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Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay V. Vazirani
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Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

Mar 31, 2018

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Page 1: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay V. Vazirani

Page 2: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

Sellers Large ISPs

National or international reach

Buyers Smaller ISPs

Enterprises

Content providers

Universities

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Cogent

Stanford University

Connectivity is sold at bulk using blended rates

Invoice Traffic

Page 3: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

Single price in $/Mbps/month

Charged each month on aggregate throughput Some flows are costly

Some are cheaper to serve

Price is set to recover total costs + margin

Convenient for ISPs and clients

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Cogent

EU Cost: $$$

US Cost: $

Blended rate Price: $$

Stanford University

Can be inefficient!

Page 4: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

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Uniform price yet diverse resource costs

Lack of incentives to conserve resources to costly destinations

Lack of incentives to invest in resources to costly destinations

Pareto inefficient resource allocation A well studied concept in economics

Potential loss to ISP profit and client surplus

Clients ISPs

Alternative: Tiered Pricing

Page 5: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

Some industries use tiered pricing extensively

Parcel services, airlines, train companies

Pricing on distance, weight, quality of service

Other industries offer limited tiered pricing

USPS mail, London’s Tube, Atlanta’s MARTA

Limited number of pricing tiers

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Price the flows based on cost and demand

Where is tiered pricing in the Internet?

Page 6: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

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Cogent

Global, Cost: $$$

Local Cost: $

Stanford University

Regional pricing

Price: $$$

Price: $

Some ISPs already use limited tiered pricing On/Off-Net Pricing

Cogent

Stanford University

Client Revenue: $

Peer No revenue

Price: $$$

Price: $

Question: How efficient are the current ISP pricing strategies?

Can ISPs benefit from more tiers?

Page 7: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

1. Construct an ISP profit model that accounts for: Demand of different flows

Servicing costs of different flows

2. Drive the model with real data Demand functions from real traffic data

Servicing costs from real topology data

3. Test the effects of tiered pricing!

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How can we test the effects of tiered pricing on ISP profits?

Modeling

Data mapping

Number crunching

Page 8: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

Flow revenue Price * Traffic Demand

Traffic Demand is a function of price

How do we model and discover demand functions?

Flow cost

Servicing Cost * Traffic Demand

Servicing Cost is a function of distance

How do we model and discover servicing costs? 8

Profit = Revenue – Costs (for all flows)

Page 9: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

1. Finding Demand Functions

3. Reconciling cost with demand

2. Modeling Costs

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Traffic Demands Network Topologies Current Prices

Demand Models

Demand Functions

Cost Models

Relative costs

Profit Model

Absolute costs

Page 10: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

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Demand = F(Price, Valuation, Elasticity)

Valuation = F-1(Price, Demand, Elasticity)

Canonical commodity demand function: Price

Demand

Elastic demand

Inelastic demand

Valuation – how valuable flow is Elasticity – how fast demand changes with price

Current price

Current flow demand

Assumed range of elasticities

We mapped traffic data to demand functions!

How do we find the demand function parameters?

Page 11: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

1. Finding Demand Functions 2. Modeling Costs

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Traffic Demands Network Topologies Current Prices

Demand Models

Demand Functions

Cost Models

Relative costs

Profit Model

Absolute costs

Page 12: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

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𝑑𝑖

𝑐𝑖

𝑑𝑖

𝑐𝑖

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Linear: Concave:

Region: Dest. type:

How can we model flow costs?

ISP topologies and peering information alone can only provide us with relative flow servicing costs.

real_costs = γ * relative_costs

Page 13: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

1. Finding Demand Functions

3. Reconciling cost with demand

2. Modeling Costs

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Traffic Demands Network Topologies Current Prices

Demand Models

Demand Functions

Cost Models

Relative costs

Profit Model

Absolute costs

Page 14: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

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Data mapping is complete: we know demands and costs! Subject to the noise that is inherent in any structural estimation.

Profit = Revenue – Costs = F(price, valuations, elasticities, real_costs)

F’(price*, valuations, elasticities, real_costs)

F’ (price*, valuations, elasticities, γ * relative_costs) = 0

γ = F’-1(price*, valuations, elasticities, relative_costs)

Assuming ISP is rational and profit maximizing:

= 0

Page 15: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

1. Select a number of pricing tiers to test 1, 2, 3, etc.

2. Map flows into pricing tiers

Optimal mapping and mapping heuristics

3. Find profit maximizing price for each pricing tier and compute the profit

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Repeat above for: - 2x demand models - 4x cost models - 3x network topologies and traffic matrices

Page 16: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

16 *Elasticity – 1.1, base cost – 20%, seed price - $20

Constant elasticity demand with linear cost model

Tier 1: Local traffic Tier 2: The rest of the traffic

Page 17: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

Data Set

Traffic (TB/day)

Local Traffic

Bit-Weighted Distance Average (miles)

Distance CV

CDN 1037 ~30% 1988 0.59

EU ISP 400 ~40% 54 0.70

Abilene 43 ~40% 660 0.54

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Approximate measure of flow servicing cost spread

NetFlow records and geo-location information

Group flows in to distance buckets

Page 18: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

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Linear Cost Model Concave Cost Model

Constant Elasticity Demand

Logit Demand

Page 19: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

Refine demand and cost modeling Hybrid demand and cost models are likely more realistic

Establish better metrics that predict the benefit of tiered pricing

Establish formal conditions under which demand and cost normalization framework works E.g., can we normalize cost and demand if cost is a

product of the unit cost and the log of the demand?

Test the framework on other industries

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Page 20: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

ISPs today predominantly use blended rate pricing

Some ISPs started using limited tiered pricing

Our study shows that having more than 2-3 pricing tiers adds only marginal benefit to the ISP

The results hold for wide range of scenarios Different demand and cost models Different network topologies and demands Large range of input parameters

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Questions? http://valas.gtnoise.net

Page 21: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

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Page 22: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

Very hard to model!

Perhaps requires game-theoretic approach and more data (such as where the topologies overlap, etc.)

It is possible to model some effects of competition by treating demand functions as representing residual instead of inherent demand. See Perloff’s “Microeconomics” pages 243-246 for discussion about residual demand.

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Page 23: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

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Page 24: Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick …netseminar.stanford.edu/past_seminars/seminars/11_03_11.pdfVytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, and Vijay

We don’t know elasticities, so we test large range of them.

The data might be biased already for the traffic because of congestion signalling (maybe real demand is more than we can see).

We can’t model competition effects in long term (in fact, no one can.)

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