traditional;
the latter, uncommon (i.e. unshared) and innovational.
Furthermore, it may be proposed that Buddhist philosophical
theories, particularly those related to ontology, can be classified
into two types as well, namely, those that are somehow connected
with Buddhist soteriology and which would be hence soteriologically
indispensable for any given Buddhist system, and those that are
not, at least not directly, connected with Buddhist soteriology and
hence soteriologically dispensable. It appears that such a
classification has indeed already been recognized,4 insofar as two
kinds of Buddhist philosophical theories can be pointed out,
namely, (a) those that are rooted in spiritual praxis and (b) those
that have not stemmed directly from spiritual
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praxis and hence are only loosely (or remotely) connected, or
not at all connected, with spiritual praxis.5 The former can be
considered primary Buddhist philosophical theories and the latter
secondary. The various versions of what I call Mtravda (Onlyism or
Mereism) Buddhist philosophythat is, the Buddhist philosophical
theory that asserts that our world of manifold appearances
constitutes nothing but x (whose dimmed existence is accepted),
whereas the existence of y, which stands for a metaphysical cause
or substrate (be it theistic or otherwise), is rejectedmay be
considered an example of the first kind. As examples of the second
type, one may mention the theory of the ledger of debtsor
promissory note(apattra: bu lon gyi dpang rgya) said to have been
proposed by some Vaibhika schools)6 and Tsong-kha-pas theory of
disintegration qua entity (zhig pa dngos po).7
Also, with regard to a spiritual praxis prescribed or described
by Buddhist sources, there may be several ways of proposing a
typology of it on the basis of various criteria. As indicated
above, spiritual praxis can be (a) mundane (laukika: jig rten pa)
or supramundane (lokottara: jig rten las das pa) depending on the
goal or objective, (b) meditative or post-meditative, (c) directly
relevant to Buddhist soteriology or only distantly or not at all
related to it, (d) spiritual praxis that is considered to be
epistemically veridical, or to which is attributed an epistemic
value (e.g. meditation on nyat) and one that is not considered to
be epistemically veridical, or one to which is attributed only an
instrumental value (e.g. aubhabhvan), or, (e) three types of
spiritual praxis that deal with the corresponding three types of
training (ik: bslab pa), namely, with adhila, adhicitta (i.e.
samdhi), and adhipraj.
2. The Issue of the TheoryPraxis Dichotomy in Buddhism
As mentioned earlier, the two issues pertinent to the
theorypraxis dichotomy in Buddhism are (a) the diachronic (or
historical) relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual
praxis, and (b) the synchronic (or doctrinal) relationship between
the two. (a) The first issue, the diachronic relationship, concerns
the question of how philosophical theories and spiritual practices
have developed historically, that is, essentially the question
whether Buddhist philosophical theories developed out of certain
spiritual practices or whether spiritual practices evolved out of
philosophical theories. This
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seems to be an issue that has been raised only by modern
historians of Buddhist ideas.8
(b) The second issue of the synchronic relationship between
philosophical theory and spiritual praxis concerns the question as
to how they relate to each other doctrinally at any given point in
time, or rather, how the two are ideally said to synchronize and
harmonize. This issue seems to be have been a constant concern
within the Buddhist traditions. Judging from Indo-Tibetan Buddhist
sources, one gets an impression that the synchronic relationship
between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis has been by no
means an easy one to agree on. Buddhist scholars and saints in
India and Tibet recognized an inherent tension between the two, for
all the considerable and diverse efforts made to synchronize or
harmonize them, or at least to emphasize the need to do so. This is
the second point that I wish to briefly touch upon in this
article.
3. The Diachronic Relationship between Philosophical Theory and
Spiritual Praxis
Let us now return to the issue of the diachronic relationship
between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis. In this context,
two points seem worth making. First, we shall have to concede that
spiritual practice seems hardly possible without any theoretical
presupposition,9 and that even the spiritual practices of the
historical Buddha himself would have had some philosophical
theories or doctrinal presuppositions underlying them. As has
already pointed out, however, it would be rather difficult to
reconstruct the intellectual or spiritual processes which induced
the Buddha to establish those philosophical theories that can be
traced back to the Buddha himself. Second, it is highly important
to bear in mind that Buddhism is a discipline of salvation, a
definition obviously approved by a host of prominent
Buddhologists,10 and that the Buddha is said to have categorically
and consistently rejected pure speculative and theoretical
deliberations as being either irrelevant or even detrimental to
ones aspiration to release from sasric bondage, as is illustrated
by the famous analogy of a man who has been shot with a poisoned
arrow.11 From such a position, which may very well go back to the
Buddha himself, one might deduce that the Buddha already
presupposed two kinds of philosophical propositions, namely, ones
that
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are salvifically irrelevant (heilsirrelevant) and others that
are relevant (heilsrelevant), and that, accordingly, one is
supposed to concentrate on the aspects of the spiritual praxis of
the Buddhas teachings and to limit ones philosophical or
theoretical speculations to the absolutely indispensable
philosophical presuppositions.
One important question that poses itself is how we are to
explain the existence of several philosophical theories and
spiritual practices that cannot, as such, be accounted for in what
are believed to be the earliest Buddhist sources. Explanations or
attempts to answer this question can be found in two articles of
Lambert Schmithausen that seek to elucidate the historical
relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual praxis. On
the basis of the history of Yogcra idealism, he has attempted to
demonstrate that particularly central philosophical theories that
are exclusively Buddhist and others that were freshly developed by
Buddhism have their origin in certain forms of spiritual praxis.12
That is, new philosophical theories in Buddhism have been the
result of subsequent reflection on certain spiritual experiences
undergone during certain meditative practicesin what could be
called theoretical consolidation and generalization. A Buddhist
philosophical theory developed in this way is historically related
to spiritual praxis but may also be considered to be of
soteriological relevance. In this regard, Schmithausen13 believes
that Buddhist philosophy not only differs from European philosophy,
particularly from Greek and modern forms, but also from Brahmanical
Indian philosophy, in which influences of spiritual practices on
the philosophical theory are, to be sure, in evidence, but in
general only to a lesser degree. The reason for this difference, he
suggests, lies in the person of the Buddha himself, who, with
unique consistency and radicalism, rejected all theoretical
speculations that are of no soteriological relevance.
How about those Buddhist philosophical theories that seem
soteriologically dispensable or irrelevant? How do we explain their
development and existence? In this case, too, Schmithausen
convincingly offers an explanation:14 such secondary Buddhist
philosophical theories came into existence particularly when
difficulties arose in systematizing, such as when primary
philosophical theories were found incompatible with other existing
doctrines. As examples, Schmithausen points to theories that
attempt to explain the karmic
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mechanism (Wirkmechanismus) governing good and bad actions,
which became a problem on account of the dogmatization of
antisubstantialism and the negative evaluation (or rejection) of a
substantial Self (tman: bdag). As an example of soteriologically
irrelevant and secondary philosophical theories, one may perhaps
mention the theory of the ledger of debtsor promissory note
(apattra: bu lon gyi dpang rgya) said to be proposed by some
Vaibhika schools, the bja theory of the Sautrntika school, the
layavijna theory of Yogcra, the positivistic Buddha Nature theory
of the Tathgatagarbha school, or Tsong-kha-pas theory of
disintegration qua entity (zhig pa dngos po), all of which seem to
be a result of different attempts made by different schools of
thought to solve some crucial doctrinal problems faced by
Buddhists, who rejected any theistic or non-theistic metaphysical
substrate of phenomena. For the Madhyamaka school and particularly
its branch known as Sarvadharmpratihnavda, this problem is not at
all present inasmuch as, for its adherents, the principle of this
mere state of conditioning (idapratyyatmtra: rkyen nyid di pa tsam)
is supposed to explain the karmic mechanism and thus not only is
there no need for a metaphysical substrate, there is no excuse for
one. Similarly, several doctrinal developments in the Mahyna, such
as ones within various sub-schools of the Yogcra and Madhyamaka
systems with their theories of epistemology and Buddhology, may
have been triggered by attempts to explain the mechanism (i.e.
Wirkmechanismus at a different level) of how the Buddha or a
buddhawithout a metaphysical substratumacts for the benefit of
sentient beings.
Besides retracing the history of the idea of the four
applications of mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag
pa), Schmithausen has also attemptedin two further articles15to
illustrate that the reverse case is possible as well, namely, that
spiritual praxis can undergo decisive change under the influence of
(new) philosophical theories. He makes his case by considering the
teaching of smtyupasthna as found in canonical non-Mahyna sources
and (non-Mantric) Mahyna sources. He also remarks that the object
lesson (das Lehrstck) offered by smtyupasthna contains a hefty
portion (ein gutes Stck) of the Buddhist history of ideas, in which
almost all dominant theories of the various strands of Buddhism
come together. He has not, however, pursued the issue in a Vajrayna
(or Buddhist Mantric) context. What I modestly attempt to do in
this paper is to take up where
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Schmithausen has left off and suggest that in the Vajrayna, too,
the praxis of smtyupasthna has undergone change under the influence
of its philosophical view.
4. The Four Applications of Mindfulness in Vajrayna
The four applications of mindfulness in the Vajrayna (or Mantric
Mahyna) system as elucidated in some sources of the rNying-ma
School of Tibetan Buddhism may first be briefly discussed with the
aid of the writings of Rong-zom-pa Chos-kyi-bzang-po (eleventh
century), Klong-chen-pa Dri-med-od-zer (13081364), and Mi-pham
rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho (18461912). By way of an introduction, let me
make a few general points. First, although smtyupasthna as known in
the non-Mahyna and non-Mantric systems and sources are not my
primary concern in this context, it may be stated in general that
Tibetan authors such as Mi-pham presuppose for each Buddhist
soteriological vehicle or path its own thirty-seven factors that
favour awakening (bodhipkik dharm: byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos;
bodhipak dharm: byang chub kyi phyogs dang mthun pai chos)which
invariably include the four smtyupasthnasdistributed among the four
paths of training (aikamrga: slob pai lam), namely, the path of
accumulation (sabhramrga: tshogs kyi lam), path of preparation
(prayogamrga: sbyor bai lam), path of seeing (daranamrga: mthong
bai lam), and path of practice or meditation (bhvanmrga: sgom pai
lam).16 This is true in particular of the Niruttarayogic system of
Vajrayna, and Mi-pham, in his general commentary on the
*Guhyagarbhatantra, does speak of the five paths of the highest
Mantric system (sngags bla med kyi lam lnga) and associates the
four Mantric smtyupasthnas with the minor Mantric path of
accumulation (sngags kyi tshogs lam chung ngu).17 In other words,
the five-mrga scheme of the non-Mantric Mahyna soteriology (which
seems to have been retrospectively extended to the non-Mahynic
systems) was extended also to Mantric soteriology, and thus it is
that one encounters descriptions of the four smtyupasthnas
according to the Mantric form of Mahyna Buddhism.Second, although
the four smtyupasthnas have been often considered the Buddhist
soteriological practices of those at the level of the minor path of
accumulation (tshogs lam chung ngu)the first of the three levels of
the sabhramrgaaccording to Mi-pham,18 aspects or
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elements of the practice (nyams len gyi cha) of what in its
totality is known as the eighty inexhaustibles (mi zad pa brgyad
bcu),19 which include the four smtyupasthnas, are said to be
present at all levels of the path.
Third, it is worth bearing in mind that Mantric sources and
systems are highly heterogeneous, and one is likely to find all
sorts of interpretations of them and their components, including
the smtyupasthnas. Particularly relevant here is the fact that
Mantric sources, depending on the grade of doctrinal conservatism,
may or may not go beyond prescribing the smtyupasthna praxis known
in the non-Mantric forms of Mahyna Buddhism. But in the sources I
have considered, it is very clear that the framework of the praxis
of the smtyupasthnas has been refilled with a new doctrinal content
that is in tune with the Mantric philosophy.
Fourth, although again the four smtyupasthnas according to
non-Mantric forms of Buddhism are not our primary concern here, it
seems important to consider the four Vajraynic smtyupasthnas not in
isolation from but rather in relation to their earlier
(non-Mantric) forms. This is precisely what Mi-pham often seems to
do, namely, to compare the concept of the four smtyupasthnas found
in the rvakayna (i.e. non-Mahyna) with those found in
Bodhisattvayna/Pramityna (i.e. non-Mantric Mahyna) and
Vajrayna/Mantrayna. That is, according to the rvakayna, bodies
(kya: lus), feelings/sensations (vedan: tshor ba), minds (citta:
sems), and phenomena (dharma: chos) are viewed as modalities of the
four aspects/facets of the truth of suffering (sdug bden gyi rnam
pa bzhii tshul), namely, transiency, (unreliability/deficiency and
hence a cause of) discontentment, nullity, and non-essentiality,
whereas according to the Bodhisattvayna they are viewed and
meditated upon as being illusion-like on the conventional level
(tha snyad du sgyu ma lta bu) and as being free from all extremes
of manifoldness on the absolute level (dam par mtha kun dang bral
bai sprod bral).20 Just as, according to the Madhyntavibhga, the
Bodhisattvaynic smtyupasthna practice is said to excel its
rvakaynic counterpart so is the Vajraynic smtyupasthna practice
said to excel its non-Mantric counterpart.21
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Let me now turn specifically to how the four Mantric
smtyupasthnas have been presented by Mi-pham, Klong-chen-pa, and
Rong-zom-pa. First, to summarize, the four Mantric smtyupasthnas,
according to Mi-pham, are as follows:22 (1) Contemplating (blo
bzhag pa) the physical bodies of oneself and others as being
characterized by primordial or intrinsic purity (dag pa), on the
one hand, and by emptiness (stong pa nyid), freedom from
manifoldness (spros bral), great homogeneity (mnyam pa chen po),
and integrality (zung du jug pa), on the other, is called
kyasmtyupasthna. (2) Transforming conceptual constructions whose
occurrence one feels/senses (or is aware of) (byung tshor gyi rtog
pa)23 into gnosis characterized by great bliss (bde ba chen poi ye
shes) is called vedansmtyupasthna. (3) Channelling or
containing/constraining (sdom pa) all kinds of manifoldness
associated with mind and mental factors into/in/to the innate
sphere of the luminous nature of the mind is called
cittasmtyupasthna. (4) Conducting oneself in a way (or with an
attitude) that all sasric and nirvic, universal and particular
phenomena are pure and equal and hence beyond adoption or
rejection, is dharmasmtyupasthna. In this context, Mi-pham
maintains that the praxis of the four (Mantric) smtyupasthnas
described is in accordance with a certain rGyud sgyu phrul dam pa.
He, however, seems not to have drawn directly from this Tantric
scripture, even if he did obviously rely on Klong-chen-pa.
Second, Klong-chen-pas presentation of the four smtyupasthnas
from a Vajraynic perspective, which is essentially not much
different from what has just been summarized, can be found in the
twenty-second chapter of his Yid bzhin mdzod24 and in the
corresponding auto-commentary, the Padma dkar po.25 The rGyud sgyu
phrul dam pa and the passage cited by Klong-chen-pa are yet to be
identified and located. There is another aspect of the Mantric
smtyupasthnas which, while having not been explicitly touched on by
Mi-pham in his Od gsal snying po, is mentioned by Klong-chen-pa in
his Yid bzhin mdzod and the Padma dkar po, namely, a Mantric
version of the smtyupasthnas of sorts that seems to be associated
with the Vajrayna soteriology that is based on the skillful
manipulation and exploitation of mainly physical/physiological
resources, such as the channels (n: rtsa), vital winds (vyu:
rlung), and seminal drops (bindu: thig le), as opposed to the
Vajrayna soteriology that is based on the skillful manipulation and
exploitation of psychical/psychological resources. In
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my view, recognition of these two kinds of Vajrayna soteriology,
that is, so to speak, a primarily physiology-based Vajrayna
soteriology and a primarily psychology-based Vajrayna
soteriology,26 would facilitate the sorting out and explaining of
several Mantric concepts found in Buddhism. At any rate, two
related ideas connected with the physiology-based Vajrayna
soteriology are mentioned by Klong-chen-pa,27 namely, (a) the
thirty-seven factors that favour awakening, which include the four
smtyupasthnas, are described as being the qualities of purity,
purities, or pure quality (viuddhi: rnam dag = rnam dag chos) of
Mantric maalas (dkyil khor), including the maala consisting of
physical bodies (lus kyi dkyil khor), and (b) all the ensuing
qualities (or good outcome) of the practice of the four paths (lam
bzhii yon tan; i.e. of sabhramrga, prayogamrga, daranamrga, and
bhvanmrga), including the outcome of the practice of the four
smtyupasthnas, would come about through the disentanglement of the
twenty-two knots of the channels (n: rtsa) of ones body and once
the vital and psychic energies (rlung sems) running through the
cakras (khor lo) of the body become functional. Klong-chen-pa
clearly intends to draw a parallel between Stric Mahyna soteriology
and the physiology-based Mantric Mahyna soteriology, and he also
maintains that the latter soteriology occurs both in the Ancient
and the New Mantric schools of Tibetan Buddhism and that it has
been endorsed by figures such as cryas Vimalamitra and
Padmasambhava.28
Klong-chen-pas claim that the psychology-based Vajrayna
soteriology (involving the Mantric concept of the four
smtyupasthnas) found its way into the New Mantric schools of
Tibetan Buddhism is supported by sources such as Kcryas
Vasantatilak and Vanaratnas Rahasyadpik, both of which are extant
in the original Sanskrit and in Tibetan translation.29 In both
these works, the four smtyupasthnas are identified with four female
Tantric deities, namely, the kyasmtyupasthna with kin
(mKha-gro-ma), vedansmtyupasthna with Lm (left untranslated in
Tibetan), the cittasmtyupasthna with Rpi (gZugs-can-ma), and the
dharmasmtyupasthna with Khaaroh (Dum-skyes-ma). Most importantly,
these deities are said to be characterized by their nature of
self-cognizance (svasavidrpa: rang rig pai rang bzhin) and by their
manifesting (the nature/form) of true reality (dharmatrpa: chos
nyid
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kyi gzugs). In other words, the praxis of the four smtyupasthnas
has now assumed a form of praxis in which the highest cognitive
subject, namely, gnosis, and the highest cognitive object, namely,
true reality (or dharmadhtu), are to be fused, thereby dissolving
any subjectobject dichotomy. Such a spiritual praxis is very much
in conformity with the fundamental Mantric philosophical theory
that Vajrayna is a Resultant Vehicle (bras bui theg pa), that is, a
soteriological path or vehicle according to which one views the
world, and conducts oneself in it, from the perspective of an
awakened being who has already reached its soteriological goal.
There seems to be hardly any doubt that Mantric praxes of the four
smtyupasthnas are different from their Stric or non-Mantric
counterparts. The main point that I thus wish to make is that the
special praxes of the four smtyupasthnas found in Vajrayna may be
best explained as outcomes of the decisive
modifications/transformations that these praxes underwent under the
influence of its (new) Mantric philosophical theories.
Third, Rong-zom-pas discussion of the four smtyupasthnas in his
commentary on the Man ngag lta bai phreng ba (abbreviated here as
lTa phreng) ascribed to Padmasambhava, may be presented here
briefly.30 As in many other cases, Rong-zom-pas position on this
issue is quite intricate, mainly because the pertinent points for
him include not only the theorypraxis relationship but also
questions relating to ontology (i.e. the ontic status of the
objects of various kinds of meditation) and epistemology (i.e. the
epistemic veridicality of perceptions of various kinds). An attempt
will be made here to summarize his position. The point of departure
for Rong-zom-pas discussion is that Padmasambhava in the Vajrayna
section of his lTa phreng merely teaches that the philosophical
view that phenomena on the absolute level are without origination
and dissipation, and that he offers instruction on how to meditate
upon (them) as divine (i.e. utterly pure), but it neither teaches
the philosophical view regarding phenomena on the conventional
level nor the special soteriological results (of Vajrayna). The
discussion of the four smtyupasthnasfrom a traditional rvakayna
perspectiveoccurs specifically in the context of explaining why
Padmasambhava does not talk here about the philosophical view (lta
ba) of divinity or purity of phenomena on the conventional level
but only about the meditational praxis (sgom pa). To drastically
simplify and summarize the key points, Rong-zom-pa explains that
there is no need
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to talk about the philosophical theory (separately) because
meditational praxis presupposes (or implies) it, and that
philosophical theory and meditational praxis will not, in any case,
(mutually) contradict (each other), inasmuch as the vision-like
theory always accompanies the actual walking-like praxis. In sum,
Rong-zom-pa seems to suggest that various kinds of
meditation/contemplation (e.g. dhynas and samdhis related to
aubhabhvan, smtyupasthna, ktsnyatana, and devatyoga) have some
common features. First, any given (Buddhist) philosophical view and
meditational praxis will necessarily always be consistent or
congruent with each other. This applies, in particular, to the
theory and praxis of the four smtyupasthnas in their traditional
(or conservative) sense. Second, all the various kinds of
meditation familiar to Buddhism have their instrumental value (i.e.
serve as antidotes of some kind). The praxis of the four
smtyupasthnas has been taught as offering antidotes to four kinds
of false views (phyin ci log gi lta ba bzhi), such as seizing upon
impure (mi gtsang ba) bodies (lus) as being pure (gtsang ba). In
general, I have the feeling that for Rong-zom-pa, all spiritual
means and pathsnay, all phenomenahave only an instrumental
value!
Third, ontologically, if analyzed on the basis of logical
reasoning and scriptural authorities, it turns out that none of the
objects of meditation contradicts its defining characteristics
(dngos poi mtshan nyid dang gal ba med). Such a result is in line
with the assumption that just as there are various layers, levels,
or dimensions of ontological reality, so too are the corresponding
epistemic perceptions/conceptions of varying degrees of
veridicality.31 For Rong-zom-pa, any given meditational praxis
(e.g. aubhabhvan) necessarily finds itself confronted with a
certain level of ontological reality and a related
perception/conception that is correspondingly veridical. Thus,
epistemologically, all cognitive subjects of
meditation/contemplation agree with the cognitive object or domain
of meditation/contemplation. Fourth, the current state of all
cognitive subjects (i.e. perceptions/conceptions) of
meditation/contemplation and all their current cognitive
objects/domains of meditation/contemplation (i.e. appearances) are
caused by karmic propensities (las kyi bag chags), and thus, though
not specified here, it will be true to state that for Rong-zom-pa
all perceptions/conceptions are ultimately delusions (like the
perception of water in a mirage) and all (perceptible) appearances
are illusions (like a mirage), and that
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ultimately there is no cognitive subject or object that is
absolutely veridical or hypostatic.
For Rong-zom-pa, then, a distinction can be made between the
various kinds of meditation/contemplation. First, all Buddhist
teachings (including those on meditation/contemplation) are diverse
in view of the difference in their intended purpose (dgongs pai
dbang tha dad pa). Second, sentient beings are diverse, but all of
them can be subsumed under either (a) those who have an impure
cognitive/interactive domain (yongs su ma dag pai spyod yul) or (b)
those who have a pure cognitive/interactive domain (yongs su dag
pai spyod yul), and both of them under the influence of either
wholesome (dkar po) or unwholesome (nag po) karmic propensities
(las kyi bag chags). Third, although all perceptions/conceptions
and appearances are similar inasmuch as they are all caused by
karmic propensities, a differentiation of true (bden) and untrue
(mi bden) can nonetheless be made on the conventional level (kun
rdzob tu) insofar as the various perceptions/conceptions and
appearances differ with regard to fallibility and infallibility
(slu mi slu) and stability and instability (brtan mi brtan). A
fuller assessment of Rong-zom-pas unique position on the
meditational praxis such as of the four smtyupasthnas and his
position on the synchronic relationship between philosophical
theory and meditational praxis seems possible only against the
backdrop of his positions on various aspects of Buddhist
philosophy, particularly on what he calls special Mahyna.
5. The Synchronic Relationship between Philosophical Theory and
Spiritual Praxis
Let us now turn to the second concern of my article, namely, the
synchronic relationship between philosophical theory and spiritual
praxis. The history of the synchronic relationship between the two
seems to be a history of the tension and resolution of the tension
between any two given poles that are somehow related to or
associated with theory or praxis. Such a tension, whether real or
perceived, may be primarily between (a) two types of doctrines, one
associated with (or representing) philosophical theory and the
other with spiritual praxis, and secondarily between (b) two types
of persons, positions, or traditions, one of which is predominantly
inclined towards
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dorji WAngchuK: Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis in
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191
intellectualism (or rationalism) and hence more towards
philosophical theory, and the other towards mysticism (or
spiritualism) and hence more towards spiritual praxis. One is bound
to encounter sources, scholars, and schools that make efforts to
reconcile or harmonize the two poles and so to resolve the tension.
Such attempts may account for the development of some Buddhist
ideas.
With regard to the synchronic relationship between two types of
doctrines associated with (or representing) philosophical theory
and spiritual praxis, I would like to point out one issue that
seems to particularly deserve our attention, namely, the issue of
what one might call the epistemic-ontic correspondence between any
given Buddhist theory and praxis. The question here is whether the
object/content of meditational praxis represents the true reality
established by the philosophical view and thus whether there is an
epistemic-ontic correspondence between the philosophical theory and
spiritual praxis, or whether there is no (and no need for)
epistemic-ontic correspondence between the two inasmuch as the two
are different by nature and in function. In this connection, there
seems to be at least two distinct positions. First, presumably most
Tibetan Buddhist scholars in general would recognize two types of
meditational praxis, namely, one that is epistemically veridical
(e.g. meditation on nyat) and the other that is not epistemically
veridical (e.g. aubhabhvan). Such a distinction presupposes that
nyat is the true reality of all phenomena and hence the
perception/conception of it is correct, whereas the impurity (of
the world full of skeletons) is not its true reality and hence the
perception/conception of the impure is incorrect. Rong-zom-pa would
have designated these two kinds of meditational praxis as one that
has been taught as [mere] antidotes [against intellectual-emotional
defilements] (gnyen poi don du gsungs pa) and thus one that is not
in conformity with the corresponding reality and the view of
reality; and one that has been taught straightforwardly (gzugs por
gsungs pa) and that thus does correspond with reality and the view
of reality. A careful study of the positions of gSar-ma scholars
such as Sa-skya-paita Kun-dga-rgyal-mtshan (11821251) and
Tsong-kha-pa Blo-bzang-grags-pa (13571419), particularly their
positions on whether special kinds of Vajrayna meditational praxis
have special corresponding philosophical theories, is bound to shed
more light on this particular issue, but such an endeavor is beyond
the scope of this paper. Second, rNying-ma scholars such as
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Rong-zong-pa and Mi-pham, however, seem to suggest or
presuppose, as a rule, an epistemic-ontic correspondence between
the philosophical view (lta ba) and meditational praxis of any
given Buddhist system inasmuch as for them one meditates upon what
has been established by the philosophical theory, it being
virtually impossible that the theory and praxis are mutually
contradictory. In other words, any given type of Buddhist
meditational praxis is such that the feet-like praxis and
vision-like theory always conform.32 Particularly for Rong-zom-pa,
all types of Buddhist meditational praxis prescribed by various
Buddhist vehicles are similar inasmuch as theyincluding practices
such as the aubhabhvanare all characterized by epistemic-ontic
correspondence. This position of his seems to be most conspicuous
in his lTa grel.33 A fuller and clearer picture of this standpoint
would emerge only against the backdrop of his positions on the
entire range of Buddhist vehicles known to him and the graded
ontology, epistemology, and soteriology that he ascribes to each
vehicle. In short, what Rong-zom-pa is actually asserting is not
only that any given type of Buddhist meditational praxis, even
aubhabhvan, is instrumentally valuable but also that the
corresponding theory is epistemically correct, although, needless
to say, for him ultimately all cognitive objects of appearance are
illusionary and untrue and all perceptions/conceptions are
delusional and false.
A careful study of the pertinent Tibetan positions on the
question of whether each Buddhist vehicle has a unique
philosophical view (lta ba) of its own with a corresponding
meditational praxis (sgom pa) or whether several Buddhist vehicles
may have the same or similar philosophical view despite having
different spiritual praxes is bound to reveal these two distinct
ways of seeing the synchronic relationship between philosophical
theory and spiritual praxis in Tibetan Buddhism.
. Epilogue
In sum, what I have attempted in this paper is to discuss some
difficulties posed by the theorypraxis dichotomy in Buddhism, which
are of two kinds, namely, (a) difficulties associated with the
historical or diachronic relationship between philosophical theory
and spiritual praxis, and (b) difficulties pertaining to the
doctrinal or synchronic relationship between the two. In the
context of the former, I have ventured to
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dorji WAngchuK: Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis in
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193
discuss for the first time the four applications of mindfulness
from the perspective of the Mantric form of Mahyna Buddhism.
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194
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dar ma rin chens dKa gnad/gnas brgyad kyi zin bris. Annotated
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WAngchuK 2009 Id., A Relativity Theory of the Purity and
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Notes
1. The present article is a slightly modified version of a paper
(Apropos the Problems of the TheoryPraxis Dichotomy in Buddhism
with Particular Reference to the Case of the Four Applications of
Mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag pa) in Vajrayna)
that I presented (on August 24, 2013) during the international
conference on Buddhist Meditative Praxis: Traditional Teaching and
Modern Application held at the University of Hong Kong marking the
tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Centre of Buddhist
Studies at the University of Hong Kong. I had initially hoped that
I would be able to enhance the present contribution for publication
considerably by augmenting it with additional primary and secondary
sources but have come to realize that that was too optimistic, and
have thus decided to submit it as it stands and with minimal
modifications. I would like to take this opportunity to thank once
again the Conference Organizing Committee and Venerable Prof. K. L.
Dhammajoti (Glorious Sun Professor of Buddhist Studies and Chairman
of the Master of Buddhist Studies Program, University of Hong
Kong). My sincere thanks also go to Philip Pierce for his careful
proofreading of this article.
2. For my understanding of the terms philosophical theory and
spiritual praxis, I largely rely on the following statements in
schmithAusen 1976b: 235 The term philosophical theory should be
understood here in a general sense comprising any attempt to make
rational statements about the true nature or the fundamental
principles of the totality or some part of the existent, or about
those aspects of it of which everyday experience is not aware. In
this sense, philosophical theories in Buddhism are, e.g., the
doctrine that there is no substantial Self, no tman; or the
doctrine that the whole universe consists of momentary factors, of
factors each of which lasts only for the time of an extremely short
moment. Spiritual practice, in the case of Buddhism, consists
essentially of moral or ethical exercises, and of practices of
meditation, deep concentration, or trance. As an example, we may
adduce the so-called four infinitudes, or unlimited ones (aprama),
i.e. the meditative practice of the attitudes of friendliness,
compassion, sympathetic joy, and impartiality or equanimity with
regard to all living beings. Another example is the contemplation
of the impure (aubhabhvan). See also schmithAusen 1973: 161163.
3. schmithAusen 1976b: 236; cf. schmithAusen 1973: 163: Es soll
dabei weniger um die angeborenen, z. T. ererbten und unspezifischen
theoretischen Voraussetzungen des Buddhismus wie etwa die Lehre von
der Seelenwanderung (sasra) gehen als vielmehr um die fr den
Buddhismus typischen philosophischen Theorien, die er erst im Laufe
seiner Entwicklung neu hervorgebracht hat. Although the two kinds
of Buddhist theories addressed in these two articles have not been
proposed as a typology of Buddhist philosophical theories, such a
distinction seems to nonetheless prove beneficial to those of us
interested in the history of Buddhist philosophical ideas.
4. schmithAusen 1973: 185 Natrlich gibt es im Buddhismus auch
philosophische Theorien, die nicht unmittelbar aus spirituellen
Quellen stammen. Solche
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dorji WAngchuK: Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis in
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Theorien entwickelten sich vor allem dann, wenn sich
Schwierigkeiten bei der Systematisierung jener theoretischen
Grundlagen, die unmittelbar aus der spirituellen Praxis erwachsen
waren, einstellten, etwa dadurch, da diese Lehren mit anderen
Lehren nicht ohne weiteres vereinbar waren. Ein Beispiel hierfr
waren etwa die verschiedenen Theorien zur Erklrung des
Wirkmechanismus der guten und bsen Werke, der vor allem durch die
Dogmatisierung des Antisubstantialismus und der negativen
Einstellung zum Selbst problematisch wurde. Solche Theorien sind
oft nur noch lose oder gar nicht mehr in der spirituellen Praxis
verwurzelt. Aber es handelt sich bei ihnen doch meist um Lsungen
spezieller und sekundrer Fragen. Fr die zentralen, das Ganze
bestimmenden philosophischen Theorien gilt, da sie, zum mindesten
zum grten Teil, unmittelbar aus der spirituellen Praxis
hervorgewachsen sein drften.
5. schmithAusen 1973: 185.6. On the concept of apattra, see
seyfort ruegg 2002: 159, n. 7.7. For the controversial dGe-lugs
theory of cessation/decay as an entity (zhig
pa dngos po), see seyfort ruegg 2002: 159169. See also
schmithAusen 1986: 217220 (VII), which provides several insights
that help us understand and explain issues pertaining (and related)
to the theory.
8. Lambert Schmithausen addressed the following issues
(schmithAusen 1976a: 235): Did Buddhism usually start from
philosophical theories and afterwards develop corresponding
spiritual practices? Or is it more typical for Buddhism that first
there are spiritual practices and that philosophical theories are
only the result of a subsequent reflection that leads to a
theoretical consolidation and generalization of those spiritual
practices? Cf. schmithAusen 1973: 163.
9. schmithAusen 1976a: 236.10. WAngchuK 2007: 3031.11. The
Buddhist parable of a man shot with a poisoned arrow is found in
the
Camlukyasutta of the Majjhimanikya. For an English translation
of the story, see horner 1957: 97101. The story is said to have
come down in the Chinese tradition, but it is not clear to me if it
has also been transmitted in the Tibetan tradition. It is
discussed, among other places, in de lA vAlle Poussin 1917:
128129.
12. schmithAusen 1973; schmithAusen 1976a. Although the author
has responded (schmithAusen 2014: 597641) to the criticisms raised
by several scholars (Robert Sharf, Johannes Bronkhorst, and Eli
Franco) against the content of these two articles, I have not been
able to carefully consider his most recent (refined) positions in
this new book.
13. schmithAusen 1973: 185186 Ich glaube, da sich der Buddhismus
dadurch nicht nur von der europischen Philosophie unterscheidet vor
allem von der griechischen und der neuzeitlichen , sondern auch von
der brahmanischen indischen Philosophie, in der Einflsse der
spirituellen Praxis auf die philosophische Theorie zwar durchaus
nachweisbar, aber doch im ganzen zweifellos geringer sind. Der
Grund fr diesen Unterschied liegt gewi letztlich in der Person des
Buddha selbst, der mit einer wohl einmaligen Konsequenz
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Buddhist Meditative Praxis: Traditional Teachings & Modern
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und Radikalitt alle fr das Heil irrelevanten theoretischen
Spekulationen abgewiesen hatte.
14. schmithAusen 1973: 185.15. schmithAusen 1973 &
schmithAusen 1976b.16. Mi-pham, mKhas jug (p. 149.56): mdor na lam
lngar rang lam gyi byang
phyogs so bdun bsgom pas gnas skabs su rgyun bzhugs sogs gsum
gyi bras bu dang | mthar bras dgra bcom pai go phang mngon du byed
pao ||.
17. Mi-pham, Od gsal snying po (p. 137.5): sngags bla med kyi
lam lnga; ibid. (p. 139.2): de ltar dran pa nyer bzhag [= gzhag]
bzhii rang bzhin can gyi sngags kyi tshogs lam chung ngu skye la
|.
18. Mi-pham, mKhas jug (p. 183.34): di dag gtso che bai dbang du
byas kyi lam thams cad na yang kun gyi nyams len gyi cha yod par
shes par byao ||. I understand that by these (di dag) Mi-pham means
all eighty inexhaustibles and that although for him certain sets of
practices are assigned to a certain level on the bodhisattva path,
all aspects of the practices can be found at all levels.
19. See, for example, Mi-pham, mKhas jug (pp. 154.5183.3); sDom
byang (p. 384.45). The concept of the eighty inexhaustibles must
have been inspired by the Akayamatinirdeastra.
20. For a rundown of the four smtyupasthnas as treated in the
rvakayna and Bodhisattvayna, see Mi-pham, mKhas jug (p.
163.5165.1).
21. Mi-pham, Od gsal snying po (p. 138.56): de yang theg dman
las theg chen gyi dran nye phags tshul dbus mtha las | byang chub
sems dpa rnams kyi ni || dmigs dang yid la byed pa dang || thob pas
de nyid khyad par phags || zhes gsungs pa bzhin du | mdo las sngags
phags tshul kyang de dang dra ste |. Cf. Maitreya (ascribed),
Madhyntavibhga (B, vol. 70, p. 909.1718): byang chub sems dpa rnams
kyi ni || dmigs dang yid la byed pa dang || thob [DC, thob PN] pas
de ni khyad par phags ||. See also Kong-sprul, Shes bya mdzod,
where a distinction between Stric and Mantric Mahyna practices of
the four smtyupasthna is made (p. 924.2428): de rnams kyi grub don
go bde bar brjod na lus sogs bzhi po kun rdzob tu mi gtsang ba sogs
bzhir snang zhing | don dam du ciang ma grub bo zhes bsgom pa ni
mdo lugs kyi dran pa nyer gzhag bzhi ste | ngo bo bdag med gnyis
bsgom par dus so || lus lha skur bsgom pa la bde stong gi rgyas
debs pa dang | tshor ba dang rnam shes dang sems byung yul snang
thams cad la yang bde stong gi rgyas debs pa ste gsang sngags bla
med kyi lam gyi dran pa nyer gzhag bzhio ||.
22. Mi-pham, Od gsal snying po (p. 138.25): de yang dang por
rang gzhan gyi lus la sogs pa dkyil khor gyi khor lor ye nas dag pa
bzhin sgom zhing | de yang stong nyid spros bral mnyam pa chen po
dang zung du jug pai tshul la blo bzhag pa ni lus dran pa nye bar
bzhag pa | byung tshor gyi rtog pa bde ba chen poi ye shes su
bsgyur ba tshor ba dran pa nye bar bzhag pa | sems sems byung gi
spros pa ma lus pa sems nyid od gsal gnyug mai dbyings su sdom pa
sems dran pa nye bar bzhag pa | khor das snang btags kyi chos thams
cad dag mnyam blang dor dang bral ba spyod pa chos dran pa nye bar
bzhag pa ste rgyud sgyu phrul dam pa nas ji skad bstan ba lta buo
||.
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dorji WAngchuK: Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Praxis in
Buddhism
201
23. The expression byung tshor gyi rtog pa is not clear to me,
and hence the interpretation and translation of it as conceptual
constructions whose occurrence one feels/senses (or is aware of) is
merely tentative.
24. Klong-chen-pa, Yid bzhin mdzod (p. 63.913): tshogs lam chung
ngur dran pa nyer gzhag ste || lus lhar bskyed pa lus dran nye bar
bzhag || byung tshor rnam rtog ye shes bsgyur ba ni || tshor ba
dran pa nye bar gzhag pa ste || sems dang sems byung spros pa nyer
zhii sgom || sems dran nyer gzhag rdzogs pai rim pa ste || snang
btags chos kun sgyu mar shes pa ni || chos dran nyer gzhag lags par
rgyud las gsungs ||. The presentation of the four smtyupasthnas in
his Shing rta chen po (p. 368.4369.10) is very general and is
without any Mantric elements.
25. Klong-chen-pa, Padma dkar po (pp. 283.15284.6). After citing
the pertinent mla text of the Yid bzhin mdzod, the Padma dkar po
goes on to cite the rGyud sgyu phrul dam pa (pp. 283.20284.6): ji
skad du | sgyu phrul dam pa las | sngags pa gang zhig rnal byor la
brtson pas | bdag byin gyis brlab pa ni | lus dran pa nye bar gzhag
pa ste | lhai ngo bo nyid du snang ba gzungs brnyan lta buo || kun
tu rtog pa ye shes chen poi gnas skabs ni | tshor bai ngo bo nyid
de bde ba chen poo || spros pai phyogs las rnam par rgyal ba ni |
dir sems mi dmigs pa nyid do || gzugs brnyan gyi ngo bo nyid du
sgyur mar sbyong ba ni chos kyi rang bzhin no zhes so ||.
26. The two types of Vajrayna soteriology are put forward in
WAngchuK 2007: 223225 in the context of discussing
Psycho-Physiological Bodhicitta in Yogic Practices. See also Almogi
2009: 247248.
27. Klong-chen-pa, Yid bzhin mdzod (p. 63.19); Padma dkar po
(pp. 281.18283.14). 28. Klong-chen-pa must be thinking of the
physiology-based Vajrayna soteriology
involving cakras; this is discussed in Almogi 2009. 29. Kcrya,
Vasantatilak (Skt. p. 51; Tib. pp. 8889); Vanaratna,
Rahasyadpik
(Skt. pp. 5153; Tib. pp. 8892).30. Rong-zom-pa, lTa grel (pp.
330.11332.14).31. Rong-zom-pas position on the various levels of
ontological reality and the
varying degrees of epistemic (i.e. perceptual/conceptual)
veridicality may become clearer if we consider what I call his
relativity theory of the purity and validity of perception,
discussed in WAngchuK 2009.
32. Rong-zom-pa, lTa grel (p. 330.1518): lta bas ji ltar bcad pa
bzhin du ting nge dzin gyis goms par byed pa yin te | gang gi phyir
lta ba dang sgom pa ni gal du mi rung ste | rig pa dang rkang par
ldan dgos pai phyir dang |; Mi-pham, Od gsal snying po (pp.
129.2130.2). Note particularly his statement: lta sgom ni rig pa
dang rkang par dang ldan dgos pai phyir.
33. Rong-zom-pa, lTa grel (pp. 330.11332.16). The question about
the ontological status of the objects of meditation that appear in
the form of visible entities (rpa: gzugs) raised at the beginning
of his Rang byung ye shes (pp. 111.22112.11) and his answer thereto
ought to help us to understand his position on the epistemic-ontic
correspondence between philosophical theory and meditational
praxis.
-
New Publication from the Centre of Buddhist Studies, The
University of Hong Kong:
Buddhist Meditative Praxis: traditional teachings & modern
applications Edited by K.L. Dhammajoti
The Centre of Buddhist Studies was inaugurated at The University
of Hong Kong in 2002. In August 2013, on the occasion of
celebrating its tenth anniversary, the Centre held a two-day
international conference on Buddhist meditative praxis as part of
the celebration, resulting in the publication of this volume of
essays. This volume is divided into two parts. The first part
consists of papers on issues related to the historical, doctrinal
and philosophical aspects on the theme of Buddhist meditative
praxis. As the contents of this part show, the scope of meditative
praxis has been viewed from a very broad perspective. The
presentations also included discussion on the modern applications
and interdisciplinary studies related to Buddhist teachings,
particularly those connected with meditative praxis. These are
collected in the second part of this volume.
-
Part I - Buddhist Meditative Praxis: History, Doctrines and
Philosophical Implications 1. The Sutta On Mindfulness with In and
Out Breathing -- L.S. Cousins (Oxford University) 2. Praj-vimukta,
ubhayatobhga-vimukta and vimokvaraa The Sarvstivda perspective
--
KL Dhammajoti (The University of Hong Kong) 3. The Sevenfold
Purification (sattavisuddhi) as the Structural Framework of the
Visuddhimagga:
Some Observations -- Toshiichi Endo (The University of Hong
Kong) 4. Jitri on Backward Causation (bhvikraavda) -- Eli Franco
(Leipzig University) 5. The Role of Meditation in the Threefold
Scheme of Buddhist Mental Culture Y. Karunadasa
(University of Kelaniya) 6. Samdhi Names: The Nature of
Meditative Experience In Mahyna -- Lewis Lancaster (The
University of Hong Kong) 7. A Reexamination of on Being
Mindless: Possible Meditative Implications of the Eightfold
Proof
of layavijna -- Nobuyoshi Yamabe (Waseda University) 8. The
Diachronic and Synchronic Relationship between Philosophical Theory
and Spiritual Praxis
in Buddhism: With Special Reference to the Case of the Four
Applications of Mindfulness (smtyupasthna: dran pa nye bar gzhag
pa) in Vajrayna -- Dorji Wangchuk (Universitat Hamburg)
9. Central Asian Meditation Manuals -- Charles Willemen
(International Buddhist College) 10. Do Meditative Objects Exist?
-- Zhihua Yao (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) Part II -
Buddhist Meditative Praxis: Modern Applications and
Interdisciplinary Studies 1. A Chinese Chan-Based Intervention: A
Way to Improve the Mind and Body - Agnes, Sui Yin
Chan (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) 2. Neurodharma:
Practicing with the Brain in Mind -- Rick Hanson (University of
California) 3. Can Meditation Change our Brain? -- Tatia M.C. Lee,
Natalie T.Y. Leung (The University of
Hong Kong) 4. The Importance of the Buddhist Teaching on Three
Kinds of Knowing: In a School-based
Contemplative Education Program -- Hin Hung Sik, Bonnie Wai Yan
Wu (The University of Hong Kong)
5. Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy for Depression -- Mark
Williams (The University of Oxford)
Ven. Professor K.L. Dhammajoti - Glorious Sun Professor of
Buddhist Studies, Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of
Hong
Kong
Bibliography of DWWangchuk 2015Wangchuk 2015.Buddhist Meditative
Praxis_Prof. Wangchuk copyWangchuk 2015 Cover .Buddhist Meditative
Praxis - Book Information