VREF-10years_low 2011.pdf - Volvo Research and Education ...

years with the FUTprogramme

VREF, Volvo Research and Educational Foundations, is the collective name under which four foundations collaborate to finance research and education with the aim to make a difference for Future Urban Transport. Acknowledging the complexities of urban transport and its development within different contexts led VREF to search for new approaches, ideas and solutions as well as to examine specific urban cases. Therefore, VREF supports research on all continents, demonstrating the variety of progress in the field. The four VREF foundations are: the Volvo Research Foundation; the Volvo Educational Foundation; the Dr. Pehr G. Gyllenhammar Foundation, and; the Håkan Frisinger Foundation for Transport Research.

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Ten Years with the Future Urban Transport Programme

The VREF is focusing on one coherent programme: Future Urban Transport

– How to deal with complexity (FUT). The program emerged in a context

of increasingly-rapid urbanization and heavy motorization of cities, and the

intention was to contribute to the development of sustainable transportation

systems that also meet the needs of the entire population of a city

– including those with the least resources. Solutions at the system level are

needed, because a number of components – including land use, city planning,

transport system choices and how decisions are made – need to be addressed

simultaneously to develop sustainable transportation systems.

Thus far there are eight Centers of Excellence (CoE) established globally,

representing a global infrastructure of more than 100 researchers. All CoEs work

in close collaboration with traffic and city planners, transport operators, decision

makers and interest groups.

This book is a progress report on that work, highlighting examples of findings

from this research effort.

ISBN 978-91-633-9489-8

9 789163 394898

Future Urban Transport (FUT), which we finance, is a relatively small but strategic research initiative. It is a large and important issue that we have taken on, and we are convinced that the research we support can make a difference by introducing fresh ideas and breaking old traditional patterns of thinking.

arne wittlöv, former chairman of the board

years with the

FUTprogramme

The Volvo Research and Educational Foundations, VREF c/o Volvo Stiftelseförvaltning Dept 1512, m2.7 SE-405 08 Göteborg

www.vref.se [email protected] Tel: +46-(0)31-66 22 72 Fax: +46-(0)31-66 16 61

Production: Capito AB (www.capito.se). Graphic design: Pelle Björkman. Printed by: Printfabriken AB 2011

Photographs: Front cover: CCNUT / iStockphoto. Page 5: Tyrone Turner / Corbis. Page 11: Gavin Hellier / Corbis. Page 17: Keith Dannemiller / Corbis. Page 25: Felix Hug / Corbis. Page 28: Gettyimages/Glowimages. Page 37: abenaa / iStockphoto. Page 40: Flory / iStockphoto. Page 47: Frank van den Bergh / iStockphoto. Page 51: urbanglimpses / iStockphoto. Page 55: Blaine Harrington III / Corbis. Page 61: gremlin / iStockphoto. Page 63: Paulo Fridman / Corbis. Page 71: Michael Prince / Corbis. Page 74: peeterv / iStockphoto. Page 78: nikada / iStockphoto. Page 86: poba / iStockphoto. Page 95: Max Milligan / Corbis. Page 98: Keren Su / Corbis. Page 106: itsskin / iStockphoto. Page 110: olaser / iStockphoto. Page 118: Song Weiwei / Corbis. Page 128: defun / iStockphoto. Page 133: grahamnorris / iStockphoto. Page 136: Louis Moses / Corbis.

Printed on environmentally-friendly paper

ISBN: 978-91-633-9489-8

custrec • china 5

FOREWORD • 8

Anders Brännström, Chairman of the Board, VREF

INTRODUCTION: FUT – THE FIRST TEN YEARS • 12

Arne Wittlöv, Former Executive Vice President of Volvo Group, AB Volvo (retired), Chairman of the VREF Board 1996–2010

TRANSLATING POLICY INTO ACTION • 22

Dinesh MohanSustainable Urban Transport in Less Motorized Countries: Research and Training in New DelhiNEW DELHI, INDIA

DEVELOPING STRATEGIC POLICY NETWORKS TO ACHIEVE CHANGE • 32

Jacqueline Klopp and Elliott Sclar The Center for Sustainable Urban Development (CSUD), Columbia UniversityNEW YORK, USA

FROM SCIENCE TO ACTION: HOW RESEARCH CHANGED CHINA’S TRANSPORT POLICY • 44

Jiang Yulin and Christian WolmarThe China Urban Sustainable Transport Research Center, (CUSTReC)BEIJING, CHINA

URBAN TRANSPORT GOVERNANCE FOR A LOW-CARBON FUTURE • 58

Nicholas Low, Matthew Burke, Crystal Legacy and Leigh GloverThe Australasian Centre for Governance and Management of Urban Transport (GAMUT), University of MelbourneMELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA

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2

3

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5

CONTENTS

MEGAPROJECTS: THE BIGGER PICTURE • 68

Harry Dimitrou and Christian WolmarThe OMEGA Centre for the Study of Mega Projects in Transport and DevelopmentLONDON, UK

BARCELONA’S BUS REVOLUTION • 82

Carlos DaganzoThe UC Berkeley Center for Future Urban Transport (CFUT), University of CaliforniaBERKELEY, USA

PARATRANSIT FUTURES IN AFRICAN CITIES • 92

Roger Behrens The African Centre of Excellence in Transport (ACET), University of Cape TownCAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

BUS RAPID TRANSIT IN PERMANENT EVOLUTION • 102

Darío Hidalgo and Juan Carlos Muñoz The Centre for Across Latitudes and Cultures Bus Rapid Transit (ALC-BRT) SANTIAGO, CHILE

THE COMPLEXITY OF BRT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION • 114

Aileen Carrigan, David A. Hensher, Dario Hidalgo, Corinne Mulley and Juan Carlos Muñoz The Centre for Across Latitudes and Cultures Bus Rapid Transit (ALC-BRT) SANTIAGO, CHILE

REDUCING PEDESTRIAN RISK AT JUNCTIONS • 126

Geetam TiwariSustainable Urban Transport in Less Motorized Countries: Research and Training in New DelhiNEW DELHI, INDIA

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7

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10

11

Anders Brännström

Chairman of the Board

VREF

FOREWORD

9foreword

EN YEARS AGO, the Board of the Volvo Research

and Education Foundations (VREF), under the

chairmanship of Dr. Arne Wittlöv, decided to focus

all its activities on one area: Future Urban Trans-

port – How to deal with complexity (FUT). This book

is a progress report on that work, highlighting examples of fi nd-

ings from this research effort.

VREF aims to make a difference, by developing new approach-

es and new initiatives. Acknowledging the complexities of ur-

ban transport and its development within different contexts led

VREF to search for new approaches in the fi eld as well as to

examine specifi c urban cases. Therefore, VREF has supported

research programmes on all continents, demonstrating the vari-

ety of progress in the fi eld.

VREF invited proposals for research programmes within the

overall framework of FUT. The proposals were reviewed by the

VREF Scientifi c Council with respect to topic, organization, the

track record of the principal researchers as well as the prospects

of imaginative and promising risk-taking in order to reach new

insights. Over the years, interaction between researchers and

practitioners has also gained in importance. The VREF Board

made the fi nal selection of research programmes and the select-

ed organisations were designated Centres of Excellence (CoE).

Each new CoE was allocated about €2.6 million over fi ve years,

provided the outlined research programme and the promised

deliveries were followed. VREF has placed heavy emphasis on

the ability of the research groups to attract co-funding. In this

way, VREF’s support has contributed to establishing research

groups in areas of long-term importance.

Thus far there are eight CoEs established globally, and 200+

person-years of research have been conducted with VREF sup-

port. These CoEs represent a network of competencies com-

prised of 100+ researchers working on a portfolio of topics. This

VREF • 10 years with the fut programme 10

is an established, global infrastructure of researchers for future

initiatives. The network of CoEs represents both deep knowl-

edge as well as a multitude of nuances in specifi c topics. VREF

intends to continue to strengthen this network.

VREF recently began to further develop the comprehensive re-

search portfolio it supports. Calls have been issued for proposals

on specifi c topics that the Board feels are particularly important

for the future of urban transport. The current (2011) call covers

urban freight and its interaction with urban passenger transport.

Acknowledgements:

Each Centre of Excellence has contributed to at least one chap-

ter in this book. I am grateful for their efforts in completing

articles in the limited time period available. Henrik Nolmark

and Måns Lönnroth have made important contributions to this

process. Christian Wolmar edited the chapters and also co-wrote

two papers. Thanks to all of you. I would also like to specifi cally

thank my predecessor, Dr. Arne Wittlöv for his leadership and

foresight and for the introductory article to this book. This re-

search network of CoEs was established during his period as

Chairman, and positive results that have infl uenced specifi c ur-

ban developments are starting to appear.

About VREFThe Volvo Research and Educational Foundations (VREF) is a generic term for four independent foundations.

The Volvo Research Foundation and the Volvo Educational FoundationThe two foundations were established in 1987 with the purpose of promoting research and education in areas linked to transport, energy consumption and various industrial endeavours. Cross-disciplinary projects have been prioritised.

The Dr Pehr G. Gyllenhammar FoundationThe foundation was established in 1997 with the purpose of promoting research within the fi eld of trademarks.

The Håkan Frisinger Foundation for Transportation ResearchThe foundation was established in 1999 with the purpose of promoting research within the fi eld of transport, preferably at Chalmers University of Technology in Gothenburg, Sweden.

These four foundations that currently support the FUT programme operated independently in different research areas before uniting under a common goal; to promote Future Urban Transport research.

For more information please see www.vref.se VR

EF

custrec • china 11

Arne Wittlöv

Former Executive Vice President of Volvo Group,

AB Volvo (retired)

Chairman of the VREF Board 1996–2010

HOW TO DEAL WITH THE COMPLEXITY OF URBAN TRANSPORT– AN OVERVIEW

THE FUTURE OF URBAN TRANSPORT:

THE FIRST TEN YEARS

13overview

RBANIZATION IS OCCURRING at a furious pace,

driven by individuals’ desire for a better life. Cities

are beacons of emancipation. They provide oppor-

tunities for employment, education and health-

care as well as social and cultural activities. As

the standard of living in cities improves, there is, too, a nega-

tive corollary: motorization and the local, regional and global

environ mental problems associated with it increase accordingly.

Without effective ways of dealing with these problems, conges-

tion inevitably escalates, resulting paradoxically in a decrease in

mobility and a slowdown in economic development.

These development patterns have created an urgent need to

address major and complex questions about how transporta-

tion systems should be organized, designed and implemented.

The aim is urban transport that is environmentally sustainable,

safe for all users and meets the needs of the entire population

of a city – the largely motorized middle classes as well as the

non-motorized urban poor. A key challenge is to develop systems

that provide accessibility for the masses while simultaneously

radically reducing transportation’s negative impacts on human

health and life expectancy, as well as local and global environ-

mental impacts.

China is one of the fastest-growing countries in the world with

respect to urbanization and motorization. In 2009, the fraction

of people living in urban areas was approaching 50 percent and

growing by one percent annually. With already 18 percent of the

world’s urban population living in China, by 2020 this fraction

will exceed 20 percent, while the annual urbanization rate will

have reached 57 percent. Indian cities are also growing rapidly.

By 2030, almost half of India’s population is expected to live in

urban areas, compared with the current 30 percent. The popu-

lation of Africa’s cities is expected, according to the United Na-

tions, to grow from 210 million in 2000 to 533 million in 2025.


Metropolitan Nairobi’s annual population growth rate is cur-

rently 4 percent; amongst the highest on the planet, although

comparable with that of other cities in sub-Saharan Africa.

The policy response to increasing traffi c congestion has main-

ly been what is bound to be a doomed attempt to accommo-

date automobile dependence, with more land being given over

to highway and parking-space expansion. This is the opposite

of current policy in many forward-looking cities in high-income

countries, where reducing automobile dependence and improv-

ing amenities for other transportation modes is the basis of ur-

ban transport policy.

The Complexity of Urban Transport Development

In the western world, with the USA leading the way during the

1950s and 1960s, metropolitan growth was structured around

automobile dependence, the low cost of energy and the availabil-

ity of land. The so-called Four Step Model – essentially predict-

ing transport needs and providing for them – became a key tool

for city and regional planners. Tools of this kind often become

very powerful as intellectual shortcuts through complex prob-

lems. The result was urban sprawl. It is now widely accepted

that this model should not be transplanted into emerging cities

or countries. On the contrary, ways to reverse the effects of the

Four Step Model should be deployed in today’s developed coun-

tries.

Though the urgency and seriousness of urban transport de-

velopment is obvious, no alternative models seem to be at hand.

Why? The issue is extremely complex and solutions are diffi cult

to implement. Managing the development of urban transport

in all its complexity has several dimensions. Not only is there

structure and function to consider in relation to issues such as

land-use planning and the provision of infrastructure, but the

process of change is inherently complex.

Radically altering an urban transport system is a task fraught

with challenges and involves a wide range of stakeholders. In-

deed, changing course is limited in each city (or region) by the

restrictions imposed by the city’s own momentum and path de-

pendency. Understanding the local context is therefore vital.

Much of the existing knowledge (not to say conventional wis-

dom) about planning transportation systems and infrastructure

is, however, based on conditions in the industrialized world.

Further, the number of stakeholders has grown over time.

Some are powerful, well-articulated and therefore easily heard.

Others – often far greater in number – are poorly organized,

15overview

diffi cult to reach and therefore easy to ignore. The lead time

for developing policies, organizing politics, building institutional

capabilities and raising necessary funding can span several elec-

tion cycles. The trade-offs are huge. Political leaders face the

challenge of developing courses of action that meet longer-term

objectives without at the same time courting unpopularity by

causing immediate problems for large fractions of the popula-

tion. This is no easy task.

The use of land is a particularly diffi cult issue when organizing

urban transport. Policies regarding land use and urban trans-

port have always been interdependent. Insuffi cient willingness

and capacity to cope with this interdependence have constrained

progress.

The Themes in this Book

This book presents a snapshot of a decade of work under the

FUT programme and examples of how results have infl uenced

the development urban transport in practice. The cases cover

themes of fundamental importance: Policy Development, Ur-

ban Transport Planning, Public Transport and Non-Motorized

Transport. How research has been able to infl uence the develop-

ment of urban transport is an overarching theme found in all of

the chapters.

Policy Development

The usual objectives of urban transport policies are to ensure

safe, affordable, comfortable, reliable and sustainable access for

a growing number of city residents to jobs, education, healthcare

and other needs within a city. To achieve this, urban transporta-

tion should be incorporated as a key parameter of city planning,

rather than being a consequential requirement. Integrated land-

use and transportation planning aimed at minimizing travel dis-

tances, providing more equitable allocation of road space and

encouraging greater use of public transport are other important

issues. Policies also have the important role of providing coor-

dination between authorities and decision makers in a complex

institutional environment.

Three of the chapters deal with policy development, describ-

ing it at different stages and in contrasting environments. These

examples demonstrate the importance of ensuring that the right

infl uences feed into policy development from early planning right

through to fi nal decision making. The strong inter-dependency

between land use and transportation, as well as institutional ca-


pabilities and administrative reforms, are recurring themes in

this research, as is the importance of fruitful interaction be-

tween researchers and practitioners.

The chapter on Delhi (Chapter 2, Translating Policy into Action)

describes how the National Urban Transport Policy and Urban

Transport Five Year Plans have been infl uenced by appropriate

research, both with regard to public transport and to better ac-

commodating all users of road and transport systems, including

the most vulnerable. The interaction between academic experts

and government policy makers in this process has been vital.

The second case is from Nairobi (Chapter 3, Developing Strate-

gic Policy Networks to Achieve Change), and provides an overview

of an action research project – or rather process. The overarch-

ing theme is “How to provoke policy development with inte-

grated land use and transport development.” Research results,

including results from traffi c studies, transport modelling, and

air-quality research, are fed into the policymaking process using

a strategic-policy-network approach.

The case from Beijing (Chapter 4, From Science to Action: how

research changed China’s transport policy) provides an overview of

the overall situation and development in China with respect to

urban transport. Based on extensive research, the Chinese gov-

ernment has been advised on the development of transportation

policies as well as the development of a series of necessary re-

forms to implement these policies. The success of administrative

changes in Chengdu, the fi rst pilot area, has opened the way for

a completely new approach to transport management.

Urban Transport Planning

A common theme of transport planning is the development of

better urban infrastructure. A great variety of stakeholders

shape the overall design of urban transport systems. Under-

standing local history is crucial for attracting support as agents

of change for urban development. Such knowledge can help the

various participants in the process to shape future planning in

a way that is more inclusive with respect to local people and,

in the long run, help to ensure that cities are developed more

sustainably.

Two chapters deal with urban transport planning. From Mel-

bourne (Chapter 5, Urban Transport Governance for a Low-carbon

Future), the research explains the use of a new tool; in this case

a tool to support the selection of a location for a new stadium,

with the objective of achieving more-sustainable urban travel by

increasing the use of walking, cycling and public transport. The


tool is not based on predicting travel demand from past experi-

ence, but rather on exploring and specifying future needs.

Identifying what constitutes a successful urban transport pro-

ject is the key theme outlined in the Megaproject case study

(Chapter 6, Megaprojects – The Bigger Picture). In the past, the

assessment of the success of a megaproject has focused rather

narrowly on whether it is completed on schedule and within

budget. While these criteria are very important (especially for

investors), how a megaproject acts as a strategic agent of change

and contributes to sustainable urban, regional and national

development, in both the short and long term, is crucial. Un-

derstanding the transformative capacity of a megaproject goes

beyond the limited analysis provided by project management

assessment. This chapter provides an in-depth examination of

past experience.

Public Transport

Public transport plays a crucial role in the quest for sustainable

urban transport systems, and an effi cient system is essential for

ensuring that low-income residents can achieve acceptable liv-

ing standards by providing them with mobility. The standard of

public transport is often a good measure of the overall level of

economic and social development in a country. In the develop-

ment of public transport systems, momentum or path depend-

ency is of fundamental importance.

In Europe, and in most of the industrialized world, the current

trend is to open up monopolies, increase the number of opera-

tors and encourage privatization. Most developing countries are

attempting in different ways to regulate a fragmented transport

market with too many operators. Non-regulated paratransit is not

reliable. Nevertheless, it often fulfi ls a market need. Transitioning

toward a more regulated form of public transport is not an easy

task. One possible solution, which involves a step-change improve-

ment in the level of service, is the provision of Bus Rapid Transit.

Four chapters deal with the issue of public transport. The

chapter on Barcelona (Chapter 7, Barcelona’s Bus Revolution) re-

views the development and implementation of RetBus, a new

high-performance public transport system. RetBus is an effi -

cient bus network that provides high-quality transportation in-

tegrated with the existing suburban train, metro, light rail and

conventional bus system, with the aim of serving all of the city’s

residents’ public transport needs. As the chapter illustrates, one

of the challenges is to minimize physical changes in order to

preserve the aesthetics of the city.

19overview

Unregulated paratransit operation, typically in the form of

minibuses – such as matatus in Nairobi, dala dalas in Dar es

Salam and danfos in Lagos – is the dominant form of public

transport in African cities. The chapter on paratransit (Chapter

8, Paratransit Futures in African Cities) discusses how to move

from a network based on paratransit into regulated, formal sys-

tems of public transport. Understanding local context and con-

straints is vital, especially given that the complete replacement

of paratransit is improbable and the most likely outcome is a

hybrid system.

Currently, there are 120 cities globally with BRT systems or

corridors, serving 28 million passengers every day. BRT systems

are under development in a further 50. The chapter on BRT

evolution (Chapter 9, Bus Rapid

Transit in Permanent Evolution)

presents an overview of how

BRT has evolved from providing

simple bus priority measures to

a far more sophisticated pack-

age of measures designed to

offer a cost-effi cient improve-

ment in the level of service. This

chapter highlights the most im-

portant breakthroughs in BRT

evolution and offers insights

into BRT’s continued develop-

ment.

Though BRT was introduced

nearly forty years ago in Curiti-

ba in Brazil, many subsequent

systems have experienced chal-

lenges and shortcomings. The

chapter on BRT implementa-

tion (Chapter 10, The Complexity of BRT Development and Imple-

mentation) discusses the complexities facing transport providers

in developing and implementing BRT as part of an integrated

city-wide transportation system. Drawing on key lessons from

this experience, the authors suggest a series of recommenda-

tions for city planners, political authorities and other stakehold-

ers.

Non-Motorized Transport

In many parts of the developing world, non-motorized modes of

transport constitute a signifi cant portion of total transporta-

This book is about research that makes a difference; research that infl uences the development of urban transport. It provides examples of what new knowledge and insights have infl uenced, as well as how new knowledge has made a difference.


tion. Approximately 40 percent of all urban transport in India

is non-motorized. In Cape Town, 30 percent of trips are on foot.

Pedestrians are present on all roads, regardless of their type and

designated function, and suffer the greatest number of traffi c fa-

talities. Despite this, the predominant paradigm in urban trans-

port development is to accommodate motorized transportation.

The confl ict between non-motorized and motorized traffi c over

space is obvious.

The chapter on non-motorized traffi c describes the situ-

ation in Delhi (Chapter 11, Reducing Pedestrian Risk at Junc-

tions), where the existing road infrasrtructure does not provide

adequate facilities for pedestrians, bicycles or any other slow-

moving traffi c. Three quarters of fatalities in road accidents are

pedestrians, cyclists and users of motorized two wheelers. The

objective of this study was to understand pedestrian crossing

behaviour and how intersection environment, bus-stop location

and grade-separated designs could be improved to facilitate pe-

destrian movement.

Research and Practice

This book is about research that makes a difference; research

that infl uences the development of urban transport. It provides

examples of what new knowledge and insights have infl uenced,

as well as how new knowledge has made a difference. Despite the

wide variety of cases presented, some important general lessons

can be distilled.

The academic content in the examples shows considerable

variation. Detailed, in-depth studies of pedestrian behaviour

when crossing intersections, building of databases, modelling of

public-transport infrastructures as well as thorough studies and

evaluation of international megaprojects are some examples. All

of these cases, however, have one important point in common:

the intention to build a solid scientifi c base with the clear objec-

tive of infl uencing the development of urban transport, locally,

regionally or even on a global scale.

The newly-acquired knowledge is intended to be used to sup-

port ongoing processes and to initiate – or even provoke – new

processes of change. How new knowledge and insights have been

communicated into such processes has differed, depending on

the particular circumstances at a given time or location. In some

examples we fi nd the ideal situation when government presents

the researchers with a specifi c problem and asks for advice based

upon scientifi c or engineering analysis. Some such situations re-

sult from long-standing relationships where trust has been built

21overview

through continuous communication via articles, training courses

and/or regular conferences. Trust is always based on long accu-

mulated experience and expertise that is acknowledged in the

academic world as well as among practitioners.

One diffi cult issue to understand, acknowledge and overcome

is the large differences in the environments and working con-

ditions of academics and practitioners. For example, while sci-

entists must retain their loyalty to the profession and follow

academic rules and standards, practitioners within government

often have an agenda driven by demand for rapid delivery on

complex issues, with time constraints and as well as limited ac-

cess to information within the available timeframe. However, this

obstacle should not be overstated. On the contrary, an important

message is that – although bound by different constraints – if

driven by a strong will to make a real difference, practitioners

and academics can fi nd common ground for constructively ex-

changing ideas and knowledge, with the aim of developing better

urban transport systems in the face of all their complexities.

22 VREF • 10 years with the fut programme

Work at the Transportation Research and

Injury Prevention Programme, Indian Institute

of Technology Delhi, focuses on reducing the

adverse health impacts of road transportation.

To achieve this it is necessary for us to

interact with policymakers. We have been

able to infl uence national urban transport

and safety policymaking, primarily because of

the initial recognition of the academic output

and publications from our group, which have

attracted the attention of both forward-looking

bureaucrats and politicians. In this article we

describe the process through which we have

been able to infl uence policymaking in urban

transportation and road-user safety.

Dinesh Mohan

COE / NEW DE LHI / INDIA

TRANSLATING POLICY INTO ACTION

23coe • new delhi

CADEMIC INSTITUTIONS FIND it diffi cult to interact with

policymakers. This is particularly the case when

their interventions are not welcomed, as their

fi ndings can be counterintuitive, resulting in both

public and professional resistance. This is what

we found in the Transportation Research and Injury Prevention

Programme (TRIPP), part of the Indian Institute of Techno-

logy in Delhi, when we focussed on trying to reduce the adverse

health impacts of road transportation.

Indeed, government policymakers are generally suspicious of

academic experts, partly because they are wary of interference

in complex issues and partly because they realise that experts do

not necessarily agree, making it diffi cult to know whose advice

to follow. In many situations, when policymakers consult aca-

demic experts they choose those who are likely to reinforce their

existing position. It is very diffi cult for researchers to engage

with governments that are already committed to a particular

policy for ideological or political reasons. Inputs that challenge

existing policy on the basis of authoritative knowledge and re-

search become an embarrassment to policymakers.

On the other hand, scientists also maintain loyalties to their

profession and must abide by the rules and standards set by

the professional elite. Scientists seen bending to political pres-

sures risk losing respect amongst their peers. This is why the

mainstream tradition is that the roles of scholarly analysts

and political activists should not coincide. However, it does

not make sense to separate these roles too much in areas of

work where scientifi c fi ndings can have a direct and immedi-

ate impact on the lives of large numbers of people, as in the

case of urban transportation. Here, scientists are faced with

a dilemma with three possible alternatives. They can either:

give advice only when requested by the government, or; ac-

cept temporary positions within policymaking committees or


government institutions, or; try to be heard while remaining

outside government. The simplest situation is when the govern-

ment presents scien tists with a specifi c problem and asks for

advice based on a scientifi c and technical analysis.

In various situations, researchers associated with TRIPP have

been prepared to adopt each of the three alternatives mentioned

above. This fl exibility is one of the reasons why we have been

successful in infl uencing some local and national policies in In-

dia. Specifi cally, we have been able to infl uence national urban

transport and road safety policymaking, primarily because the

academic output from our group has attracted the attention of

both forward-looking bureaucrats and politicians.

The scientifi c content of our work and technical modelling

exer cises add further credibility. Some of us have become mem-

bers of technical policymaking committees appointed by the

city and national governments. We have used such opportunities

to obtain offi cial consensus supporting some of our proposals.

There are two examples in particular where our approach has

borne fruit: the introduction of bus rapid transit and improving

the safety of vulnerable road users.

Bus rapid transit and non-motorised transport

One of the most signifi cant examples of the practical application

of academic fi ndings was the development and design of the fi rst

18km bus rapid transit (BRT) corridor for the Government of

Delhi. In 1996 the Central Pollution Control Board of India asked

us to provide them with a comprehensive plan for sustainable

transportation policies for Delhi. The team produced a report

titled Delhi on the Move 2005 – Future Traffi c Management Scena-

rios. The report contained three core ideas: the non-viability of

metro systems; the success of high-capacity bus systems, such as

the one initiated in Curitiba (Brazil), and; the need to establish

dedicated bicycle lanes on all arterial roads in Delhi as a pre-

condition for effi cient traffi c fl ow. The study was widely reported

in the press. A newly-appointed Minister for Transport for Delhi

took notice of the press reports and commissioned TRIPP to

prepare a Bicycle Master Plan for Delhi.

The government changed soon after, and the new Minister of

Transport and the Chairman of Delhi Transport Corporation

both showed interest. This resulted in an international confer-

ence on BRT in January 2002, at which the Government of Delhi

announced that it would initiate plans for establishing fi ve BRT

corridors in Delhi. The Government of Delhi subsequently ap-

pointed a high-level committee (which included a member from

custrec • china 25


TRIPP) to prepare plans for sustainable transport in the city.

The Committee submitted its report in September 2002, which

resulted in funding for the construction of the fi rst BRT corridor

in Delhi. This was designed with our participation and opened

for operation in April 2008.

During this period, the Government of India established two

other planning initiatives: a committee to prepare a National Ur-

ban Transport Policy, and a Working Group on Urban Transport

for the 11th Five Year Plan (2007–2012). TRIPP was represented

in both of these groups and one of the offi cials who worked on

this initiative was registered as a doctoral student at TRIPP. The

National Urban Transport Policy was launched in 2005, and in

a signifi cant departure from previous policies stated that, “Cen-

tral Government would… encourage measures that allocate road

space on a more equitable basis, with people as its focus. This

can be achieved by reserving lanes and corridors exclusively for

public transport and non-motorized modes of travel... Central

government would encourage all State capitals as well as other

cities with a population of more than one million to start plan-

ning for high capacity public transport systems… The Govern-

ment will provide 50 per cent of the cost of preparing compre-

hensive city transport plans and detailed project reports… While

the high capacity rail systems and buses on shared rights of way

are the only ones tried out in India, several others have proved

successful in other parts of the world. Electric trolley buses have

been running in San Francisco. New Bus Rapid Transit Systems

(BRTS) have become very popular in cities like Bogota (Colom-

bia) and Curitiba (Brazil).”

Recommendations for urban transport were published in

2006 in the 11th Five Year Plan. They included: “All cities must

prepare a master plan for non-motorised transport and must

develop and implement plans for adequate and safe pedestrian

and bicycle facilities on all arterial roads... All million plus cities

should prepare plans to introduce/upgrade existing bus services

and also introduce BRT systems on selected arterials during the

11th plan period.”

As a result of these policies, Bus Rapid Transit corridors have

already been constructed in Delhi, Pune and Ahmedabad, and

are in the process of being planned and built in several other

cities. Two recent reports on urban renewal in India have also

included BRT as a signifi cant part of urban transport invest-

ments. In March 2011 the Government of Delhi announced that

14 new BRT corridors covering a total of 229 km will be con-

structed in Delhi. Detailed planning work is already underway.

This represents a clear change in policy. The introduction

27coe • new delhi

of BRTs and the improvement of facilities for pedestrians and

cyclists in urban areas are now an integral part of In dian fed-

eral government policy. However, as both of these policies involve

local action and redistribution of road space, our experience of

the past decade informs us that implementing them will not be

easy. Both professionals and local people will have to continue

putting pressure on policymakers through the dissemination of

research fi ndings, popularising international best practice, and

developing India-specifi c policy options that increase effi ciency

and reduce costs.

Safety of vulnerable road users

The second area of infl uence has been TRIPP’s focus on impro-

ving the safety of vulnerable road users. In addition to academic

publications, our activities have included the organisation of an

international conference on vulnerable road users to highlight

the issue, and providing an annual international course on traf-

fi c safety for the past two decades. These activities have helped

to attract the interest of policymakers and the public at large

on these issues, both nationally and internationally, as well as

our own faculty members. More importantly, many professionals

who have attended these courses and conferences have become

active in supporting our work and promoting our views.

One of the problems in many less-motorised countries is that

reliable statistics regarding road traffi c injuries (RTI) and infor-

mation about international best practices are not easily acces-

sible to policymakers. We have tried to fi ll this gap by collecting

urban and rural road accident details from police reports and

sampling studies in hospitals. This data, along with information

from all available national resources, has been made available in

the form of technical reports. In parallel, scientifi c work involv-

ing crash simulations studying the impacts of different classes

of vehicles on vulnerable road users, improvements in helmets,

and the development of bus design have helped to consolidate

TRIPP’s work. TRIPP has promoted its fi ndings both through

academic papers and articles in the popular press, as well as

producing training manuals and other technical information.

We have also participated in numerous radio and TV talk shows

dealing with transportation policy and safety issues.

Our research has resulted in several members of the TRIPP

team being invited to participate in the preparation of the infl u-

ential World Report on Road Traffi c Injury Prevention (WHO). At

the national level, we have participated as members of numerous

technical committees covering bus, truck, helmet and road de-

29coe • new delhi

sign, safety standards, the Eleventh and Twelfth Five Year Plan

Committees, and the Motor Vehicle Act. TRIPP members were

also appointed as members of a national committee to examine

the issue of creating a dedicated national agency for road safety

and traffi c management, which has resulted in the consideration

of a National Road Safety and Traffi c Management Board Bill by

the Indian Parliament.

Lessons learned

Through our work, we have attempted to understand the role

of specialists in infl uencing urban social issues by the delive-

ring appropriate technical and scientifi c inputs regarding trans-

portation infrastructure and policy. We have also attempted to

overcome three main barriers to the utilisation our research

fi ndings: differing views held by

professionals in the fi eld; resist-

ance from policymakers due to

risk aversion and/or the absence

of any ideology or methodology

about how to tackle controver-

cial issues, and; the manipula-

tion of the media and the politi-

cal process by lobbying groups

and organisations representing

different types of road users.

Perhaps surprisingly, we have

found that the differing views

of professionals have been the

source of the strongest resist-

ance to our ideas. Our experi-

ence suggests that policymakers are rarely inclined to defer to

researchers, and it is particularly important to keep them well

informed about academic work. When professionals disagree,

policymakers fi nd it diffi cult to take a fi rm position. Scientifi c

uncertainty can lead to a great deal of confusion amongst stake-

holders and result in lack of clarity in policymaking. The role of

the media is sometimes mischievous in this regard, as they de-

light in exploiting scientifi c disagreement for the sake of a story.

This was brought home to us forcefully in the process of intro-

ducing BRT in policy and the construction of the fi rst corridor.

Initially, it took a long time to familiarise policymakers with the

concept of BRT and we had to use all strategies possible: publish-

ing technical reports, organising workshops and an international

conference, arranging meetings with internationally-renowned

There are two examples in particular where our approach has borne fruit: the introduction of bus rapid transit and improving the safety of vulnerable road users.

advocates like Enrique Penalosa (former Mayor of Bogotà) and

local politicians and bureaucrats, and numerous personal meet-

ings with stakeholders. Even after the decision was taken by the

Delhi Government to implement the BRT project, many profes-

sionals and the Delhi Police maintained their opposition to the

project because they feared that space for cars would be reduced.

Once the construction of the corridor started, the opposition be-

came more vociferous and the media took a very hard negative

position. The hostility of the press was unexpected, and took the

form of a long-term anti-BRT campaign accompanied by distort-

ed information and personalised attacks on individuals involved.

Once the corridor was operational, some initial hardship

to motorists occurred in the form of long queues and some

operational glitches, but nothing on a scale to justify the powerful

opposition. We are still not able to explain why the press united

on this issue and why there was such a strong oppositional lobby

behind the scenes. It has taken perseverance and a coordinated

dialogue with policymakers and supportive civil-society and en-

vironmental groups to disseminate positive information through

different channels to reverse public perceptions in favour of the

BRT concept. This was helped by the release of surveys showing

strong support for BRT by pedestrians, cyclists, bus commuters

and indeed many car users. The positive outcome is that the BRT

concept has been accepted across India, but it has taken about

fi fteen years to reach this stage. However, some policy makers

continue to have reservations and it will take some time for us

to obtain consensus on public transport policies.

In conclusion, it is essential that we understand the barriers

that might infl uence research affecting policy in our own specifi c

contexts. Then it becomes easier to build strategies around the

dissemination of research, ensuring that it is more accessible to

policymakers. We have to take into account how politics effects

the extent to which policymakers take notice of research fi nd-

ings, given their often short-term horizons and their need for

clear and accessible presentations of scientifi c fi ndings. Simply

having a particular idea implemented does not ensure long-term

success. Changing the orientations of policymakers through

persuasion by all means available, such as the media, attract-

ing support from colleagues, personal charm and recognition for

knowledge and wisdom, is more important. To some of our fellow

academics, it may be seem that involving ourselves too much

in trying to gain leverage with decision maker s is opportunist.

That is not true, but we all should strive for a balance between

academic rigour and effecting change.

30 VREF • 10 years with the fut-programme

Road safety and urban transport planningDuring its fi rst years, VREF´s fi rst Centre of Excellence – in New Delhi – has ex-plored a range of transportation questions, from increased safety for pedestrians to developing traffi c planning and policy making. The CoE in New Delhi – Sustainable Urban Transport in Less Motorized Countries: Research and Training in New Delhi – commenced its work in April of 2003. The Centre has received SEK 25 million in fi nancing from VREF. A total of 15 to 20 researchers have been involved in the Centre´s activities.

Dinesh Mohan is Professor at the Transportation Research and Injury Prevention Programme at the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi. His fi elds of research include: transportation (safety and pollution), human toler-ance biomechanics, motor-vehicle safety, and road-traffi c injuries.

CO

E N

EW

DE

LH

I / IN

DIA

Creating effective transport and land-use

policy in rapidly-urbanizing cities is a

universally-recognized and urgent problem.

Effective policy creation is typically given

second priority by academic experts more adept

at problem diagnostics than understanding

effective policy implementation dynamics. Using

the experience of Nairobi, we demonstrate the

development and application of strategic policy

networks to leverage expertise for improved

planning implementation.

Jacqueline Klopp

Elliot Sclar

CSUD / NEW YORK / USA

DEVELOPING STRATEGIC POLICY NETWORKS TO ACHIEVE CHANGE

33csud • new york

AIROBI, KENYA’S BUSTLING capital, exemplifi es

the typical problems found in Africa’s rapidly-

expand ing cities. These problems include high

levels of poverty, social segregation, oil depend-

ency and destruction and contamination of agri-

cultural, forest and pastoral lands. In terms of transport, Nairobi

also faces the typical problems associated with cities in the de-

veloping world, which include a high rate of traffi c accidents and

pedestrian fatalities, extremely poor air quality, serious traffi c

congestion, and limited public transportation choices with lit-

tle consideration of the needs of pedestrians, who represent the

majority of urban travellers. These diffi cult dynamics are exac-

erbated by the city’s high rate of urbanization. Meeting Nairobi’s

varied urban challenges is important for Kenya’s future, but any

success will also be important for the lessons it provides to the

rest of the continent.

The principal land-use and transportation solutions Nairobi

is presently pursuing are much like the ones followed by cities

in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, when metropolitan

growth was organized around expanding automobile dependency

and highway-based settlement patterns – in other words, urban

sprawl. Metropolitan Nairobi’s population is forecast to grow at

3.2 percent per year through 2025, comparable to the similar

fast rate in other cities of sub-Saharan Africa. Over the same

time period, the rate of automobile ownership is expected to in-

crease 12.3 percent per year (almost 4 times as fast). If these

trends hold, metropolitan Nairobi can expect to add 25,500 new

personal vehicles per year to its congested streets. The response

to this growth has been an attempt to accommodate growing

auto mobile dependence with more land given over to highway

and parking space expansion. This is, of course, precisely the

opposite of cutting edge policy in many high-income countries

where, in response to climate concerns, pollution and high


energy costs, forward-thinking civic leaders are attempting to

shift lane capacity away from automobile use to bus rapid tran-

sit and non-motorised transport. If Kenya replicates past mis-

takes, rather than adopting and adapting cutting-edge ideas, it

will lose a critical opportunity.

Nairobi is a city that benefi ts from thriving entrepreneurial

and intellectual activity, and boasts unique urban green spac-

es, such as Nairobi National Park, and breathtaking indigenous

city forests. Unless a way can be found to modify current land-

use and transport policies, its interconnected urban ills will

persist and the great social and economic potential of these

assets will be lost. The technical solutions for addressing land-use

and transport problems are well known. An effective solution in

situations such as the one faced by Nairobi is largely a question

of improving the policymaking and planning implementation

processes. How to achieve this change is where the gap in our

planning knowledge is greatest.

Putting Strategic Policy Networks to Work

It was with this dilemma in mind that the Centre for Sustainable

Urban Development (CSUD) began work in Nairobi in 2005, with

VREF support. CSUD sought to develop an approach to policy-

making that took into account a more thorough understand-

ing of urban problems, while addressing the critical question of

how transport and land-use policies might feasibly be changed

to accommodate these problems. At the outset, CSUD decided

that tackling the land-use and transport dimension of the prob-

lem effectively required embracing the complex social, economic,

political and environmental context in which it is embedded.

Taking an “action research” approach, CSUD began collabora-

tively producing and sharing targeted research with key urban

policy actors working on different parts of the wider metro-

politan picture. The research included traffi c studies, transport

modelling, map making, air-quality measurements and land-use

planning. The partners included central government agencies,

municipalities, think tanks, universities, and civil society (es-

pecially residents’ associations). As we developed project-based

relationships with their inevitable trials and errors, we quickly

realized that the network in which CSUD was becoming embed-

ded was itself an element of the governance system that could

shape policy interventions and help set the framework for im-

proved technical decisions. Further, nurturing an ethic of in-

formation sharing (our GIS data base of Nairobi has been made

open access, for example) and co-production of research, as well

35csud • new york

as producing policy papers that proved popular, we built trust

and strong partnerships that also helped us to obtain access to

policymaking processes.

Once we became aware of this, studying how networks of policy

actors made decisions became as important a subject for our re-

search as the targeted research projects. As the depth of CSUD’s

knowledge about local decision-making dynamics grew, we real-

ized that if we could identify and reach out to critical partners,

especially ones presently excluded from the effective policymak-

ing networks, we could signifi cantly improve the governance of

policymaking and implementation, despite our limited resources.

We realised that our contributions included strategically culti-

vating and expanding networks that promote alternative trans-

portation and land-use ideas, policies and projects. We call this

the strategic policy network approach. The role of our techni-

cal projects could then be doubly powerful; such research could

contribute to general scientifi c understanding and, if carefully

disseminated through these networks, help expand the range

of acceptable options to solve urban problems. This would, in

turn, support processes through which policy directions could be

changed. This approach thus had far more policy impact than if

our work had been restricted to technical analysis.

The strategic policy network approach to technical assistance

moves away from the traditional understanding of a separa-

tion between research that precedes policy development, to one

in which the two are simultaneous parts of a complex ongoing

process of dialogue and politics. Fostering positive urban change

via planning is transformed from a two-step approach where

research is fed into a separate policymaking process to a con-

tinuous and interactive one. The networks developed through

this approach bring added resources, new ideas and innovative

narratives to the process of policy design and implementation.

In concrete terms, this understanding of how planning and

policy processes actually work began with our partnership with

faculty and students of the Department of Urban and Regional

Planning (DURP) at the University of Nairobi. Our initial part-

nership was formed around examining the urbanization prob-

lems facing the Municipal Council of Ruiru, a town sixteen

kilometres north of Nairobi. Geographically, the choice of a

peri pheral area rather than the central city as our initial point

of entry was itself a departure from the usual way in which

urban technical assistance in African cities is formulated. The

typical model is an “inside-out” one, in which the challenges of

city-centre slum upgrading are almost invariably defi ned as the

crucial problem. We approached this work from a more holistic


understanding, that urbanization necessarily includes a process

of metropolitan spread and overall urban policy failure; slums,

like sprawl, are symptoms of this larger phenomenon, which

needs to be better understood politically. The historical record

demonstrates that the social and economic problems of such

areas of deprivation are never solved in the slums themselves.

Rather, solu tions emerge through improved urban policy and

governance institutions, including the way in which transport

and other infrastructure is developed together with spatial op-

tions of the larger metropolis.

The opportunity to work in Ruiru came as a result of hav-

ing local partners who were aware of the serious problems the

municipality faced and were confi dent that the local offi cials

would welcome collaboration with us. Ruiru is approximately

the halfway point on the road that connects Nairobi with the

provincial outpost of Thika. To the casual observer, it is hard

to see where Nairobi ends and Ruiru starts. Scattered develop-

ments pepper the landscape along what is one of East Africa’s

major transportation corridors. Scarce fertile agricultural land

is rapidly being covered over to accommodate both commercial

and residential buildings. With no traffi c, the trip takes less than

30 minutes, but more typically, at congested times, two to three

hours is usual.

We fi rst met with the Ruiru Municipal Council and the town

clerk in April 2005. Unlike Nairobi, Ruiru, with its population

of 300,000, received virtually no attention from central govern-

ment, international donors or philanthropic organizations, de-

spite the fact that it was rapidly transforming from a rural to an

urban area with all the attendant problems. We began our initial

project with DURP and the Council, drafting a physical devel-

opment plan for Ruiru. This involved engaging with the Coun-

cil on the design of a collaborative process that included citizen

participation. Through this engagement, we gained a thorough

understanding of many of the national and local dynamics that

affect effective planning in metropolitan Nairobi. Ruiru Council

was under-staffed and clearly struggling with service provision,

including an appropriate road network and transportation ser-

vice, and the management of the related problems of land-use,

water, sanitation and solid waste disposal. When we began, Ruiru

did not have a municipal planner and it later became clear that

structural problems also inhibited change. These included con-

fl icts of interests within the Town Planning Committee, which

is currently headed by a surveyor who receives work from de-

velopers, and interference in the planning process by powerful

politicians and large landowners.


Despite these challenges the DURP-CSUD and Ruiru collabo-

ration produced a draft plan in 2007. When, with our encour-

agement, the Council hired a planner, our draft plan became

the basis for some land-use control and was available for public

discussion. However, it also became clear that the Council had

no systematic mechanism for communicating with residents. We

asked ourselves: how could new planning ideas and some form

of accountable, public land-use control emerge in this context?

Because sometimes the lack of communication between the

local authority and the residents was a deliberate policy, we took

an indirect approach rather than attempting to directly con-

front the Council. We engaged a small start-up company, I-pas ha,

formed by former DURP students, to improve communications.

I-pasha began by carrying out Information & Communication

Technology (ICT) training for the Council’s elected leaders and

administrators. The experience proved so positive that it led the

Council to support undertaking focus group discussions with

residents and businesses to learn about the information needs of

citizens. This helped facilitate participation in planning, and put

pressure on the Council and central government for structural

changes to make the system even more effective.

The focus group discussions facilitated a deepening of our lo-

cal policy networks, and the support and interest generated by

the training meant high attendance for the CSUD-I-pasha pres-

entation of the results of the discussions with citizens. In turn,

this led to an agreement by the Council to make key information

available to the public via a new website. The town planner also

agreed to prepare and circulate a citizen’s guide to basic plan-

ning issues. This is an important start and will set a precedent

for other councils.

While extending the strategic network approach and deepen-

ing our understanding of local processes, we were also simulta-

neously broadening the regional network. We engaged with the

Association of Local Government Authorities of Kenya (Algak),

the lobby group for all local government bodies in Kenya, in our

initial ICT training and in a discussion about the Ruiru work.

We provided I-pasha support for the Algak website to help the

organisation circulate information to their members. Algak has

since invited us to present the Ruiru work to their association

and has profi led it in their newsletter. In this way, strategic pol-

icy networking along with action research has helped provide

exemplars of more participatory planning processes and, thus,

is shaping a broader understanding about the importance of in-

forming citizens on planning issues and the practical need for

better forms of participation and accountability.

39csud • new york

The strong CSUD-DURP working relationship, created through

the Ruiru experience, led to an invitation in 2009 to take part

in an international competition to create a spatial concept for

metro politan Nairobi. Prior to embarking on a full-blown plan,

the national government sought a consultant, via an international

competition, to create a conceptual vision for the spatial growth

of the region. CSUD was invited by DURP to join in the formation

of an international team to enter this competition. This open-

ing was important in two ways. First, this national turn towards

metropolitan-level planning meant that the land-use and trans-

portation issues that underlay

our strategic approach were

now central to the concerns of

Kenya’s national leaders. Sec-

ond, the process of working in a

team effort with Kenyan urban

planners, including a former Di-

rector of Physical Planning from

the Ministry of Lands, on creat-

ing a spatial concept for the en-

tire region, deepened our know-

ledge about the metropolitan

area and forced us to articulate

clear ideas for change.

As participant observers in

the competition process, we

learned the identity of our com-

petitors and a great deal about which key national actors were

engaged in metropolitan planning issues and, thus, who might

be incorporated more deliberately into our strategic networks.

Finally, by knowing the winning team and their plans, we were

better able to understand the mental processes of key decision-

makers and thus engage effectively in the public discussion

about the relative merits of different ideas and interpretations.

Out of 19 entries, our concept was awarded the runner-up prize

by the international panel of judges, just three points behind

the winning concept. The winning team was an engineering fi rm

that was also working on a new master highway-based transpor-

tation plan for the metropolitan region, funded by the African

Development Bank, and had a key role in the Thika Highway Im-

provement Project (a scheme to transform the Thika Road that

runs directly through Riuru into Kenya’s fi rst super highway).

A side effect of their highway plan is that it is drastically re-

shaping Ruiru without any input from citizens or the Municipal

Council. This has become a major concern for us as we assist in

We believe that the concept of strategic policy networks holds great promise as an effective and effi cient approach to the global challenges of sustainable urbanization.

41csud • new york

updating the 2007 draft plan. We discovered that only very mini-

mal information was being provided to the public on this ma-

jor transformative project. This highway physically and socially

bisects the municipality without properly considering existing

land use and the many negative consequences for the metro-

politan region, including increased environmental damage and

accident rates as well as erosion of Ruiru’s urban fabric and lost

opportunities to improve infrastructure for public transporta-

tion. Kenya has one of the world’s highest traffi c death rates,

at 34.4 traffi c deaths per 100,000 of population. The approach

to date in planning the Thika highway expansion promises to

exacer bate and not ameliorate this serious national problem.

The social costs that this is going to impose upon the community

include increases in pedestrian deaths and injuries as residents

seek to dodge traffi c to carry out their activities of daily life, as

well as the cumulative public health impacts from deteriorat-

ing air quality that will result from increased traffi c volumes

through the town.

As a result of our involvement in Ruiru and in the competi-

tion, CSUD has now been invited to participate in contributing

specifi c policy and planning ideas about the shape of the planning

bodies being created as a result of the adoption of a new national

constitution in August 2010; the fi rst major constitutional change

since independence in 1963. The way in which the new structure

devolves power to counties and local areas is going to be crucial

in determining the spatial and environmental shape of Nairobi.

Our fi rst-hand experience with metropolitan planning should

contribute much valuable information to this important process.

Lessons

Two important lessons emerge from this experience in trying to

bring about positive change. First, fact gathering and scientifi c

research are a necessary, but not a suffi cient, condition for sup-

porting change. Second, existing policy networks are not set in

stone. Good science and rigorous research are a sine qua non of

any academic-based interventions, but the results do not speak

for themselves. The way information is produced and introduced

into a situation is as important as the information itself. It is cru-

cial to be mindful of the processes, including the power dynamics

and mental models through which information is fi ltered, inter-

preted and used within policy formulation and implementation.

A common mistake is to think of existing policy networks as

impenetrable. In situations of even some democratic openness

it is possible to make meaningful interventions in how policy


decisions get made. Thus, while it is important to understand

the existing policy network and its effectiveness (or lack of it),

it is also important not to think of it as immutable. It is possible

to support and cultivate alternative strategic policy networks

with real infl uence by ensuring the inclusion of important but

excluded stakeholders, infusing these networks with new ideas

and research results and creating new policy spaces for nego-

tiation and dialogue with existing decision-making bodies and

networks.

We believe that the concept of strategic policy networks holds

great promise as an effective and effi cient approach to the

global challenges of sustainable urbanization. Such challenges

are emerging in the context of rapidly-expanding metropoli-

tan regions, in which governance is invariably in a state of fl ux.

Rather than seeing this as a problem, the strategic policy net-

work approach advocates leveraging spaces with complex and

changing governance systems to assist in the creative formation

of networks capable of creating needed change in urban policy

and practice.

43csud • new york

The Centre for Sustainable Urban DevelopmentThe Centre for Sustainable Urban Development (CSUD), founded in 2005, fosters education and research for the advancement of physically and socially sustainable cities. CSUD engages in interdisciplinary analyses of the link-ages between urban transportation and land use with governance institutions, economic development, demography, population health and climate change. It collaborates with faculty, students and researchers across Columbia University, but its work stretches far beyond the university setting. Affi liates work on the ground, both locally and internationally, with a variety of stakeholders, includ-ing local universities, offi cials and community-based organizations, to develop policies and plans to meet their goals for sustainable urban-based social and economic development.

Jacqueline KloppPrior to joining CSUD, Jacqueline Klopp was an Assistant Professor of International and Public Affairs at the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Columbia Uni-versity, where she taught the politics of development. She holds a BA from Harvard University where she received a Michael Rockefeller grant to live and work in Western Kenya for two years. This sparked her fascination and love for Kenya and she subsequently fi nished a PhD in

Political Science from McGill University, focusing on land, violence and corrup-tion in multiparty Kenya. Her research continues to focus on the intersection of development, democratization, governance, violence and corruption in Kenya and the Great Lakes region. Klopp is the author of articles in Africa Today, African Studies Review, African Studies, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Compara-tive Politics, Forced Migration Review, World Policy Journal and the International Peace Academy among others. Her work at CSUD focuses on strategies for improved land-use through deepening local knowledge production through university reform, improved urban governance and policy-networking.

Elliott SclarElliott Sclar is the director of the Center for Sustainable Urban Development (CSUD) at Columbia University’s Earth Institute. He is a professor of urban planning in Co-lumbia’s Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation. An economist and urban planner, Professor Sclar’s research interests include urban economic devel-opment planning, transportation and land-use planning, and economics of privatization.

Sclar was a co-coordinator of the Taskforce on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers, one of ten task forces set up by the UN Millennium Project to aid in the implementation of the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals. He was a lead author on the Taskforce’s book-length report (2005): A Home in the City. Professor Sclar is a nationally recognized expert on privatization: his book You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization (Cornell 2000) won two major academic prizes: the Louis Brownlow Award for the Best Book of 2000 from the National Academy of Public Administration and the 2001 Charles Levine Prize from the International Political Science Association and Governance magazine for a major contribution to public-policy literature. Dr. Sclar was recently awarded a Fulbright Specialist award to take part in a new educational exchange between the New University of Lisbon, Portugal and Columbia University.CS

UD

NE

W Y

OR

K / U

SA

China has experienced unparalleled growth

in both urban populations and the use of

automobiles. This has created a wide variety

of problems that cannot be solved by building

more roads. CUSTReC has advised the

Chinese government on developing new urban

transportation policies with the aim of improving

public transport at their core. Based on extensive

research, both at home and abroad, CUSTReC

has helped the Chinese government to formulate

new policies on urban transportation and develop

a series of necessary administrative reforms to

implement these policies. After a successful pilot

project in Chengdu, the reforms and policies are

being rolled out in cities across the nation.

Yulin Jiang

Christian Wolmar

CUSTREC / BEIJING / CHINA

FROM SCIENCE TO ACTION: HOW RESEARCH CHANGED CHINA’S TRANSPORT POLICY

45custrec • beijing

INCE CHINA’S ECONOMY took off in the 1980s, there has

been a dramatic shift toward urban living, paralleled

by a rapid rise in automobile use. These two trends

have stretched city transportation systems to the

limit, creating severe congestion on roads and over-

stretching public transport.

The raw fi gures are quite astonishing, and demonstrate the

extent of the problem: in 2009, 46.6 percent of the population

lived in towns, a share that is growing by one percent per year.

In 2009, 18 percent of the world’s town-dwelling population lived

in China. This share will exceed 20 percent in 2020, when it is

expected that 57 percent of China’s population will live in towns

and cities. This rapid urbanization has been accompanied by an

almost exponential increase in car acquisition and use. In 2009,

there were 76.19 million privately-owned vehicles in China. The

number has risen at an average annual rate of 12.2 percent over

the past ten years with no sign of this rate of increase slowing

down. As a result, China is now experiencing all the transpor-

tation-related problems familiar to the developed nations of the

West. Cities are facing traffi c congestion, environmental pollu-

tion, increased greenhouse-gas emissions and consumption of

resources, posing severe challenges to the national economy, so-

cial development, the environment and public health.

The transportation situation in towns and cities has been exac-

erbated by a failure to improve public transport. This is a result, in

part, of the administrative situation. Public transportation in city

centres is run by city governments and enjoys low fares. In con-

trast, in suburban and outlying rural areas, public transport is pro-

vided by small private companies on a more market-oriented basis,

with poor service quality. High fares and inconvenient bus services

outside of city centres, combined with cheaper housing found in

the suburbs and rural hinterland, have encouraged people to live in

those areas and use cars to meet their transportation needs.


These problems have provoked debate over transportation

issues within the Chinese government. On one side, there has

been a notion that development can continue to be car-based,

augmented by extra public-transport facilities (especially new

underground lines). Others have argued that a step-change im-

provement in public transport – including buses – is required,

in order to prevent cities becoming gridlocked during much

of the day. The China Sustainable Urban Transport Research

Centre – CUSTReC – has been instrumental in infl uencing deci-

sion makers to ensure that public transport is central in trans-

portation policy.

CUSTReC was established in 2006, to analyze the urban trans-

port situation in China and to put forward solutions that would

bring about a more public-transport oriented urbanisation and,

as a result, a pathway toward sustainable, low-carbon cities. Its

mission is to promote sustainable urban transport through in-

novative transport solutions that prioritize public transporta-

tion and integrate land-use and mobility management in order

to benefi t the general public. For the past fi ve years, with sup-

port from VREF and the Chinese Ministry of Transport, CUS-

TReC has grown from a project engaging just a dozen employees

to a national think tank with 40 scientists and researchers.

CUSTReC has helped transform the administrative structure

of transportation in China. Until 2008, the Ministry of Trans-

portation was not responsible for urban transportation. Its re-

mit was limited to intercity roads and highways. Railways, too,

were under a separate ministry. The key administrative reform

was to change this situation to ensure that the various pow-

ers relating to transport were transferred from the Ministry of

Housing to the Ministry of Transportation. Then, clear guide-

lines were needed that emphasized the importance of public-

transport-based solutions to urban problems, which cities were

then expected to implement with local variations.

CUSTReC has been a key player in changing the Chinese Min-

istry of Transport’s approach to tackling the issue of the future

development plans of Chinese cities. CUSTReC operates in three

areas: research and development; education and dissemination,

and; capacity building. Five key research themes are addressed:

benchmarking the effi ciency of urban transport; fi nancing urban

transport; transit-oriented development (TOD); travel-demand

management (TDM), and; urban passenger transport manage-

ment. In order to maximise its infl uence, CUSTReC’s work is

strongly evidence based. The programme has undertaken studies

in more than 30 cities to obtain primary data on transport poli-

cies, usage and administration. This information has been stored


in a public-transport database, developed to provide support for

decision-makers and academic experts on urban transport.

CUSTReC has been highly infl uential and has become a cata-

lyst for key policy changes in China. In 2009, CUSTReC sup-

ported the State Council (the chief administrative authority

of the Chinese government) in drafting a document entitled

Suggestions to Prioritize Development of Public Transport.

Premier Wen Jiabao and other leaders of the State Council

approved this key document, which shifts transport priorities

towards public transport and away from car-based solutions.

The Chinese central government has now adopted a series of

policies, including prioritizing urban public-transport develop-

ment, shaping a ‘resource-saving and environment-friendly’

transport development pattern, and integrating urban-rural

transport development. More detailed work by CUSTReC has

ensued, involving the preparation of regulations and guidelines

for prioritising urban public transport. On fi nancing, our policy

recommendations were submitted to the Ministry of Finance.

Such high-level policy activity is accompanied by the work of

CUSTReC’s strategy and planning group, which provides stra-

tegic and technical support for transport-oriented urban plan-

ning. The research results have been applied in urban planning,

public-transport planning, BRT design, and planning integrated

rural and urban transport systems at national, municipal and

local levels.

This demonstrates how – in a radical departure from past

practice – all levels of Chinese government are now focussed on

the need for sustainable development of urban transport. The

situation is urgent, given the challenges faced in creating sus-

tainable urban-transport development in China. The problems

are numerous. There is a widening gap between available capac-

ity and ever-rising demand stimulated by urbanisation and eco-

nomic growth. This, in turn, places great pressure on resources

and on the environment. There is no doubt that current invest-

ment levels are inadequate. This is exacerbated by the fact that

there is no clear mechanism for subsidizing public transport or

policy on fare-setting. In most regions, fares have not risen for

15 years, and transport authorities do not have funds to invest.

Finally, there is a lack of balance between urban and rural trans-

port development efforts.

Policy aims

CUSTReC has supported the Ministry of Transport of China in

implementing an annual seminar on urban transport reform and


Chengdu is very much a pioneer, and it is intended that the city’s new structure will be used as a model for administrative transport reforms in other central cities.

the development of central cities in China. It has also created a

platform for academic exchange and mutual technical assistance

between domestic and foreign cities, supported by the Centre of

Excellence network. Based on its research fi ndings, CUSTReC

has argued that achieving sustainable urban transportation re-

quires a policy strategy with people in focus at its core, and with

priority given to developing public-transport.

The overall objective of the new national sustainable urban

transport policy is to implement urban public-transport devel-

opment strategies across the nation by 2020. In central cities,

safe, convenient, economic, reliable and environmentally-friendly

urban transport systems will be established. The service quality

of public transport will also be signifi cantly improved. To that

end, CUSTReC has developed a

method for assessing the qual-

ity of public transport services

and company management. A

method was developed in 2009

for measuring a set of indicators

under six different headings:

safety, convenience, comfort,

punctuality, affordability and

management. This method ena-

bles each public-transport sys-

tem to be given a score and for

the scores to be compared. Eve-

ry city will need an integrated

transportation administration

to manage urban transportation

and coordinate urban-rural transport development, as well as all

modes of transportation.

The effectiveness of hubs needs to be assessed in a similar

way. Transport hub reliability – allowing passengers to switch

between several modes of transport within a short distance –

is a key determinant of travel mode choice; diffi cult changes

are a deterrent to public transport use. CUSTReC has devel-

oped guidelines for designing hubs. The ‘SiXin block’ in Wuhan

has been used as a case study. Integrated land-use development

around transport hubs and along transport corridors remain

key areas for further study.

To achieve major improvements in public transit, a clear and

radical strategy is required. Improving urban transportation

systems requires strengthening coordination between transport

and urban planning. Comprehensive transportation planning

schemes that coordinate all transportation modes – including


urban transport, railways, highways, waterways, and even civil

aviation – need to be developed simultaneously with overall ur-

ban plans for cities. Under the planning process, priority should

be given to public-transport development and investments such

as constructing integrated bus and railway stations. Transpor-

tation needs to be at the centre of the urban planning process,

rather than an afterthought.

In addition, as part of the change in planning policy, compact

urban development with high-density land use is necessary to

ensure the viability of public transport. In compact cities, trav-

el distance and energy consumption are reduced and walking

and bicycle usage levels can increase. Achieving these benefi ts

requires careful integration of transportation and urban plan-

ning, and an emphasis on mixed use, allowing many people to

be able to live close to their workplace. This will make it easier

to promote transit-oriented development that results in dense

and multi-purposed development along high-capacity transport

corridors.

Finally, priority must be given to developing and improving

urban public-transport systems. This involves a wide range of

measures, including investment and creating an effective and

stable subsidy regime. As mentioned above, effective hubs for

interchange are a vital component, allowing people to make far

more complex journeys than if they are confi ned to one journey

per trip. There is also the need for a fair and reasonable fare

system that both refl ects costs and allows for investment. Rural

and urban transport systems also need to be better integrated;

at present they are operated separately.

Infl uence

During its fi rst fi ve years, CUSTReC has been highly effec-

tive and infl uential in promoting sustainable urban transport

development in China. In December 2008, after the research

report ‘Studies on Institutional Reform of Urban Transport

Administration’ was published, a summary of the main points

of the report were disseminated nationwide by the Ministry of

Transport. The research has promoted a process of institutional

reform of urban transport administration. The importance of

CUSTReC’s ground-breaking fi ndings has been recognised by the

State Council. Following the publication of the report, nearly all

municipal transport departments have taken over the responsi-

bility for urban public-transport management from the former

Ministry of Construction. Based on previous studies, CUSTReC

proposed that developing public transportation be prioritised.


This proposal was later endorsed by Premier Wen Jiabao and

other leaders of the State Council.

CUSTReC provided technical support for the preparation of

the document ‘Policy recommendation on strengthening fi nan-

cial support for urban public transport,’ which was put forward

by the Democratic National Construction Association Central

Committee of China. CUSTReC research has also played an

important role in the decision-making process in government,

resulting in the publication of two policy documents. The fi rst

recommends that public transport be put in place before big

development schemes are built. The second – the ‘urban public

transport development plan’ – has been incorporated into the

fi ve year plan for national economic and social development for

the fi rst time, and will be endorsed by the State Council.

With the support of the Ministry of Transport, CUSTReC has

now applied its main research results to several key Chinese cit-

ies, which has led to radical changes. Two cities were chosen as

pilot schemes: Chengdu and Shenzen. Over the next fi ve years –

based on the summary of pilot study fi ndings and a China urban

socio-economic development trend projection – CUSTReC will

help the Ministry develop guidelines for further implementing

urban public-transport priorities in its development strategy,

and further promoting urban low-carbon transport develop-

ment.

Case study – Chengdu

The city of Chengdu, with support from CUSTReC, was a pioneer

in reforming its urban transport structure along more effi cient

lines. Chengdu – the capital of the Sichuan region of south-west

China and one of the most important economic, transportation,

and communication centres in the region – has been growing

rapidly. Its population of 14 million is divided almost equally be-

tween people living in the central area and those in the sur-

rounding region.

As in other cities, responsibilities were split between the local

government for the town centre and the national Ministry of

Housing for outlying areas. This situation had not changed since

the last series of administrative reforms in 1984, and was clearly

unsatisfactory. The division of responsibilities for transport be-

tween various administrative departments and ministries cre-

ated a situation of paralysis, and the transport administration

of Chengdu was unable to cope with the rising transportation

demand created by the booming economy. The chaotic nature of

the old structure was illuminated by the fact that there were six


overlapping transportation management structures. The Trans-

port Department was responsible for highways and waterways,

road freight, long-distance passenger transport and taxis in the

suburbs. Meanwhile, the Department of Public Works and Utility

was responsible for all aspects of urban public transport includ-

ing taxis in the central area and railway stations. The Depart-

ment of Public Security was responsible for traffi c security and

parking lots, and the Department of City Management for the

maintenance of streets and bridges. Finally, the Municipal Eco-

nomic Commission coordinated railway, road and aviation trans-

port for the whole city while the Municipal Construction Com-

mission built urban roads and bridges. Not surprisingly, this lack

of coordinated planning meant there was no coherent transport

policy. This situation was exacerbated by a shortage of funds

for public-transport investments. For example, two major road

schemes, the third ring road and the airport expressway, were

built simultaneously but without coordination, reducing their

usefulness. Similarly, both private and public transportation ser-

vice providers were operating on the same routes, competing for

customers rather than trying to provide a common service. And,

as indicated above, urban and suburban taxi services were not

coordinated.

In January 2006, the Chengdu government took the radical

step of uniting various responsibilities for transportation under

one organisation. They created the Chengdu Municipal Trans-

port Committee, which is responsible for highways, city roads,

urban transportation, water transportation, local railway trans-

port and various other functions. Enforcement became the re-

sponsibility of the committee as well, ensuring that the various

laws were aligned and that confl icts between them were elimi-

nated. Through organizational adjustment and resource inte-

gration, the city has gradually established an effi cient transport

administrative management system. The new structure is able

to accommodate the rapid rise in demand resulting from the

growth in the economy by bringing together various functions

such as transportation planning, infrastructure construction,

and transport management. The decision-making process and

delivery and supervision of schemes is better coordinated as well.

Thanks to the new structure it has also been possible to invest

in several important new projects. In 2007, Chengdu city an-

nounced a programme of 31 key transport schemes, covering rail

transportation, parking lots, highways, urban motorways, and

passenger stations. The highlights include the establishment of

a light-rail system and the opening of the Shahebao hub: the

largest rail centre in western China. Other smaller hubs have


been developed in the outlying areas. A programme to ensure in-

tegration of the fare systems to enable people to travel with one

card is also being developed. One interesting effect of the new

structure is that it makes it easier to travel between suburban

and rural outlying areas and the centre. Integrating rural-urban

public transport has, on the one hand, brought urban civilization

to the countryside, and on the other hand brought advantages

of the countryside back to the city, resulting in interaction and

improved opportunities for people residing in both urban areas

and the countryside.

While transport management reform in Chengdu has pro-

gressed and has promoted sustainable urban-transport develop-

ment, gaps in the structure remain and coordination between

areas of transport administration is insuffi cient. There is still

no unifi ed management of the bus and underground railway

networks, or of urban and rural public transport. Decisions re-

garding the construction of new facilities are not always aligned

with demand, and, therefore, the most-needed schemes do not

always progress fi rst. Enforcement by the transportation and

public-security departments remains inconsistent, and informa-

tion sharing on urban transport is lacking.

In June 2009, to bring about further change, the central Chi-

nese government approved an extension of Chengdu’s reforms to

establish an urban and rural area ‘reform testing district’; an in-

novative measure designed to strengthen and coordinate urban

planning and transport planning management. Using experi-

ence from both home and abroad, this will allow Chengdu to try

to remedy the remaining problems. In particular, there will be

greater integration of urban transport management functions,

clarifying the relationship between transport construction and

its management. Management methods will be improved, with

greater emphasis on the integrated management of transport

enforcement. A better decision-making process will ensure that

resources are targeted to the most important schemes and an

urban master plan will ensure that transport is at the centre of

the planning process, rather than being an afterthought. Final-

ly, there will be a much-improved information-sharing process.

Simply coordinating the traffi c-light system, for example, has

resulted in a 15 percent increase in road capacity.

Chengdu is very much a pioneer, and it is intended that the

city’s new structure will be used as a model for administra-

tive transport reforms in other central cities. The transporta-

tion sector in a second pilot city, Shenzen (in Guangdong prov-

ince north of Hong Kong – a rapidly-growing area as it part of

China’s fi rst Special Economic Zone), was reformed along simi-


lar lines in 2010. This city is seen as a fl agship for further pro-

moting institutional reform in China. The responsibility of the

new Shenzhen municipal transport department covers highway,

urban public transport, waterway, ports, railway, rail transit,

civil aviation, logistics and post. It is the fi rst time in China that

a transport authority has taken overall responsibility for all as-

pects of urban transport management.

Conclusion

While there is no shortage of diffi culties ahead – not least the

Chinese passion for automobiles – the work of CUSTReC has

contributed to a good start being made in implementing public

transport solutions as a way of solving the worst urban transport

problems. The success of administrative changes in Chengdu,

the fi rst pilot area, has opened the way for a completely new

approach to transport management. More radical solutions,

such as congestion charging, are likely to be seen in the future.

Changing Chinese urban transport policy is a long process. As an

old Chinese proverb suggests, it takes nine dragons to move one

river. That is CUSTReC’s aim.

csud • new york

Sustainable transportation in ChinaThe China Urban Sustainable Transport Research Center (CUSTReC) in Beijing is working to fi nd solutions that are applicable at both technical and policy levels. The researchers hope that their results will even be useful in other developing countries. CUSTReC initiated activities in 2006. VREF is fi nancing the Centre through 2010. Twenty four researchers are employed at the Centre. They collaborate with an additional 12 international researchers in China and the outside world. The collaboration provides the Centre with access to international expertise and opportunities for the Centre.

Yulin JiangProfessor of Civil Engineering and Policy Studies, the Director of CUSTReC and the Deputy Chief Engineer of the China Academy of Transportation Sciences, Ministry of Transport. Dr. Jiang is recognized as a leading international expert on policy studies of sustainable urban transport, climate change and environmental protection. Dr. Jiang has been playing an important role in formulat-ing China’s recent urban transport policies, such as

Institutional Reform of Urban Transport Administration, Suggestions to Prioritize Development of Public Transport, Policy Recommendation on Strengthening Financial Support for Urban Public Transport, and Urban Public Transport Devel-opment Plan.

Christian Wolmar is an author and journalist based in London, specialising in transport. He contributes regularly to national newspapers such as The Times and The Guardian as well as to specialist magazines. He is a frequent speaker at conferences both in Britain and abroad, and has written a series of books on railway his-tory, including The Subterranean Railway (the London Un-derground), Fire & Steam (Railways in Britain) and Blood, Iron & Gold (The infl uence of railways across the world).

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A

Confronting the tasks arising in response to the

future decline of oil-based mobility is central to

GAMUT.

This chapter explores some of the implications,

using a research method developed at the

Centre. The Centre’s main research themes

are transportation sustainability analysis,

governance practices to support sustainability,

and governance analysis in different national and

local contexts. We outline a research initiative

within this programme, demonstrating a new way

of assessing access to public transport, and show

how this model was used in considering the best

site for a new sports stadium on Queensland’s

Gold Coast.

Nicholas Low

Matthew Burke

Crystal Legacy

Leigh Glover

GAMUT / MELBOURNE / AUSTRALIA

URBAN TRANSPORT GOVERNANCE FOR A LOW-CARBON FUTURE

59gamut • melbourne

T THE GAMUT Centre in Melbourne we address the

question of transportation from the viewpoint of

urban governance and environmental research.

Using a World Bank defi nition, urban transport

governance is the exercise of political authority

and the use of institutional resources to manage society’s urban

transport problems and affairs. Mobility, which can be defi ned as

people and goods travelling around cities and around the planet,

is at the core of the global economy which, in turn, can be con-

sidered as the benefi cial exploitation of the environment for hu-

man use.

However, the environment imposes limits, which means that

future urban transport must contend with a decline of global

mobility. Since, according to a 2008 OECD report, 98 percent

of transport worldwide is fuelled by oil, the impact of climate

change and peak oil production will together force a great dis-

ruption in the world economy, unless an alternative mode of

mobility can be found. GAMUT research suggests that these

propositions are broadly correct. We are trying to develop a new

approach to urban mobility that will avoid the disruption.

The mobility crisis looms straight ahead of us like a brick wall.

There is not enough time, energy or money to develop and put

in place completely new urban transport systems. To preserve

mobility, cities need to learn how the various current modes of

public transport — trains, buses, light rail or trams, and even

cycle hire schemes — can be adapted to work together as seam-

less systems, linked in with land-use planning. This idea, some-

times called ‘sustainable transport’ will have to spread through-

out the world in various forms if the great disruption is to be

avoided. Research by GAMUT partners is showing how this can

be achieved, with practical applications in Australia, China, and

New Zealand. Our research in Australia and Japan highlights

both how this new thinking can be promoted, and the barriers

to it. Researchers in China are investigating how the different

shapes and forms of cities affect travel behaviour. Where and

how we will live and work is connected with how we move around

cities. City governments accustomed to leaving such matters to

separate land and transport markets, together with bundles of

mega-transport projects, will have to learn how to systemati-

cally plan transport together with land-use.

Many European cities are comfortable with such planning,

and a few cities such as Barcelona, Copenhagen, London, Paris,

Stockholm, and Zürich do it very well. But in the ‘new new’ world

of rapid economic growth – meaning not just North America but

also Australasia, East Asia, India, and parts of South America

– planning for the most part is not done well, and sometimes

not at all. There are, however, outstanding exceptions, in cit-

ies such as Bogota, Curitiba, Portland, Singapore, and Vancouver.

We have developed a number of tools to assist transportation

and land-use planning, based not so much on predicting travel

demand from past experience but on exploring and specifying

future need.

To create a fresh narrative about transportation and land-use

integration for the 21st Century, it is necessary to engage con-

structively with government and stakeholders to introduce new

ideas. GAMUT has developed a range of ways of doing this. One

example is the use of a new planning tool developed by GAMUT

for the siting of a new sports stadium Queensland’s Gold Coast.

Using technical tools to infl uence policy and planning

How can we assist decision-making for future cities, where the

objective is to achieve more sustainable urban travel with more

walking, cycling and public-transport use? An example where

this question emerged was when the Australian Football League

(AFL), with government support, planned a new stadium on

Queensland’s Gold Coast. This stadium was to host a new AFL

team representing the Gold Coast, which would receive a license

to be part of an expanded national league. This means there

were wider economic and cultural interests involved in the pro-

ject beyond those of merely building a new sports facility.

As an urban area, the Gold Coast exhibits several unique char-

acteristics in Australia, due in part to its origins as a tourist

destination that has been transformed by rapid development

into the nation’s tenth-largest urban area, with 530,000 perma-

nent residents (more than double its 1986 population). The area

developed from a group of car-based coastal settlements (in-

cluding Southport, Surfers Paradise, Broadbeach, and Burleigh



Heads) that merged into a single conurbation and spread into

the hinterland. It has no Central Business District and is with-

out a high-capacity local public transport system, apart from a

13km light-rail system currently under construction. The bus

network provides local public transport. The main railway, the

Gold Coast line (a branch of the rail system of Brisbane, the

state capital 80km away), runs North-South through the Gold

Coast hinterlands, and, therefore, does not serve the area well,

since the population is concentrated along the coast to the East.

In 2007, several possible Gold Coast stadium sites were con-

sidered for the AFL. The cheap and easy option was to rebuild

an existing small stadium at Carrara, located somewhat cen-

trally and inland within the

Gold Coast, 1.8km east from the

rail line and set amongst park-

land and golf courses. Other

sites on the rail line were also

considered, including sites at

Nerang and Helensvale. These

sites were attractive, as travel

demand management is being

used in Queensland to persuade

sports patrons to use public

transport and it is now increas-

ingly diffi cult to drive a car to

attend any major urban sport-

ing event.

Surprisingly, there has been

little research on the relation-

ship between transportation

and sports stadiums, especially in Australia. In many ways, this

relationship has been a barometer of transport planning. For

Australia, the early, large sport grounds were primarily serviced

by suburban trains and trams. In the 1960s and 1970s, stadiums

were developed around car access. However, today’s stadium de-

velopers have tended to return to locations with large-scale pub-

lic transport access.

Planning in accordance with this renewed interest in public

transport accessibility requires suitable assessment techniques.

Past research on locating sports stadiums within cities was lim-

ited. Conventional four-step models that produce forecasts of

future transport demand using trip generation (usually cover-

ing such variables as origin, destination, and trip purpose), trip

distribution (origins and destinations), mode choice, and route

assignment were not very useful for appraising public transport

We have developed a number of tools to assist transportation and land-use planning, based not so much on predicting travel demand from past experience but on exploring and specifying future need.

access. In order to bring transport and accessibility to the fore

in decision-making, researchers at Griffi th University used the

Modular Urban Land Use and Transport Tool (MULUTT), de-

veloped by the GAMUT collaboration.

MULUTT allows for a more robust exploration of public trans-

port accessibility and the prospects of the stadium location cap-

turing a greater market. This technique harnesses advanced

geographic information systems to appraise public transport ac-

cess and possible catchments for each of the location options.

This model produces outcomes to support transport decisions,

but it is not useful for analyzing political or planning decisions.

It only looks at the transport factors. MULUTT calculates all

the locations on the road network that are accessible via public

transport. Then the number of residents in these locations is

counted, thereby providing a measurement of the public trans-

port catchment for the stadium location. This process is repeat-

ed for each stadium site. Travel times, including walking trips

within the journey rather than distances, were used to assess

accessibility. Two journey time measures were employed: ‘High

Accessibility’ is defi ned as a journey up to 45 minutes and ‘Rea-

sonable Accessibility’ up to 75 minutes, which is deemed the ac-

ceptable maximum trip duration. An evaluation was made of

six stadium locations in the vicinity of the Gold Coast rail line:

Carrara and Robina (both sites of existing stadiums), and four

greenfi eld alternatives.

The results for the Carrara site are shown in Figure 1 (see

next page). Of the six sites, Nerang had the most ‘High Accessi-

bility’ journey times, serving 53.3 percent of the population, and

also the most ‘Reasonable Accessibility’ journey times (serving

92.2 %). Carrara came second in ‘High Accessibility’ (48.7%) but

had the lowest level of ‘Reasonable Accessibility’ journey times,

serving 82.5 percent of the Gold Coast population. The map gen-

erated by MULUTT shows that although Carrara is accessible

for residents in the central area of the city, it fails to provide

high levels of access to the key growth corridor of Coomera and

Beenleigh. Although future urban growth was not covered by

this study, in all likelihood it will be concentrated in this corri-

dor, placing more potential stadium patrons in the vicinity of the

Nerang site. The analysis showed that relocating the stadium to

Nerang, immediately adjacent to the Nerang railway station on

the Gold Coast rail line, would make the stadium more accessible

to a signifi cantly larger proportion of existing (and likely future)

Gold Coast residents than any of the other proposed sites.

Carrara was selected as the preferred site, and the new

AUD$144 million, 25,000-seat-capacity Metricon stadium held



Figure 1. Public transport accessibility to the Carrara AFL Stadium site


its inaugural game in May 2011. Although the decision-mak-

ing process remains confi dential due to government rules on

private-public partnerships, it is known that it was a complex

matter involving the Gold Coast City Council, state government,

national government, and the AFL (all of which contributed fi -

nancially). In addition, the decision was infl uenced by the avail-

ability of the existing infrastructure at Carrara as opposed to

the alternatives, the opportunity to develop a sporting precinct

at the Carrara site as a possible venue for the 2018 Common-

wealth Games, and the potential for the Gold Coast Council to

relocate facilities to the area. Property developers, local business

lobbies and others had also sought to infl uence the City Council,

the state government and the AFL itself to site this substantial

investment where it would help their interests. This, too, proved

crucial; although there was a review of alternative sites, the

powerful infl uences and interests of these major stakeholders

undoubtedly played a role. Ultimately, the benefi t of optimizing

access for stadium patrons was considered less important than

other factors.

Whatever other advantages the Carrara site might have pos-

sessed, the MULUTT analysis suggests that it was a poor choice

in terms of providing access to its patrons. Furthermore, this

choice of site has environmental implications; when public

transport access is poor in societies such as Australia with high

levels of car ownership, there will be a strong motivation for

patrons to drive, with the associated costs of greenhouse-gas

emissions, other local pollutants and risks of road trauma. Some

public transport, in the form of buses, was provided to the site.

GAMUT works from a well-developed theory base to devise

practical ways of addressing and overcoming what we see as the

coming disruption to mobility. These don’t always result in out-

comes we would regard as satisfying, but change of the kind that

we envisage is far-reaching and politically diffi cult to achieve.

The task must be approached with sensitivity. Our Centre can

only keep raising the issues until, eventually, the political will

exists to implement them.

Australasian Centre for the Governance and Management of Urban TransportGAMUT was established in 2006 under the Future Urban Transport programme as a collaborative research centre of the University of Melbourne. GAMUT has partners in three other Australian universities and two overseas universities. We have collaborated with the OMEGA Centre in London and CUSTReC in Beijing. GAMUT is the only transportation research centre in Australia explicitly linking transport with the environment and pressing for the change necessary to combat climate change and peak oil. It is also the only research centre in Australia spe-cializing broadly in the governance and management of urban transport systems. We bring a multi-disciplinary approach to the problems we see ahead, drawing insights from political science, planning, environmental philosophy, geography, engineering and institutional economics. The current Director of the Centre is Dr. Leigh Glover.

Nicholas Low is the author or editor of eight books, two of which have won national and international prizes. He is known for his contributions to the study of the politics of planning and transport, and for his international research on urban sustainability published in numerous international journal articles. His book (with Brendan Gleeson) Justice, Society and Nature won the Harold and Margaret Sprout Prize of the International Studies Association 1998 for the best book published on ecological politics in that year.

Matthew Burke is a Research Fellow in the Urban Research Program, Griffi th University, Brisbane, after previously working in transport and land use planning at all three tiers of government. Matthew’s research is presently focused on issues of travel behaviour, transport accessibility, urban environments and the relationships between active transport, physical activity and health.

Crystal Legacy is a Research Associate at the City Futures Research Centre at the University of New South Wales, Sydney. Crystal completed her PhD in 2010 which was undertaken at the Australasian Centre for the Governance and Management of Urban Transport at the University of Melbourne. Her fi elds of research include: metropolitan governance, participatory planning, strategic planning and plan-making.

Leigh Glover succeeded Professor Nicholas Low in January 2011 as the Director of GAMUT. His research interests include urban sustainability, climate change, global environmental politics, environmental policy and planning, environmental and political theory, and issues of science, technology and society. Previously he worked in policy formulation and research for Australian state and federal governments in the areas of climate change, water resources, and public land planning.G

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Analyses of the success and failures of

megaprojects have been surprisingly shallow,

despite the large sums of money and considerable

resources that go into building the projects.

By interviewing a wide range of stakeholders

involved in 30 projects in ten developed

countries, the OMEGA Centre has highlighted

the inadequacy of existing methodologies for

assessing megaprojects. They conclude that there

should be a far wider analysis of the results of

the construction of megaprojects, with a much

deeper understanding of the impacts of changing

contexts on decision making. Such analysis

should include an emphasis on sustainability

and a better understanding of longer-term and

broader effects.

Harry Dimitriou

Christian Wolma

OMEGA / LONDON / UK

MEGAPROJECTS: THE BIGGER PICTURE

69omega • london

EGAPROJECTS ARE OFTEN controversial and

high profi le. That is a bad combination. They

are frequently initiated in a climate of hype,

with promoters and developers tempted to

exaggerate the benefi ts and underestimate

the costs in an effort to attract support and funding. As pro-

jects run their course, however, the initial enthusiasm can be

quickly dissipated. All too often, infl uenced by hostile media cov-

erage and opposition, politicians and local groups worry about

environmental damage and disruption, the public perception

of schemes becomes negative. Projects are criticised because of

their high cost and the inevitable problems arising from their

complexity. In many cases, megaprojects are written off long be-

fore completion as a waste of taxpayers’ money and created only

to serve politicians’ vanity and developers’ fi nancial interests.

Yet there is clear evidence that, in the long term, many

megaprojects generate considerable benefi ts to a very wide spec-

trum of the population and a geographical area far beyond even

their promoters’ expectations. Projects may well quietly deliver

substantial economic and social benefi ts for decades, if not cen-

turies, when the hostility engendered during their planning and

construction has long been forgotten. Moreover, just because a

project may have cost more than expected does not imply fail-

ure. One only has to look at what was effectively the biggest

megaproject of the 19th Century, the construction of the world’s

railway systems, to illustrate this. More recently, the Sydney

Opera House, once derided as an expensive architectural folly, is

now seen as one of the world’s iconic buildings and a remarkably

successful music venue attracting thousands of tourists.

While there have been massive failures, too, it is undeniable

that there is a dissonance between the developers’ and politi-

cians’ hype and the criticism by opponents that is rooted in the

very nature of megaprojects. It is partly a question of timing.


The diffi culties experienced by megaprojects invariably occur in

their early stages during planning and construction, when de-

lays, cost overruns and funding diffi culties are all too common.

The overselling of the benefi ts to tempt funders becomes a hos-

tage to fortune. Politicians – and developers – are undoubtedly

seduced by the aura surrounding what the French call Grands

Projets. The dream of leaving a permanent legacy is an alluring

one for visionary and ambitious politicians, and the temptations

of making vast sums of money is equally appealing to promoters.

How to defi ne success

The question at the root of this issue is how to defi ne success in

relation to a megaproject. This requires understanding the trans-

formative capacity of a megaproject as an agent of change that

goes beyond the limited ‘iron-triangle’ analysis of time, cost and

output provided by project management assessment. All too of-

ten success and failure are defi ned in terms of narrow criteria

covering only the visible and short-term results of the project.

Cost overruns and delays in the timetable are seen as more im-

portant benchmarks than other deliverables, in both the media

and academic studies. The phrases ‘on time’ and ‘on budget,’ which

feature prominently in press releases, do not help us assess the

long-term balance sheet of a scheme in broader economic, social

and environmental contexts. Strangely, given the importance of

these schemes at the local, national, and often, international lev-

els, little attempt has been made to defi ne long-term success or

failure. Megaprojects cannot be viewed as little more than larger

versions of small schemes. Instead they should be studied as a

separate category, with particular features and challenges requir-

ing a much wider set of concerns to inform future stakeholders.

More than 40 researchers

This lacuna was the genesis for a fi ve-year research programme

by the OMEGA Centre for Mega Projects in Transport and De-

velopment at University College London, made possible by grants

from the Volvo Research and Education Foundations. The pro-

gramme, involving more than 40 researchers from a wealth of

disciplines, has examined 30 urban transport megaprojects (re-

ferred to simply as ‘megaprojects’ in this chapter) in 10 developed

countries in Europe, America, Australia and Asia. In addition

to using the conventional method of focussing on academic and

professional literature in the public domain, the OMEGA teams

carried out in-depth interviews with 20 or more key stakehold-


ers from each megaproject, ranging from planners, project man-

agers and academics to developers and politicians, including very

prominent fi gures such as the former Swedish Prime Minister,

Ingvar Carlsson, who was a key player in promoting the Öresund

Link, and ex British Deputy Prime Ministers Michael Heseltine

and John Prescott, who were both political champions for the

Channel Tunnel Rail Link (now known as High Speed One). The

narratives provided by interviewees, at times differing from one

another, greatly widened the knowledge base for analysing the

decision-making behind these schemes.

The OMEGA research programme started from the premise

that judging the success of a megaproject should rely on a wide

assessment of how risk, uncertainty, complexity and context were

treated in the planning, appraisal and delivery of the project. This

is about broadening the criteria on which schemes are judged.

Context, here, is all important. The conventional focus on internal

project risks fails to consider schemes in the light of wider ex-

ternal project risks over which the parties that are immediately

involved have limited or no control, such as changes in the politi-

cal complexion of governments, the imposition of more stringent

environmental or safety requirements, or even a recession.

Metaprojects – far more diffi cult to assess.

While all of the schemes in the research were, by defi nition, big

– involving hundreds or thousands of millions of pounds – there

is, in fact, a signifi cant difference in scale among the projects

reviewed; between the smallest and the largest perhaps up to

an order of 10, especially if subsequent related developments

are taken into account. There are, therefore, straight-forward

megaprojects, and what may be more accurately described as

‘metaprojects’ – i.e. programmes or bundles of megaprojects. It

is relatively easy to summarise the impact of a simple project

such as the construction of a major bridge that replaced a ferry

service, although even here there can be both anticipated and

unexpected impacts. Metaprojects are invariably far more diffi -

cult to assess. They are generally undertaken with complex and

multiple objectives and are best seen as clusters of related pro-

jects that, in turn, have a tendency to spawn further megapro-

jects and develop new emerging objectives as they proceed. The

Channel Tunnel Rail Link, for example, started out as a simple

notion of connecting London with the Channel Tunnel by rail,

but later changed the scheme to a longer high-speed rail route

through East London to stimulate regeneration. The existence

of the rail link undoubtedly contributed to London’s successful

73omega • london

bid for the Olympics and this success illustrates the way that

megaprojects can have unexpected consequences that would be

missed by a narrow analysis of their impact.

The Öresund link, too, must be viewed in this way, as it is much

more than a bridge linking two countries. As well as having sym-

bolic importance, it was initiated for a wide range of reasons: ce-

menting Sweden’s accession to the EU, stimulating integration of

the Danish and Swedish labour markets, and promoting urban re-

generation in both Malmö and Copenhagen. Therefore, to analyse

the link in terms of the number of cars or rail passengers using

it compared with necessarily-

vague forecasts would be to miss

the point.

The length of time from con-

ception to construction, which

can be as much as fi ve decades,

means megaprojects are subject

to many outside infl uences and

events that can contribute to a

wide range of unexpected im-

pacts, including cost overruns

and delays. These projects must,

therefore, be considered as ‘or-

ganic’ in character rather than

as static engineering artefacts.

Elements hostile to such pro-

jects fail to take into account

the unpredictable nature of such events and, consequently, use

them unfairly as the basis of criticism. For example, the sud-

den imposition by the UK government of a New Year’s Eve 1999

deadline on London’s Jubilee Line Extension (JLE) imposed

considerable extra costs as contractors bid up their prices and

workers were able to dictate terms in return for not striking.

On the other hand, such external infl uences can be positive, too.

It was pressure from local authorities that ensured that several

extra stations – serving deprived areas – were built as part of

the JLE project. These stations, while adding cost, have proved

to be of enormous benefi t to the local communities they served;

their social benefi ts far outweigh the added expenditure.

The size and importance of megaprojects, combined with fears

of media or local criticism, can make it tempting for politicians

and promoters to try to control the fl ow of information about

such projects. In Sweden, for example, the debate over possible

alternatives for the Öresund Link, such as whether it should only

be for rail traffi c, took place principally within the ruling Social

Megaprojects should at a minimum seek to be environmentallyneutral, and ideally should make a positive contribution to theenvironment, for example through modal shifts.

75omega • london

Democratic Party and was not opened up to the wider public

until the decision was a fait accompli. On the TGV Med scheme,

SNCF tried to damp down public debate by keeping route op-

tions closed, but eventually was forced to open discussion by

public opposition. While during the last stages of planning and

the construction it is necessary to treat megaprojects as closed

systems, because of the high cost of late variation, OMEGA re-

search suggests that employing more open systems of analysis

prior to construction and following project implementation has

numerous advantages and can reduce opposition.

The absence of systematic and consistent appraisal methods

was one of the inspirations for the OMEGA programme. The

failings of traditional appraisal methods, which have been far

too narrow in scope, have not led to a process of institutional

learning and the development of improved forms of assessment.

There is, perhaps, a suspicion that some stakeholders are reluc-

tant to investigate megaprojects too deeply, as they fear that any

negative fi ndings may provide their opponents with ammunition.

There is also the notion that once an investment has been made

and a project is a fact of life, any investigation would be point-

less. The media, too, tends to lose interest once a project has

been completed and the bills have been paid. In short, there is no

consistent tradition of institutional learning and sharing from

past megaproject experiences.

Moreover, the use of private capital, often in tandem with com-

plex public-private-partnership instruments, has resulted in some

megaproject stakeholders opting to keep detailed information

about past project developments in house, on the basis of com-

mercial confi dentiality given their value in preparing future bids.

This reluctance to share information, an inevitable consequence

of narrow commercial interests, prevents other stakeholders,

such as governments and other private promoters, from assessing

past schemes in depth. The academic world is also constrained,

because of the way it typically operates in narrow silos of separate

disciplines, which prevents academics from developing broader

appropriate methodologies for rigorously assessing megaprojects.

How much is the habitat of a rare bird worth?

The most prevalent method of appraising projects, which is gen-

erally carried out at the planning stage and only rarely used to

look at schemes retrospectively, is cost benefi t analysis (CBA).

However, in a survey of some 50 international infrastructure

specialists funded jointly by the UK Institution of Civil Engineers

(ICE) and the Actuarial Profession (AP), OMEGA researchers


found that 84 percent of stakeholders – including practising en-

gineers and economists who make constant use of this meth-

odology – considered the method inadequate for megaproject

appraisal. CBA was initially developed to ascertain the wider

benefi ts and costs of projects, but is hamstrung by the diffi culty

of ascribing monetary values to many of the effects of projects.

How much is the habitat of a rare bird worth? Moreover, the

method cannot account for possible future side effects, both

positive and negative, such as the granting of the Olympics to

London mentioned above. In sum, the methodology fails to take

account of the second- and third-order results of schemes.

Megaprojects, moreover, become ‘strategic agents and drivers

of change,’ another outcome that is diffi cult to quantify through

conventional appraisal methods. This may be as simple as stimu-

lating the use of new technologies in construction or, on a much

larger scale, transforming a whole area or region into a more

economically-dynamic and socially-vibrant area. During both

the planning and construction processes, the very size and speed

of development of megaprojects challenges existing institutions

and provides scope for learning, leading to both changes in work-

ing methods and the adoption of new technologies. In Athens,

for example, the operating company, Attiko Metro SA, developed

the culture of a learning organisation, in which the presence of

highly-qualifi ed personnel and frequent interaction with con-

sultants was seen as an opportunity to acquire valuable new

knowledge and refl ect on mistakes. This can go wrong, however.

The use of a technologically-advanced signalling system on the

Jubilee Line Extension proved impossible to implement in time

for the line’s opening, and a more basic system had to be adopted

temporarily at great cost.

Transformed into something much bigger

The way that megaprojects drive change suggests that the in-

vestigation of potential outcomes must transcend obvious im-

pacts and, furthermore, consider both a longer timeframe and

a greater geographic space than originally envisaged. Moreover,

given the lengthy gestation period of megaprojects, priorities

can change as the project progresses. Assessing the value of this

change process is obviously very diffi cult and does not fi t easily

into the CBA methodology, and yet such analysis is essential if

the full value and impacts of such projects are to be understood.

This research suggests that a new approach to the planning,

appraisal and, ultimately, the monitoring of megaprojects is

needed. It proposes a new policy-led multi-criteria framework

77omega • london

against which the successes and failures of such projects may

be better assessed over time and space, providing a clearer in-

dication of ultimate winners and losers. A project that starts

with the notion of solving a relatively narrow problem can be

transformed into something much bigger and more strategic by

employing this framework, which means that judgements about

their success should not be left to narrowly-focussed profession-

als or interest groups. The clumsy expression ‘multi-disciplinary

approach’ has never been so apt. Megaprojects require a kind of

mega- or meta-analysis that involves such multi-criteria analy-

ses, which, unfortunately, are rarely deployed.

The very ‘mega’ nature of these projects, particularly the most

complex ones, is often underestimated by those commissioning

them, as their frequently-changing multiple objectives are dif-

fi cult to balance. One of the consistent fi ndings of the OMEGA

team at UCL is that many seasoned infrastructure specialists

argue that megaprojects need ‘time to breathe.’ In other words,

it is foolhardy to equate speeding up the planning and appraisal

process with achieving greater effi ciency. On the other hand,

project promoters are sometimes in a hurry due to the availabil-

ity of particular funding or the right political climate.

The art here is timing

The art here – as with many similar issues – is timing, and that

requires confi dent decision makers at the helm, versed in many

skills and able to balance a wide variety of considerations. For

example, stakeholders must be able to judge the success of the

wider environmental aspects of a project against its more easily-

quantifi ed delivery of reducing of congestion. The Boston Big Dig

is an obvious example, where in terms of cost overruns and nar-

row transport outcomes the scheme failed to meet expectations,

but nevertheless resulted in freeing 300 acres of land, creating

45 parks and piazzas, providing access to a lengthy waterfront

and, consequently, boosting local land and property values. The

timeframe is important as well. As the parks and piazzas are

built, the long and expensive gestation period and the disasters

of the construction process fade from memory.

Unfortunately, two of the key factors that would greatly im-

prove the assessment of megaprojects are diffi cult to control.

The silo-thinking that dominates academia (and often profes-

sional practices too, despite rhetoric to the contrary) is a ma-

jor barrier to a multi-disciplinary approach. In an attempt to

overcome this barrier, with funding support from VREF and

teaching inputs from the OMEGA team, UCL is offers a new


MSc programme in mega-infrastructure planning, appraisal and

delivery, which commenced in September 2011. The other key

factor is public attitudes to megaprojects, which are greatly in-

fl uenced by the media. While hostile media coverage – which, for

example, is explicitly cited as one of the reasons for the diffi cul-

ties of the Sydney Cross City Tunnel – cannot be controlled, it

can be mitigated through a clear and more open media strategy,

including giving journalists ready access to information.

Remarkably only nine of the 27 schemes researched by the

OMEGA Centre – all of which were conceived at least two dec-

ades ago – carried out environmental impact assessments be-

fore the fi nal project was chosen. This suggests that sustain-

ability was not an integral part of the decision-making process.

That could not happen today. Sustainability is no longer an add-

on, but more frequently seen as an integral part of the project

assessment process; success today cannot be measured without

employing sustainable-development criteria. The OMEGA team

suggests that operationalizing sustainability encompasses four

key dimensions: environmental, economic, social and institution-

al sustainability. With this much stronger and wider defi nition,

sustainability will play a much larger role in future decisions

regarding whether or not to proceed with a megaproject.

Megaprojects should at a minimum seek to be environmental-

ly neutral, and ideally should make a positive contribution to the

environment, for example through modal shifts. However, build-

ing sustainable megaprojects requiring, for example, cleaner but

more expensive technology may well be less profi table. How will

politicians be persuaded to take on such projects when many of

the megaprojects analysed by the OMEGA research team were

driven by the need to boost regional competitiveness in the glob-

al economy? Changing the way that megaprojects are planned

and appraised will require building international agreement and

support for this approach, for example, through international

conventions and the infl uence of bodies such as the UN and the

World Bank. This approach to megaproject planning and ap-

praisal will have major implications for the way the private sec-

tor is involved, because it often confl icts with the private sector’s

need for short-term high rates of return. A shift towards plan-

ning sustainable megaprojects implies a more tightly-defi ned

role for the private sector.

Future megaprojects holistic

One of the key conclusions of OMEGA research is that the plan-

ning and appraisal of future megaprojects should be very dif-

ferent from current practice; they should be holistic, systematic

and multi-disciplinary, and extend well beyond simply looking at

time, cost and output. All of the players would be committed to

the overall project rather than only to narrow interests within

it. Champions – who may be politicians, offi cials or private pro-

moters – are an essential part of this process as supporters and

campaigners for the scheme. Ideally, they would work up the

project, which would then need to be tested independently with-

in government and in consultation with civil society. The pre-

liminary assessment would take into account the wider picture,

stressing that the megaproject would be an agent of change with

consequences and outcomes far beyond its immediate remit. Ul-

timately, it would be incumbent upon every megaproject team to

convince government and local communities that the proposal

was better than do-nothing or de minimis alternatives, as well

as affordable, sustainable and deliverable.

The decision regarding whether or not to go ahead with a

megaproject would thus be informed, not only by specialists

working in silos but by experts able to handle and assess all of

the criteria on which such projects would be based. The insti-

tutional barriers between, for example, transport organisations,

planning authorities and funders would be broken down. Ideally,

there would be a national institution working across govern-

ment departments and able to assess the full implications of

schemes. Learning from past experience and research such as

the OMEGA team’s work, they would also be able to better in-

form the public and the media on the advantages as well as the

risks and uncertainties of major schemes. Ex post facto assess-

ment and analysis would be treated in the same way; a compre-

hensive approach to analysis that would take on board second-

or third-order consequential outcomes. A body of work covering

all types of megaprojects across the world could be drawn upon.

It would be tempting for supporters of projects to cast their

net widely, seeking potential favourable outcomes, without also

examining possible downsides. Megaprojects will remain contro-

versial by their very nature, but expanding perceptions and the

toolset available to assess them, both before and after comple-

tion, may well reduce the simplistic negative assessments that

all too easily become the norm, while allowing better appraisal

of their true long-term costs and benefi ts.


The OMEGA Centre The OMEGA Centre for Mega Projects in Transport and Development at Univer-sity College London was set up to analyse the growing disquiet regarding the failure of megaprojects to be delivered on time and within budget, or to produce promised benefi ts. The Centre seeks to address growing international realisation of the need to understand how megaprojects can deliver their objectives, and to examine more closely the criteria by which the success of such projects should be judged, in the context of the increasingly complex and changing environment of the 21st Century and of visions of sustainability promoted both locally and globally. Directed by Professor Harry Dimitriou, the OMEGA Centre research team at UCL includes: Phil G. Wright, Dr. E. John Ward, Rob Gallagher, June Taylor and Yen-Ning Tseng. They have been assisted in their case-study work by international partners drawn from the: University of Melbourne in Australia, École Nationale Ponts et Chaussées in France, Free University of Berlin in Germany, University of Thessaly in Greece, University of Amsterdam in Holland, Tokyo Insti-tute of Technology in Japan, University of Hong Kong in PRC, Lund University in Sweden, and New York University in USA, as well as by the Complexity Interest Group at Glamorgan University and its sister organisation, Cognitive Edge Plc., which assisted in the analysis and synthesis of the case stakeholder narratives.

Harry Dimitriou is Bartlett Professor of Planning Stud-ies at University College London and Director of the OMEGA Centre. He has taught and undertaken research at Aalborg University, University of Hong Kong, Sheffi eld University and Development Planning Unit at UCL. He is author/editor of seven books, including Urban Transport Planning: A Developmental Approach (Routledge, 1992), and published articles in numerous professional and academic journals. His principal areas of research and

teaching lie in the fi elds of urban land-use/ transport planning, urban transport policy and sustainable development, mega infrastructure appraisal and planning, strategic and regional planning, and institution building for urban development and transport. Much of his work has concentrated on cities and regions in the Developing World. Professor Dimitriou has held numerous advisory and con-sultancy positions, including for the World Bank, World Bank Institute, UNDP, UN-Habitat, ESCAP, Harvard Institute for International Development, Hong Kong Government, Government of Indonesia, and UK Regional Development Agen-cies.

Christian Wolmar is an author and journalist based in London, specialising in transport. He contributes regularly to national newspapers such as The Times and The Guardian as well as to specialist magazines. He is a fre-quent speaker at conferences both in Britain and abroad, and has written a series of books on railway history includ-ing The Subterranean Railway (the London Underground), Fire & Steam (Railways in Britain) and Blood, Iron & Gold (The infl uence of railways across the world).

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The City of Barcelona is in the process of

revamping its bus service and implementing a

new high-performance system tentatively called

RetBus. The new system uses a hybrid network

concept developed at the Centre for Future

Urban Transport in Berkeley (CFUT). A team of

Barcelona researchers affi liated with CFUT, and

led by the centre’s Director, optimized the design.

RetBus will cover the city with fast and frequent

buses on 12 routes. To avoid the costs of BRT-like

infrastructure, the system will use soft methods

proposed by the research team to separate itself

from the traffi c stream and to speed up passenger

boarding. Although RetBus is designed to provide

an effi cient stand-alone mobility solution for the

long-distance trips of able-bodied citizens, it will

be coordinated with the existing suburban train,

metro, light rail and conventional (short-distance)

bus systems to serve all kinds of trips. RetBus

service can be provided using only a small fraction

of the buses currently in use, and, since it allows

for conventional service to be streamlined, it can

be provided without adding buses.

Carlos Daganzo

CFUT / BERKELEY / USA

BARCELONA’S BUS REVOLUTION

83cfut • berkeley

N MARCH 2011, Transportes Metropolitanos de Barcelona

(TMB), the public transportation agency of Barcelona,

announced that it had completed its implementation

plans for the staged introduction of a new high-

performance bus system, tentatively named RetBus.

The idea behind RetBus is that it will be the backbone of the

city’s bus network, and enable people to travel anywhere in the

city quickly and reliably with fast and frequent services. The

design of the system is based on research by Carlos Daganzo,

Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Director

of the Volvo Centre for Future Urban Transport (CFUT) at the

University of California, Berkeley.

Barcelona is a city with a long-established commitment to us-

ing public transport to improve mobility and reduce the envi-

ronmental impacts of automobile travel. To that end, the city

has developed an extensive transit system consisting of an urban

subway network, two lines of modern tramways, an urban bus

network, suburban rail lines and commuter bus lines. Barcelona

introduced an integrated fare system in 2001, and during the

past ten years has focused public-transport investment on rail.

In a continuing effort to improve overall transit system quality,

two key agencies of the city, TMB and Ajuntament de Barce-

lona (ADB, the City Council), are now working to revamp the

city’s bus network, which will continue to play an essential role

in serving the mobility needs of the city, due to the fl exibility and

accessibility of buses in providing surface public transport. TMB

is the bus-operating agency, while ADB oversees traffi c regula-

tions and traffi c signals in the city and can make necessary ad-

justments to accommodate and expedite the movement of buses.

CFUT, along with the Centre for Transport Innovation (CEN-

IT), a Barcelona-based research Centre headed by F. Robusté,

collaborated with TMB and ADB to develop the plans for Ret-

Bus and for rationalising Barcelona’s conventional bus network.


Daganzo conceived the advanced hybrid network system and led

the research underlying the development of the plans.

Old versus New

The existing urban bus network, covering an area of about 10 by

5km, has 110 routes that have developed over time (see Figure

1). As with most conventional bus networks, lines and stops are

closely spaced to afford easy walking access to passengers. How-

ever, this good spatial coverage comes at the expense of adding

to the journey times of the service. Because the bus-operating

agency has limited resources, it can only allocate a few buses to

each line. The operating speed of buses, which is already low due

to intersection traffi c signals and interference from car traffi c,

is further reduced by frequent stops. Currently, the city’s buses

have an average operating speed of 11.7 km/hr. The limited num-

ber of buses on each route, combined with slow operating speed,

leads to a low service frequency. Moreover, not only can the bus

headway be long, but it is also unpredictable. As a result, bus us-

ers can wait a long time for a bus, and then travel slowly while

the bus makes frequent stops along the way.

The new RetBus system consists of 12 corridors: seven “verti-

cal” (from the hills to the sea) and fi ve “horizontal” (see Figure 2).

Buses on these corridors will run more frequently, on dedicated

bus lanes (or lanes with intermittent bus priority). Compared

with the conventional system, the routes are straighter and sim-

pler, with stops that are spaced further apart. Buses are given

Figure 1.

85cfut • berkeley

priority at traffi c signals. Together, these features will increase

vehicle operating speed (promised at 15km/hr but estimated to

approach 20km/hr) and reduce passenger travel time. Comple-

mented by changes to roadside infrastructure and the vehicles

themselves, RetBus will make bus travel faster, reliable, and at-

tractive. RetBus also represents a major effi ciency improvement:

30 percent of the buses will provide 64 percent of seat capacity

during the peak travel period. The overall bus-system capacity

will increase by 28 percent.

With RetBus, Barcelona is on the verge of creating a bus net-

work with three hierarchical levels. As the backbone of the net-

work, RetBus is expected to carry the majority of bus traffi c, of-

fering mobility and performance similar to metro and trams but

operating at a fraction of the cost. Travel on RetBus will compete

favourably with private vehicles when both the access and travel

times are taken into account. The existing urban bus network

(the middle level) will be streamlined by eliminating or consoli-

dating redundant lines, reducing the number of conventional bus

routes. The remaining lines will complement RetBus to fi ll gaps

in spatial coverage. Routes on which frequent stops are desirable,

as well as local neighbourhood routes (the lower level) where

short trips are predominant, will be retained. These local routes,

which serve neighbourhoods and connect with the conventional

bus lines, will also provide connections with RetBus.

The RetBus system is designed to be well connected with all

key stations of the metro, the tram, and the commuter lines. The

plan envisages full implementation of the system by 2013, when

0 500 10000 500 1000

Figure 2.

Barcelona residents and visitors will enjoy an integrated trans-

portation network with regional coverage and easy transfers.

The Birth of Project RetBus

Since 2005, CENIT has collaborated with TMB and ADB to bet-

ter understand the reality of bus service operations and identify

opportunities for improvement. During 2005–2008, studies were

conducted to examine the fea-

sibility of traffi c-signal priority

and dedicated bus lanes. In 2008,

Daganzo was invited to present

his research on the structure of

competitive transit networks.

Representatives of TMB and

ADB were in the audience, and

the ensuing discussion quickly

moved to in-depth discussions

about a city-wide system for

Barcelona that would offer high

performance bus service with

little new infrastructure. Excit-

ed by this opportunity, the three local organizations (CENIT, TMB

and ADB) teamed up with CFUT to develop a plan for the system.

The results of the initial study were presented in February 2010

at a technical conference, ’Design and Effi cient Operation of Ur-

ban Bus Networks,’ held in Barcelona, where Daganzo explained

the scientifi c basis of the plan. As a result, the public agencies

announced their intention to implement the plan, which they

called ’RetBus.’ RetBus translates from Catalan into ‘Net Bus,’

and is inspired by the words net, vertex, line, grid and Mediter-

ranean fi shing nets. The name confers an identity distinguished

from conventional bus services and an association with a unique

set of attributes including improved infrastructure, operations,

and vehicle characteristics. The project has gained widespread

support from politicians. Recently, when fi ve leading mayoral

candidates for Barcelona were asked about their proposals for

urban mobility, all mentioned transit improvements and three

explicitly emphasized the implementation of RetBus.

Scientifi c Basis

Many bus networks are based on either a grid or radial ar-

rangement. For a small city with low demand, radial lines are

a cheap way of providing direct travel to a central destination

87cfut • berkeley

RetBus is poised to be the fi rst systematic implementation of a hybrid network design from scratch in the world.


and circuitous travel to other destinations. Grid systems elimi-

nate circuitous routes but require more vehicles and road in-

frastructure, and can only be supported if demand is high. Grid

systems, however, are typically underutilized in their periphery.

Thus, for a city with suffi cient demand, a hybrid pattern of “grid

in the centre and radial lines on the periphery” makes sense, as

resources can then be deployed in the most economical way. Da-

ganzo proposed this concept and showed how to optimize the de-

sign for a given city by considering an idealization of the system

that included only four decision variables: route spacing, stop

spacing, bus frequency and the relative size of the central grid

area. An illustration of an idealized system relevant for Barce-

lona is shown in Figure 3. Radial lines on the periphery provide

adequate coverage because the initial travel on the periphery is

mostly in one direction, and the central grid offers good transfer

opportunities to other directions.

This approach was applied to Barcelona and the results were

astonishing. Figure 4 gives a comparison of the old bus network

with a hybrid system that did not include any soft-bus rapid

Figure 3: The Hybrid Network Concept

Current bus Semi-alternating system (no BRT, v = 21 km/hr)

Door-to-door travel time (min) 57,9 50,3

Commercial speed (km/hr) 11,9 15,1

Number of buses 890 272

Stop separations (m) 300 650 (430 in the center)

Network shape xx = a/A = b/B N:A: 0,80

Headway (min) 13 3

Figure 4: Comparison of old bus network with the hybrid system.

89cfut • berkeley

transit, such as priority over cars and traffi c signal activation, so

the maximum cruising speed was 21 km/hr. It was found that –

assuming passenger travel destinations are uniformly distribut-

ed – replacing Barcelona’s bus network with an optimized hybrid

system, where lines are further apart but with buses running

at much higher frequency, would reduce the average passenger

travel time by more than ten percent. Furthermore, the number

of buses required for operating the hybrid system would be less

than a third of the number required under the old system!

From Theory to Implementation

It was not feasible to eliminate all bus routes and replace them

with the hybrid network all at once. In some cases, routes with

densely-spaced stops are necessary, either to serve shorter trips

or closely-spaced destinations. Some users will inevitably baulk

at the increased walking distance to access the new routes, at

least initially, before the public is convinced that the overall trip

time reduction outweighs some instances of increased walking.

To develop an implementation plan that would gain the accept-

ance of agencies and the public, the teams adopted three key

strategies. First, they developed RetBus routes using only avail-

able streets but following as much as possible the optimized hy-

brid system specifi cations (number of routes, size of central grid

area). Second, they eliminated conventional services overlapping

the new RetBus routes, and reduced the frequency of buses run-

ning on remaining conventional lines according to the expected

distribution of passenger demand. Third, bus headways on the

RetBus system were slightly increased from the idealized value,

to reduce operating costs until further consolidation of the con-

ventional routes could generate some savings. The implementa-

tion plan announced by TMB thereby provided a transitional

path to a bus network that would become more reliant on the

RetBus system over time, providing opportunities to further re-

duce the remaining number of conventional routes.

RetBus is poised to be the fi rst systematic implementation of a

hybrid network design from scratch in the world. Its basic con-

cept is to enable buses to run more frequently on routes that are

further apart, together with other strategies designed to make

the buses fast, reliable, and attractive. TMB is also deploying

specially-designed new buses that are clean, green and easily ac-

cessible, to emphasize the RetBus identity. Special measures by

ADB will be put in place to segregate traffi c and give priority to

buses. Bus stops will be re-designed to accommodate easy and

quick access to the new buses. An integrated fare system will


facilitate free and easy transfer between RetBus and other pub-

lic transport networks..

With regard to roadside infrastructure, the challenge is to make

the least possible physical changes, so as to preserve the aesthet-

ics of the city. Barcelonans care deeply about art and architecture;

a system with prominent structures typical of bus rapid transit

schemes elsewhere is out of the question for Barcelona. The Ret-

Bus system must therefore rely more on management than new

specially-constructed facilities, taking advantage of what technol-

ogy has to offer. The large spacing between RetBus lines makes it

feasible to deploy traffi c-signal priority on RetBus routes. The city

also plans to adopt a management scheme developed in Berkeley

called BLIP (Bus Lane Intermittent Priority) on route segments

where it is diffi cult to dedicate a traffi c lane to buses.

Overcoming Implementation Barriers

The hybrid network design together with the complementary

technologies and management policies for RetBus are innova-

tive. The team development has overcome many barriers to fast-

track the implementation of RetBus onto the immediate agenda

of a city with a great sense of tradition. The key factors behind

the successful approach have been:

1) a sound scientifi c basis for designing the new system that was

trusted by TMB and ADB;

2) a win-win solution for both passengers and operators, ensur-

ing wide-based political support;

3) a realistic approach for introducing the system gradually yet

steadily working towards the long-term optimum; and

4) the customization of complementary measures to address the

particular aesthetic sensitivities of the city and its people.

CFUT is committed to continuing to work with its partners in

Barcelona towards the successful implementation of RetBus. If

Barcelona does it right, it will not only offer a design blueprint

for other cities, but also lessons on how to overcome barriers.

Postscript: As this book went to press, the new Barcelona gov-

ernment was considering scrapping the name “RetBus” and im-

plementing a radically different design. They believe the original

plan is too closely associated with their predecessors who are now

in the opposition. The Berkeley CFUT team continues to push for

the original concept. So, an additional lesson to be learned is that

perseverance and luck are also needed for success.

Centre for Future Urban Transport, at the University of California, BerkeleyCFUT is comprised of faculty members and graduate students from the City and Regional Planning and the Civil and Environmental Engineering departments at the University of California, Berkeley. Since 2005, the CoE has studied how technology and policy, considered together, can improve urban accessibility. It has developed fl agship areas of knowledge pertaining to transit and multimodal traffi c, and built partnerships with cities to implement solutions resulting from its research. CFUT has worked with Nairobi (Kenya) and Chengdu (China) on solu-tions to improve fl ows at intersections and increase the capacity of city streets. It is now working with Barcelona (Spain), Amman (Jordan) and other cities to enhance urban accessibility through innovative strategies for delivering public transportation services.

Carlos DaganzoProfessor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and CFUT’s Director of the UC Berkeley Center. Research and Teaching Areas: Future transportation, Logistics and supply chains, Traffi c fl ow theory and control, Networks and Public Transportation.

CF

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Paratransit is the dominant mode of public

transport in most African cities. Many of these

cities plan to replace paratransit entirely with

formal systems modelled on South American

experience. However, complete replacement

of paratransit is unlikely to be achieved; the

most likely outcomes are hybrid systems.

Public transport transformation strategies that

recognise hybridity and are grounded in local

contexts and strategies that recognize hybridity

and are grounded in local contexts may offer the

most effi cient allocation of limited resources and

the most equitable spread of benefi ts.

Roger Behrens

ACET / CAPE TOWN / SOUTH AFRICA

PARATRANSIT FUTURES IN AFRICAN CITIES

93acet • cape town

US MONOPOLIES WERE common in sub-Saharan Af-

rican cities during the fi rst half of the 20th Cen-

tury. These monopolies operated large bus fl eets

on scheduled routes with harmonised fares, pas-

senger information and livery. In the second half of

the 20th Century, however, these operations came under increas-

ing pressure from rapid and unplanned urban growth, together

with a lack of capital and operational funding support from the

state. In many cases, bus companies were nationalised as part

of the decolonisation processes of the 1960s. In the immediate

postcolonial era, fares were regulated by governments and kept

uneconomically low. Initially, many state-owned bus companies

were able to operate without subsidy, but as operating defi cits

grew and subsidy budgets stagnated they experienced diffi culty

maintaining and replacing vehicle fl eets. The result was steady

decline in both the quantity and quality of services. Most public

bus companies eventually collapsed, with many of the bankrupt-

cies occurring in the 1990s, when structural adjustment pro-

grammes resulted in subsidy cuts.

Paratransit in Africa

In most african cities, the degeneration and collapse of formal

bus services allowed the establishment of large-scale paratransit

operations, typically in the form of minibuses with local nick-

names such as tro-tros in Accra, cars rapides in Dakar, dala

dalas in Dar es Salaam, danfos in Lagos, and matatus in Nai-

robi. These partially-regulated or unregulated operations, which

rarely follow a fi xed route or schedule, today command a domi-

nant share of public transport in many African cities. According

to research by the African Association of Public Transport in

2010, paratransit shares of public transport were 72 percent in


Nairobi, 84 percent in Dakar, 95 percent in Lagos, 98 percent in

Dar es Salaam, and 99 percent in Accra.

For the most part, this change from formal to informal trans-

port systems was not the result of any deliberate policy decision

to deregulate public transport, but rather represented a local

response to growing unmet passenger demand and unrestricted

market entry in a regulatory vacuum. The paratransit vehicles

typically accommodate between eight and 25 passengers, with

roadworthiness varying according to the ability of public au-

thorities to enforce standards. The informal sector providing

these services is characterised by fragmented ownership, with

most operators owning a small number of vehicles rented out

to drivers. Drivers keep the balance of the cash fares they col-

lect once the vehicle rental payment and vehicle operating costs

have been covered. However, paratransit ownership structures

are not necessarily informal; in cities such as Dakar, Dar es Sa-

laam, Cape Town and Kinshasa, large-scale formal or licensed

minibus networks coexist alongside informal or unlicensed

operations.

Problems and benefi ts

The problems commonly associated with paratransit opera-

tions can be linked to both ease of market entry, which in some

instances may be entirely self-regulated through route associa-

tions, and the capacity of public authorities to formulate and

enforce coherent competition and regulatory regimes. Unre-

stricted market entry can lead to overtrading on more lucra-

tive routes. In the absence of effective law enforcement, this

can lead to violent attempts to remove competitors, aggressive

driver behaviour and the abandonment of safe operations and

fair labour relations. When vehicle assets are not maintained

and there are no plans to replace them, the result can be ru-

inous competition. Poor business viability results, in turn, in

overloading on more lucrative routes, and the withdrawal of

services from less profi table ones or at less busy times of the

day. The experience for passengers can be uncomfortable and

even frightening.

Despite these problems, the paratransit sector often presents

benefi ts that are seldom associated with formal, fi xed systems.

Paratransit services are largely demand responsive, fl exible, pen-

etrate deep into the market and do not require operator subsidy.

Not only do they provide an important urban transport service,

they are also an important source of employment and poverty

alleviation for people superfl uous to the formal economy.


Contemporary challenges

Introducing realistic ownership and regulatory regimes to trans-

form fragmented public transport networks into systems that

are safe, comfortable and accessible for their residents is an im-

portant challenge facing African city governments. Over the past

decade, under the infl uence of international development agen-

cies (particularly the German Technical Corporation, the Insti-

tute for Transportation and Development Policy, and the World

Bank), a number of African city governments have embarked on

the initial phases – or at least have proposed the creation – of

bus rapid transit (BRT) networks as a means of transforming

public transport systems. These proposals have been modelled

on notable successes in South America, in particular the widely-

acclaimed TransMilenio system in Bogotá, which has been pre-

sented as an example of best practice. Cities that have started

operating BRT-type services include Cape Town, Johannesburg

and Lagos, while cities at advanced stages of planning include

Accra, Dar es Salaam and Port Elizabeth. It has been argued that

BRT systems are particularly suited to resource-constrained

African cities on the basis that they offer similar capacity to rail

systems but require far less capital. With notable exceptions in

West Africa (Accra and Dakar), these proposals envisage, explic-

itly or implicitly, the eventual complete replacement of informal

paratransit services, albeit gradually or in phases.

The established interests of paratransit operators, together

with the lack of fi nancial and regulatory capacity of government

agencies, however, present deeply-embedded constraints to poli-

cy choices, as well as path dependencies that cannot be ignored.

Resistance by existing operators with vested interests and an

understandable reluctance to surrender control of their busi-

nesses and livelihoods en masse to an uncertain future, as has

already been seen in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Port Eliza-

beth, poses a signifi cant obstacle to change.

It is even possible that action by disaffected groups of para-

transit operators could render BRT services inoperable. Further,

the use of supposedly best-practice BRT models that have not

been suffi ciently tailored to specifi c local institutional frame-

works and urban environments, and consequently have not se-

cured the substantial capital and operating expenses required

by these systems, may well prove unaffordable without a major

diversion of scarce public resources. These models may also offer

a poorer benefi t-to-cost ratio than originally expected.

While the South American experience generally, and the Bogo-

tá experience more specifi cally, undoubtedly provides inspiration

and important lessons for African cities, it does not necessar-

ily offer a model that can be transferred directly and uncriti-

cally into a different economic and social environment. It does

not necessarily follow that the processes and technologies that

have enabled successful outcomes in one context will achieve the

same level of success when transferred to another.

Policy recommendations

With the exception of some Brazilian cities, which have a fair-

ly unique political and institutional history, the total replace-

ment of paratransit with formalised BRT systems has not been

achieved in the exemplary South American BRT systems; far

from it. In Bogotá, for example, the city government reported

in 2011 that more than 80 per-

cent of the public-transport

passenger market continues to

be carried by paratransit. The

prospect of achieving the am-

bitious objective of total para-

transit replacement in African

cities in the short- to medium-

term seems, therefore, remote.

Indeed there are two possible

likely outcomes of BRT-based

transformation projects. Either

complex negotiations with ex-

isting operators, together with

budget constraints, will result in

comprehensive transformation

taking a long time or, alterna-

tively, it may not happen at all.

In either case, cities will depend,

for the foreseeable future, on hybrid public-transport systems

that combine both formal and paratransit operators.

What, then, should African city governments do? It is clear

that the formulation of appropriate strategies to achieve pub-

lic-transport reform must take the complex path dependencies

presented by incumbent operators and institutional limitations

into account. There are no directly transferable silver bullets,

and the de-contextualized adoption of regulatory regimes and

new technologies developed elsewhere must be avoided. Trans-

formation projects, particularly those involving the introduction

of new modes, require rigorous comparative assessments of the

estimated costs and benefi ts attached to the implementation of

alternatives, including incremental options.


Ultimately, it would be incumbent upon every megaproject team to convince government and local communities that the proposal was better than do-nothing or de minimis alternatives, as well as affordable, sustainable and deliverable.


These assessments must include initial capital costs and long-

term operating expenditures, any requirement for fare subsidy,

as well as broader socio-economic effects – particularly in rela-

tion to the displacement of established paratransit operators.

The assessment of potential benefi ts and costs of a particular

proposal must undergo critical scrutiny as early as possible in

the process of planning and decision making, and certainly well

before any commitment is made to purchase vehicles or build

infrastructure, given that the project may prove to be inappro-

priately conceived and possibly unaffordable.

Alternative strategies grounded in local contexts and con-

straints may simply revolve around supporting the systematic

upgrade of services offered by existing operators, while in others

they may involve the more elaborate installation of formal pub-

lic-transport networks in line with prevailing passenger demand

and available public resources. When based on upgrading exist-

ing operator services, support programmes should be introduced

to improve management capacity, promote fair labour practices

and facilitate fl eet renewal. Regulatory regimes should be formu-

lated to address both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the

service. Quantity regulation should be focussed on avoiding the

destructive competition that can arise from overtrading, while

quality regulation should be focussed on vehicle roadworthiness,

customer care and safe driving behaviour. When based on the

introduction of new formal modes, there should be negotiation

around the transfer of ownership structures and the incorpora-

tion of existing operators into new operating entities, while the

implementation of new systems should be carefully programmed

in fl exible stages rather than via a big bang. Also important here

will be the development of the institutional capacity required to

plan, manage and regulate any fundamentally-new system.

The policies adopted by African city governments towards hy-

bridity, as they try to improve public transport, will be an impor-

tant determinant of whether the resulting formal public-trans-

port and paratransit services complement, rather than compete

destructively, with one another. Internationally, systems associated

with BRT-type transformation processes can be divided into three

main categories. The fi rst are systems in cities in which paratran-

sit operators were encouraged to join together into companies to

operate new BRT services. This incorporation has proved diffi cult

to complete, but the operational and regulatory frameworks re-

main unchanged (e.g. Bogotá). The second are systems in cities

that have adapted BRT initiatives in order to accommodate a con-

tinued but unplanned presence of paratransit services (e.g. Delhi,

Lagos and Port Elizabeth). The third are systems in cities that,

from the outset, have sought a complementary multi-modal sys-

tem (e.g. Accra and Dakar). Transformation strategies that recog-

nise the likely hybrid nature of public-transport-system outcomes,

such as these two latter categories, have greater prospects of ex-

tending improvements beyond demonstration corridors, and can

therefore be expected not only to have the most benefi cial results

for the greatest number of city inhabitants but also present the

most effi cient and equitable allocation of limited public resources.


The African Centre for Studies in Public and Non-motorised Transport ACET comprises researchers from three main universities, in Cape Town, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The key research objective of the ACET research programme is to analyse public and non-motorised transport problems facing African cities, and to recommend strategies on how they might be addressed, particularly in the context of poorly-developed institutional frameworks and limited resources. The research is focussed on paratransit regulation in the context of contemporary public-transport transformation initiatives, and on accommodating long-distance pedestrian movements along and across busy arterial streets.

Roger Behrens ACET Director, based at the University of Cape Town’s Centre for Transport Studies. His research interests include travel behaviour change, paratransit regulation, and pedestrians.

AC

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This paper shows how Bus Rapid Transit has

evolved from simple bus priority measures

to an integrated approach for better service

provision. We show how cost effective solutions

have been continuously evolved to improve the

level of service, including some emblematic

breakthroughs in BRT evolution in cities like

Curitiba, Bogotá, Istanbul and Guangzhou. We

also present new research and development

activities that will continue to shape BRT

evolution in the coming years.

Dario Hidalgo

Juan Carlos Muñoz

ALC-BRT / SANTIAGO / CHILE

BUS RAPID TRANSIT IN PERMANENT EVOLUTION

103alc-brt • santiago

US RAPID TRANSIT can be defi ned as a fl exible, rub-

ber-tyred form of public transport that combines

stations, vehicles, services, running ways and in-

formation technologies, into an integrated system

with strong identity, to offer fast, comfortable and

low-cost urban mobility. Currently, there are about 120 cities

with BRT systems or corridors around the world, comprising

about 280 corridors serving about 28 million passengers per day.

As of January 2011, more than 80 new cities were building or

planning systems and 16 cities were expanding their corridors.

Making buses run like a surface metro – Curitiba 1982

Curitiba can be considered the cradle of the modern BRT con-

cept. Its Integrated Transit Network (RIT) was conceived around

structural axes that provide the backbone for linear urban de-

velopment. The concept was fi rst elaborated in the 1970s. Since

then, Curitiba has constantly improved its bus-based transit sys-

tem through innovative performance and capacity developments.

The RIT is made up of a series of key components. These in-

clude: segregated bus ways; tube-shaped stations with fare pre-

payment and at-level access; both physical and fare integration

among diverse services (mid points and terminal stations); dis-

patch control at terminal stations; differentiated services, and;

centralised fare collection, using off-board ticketing at main sta-

tions and terminals, and on-board ticketing for feeder and inter-

terminal services.

The RIT infrastructure comprises 72 kilometres of busway

corridors, 347 tube-shaped stations and 29 urban terminals with

integration for feeding services. The system includes several ve-

hicle types: bi-articulated (270 passengers), articulated (160),

conventional (90), microbuses, and special buses (i.e. for hospi-

tals, students and tourism). As a result of this systematic use of


infrastructure, vehicles and operations, the structural corridors

of the RIT can be considered a surface metro. The corridors

handle up to 23,000 passengers per hour in each direction, with

an average speed of 25km/hr, and have been the backbone of

the city’s urban development plan for several decades. Over the

years, Curitiba has been demonstrating its potential to produce

creative and relatively low-cost solutions for urban mobility to

the world.

Expanding capacity with advanced operations – Bogotà 2000

In 2000, the city of Bogotá built very-high-capacity corridors in

the TransMilenio BRT System. Inspired by Curitiba, this system

integrates trunk corridors and feeder services. Trunk corridors

use exclusive bus lanes, stations with pre-payment and at-level

boarding, advanced fare-collection systems, centralised con-

trol, real-time user information, and boasts a distinctive image.

Trunk-line operations work to very high performance stand-

ards; they are capable of handling 45,000 passengers per hour in

each direction during the peak – the highest throughput of any

bus system in the world – and operate at a speed of 27km/hr.

The high throughput is the result of creating large stations with

several platforms and dual lanes, allowing for bus overtaking,

at-level boarding, pre-payment and combined local and express

routes.

Introducing high speed buses on expressways – Istanbul 2008

The Istanbul Metrobüs connects Europe and Asia in the only in-

tercontinental BRT system. This system has central busways on

an expressway (fully segregated BRT), and very long and widely-

separated station platforms (90m long and 1.1km apart on aver-

age). Metrobüs operates with low-fl oor buses (articulated and

bi-articulated), and achieves a very high average speed (42km/

hr) and can handle 30,000 passengers per hour in each direction

at peak times, with dispatches every 15 seconds. In March 2011,

Metrobüs carried 700,000 passengers per day in a 45km corridor.

The system is being expanded, with a ten-kilometre extension

to the west.

Reducing transfers with direct services – Guangzhou 2010

As opposed to the feeder-trunk services popular in Latin Ameri-

can BRT schemes, Guangzhou operates with direct services, that

is, with buses entering the trunk corridor from adjacent neigh-


bourhoods and continuing on the trunk section. The Guangzhou

Corridor spans 22.5km and features long stations, ranging from

55 to 260m. It includes overtaking lanes and combines multiple

direct services on the same infrastructure. This layout allows up

to 27,000 passengers per hour in each direction, with 350 buses

per hour. The Guangzhou BRT carries 800,000 passengers per

day, which is the highest BRT productivity in the world: 35,500

passengers/km. The very high usage of the corridor is due in part

to the density and mix of activities along its alignment, which

result in very high passenger rotation and low peak factors. The

corridor operates at quasi-peak conditions for 14 hours a day.

Improving dispatch and centralised control

Centralised dispatch and control is becoming a standard feature

of BRT systems, especially those with high-frequency services.

These features are standard in rail networks. Their adoption in

bus-based operations increases safety, reliability and user satis-

faction. They also provide very signifi cant improvements in re-

covery time after incidents. Average frequencies are directly re-

lated to the level of service provided to passengers, since higher

frequencies obviously reduce waiting time and increase capacity.

However, two systems offering the same average frequency can

be perceived quite differently by passengers, and may have con-

trasting cost structures.

Costs (for passengers and operators) can be reduced if buses

run on strictly regular headways. However, this regularity is ex-

tremely diffi cult to achieve, and uncontrolled buses invariably

bunch. On medium- to low-frequency routes (fewer than fi ve

buses per hour), services are usually controlled through a sched-

ule. However, BRT usually operates on a much higher frequency,

with no necessity for schedules. In this case, bunching is a seri-

ous issue that signifi cantly affects performance. Average waiting

times can be twice their planned length, and passengers may

experience far longer waits.

Lack of reliability not only affects waiting time but also causes

an uneven distribution of passengers on buses, with some being

completely full and others rather empty. This is a serious prob-

lem during peak periods, when the maximum capacity of the

buses is needed, since conditions inside the bus can become re-

ally uncomfortable and passengers may need to wait for the next

bus, extending their delay even further. On the operational side,

average cycle times increase, which affects capacity and running

time variability, making driver and bus operations at terminals

more diffi cult and costly.

So far, few BRT systems worldwide are equipped with a headway

control system rather than regulating dispatches at the termi-

nals. Moreover, most systems with headway control rely on human

visualization of vehicle positions (reported by GPS) over a monitor.

Such tools do not provide an adequate control mechanism, since

human reactions are imprecise, making bunching unavoidable.

Introducing fl exibility in BRT operation

The most common application of BRT considers a single type of

service visiting every station. Nevertheless, buses are fl exible and

operations can benefi t from that fl exibility. For example, fl exi-

bility may include dispatching empty buses to reach and serve

busy terminals (deadheading), making short loops, or introduc-

ing limited-stop and direct services.

Deadheading can be introduced when demand is signifi cantly

unbalanced between directions. In such cases, a deadheaded ser-

vice that runs nonstop in the less-loaded direction may improve

the capacity of the most-loaded direction without increasing the

number of buses. Short loops can increase supply in a section

of the corridor, without the need for signifi cant numbers of ex-

tra vehicles. This strategy allows the operator to tailor capacity

far more accurately, to meet demand. If buses can also overtake

each other on the corridor, then some limited-stop and even di-

rect services should be offered.

Limited-stop services serve only a predefi ned subset of stops

and allow the operator to increase the average speed on the

corridor while raising the capacity of the system at a low cost.

Another advantage is that the operational cost per kilometre is

usually reduced, since buses accelerate and decelerate less fre-

quently and doors are opened less often. These benefi ts come at

the expense of longer waiting times for passengers travelling on

low-demand origin-destination (O-D) pairs. These services are

attractive for very heavily-loaded corridors, long trips and where

demand is concentrated on a few O-D pairs.

These opportunities for fl exibility are even more signifi cant for

networks of BRT corridors and their feeder services. The design

should balance the effi ciency of these services with the passen-

gers’ general aversion to bus transfers. This raises the issues of

providing routes that serve more than one corridor and having

feeder services entering corridors. Allowing feeders to enter cor-

ridors is complicated, because it requires bus-station compat-

ibility to be fl exible, and can also require special traffi c-control

procedures outside the corridor to mitigate the irregularity of

arrivals of the feeder services at the corridor.



Providing a broad range of services has proved very effective.

There are systems that already use some of these strategies. For

example, Quito introduced short loops in its BRT, Bogotá com-

bines local and express services in the same infrastructure as

well as routes from several corridors, Guangzhou operates with

direct services reducing transfers, and Curitiba recently upgrad-

ed its original BRT corridors to allow for bus overtaking, thereby

increasing capacity and reducing passenger travel times.

Dynamic bus priority

Achieving a high average speed is crucial for BRT success, not

just because passengers prefer a fast trip, but because speed

affects capacity. Therefore, operators should make every effort

to keep commercial speeds as high as possible. This means seg-

regating bus fl ows from the rest of the traffi c (including taxis),

reducing dwell times in which passengers board and alight, and

eliminating instances where the bus must stop.

The ideal solution depends on bus frequency in the corridor.

In corridors with very-high-frequency segregated lanes, special

infrastructure such as underpasses or fl yovers for buses should

be considered to avoid intersections. In corridors with medium

frequency, communication devices can enable traffi c signals to

give priority to approaching buses. Coordination between buses

and traffi c signals can be further improved if headway regularity

is also considered in the setting of green lights.

Running way guidance

Some BRT applications have introduced guidance systems to

increase speeds in narrow corridors, improve safety, prevent

unauthorized vehicle use and improve docking by reducing the

horizontal gap at stations.

There are three types of guidance systems: mechanical, op-

tical, and magnetic. Guidance provides better performance, by

improving travel time, reliability, image, safety, capacity and ac-

cessibility. Guidance systems make BRT feasible in very narrow

right of ways and improve access for people with disabilities.

Nevertheless, they introduce complexity and involve higher cap-

ital and operational costs.

New vehicle propulsion technologies

Current commercially-used technologies include convention-

al diesel, compressed natural gas (CNG), liquefi ed natural gas

109alc-brt • chile

(LNG), electricity (trolleybuses), and hybrid-electric drives. Pro-

totype technologies include hydraulic hybrids, battery-electric,

and hydrogen-powered buses. The impetus for developing these

new propulsion technologies is the desire to improve energy ef-

fi ciency and reduce emissions (of both local air pollutants and

greenhouse gases).

Diesel is still the most widely-employed form of propulsion in

public transport, thanks to its low cost and effi ciency, but there

are major concerns about its large emissions, especially when

high-sulphur diesel oil and en-

gines that are not equipped

with particle fi lters are used. As

a result, there has been exten-

sive research and development

by vehicle manufacturers to

comply with increasingly-strict

emissions standards. Solutions

have included reducing the fu-

el’s sulphur content, engine im-

provements, fi lters and catalytic

converters. Diesel engines us-

ing cleaner fuel are expected to

evolve. Nevertheless, the cost of

fuel is expected to rise, and con-

cern is growing about very fi ne particulates and black carbon.

As a result, a transition to other fuels and engines is expected

for BRT vehicles.

CNG engines have been increasingly used in public transport

operations; they are regarded as clean, due to their lack of par-

ticulate emissions, but still result in other harmful emissions.

The introduction of more-effi cient engines and after-treatment

devices allow CNG to meet strict environmental standards, but

concerns remain regarding the length of time it takes to refuel

and vehicle autonomy. CNG is usually more expensive than die-

sel with respect to both capital and maintenance costs.

Electric buses, or trolleybuses, operate with electric engines

connected to the power grid through overhead wires. They have

zero tailpipe emissions but, obviously, emissions at the power

source need to be considered. Their implementation is restrict-

ed as a result of the higher operating and infrastructure costs

as well as the negative aesthetic impacts of overhead wire sys-

tems. The concern about overhead wires is being addressed with

underground lines and ultrafast battery charging at bus stops.

Hybrid electric technology uses an internal-combustion en-

gine to drive an electric motor, reducing energy consumption

BRT will provide increased support to mixed-use and high-density urban development, which in turn will increase BRT ridership and impact.


and emissions. Most hybrids in commercial operation have a

parallel confi guration; two engines are attached to the trans-

mission, and the electronic control chooses which one to use

(electric for low speeds, combinations at medium speed, and the

internal-combustion engine at high speed). There are multiple

applications of this technology in bus systems, and the market is

expected to continue growing as capital and maintenance costs

are reduced.

There are several other technologies under research and

development. A promising one in the short term is the series

hybrid. This involves an internal-combustion engine that drives

an electric generator, which charges a battery. The electric

motor that provides traction is always fed through the battery,

which is also recharged when brakes are applied. Other propul-

sion technologies that could be introduced in the medium and

long term in commercial operations include hydraulic hybrids,

battery electric and hydrogen power. There are several proto-

types for these technologies, including an operation with 300

electric buses in Shenzhen, China, but their capital costs are still

an issue. In the case of hydrogen, the main barrier is the highly-

energy-intensive production process.

The BRTs of the future

BRT has come a long way since bus priority measures were fi rst

introduced in Chicago in 1939. Bus systems are no longer seen

as isolated buses on busways, but rather as integrated systems

with several components combined to provide better quality of

service and adapted to local demand. Breakthroughs in places

like Curitiba, Bogotá, Istanbul and Guangzhou have helped both

the concept and its application to evolve.

The fare collection cards used in BRT systems will have mul-

tiple uses, and in many cases will be integrated into cellular

phones, directly discounting fares from electronic accounts. Fare

systems will be able to differentiate time of the day, day of the

week and distance, and will charge usage according to supply

and demand conditions. In addition, user information will be dy-

namic, with electronic variable message signs, video screens and/

or messages to cell phones (SMS) indicating best routes, next

services, as well public announcements in electronic boards.

BRT will provide increased support to mixed-use and high-

density urban development, which in turn will increase BRT

ridership and impact. Contracts with service providers will be

entirely based on performance, with adjustment of payment

refl ecting changes in service delivery, input costs, and public


subsidies. Finally, infrastructure, technology, training, education

and control will help to signifi cantly reduce accidents and fatali-

ties, and will foster physical activity, low or zero emissions and

universal accessibility for people with limited mobility.

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E ALC-BRTALC-BRT is a VREF Centre of Excellence implemented in Chile in May 2010, which works as a consortium comprised of Pontifi cia Universidad Católica de Chile, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Technical University of Lisbon, The University of Sydney and the EMBARQ network. Its main goal is to develop a new framework for planning, design, fi nancing, implementation and operation of BRT in different urban areas, giving clear guide-lines to decision makers on when and how BRT projects can effectively enhance mobility and meet accessibility needs. These guidelines will be a major milestone to change the way decision makers address investment and design plans for confi guring urban mobility systems.

Dario Hidalgo, Director Research and Practice Practice, EMBARQ, The World Resources Institute Center for Sus-tainable Transport. Dr. Hidalgo manages the EMBARQ Network’s inter-national team of transport engineers and environmental scientists. He has more than 20 years of experience as a transport expert, consultant, and government offi cial. He was Deputy General Manager of TRANSMILENIO S.A., Bogotá’s renowned Bus Rapid Transit system. As a

consultant for international agencies and local governments, Dario has taken part in projects and taught training courses on sustainable urban transport in multiple countries across Latin America, Asia and Africa. He has also been a graduate-level lecturer in urban planning and is the author of more than 55 publications and conference presentations, including an extensive review of bus systems in developing countries.

Juan Carlos Muñoz, Associate Professor of the Depart-ment of Transport Engineering and Logistics at the Pontifi -cia Unversidad Católica de Chile. Dr. Muñoz is the Director of the Across Latitudes and Cultures Bus Rapid Transit Centre of Excellence. His research interests include Transit Operations and Design as well as Logistics and Traffi c Flow Theory. He has several publications in some of the most prestigious journals of transportation studies and is a Member of the Editorial

Advisory Board of Transportation Research. He acted as adviser to the Chilean Minister of Transport on transit issues (2003–2004) was a member of the Board of Metro Valparaiso, and adviser to Metro de Santiago’s Board President from 2007 to 2010. He was a member of the 12 transit experts group nominated by the Chilean Transport Minister in 2008 to provide guidelines to improve San-tiago’s transit system (Transantiago).

The development and implementation of BRT

requires that political, institutional, fi nancial and

cultural challenges are addressed. This chapter

identifi es the principal challenges, including:

the role of high-level political support and its

connections to the decision-making process and

project planning; fi nancial sustainability and the

role of user fares; the linking and integration of

new BRT systems with existing networks, and;

marketing, branding and information provision

requirements of BRT systems. It provides

examples and case studies to demonstrate the

complexity of BRT implementation. It concludes

by providing recommendations on approaches to

minimising known implementation challenges.

David Hensher

Corinne Mulley

Dario Hidalgo

Aileen Carrigan

Juan Carlos Muñoz

ALC-BRT / SANTIAGO / CHILE

THE COMPLEXITY OF BRT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION


HILE BUS RAPID transit (BRT) has emerged as

an attractive, sustainable, urban transport

solution in many cities throughout the world,

many systems have experienced challenges

and shortcomings. This chapter discusses the

complexities facing decision makers in developing and implement-

ing BRT as part of an integrated city-wide transportation system.

One of the attractions of dedicated BRT systems stems from

its comparison with other urban transport solutions such as

light rail. BRT benefi ts from a combination of low cost struc-

ture and good service characteristics, which allow the delivery

of higher capacities than rail-based alternatives at a much lower

cost. For many cities, this has meant that the infrastructure cost

has been less of a burden on the taxpayer, since more infrastruc-

ture can be provided for a given level of funding.

Reviews of existing development and implementation of BRT

systems around the world reveal common challenges and lessons

from bus-system improvements and BRT. These include issues

relating to planning, implementation, and operations of BRT

systems, and their interconnections with fi nancial, institutional

and regulatory constraints. In many systems, initial problems

were resolved in the early period of operation, but others en-

countered more profound issues leading to adaptation and im-

provement over time. We illuminate here the lessons from BRT

projects in Latin America, Asia, Africa and Australia.

The role of political support

Political support can be vital in the development of the BRT con-

cept. Rail and light-rail solutions may be favoured on emotional

or ideological grounds, leading to a failure to recognise the po-

tential contribution of a BRT system. This is particularly true of

developed countries, although the example of Brisbane, Austra-


lia, demonstrates how successful implementation can lead to en-

hanced political support and to extensions of the BRT network.

Political commitment plays a key role in the overall speed of BRT

project planning and implementation. When there is no clear

high-level commitment (e.g. León), project implementation can

take several years. In contrast, where the mayor or other politi-

cal leaders have a clear vision for a project (i.e. Curitiba, Bogotá,

Guayaquil, Jakarta), a scheme can be implemented quickly.

Whilst strong political champions are often seen as assets

to development and implementation, they involve risks as well.

Political leaders can try to rush through project planning and

implementation to ensure completion before an election cycle,

leading to incomplete or low-quality systems. Moreover, the

long-term support or expansion of a BRT system may be jeop-

ardized if a project is too strongly associated with a particular

administration or political party, especially when political lead-

ership changes. This was the case in Guadalajara, where expan-

sion of the BRT system was halted when a mayor from the for-

mer opposition party was elected.

The decision-making process

The decision to initiate a BRT project can be top-down or bottom-

up. Top-down decision making originates in the upper echelons

of the political hierarchy, such as elected offi cials and cabinet-

level authorities, while bottom-up initiatives typically come from

staff proposals in planning or implementation agencies or from

compre hensive long-term planning processes. Examples of top-

down approaches are Curitiba, Bogotá, Quito, Guayaquil, São

Paulo, Jakarta, Beijing, Brisbane, Ahmadabad and Guadalajara.

Bottom-up examples include Sydney, León, Mexico City, Pereira

and Santiago. Top-down processes generally take less time to plan

and implement and are characterised by fewer confl icts between

agencies, although interagency confl icts can emerge later dur-

ing the construction and/or operational phases. For instance, in

Bogotá, the leadership of the Mayor made interagency coopera-

tion straightforward in TransMilenio’s Phase I, but lack of similar

leadership in successive administrations made interagency coop-

eration diffi cult in Phases II and III. This resulted in delayed im-

plementation and increased costs for the later phases.

Project planning

Project teams can easily get stalled in protracted discussions re-

garding technical design issues, such as the location of bus lanes


(curb or median) and the height of the buses (low or high fl oor),

while neglecting other important issues. A comprehensive plan-

ning process should combine fi nancial, legal, institutional and

environmental concerns with engineering and technical design

issues. Many BRT projects establish planning and implementa-

tion teams outside the existing public institutional frameworks,

with some of these BRT task forces evolving into new transit

institutions. Special-purpose agencies have been created to plan,

oversee and control system development and provide coordina-

tion capacity. These separate agencies are often more successful,

because they do not face competing interests.

Financial sustainability and the role of user fares

The revenues collected through fares are rarely suffi cient to

make urban transit systems fi nancially sustainable. A BRT sys-

tem is no exception. However, political buy-in is often based on

how many people travel. In turn, this encourages decision mak-

ers to set transit fares as low as possible, to encourage patronage

of the system. But fares that are too low can put a BRT project’s

fi nancial stability in jeopardy. In the development phase, the

projected revenue from low fares can discourage project plan-

ners from incorporating features of a high-quality BRT system,

such as high-capacity and low-emission buses, advanced fare

collection and control systems, user information systems and

new bus operators organized as formal companies. Yet, these

very features are essential to providing a high-quality service

that will convince people to transfer from car to public transit

and bring sustainability to the city. Fares that are too low can

even jeopardise continuing operation and political buy-in if total

revenues are insuffi cient to cover the operating costs not cov-

ered by subsidies.

Cities that have implemented BRT systems have taken a num-

ber of different approaches to setting fares. The fares for BRT

projects with competitive bidding for bus operating concessions

(e.g., Bogotá’s TransMilenio, Pereira’s Megabus and Transantiago)

have often been determined through the bidding process itself.

Initial user fares were calculated based on prospective operators’

bids, and the contracts then issued for operating have included

adjustment formulae for future increases in labour and fuel costs

over time. In other systems, political authorities defi ned fares

that did not refl ect the actual costs of the system or the required

levels of subsidy. This approach can have adverse effects. For in-

stance, Quito’s system was unable to generate enough surpluses

to pay the operators of the Ecovía buses, while the BRT systems


of Mexico City, Jakarta and Beijing were fi nancially stressed until

fare increases were approved. Setting fares based on knowledge

of costs and an understanding of subsidy requirements is neces-

sary to ensure fi nancial sustainability for operators and fund-

ing authorities as well as continued political buy-in. Detailed

research has been undertaken on how fares should be set and

revenue distributed between operators and government so as to

allocate risk effi ciently.

Managing incumbent bus operators

There is much evidence to support the approach of managing

bus operations through public-private partnerships, where the

private operators provide the equipment and services and the

public sector builds and maintains the infrastructure. As BRT

systems are generally introduced into an existing network of

services, integrating the operation of old and new services is a

challenge. It is therefore common for cities to incorporate exist-

ing operators into the new BRT system, so as to minimize politi-

cal and contractual risks.

Particularly in developing countries, public authorities often

want to transform an unregulated transport system of small

owners and businesses into formal companies. Cities in Latin

America, Asia and Africa have encouraged small transport busi-

nesses and operators to organize themselves into formal com-

panies through restricted bidding for operation contracts, or

through direct negotiations.

In contrast, the open bidding of operation contracts can lead

to protests by incumbent operators, but allow the public to take

advantage of the competitive process. In Bogotá and Santiago,

politically-powerful transport authorities were able to open up

project operations to open bidding. Existing bus operators pro-

tested, but the public benefi ted from the outcome of the competi-

tive process. Negotiating contracts directly with existing opera-

tors can result in smoother implementation and avoid protests,

but often, although not always, leads to higher costs and weak

contractual agreements, as was the case in Mexico City and Quito.

Integration

Integration can be defi ned at three levels: physical, operation-

al and fares. Physical integration refers to infrastructure that

allows passengers to transfer between bus routes and other

modes of transport. Operational integration involves coordi-

nation of schedules, and fare integration allows users to pay a



single fare or reduced fare across several city transit services.

Integrating service provision has been shown to be particularly

important to users.

BRT systems in Latin America and Asia feature a diversity of

scope and level of integration. There are: single-corridor projects

without fare integration with feeder services and other trans-

port modes (e.g., Mexico City, Beijing); projects with sequential

implementation of non-integrated corridors (Quito, Jakarta);

schemes that gradually implement physically-integrated corri-

dors (Bogotá, Guayaquil); and others that deploy extended route

re-organizations (São Paulo, Santiago, León). Evidence points to

sequential implementation with physical and fare integration of

bus and other public transport services being preferable to devel-

oping isolated corridors. Large-scale route re-organization (e.g.,

as in Santiago and São Paulo) including the introduction of a BRT

system seems to be the best conceptual approach, as this enables

optimum re-use of much of the existing infrastructure and plan-

ning frameworks. However, this can provoke signifi cant opposi-

tion from incumbent operators and carries the risk of institu-

tional or fi nancial overreaching, as was the case in Santiago.

BRT marketing, branding and communications

User education is often neglected in cities introducing new BRT

projects, causing many problems during the fi rst weeks of opera-

tion, as in Mexico City and León. Poor communication during the

disruption caused by construction can erode public support for

a project, and insuffi cient user information and education prior

to system launch can lead to chaotic conditions or even protests.

BRT decision makers must allocate suffi cient resources to

implement a strong and consistent marketing, branding and

communications strategy. The strategy must begin early in the

project planning process and include disseminating the BRT

brand and identity, together with internal communications, user

education plans, information and feedback systems, marketing

campaigns, a public-relations and external-communications

strategy, and online engagement.

Cultivating a strong brand helps a BRT systems attract new

users from private transport, as well as to retain existing public

transport users and secure political and fi nancial support from

governments. Where BRT is introduced into an existing tran-

sit network, a choice of connection or differentiation from the

existing network must be made. Branding is important for posi-

tioning the new system as a uniquely local network that refl ects

local values and associations. For instance, in Ahmadabad, India


the new BRT was called Janmarg, meaning “people’s way” in Gu-

jarati, to foster a sense of local pride and ownership.

Santiago and Transantiago – Large scale systems integration

In February 2007, Santiago fi nalised the Transantiago scheme

aimed at dramatically improving its transit system. In one day

the system changed its bus services to a trunk and feeder struc-

ture, with fare integration between all bus services and the met-

ro. The key innovation was to undertake bus sector reform as a

single process and to transform service delivery.

The process was traumatic for the city, as several elements of

the plan did not work as planned.

Very few corridors were in place

and the stations did not provide

a pre-paid area to speed up pas-

senger boarding. Since a trunk

and feeder system for ces many

passengers to transfer, dwell

times grew signifi cantly, dam-

aging operational speeds and,

thereby, the system’s capacity.

Taking advantage of the inte-

gration features, many passen-

gers decided to use the metro

due to its speed and reliability,

which resulted in overcrowding.

Some of these problems

were addressed within the fi rst year of implementation of the

Transantiago system. Around 200 stops were equipped with a

provisional pre-paid fare facility and several fully-segregated

bus corridors were built. The metro implemented operational

strategies, such as express services, and added extra trains to

improve capacity. Additional buses were also incorporated. The

operational contracts were re-negotiated to improve the ability

of the government to control services, and subsidies – not ini-

tially considered in the system planning – were also introduced.

Despite initial diffi culties, Transantiago has improved its per-

formance and the current system is better than the one it re-

placed; travel times have been reduced and there have been large

reductions in emissions as well as road fatalities and injuries.

The Transantiago experience provides lessons regarding the

challenges of running an integrated system as it increases the

number of transfers because people can make the journey on one

ticket. These changes impact the fastest services in the city the

Despite initial diffi culties, Transantiago has improved its performance and the current system is better than the one it replaced.


most (metro or BRT), particularly trunk lines that can result

in excessive crowding and discomfort. City-wide implementation

or “big bang” can be too radical to control with existing insti-

tutional and technical resources. Educating users in Santiago

required much more resources than anticipated. Although mod-

elled in advance, in practice there were more operational diffi -

culties than anticipated.

Peer-to-peer collaboration

Cities exist in specifi c geographical settings, and it is clear that

what works well in one place may not work well in another.

Never theless, understanding why certain actions or policies

work in one city can help others, thus allowing experience to be

transferred between cities. Recognition of the transfer benefi ts

from understanding how transit systems work is the basis of the

growing number of transit-benchmarking groups that provide

a forum for mutual help in improving service delivery and ef-

fi ciency. Benchmarking involves comparing the operational per-

formance of similar organizations or “peers” and using the infor-

mation to understand and therefore reduce performance gaps.

Modelled on the experience of metro-system and bus bench-

marking groups, the SIBRT group of 15 transit agencies from

Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Peru was formed in 2010

(www.sibrtonline.org). The SIBRT mission is to generate syner-

gies for promoting, consolidating and strengthening BRT and

integrated bus systems, to ensure that they become a paradigm

for urban mobility and a platform for learning from experience.

Recommendations

There are seven key lessons learned that lead to the following

recommendations for city transport planners and political au-

thorities:

First, high-level decision makers’ approval early in the pro-

cess speeds implementation and minimises inter-agency confl ict.

This support is needed to maintain and nurture high-level ap-

proval and buy-in during implementation and operation of the

system.

Second, BRT systems should be developed and implemented

within comprehensive planning processes that take local fi nan-

cial, legal, institutional, and environmental concerns as well as

engineering/technical requirements into account. One idea that

has worked for several cities is to have a special agency for BRT-

system planning and implementation to avoid competing interests.


Third, collaboration of peer agencies and cities improves ser-

vice delivery. Understanding experiences of other cities and par-

ticipating in a benchmarking group can improve quality of ser-

vice and operational effi ciency.

Fourth, involve existing operators in the new BRT systems’

operation, to mitigate confl icts. Prefer bidding processes rather

than direct negotiation to reduce user costs through increased

market competition.

Fifth, recognise that user fares play an important role in both

patronage use of, and in political buy-in to, new BRT systems.

Set fares based on knowledge of the costs of the desired system

and identifi ed commitment to subsidy, in order to promote fi -

nancial sustainability. Recognize that subsidies may be required

to provide a higher level of service that attracts new users from

private transport, both in the short and longer term.

Sixth, recognise that real resources must be dedicated to plan

and implement user education programmes and strong market-

ing and branding programmes on a continuous basis.

Seventh, integrated systems are important for passengers, but

moving to an integrated network involves large challenges. Plan

for stepped implementation of changes, allowing time for learn-

ing and adaptation as the system evolves.


ALC-BRTALC-BRT is a VREF Centre of Excellence implemented in Chile in May 2010, which works as a consortium comprised of Pontifi cia Universidad Católica de Chile, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Technical University of Lisbon, The University of Sydney and the EMBARQ network. Its main goal is to develop a new framework for planning, design, fi nancing, implementation and operation of BRT in different urban areas, giving clear guide-lines to decision makers on when and how BRT projects can effectively enhance mobility and meet accessibility needs. These guidelines will be a major milestone to change the way decision makers address investment and design plans for confi guring urban mobility systems.

AUTHORSDavid Hensher, Professor of Management and Founding Director of the Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies (ITLS), The National Centre of Excellence at The Univer-sity of Sydney. Professor Hensher has more than 40 years experience in transport economics and applied econometrics. He established ITLS in 1990, now one of the leading re-searching and teaching groups in transport and logistics. David is a world-renowned academic and adviser to gov-

ernment and industry, and is the recipient of the 2009 IATBR Lifetime Achieve-ment Award in recognition for his long-standing and exceptional contribution to IATBR as well as to the wider travel-behaviour community.

Corinne Mulley, Chair in Public Transport at the Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies (ITLS), the Australian Key Centre of Teaching and Research in Transport Man-agement in the University of Sydney Business School. Corinne is a transport economist and has researched and published at the interface of transport policy and eco-nomics, in particular on issues relating to public transport. Her research is motivated by a need to provide evidence for policy initiatives. Corinne has directed numerous

research projects including a high-profi le European and UK consortia undertak-ing benchmarking in urban public transport, and has provided both practical and strategic advice to local and national governments on benchmarking, rural transport issues, and public-transport management.

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Dario Hidalgo, Director Research and Practice Practice, EMBARQ, The World Resources Institute Center for Sus-tainable Transport. Dr. Hidalgo manages the EMBARQ Network’s inter-national team of transport engineers and environmental scientists. He has more than 20 years of experience as a transport expert, consultant, and government offi cial. He was Deputy General Manager of TRANSMILENIO S.A., Bogotá’s renowned Bus Rapid Transit system. As a

consultant for international agencies and local governments, Dario has taken part in projects and taught training courses on sustainable urban transport in multiple countries across Latin America, Asia and Africa. He has also been a graduate-level lecturer in urban planning and is the author of more than 55 publications and conference presentations, including an extensive review of bus systems in developing countries.

Aileen Carrigan, Transport and Urban Planning Associ-ate, EMBARQ, The World Resources Institute Center for Sustainable Transport. Aileen Carrigan is a Transport and Urban Planning As-sociate in EMBARQ’s Research & Practice group. She holds a master’s degree in urban planning from Harvard University and a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineer-ing from Stanford University. Most recently, she worked as a transportation planner for the City of Johannesburg, helping

to design and implement the city’s new bus rapid transit system. Aileen’s focus is on issues of station design; accessibility for people with disabilities; wayfi nding signage; bus shelter design; improving connections to the BRT for pedestrians and bicycles; and station-area land use planning.

Juan Carlos Muñoz, Associate Professor of the Depart-ment of Transport Engineering and Logistics at the Pontifi -cia Unversidad Católica de Chile. Dr. Muñoz is the Director of the Across Latitudes and Cultures Bus Rapid Transit Centre of Excellence. His research interests include Transit Operations and Design as well as Logistics and Traffi c Flow Theory. He has several publications in some of the most prestigious journals of transportation studies and is a Member of the Editorial

Advisory Board of Transportation Research. He acted as adviser to the Chilean Minister of Transport on transit issues (2003–2004) was a member of the Board of Metro Valparaiso, and adviser to Metro de Santiago’s Board President from 2007 to 2010. He was a member of the 12 transit experts group nominated by the Chilean Transport Minister in 2008 to provide guidelines to improve San-tiago’s transit system (Transantiago).

Pedestrians are present on all roads in Indian

cities, regardless of road type and designated

functions. Not surprisingly, given their number

and constant presence, pedestrians are the

largest group of victims in total traffi c fatalities.

Often, very little attention is given to the

convenience and safety of pedestrians and

non-motorised vehicles when planning urban

roads. We have studied signalized intersections,

bus stops and grade separators in Delhi to

understand pedestrian crossing behaviour. The

objective of these studies was to understand

how intersection environment, bus-stop location

and grade-separator design can be improved

to facilitate the safe movement of pedestrians.

Contrary to the general belief that pedestrians

take unnecessary risks and indulge in jaywalking,

our study shows that the majority of pedestrians

prefer crossing at least half of the road under

safe conditions. This is an important message

for road designers. The Centre of Excellence

has initiated the process of revising urban

road standards with the Ministry of Urban

Development, in the light of in-depth research on

pedestrian risks in urban areas in Delhi.

Geetam Tiwari

COE / NEW DELHI / INDIA

REDUCING PEDESTRIAN RISK AT JUNCTIONS

127coe • new delhi

EDESTRIANS ARE A neglected group of road users in

India. While they are present on all types of roads

in Indian cities, existing road designs do not pro-

vide adequate facilities for pedestrians, bicycles, or

any other slow-moving traffi c. In order to improve

the situation, pedestrian behaviour is being researched by an in-

terdisciplinary team including researchers from the mathemat-

ics and civil engineering departments at the Indian Institute of

Technology, Delhi.

The problems for pedestrians go deep, and are a result of

long-entrenched policies related to highway management and

road design. Approaches to bus stops, bus priority lanes, con-

tinuous pedestrian paths, and dedicated lanes for slow vehicles

like bicycles and rickshaws have not been included in road net-

work designs. Consequently, all road users have to share the

same space. This inevitably leads to unsafe conditions for pe-

destrians and slow-moving vehicles, and congested conditions

for motorised vehicles. At some locations pedestrian under-

passes and foot overpasses have been provided to ensure that

pedestrians do not obstruct motorized traffi c. However, due to

their generally poor locations, and the extra walking distance

climbing a height of 5m, they have low usage rates. Because cy-

clists and pedestrians have to share the road space with fast-

moving motorized traffi c, they are exposed to greater risks of

being involved in road-traffi c accidents. In Delhi, three quar-

ters of the fatalities in road-traffi c accidents are pedestrians,

cyclists, and drivers and passengers of motorised two wheelers.

Pedestrians are the largest group of road-traffi c-accident fa-

talities. Yet, state authorities and city engineers and planners

continue to plan infrastructure that ensures the fast move-

ment of cars while paying very little attention to the conveni-

ence and safety of pedestrians and non-motorised vehicles.

The situation is no better at road junctions. The main focus in


planning signalized intersections continues to be ensuring the

minimisation of delays for motorized traffi c. In our research, we

selected signalized intersections in Delhi to understand pedes-

trian crossing behaviour. The aim of the study was to under-

stand how intersection environments can be improved to facili-

tate pedestrian movement. Pedestrian behaviour was observed

at seven selected intersections by placing a video camera at each

zebra crossing. Pedestrian crossing behaviour was then obtained

from a careful review of the videotapes. We have used a survival

analysis method, where we focused on the time it took before a

pedestrian attempted to cross the road in an unsafe way, such

as when there was a green or yellow light signal for the motor

vehicle traffi c, and red for the pedestrian. Before crossing, pe-

destrians wait for some time, which is called “waiting time” or

“survival time.” For the purpose of studying pedestrian crossing

behaviour, any attempt to cross when the signal was red against

the pedestrian was defi ned as an “unsafe event.” The results show

that the probability of a pedestrian crossing the road when it is

unsafe increases with average delays faced by the pedestrians. As

average delay at signal increases, pedestrians get impatient and

violate the traffi c signal, which places them at increased risk of

being struck by a motor vehicle. Thus, reducing the average delay

at signalized crossings for pedestrians is likely to decrease the

probability of pedestrians being run over.

Pedestrians prefer crossing under safe conditions

We calculated the correlation between mean waiting time and

pedestrian delays for full crossing situations, and between wait

time to unsafe crossing of 90 percent of pedestrians with pedes-

trian delays for full crossing. Full crossing denotes traversing

the full width of the road, i.e. from 1 to 3, (excluding median

width). Half crossing is traversing the width from one side of the

road to the median, i.e. from 2 to 3. Pedestrian delay is defi ned as

the average delay experienced by the pedestrian while crossing

the intersection safely. It is the characteristics of intersections

under consideration, with regard to their geometry and signal

timing.

Contrary to the general belief that pedestrians take unnec-

essary risk and indulge in jaywalking, our study shows that the

majority of pedestrians prefer crossing at least half the road

under safe conditions. At three of the seven intersections, pe-

destrians could not make a safe full crossing because the total

green time for them was less than the time required to cross

the road at normal walking speed.


Pedestrian delays for crossing half the road vary greatly from

intersection to intersection. At all but two of the intersections

monitored, the number of pedestrians making a safe crossing

across the whole road was much higher than the number mak-

ing a half crossing safely. At the other two intersections, the

number of pedestrians crossing from halfway to the pavement

in a safe manner was higher than the number making a full

safe crossing. For unsafe events, too, the number of full cross-

ings was much higher than half crossings, except at one in-

tersection. This suggests that pedestrians are more capable of

judging crossing possibilities at the fi rst stage of crossing than

at the second stage. Therefore, it is recommended that on wide

roads crossings should be made at two distinct stages, with a

wait time at the central traffi c island. Since a large number of

pedestrians were observed making unsafe full crossings, these

were used for the purpose of survival analysis.

People who become impatient

While there are a large number of people with negligible wait

time, there are only a few who wait. We estimated wait time

for 90 per cent of the pedestrians who crossed unsafely. Ten

percent of pedestrians who wait longest are generally non-risk

takers. This explains the strong correlation between pedestrian

delay and 90 per cent wait (or, as we have termed it, surviv-

al) time. This is contrary to the hypothesis in the US Highway

Capacity Manual 2000, which states that when pedestrians ex-

perience more than a 30-second delay they become impatient

and engage in risk-taking behaviour. Since our data for survival

analysis only includes pedestrians facing unsafe conditions, the

correlation suggests that those people who become impatient be-

cause of long delays are not willing to wait at all. The remaining

pedestrians are risk averse and wait longer at the intersection

having higher pedestrian delays. Clearly, higher pedestrian de-

lays at the intersection result in more unsafe crossings.

The results of survival analysis indicate that the mean wait-

ing time for females is 27 per cent longer than for males, while

the waiting time of the 90 per cent of female pedestrians who

waited longest is 44 per cent longer than for the corresponding

males. This confi rms the fi ndings of an earlier study by Emil-

io Moyano Dyaz1 which reported that male pedestrians com-

mit more frequent violations of traffi c regulations than female

1 (Theory of Planned Behavior and Pedestrians’ Intentions to Violate Traffi c

Regulations. Transportation Research Part F 5 (2002), 169–175),


Safe pedestrian behaviour at signalized intersections can be encouraged by making changes in intersection geometry and signal-cycle timings.

pedestrians. Our study included divided roads with medians.

However, the medians are usually 45-cm high and not conveni-

ent for pedestrian use. At some places, barbed-wire fences have

been installed to discourage people from crossing the road. It

seems that pedestrians either cross half the road under safe

conditions and wait at the median or cross the full road un-

der unsafe conditions. The fact that pedestrian green time at

many intersections is less than the minimum time required for

crossing the given road width explains why there are higher

numbers of pedestrians attempting full crossings under unsafe

conditions. This implies that existing signal phasing needs to

be carefully restructured, with

each phase of the signal cy-

cle being checked against the

minimum time required by

pedestrians to cross that sec-

tion. This is an important mes-

sage for road designers. Shorter

red-light times for pedestrians

reduce the number of unsafe

crossings. Refuge islands for

pedestrians should be provided

instead of fences, to encour-

age safe pedestrian crossings

at major roads. Safe pedestrian

behaviour at signalized inter-

sections can be encouraged by making changes in intersection

geometry and signal-cycle timings. This will reduce the inci-

dence of jaywalking and the risk of accidents involving pedes-

trians.

Following this study, the COE has taken up the study of pe-

destrian risk at bus stops, grade-separated intersections and

un-signalized pedestrian crossings. The existing literature on

bus-stop planning is mainly focused on the spacing between

stops and their location and design. The literature highlights

the signifi cant pedestrian accident problems and safety issues

within bus-stop areas. However, almost no publications have

identifi ed specifi c hazards related to how bus passengers as pe-

destrians interact with motor vehicles, and areas around bus

stops where confl ict is created between motorised vehicles and

pedestrians. Bus stops are the most important facility with

respect to safety where bus commuters become pedestrians,

many of whom subsequently cross busy arterial roads. In a

recent study, we analyzed pedestrian behaviour and the risk

faced when crossing roads in the vicinity of bus stops at three


different locations in Delhi. The analysis shows that women,

middle-aged people and those with luggage wait for a bigger

gap between cars before crossing. At the intermediate point of

the road (the middle traffi c island), irrespective of the age, gen-

der and type of pedestrian, everyone crosses the road without

waiting. Pedestrian crossing has been analyzed using a binary

logistic model, since there can be only two outcomes – crossing

or not crossing – assuming that the probability of road cross-

ing by pedestrians depends on the gap between pedestrians

and oncoming vehicles. The correlation between waiting times

and gaps accepted by pedestrians indicates that the size of gap

when pedestrians cross reduces once the waiting time exceeds

12–13 seconds. There is always a risk to pedestrians if there is

no safe crossing near a bus stop. When pedestrians reach the

middle of the road, they feel unsafe and risk smaller gaps to

cross. The model shows that the risk to pedestrians tends to

zero when accepted gap size approaches 18 seconds.

The probability of crossing for pedestrians varies with the

length of time they have been waiting. Initially, the pedestrian is

likely to wait for a safe gap between vehicles, but when waiting

time increases they are likely to cross in more dangerous situ-

ations with smaller gaps. The crucial point is 18 seconds, after

which pedestrians become so impatient that they will accept al-

most any gap between vehicles. After the critical wait time, the

probability of crossing the road unsafely increases considerably.

The nonsignalized crossing

Pedestrians can be encouraged to take less risk if the wait-

ing time and the distance to safe crossings with adequate sig-

nal time are reduced, by designing appropriate facilities near

bus stops. The results are basic inputs to the road crossing

simulation needed to design well-structured public transpor-

tation systems and highlight human behaviour and risk taking

owing to road geometry and operations. When designing public

transportation systems, traffi c engineers and planners must en-

sure that there are safe pedestrian crossings in the vicinity of

bus stops.

We also studied pedestrian crossing behaviour at the non-

signalized crossing near the AIIMS fl yover on the Delhi ring

road. The AIIMS fl yover interchange carries large fl ows of

bus, pedestrian, and motor traffi c. The Ring Road, which is a

major arterial road, and Aurobindo Marg form the AIIMS

grade-separated interchange. Traffi c data collection was ob-

tained when the AIIMS junction was an at-grade, signalized


intersection, and later when the fl yover interchange was con-

structed with traffi c signal control. The results were analyzed

to examine pedestrian crossing behaviour in relation to pe-

destrian, environment, and traffi c characteristics. Twenty-two

percent of pedestrians accepted a risk despite the presence of

a nearby underpass. The survey showed an interesting aspect

of behaviour with respect to the distance pedestrians are will-

ing to walk to use an underpass. While 85 percent of pedestri-

ans were willing to walk 11 metres to the underpass, only 62

percent were willing to walk 45 meters to use it. This suggests

clear insights regarding the location of bus stops and pedes-

trian crossing facilities, such as underpasses and overpasses.

In a follow-up study, pedestrian risk was studied at a grade

separator. The grade separator is another key facility around

which there is commonly signifi cant pedestrian accumulation

at bus stops, resulting in confl icts with vehicular traffi c. Traf-

fi c planning that takes pedestrian movement from bus stops

to various well-used local destinations into account is often

missing where grade separators have been constructed. On the

contrary, the high speed of the access ramps to the ring road

increase the risk faced by pedestrians crossing the road.

Poor placement of pedestrian generators

A video survey was conducted at a grade separator and the re-

lationship between the risk to pedestrians and volume of ve-

hicles was developed to measure the variation in risk per pe-

destrian in relation to traffi c fl ow. It was observed that the

high-speed interchange ramp terminals monitored involve

higher risk than the at-grade intersections. The probable rea-

son for this higher risk is the poor placement of pedestrian

generators such as bus stops. Moreover, the situation appears

to be getting worse, as the accident record at the location

observed also shows an increasing trend of pedestrian involve-

ment in road accidents resulting in injuries.

The insights gained from the pedestrian research projects at

the Delhi COE have resulted in an initiative with the Institute

of Urban Transport in Delhi and the researchers at the COE to

revise urban road standards, with specifi c attention to pedes-

trian facilities and based on universal design principles. The

proposed revisions include guidelines for urban roads, inter-

sections, roundabouts, dedicated facilities for pedestrians, bi-

cycles and buses. This is under discussion with the road-build-

ing authorities and Indian Roads Congress, a professional body

responsible for setting road standards at the national level.

Road safety and urban transport planningDuring its fi rst years, VREF´s fi rst Centre of Excellence – in New Delhi – has ex-plored a range of transportation questions, from increased safety for pedestrians to developing traffi c planning and policy making. CoE in New Delhi Sustainable Urban Transport in Less Motorized Countries: Research and Training in New Delhi commenced its work in April of 2003. The Centre has received SEK 25 million in fi nancing from VREF. A total of 15 to 20 researchers have been involved in the Centre´s activities.

Geetam TiwariDr. Tiwari is a MOUD Chair Professor for Transport Plan-ning in the Department of Civil Engineering. Dr. Tiwari’s research interests are in transportation issues of special relevance to low-income countries. These include: planning and designing road-based public transport systems; safe pedestrian and bicycle infrastruc-ture, and; analysis of heterogeneous traffi c movement.

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years with the FUTprogramme

VREF, Volvo Research and Educational Foundations, is the collective name under which four foundations collaborate to finance research and education with the aim to make a difference for Future Urban Transport. Acknowledging the complexities of urban transport and its development within different contexts led VREF to search for new approaches, ideas and solutions as well as to examine specific urban cases. Therefore, VREF supports research on all continents, demonstrating the variety of progress in the field. The four VREF foundations are: the Volvo Research Foundation; the Volvo Educational Foundation; the Dr. Pehr G. Gyllenhammar Foundation, and; the Håkan Frisinger Foundation for Transport Research.

Ten

years w

ith th

e FU

T p

rogra

mm

e

Ten Years with the Future Urban Transport Programme

The VREF is focusing on one coherent programme: Future Urban Transport

– How to deal with complexity (FUT). The program emerged in a context

of increasingly-rapid urbanization and heavy motorization of cities, and the

intention was to contribute to the development of sustainable transportation

systems that also meet the needs of the entire population of a city

– including those with the least resources. Solutions at the system level are

needed, because a number of components – including land use, city planning,

transport system choices and how decisions are made – need to be addressed

simultaneously to develop sustainable transportation systems.

Thus far there are eight Centers of Excellence (CoE) established globally,

representing a global infrastructure of more than 100 researchers. All CoEs work

in close collaboration with traffic and city planners, transport operators, decision

makers and interest groups.

This book is a progress report on that work, highlighting examples of findings

from this research effort.

ISBN 978-91-633-9489-8

9 789163 394898

Future Urban Transport (FUT), which we finance, is a relatively small but strategic research initiative. It is a large and important issue that we have taken on, and we are convinced that the research we support can make a difference by introducing fresh ideas and breaking old traditional patterns of thinking.

arne wittlöv, former chairman of the board

VREF-10years_low 2011.pdf - Volvo Research and Education ...

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