Waiting for Democracy: The Politics of Choice and Recognition.

Waiting for Democracy:

The Politics of Choice and Recognition

Representation, Citizenship and the Public Domain:

Institutional Choice in Decentralization

Jesse C. RibotEquity, Poverty & Environment GroupInstitutions and Governance Program

World Resources Institute

Shell corporation ad

Malaysian Naturalist

September 2004

We do our best to find the right partners for our sustainable development Programmes.

This means searching for individuals and organisations who share our global vision and local community interests. People with the right attitude, aptitude and with the experience to match.

That’s why men like the one you see here end up working with Shell.

Research Program on Democratic Decentralization Project Main findings

New Research Programs Commodity Chain Analysis as a Policy Tool Institutional Choice and Recognition

Institutional Choice and Recognition

Today’s Talk

Power Transfers

Defining Decentralization

Central GovernmentMinistries:

-Health -Environment -Education….

Democratic Local

Government

AdministrativeLocal Authority

Customary Authority

NGOPVOCBO

DonorsBig NGOs

Individual orCorporation

Democratic

Decentra

lizatio

n

Decon

cent

ratio

n

(Adm

inis

trativ

e

Decen

traliz

atio

n)

Privatization

Hybrids?

3rd SectorGovernment

Non-market Privatization

Decentralization Not Decentralization

Public-Private Spectrum PrivatePublic

Participation

Contracts & Delegations

Theoretical Mechanisms of Decentralization Benefits

Advertised Benefits Enfranchisement, Equity, Efficiency, Development, Better

Management, Better Service Delivery, Benefit retention

Mechanisms Local Authorities are believed to: Better match services to needs and aspirations (public choice theory) Reduce transaction costs (new institutional econ) by proximity

allowing: Mobilizing local knowledge and skills for collective/public good Mobilizing local labor for collective projects Improved coordination among local programs

Balance of negative and positive outcomes in decision making (economic theory of “internalizing externalities”)

ALL IMPLY INCLUSION MECHANISM: REPRESENTATION *With* POWERS

REPRESENTATION

Preferences

Signals

Mandates

Policies Outcomes

Responsiveness Accountability

Sanctions

= Responsiveness &/or Accountability

Elements of Effective Decentralization

Positive Outcomes are Expected from:

Local InstitutionsActors

Entrusted with Powers (executive, legislative, judicial: discretion+capabilities to exercise them)

That are Accountable to the Local Population

[Representation is integrative mechanisms in rural development]

Central GovernmentMinistries:

-Health -Environment -Education….

Democratic Local

Government

AdministrativeLocal Authority

Customary Authority

NGOPVOCBO

DonorsBig NGOs

Individual orCorporation

Democratic

Decentra

lizatio

n

Decon

cent

ratio

n

PrivatizationNon-market Privatization

Participation?

Local Populations

??

Power Transfer

Accountability

Contracts & Delegations

Central GovernmentMinistries:

-Health -Environment -Education….

Democratic Local

Government

AdministrativeLocal Authority

Customary Authority

NGOPVOCBO

DonorsBig NGOs

Individual orCorporation

Democratic

Decentra

lizatio

n

Decon

cent

ratio

n

PrivatizationNon-market Privatization

Participation?

Local Populations

??

Power Transfer

Ability to Sanction

Contracts & Delegations

What Happens in Practice?

Power Choices in Practice

Choice of Institutions in Practice

Institutional Choices in Practice Local democratic institutions rarely empowered. Elected local institutions, when chosen, are often not democratic. Deconcentration to local branches of forest departments most common. Privatization of public resources in the name of Decentralization very common:

Hunting in Senegal and Namibia Forests to individuals and chiefs in Mali and Uganda Land to individuals in South Africa

NGOs and community groups being chosen by donors—even where there are democratic local authorities Competition with & de-legitimating of local democracy-[Bee-keepers in Uganda] Proliferation of Committees, PVOs and NGOs since 90s Institutional “pluralism” undermining democracy [pluralism is good, but it must be

subordinated to representative authorities] Participatory Processes in lieu of working with elected local authorities Customary authority being chosen as if representative.

Many of these choices take legitimacy and powers from local democratic authorities, and are used to mobilize rather than enfranchise.

Choice of Powers in Practice Only a few cases discretionary powers (domain of democracy)

Fiscal resources (eg Cameroon) & some allocation decisions Non-commercial subsistence resources transferred Powers to allocate lucrative resources retained Mandates: the odium of management, dominate transfers

Some funded Most unfunded—NRM not viewed as labor Forced labor for tree planting still included in Ugandan laws

Draconian mgt. Planning required for communities [although NOT usually necessary double standards applied] Local use often not ecological problem, but requires elaborate plans Concessions get to operate with few regulations Access to resource exchanged for labor to implement plans—participatory

corvee in Senegal, Cameroon, Zimbabwe CBNRM programs Donors and NGOs needed to assist planning

Means of transfer problem—rights vs. Privileges Most are insecure Secure means of transfer legitimacy, security, stability over time

These choices constitute Government Tactics

resisting decentralization

Choice of Institutions

Resisting Power Transfers

Getting the Institutions Right?

Decentralization theory is an IF-THEN proposition [out of new institutionalism] If we have the right institutions with the right powers Then we get all these positive outcomes

But we’re not getting to ‘IF’ in most cases

New institutionalism is being stomped out by a larger set of political-economic forces

[Sort of like “Bambi Meets Godzilla”]

New Institutionalism Meets Political Economy

CONCLUSIONS

What are we doing about it?

Better Match Policy to protect procedural objectives of democracy against instrumental

sectoral objectivesPowers: Subsidiarity/Standards

Actors & Accountability: Institutional Choice

New Research Program: If states resist via institutional choices: lets understand those

choices and their effects.

Recommendations Section

Principles of Institutional Choice

Choose democratic local institutions where they exist; Call for them where they do not Scrutinize and re-design local electoral processes to make elected bodies democratic

Choose and focus on fewer institutions. Nest institutions so that any institution with powers over

“public” or collective resources is subordinated to democratic authorities NGOs, Local administrative authorities, Local forest services, customary

authorities should be accountable to local elected authorities Disciplining effect of just hierarchy

Do not transfer public powers to private institutions Use Participation as a tool not a substitute for local

democracy Inclusion of marginal groups…. Use committees as tools within democratic structures not in

place of them

Central GovernmentMinistries:

-Health -Environment -Education….

Democratic Local

Government

AdministrativeLocal Authority

Customary Authority

NGO/ PVOCBO

Committees

Individual orCorporation

IdealAccountability of Institutions

Power Transfer

Accountability

Local Populations

Subsidiarity Principles Focus on creating local discretion Devolve lucrative opportunities Separate technical from political decisions—

devolve political decisions. Shift oversight and approval to a legal control

model—function of forest service to assure compliance with laws, not to approve every decision.

Keep in mind that capacity follows power Use taxation of resource to retain value [must set

at higher level—do not only give locals revenues from fines.]

Shift from Planning to Minimum Standards [next]

Subsidiarity Principles IILimits and Context of Powers

Shift to uniform minimum standards from a planning approach Planning not needed Standards needed Delimit Space of Discretion Eliminate double standards between communities and corporations [That much forest management being required of local communities by

forest services is unnecessary is unthinkable—gather the data to make it thinkable!]

Incentives—local people do not choose to invest in the environment Treat NRM investments as other public works—pay labor Project solutions—reduce co-pay, pair projects, green windows

Framework for Future Analysis Representation

Means of Transfer Empowering Representation Mix of Institutions

Citizenship and Belonging Residency Interest Identity

Public Domain Maintaining public space Enclosure through privatization and desecularization

Public Domain Representation and Belonging

The End